Paper presented at Roundtable Honouring Professor John Mearsheimer, 45th
Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal, 17-20
March 2004.
Why British scholars must read Mearsheimer
Theo Farrell
University of Exeter
t.g.farrell@exeter.ac.uk
I am privileged to be on this panel honouring John Mearsheimer. Jay has asked
me to discuss how John’s work has been received outside the “US arena.” Well
first off, let me give some context. When it comes to IR (and especially security
studies), American scholars are from Mars, and the Brits are from Venus. The
discipline is still dominated in America by intra-Realist debate and the neo-neo
synthesis, and only explanatory theory has validity. Realism has far less currency
in British IR, and the British have far more time for constitutive and critical
theory. I am not saying anything new here: the transatlantic rationalistreflectivist divide has been noted by ISA Presidents Robert Keohane and Steve
Smith, and documented by Ole Waever.
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But all this does raise the question: how is John Mearsheimer received in
the land where Realism is not King and Rationalism is not worshiped. Well, I
think that I can safely say that John is widely and rightly respected as a leading
figure in modern American Realism. He has made a number of important
interventions in scholarly and policy debate that have resonated in British
academia.
One that stands out in my mind is John’s “Back to the Future” article,
published in International Security in 1990. In it, he challenges us to imagine what
the end of the Cold War would mean for the future of Europe security. John
predicted that absent the Soviet threat, European integration would stall and
NATO would whither. His solution was managed nuclear proliferation, at least
to Germany. This prognosis for European security flowed from Realist logic as
meticulously laid out by John in this long article. But, from a European
perspective, it all seemed so very far removed from reality. Many British scholars
shared Stanley Hoffmann’s scepticism at the notion that anybody, the Germans
included, would want a nuclear armed Germany. And like Hoffmann, for many
in British IR this article was indicative of the theoretical abstraction and counterproductive dogmatism displayed by American realism. And, as we now know,
things did not turn out as John had predicted: Europe did not go back in its
future. NATO survived, the EU has thrived, and Germany hasn’t gone nuclear.
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There may be much in "Back to the Future" that I disagree with, but for me
it is still testament to the enormous strengths of John's work. Once asked what it
takes to be an IR scholar, John responded that you had to be “willing to invent
new ideas”, “willing to think long and hard about how the world works”, and
“willing to make arguments that are likely to be controversial.” In other words,
to think big, study hard, and be bold. This is an admirable creed, and one that
John has kept faith to.
Has might be expected, John has attracted fire for his bold policy
pronouncements. But as yet, his theoretical contribution to the discipline has not
received the close attention from British scholars that it warrants. In this
presentation I want to argue why it is time for my colleagues in Britain to take a
hard look at John’s work. I’m going to advance my argument in three stages.
First I want to discuss why British IR has not really engaged modern American
realism. Second, because of this I want to suggest that most British scholars fail to
appreciate important differences within the neorealist camp and therefore have
failed to appreciate the central contribution John has made to American Realism.
And finally, I want to argue why it is now time for the British to read John
Mearsheimer.
If I may mix my metaphors: American Realism is on the radar scope of
British IR but it is far from centre stage. This is because two of main approaches
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to security studies in Britain are not at all sympathetic to American Realism. The
first of these is basically atheoretical. These are British scholars who are perfectly
content to do contemporary history or empirical policy studies and so they don’t
see much point in theory. By and large, this is true of the Depts of War Studies at
King’s College London and Peace Studies at Bradford. A second approach,
characterised by Critical Security Studies, views the world through the
reflectivist lens. Theory is essential to this approach in interpreting the past and
present. But the reflectivist approach is all about challenging the dominant
narratives in the discipline, chief among them being the American Realist one.
Engagement with American Realism is off the cards for these two
approaches. For the first one, it has little to offer. Debating with American
Realists in the pages of International Security left a disillusioned Paul Schroeder
feeling “more than ever that neo-realist theory in general has little to offer the
historian.” Lawrence Freedman is equally dismissive, labelling it “unreal
realism.” For the second approach, engagement with American Realism is
hindered by fundamental differences over ontology and epistemology.
Reflectivists seek to understand the identities, discourses, and narratives that
constitute modern world politics. This leads them to question what Realists take
for granted: namely, the “fact” of state power and the validity of social science.
So I think that John is mistaken when he writes in his "False Promise" article that
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the debate between Realists and Critical Theorists “is over which theory provides
the best guide to understanding state behaviour.” The whole point is that
Reflectivists challenge the privileged position of the state and of social science
methodology in American IR.
John may have misrepresented reflectivism in his "False Promise" article.
