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Paradoxical Consequences of Prohibitions
Sana Sheikh1 and Ronnie Janoff-Bulman2
1
2
University of St. Andrews
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
May, 2012
running head: Paradoxical Consequences of Prohibitions
emails: ss96@st-andrews.ac.uk, janbul@psych.umass.edu
mailing address: Sana Sheikh
School of Psychology
St. Mary’s College
University of St. Andrews
Fife, United Kingdom KY16 9AP
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Abstract
Explanations based in attribution theory claim that strong external controls such as parental
restrictiveness and punishment undermine moral internalization. In contrast, three studies
provide evidence that parental punishment does socialize morality, but of a particular sort: a
morality focused on prohibitions (i.e., proscriptive orientation), rather than positive obligations
(i.e., prescriptive orientation). Study 1 found young adults’ accounts of parental restrictiveness
and punishment activated their sensitivity to prohibitions and predicted a proscriptive orientation.
Consistent with the greater potency of temptations for proscriptively-oriented children, as well as
past research linking shame to proscriptive morality, Study 2 found that restrictive parenting was
also associated with greater suppression of temptations. Finally, Study 3 found that suppressing
these immoral thoughts is paradoxically harder for those with strong proscriptive orientations;
more specifically, priming a proscriptive (versus prescriptive) orientation and inducing mental
suppression of “immoral” thoughts led to the most ego depletion for those with restrictive
parents. Overall, individuals who had restrictive parents had the lowest self-regulatory ability to
resist their “immoral” temptations after prohibitions were activated. In contrast to common
attributional explanations, these studies suggest that harsh external control by parents does not
undercut moral socialization, but rather undermines individuals’ ability to resist temptation.
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Paradoxical Consequences of Prohibitions in Moral Socialization
Traditionally, psychologists have explained immoral conduct as a failure to internalize
the appropriate moral norm. In particular, explanations based in attribution theory argue that
strong external controls such as parental punishment undermine moral internalization (see review
by Grusec & Goodnow, 1994; also see Lepper, 1983). Here, moral demands made with threat of
punishment produce compliance on the child’s part; however, the child does not attribute such
compliance to a personal desire or internal motivation, but rather to the more salient external
control (i.e., fear of punishment). It follows that in the absence of these external pressures
children will engage in the forbidden behavior, for they have not internalized the moral
prohibition.
Past studies find that harsh, punitive parenting does predict children’s low inhibitory
control (Moilanen, Shaw, Dishion, Gardner, and Wilson, 2010), more externalizing behaviors
(Bates, Pettit, Dodge, & Ridge, 1998), lower levels of compliance (Campbell, Pierce, March, &
Ewing, 1991; Crockenberg and Litman, 1990; Grusec and Goodnow, 1994; Karreman, van Tuijl,
van Aken & Dekovic, 2006; Paulussen-Hoogeboom, Stams, Hermanns, & Peetsma, 2007) and
engagement in antisocial behaviors in adolescence and young adulthood (Loeber and Dishion,
1983; Patterson, 1986). As Baumrind (1966) notes, recurring punishment seems to be an
“ineffective means of controlling child behavior…” (p. 892).
However, harsh, punitive parenting is also associated with high levels of psychological
distress (i.e., anxiety, tension, and depression; Lamborn, Mounts, Steinberg, & Dorbbusch, 1991;
Steinberg, Mounts, Lamborn, & Dorbbusch, 1991) as well as shame (Kaufman, 1985; 1989;
Lutwak and Ferrari, 1997; Mills, 2003; Stuewig & McCloskey, 2005; Tangney and Dearing,
2002; also see review by Mill, 2005). Shame in particular is a moral emotion—an emotion
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requiring the ability to evaluate oneself as immoral, one’s deeds as wrong. According to the
attributional perspective, children of highly restrictive parents would be very unlikely to feel
shame, for they have not internalized the appropriate moral norms. Yet here we have a
fundamental inconsistency, for these children evidence a great deal of shame.
To resolve this inconsistency, we propose an alternative model of moral socialization via
restrictions and punishment, one that can account for children’s greater shame and greater
inhibitory failures (“bad” behaviors). This new perspective regards socialization by restrictive,
punishing parenting to be a problem not of under-regulation of morality, but rather of overregulation, or more specifically, over-regulation of a specific type of morality which, as we hope
to illustrate, results in unintended, paradoxical consequences.
Socialization of Proscriptive versus Prescriptive Orientations
The study of morality in psychology has largely taken place in the moral developmental
literature, within the cognitive-developmental (Piaget, 1965; Kohlberg, 1981, 1984),
socialization (Kochanska, 1993; Kochanska, Coy, and Murray, 2001; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987)
and psychoanalytic traditions (Freud, 1960/1923; Klein, 1933; Sears, Whiting, Nowlis, & Sears,
1953; Sullivan, 1953). Across perspectives moral socialization is regarded as the process
whereby an individual internalizes norms of right and wrong from relational experiences with
others. Parent-child interactions not only influence which standards the child will internalize,
but also the nature of the child’s self-regulatory capabilities (Kagan, 1984). The ability to selfregulate then allows the child to guide his or her actions in accordance with internalized norms
and evaluate him- or herself in relation to these norms.
Self-regulation theory (e.g., Carver and Scheier, 1998, 2008; Gray, 1982) posits two
critical motivations, approach and avoidance, that guide behaviors in relation to internal end-
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states. Approach motivation involves activation of movement towards positive goals, whereas
avoidance involves the inhibition of movement towards “anti-goals” (Carver, 2006) that may
lead to negative or painful outcomes.
Paralleling these differences, Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and colleagues (Janoff-Bulman,
Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010a; Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010b) have
distinguished between two forms of self-regulation within the moral domain--restricting
prohibited behaviors (“should nots”) and activating positive obligations (“shoulds”). Moral
prohibitions such as “I should not harm others” require the inhibition of punishable behaviors
and entail the motivation to avoid punishing end-states, or “anti-goals” (e.g., Carver, 2006)—
what we call a proscriptive orientation. Conversely, positive obligations, such as “I should help
others,” require the activation of praiseworthy behavior and entail the motivation to approach
rewarding end-states—what we call a prescriptive orientation (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). Thus,
a proscriptive orientation engages negative internal referents (e.g., “I should not harm others”; “I
should not cheat”) and a prescriptive orientation engages positive internal referents (e.g., “I
should help others”; “I should work hard”). The former regulates morality by curbing negative
desires and temptations to engage in wrong conduct. In contrast, the latter regulates morality by
catalyzing the positive desire to engage in right conduct.
Although we all have both self-regulatory systems to some extent, one may be dominant
over the other, both may be equally dominant, or neither may be dominant (indicating the lack of
moral socialization). Regardless, consistent with the negativity bias in psychology (e.g.,
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001), Janoff-Bulman
et al. (2009) provide support for the greater potency of the proscriptive system over the
prescriptive system. More specifically, moral judgments related to the proscriptive system are
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more condemnatory, strict, and mandatory than those related to the prescriptive system, and
proscriptive immorality engenders greater blame than prescriptive immorality. Thus, for
example, “not harming others” is more mandatory then “helping others,” and the commission of
bad behavior incurs more blame than the omission of good behavior.
