Mutuality and state welfare: a historical comparison between Britain and Japan
Minoru Takada
(Kyushu International University)
Introduction
Welfare is an amorphous complex consisting of multiple principles and many
different agencies; the relationships between the constituents have changed in
accordance with historical context1. Family, community, charity organisation, company,
local government and the state have provided various supports for their members
through paternalism, philanthropy, commercial and public insurances, and tax-based
assistance. Mutuality has been certainly one of the most important components as well.
It was a fundamental principle for developing insurance and pensions in private and
public sectors. Mutuality was crystallised in voluntary associations such as trade unions,
friendly societies, and cooperative societies in the private sector2. The principle was
As to the argument of ‘mixed economy of welfare’, see, P. Thane, ‘Histories of the welfare states’
in W. Lamont ed., Historical controversies and historians, UCL Press, 1998; M. Daunton, ed.,
Charity, Self-interest and Welfare in the English Past, UCL Press, 1996; M.B. Katz and C. Sachße
eds., The Mixed Economy of Social Welfare: Public/ Private Relations in England, Germany, and the
United State, the 1870’s to the 1930’s, Nomos Verlaggesellschaft, 1996.
2 As to the origins and continuity of association, see, M.F. Robinson, The Spirit of Association:
Being some Account of the Gilds, Friendly Societies, Cooperative Movement, and Trade Unions of
Great Britain, John Marry, 1913; P. Clark, British Clubs and Societies 1580-1800: the Origins of an
Associational World, Oxford University Press, 2000. As to mutual aid associations, see, M. Gorsky,
‘The Growth and Distribution of English Friendly Societies in the Early Nineteenth Century’,
Economic History Review, vol.51, 1998, pp. 489-511; do. ‘Mutual Aid and Civil Society: Friendly
Soceities in Nineteenth-century Bristol’, Urban History, vol. 25, 1998; P. Johnson, Saving and
Spending: The Working-Class Economy in Britain 1870-1939, Oxford University Press, 1985；E.
Hopkins, Working-class Self-help in Nineteenth Century England: Responses to Industrialisation,
UCL Press, 1995; P. Gurney, Cooperative Culture and the Politics of Consumption in England,
c.1870-1930, Manchester University Press, 1996; K. Fukasawa, Voluntary Provision for Old Age by
Trade Unions in Britain before the Coming of the Welfare State, unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of London, 1996; do. ‘From Superannuation to State Old-Age Pensions: the Development
of Trade Union’s View’ in Ad Knotter et al. eds, Labour, Social Policy, and the Welfare State,
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1
transplanted in the public sector since the late nineteenth-century. National insurance
system was a typical example of the transformation, in which all the players of society
compulsorily participate under the state power. The welfare state after the Second World
War might be partly interpreted as the historical result of institutionalising mutuality as
a state system. In this sense the principle of mutuality has continuity than has been
thought, although its forms underwent big changes. Nevertheless, the cardinal principle
of mutuality as well as the institutions of the welfare state has been seriously damaged
by the expanding market economy principle for the last quarter of century. Now, the
total structure of welfare complex is changing drastically.
This paper aims to examine the historical function of mutuality in the process of
welfare state formation by comparing the British experience with the Japanese one in
the nineteenth- and twentieth-centuries: that is a comparison between the early starter of
the welfare state and the late comer. The examination was conducted mainly on the
British case3, and then, by comparison, some characteristic features would be roughly
suggested for the Japanese case4.
The three questions are to be considered here. First, how did mutuality develop in
the two countries in the terms of institutions and culture? Friendly society was not
simple benefit society, but also cultural being. The culture was unique, and it
constructed a peculiar identity of membership. The institutional function of mutual-help
and socio-cultural implication of being the members of the societies cannot be separated.
Stiching beheer IISG, pp. 111-124. As to charity, see, M. Gorsky., Patterns of Philanthropy: Charity
and Society in Nineteenth Century Bristol, Boydell, 1999.
3 As to the British case, see, my papers, M. Takada, ‘The Ancient Order of Foresters Friendly
Society and the Old Age Pensions in Early Twentieth-century Britain’, KIU Journal of Business
Studies and Economics, vol.8, 2001、pp. 99-134; do, ‘The Administration of Old Age Pensions and
the Intermediate Bodies in Britain, 1909-18’, KIU Journal of Business Studies and Economics, vol. 9,
2003, pp, 123-235.
