Essay Abstracts Zack Beauchamp Liberty and Egalitarianism Brown University G.A Cohen has argued that John Rawls’ acceptance of incentive-based economic structures is inconsistent with Rawls’ difference principle, as any economic system based on motivation by incentive will allow for some inequalities that do not maximally benefit the least well off. Specifically, Cohen argues that incentive economics both rely on and promulgate a social ethos that prioritizes self-interest and wealth acquisition over helping others, a value structure which Cohen believes necessarily prevents the distribution of wealth to be in the best interests of the least well off. This paper defends Rawls against Cohen’s criticism, arguing that any attempt to replace the current incentive-based system with one where people are motivated by a communal social ethos (Cohen’s solution) will either fail or violate Rawls’ first principle of justice (that all citizens are entitled to a scheme of basic liberties compatible will equal basic liberties for all citizens). The paper will then provide a defense of prioritizing the first principle over the second, arguing that equal basic liberties for all citizens are necessary in order to ensure any real egalitarian distribution of wealth. Aims and Arguments in Kant’s Metaphysical University of Pennsylvania Expositions of Space and Time Immanuel Kant intends his metaphysical expositions of space and time to support a revolution in metaphysics and epistemology that is primarily aimed at establishing a theoretical basis for human autonomy. I devote this paper primarily to making Kant's goals explicit so that we can see exactly what he ultimately intends his expositions to support. But I also evaluate the expositions more narrowly in relation to his precise metaphysical aims. The expositions reveal that Kant's quest for freedom eclipses his quest for knowledge, and that he purchases very little freedom at a very high price. The expositions are essential to Kant's project (at least as he conceives it), and yet they spring largely from his resourcefulness and strategic introspection rather than necessity. Moreover, the expositions Joseph Billings of space and time are supposed to deliver a sound basis for knowledge (a priori synthetic, necessary judgments) where inductive inferences fail. But if Kant's freedom-preserving expositions are correct, then he has actually given us a reason to rely more heavily (indeed desperately) upon inductive inferences in the pursuit of knowledge, not a sound alternative. Enoch Chan Moral Consideration and Intentionality Dartmouth College Knobe’s influential experiments on the intentionality of side-effects have set the stage for subsequent debates on intentional action. His experiments provide compelling empirical evidence to counter the Simple View. By showing that the folk are more willing to say that a side-effect was brought about intentionally when they regard that side-effect as morally blameworthy, Knobe shows that intention is not the only criterion for intentional action. I suspect that if the ascriber of intentionality is the agent himself, the moral consideration that Knobe describes (that people are more willing to blame) will follow a different pattern. To prove my point I conducted an experiment using Knobe’s Chairman Experiment as my template. My experiment has shown, firstly, that subjects are expected to ascribe intentionality to side-effects very differently when they are themselves the agents, and, secondly, that the role moral consideration plays on intentional action intuition is reduced after the subjects acknowledge the agent’s possible mindset. My experiment shows that the influence of moral consideration on intentional action intuition is not necessary. Folk’s conception about intentionality, obviously troubled by subjective feelings and misconceptions, does not tell us everything about the relation of intention and intentional action. Kimberly Chuang Yi and Li in Confucian California State University- LA and Mencian Virtue Ethics This essay will argue that the virtues of yi (righteousness) and li (behavioural norm) in the ethical theories of Confucius and Mencius do not command the 'strict' normativity that most are familiar with in an Aristotelian tradition. Instead, moral flexibility in Confucius and context-sensitivity in Mencius are determinant of virtuous behaviour in ethically relevant situations. To further contrast Aristotelian virtue ethics with Confucian and Mencian virtue ethics, the paper will ascribe to Aristotelian virtue a 'transcendent' form of normativity that is lacking in Confucian and Mencian virtue ethics. Likewise, the moral flexibility of Confucian and Mencian virtue ethics is absent in Aristotelian virtue ethics. While acknowledging that Confucian and Mencian moral traditions are subtly distinct from one another in both moral development, as well as the determination of appropriate and virtuous behaviour, the paper will nevertheless conclude that the Confucian and Mencian moral traditions are incompatible with an Aristotelian moral tradition. Elena Falloon Are Deliberative Democrats Naïve About Power? Dartmouth College In the face of a public that has grown increasingly apathetic about democracy, deliberative democrats such as Benjamin Barber, Bruce Ackerman, and James Fishkin present a vision of democracy that is centered on engaged public discourse, rather than the current vision, in which citizens only engage with government through voting. This paper explores the reasoning behind their vision, and ultimately finds that their views, while appealing, misunderstand the workings of power in a democracy. Frankfurt’s