Kochanska and colleagues’ studies on children’s moral development (Aksan &
Kochanska, 2005; Kochanska, 2002; Kochanska et al., 2001) provide support for differentiating
between these two forms of moral self-regulation. They distinguished between “do’s,” behaviors
involving activating and sustaining an activity (e.g., cleaning up one’s toys), and “don’ts,”
involving prohibitions and suppressing behaviors (e.g., not playing with an attractive, yet
forbidden toy). Kochanska et al.’s (2001) research demonstrates that “do’s” are more
challenging than “don’ts” for children at all ages studied (i.e., 14, 22, 33, and 45 months), and
fearfulness is associated with “don’ts,” but not with “do’s.” The researchers conclude that their
data provide “impressive evidence of substantial differences” between do’s and don’ts in early
self-regulation.
Restrictive Parenting and the Internalization of a Proscriptive Orientation
Two parenting dimensions central to socialization research are parental restrictiveness
and nurturance (e.g., Baumrind, 1966; 1967). Parental restrictiveness refers to the amount of
monitoring and the rigidity of limits set for the child, mainly exhibited by the threat or use of
punishment and psychological and/or physical control, whereas nurturance refers to the amount
of affective warmth expressed by the parents in parent-child interactions.
In her influential developmental research, Baumrind (1966; 1967) crossed these two
dimensions to distinguish authoritative, authoritarian, and permissive parenting styles (and later
added neglectful; see e.g., Maccoby & Martin, 1983). The authoritative parent combines
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nurturance with restrictiveness, guiding the child’s behavior through issue-oriented rationales
and encouraging verbal give and take from the child. The permissive parent makes few demands
and is generally accepting of the child’s desires and actions. The authoritarian parent is highly
restrictive and displays little to no warmth towards the child; s/he utilizes punitive force, a focus
on threats, and obedience to the parental figures. As noted by Baumrind (1966), “The
authoritarian parent attempts to shape, control, and evaluate the behavior and attitudes of the
child in accordance with a set standard of conduct…She values obedience as a virtue and favors
punitive, forceful measures to curb self-will at points where the child's actions or beliefs conflict
with what she thinks is right conduct” (p. 890). Rather than employ the selective use of
restrictions, which is likely to successfully keep the child from engaging in potentially damaging
behaviors, the authoritarian parent is primarily threatening and lacks nurturance across all parentchild interactions.
Parental control and punishment focus the child on the bad behaviors s/he needs to
restrain from (“should nots”), not on socially valuable behaviors (“shoulds”) to be encouraged.
The parent restricts the child’s behavior--and this is exactly the moral function of proscriptions-that is, restricting immoral behavior. Overall, then, it appears that restrictive, punitive parenting
does morally socialize, but through the regulation of actions motivated to avoid punishment and
the evaluation of morality based on how well one successfully inhibits immoral conduct; that is,
the restrictive parent is likely to socialize a proscriptive orientation in the child.
Proscriptive Orientation, Feature-Positive Monitoring, and Shame
In the context of strong parental prohibitions and threat of punishment, thoughts of
prohibited behaviors--temptations--will be potent indicators of one’s immorality. And such
thoughts are likely to be particularly present in the child’s consciousness, given the feature-
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positive nature of self-regulatory monitoring; that is, it is far easier, efficient, and effective to
search for the presence rather than the absence of evidence (Klayman & Ha, 1987; Newman,
Wolff, & Hearst, 1980; also see Clark, 1974). In the case of approaching desired goals,
individuals monitor for the presence of desired outcomes, whereas in the case of avoiding
undesired goals, individuals monitor for the presence of undesired outcomes (see Coats, JanoffBulman, and Alpert, 1996). The effects of feature positive monitoring extend also to
retrospective behaviors in terms of additive counterfactual thinking (“I should have done”) and
subtractive counterfactual thinking (“I should not have done”) as a function of motivation
(Roese, Hur, & Pennington, 1999). Approach motivation makes accessible constructs
representing successes in approaching desired goals. In contrast, avoidance motivation makes
accessible constructs representing failures to avoid the undesired goals.
Similarly, a prescriptive orientation focuses on activating good behaviors, and thus
feature-positive searches monitor for successes--good deeds and positive intentions (the
“shoulds”)--bringing to consciousness instances of good behaviors, but not their absence. A
proscriptive orientation focuses on inhibiting prohibited behaviors, and thus feature-positive
searches monitor for failures—thoughts and behaviors of prohibited conduct (the “should nots”),
or more specifically, behavioral transgressions and temptations to engage in such acts. Those
with strong proscriptive orientations will therefore be far more aware of their own moral
“shortcomings” and will likely interpret such “hits” as indicative of their temptation to transgress
(see Forster & Lieberman, 2001, and Lieberman & Forster, 2000, whose MIMO model is
discussed below; also see Nisbett & Valins, 1987).
For the child of restrictive parents, such temptations are likely to be particularly potent
and threatening, harsh reminders of their moral shortcomings, given their association with
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parental harshness, disapproval, and punishment. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, past research
has found that these children manifest high levels of shame (Kaufman, 1985; 1989; Lutwak and
Ferrari, 1997; Mills, 2003; Stuewig & McCloskey, 2005; Tangney and Dearing, 2002; also see
review by Mill, 2005). Both shame and guilt serve as indicators of one’s moral failure. Yet in
recent work we have found strong links between shame and proscriptive morality, and between
guilt and prescriptive morality (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). More specifically, avoidance
orientation was positively associated with shame-proneness, and situationally priming a
proscriptive orientation resulted in increased feelings of shame; in contrast, situationally priming
a prescriptive orientation resulted in increased feelings of guilt (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010).
The approach basis of prescriptive morality and the avoidance basis of proscriptive morality
motivate different action tendencies for guilt versus shame, for guilt has been found to motivate
reparative actions such as apologizing, confessing, and righting one’s wrongs, whereas shame
induces a desire to hide from others, deny one’s actions, and escape from the situation (e.g.,
Lewis, 1971; Lindsay-Hartz, 1984; Tangney & Dearing, 2002).
Oversensitivity and over-attention to immorality are likely to characterize those
socialized with a strong proscriptive focus, which explains why past developmental findings link
parental restrictiveness to an increased likelihood to experience shame. Heightened accessibility
of immoral thoughts and temptations is particularly condemning for those who are motivated to
avoid immorality. However, if children of punitive parents are more likely to experience greater
shame, why are they also more likely to engage in prohibited conduct?
Temptations, Suppression, and Ego Depletion
A proscriptive focus on immorality and temptations, and in particular the shame and selfcondemnation this engenders, are likely to produce a strong motivation to avoid these thoughts.
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Mental suppression may be a likely strategy used to avoid thoughts of immorality. Yet
considerable past research on suppression has made it clear that such attempts are likely to
backfire.
Suppression has paradoxical effects; specifically, when individuals are asked not to think
of a construct, they are more likely to think of it than in the absence of the request. Researchers
have demonstrated this effect with constructs as different as color-words to describe paintings
and stereotypes (e.g., Forster & Liberman, 2001; Liberman & Forster, 2000; Macrae,
Bodenhausen, Milne, 1998). Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White (1987; see also Wegner, 1989)
first and most famously illustrated this paradoxical phenomenon in instructing individuals not to
think of a white bear. Those who received this instruction found it more difficult to suppress
white bear thoughts and also had more of these thoughts arise in consciousness than those who
were not given any suppression instructions. Suppressed temptations are apt to rebound and
make an even stronger presence in consciousness, demanding even greater efforts at suppression
(Wegner, 1992, 1994).