4 As to international comparison of mutualism, see, Marcel van der Linden ed., Social Security
Mutualism: the Comparative History of Mutual Benefit Societies, Peter Lang, 1996.
2
The relationship will be made clear.
Secondly, how was mutuality transplanted in the state welfare? What was the
driving force for the change in cultural terms? Although the friendly societies were one
of the most popular welfare agencies, since the late-nineteenth century they faced to the
limitations in terms of membership and finance. This crisis was overcome with help of
the state. But friendly society needed a new justification for accepting the state help
which seemed to be hostile to its prime principle of ‘independence’. The society
culturally constructed a new concept of the state. The process will be examined.
Lastly, what impact did the perception of foreign welfare reforms have on the
welfare state formation in Japan? Japan, as a late starter of modernisation, tried to catch
up the Western society since the 1860s. Germany and Britain were great models in the
field of welfare reform, although both states provided with different types of social
services. German impact was bigger than British one before the Second World War, but
after the War it was changed. The process will be analysed.
In considering these questions, the attention was specially paid on the problem of
inclusion and exclusion, and on the co-relationship between institution and discourse.
The development of mutuality in the nineteenth century
Firs of all, this paper starts with surveying the institutions of mutuality, and its
cultural implication in the nineteenth century. Medieval community was dissolved in the
process of industrialisation, and the vacuum of communality was fulfilled by voluntary
associations, such as trade unions, friendly society, and cooperative society in Britain. In
this paper the main focus is upon friendly society. The membership of the society was
more than seven millions in its heyday, which was larger than that of trade union. The
3
friendly societies in the both countries provided sick and burial benefits for their
members as of right on the condition of the regular contribution as of duty. But they
were more than benefit societies; they were culturally constructed as well. The latter
aspect was indispensable for cementing the mutual bond of the members in both
countries.
In Britain the members were asked to share a common quality of ‘respectability’: a
sense of ‘intelligent and truer self-help’. The regular payment of contribution was
praised as ‘self-denial’ practice. The active participation in administrating the society
was encouraged as conduct of ‘good citizenship’. The society had strict rule decided by
the general meeting; elected executive committee managed the society business; and
breach of the rule was strictly fined. In other words, the friendly society was a kind of
the state in miniature with the functions of legislation, administration, and justice. In
fact, the executive committee encouraged their members to participate in the
administration by using the analogy of the state and citizenship: ‘those associations
[friendly societies or trade unions] which have sprung from the people themselves
afford numerous opportunities for those capable of governing, of experiencing their
opportunities, and educating themselves to fulfil to such situations in the State as may
from time to time to be offered to them’5. The respectability must be visualised: the
membership certificate beautifully decorated, the sashes and badges put on the cloths,
and the procession with big flags in the city centre after the meeting. Ritual and
ceremonies also played an important role6. Those cultural tools contributed to enhancing
their comradeship as the first class citizens.
Their identity distinguished the ‘voluntary’ and ‘mutual’ nature of their association
5
6
Foresters’ Miscellany, Jan., 1882, p. 8.
S. Cordery, British Friendly Societies, 1750-1914, Palgrave, 2003, esp. ch. 2.
4
from the commercial insurance: ‘Commercialism means money and costs money. Given
a purely mutual Friendly Society founded by the people, governed by the people, for the
protection of the people, there can be no gainsaying the fact that the greatest help and
economy prevail’ 7 . Moreover, ‘communal’ nature of the society was emphasised:
‘Friendly Society thrift differs from other forms of thrift, especially as compared with
the deposits in saving banks, or membership of a comparative society or building
society, these forms of thrift are purely personal, whereas Friendly Society thrift is
communal’8. The friendly society was proud of this ‘communism’: ‘they were teaching
a truer and nobler communism, a communism that would promote kindness, humanity
and brotherly feeling, by obeying the great junction of bearing each other’s burdens’ 9.