Causal Theory of Action University of Vermont and Why it Falls Short This paper is aimed at addressing J. David Velleman’s objections to Harry Frankfurt’s “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.” Velleman claims that Frankfurt’s account of action leaves action devoid of agency, an objection that threatens to unravel Frankfurt’s conception of action. The goal of this essay is to revise Frankfurt’s conception of the causation of action in such a way that it is secured from Velleman’s objection without having to sacrifice its better aspects, specifically, its simplicity and its usefulness in Garson Fields evaluating the mental states that separate the agent from the non-agent. Melissa Garland The Price of Escaping the Vat Spring Hill College If the contents of mental states are determined by objects outside the mind, and it is not possible to know with special authority those objects outside of minds, how can anyone know what they think? Donald Davidson offers an alternative position about self-knowledge that rejects externalism completely and suggests that philosophers abandon the dogma of considering a belief as containing an 'object before the mind,' instead opting for a more fluid conception. Akeel Bilgrami objects, saying that rejecting the dogma leaves us with the same problem Putnam had originally – the problem of how we can know anything outside our minds. His objection is ultimately unconvincing, and the following question is addressed: What is the cost of abandoning externalism? The cost is confidence in knowing anything about real people in the real world – confidence that life is more than a brain floating in a vat. In "Brains in a vat," Putnam demonstrates that the implication of his Twin Earth example, however counterintuitive, gets humanity out of the vat. While Davidson's alternative account certainly is plausible, then, it may not be worth the price. Joe Hedger The Subject of Consciousness: Arizona State University An Unresolved Tension in Ned Block’s Theory Ned Block's paper Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience, and his subsequent replies to commentators, seem undecided between holistic and atomistic views of consciousness. This paper aims to resolve that tension. To do so it offers an explicit definition of consciousness based in part on Block's notion of phenomenology, Joseph Levine's notion of conscious access, and Thomas Nagel's notion of "what it is like" to be conscious. The definition logically leads to the holistic view. As a result, in Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience, Block implicitly assumes the holistic view. This paper also presents number of arguments in support of this view, based upon philosophical reasoning, neuroscientific research, evolutionary biology, and studies of cases such as the subject Zazetsky and persons with identity disorders. In closing this paper considers the implications of this thesis on the surest path to scientific understanding of consciousness. Neuroscientists should search for a neural correlate of consciousness, including awareness of a subject, and not mere correlates of individual mental states. Jennifer S. Jhun Perception and Its Lack of Content Northwestern University In philosophy of perception, it is commonly assumed that perceptual episodes have intentional content. This paper provides a logical formulation of minimal intentionalism, presupposed by most proponents of intentionalism but rarely argued for: that all perceptual episodes have intrinsic, determinate intentional content, usually cashed out in terms of accuracy conditions or conditions of satisfaction. This paper also provides a formalisation of its strong counterpart, anti-intentionalism. By way of a thought experiment inspired by Anil Gupta and Charles Travis, this paper challenges the minimal intentionalist thesis by demonstrating that anti-intentionalism instead better accommodates the fact that we bear upon our experiences background knowledge and beliefs. James Kim Criterian Account of Emotions Dartmouth College Any exploration into human nature will undoubtedly arrive at the subject of human emotions. Though both Hobbes' and Freud's accounts of emotions fit quite nicely into their respective views on human nature, they present emotions as goal-oriented phenomena. This paper will explore the implausible consequences of holding a goal-oriented view on emotions, especially when we attribute this view to children and infants. This paper will also present Bernard Gert's criterian account of emotions as a basis for a proper account of human emotions. Sara Ludin Go With the Flow of Empathy Dartmouth College David Hume’s sentimentalist moral theory provides the foundation of Michael Slote’s virtue ethical account. In his 2007 article “Famine, Affluence, and Virtue,” Slote applies his sentimentalist virtue theory to the moral challenge posed by Peter Singer in his seminal 1972 piece “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” The beginning of this essay spells out the Hume-Slote connection, paying special attention to sympathy and its partiality. The second part compares the corrective mechanisms that Singer, Hume, and Slote each offer to deal with the challenge of partialism. This leads to a discussion of moral obligation and supererogation, which juxtaposes Singer’s strict threshold with Slote’s more fluid understanding of moral duty. In the end, the paper concludes that Slote’s theory convincing, due in large part to its meta-ethical implications. Larry McGrath Temporality and Agency as Eternal Recurrence University of California-Berkeley Despite over a century of critical scholarship, the notion of