Wegner explained this effect in terms of ironic monitoring processes, whereby an
automatic monitor remains sensitive to the suppressed thoughts, thereby making them accessible
following suppression. This perspective is consistent with models of semantic priming, by
which primed (i.e., activated) thoughts remain accessible (see, e.g., Higgins, 1996). More
recently, Liberman & Forster (2000; Liberman & Forster, 2001; also see Denzler, Forster,
Liberman, & Rozenman, 2010, on post-suppressional behavioral rebound) have proposed and
found support for a motivational inference model (MIMO) of post-suppressional rebound. Here
people use the difficulties of suppression to infer that they are motivated to use the construct, or
in the case of temptations, to engage in the prohibited behavior. This motivational model seems
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particularly apt as a description of rebound in the case of temptations: “If I find it so hard not to
think these thoughts, I must really want to engage in these prohibited behaviors.”1
Suppression of proscribed temptations is apt to be most difficult for proscriptivelyoriented individuals, given their oversensitivity to temptations. In other words, individuals most
focused on prohibitions are likely to be least successful at suppressing temptations because they
are most apt to draw inferences of immorality (i.e., “I must really want to engage in these
prohibited behaviors”). According to MIMO, a stronger post-suppressional rebound ensues,
requiring ever greater efforts and inevitable failures at suppression. For proscriptively-oriented
children of restrictive parents, suppression is likely to make particularly strong resource
demands. And these demands would have important implications for actual behavior, for the
individual is left with fewer resources to actually inhibit proscribed behaviors.
The inhibition of tempting, proscribed behaviors requires self-control, yet past research
has found that efforts to suppress result in ego depletion. Baumeister and colleagues (e.g.,
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007) have
demonstrated that engaging in self-regulation expends psychic energy and reduces subsequent
self-regulatory success. These researchers note that mental suppression entails self-regulation
and weakens future self-regulatory abilities. Thus Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister (1998) found
that participants who were asked to suppress thoughts of a white bear subsequently gave up
solving a set of problem-solving tasks faster than those who were not given any suppression
instructions.
This is important because ego depletion implicates behavior, for the self lacks the
resources to restrain from desired (yet proscribed) conduct (Baumeister et al., 1998; Baumeister
et al., 2007; DeWall, Baumeister, Stillwell, & Gaillot 2007). Efforts to resist temptation are
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likely to result in failures to curb the tempting behaviors due to decreased self-regulatory
resources. Children of restrictive parents do not lack a moral compass, but rather are more apt to
have moral lapses and engage in immoral behavior). That is, we propose their problem is not
under-regulation and the absence of moral internalization. Instead, the problem is the overregulation of proscriptive morality, which ultimately results in increased ego depletion and, more
generally, failures of self-control.
Current Studies
We conducted three studies to provide initial evidence for this alternative perspective.
Here individuals with restrictive parents have a greater focus on restraining from immoral
behaviors--a proscriptive orientation; this link is tested in Study 1. Given past findings
demonstrating greater shame as a result of restrictive parenting, we propose that a proscriptive
focus induces greater suppression of temptations for those with restrictive parents; this prediction
tested in Study 2. Suppressing these painful, immoral thoughts and temptations is hypothesized
to be more demanding for proscriptively oriented children of restrictive parents, inducing greater
depletion of ego resources; this effect is tested in Study 3.
Study 1: Restrictive Parenting Socializes a Focus on Prohibitions
Study 1 investigated the relationship between restrictive parenting style and strength of
individuals’ proscriptive orientation. Specifically, we tested the following hypothesis: There is a
positive relationship between young adults’ accounts of their parents’ restrictive behaviors and
internalization of prohibitions but not positive obligations. In this study we relied on students’
self-reports of their parents’ restrictiveness and nurturance, for our primary interest was in their
experiences as they perceived them (this issue is addressed in the General Discussion). Did they
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view their parents as restrictive and punitive? And if so, would such perceptions be associated
with a more proscriptive moral orientation?
Method
Participants
A total of 280 undergraduate participants (218 women and 62 men) completed the study.
In this sample, 196 participants identified themselves as White, 42 as Asian, 14 as Latino/a, and
12 as Black.
Materials
Child Rearing Practices Report (CRPR): A modified version of the CRPR (Rickel &
Biasatti, 1982), a 40-item self-report scale measuring participants’ retrospective accounts of their
parents’ restrictive (18 items) and nurturing (22 items) behaviors was administered. While
Rickel & Biasatti’s (1982) CRPR is intended to capture restrictiveness and nurturance from the
parents’ perspectives, we modified the items in order to assess the child’s accounts of the extent
to which his or her parents were restrictive and nurturing. The prompt read: “Using the scale
below, indicate how closely it describes your relationship with your mother (or father) figure.”
Participants responded on a 7-point scale (1 = “not at all” to 7 = “very much so”). Each item was
presented for a mother figure and a father figure separately, and presentation of the mother and
father scales was counterbalanced. Restrictiveness items assessed parental punitiveness, uses of
threats, and physical/psychological control. Such statements included “Used to control me by
warning me of all the bad things that could happen to me” and “Thought that scolding and
criticism would make me improve.” Nurturance items included “Expressed affection by hugging,
kissing, and holding me” and “Emphasized praising me when I was good more than punishing
me when I was bad.” The scale also asked participants to indicate whether their mother figure
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and father figure were biological, adoptive, stepmother/father, or other. The CRPR has been
used to assess Baumrind’s four parenting styles using a median split (Reitman & Gross, 1997).
For the analyses in this research, however, scores on restrictiveness and nurturance were
analyzed as continuous variables. Reliability for each subscale was acceptable (α’s >.85)
Moralisms Scale (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). This 20-item measure assesses
proscriptive and prescriptive moral judgments. The scale comprises 10 proscriptive and 10
prescriptive items, and each item consists of a scenario in which the target person is deciding
whether or not to engage in a particular behavior. In the case of proscriptive items, these are
behaviors the person presumably should not engage in to be considered moral. Proscriptive
scenarios represent behaviors involving personal temptations or behaviors that indicate a desire
or willingness to disregard social norms. Examples include “excessive” gambling, wearing a
skimpy dress to a funeral, painting a house bright pink and purple in a modest, well-kept
neighborhood, and going into greater debt to purchase an expensive TV. As a specific example,
the latter debt scenario is written as follows: “Sarah is getting more and more into debt with her
credit card. She recently bought lots of expensive new clothes and costly furniture for her
apartment. She could start saving her money but instead is thinking of buying a very expensive
hi-definition TV and going into greater debt.”
The prescriptive scenarios involve behaviors the person presumably should engage in to
be considered moral. For example, “While on campus, Jay is approached by a student asking if
he could volunteer two hours this weekend to help with a food drive for the local survival center.
Jay doesn’t have plans for the weekend. Jay is deciding whether to commit himself to helping
with the food drive.” For both proscriptive and prescriptive scenarios, participants are asked the
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extent to which the person in the scenario should or should not engage in the behavior (1= “feel
very strongly s/he should not” to 9 = feel very strongly s/he should”).
Morally ambiguous scenarios are intentionally used to allow for variation among
participants’ responses. The scenarios assess reactions to a target person’s behavior and do not
involve instances that would typically entail punishment or threat. Moreover, the scenarios are
counterbalanced in terms of behaviors about the target’s own behavior versus responses to
others. Past research has found the proscriptive and prescriptive scenarios to be uniquely
correlated respectively with Carver and White’s (1994) measures of the Behavioral Inhibition
System (avoidance orientation) and the Behavioral Activation System (approach orientation)
respectively (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009).