Nevertheless, friendly society could not be stable without state help. Many societies
lacked actuarial soundness, and they were often thrown into bankruptcy. The
government intervened to improve this aspect, and it imposed them the duty of
registration. Protection and preferential treatment was given to the society in exchange
of registration under the Friendly Societies Acts. Cheap government did not necessarily
mean laissez-faire state; it actively intervened into the society to build and keep the
framework within which the agencies of society sufficiently could carry out their
functions. The state was ‘small’ and ‘minimal’, but it was also ‘regulatory’ and
‘strong’.10
Foresters’ Miscellany, Feb., 1900, p. 547.
Foresters’ Miscellany, Sep., 1909, p. 396.
9 Foresters’ Miscellany, Dec., 1907. pp. 963-964.
10 As to the relationship between the state and society, see, J. Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War,
Money, and the English State, 1688-1783, Century Hutchinson, 1989; P. Harding and P. Mander,
‘From "Fiscal-military" State to Laissez-faire State, 1760-1850’, Journal of British Studies, vol. 32,
1993; J. Harris, Private Lives, Public Spirit: A Social History of Britain, 1870-1914, Oxford
University Press, 1993P. Thane ‘Government and society in England and Wales, 1750-1914’, in
F.M.L. Thompson ed. The Cambridge Social History of Britain, 1750-1950, vol.3, 1990; J. Harris,
‘Society and the State in Twentieth-century Britain’, in ibid.; M. Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: the
7
8
5
The friendly society, however, was not available to all. It has a definite borderline
of inclusion and exclusion. Lower-waged workers could not join the society because of
the difficulty of continuing to pay the subscription. Women were also excluded from the
masculine world, except as the wife of male members; women were not expected to be
active citizens in friendly society. Moreover, the members who could not observe the
society’s moral code were often forcefully expelled. Their behaviour, particularly during
the period of receiving the benefits, was kept under close surveillance. Sick visitors
regularly visited ill members with dual purposes of caring and checking. If some
member receiving sick pay was found in a pub, he was to be fined. If he repeated
unrespectable behaviour, he was to be expelled from the society. In cultural terms, this
was legitimatised by referring to the past: the memory of the Greek and Roman Clubs
was mobilised. ‘The point I want to make clear is that in Greek and Roman societies
there was not only an insurance at death, such as we have today, but that in the Roman
Club an attempt was also made, as we are doing today, to exclude from membership any
undesirable persons as members’11. The memorised, therefore constructed, antiquity
played an important role of justifying the reality of exclusion in the modern friendly
society.
In the case of Japan, there were similar bodies as friendly societies. Yet, they were
different from British ones in terms of coverage and historical character. There were two
types of friendly societies. One is an old type of artisans confined in coal mining
(Tomoko), which was similar as a guild in Europe. This type of society controlled labour
Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799-1914, Cambridge University Press, 2001; do., Just Taxes: The
Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1914-1979,Cambridge University Press, 2002. As to the Friendly
Societies Act, see P.H.J.H. Gosden, The Friendly Societeis in England 1815-75, Mancheser
University Press, 1961.
11 Foresters’ Miscellany, Jan., 1900, p. 6.
6
supply to keep wage at a certain level, and prevented non-member from entering the
labour market. It provided sick, burial, and unemployment benefits to the members; and
some societies had a labour exchange function. As in British friendly society, it also had
a strict rule, and if members breached it, they had to leave the society. Ritual was also
essential to it. This type society had a long life than has been thought, and it survived
the industrial revolution in Japan. It was eventually transformed into the trade union12.
The other one is modern type (Kyosaikumiai) which was closely associated with
company welfare. Around the turn of the last century, in facing the social problems of
injury in factories and poverty caused by the industrial revolution, the company owners
in both private and public sectors recognised the necessity of organising mutual-aid
society in their companies in order to alleviate the problems. The idea was borrowed
from Europe. The bureaucrats and company owners shared the organic theory of society
and the state. Under their initiative, modern friendly societies were established to
promote social solidarity in the organism. The members were limited to the middle- and
upper classes of workers with permanent employment; and they contributed to 3 or 5 %
of wage to the society’s fund. The societies were expected to provide benefits for death,
sick, and factory injury. In this respect, they were similar with European societies. Yet,
the culture was more tightly tied with work space and work ethic rather than civil
society; ‘working diligently’ was the best values to be followed. It is because the society
was organised in each company; it had, therefore, often an affinity with the ‘paternalism
of company welfare’. Company itself, in fact, regularly contributed the considerable
amount money to the fund of friendly society. Horizontal solidarity of workers, such as
nationwide Orders in Britain, could not be seen in Japan. Rather, cooperation with the
12
N. Murakushi, Traditional Industrial Relationship in Japan (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1989 ; do, Coal
miners in Japan: a history of Tomoko system (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1998.