the eternal recurrence arguably remains the most enigmatic of Nietzsche’s ideas. In its most straightforward presentation, the thought of the eternal recurrence of the same inspires us to see that all events than span our lives, and the world, have recurred and will continue to recur in an endless cycle. Yet, true to the enigmatic nature of the idea itself, Nietzsche offers it as two disparate formulations: an ethical imperative and a cosmological thesis. The first holds that the eternal recurrence amounts to a thought experiment. It inspires us to assume a healthy disposition toward the past, no longer viewing it as a burden that weighs upon our action, but as a collection of events that eternally persist through the present. The second advances a metaphysical thesis of the nature of cosmology, which holds that the structure of world events follows an eternally recurring cycle. Whereas the majority of critics dismiss the second formulation in order to preserve the first, this essay argues that both are mutually co-dependent. The ethical formulation establishes the conditions of subjective agency. These conditions depend upon the cosmological formulation, which establishes the structure of temporality. Together, these dual formulations situate the possibility of agency in time. Our actions depend upon our temporal constitution. Central to this reading of the eternal recurrence is a re-working of Nietzsche’s notion of “cosmology.” Unlike critics who interpret Nietzsche’s account of cosmology as the sum total of events that span the duration of time, this paper argues that Nietzsche is more concerned with the nature of temporal duration as such. Temporality, for Nietzsche, constitutes the permanence of the present moment – an event that summons the transformation of relations of force that constitute all reality. In the concluding section, this paper advances the notion that the cosmological formulation accounts for the movement of temporality as a rhythm to which our agency conforms. It is the nature of this rhythmic movement that conditions the possibility for human action. Avi Miller The Natural Constraint to Truth and Reality and its Princeton University Application Across Matrices The aim of this paper is to attempt to reconcile two seemingly conflicting intuitions regarding the nature of reality. The first is that the experience of ‘a brain in a vat’ cannot represent reality. The second is that every person experiences the world differently; no two people share the same reality or conception of the world. The former implies that the there is an objective reality whilst the latter puts that belief into question. The brain in a vat intuition is further challenged when we consider its theological analogue. Would our ‘brain in a vat’ experience still be unreal if God were the creator of the matrix rather than an evil genius or complex machine? Many religious and theological perspectives cohere with such a vat model and it would be strange to think that holding such religious views implicate a disbelief in the reality of the world. In hopes of answering these questions, I will present an argument for the unreality of vat experience which, unlike other arguments previously offered, respects a broad and liberal notion of reality, one that allows for the possibility of intersubjectivity within human experience. My purpose is not define reality or prove the reality of any particular experience or matrix, but rather to define a limit concept of reality and prove strictly that vat experiences cannot be real. I believe that such a limit concept can be captured by introducing the natural-artificial distinction, although not without its own set of complications and worries. Daniel Moose Alternate Possibilities, Considered Possibilities, University of Arkansas and Moral Responsibility One of the simplest and most intuitive proposed necessary conditions for moral responsibility is the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), which states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. However, this principle is easily defeated by Frankfurt-style counterexamples. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza describe a difference between regulative control, where all alternate possibilities are available to an agent, and guidance control, where an agent is free to act only with respect to some actions but is not free to act with respect to others. In this paper, I attempt to develop a necessary condition for moral responsibility by revising PAP to address the counterexamples that are brought against it. In the end, I put forth the Principle of All Considered Possibilities (PACP), an intention-based condition that allows a person to be morally responsible even when lacking alternate possibilities. Bryan Norwood Experiencing Complexity Mississippi State University Cognitive science and much of contemporary philosophy of mind are built around a central hypothesis that Paul Thagard describes: “Thinking can best be understood in terms of representational structure in the mind and computational procedures that operate on these structures.” This mechanization of epistemology has not come without ontological consequences. The de-emphasis of the subject in epistemic justification goes hand in hand with an objectivist ontology of reductive physicalism. I argue that reduction is built on the assumption of foundationalist epistemology and thus necessarily entails ontological “properly basic” pieces that must be intuitively explained. Many attempts to answer the reductive physicalist ontology, including non-reductive physicalism and emergentism, have failed because they still work from the same