Procedure
Given that the research participants were college students (i.e., not children or
adolescents living at home), we were interested in differences that might arise when making
parental behavior salient or not through the ordering of the scales. We believed that completion
of the parenting scales before the Moralisms Scale would make parental behaviors salient and
thereby activate parental restrictiveness or nurturance for the participants; and those with the
most restrictive parents would likely be highest in proscriptive orientation. Completion of the
parenting scales following the Moralisms Scale might result in far weaker associations between
restrictive parenting and proscriptive orientation given that the participants were no longer at
home and the Moralisms Scale does not involve strong temptations likely to arise in a college
sample (see Study 2). We therefore varied the order of the CRPR and Moralisms scales.
After signing a consent form, student participants from the University of Massachusetts,
Amherst were randomly assigned either to complete the CRPR first followed by the Moralisms
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Scale or to complete the Moralisms Scale first followed by the CRPR. Lastly, they were asked
to fill out a brief demographics questionnaire and thanked for participating in the study.
Results and Discussion
A majority of this sample had biological mother and father figures: A total of 273
participants had biological mothers, 2 had adoptive mothers, 2 had stepmothers, and 2 replied
“other,” while 259 had biological fathers, 2 had adoptive fathers, 10 had stepfathers, and 2
replied “other.” The overall means for the mother restrictiveness and nurturance scales were
3.98 (SD = .93) and 5.42 (SD = 1.07) respectively, and those for the father restrictiveness and
nurturance scales were 3.92 (SD = 1.00) and 4.94 (SD = 1.29) respectively. Mother and father
restrictiveness were highly correlated, r(277) = .58, p <. 001, as were mother and father
nurturance, r(277) = .35, p <.001. We thus collapsed the scales into two parental scores (α’s >
.90), parental restrictiveness and parental nurturance, which had overall means of 3.95 (SD =
.86) and 5.18 (SD = .96) respectively; the two scores were not correlated, r(206) = .04, p = n.s.
Means for parental restrictiveness when the CRPR was administered first and when the CRPR
was administered last, 4.00 (SD = .85) and 3.86 (SD = .87) respectively, and means for parental
nurturance, 5.18 (SD = .96) and 6.00 (SD = 1.03) respectively, did not differ across the two
orders.
The mean scores for prescriptive moral judgments were calculated so that higher numbers
indicated stronger prescriptive orientation. To calculate the means scores for the proscriptive
moral judgments so that higher scores indicated stronger proscriptive orientation, we subtracted
participants’ scores from 10 (see Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). Means for proscriptive and
prescriptive moral judgments were 6.94 (SD = 1.00) and 6.76 (SD = .79) respectively, and scores
on the scales were correlated, r(206) = .28, p < .001. Given this correlation, the following
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analyses were also run controlling for one form of moral judgment when looking at the other. To
test our hypothesis and explore the effect of the order of the parenting measure, a multiple
regression was conducted with parental restrictiveness, parental nurturance, order manipulation
(categorical variable: CRPR first = 1, CRPR last = 0), parental restrictiveness by order
interaction, parental restrictiveness by nurturance interaction, and parental restrictiveness by
nurturance by order interaction as predictor variables (see Table 1).2
There was no main effect of order manipulation (B = -.07, SE = .13, β = -.03, p = n.s.),
but there was a main effect of parental restrictiveness on proscriptive orientation (B = .19, SE =
.07, β = .17, p = .01), which was qualified by a significant interaction between parental
restrictiveness and order of scales (B = .39, SE = .15, β = .30, p = .01). Here, parental
restrictiveness predicted a stronger proscriptive orientation when the CRPR was given first
compared to when it was given last. More specifically, higher accounts of parental
restrictiveness significantly predicted proscriptive orientation when the CRPR was administered
first (B = 0.31, β = .26, SE = .08, p < .001), but not when given second (B = -.11, β = -.09, SE =
.13, p = n.s). There was no significant main effect of parental nurturance (B = .02, SE = .06, β =
.02 p = n.s.) nor significant interactions involving parental restrictiveness and nurturance (B =
.06, SE = .12, β = .05, p = ns). Regressing prescriptive orientation on the same predictor
variables produced no significant main effects or interactions.
Overall, the findings of Study 1 suggest that restrictive parenting does in fact socialize
morality, and that individuals are oriented towards prohibitions as a function of their restrictive
past. More specifically, accounts of parental restrictiveness (but not nurturance) predicted a
proscriptive (but not prescriptive) orientation, such that recalling one’s parents as restrictive
before completing the morality measure appeared to activate a sensitivity towards prohibitions.
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Although Baumrind’s (1966; 1967) parenting typology would mostly likely have predicted
authoritarian parents to socialize the strongest proscriptive orientation, the interaction between
restrictive and nurturant parenting was not significant. Accounts of parental restrictiveness on its
own—with or without nurturance—predicted proscriptive judgments but not prescriptive
judgments.
The interaction between accounts of parental restrictiveness and scale order suggests a
difference between the availability and accessibility of mental constructs (Forster, Liberman, &
Higgins, 2005). Here, recalling past punitive interactions with their parental figures served to
activate (i.e., make accessible) an underlying (i.e., available) sensitivity to prohibitions as a
function of the extent to which participants perceived their parents to be restrictive. For those
with a sensitivity to prohibitions, proscriptive morality is likely to be activated by proscriptiveinducing cues such as threat (i.e., avoidance-based cues; see Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). These
findings provide support for the ROAR (Relevance of a Representation) model of activation
recently proposed by Eitam and Higgins (2010). These researchers propose that that “not all
stimulated representations are in fact activated (i.e., influence thought and action processes)” and
maintain that “the degree to which a representation is available to processes of thought and
action is a function of that representation’s motivational relevance” (Eitam & Higgins, 2010, p.
951). Prohibitions (i.e., proscriptive morality) are motivationally relevant for those who have
experienced restrictive parenting. In this study reading and responding to punitive parenting
items had no impact on those whose parents were low in restrictiveness and who presumably
lack an available proscriptive orientation.
Although the study participants’ recall may not have been entirely accurate, the “child’s
perception of his parents’ behavior may be more relevant to his adjustment than the actual
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parental behavior” (Schludermann and Schludermann, 1979, p. 239). As noted earlier, we were
particularly interested in the children’s experience of parenting—that is, the extent to which they
perceived their upbringing as restrictive and punitive. Interestingly, the interaction between
parental restrictiveness and scale order helps address the issue of potential bias in self-reports of
socialization, whereby recalling that one’s parents were restrictive may be an artifact of a more
general negativity (e.g., a greater responsivity to negative stimuli on the whole). The association
between parental restrictiveness and proscriptive moral judgments arose only when the parental
restrictiveness scales preceded morality judgments, suggesting that the findings were not due to a
general negativity in responding. Moreover, if a negativity explanation based in mood
congruency were operating, one would likely expect it to be evident in judgments of both types
of immorality, proscriptive as well as prescriptive and in both directions, from parental
restrictiveness to prohibitions (proscriptive morality), as was found, and from prohibitions to
parental restrictiveness, which was not found.
Study 2: Restrictive Parenting and the Suppression of Immoral Temptations
Study 1 found that recalling parents’ restrictiveness activated participants’ proscriptive
orientation; it appears that those with restrictive parents had a morality sensitive to prohibitions,
and this sensitivity could be primed by recalling their parents’ behaviors. The purpose of Study 2
was to investigate the consequences of activating a proscriptive orientation in our alternative
understanding of the role of restrictive parenting on children’s immoral conduct.
