There Is No Instinct for War
by David Adams
translated from the Russian in Psychological Journal (Moscow)
Academy of Sciences of USSR, 1984, Volume 5: Pages 140-144
The problem of whether there is an instinct for war can be solved. It can be solved through a
combination of static analysis which uses scientific experiments, and dynamic analysis which
uses historical reconstruction. The static analysis can show how various types of biological
motivation are active during warfare, but that none of them are necessary for war, because war is
a sociological rather than a biological phenomenon. The dynamic analysis of the history of war
can show why war has come to be carried out by men and not by women as a result of
sociological rather than biological reasons.
I will present evidence to show that most of the various types of biological motivation are active
during war, but that none of them are particularly necessary for war. In other words, there is no
instinct for war. I will then consider the question of why there are so few women warriors. This
problem can be solved by understanding the contradictions between the social institutions of
marriage and warfare. It is not caused by any difference between men and women in their
biological instincts.
Motivational Systems
The various types of biological motivation in the primates have been studied by techniques of
brain research (Adams, 1979) and behavioral observations (Adams and Schoel, 1982). Although
most of the important information has come from work with the stumptail macaque monkey,
other supporting data come from chimpanzees and other kinds of monkeys. I have presented
evidence that the types of biological motivation are remarkably similar in all mammals including
those as different as the rat and the monkey (Adams, 1980).
In the stumptail macaque, as in other primates, there are at least nine motivational systems of
social behavior. A motivational system, as I have described it from work in brain research and
behavioral observation consists of the brain structures that are responsible for groups of
behaviors that occur together under a particular type of situation, e.g., sex, aggression, fear,
hunger, etc. (Adams, 1979). Since war is a social phenomenon, I will emphasize social behaviors
such as sex and aggression in this paper, rather than non-social behaviors such as hunger and
thirst, assuming that the former are more likely to be important for warfare.
The nine motivational systems of primate social behavior are 1) offense, 2) defense, 3)
submission, 4) sex, 5) grooming, 6) display, 7) play, 8) group contact, and 9) parental behavior.
The first eight have been described from a statistical analysis of the social behavior of adult male
stumptail macaques (Adams and Schoel, 1982). The ninth system, parental behavior, is found
only in females and wasn't observed in that experiment. The first three systems, offense, defense
and submission, are three aspects of aggressive and fear behaviors. They each have different
brain mechanisms and are similar throughout the mammals (Adams, 1979). In humans, they
correspond to the emotions of anger, fear, and social anxiety, respectively. Sexual motivation is,
of course, well known. Whether male and female sexual motivations are separate is a question
that will not be considered in this paper. Grooming, another social motivation, may be divided
into two systems depending upon whether the grooming is of the self or of another animal, but
that question also will not be discussed here. "Display" is a system that is unique to the primates
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and not present in lower mammals. It corresponds to what we normally call joy, excitement, or
crowd contagion. Play and group contact are especially common in young animals, but may also
be found in adults in some primates, especially chimpanzees and humans. In the adult stumptail
macaque we observed one behavior related to group contact. When the adults were separated
from their cagemates, they made a cooing vocalization which was answered by their cagemates
from the other room, evidently a contact call. Therefore I have called this a "group contact"
motivation rather than a "juvenile contact" motivation which it has been called by other
scientists.
An Example of Warfare
As an example of warfare, I have chosen the warfare of the Mae Enga culture of New Guinea, as
it has been described by Meggit (1977). The warfare of the Mae Enga is typical of the warfare of
the so-called "primitive" cultures, and it is especially well documented by Meggit. Rather than
using the word "primitive," I prefer the term "stateless" which refers to cultures that do not have
a state structure. Warfare among the Mae Enga is very similar to the warfare described for other
stateless cultures, including the Australian aborigines (Warner, 1937), other New Guinea
cultures (Heider, 1970), the Yanomamo of South America (Chagnon, 1968) , the Kwakiutls of
North America (Boas, 1966) and the Angami Naga of Southern Asia (Hutton, 1969). These are
among the best anthropological descriptions of warfare. Warfare becomes more complex in
societies with a state structure, since there is a formation of a warrior class of men, but that
question is beyond the scope of the present analysis. Presumably, if there were an instinct for
war, it would be seen in stateless societies as clearly, if not more so, than in complex societies.
The warfare of the Mae Enga, as described by Meggit (1977) may be understood by breaking it
down into five stages of a typical war. They are: (1) the immediate event that caused the war
(pages 11-15 and 70-94); (2) the group's decision about whether and how to attack (pages 7683); (3) the preparation of weapons and supplies for the attack (pages 53-60); the march to the
place of attack (pages 88-89); and (5) the attack itself (pages 89-98). In addition to these five
stages, which occur over several days or weeks during the course of events of the war, there is
another level of analysis. The other level of analysis extends over hundreds of years in time. It
consists of the traditions of warfare that are transmitted through myths, rituals, and practices of
child-rearing, training, marriage practices, etc. Any "instinct' for war would be more likely to be
found by studying the events that take place during a war, rather than in the traditions of warfare
which involve a more abstract level. Therefore, the latter will not be considered here in detail.
