Frederick
SCHNEIDER
European Public Policy PO886
1st essay: 2186 words
“There is no one theory or framework that
best explains EU policy-making.” Discuss.
UNIVERSITY OF KENT 2007/2008
European integration has the particularity that the theory about it appeared
before its own appearance. In fact, federalism as an idea of European integration
appeared already during the Second World War 1 and European integration itself
started in 1951.
Of course, federalism was more a philosophical and normative trend than a
real theory explaining the existing integration. But this shows that since its very
beginning European integration was thought and conceptualised. New theories
emerged with the development of the continental cooperation itself.
First theories were more focused on the phenomenon of integration itself than
on forms of integration. They tried to analyse and to explain the fact that a
supranational level of decision-making appeared and the evolution of this. They didn’t
pay much attention to the processes of policy-making. This includes mainly
intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. Therefore, these theories are called
integration theories.
However, with the increasing development of integration, the EU became
responsible of more and more policy areas. It is why new theories, focused more on
policy-making per se, emerged in the last decades.
These theories can complete themselves in some extent, but sometimes, they
are totally antagonistic. It is not possible to affirm the validity of all of them as they
claim sometimes totally opposite things.
So, which ones of these theories are more accurate? Can’t we say that they
describe different phenomena and that no one gives a full picture of what the EU is?
We will try to limit ourselves to the main existing theories. Federalism will be
excluded, as it is more a normative than a descriptive theory. We will first analyse
integration theory with neo-functionalism followed by intergovernmentalism. We will
then see theories describing decision-making per se: neo-institutionalism, multi-level
governance and social constructivism.
Neo-functionalism is the first analysed theory because it emerged before
intergovernmentalism. It can be said that it is an extension of federalism to some
extent. It is based on the Federalist Monnet’s idea of step by step policy. This idea is
1
Nugent, Neill (2006), The Government and Politics of the European Union (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan), 551.
2
called “spillover” in the neo-functionalist framework. Haas was the first to
conceptualised it in “The Uniting of Europe”.2 He explains that cooperation in one
policy area will create pressures to extend it to other ones. He quotes the example of
coal and steel (the European Community’s cooperation concerned first these sectors)
saying that the existence of an authority of common institutions on this sectors creates
pressure to extend it to taxation, wages, and exchange rates. He says that all these
policy areas are related and that if we want to have a coherent common policy on coal
and steel, we should also have some common rules about taxation, wages and
exchange rates. 3
This specific kind of spillover is called “functional spillover”. However, Haas
also identifies political spillover. In this kind of mechanism, extension of the authority
of the European Community is not a logical result of an already existing cooperation,
but a consequence of political will of the member states. This includes “packagedeals”. States don’t necessarily agree with all the points of these deals, but they accept
it because they see benefits in other points of these deals and because they support
each other.4
According to neo-functionalists, the European Commission can be seen as a
political entrepreneur, which tries to push states to accept further integration. The
European Court of Justice and the European Parliament are its allies. States often try
to keep sovereignty, but they don’t resist to the pressures.5
Neo-functionalism assumes that there is elite socialization. People working for the
supranational polity show “European” loyalty. They are for more and more
cooperation and try to convince national elites to accept a loss of sovereignty on the
benefit of European integration. Another assumption of this theory states that there
are strong supranational interest groups. These groups have different problems and
preferences, but they perceive European cooperation as a means to achieve it. They
quote here the example of UNICE, the European union of employers, which emerged
in 1959, just after the creation of the Community.6
2
Pollack, Mark, Theorizing EU Policy-Making, in Wallace, Helen, Wallace, William, Pollack, Mark
(2005), Policy Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 15.
3
Ibidem.
Stroby-Jensen, Carsten, Neo-functionalism, in Cini, Michelle (2007), European Union Politics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 86.
4
5
6
Idem, 89.
Idem, 92.
3
Generally, neo-functionalism is seen as the theory which better explained the 58-63
period, but has lost its relevance with the empty chair crisis.7 This crisis showed that
European integration is not a uniform process which consists on always more and
more cooperation. Haas himself confessed that neo-functionalism assumptions were
wrong and that there are not only spillovers but also spillbacks. He acknowledges that
“what once appeared to be a distinctive supranational style now looks more like a
huge regional bureaucratic appendage to an intergovernmental conference in
permanent session” 8 . Moreover, neo-functionalism doesn’t give enough weight to
states (their importance could be particularly seen in the 70s, as the COREPER had a
huge importance in decision-making). Neo-functionalism is also seen as too elitist and
overdeterministic.9
The empty chair crisis was a turning point in European integration theory. Not
only it was synonym of decline of neo-functionalism, but it also led to the emergence
of intergovernmentalism. Stanley Hoffman used the opportunity which appeared with
this crisis to build a new European integration theory based on the realist international
relations theory. 10 Its main point is that integration depends mainly on bargaining.
