Workshop on Evaluating the Effects and Effectiveness of UN Targeted
Sanctions, Geneva Oct 1-3, 2009
Memo on Targeted Sanctions
Michael Brzoska, Intitute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg,
Germany
Are targeted sanctions different from other sanctions, and if so how? Obviously much here depends
on definitions, particularly conceptions of the term “targeted”. In what follows, I argue that it makes
sense to think in terms of a distinct category of targeted sanctions, but that neither sanctions theory
nor the practice of sanctions policy (I focus on UN sanctions in this memo) have come to grips with
it.
I will start off, in this brief memo, with differentiating what I see as targeted sanctions from other
forms of sanctions. I will than provide a preliminary definition of targeted sanctions, followed by a
brief discussion of its problems and implications.
Targeted and other sanctions
The concept of targeted sanctions has its origins in the double sanctions crisis of the mid-1990s.
Comprehensive economic sanctions, such as those mandated on Iraq and Yugoslavia were widely
seen as having overproportional negative effects on the general population. Conversely, limited
sanctions, at that time primarily arms embargoes, had the image of having no effect on the
behaviour of targets.
The idea of targeted sanctions borne out of this double crisis than was to mandate sanctions which
would be limited, particularly in their consequences to the larger population, but effective in terms
of sanction goals.
This intellectual history of targeted sanctions makes it clear that they are fundamentally different
from comprehensive sanctions. Several of the mechanisms of standard sanction theory which work
through inflicting pain on the general population – such as loss of legitimacy, or overthrow of the
government – are explicitly foregone in the policy of targeted sanctions.
But how are santions to be effective if not through inflicting pain on the general population? It is on
this score that targeted sanctions are supposedly different from limited sanctions, or, rather, to be an
improvement on limited sanctions. Targeted sanctions should be limited in a particular way, namely
to directly affect decision-makers but not the general population.
The mechanisms of targeted sanctions are not new to sanctions theory. Targeted sanctions are
supposed to be directly effective through their immediate links to decision-making, by changing
cost-benefit calculations behind incriminated behaviour, by inconveniencing decision-makers, by
signalling serious discontent with decision-makers or by some other mechanism.
On the one hand, the focus on decision-making and –makers limits the scope of sanction
mechanisms compared to comprehensive sanctions. On the other hand, by going to the center of the
problem – the decision-making behind incriminated behaviour – they can be more precise, direct
and thus effective in changing such behaviour, in case relevant mechanisms can be identified.
Viewed this way, targeted sanctions are a subclass of limited sanctions, namely those limited
sanctions which directly aim at and have the potential to sway decision-makers to change their
incriminated behaviour.
Which brings me to smart sanctions. The term smart sanction has been used, including by myself,
interchangeably with targeted sanctions. However, it makes sense to distinguish the two terms with
respect to their theoretical bases and the intellectual history of the concept of targeted sanctions.
In a sense, any sanction (and threat of sanctions) that gets the job done is ‘smart’. While the
humanitarian costs of the comprehensive sanctions on Iraq after 1991 may have been
overproportionally high, they “worked” in terms of their objectives stated in SCR 687. The theory
behind the Iraq sanctions – that the denial of income from oil and the import of almost all types of
goods would limit the options of the Iraqi leadership and thereby lead them to refrain from the
production of weapons of mass destruction – proved to be largely correct. Of course, it is possible
that more limited sanctions directly aimed at the Iraqi leadership but not affecting the Iraqi
population would have also have ‘worked’. They probably would have been smarter than the
comprehensive economic sanctions in force, but that does not, in my view, mean, that the
comprehensive sanctions were ‘dumb’.
In more general terms, if smart sanctions are sanctions that ‘work’, what makes it likely that
sanctions are ‘smart’ before we know whether they have ‘worked’ or not? I would argue that smart
sanctions are policy measures based on sound theory on relevant sanction mechanisms and strong
implementation of the sanctions. While afflicted with much uncertainty, sanctions policy has a
better chance to attain its objectives if there is a reliably understanding of how sanctions can and
will affect targets. Furthermore, only sanctions which are implemented well, can have influence.
Targeted sanctions in this understanding are a subclass of smart sanctions. They are smart sanctions
which directly aim at decision- makers. Targeted sanctions, to earn this classification, thus need to
be based on a profound theoretical understanding and sound intelligence on how they can and will
affect decision- makers, their options, behaviour and incriminated policies, but spare the general
population from harm. This understanding should include countermeasures and evasion strategies
decision-makers may use.
Types of sanctions
Comprehensive
Smart
Targeted
Limited
Defining targeted sanctions
Targeted sanctions are measures to directly reduce the options of decision makers in order to sway
them from the pursuit of an undesired course of action without unduely harming others.