7
specific company became the main feature of mutual help, which contributed to
industrial efficiency of the company. In the end, the friendly societies in Japan were
organised from the above by the industrial bosses and the state bureaucrats, and the
‘voluntary’ aspect of mutuality was extremely weak. Mutuality was prone to be utilised
to enhance the royalty to the company, a sense of ‘for the sake of company’s interest’,
which is a historical foundation of so called ‘Japanese companyism’13.
In addition to that, the bureaucrats expected the mutual-help associations the role of
supplementing minimal nature of public assistance. Public/private distinction was,
unique in Japanese society. Public sphere organised from the top with imperial authority
was far above and separated from the society of ordinary people. The mutual-aid society,
in reality, played a role of substituting public help as an obligation of a member of
organic society. It is interesting to pay attention to the similarity and difference of the
parts the state played between the two countries. Both governments were ‘minimal’ and
‘regulatory’, but the primary motive behind was entirely opposite: the British one is to
encourage civil society, and the Japanese one is to police the society.
The material and cultural aspects were interwoven, and the mixture maintained the
friendly societies as the associations of mutuality in the modern society. Yet the
historical context differentiated the functions of the friendly societies between the two
countries. The individuals were protected through the collective and ‘communal’, not
‘purely personal’, self-help.
13
As to the new type society, see, T. Saguchi, A History of Social Insurance Scheme in Japan(in
Japanese), Tokyo, 1977, ch. 2; T, Ikeda, A History of Social Welfare in Japan (in Japanese), Tokyo,
1986, pp. 420-431.
8
The limitations of voluntary mutual-aid and the emergence of the state welfare in
the early twentieth century
The collective self-help in the forms of friendly association, however, had serious
limitation. The limit became to be realised since the late nineteenth century, and
movements for the new state welfare occurred. In terms of international comparison, it
is interesting enough that the state welfare was introduced in the 1900s and the 1910s,
in almost same years, although economic and political conditions were very different
from country to country14.
The lower wage workers, the ‘non-respectable’ people, and women were often left
outside the mutuality as mentioned above; they were consciously excluded out of it. In
addition to that, the friendly society itself faced the organisational crisis: the
membership became stagnant, resulting in a financial instability since the late nineteenth
century. Ageing of the members also worsened the financial situation by increasing the
expenditure for sick pay as a real old age pension. The competition with other welfare
agencies became severer as commercial insurance and dividing society became more
popular. In terms of finance, the friendly society invented some relief fund systems to
redistribute the burdens within the society, but it was not sufficient for coping with the
difficulty. It is indispensable, therefore, to recruit new members for improving this
serious situation. One of the expedients was to reform its exclusive structure. The
friendly society loosened the condition for membership: the age was lowered to zero,
juvenile section was built, and women were more positively welcomed by modifying
the rule. The Friendly Societies Act also endorsed the revisions. The society tried to
14
P. Thane, The Foundations of the Welfare State, 2nd edn, London. 1996, ch. 6.
9
become more inclusive in terms of the institutional structure15.
Nevertheless the problem of exclusion still remained. The necessity of continuous
subscription remained a block to the lower waged workers, and moral barrier was also
not applicable to all the member of the nation. The problems with the exclusive nature
became to be gradually recognised by both the friendly societies, and the politicians and
the state bureaucrats. Their eyes to the excluded people brought to the fore the new idea
of mobilising the state power more positively in the late nineteenth-century. In the
debates of the state pensions, the growing concern about the miserable condition of poor
women was important. For example, leading politicians, like Asquith or Lloyd-George,
talked against the contributory state pension scheme, on the ground that many of
working class, particularly women, had been excluded from the friendly societies with
contributory scheme. They also suggested the supplementary role of the friendly
societies to fill the gap left after the introduction of the state pension16.