States negotiate with each other and the result of bargaining depends on the power of
the states. This determines the policy outcomes. Moravcsik explains that historic
agreements (mainly treaties) are not driven by a supranational entrepreneur like the
Commission but by the powerful states such as Germany and France.
11
He
acknowledges a gradual process of preferences convergence, but he says that
European integration is not at the origin of that, he denies the idea of elites
socialization. National preferences formation is shaped by domestic and not European
7
Pollack, Mark, Theorizing EU Policy-Making, in Wallace, Helen, Wallace, William, Pollack, Mark
(2005), Policy Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 16.
8
Haas, Ernst (1968), The uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
Nugent, Neill (2006), The Government and Politics of the European Union (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan), 564.
9
10
Pollack, Mark, Theorizing EU Policy-Making, in Wallace, Helen, Wallace, William, Pollack, Mark
(2005), Policy Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 18.
11
Nugent, Neill (2006), The Government and Politics of the European Union (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan), 565.
4
pressures. He recognizes that there are other actors than states, but they don’t play an
important role.12
Integovernmentalist arguments are not very convincing. First, Moravcsik is
too selective on the evidence he analyses. “Historic” agreements are not
representative of the whole European integration and decision-making process.
Moreover, these agreements are very often the result of an already de facto existing
situation and of the pressures of numerous public and private European-wide actors.
Second, intergovernmentalism is based on formal stage and as we will see later
informal rules are also very important. Third, it sees international politics as a rational
process in which preferences of states and the result of a bargaining can be calculated.
This assumption is wrong because states don’t have a flexible position and listen to
others’ arguments. Fourth, intergovernmentalists underestimate totally the importance
of supranational institutions.13
The EU integration is complex, constantly changing and can be viewed from
different angles.14 Therefore, the idea of building a “grand theory” explaining all the
European integration processes within a same framework which was the aim of
intergovernmetalism and neofunctionalism is unrealistic. Intergovernmentalist
assumptions seem to be totally wrong. Neo-functionalism was disapproved by reality
between the mid 60s and the mid 80s, but it reemerged under a renewed, softer form
in the 90s15 in the works of Mikkelsen thanks to the creation of the single market and
the EMU.16
Policy-making per se theories should better explain how to analyse the
decision-making process because their very raison d’etre is to do that, which is not
12
Pollack, Mark, Theorizing EU Policy-Making, in Wallace, Helen, Wallace, William, Pollack, Mark
(2005), Policy Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 18.
13
Nugent, Neill (2006), The Government and Politics of the European Union (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan), 566-7.
14
Idem, 569.
Stroby-Jensen, Carsten, Neo-functionalism, in Cini, Michelle (2007), European Union Politics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 96.
15
16
Nugent, Neill (2006), The Government and Politics of the European Union (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan), 564.
5
the case for the integration theories. However, we will see that they also have many
lacks.
The neo-institutional theory tries to use a reasoning characterized by more
subtlety. It focuses on the importance of rules, including also informal rules.17 Neoinstitutionalists argue that institutions matter, but that they influence only incentives
and not the preferences and identities themselves. They try to find a balance between
national and supranational forces.18 They claim that there are distinct cultures among
these institutions.
The rational choice neo-institutionalist theory says that human beings behave
rationally. Institutions don’t change the preference function, but have an influence on
the way, in which actors try to achieve their goals. In the contrary to other
institutionalisms, rational choice theory focuses on formal rules.19 It wants to build an
EU policy-making explanation in a systematic way. Rational choice theory has been
very criticised. It is said that it has unrealistic assumptions and that it is not related
with the complex interactions which occurs in realty. Moreover, it is supposed to be
more rigorous, but there is no evidence confirming that.20
Historical institutionalism studies long term effects of institutions. Its
assumption is that states didn’t foresee the impact of the institutions and that they will
lose control over that. It is a totally opposite assumption to this formulated by
intergovernmentalism, which claims that states remain the main actors. According to
historical institutionalists member states governments have constrained their own
behaviour through supranational institutions.21 Evidence confirms this thesis: member
states very often protest against European Commission and European Court of Justice
decisions. Sometimes, it is a very strong opposition and member states would
obviously not give such power to supranational institutions in the conflicting area if
they would know that they would be sanctioned because of that.
17
Pollack, Mark, Theorizing EU Policy-Making, in Wallace, Helen, Wallace, William, Pollack, Mark
(2005), Policy Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 19.
18
Rosamond, Ben, New Theories of European Integration, in Cini, Michelle (2007), European Union
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 122.
19
Idem, 124.
20
Ibidem.
21
Nugent, Neill (2006), The Government and Politics of the European Union (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan), 573.
6
The multi-level governance approach makes the assumption that there is a loss
of control of member states. 22 There is an interdependence of the governments
operating at different territorial levels. Previously, states were dominant actors, but
with recent changes such as globalisation new actors emerged. In the European Union,
as well in the public as in the private sector, three levels can be distinguished: the
regional one, the national one, and the continental one. Informal “public
communities” to which both public and private actors belong emerged in the recent
decades.23 Different networks appeared. The interdependence and the openness of all
these networks determine the content of policies and the influence of different actors.