Stage one of warfare is the immediate event that caused the war. Out of 71 incidents of warfare
recorded by Meggit, 61 could be classified into only three types of events. There were 41 caused
by disputes over land, 12 caused by theft of pigs, and 8 that were meant to avenge a homicide.
Other events, more rarely described as causes of war, included accusations of sorcery, rape, and
the jealousy of a jilted suitor. The most common causes, disputes over land and pigs, need not
have involved any of the various social motivational systems that we described earlier. The Mae
Enga live in an area of severely crowded population and disputes over land and pigs could well
arise without any particular necessity of anger, fear, or sexual desire.
Stage two, the group's decision on whether and how to attack, is made in a special secret session
that is attended only by the men of the community. In this stage, one social motivation is
probably essential: the motivation of group contact. As Meggit says, "although no man who has
the right to be at a clan assembly is forced to appear, only a man who was profoundly indifferent
to his clan's welfare would voluntarily absent himself." Meggit's description of these meetings
indicates that they are carried out without any great passion or emotion. He uses words such as
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"indicate," "argue," "solicits responses," "speak," "contribute," "make their points with elaborate
oratorical flourishes," "clarified the issues," "carefully dissected the facts," "summarizes the
main arguments," and "announces the decision reached." The description could easily be one of a
congress drafting a law or the board of a corporation making a marketing decision. There is no
reason to consider that offense or defense, i.e., anger or fear, plays a critical role in this stage.
Stage three, the preparation of weapons and supplies, is carried out with a minimum of emotion
or other sign of social motivation. The one possible relevant motivational system is grooming,
since the warriors may deck themselves rather elaborately with ornaments or blacken their faces
or smear their bodies with soot or earth or clay.
Stage four, the march to the place of attack, is made in silence in order to be sure that the attack
is a surprise. It seems likely that the warriors feel many emotions during the march, including the
excitement (display) caused by the group's movement and the fear (defense) caused by the
possibility that they may be injured or killed in the fighting to come. However, it would be
difficult to argue that these emotions and their corresponding motivations are necessary to this
stage of warfare. To the contrary, they could be contradictory if the display led to shouting that
alerted the enemy or if the defense led to fleeing or freezing behaviors that interrupted the march.
On the other hand, the motivation of group contact, may be essential. It is probably this
motivation that keeps the warriors together and counteracts their fear.
Stage five, the attack itself, involves strenuous and dangerous activity. Meggit describes it as
"forcing doors, shooting arrows into the houses, burning the thatch. ..and cutting down
fugitives." If prolonged, the fighting may turn into a war of attrition with alternating periods of
fearful watching and fierce fighting. All of the social motivations may well be aroused during the
course of such battles; certainly group contact, offense (anger), defense (fear), submission
{shamed obedience), and display {excitement). Are any of these essential, however? Once again,
group contact is probably essential. With regard to fear, however, it is taught that fear is to be
avoided, and, if necessary, "a frightened youth may also be publicly shamed." This suggests a
more critical role for submission than for fear. With regard to anger and display, the instructions
to young warriors do not emphasize passion, noise, and violent movement; instead, they
emphasize careful deliberate calculated activity. For example they are advised to "watch your
enemy carefully," "remain still if you see the shaft of an arrow, but duck if you see only the
point," and "if a house is burning, especially your own, do not watch it lest you are dazzled by
the glare and miss seeing an enemy on your flank."
In summary, it would appear that only one social motivation proves to be essential for warfare,
and that is group contact. Without group contact it would seem unlikely that the planning
assemblies or the marches that are necessary for war could take place. Submissive behavior may
also play a role in training warriors to avoid acting out of fear. The aggressive motivations,
offense and defense, may well be aroused during some causal incidents and during the actual
attack, but they do not appear to be essential to the process. Grooming may also play a role in
preparation for warfare but would not appear to be essential. Other social motivations seem even
less important.
History of Warfare
We turn now to the dynamic historical analysis of warfare which uses the methods of crosscultural anthropology. This is similar to the way that the methods of comparative anatomy are
used by biologists to reconstruct the history of evolution. We know from anthropology that there
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has been a historical sequence of human economic systems beginning with hunter-gatherers, then
horticultural and agricultural systems, and finally industrial systems. Therefore, we can
reconstruct the history of war by seeing how it differs in various cultures with different economic
systems that still exist today. Also, we know that there has been an historical trend from early
stateless societies to more recent societies with state structure, so we can compare war in these
two types of cultures. Finally, we know that there is a close relationship between the type of
warfare and the type of marriage residency system in each culture. From this relationship it is
possible to understand why it is men and not women that have come to carry out most warfare.