A greater sensitivity and attention given to prohibitions are characteristic of those with
restrictive parents. However, a proscriptive orientation leads individuals to attend to the very
temptations they are motivated to avoid. These temptations are distressing for proscriptivelyoriented individuals (as the developmental literature linking restrictive parenting and shame
20
suggests), and we believe that they will thus employ strategies to avoid immoral temptations and
their damning implications—in particular, suppressing these unwanted thoughts. In the second
study we therefore explored the following hypothesis: A proscriptive orientation leads to
suppression of one’s own immoral temptations. Here we made use of the Study 1 findings
regarding the activation of proscriptive morality; the parenting scales activated a proscriptive
orientation for those with restrictive parents when administered prior to the measure of
proscriptive morality. Similarly, we varied order of measures in Study 2 and assessed parenting
styles either before or after a temptation scale. We expected lower reports of personal temptation
(indicating suppression) for those with restrictive parents when the temptation measure followed
rather than preceded the parenting measure, for it is here that proscriptive morality would be
activated. However, we expected these findings to occur only for one’s personal temptations
such that participants reporting on others’ temptations would not exhibit similar suppression in
these conditions.
Method
Participants
A total of 130 participants (94 women and 36 men) who were either undergraduates or
recent graduates completed the study.
Materials
CRPR: As in Study 1, the same modified version of the CRPR (Rickel & Biasatti, 1982)
was used to provide a measure of young adults’ retrospective accounts of the extent to which
their parental figures were restrictive and nurturing.
Temptation Scales: Participants filled out a scale on one’s own temptations (selftemptation). Each scale listed 17 undesirable behaviors that were generated in a pretest by
21
University of Massachusetts, Amherst undergraduate students. The self-temptation measure
asked “Regardless of actual behavior, to what extent do you really want to engage in each of the
following behaviors? In other words, how tempted are you to engage in each of following
behaviors?” The behaviors, compiled from pretesting at the University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, included: cheating on an exam or paper, sleeping around, experimenting with drugs,
stealing, destroying property, driving too fast or recklessly, skipping class, and driving drunk.
To determine whether only one’s own temptations are suppressed and not immoral stimuli more
generally, another version of the scale was developed to assess responses about others’
temptations (other-temptation). In this case, the prompts asked, “Regardless of actual behavior,
to what extent do you think the typical university student would really want to engage in each of
the following behaviors? In other words, how tempted is the typical student to engage in each of
following behaviors? Please circle the number on the scale below from 1 (“Not at all tempted”)
to 7 (“Extremely tempted”).” Reliabilities for the scales were acceptable (α’s > .84).
Procedure: In order to keep responses from one scale from influencing the other,
participants were randomly assigned to either complete the self-temptation or the othertemptation scale. Similar to Study 1, we varied the order of the measures such that there were
two between-subject conditions: CRPR followed by the temptation scale and the temptation scale
followed by the CRPR. Participants were then asked to fill out a brief demographics
questionnaire and thanked for participating in the study.
Results and Discussion
Parental restrictiveness and parental nurturance scores were calculated in the same way as
in Study 1 with means of 3.99 (SD =.83) and 4.80 (SD = 1.02) respectively. Scores on parental
restrictiveness and nurturance were negatively correlated, r(67) = -.41, p = .001. Parental
22
nurturance was thus included as a covariate when looking at the predictive value of parental
restrictiveness. The mean for the self-temptation scale was 3.06 (SD = .94). The mean for the
other-temptation scale was 4.83 (SD = .85). Means for parental restrictiveness when the CRPR
was administered before the temptation scales and when the CRPR was administered after the
temptation scales, 3.96 (SD = .95) and 4.15 (SD=.93) respectively, did not significantly differ
from each other, nor did means for parental nurturance, 4.98 (SD = 1.01) and 4.76 (SD = 1.25).
To test the suppression hypothesis, a multiple regression was conducted with order of
presentation (categorical variable: CRPR first = 1, CRPR last = 0), parental restrictiveness,
parental nurturance, and the order by parental restrictiveness interaction term as potential
predictors of amount of temptation reported (See Table 2). Here, we found an interaction
between order of presentation and parental restrictiveness (B = -.52, SE = .28, β = -.34 p = .06).
As shown in Figure 1, parental restrictiveness predicted temptation when the parenting measure
was given last (B = .54, β = .44, SE = .20, p = .03); those with more restrictive parents reported
greater temptations. Interestingly, however, there was no significant relationship between
parental restrictiveness and self-temptation when the parenting measure was given prior to the
temptation measure (B = -.15, β = -.14 SE = .22, p = n.s.). In other words, it appears that selftemptation was suppressed when the parenting measure was administered prior to reporting
one’s temptations.
To investigate whether suppression of prohibited behaviors occurs among those with
restrictive parents only when the self is implicated, the same interaction analysis was conducted
with other-temptation as the dependent measure (see Table 3). No significant interaction
emerged (B = .15, SE =.19, β = .09, p = ns). However, we found a significant main effect of
order (B = -1.35, SE = .29, β = -.56, p <.001) such that participants who completed the parenting
23
scale first reported greater other-temptation, regardless of their reports of parental restrictiveness.
Apparently thinking about one’s parents (regardless of degree of restrictiveness or nurturance)
increases reports of others as more tempted, thereby perhaps rendering oneself in a better light
compared to others. There was no suppression or increase in other-temptation as a function of
restrictive parenting, suggesting that the self-temptation findings (i.e., suppression) are uniquely
associated with restrictive parenting and the activation of proscriptive morality.
Overall, Study 2 follows nicely from the results of Study 1: recalling the extent to which
one’s parents were restrictive again likely made available a proscriptive orientation—what one
should not do—and increased a desire to suppress one’s prohibited temptations. Indeed, when
confronted with a list of immoral temptations, those with restrictive parents reported the greatest
temptation. However, when a proscriptive orientation was activated (through reminders of their
parents’ restrictiveness), these temptations were not reported.
At first glance, restrictive parenting seems to have a beneficial influence—those who
recall their parents as restrictive become highly motivated to avoid immorality and inhibit their
otherwise reported temptations. However, if this effect is in fact due to mental suppression, it
will ultimately be a detrimental strategy given its well-known ironic effects. Study 3 will
directly manipulate a proscriptive orientation and induce mental suppression to investigate
whether activating a proscriptive orientation renders suppression of prohibited behaviors most
ego-depleting, especially for those with restrictive parents.
Study 3: The Ego Depleting Effects of Prohibitions
For individuals with restrictive parents, having one’s temptations brought to their
attention is damning in terms of self-evaluation—it implicates shame and one’s own immorality.
As Study 2 found, mental suppression of these temptations is thus a likely strategy. Given their
24
potency, however, temptations are likely to be more difficult to suppress for those with
restrictive parents compared to those who do not have restrictive parents and don’t associate
shame with their temptations. Due to the ironic consequences of mental suppression, these
temptations are likely to rebound and arise in consciousness even more, painfully highlighting
one’s immoral temptations (as MIMO would suggest) and requiring even more effort to
suppress. Research has demonstrated the ego depleting effects of engaging in mental suppression
(e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Baumeister, et al., 2007; Muraven et al., 1998). Thus restrictive
parenting may (unintentionally) increase the likelihood of immoral conduct, because efforts to
suppress potent temptations ironically deplete the very self-control resources needed to resist
these temptations.