But to be fair, reflectivists (in Britain at least) tend to caricature American
Realism. Most understand the basic difference between classical Realism and
neorealism. However the vital difference between defensive and offensive
Realism is under-appreciated in Britain. It is assumed that neorealism argues that
states seek to maximise power. The actual neorealism prediction, that states will
seek to balance power, is often missed. In other words, when British scholars
take pot shots at neorealism, as they frequently do, they aim at Waltz but hit
Mearsheimer.
Why do the British assume the worst of neorealists? John has noted that
Realism offends the "optimism and moralism of American society." But Realism
is not only a "hard sell" in America. As Robert Gilpin lamented: "NOBODY loves
a Realist." In part this is because Realists are so downbeat. The world is all doom
and gloom, and it's not going to get better. In part it's because of the Realist focus
on power and the neglect of ethics. In a recent defence of America Realism in the
Review of International Studies, Michael Desch argues that Realists do have an
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ethical agenda, albeit one that is subservient to considerations of power and
national interest. He also argues that Realist policy prescriptions often lead to
better ethical outcomes than liberal ones. In Mike's words, sometimes "it is kind
to be cruel." British scholars miss this softer side of realism. But with John there is
no soft side: ethics has no place in the never-ending struggle for power.
Indeed, John is the hard man of realism. In Mearsheimer's world, states
have an insatiable appetite for power. Given this, as John puts it: "great powers
are primed for offense" and "the world is condemned to perpetual great-power
competition." John supports his Offensive Realism with characteristically
rigorous theorising and a thorough exploration of international history. This is
an account of world politics that demands serious scholarly attention.
A close reading of John’s work would certainly benefit the third approach
to security studies in British IR: the English School. Central to the English School
are three concepts of world politics, that of an international system, international
society, and world society. As an international system, world politics is statecentric and structured by international anarchy (with the accordant imperative to
balance power). This picture will be familiar to American Realists. With
international society, the ontology is also statist, but state relations are governed
by norms, rules and institutions. This concept is consistent with constructivism
and neoliberalism and also, as Richard Little has recently pointed out, with the
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Classical Realism of Hans Morgenthau. And finally is world society, where
identities and communities, interactions and communications, have transcended
the state and are organised at a global level. This is a concept of world politics
that Realists dismiss as fantasy.
There is obvious potential for engagement with neorealism in terms of
exploring the theoretical and historical boundaries between international system
and international society. Most promising is this regard is Barry Buzan's work on
the uneven development of international society in the modern world and, most
recently, Barry's structural re-interpretation of the English School.
Engagement with neorealism is also necessary in order to explore the
implications of American hyperpower for international society. Tim Dunne
identifies this as the next big challenge for English School scholars. He suggests
that international society is at risk of being "choked from above" by an allpowerful United States that sees itself as being above international law. In short,
society may be replaced by hierarchy.
There is much neorealist debate about the character and consequences of
US preponderance. William Wohlforth presents a picture of stable American
unipolarity. War with a rising challenger, he argues, is unlikely because nobody
is able to counter-balance the sheer concentration of US power. Any counterbalancing alliance would also be undermined regional balancing dynamics.
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Some Realists also suggest that, ala Walt, European and Asian powers have no
reason to counter-balance because they do not fear a benign American hegemon.
ES concern and neorealist optimism are reconcilable. As John Ikenberry has
argued, the United States has the interest and has previously shown the
inclination to be a responsible hegemon. US hyperpower can serve to stabilise
the international system and shore up international society.
However, in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics John presents a different
neorealist view of US hegemony; one that offers little comfort to the ES. Unlike
most neorealists, he doesn't buy the idea of American unipolarity. He accepts
that the US has the largest portion of economic and military power in the world,
but he points out that two other states are currently capable of militarily resisting
the United States: these being China and Russia. Thus for John, the United States
is hegemon in the Americas only. That said, US power is crucial in balancing
against the rise of hegemons in other regions of the world.
John predicts tough times ahead. In the next 20 years he expects the
withdrawal of US forces from Europe and the rise of German hegemony. He
anticipates that the US will maintain forces in Asia and this could draw the
United States into conflict with a rising China. John's prescription for peace is US
power. He suggests that continued US presence in Europe would counter-
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balance German power. And he recommends that the US contain the rise of
China.
ES scholars worry that the US has become too powerful and too pushy.
John worries that the US is not all-powerful and might be a push-over. These are
divergent visions of the world with crucial implications for policy-making. The
ES must either enter into dialogue with Offensive Realism or defeat it in
scholarly debate. Either way, it is time for the British to face up to John
Mearsheimer.
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