No distinction between EU policy areas and national ones can be made. Nowadays,
the EU and national states have shared authority in almost all the fields and are
influenced by the regional level.24
Generally, the multi-level governance theory makes a few fair points. It
represents an interesting attempt to define the complexity of the EU. However, it is
more an organizing metaphor than a real theory.25 It stresses correctly that there are
several decision centres, but it is unclear about how they work precisely and how to
identify them.
The constructivists’ main assumption is that human beings don’t exist
independently from their environment. Actor preferences are endogenous to
institutions. They have socially built (“constructed”, hence “constructivism”) roles
and institutional rules. According to this approach, European Union institutions
influence as well the actors’ behaviour as their preferences and identities. 26
Integration is seen as a process in this theory. As we have seen, intergovernmentalists
study bargaining. Constructivists, on the contrary, analyse the process leading from
bargaining to a polity. The main research topic of this theory is “the origin and
reconstruction of identities, the impact of rules and norms, the role of language and
22
Jachtenfuchs, Kohler-Koch, Beate, Governance and institutional development, in Wiener, Antje,
Diez, Thomas (2004), European Integration Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 101.
23
Pollack, Mark, Theorizing EU Policy-Making, in Wallace, Helen, Wallace, William, Pollack, Mark
(2005), Policy Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 39.
24
Rosamond, Ben, New Theories of European Integration, in Cini, Michelle (2007), European Union
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 129.
25
Ibidem.
26
Pollack, Mark, Theorizing EU Policy-Making, in Wallace, Helen, Wallace, William, Pollack, Mark
(2005), Policy Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 22.
7
political discourse.”27 They make an attempt of sequencing EU decision-making in
order to explain a particular step.
Moravcsik criticizes constructivism because it fails to construct distinct falsifiable
hypotheses.28 The constructivists reply that this is not necessary because European
Studies are not a science. We rather agree with this idea that European integration can
not be conceptualised as a science. You will never have a general rule that will be
confirmed each time. This is precisely what Moravcsik tries to do within the
framework of intergovernmentalism and it is why he is wrong. However, empirical
evidence shows that EU-level socialization plays a very limited role and this weakens
strongly the constructivist argumentation.29
In 1972, Puchala compared scholars dealing with EU policy making to blind
men trying to describe an elephant touching it. Each of them spoke about a very
different animal. Different schools of thought in European integration also describe a
very different entity, because they are focused on different aspects of cooperation and
criticize each other as if they would not see other aspects. Intergovernmentalism is
focused on “historic” decisions and bargaining. Neo-functionalism mainly deals with
the spillover effect and sees it as a continuum. Rational choice neo-institutionalism is
interested in changing relative power of institutions. Historical neo-institutionalism
looks at the long term effects of institutions. The multiple-level governance speaks
about the multitude of decision centres. Social constructivism is an analysis of
socially constructed roles and institutional rules.
Moreover, all the theories are not totally convincing. Intergovernmentalism is
attached to international relations realist theory and doesn’t want to acknowledge the
importance of non-state actors. Rational choice theory is too theoretic and is not
proved in practice. Neo-functionalism shows partly the reality and explains well the
progression of European integration, but it didn’t foresee crises such as the rejection
of the Fouchet plans or the failed referenda about European Constitution in France
and the Netherlands. The multi-level governance explains well the new reality, but it
doesn’t explain completely EU policy- making and is not precise enough. Historical
27
Christiansen, Thomas, Jorgensen Knud, Wiener, Antje (2001), The social construction of Europe
(London:Sage), 12.
28
Pollack, Mark, Theorizing EU Policy-Making, in Wallace, Helen, Wallace, William, Pollack, Mark
(2005), Policy Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 23.
29
Ibidem.
8
neo-institutionalism is a good explanation of long term changes, but it doesn’t speak
at all about everyday’s policy-making. Therefore, we can’t really speak about one
theory which best explains EU policy-making. And this is maybe not bad news,
because it shows that the EU is a living body which changes all the time and adapts to
the present world.
Bibliography:
Christiansen, Thomas, Jorgensen Knud, Wiener, Antje (2001), The social
construction of Europe (London: Sage).
Cini, Michelle, Intergovernmetalism, in Cini, Michelle (2007), European Union
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 99-116.
Haas, Ernst (1968), The uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press).
Jachtenfuchs, Kohler-Koch, Beate, Governance and institutional development, in
Wiener, Antje, Diez, Thomas (2004), European Integration Theory (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), 97-116.
Nugent, Neill (2006), The Government and Politics of the European Union (New
York: Palgrave MacMillan).
Pollack, Mark, The New Institutionalisms and European Integration, in Wiener,
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Pollack, Mark, Theorizing EU Policy-Making, in Wallace, Helen, Wallace, William,
Pollack, Mark (2005), Policy Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).
Rosamond, Ben, New Theories of European Integration, in Cini, Michelle (2007),
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