Study 2 suggests that activation of a proscriptive orientation leads to suppression of
immoral thoughts and temptations. To directly test whether suppression has detrimental
consequences for proscriptively-oriented individuals, we experimentally primed a proscriptive
orientation in the following experiment to investigate the effect of a focus on prohibitions and
subsequent mental suppression of immoral thoughts on ego depletion. Given the results of
Studies 1 and 2, we hypothesized a moderating role of restrictive parenting: a proscriptive prime
would interact with accounts of parental restrictiveness to incur ego depletion. Parental
restrictiveness and nurturance were assessed at the end of the study and therefore were not
salient to participants; however, based on Study 1 findings, we expected parental restrictiveness
to be associated with a sensitivity (availability) to proscriptive morality, which was explicitly
primed in this study (activation.) We therefore hypothesized that participants with restrictive
parents who were proscriptively primed would show the greatest ego depleting effects.
Method
25
Participants
A total of 104 undergraduate participants completed the study, but 24 participants
(roughly half from each condition) were dropped from analyses for not following the suppression
instructions. This is not surprising given the relative difficulty of the suppression task (see below
and Wegner et al., 1987). A total of 80 participants (63 women and 19 men) remained, of whom
56 reported that they were White, 12 Asian, 6 Black, and 5 Latino/a. There were 43 participants
in the proscriptive morality condition and 37 participants in the prescriptive morality condition.
Materials
CRPR: As in Studies 1 and 2, a modified version of the CRPR (Rickel & Biasatti, 1982)
was administered to assess young adults’ retrospective accounts of the extent to which their
parental figures were restrictive and nurturing.
Moral Priming Manipulation: Participants were randomly assigned to either a
proscriptive prime or a prescriptive prime condition. Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and colleagues
(Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009; Sheikh and Janoff-Bulman, 2010) have successfully used this
manipulation in the past to activate proscriptive versus prescriptive orientations. In both
conditions participants were informed that we were interested in morality: “Each of us has our
own way of understanding right and wrong. We are interested in your views. What comes to
mind when you think about how to be moral or not be immoral?” Participants in the prescriptive
condition were asked to indicate what they should do, whereas participants in the proscriptive
condition were asked what they should not do. Each group was provided with the phrase “To be
moral or not be immoral” followed by 10 lines, each preceded by the stem “I should”
(prescriptive condition) or “I should not” (proscriptive condition) and were asked to fill in as
many lines as they could.
26
Mental Suppression Induction: Three ambiguous pictures pre-tested to elicit descriptions
of prohibited behaviors were presented to participants. For example, one picture shows a young
woman who seems to be hiding in a tree and spying on another young woman below. These
pictures were presented to participants with the following instructions: “Please describe in
several sentences what you think is going on in the picture below in as much detail as you can.
What are the people in the picture below thinking, feeling, and doing? Please do NOT use any
words related to bad, immoral, undesirable behaviors, intentions, or outcomes (e.g., sneaky).”
These instructions were adapted from Liberman and Forster (2000), who have used them
successfully in the past to induce mental suppression.
Stroop Task: Based on prior research (e.g., Richeson and Shelton, 2003), the Stroop task
(Stroop, 1935) was used as a measure of ego depletion. In this task, participants were presented
one at a time with stimuli in green, yellow, red, or blue. The stimuli included a string of Xs (e.g.,
Xs in green type; control trials), a name of a color presented in a congruent color (e.g., “green” in
green type; congruent trials) or a name of a color presented in an incongruent color (e.g., “green”
in yellow type; incongruent trials). They were instructed to identify the color in which the
stimulus was printed as quickly and as accurately as possible. Each stimulus appeared for
2000ms and then timed out. The incongruent trials ostensibly elicit interference, forcing
participants to override their natural inclination to read the word instead, and taking longer to
respond to compared to control and congruent trials.
Based on prior research (e.g., Richeson and Shelton, 2003; Richeson and Trawalter,
2005), all times greater than 2000 ms were recoded as 2000 ms and all times less than 200 ms
were recoded as 200 ms. There were a total of 84 experimental trials, and time taken to identify
the color in which each stimulus was presented was recorded such that participants received a
27
mean score for control trials, incongruent trials, and congruent trials. The means were then logtransformed for normality,3 and the interference scores were calculated by subtracting the log
transformed mean for the control trials from that of the incongruent trials.4 Here, Stroop
interference represents ego depletion: the larger the stoop interference score, the greater one’s
ego depletion.
Procedure
After completing the proscriptive versus prescriptive priming manipulation, participants
were presented with the three pictures and the suppression instructions. They were then given
the Stroop task in order to measure the ego depletion effects of the priming manipulation. To
test whether the effects of proscriptive orientation were moderated by dispositional proscriptive
sensitivity induced by restrictive parenting, participants were then asked to respond to the CRPR
followed by a brief demographics questionnaire.
Results and Discussion
Means for parental restrictiveness and nurturance were 3.97 (SD = .72) and 4.94 (SD =
.88) respectively, and the Stroop interference mean was 116.97 ms (SD = 180.64). Means for
parental restrictiveness in the proscriptive and prescriptive morality conditions, 3.98 (SD = .80)
and 3.98 (SD = .62) respectively, did not significantly differ from each other, nor did means for
parental nurturance, 4.79 (SD = .97) and 5.11 (SD = .77) respectively. The scores on
restrictiveness and nurturance were negatively correlated r(80) = -.29, p = .01, so the following
analyses included parental nurturance as a covariate.
To test for the hypothesized interaction between the proscriptive prime and accounts of
parental restrictiveness on ego depletion, a multiple regression was conducted with the moral
priming conditions (categorical variable: proscriptive morality = 1, prescriptive morality = 0),
28
parental restrictiveness, nurturance, and priming condition by parental restrictiveness as
predictors of ego depletion (See Table 4). As shown in Figure 2, a significant interaction
between priming condition and parental restrictiveness emerges (B = .11, SE = .05, β = .42, p =
0.03). In other words, the proscriptive prime caused more ego depletion compared to the
prescriptive prime as a function of parental restrictiveness. Moreover, parental restrictiveness
was positively associated with more ego depletion in the proscriptive priming condition (B =
0.07, β = .38, SE = .03, p = .02), but there was no significant relationship between the two in the
prescriptive condition (B = -.04, β = -.18 SE = .04, p = n.s.).
Although one might assume that a proscriptive orientation would foster greater successful
restraint of tempting thoughts and behaviors, the results of Study 3 suggest otherwise.
Supporting our hypothesis, situational activation of a proscriptive orientation followed by
suppression of proscriptive thoughts interacted with parental restrictiveness to incur the most ego
depletion. When parents were reported as restrictive, a proscriptive (but not prescriptive)
orientation apparently made it harder to suppress “immoral” thoughts, incurring more rebound
effects and more frequent confrontations with one’s “bad” self, and ultimately resulting in the
most ego-depletion, the greatest loss of self-control. Past research has found that merely
engaging in mental suppression leads to greater ego depletion compared to not suppressing (e.g.,
Muraven et al., 1998; Trawalter and Richeson 2006); suppression should then have been ego
depleting for people in both conditions. However, those who did not have thoughts with such
negative potency (i.e., those primed with a prescriptive orientation) did not suffer as much
depletion; the prescriptive prime did not activate a proscriptive dispositional sensitivity
associated with restrictive parenting.