Warfare is practiced by cultures with all types of economic systems, which indicates that warfare
began in the dawn of human evolution. Although there is some evidence that hunter-gatherers
are less warlike than horticultural and agricultural peoples, there is no doubt that there is at least
some warfare among most hunter-gatherer cultures (Ember, 1978). Even cultures that are famous
for having no warfare at the present time did have some warfare in previous eras (for the Kung
Bushmen, see Lee, 1979, pages 382-383, and for the Mbuti pygmies, see Turnbull, 1961, page
275). Even the most primitive peoples ever studied, the Tasmanian aborigines, had extensive
primitive warfare (Jones, 1974).
The fact that warfare has occurred in most cultures and throughout the course of human history
is not evidence that it is instinctive. We know of many cultural traditions that are practically
universal yet are not "instinctive," e.g. language, clothing, pottery-making, etc. On the other
hand, the opposite argument cannot be made either. The absence of warfare from a few cultures
cannot be used to argue that warfare is not instinctive because, as we have noted, warfare has
occurred in most cultures and throughout history.
Warfare is common in both state and stateless societies. In reconstructing the origins of warfare,
it is best to use data from stateless societies where war is not complicated by the existence of
state structure with a warrior class and other classes.
Warfare and Marriage
The relationship between type of warfare and type of marriage residency system can show why it
is men and not women that have come to be warriors. From this it is possible to refute the claims
by some authors that this sex difference reflects some difference in instincts between men and
women. Women are quite capable of fighting in wars, and they have sufficient strength to run, to
use spears, and to use bows and arrows, and they are certainly capable of all of the various
motivations and emotions. They are usually absent from war, however, because they have been
actively excluded by men. Men have maintained a monopoly on war and the use of the weapons
of war. This has occurred because their wives often came from the families of the enemy. Under
this circumstance, the wife would have divided loyalties and could not be trusted during warfare.
Whose side would they take, their husband's side or the side of their fathers and brothers?
Cross-cultural data indicate that the problem of the wife's divided loyalty during warfare has
been especially common in just those cultures in which warfare developed in early human
prehistory. These are stateless cultures of hunter-gatherers that practice internal warfare (i.e.,
warfare directed against neighboring groups with the same language and culture). The problem
of the wife's loyalty has arisen because these cultures have marriage residency systems of
patrilocal exogamy. This means that the bride comes from a different community (exogamy) and
goes to live with the family of the husband (patrilocality). Patrilocal exogamy is the most
common marriage residency pattern in all cultures with internal warfare (Ember and Ember,
1971; Adams, 1983); It is especially common in stateless hunter-gatherer cultures with internal
warfare. In the survey of hunter-gatherers by Ember (1978), 15 of the 21 cultures with internal
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warfare had marriage residency systems that were patrilocal with at least some exogamy.
The reason why cultures with internal warfare have adopted patrilocal rules for marriage
residency has been suggested by Ember and Ember (1971). They suggest that patrilocality
ensures men that their sons who have been trained as warriors will continue to live with them
and fight alongside them and their brothers. The contradiction between patrilocal exogamy and
the loyalty of women during warfare has been solved by the exclusion of women from war. The
exclusion is complete. Not only are women not allowed to fight, but they are not allowed to
attend the war planning meetings. They are not allowed to own, make, or even touch the
weapons of war, and since these weapons are used in hunting, they are not allowed to hunt with
them as well. They are not even allowed to sleep with their husbands during war. In one New
Guinea culture, the fingers used to pull a bow string are cut off from the hands of little girls,
which ensures that they will never become warriors (Heider, 1970).
I have made a test of this theory (Adams, 1983). The theory predicts that in cultures in which
there is no possibility of disloyalty by wives there should be some cases of women warriors. I
found that in a sample of 34 stateless cultures without any exogamy and with only external
warfare (i.e., warfare only against distant cultures with which there is no inter- marriage), there
are reports of women warriors in 9 of them. These are the cultures in which there is no problem
of the wife's loyalty, since war is never carried out against her relatives. By contrast, in a sample
of 32 cultures with patrilocal exogamy and internal warfare, where disloyalty is a potential
problem, there have never been any reports of women warriors. This test supports the theory. In
other words, women are quite capable of fighting as warriors when there is no question of their
loyalty. The fact that there are so few women warriors arises from the frequent occurrence of the
contra- diction between patrilocal exogamy and internal warfare. It arises because men have
actively monopolized warfare in these cultures and have excluded women from taking part in
war.
Conclusion
In conclusion, there is no evidence for a special instinct of war. Instead, there is considerable
evidence that warfare is a cultural institution with an ancient history and close relations to other
cultural institutions, e.g., marriage systems. Therefore, we can encourage the millions of people
around the world who are engaged in the struggle to abolish war and militarism. We can say to
them that there is nothing that we know in biology that stands in the way of the abolition of war.
Instead, we can note how contradictions between social institutions have led historically to
changes in them. We can note how there is a contradiction in our time between nuclear warfare
and the very survival of culture itself. And we can predict that the time has come when the
institution of war can be abolished.
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