assumption of reductive ontological levels that imply an essentially foundationalist epistemology. I will attempt to illuminate the explanatory problem of epistemic and ontological reductions through an aesthetic argument that turns to Gestalt theory, painting, and the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. I conclude with a suggestion that Merleau-Ponty’s robust ontology of the flesh is capable of replying to reductivism and avoiding the pitfalls of non-reductive physicalism and emergentism. Will Price Dasein in Love: Embodiment and Being-With Colby College Although Heidegger finds that being-with-others is a fundamental mode of Dasein which cannot be escaped from, he believes that to live an authentic existence—to be to one’s ownmost potential—requires that the they of Mitsein be passed over and pushed into insignificance, such that only the true and personal self confront the meaning of its own being. However, in examining the manner in which Dasein is in the world through its embodiment, we find that to ask such a passing over of the they in reaching an authentic understanding of ourselves is inconsistent, for if embodiment is a fundamental element of Dasein then surely we can only exist to our ownmost potential as embodied Dasein. In studying the way in which we are with others while embodied, it is found that such bracketing away of the other is to deny what we are as embodied entities, and so it seems rather inauthentic to simply forget them on our quest for authentic being towards our ownmost possibility. Grant J. Rozeboom Freedom Beyond Restraint University of Northern Iowa Hannah Arendt developed an understanding of politics and freedom through her consideration of ancient Greek culture and thought. In doing so, she rediscovered the fundamental tension between activities of necessity (found in the household/oikos realm) and freedom (found in the polis// public realm). She developed these categories through her analysis of the American and French Revolutions, and forwarded a notion of freedom that consists of public, joint action by citizens. Hanna Pitkin has criticized Arendt for ignoring the plight of the poor in her political theory, but a careful examination of Arendt’s writings reveals such criticisms to be unfounded. Additionally, the phenomenological analysis undertaken by James Mensch offers a substantive line of reasoning for understanding Arendtian citizenship and freedom, and is deficient only insofar as it retains a confusing notion of private freedom. Arendt’s use of Jesus’ teachings on forgiveness provides an apt alternative to Mensch’s use of private freedom, and ensures the preservation of a genuine and secure public realm of freedom. David Samra Must the Cosmological Argument Depend University of New Hampshire on the Ontological Argument? Is Kant’s criticism of the Cosmological Argument sound? This paper defends Kant from a contemporary scholar William J. Forgie, who argues that Kant’s criticism only works against a priori arguments such as the Ontological Argument and not a posteriori arguments such as the Cosmological Argument. In doing so, it elucidates Kant’s views on the limitations of a posteriori knowledge in order to counter Forgie’s claim that the CA can work independently of any a priori knowledge. Melissa Schumacher Saints and Sensibility: Northern Carolina State University Hume on the Irrationality of Religious Belief If one accepts Hume's concept of rationality, religious belief is seen to be irrational. According to Hume, belief in the existence of anything, God included, is induced by experience. However, in order for experiences to lead to rational belief, they must be either direct sensory perceptions or valid analogical inferences from such perceptions. The a posteriori evidence for God's existence - specifically miracles and various design arguments does not fit these criteria. A priori arguments for God's existence are ruled out on Hume's view, because no amount of logical reasoning can prove the existence of something in the real world. Therefore, anyone who is rational in Hume's sense of the word must reject religious belief. Laura Specker Western and Japanese Understandings of Personhood: Williams College Throwing off the Mind-Body Distinction This paper will look at the concept of ‘person’ through two lenses. The first lens is that of Western philosophy through Kathleen Wilkes; the second is Japanese philosophy through Yuasa Yasuo. Both philosophers’ efforts to ‘throw off the mind body distinction’ will be compared and their theories streamlined. Jane Tucker The Duty to Care: On Friendship and White Lies Dartmouth College Most of us agree that lying is wrong, but would be lying if we claimed to always tell the truth. Whether it be to conceal something, escape blame, or simply to avoid hurting someone’s feelings, we tell lies all the time. This paper will concern itself with this third motive for lying, which results in what we commonly refer to as the “white lie.” It will attempt to provide a moral justification for what is widely considered to be a general societal acceptance of white lies in the context of a particular type of relationship: that of friendship. Within the context of friendship, white lies are told often and without a real sense of moral compunction. To show why this is not only acceptable but in fact preferable given this type of human relationship, this paper will address the definition of friendship, its importance and value in our lives, and the duties we have toward our friends and toward the maintenance of friendship. Traditional deontological and consequentialist ethical theories fail to adequately account