29
It is important to note that individuals with restrictive parents were not depleted across all
situations; rather only when a proscriptive orientation was situationally activated. As also evident
in Studies 1 and 2, restrictive parenting seems to establish a dispositional sensitivity: When made
salient before the dependent measure, restrictive parenting seems to have a direct effect on
outcomes (by virtue of its salience). When a “background variable,” measured at the end of the
study, it alerts us to a dispositional sensitivity to prohibitions, which may or may not be
situationally activated; that is, a proscriptive orientation is available for activation (see Eitam &
Higgins, 2010). In Study 3, parental restrictiveness therefore interacted with the proscriptive
(versus prescriptive) prime such that those most ego depleted, as we would predict, were those
with restrictive parents (i.e., dispositional sensitivity to prohibitions) and primed with
proscriptive morality. Here, for those with restrictive parents, confrontations with immoral
thoughts were maximally powerful, and suppression maximally difficult.
General Discussion
The most prevalent account in psychology of the role of punishment on moral
socialization argues that due to the external attribution for control, children of punitive parents
are less likely to internalize norms of right and wrong. The results of these three studies,
however, suggest otherwise: restrictive, punitive parenting does activate a sense of morality—but
this sense is mainly proscriptive, focusing the child on prohibitions and unwanted temptations,
and resulting in suppression and the subsequent depletion of self-regulatory resources.
Accounts of restrictive parents predicted a proscriptive orientation, but not a prescriptive
orientation (Study 1). In particular, recounting the degree of parental restrictiveness—the extent
to which they used punishment, threat, and physical and/or psychological control—activated a
mirroring proscriptive orientation. If one’s parents were highly restrictive, a strong proscriptive
30
orientation was activated; if one’s parents were not at all restrictive, a proscriptive orientation
was not activated.
Although a likelihood to “act out" (e.g., Grusec & Goodnow, 1994; Lepper, 1983; Lepper
& Greene, 1976) and a greater proneness to shame (Tangney and Dearing, 2002) seem like
contradictory findings from an external justification perspective, they make sense when viewed
through the lens of self-regulation. Following theory on feature positive monitoring and mental
suppression, activation of a proscriptive orientation suppressed immoral temptations with which
they are regularly confronted (Study 2). Unfortunately efforts to suppress these unwanted
thoughts deplete self-regulatory resources (Study 3): not only are the temptations unwanted but
they drain valuable energy, leaving one ironically less prepared to control moral lapses.
Although much of the socialization literature uses parents’ reports of their disciplinary
style or an outside observer to predict psychological and behavioral outcomes (Grusec and
Goodnow, 1994), our work explored young adults’ retrospective accounts of their parents’
behaviors. Individuals’ perceptions of their parents, whether real or imagined, play a key role in
their orientation towards the world. Indeed, the “objective” occurrences influence the child’s
moral perspective through the meanings accorded by the child to those occurrences. For
example, Bowlby (1978; 1981) argued that early social interactions leading to maladaptive
cognitive models arise from children’s inferences “about their acceptability and lovableness”
from those early interactions (Brewin, Andrews, & Gotlib, 1993, p.82). These meanings of
“acceptability” and “lovableness” are then what lead to certain cognitive styles, motivational
orientations, and behavioral and psychopathological patterns.
Even so, evidence on the accuracy of retrospective reports has found that individuals’
accounts of their childhood largely mirror the accounts provided by their parents, and children
31
often remember early parent-child interactions more accurately than the parents (who tend to
exhibit self-serving biases; Brewin et al., 1993). Moreover, evidence argues for the temporal
stability of self-reports of past childhood events across mood and psychopathological states such
as depression (e.g., Brewin et al., 1993; Manian, Strauman, and Denney, 1998; Parker, 1981).
Overall, in their review of retrospective reports of childhood, Brewin et al. (1993) concluded,
“the central features of [autobiographical] accounts are likely to be reasonably accurate.”
In terms of moral socialization, restrictive parenting appears to socialize an orientation
towards prohibitions that interacts with one’s current environment; that is, the role of parental
restrictiveness in the studies highlights the interactional nature between the person and the
situation in moral self-regulation. In Study 1, recalling one’s parents as restrictive and
threatening increased a proscriptive orientation only when participants completed the parenting
scales before responding to the proscriptive items on the Moralisms Scale. In Study 2, recalling
parental restrictiveness motivated individuals to suppress temptations. And writing down moral
statements starting with “I should not” (the proscriptive prime) interacted with reports of parental
restrictiveness to render suppression more difficult and predict greater amounts of ego depletion
in Study 3. It seems as though both personality and situation, accessibility and activation (Eitam
and Higgins, 2010), are integral to understanding the consequences of parental restrictiveness.
Past research has in fact studied self-regulation both as a personality trait and as a
situational, context-driven construct. For example, Elliot and Thrash (2002) have argued that
approach and avoidance motivations are stable temperaments that represent the foundation of
several different approaches to personality. In particular, they found that measures of
extraversion and neuroticism (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992), positive and negative emotionality
(e.g., Watson & Clark, 1993), and the Behavioral Activation System and the Behavioral
32
Inhibition System (e.g., Carver & White, 1994) assess underlying approach versus avoidance
personality traits, which are stable temperaments carried across different contexts. In contrast,
other self-regulation researchers have focused on the contextual aspects of self-regulation (e.g.,
Higgins, 1998; Friedman & Förster, 2001). For example, Friedman and Förster (2001)
situationally primed individuals with either approach or avoidance motivation using a maze task
that activates “seeking reward” or “avoiding punishment” respectively and have found that this
situational manipulation affects subsequent cognitive processes. An interaction between the
present environment and one’s personal socialization history shows how personal histories
manifest themselves in the present. For example, one’s personal history of having restrictive
parents may not matter in everyday contexts, but does matter when punitiveness, threat, or
proscriptive morality is environmentally activated. It is important then to understand
dispositional sensitivities, at least when taking socialization histories into account (as found in
these studies), not as chronically manifesting themselves in every situation, but as arising when
the environment pulls for them. There is indeed a dynamic relationship between the person and
the situation.
Parental restrictiveness seems to socialize a focus on moral prohibitions, which then
interacts with one’s environment to produce emotional, evaluative, and behavioral outcomes.
The socialization of these moral psychological processes not only pertains to interpersonal harm,
justice, and fairness (as traditionally argued by the liberal philosophic perspective; e.g.,
Kohlberg, 1981, 1984; Turiel, 1983, 2002), but also to behaviors such as drinking, cleanliness,
and eating—conduct not typically considered in the realm of morality. In fact, cultural
psychologists (e.g., Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Shweder, 1991; Shweder, Mahapatra, &
Miller, 1987; Shweder & Sullivan, 1993) have argued that the domain of morality especially
33
across cultures extends past harm, rights, and justice (also see Haidt, 2007; Haidt & Joseph,
2004). Haidt (1993), for example, has shown that offensive violations of what are typically
thought of as social conventions, such as those involving sexual behaviors, work ethic, and
cleanliness--behaviors that are deemed harmless--often elicit strong moral reactions. Taking this
perspective into account, the measures in this project used behaviors involving the gamut from
personal conduct (i.e., overindulgence) to interpersonal harm.
Limitations and Future Research
Certainly longitudinal research that follows children and adolescents over time would be
optimal when investigating the impact of parenting style on children’s (im)moral thoughts and
behaviors. Further, generalization to non-college participants is an important question for future
investigation. We might expect that the relationship between restrictive parenting and
temptations, and its effect on mental suppression and ego depletion, would be least likely to be
found in a college student sample. One could argue that these participants are not apt to be
“delinquent” and are most likely to have relatively nurturing parents, and thus non-college
student participants might show stronger relationships between restrictive parenting, temptations,
and shame—as well as greater depleting effects of suppressing immoral thoughts.