Four elements in need of further refinement are contained in this definition are:
1.
Aims and effects of targeting
Sanctions rightly to be called targeted should be based on convincing theory and empirical evidence
that they are likely to affect decision-makers in particular cases. Furthermore, aiming sanctions at
decision-makers may in fact reduce the options of other groups including the general population.
One example are commodity sanctions, such as diamonds, which affect an important sector of an
economy. While some effect beyond decision-makers is likely for most types of limited sanctions
(see below), targeted sanctions should be designed in a way that effects on the general population
are minimized.
2.
Measures likely to reduce options
When studying sanctions and their effects, it makes much sense to distinguish between sanctions
output (the effect of sanctions decisions which are under the control of those mandating sanctions)
and sanctions outcome (the effect of sanctions output under the control of the target). Sanctions can
have a variety of outputs. Prominent examples are the reduction of flows of arms and the freezing of
financial assets. These outputs will, in some way, limit the options of decision-makers. However,
this likely is not the prime objective of sanctions. For instance, in the case of arms embargoes, the
prime objective generally is to weaken a target’s military power, and not the options available to
decision-makers as such. In the case of arms embargoes, the reduction of the options of decisionmakers rather is indirect, via the weakening of the military power they can command. An alternative
more narrow definition of targeted sanction would be to focus on the reduction of the personal
options available to decision-makers. This however, would be too narrow in my view. Not only
would arms embargoes be stricken from the list of targeted sanctions, we would also run into trouble
with sanctions against associates of decision-makers and diplomatic sanctions.
3.
Measures which can and will sway decision-makers
The links between output and outcome of sanctions are not well establihshed. Put differently, we do
not have much in terms of sanctions theory. What we have are very general theoretical contentions –
primarily of the cost-benefit type – and laundry lists of mechanisms which either have swayed
decision-makers in the past, or where some peophle think, that they might sway decision-makers in
the future. Examples of such mechanisms include personal inconvenience of decision-makers, their
international reputation, their political esteem or the possibly to buy and reward allegiance of
followers.
Sanctions theory currently is the weak point in the argument for targeted sanctions. Within a costbenefit framework of sanctions it seems logical to assume that comprehensive sanctions will work
better than limited sanctions. And also if one looks at the individual measures adopted as targeted
sanctions and considers the mechanisms of their outputs, it is not easy to argue that they should have
much effect on decision-makers. In my view, further theoretical and empirical work on how
decision.-makers can and will be swayed through limited sanctions aimed at them is crucial for
advancing the prospects of targeted sanctions policy.
4.
Little harm to others
Many of the measures which have been adopted as targeted sanctions have some, even if limited,
negative effects on other population groups in targeted countries than decision-makers, as well as
actors outside of targeted countries. This is particularly true for aviation sanctions (which one
should possibly drop from the list of targeted sanctions anyways) but also for commodity sanctions.
Diamond sanctions, for instance, have harmed diamond producers and traders, in addition to
decision-makers. While some work has been done on humanitarian effects of sanctions, both in
general and in particular cases, there currently are no agreed standards on how much harm to others
than decision-makers would be commensurate with the concept of targeted sanctions. A case in
point are the diverging views on the sanctions against Haiti. Further work on the humanitarian
aspects of targeted sanctions is needed, both in terms of their actual effect, short- and long-term, and
the acceptability of effects on others than decision-makers.
Consequences for current sanctions theory and policy
As mentioned, current sanctions theory does not provide much convincing argument why targeted
sanctions should work beyond broad general statements and common sense. Correspondingly,
sanction praxis, generally is not based on strong foundations. Sanctions are often adopted without
much prior investigation about their effects neither on decision-makers nor the general population.
That makes it questionable to call them targeted sanctions as defined here. Put differently, the
differentiation between limited and targeted sanctions drawn here is blurred by current sanction
theory and practice.
My conclusions from this analysis are:
1. Targeted sanctions are in need of better justification than is generally provided, both in general
and in particular cases. Sanctions theory currently provides ambigous support for targeted sanctions
policy, those mandating sanctions often have little clue on whether or not they will work, and there
is a tendency to label all sanctions post-Yugoslavia (the last clear case of comprehensive sanctions)
as targeted.
2. However, not all limited sanctions are targeted sanctions. Among sanction measures adopted in
the past, there is particular need to discuss aviation sanctions. Another difficult area are partial
export sanctions, such as arms embargoes, and sanctions on dual-use goods (not already controlled
by general instruments, such as MTCR, nuclear supplier or Australia Group).
3. There is need for a particular theory of targed sanctions. Whether it will be possible to develop
such a theory, is an open question – in any case, it will need much more empirical work.