for special duties arising from friendship and would not admit for the moral permissibility of a lie based solely on this special type of relationship. In deontological theories “tell the truth” is seen as among the most basic moral maxims. Some deontologists, most notably Kant, do not admit the possibility that under particular circumstances lying may be permissible and instead maintain, as Kant does, that, “to be truthful (honest) in all declarations is…a sacred command of reason prescribing unconditionally”. i Some deontological theories admit for some sorts of special duties that arise from certain relationships (parent and child, for instance), though not of the particular type with which this paper is concerned. Consequentialist theories, which view white lies as morally acceptable due to their immediate consequences, also fall short. As this paper will show, some white lies are not only morally permissible due to their intended effect, but morally required given special duties that arise from particular relationships. To do so, this paper will consider an alternative moral framework drawn from feminist ethical theory, often referred to as “care” ethics. Through this framework we may reconcile the sense of duty that we feel to tell white lies to our friends in particular circumstances with our general perception that lying is wrong. Finally, it will consider the implications of accepting such a framework as a guide for moral action. Leo Ungar Believing by Volition: Princeton University Is it Possible? Rational? Desirable? To what extent can one choose what one believes? While current beliefs cannot be determined volitionally, it is possible, through the techniques of acquiring evidence asymmetrically and self-signaling, to greatly influence the beliefs of one's future self. However, the beliefs gained from these two techniques are inherently not rational, which may undermine their utility. The extent to which one should refrain from manipulation of one's beliefs depends on how strongly one values one's faculty of reason in itself rather than considering it as simply a means to achieve preferred consequences. But because reason can have varying degrees, it seems that one can manipulate one's beliefs and incur a level of irrationality without grave risk of compromising one's rationality more generally. David Watson On Normative Theory Dartmouth College This paper is an analysis of the normative scientific philosophy of Karl Popper, as criticized by Thomas Kuhn and Hilary Putnam. The differences in the three thinkers’ philosophies are best understood when examined under the lens of the primary and auxiliary questions of normative scientific philosophy. Through this analysis we find that Popper’s falsificationism soundly answers the question of demarcation, but over-emphasizes the implications of this discovery. Falsificationism is necessary to a complete normative theory, but not sufficient. Popper’s philosophy does not include certain unavoidable elements of science, largely due to his disinterest for descriptive analysis. A more historical, practical approach to scientific philosophy, e.g. an approach of the sort adopted by Kuhn and Putnam, adds valuable insights to a better normative understanding. “Good” science will inevitably involve good theory and good practice; embracing one without the other amounts to normative dogmatism. A synthesis of the best components of all three thinkers’ philosophies is advanced in the paper’s conclusion, in which answers are offered to the auxiliary questions of normative scientific philosophy. A more tentative response is sketched for the primary question, with the understanding that anything more ambitious would be a dangerous undertaking for science, as well as for the philosophy of science. Ross Wolfe Substance, Causation and Penn State University Free Will in Spinoza and Leibniz The 17th-18th century continental debate over the possibility of rescuing the idea of free will was largely a reaction to the conclusions reached by Spinoza in his work, The Ethics. This paper examines the logic of Spinoza’s refutation of Providence and human free will, as well as G.W. Leibniz’s critique of Spinoza’s refutation in Discourses on Metaphysics and the Monadology. It finds the pertinent metaphysical issues for both thinkers to rest in the rational ideas of Substance (as that upon which existence subsists) and Causation (along with subordinate relations of Possibility/Actuality and Contingency/Necessity). Spinoza’s argument against free will begins from a discussion of Substance, circumscribed according to the widely-accepted philosophical definition of that time. Spinoza demonstrates that only one Substance can rationally exist, because an absolutely infinite Substance would have an infinity of attributions and modulations, which would preclude the possibility of any other Substance existing without its attributes or modalities conflicting with those belonging to the first Substance. He thus states that God (or Nature) is the only Substance. All existence and existents subsist on the infinite modal emanations of His attributes. The order of these emanations operates according to the rational principle of Causation, which holds that a given antecedent (cause) necessarily produces a non-identical subsequent (effect). Since Causation is thus based on an idea of Necessity, stretching backwards toward the original self-causing cause, it follows that from the effects of the First Cause no other sequence of events was ever actually possible. Therefore, even God could not have had things be otherwise, since His emanations are themselves causally (thus necessarily) determined.