The findings of the current studies provide initial evidence for a self-regulatory
perspective on the association between restrictive, punitive parenting and children’s “immoral”
conduct. It is a beginning, and many unanswered questions remain. For example, future work
ought to investigate the emotional dimension of this phenomenon and, specifically, the dynamics
between temptations and shame. A substantial amount of research has already shown that
restrictiveness socializes a proneness to shame, and this moral emotion in particular may
motivate MIMO and the suppression of temptations. Moreover, increased shame is likely also a
34
consequence of failures at suppression and subsequent ego-depletion as a recognition of
proscriptive failure (see Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010), prompting greater attempts at
suppression, and greater consumption of ego resources—a sort of social cognitive “shamespiral.”
Moreover, we know little about the role of actual behavioral (rather than mental)
inhibition in resisting temptations. Physically restraining from perceived wrongdoing is ego
depleting in itself (see Baumeister et al., 1998) and is likely to be even more ego depleting if the
temptations are in themselves morally potent, resulting in an increased likelihood of future lapses
of self-regulation. This aspect of ego depletion was not the focus of this research, but is an
important avenue for future work.
These studies also did not focus on the socialization precursors of a prescriptive
orientation, a task for subsequent research. In prior work (Sheikh & Janoff-Bulman, 2010), we
have proposed that parental nurturance promotes a focus on prescriptive orientation. Rather than
a vigilance to avoid punishment, warmth and care are rewarding goals achieved through enacting
the “shoulds.” Indeed, past socialization research has found early, secure attachment and parental
nurturance socialize prosocial conduct and self-reliance (Grusec, Goodnow, & Cohen, 1996; for
a review see Grusec, Davidov, & Lundell, 2002; Eisenberg, Spinrad, & Sadovsky, 2006;
Hastings, Utendale, & Sullivan, 2007); these are behaviors associated with a prescriptive
orientation. In the current studies, we did not find any systematic evidence for the predictive
value of parental nurturance (on the CRPR) as a prescriptive regulator. However, the means for
parental nurturance in all three studies were over 5 (out of 7), suggesting it may difficult to
uncover effects of nurturance in a college student population because of ceiling effects.
Further Implications
35
Although this research focused on parental influences in moral socialization, we expect
socialization figures such as other relatives, teachers, and religious figures, as well as broader
systems of socialization such as educational and religious systems, to influence individuals’
regulatory orientation as well. Punitive socialization agents are also likely to orient individuals
towards prohibitions, making them more aware of temptations and more likely to feel shame.
This may work towards the socialization agent’s benefit: for example, an authoritarian social
structure may orient people towards their own immorality, occupying themselves with curbing
their own temptations and shame, valuing inhibition and thus perpetuating the existing,
proscriptive social order. While these rigid, authoritarian ideologies are likely to render
temptations unmanageable, a multidimensional belief system involving both proscriptions and
prescriptions may promote successful self-regulation and well-being (Koole, McCullough, Kuhl,
& Roelofsma, 2010).
A strong sensitivity towards one’s own immoral temptations may also result in a
defensive, punitive orientation towards others, a phenomenon known as “reaction formation.”
Taking an overly condemnatory stance towards other people’s behaviors may serve as a
defensive strategy to mitigate the distress and shame associated with one’s own temptations.
Moral emotions researchers (e.g., Lewis, 1971; Tangney et al., 1992; Tangney, Wagner, HillBarlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996; Thomaes, Stegge, & Olthof, 2010) have also noted that
the threat of immorality and pain associated with shame can also be externalized into severe rage
and aggression towards others; here, hostility towards others is in part motivated by attenuating
one's own shame and blaming others for one’s pain. Both of these processes may lead one’s own
perceived immorality to increase a (hypocritical) harsh and punitive stance towards others for
their supposed immorality.
36
Although appropriate uses of restrictiveness and punishment may certainly guard against
harmful, even potentially dangerous behaviors, punitiveness as the primary mode of discipline
and communication from parent to child produces a motivational orientation with ultimately
detrimental consequences. Restrictive parenting is not wholly ineffective in socializing morality,
but instills a particular form of moral orientation: a focus on prohibitions. This perspective
outlines an alternative and comprehensive route to moral lapses. Individuals are not reacting
against external demands; rather, their attempts to be moral are what paradoxically make them
more susceptible to actions they themselves condemn.
37
ENDNOTES
1. These inferences of motivation are not necessarily explicit, but are likely to occur outside the
realm of consciousness (Forster & Liberman, 2001; Strack & Forster, 1998).
2. All continuous variables entered in all regressions were centered prior to being added to the
equations and computing the interaction terms.
3. For ease of interpretation, all interference scores are presented as the untransformed values.
4. Because reaction times for the congruent trials often reflect facilitation effects, they were not
used in the analyses (e.g., Richeson and Shelton, 2003).
38
Table 1. Unstandardized and Standardized Regression Coefficients Predicting Proscriptive
Orientation.
B
SE
β
VIF
Parental Restrictiveness
.19**
.07
.16**
3.75
Parental Nurturance
.02
.06
.02
3.56
Order
-.07
.13
-.03
1.02
Order*Parental
Restrictiveness
Order*Parental Nurturance
.39**
.15
.30**
3.74
-.18
.14
-.15
3.53
Parental Restrictiveness*
.06
.20
.05
3.51
Nurturance
Order*Parental
.02
.15
.01
3.49
Restrictiveness*Nurturance
Note. F(7, 273) = 2.64, p = .01. B is the unstandardized regression coefficient. β is the
standardized regression coefficient.
*p≤.05. **p≤.01.
39
Table 2. Unstandardized and Standardized Regression Coefficients Predicting Self-Temptation.
Parental
Restrictiveness
Parental
Nurturance
Order
Order*Parental
Restrictiveness
B
SE
β
VIF
.20
.15
.18
2.37
-.09
.13
-.10
1.27
.28
.24
.15
1.08
-.52*
.28
-.34*
2.22
Note. F(4, 62) = 1.96, p = ns. B is the unstandardized regression coefficient. β is the
standardized regression coefficient.
*p≤.06. **p≤.01.
40
Table 3. Unstandardized and Standardized Regression Coefficients Predicting Other-Temptation.
Parental
Restrictiveness
Parental
Nurturance
Order
Order*Parental
Restrictiveness
B
SE
β
VIF
-.03
.14
-.03
2.12
-.05
.12
-.05
1.12
-1.35**
.29
-.56**
1.00
.15
.19
.09
2.16
Note. F(4, 60) = 5.47, p = .001. B is the unstandardized regression coefficient. β is the
standardized regression coefficient.
**p≤.01.
41
Table 4. Unstandardized and Standardized Regression Coefficients Predicting Stroop
Interference.
B
SE
β
VIF
Parental
Restrictiveness
Parental
Nurturance
Condition
.03
.03
.13
3.01
.02
.02
.13
1.14
.01
.04
.04
1.04
Condition*Parental
Restrictiveness
.11*
.05
.42*
3.00
Note. F(4, 75) = 1.68, p = ns. B is the unstandardized regression coefficient. β is the
standardized regression coefficient.
*p<.05.
42
Figure 1. Predicting Goodness of Fit for Self-Temptation as a Function of Accounts of Parental
Restrictiveness and Order of Parenting Scale
43
Figure 2. Predicting Goodness of Fit for Stroop Interference as a Function of Accounts of
Parental Restrictiveness and Moral Priming Conditions
44
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