Johnson Chap. 4 1. Introduction (pg. 76) This essay : (i) challenges the conception of logic and argument at work in FDL; (ii) speculates as to how our conceptions of logic, inference, and argumentation underwent such a radical transformation; and (iii) argues that logic must be naturalized. It puts forward two theses: Inference is not argument Logic is not equivalent to deductive logic. 2. Argument is not Inference (pp. 77-78) IN FDL an argument is either defined as a set of reasons leading to a conclusion or is identified with inference (implication). 3. Logic is not equivalent to Formal, Deductive Logic (FDL) (pp. 78-79) 4. Where did we go Wrong: Lessons from the Past? (pp.79-82) 5. The Concept of Argument in New Wave Texts (pp. 82-83) 6. What We Can Learn from Others: The View from Afar (pp. 83-84) 7. Conclusion (pp. 84-85) Why? (a) Important to get it right (b) Reviving practice of argument requires a full-bodied conception of argument. (c) Argument construed merely as reasons to a conclusion without clear reference to the demands of dialectical interchange ceases to be the powerful instrument it might otherwise be.