Friendly society, however, could not accept the proposition initially because of a
strong ethic of ‘independence’17. It seemed moral decay for the society to accept the
state help, i.e., an external help. This spirit of ‘independent’ was even characterised as
national identity: ‘the spirit of independence is stronger in Englishmen than in the
habitants of other State’. Extremely enough it was alleged that, because of the very sprit,
‘a great number prefer to accept death early rather than seek to prolong life at the
expense of other people’18. It was also insisted that ‘they [working men] know they are
capable of managing’; that ‘our objection is to the working-class being singled out as
15
About the details, see my paper (AOF).
The Parliamentary Debates, vol. 180, 1908, cols. 564-587 (16 June, 1908).
17 As to the debates in friendly society over the state pensions, see, J.H. Treble, ‘The Attitudes of
Friendly Societies towards the Movement in Great Britain for State Pensions, 1878-1908’,
International Review of Social History, vol. 15, 1970, pp. 266-99;
18 Foresters’ Miscellany, Jan. 1882, p.3.
16
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the class which require nursing from the cradle to the grave’; and that ‘their history of
the past thirty years, as written in their own organizations, proves indisputably that they
are competent, and will ultimately “work out their own redemption”’ 19 This was
another important reason against the state intervention. It should be borne in mind that
independence was consistently the first imperative for their argument, and that any
measures to injure this basic sprit would never acceptable for them at all. Moreover,
they disliked the National Insurance because participation and self-government was
lacked in the system. They said, ‘if National Insurance were established it would injure
those organizations of the people, for it would lack this one essential element--- the
contributors would have no voice in the management of the fund.’20 The notion of
ratepayers’ democracy accompanying participation and self-government played a
crucial role for opposing the state insurance. This would also have continuity. The spirit
of associational culture was the important basis for criticising state welfare at least at
this initial stage of state pension debates in the 1880s.
Yet, in the 1890s and 1900s the tone of argument changed. The factors promoting
the change were the worsening financial situation, and the increasing concern to the
excluded person from the help of voluntary associations. How did the friendly societies
change their attitudes to the state welfare? Their justification was quite interesting. They
constructed the new image of the state as the extended entity of their cardinal principle
of mutual-help. The state was no longer to be the other; it was to be the expanded
themselves. One leader said:
By all means let us preach self-help, applying it to the trade and friendly
associations, but not to stop there. The same spirit must lead people more and
19
20
Foresters’ Miscellany, Jan. 1882, p.9.
Foresters’ Miscellany, Jan. 1882, p.8.
11
more to recognise that the State is themselves, and learning their power in this
direction will use their collective capacity for dealing with these problems that
affect our national life, and in doing so they will be exercising the principle of
self-help in its truer sense.21
Another leader also pointed out the same thing:
It seems desirable to promote the idea that the Government is ourselves, organised
for collective purpose regarding the State as a great benefit society of which the
whole body of citizens are member. The provision of Pensions for the aged
appears me an obvious expansion of the democratic idea22.
Significantly the state intervention was legitimatized as an extended mutuality. In this
way stubborn friendly society eventually became a supporter of the state welfare in the
case of state pension. They found a new proper space of supplementing the state welfare
in the mixed economy of welfare.
In the case of the National Insurance Act of 1911, the clash between friendly
societies and the state was severer, because they battled over the limited resources for
subscription of the people. But in this case, the successful adjustment was made again;
the friendly societies were given a privileged position of ‘approved society’, and they
underpinned the administration of the state insurance. Their principle was transplanted
in the state insurance, within which their organisation played a practical role. The fresh
and close relationship with the state was built up. This brought a satisfactory result, at
least in terms of membership. After the introduction of the National Insurance Act the
membership rapidly increased, and in the 1920s and 30s, the friendly society entered
‘the new Golden Age’ underpinned by the network of the state insurance, although a
21
22
Foresters’ Miscellany, Oct. 1897.
Foresters’ Miscellany, Jan. 1898.
12
conflict between voluntary and state sectors in the society became severer, leading to a
kind of identity crisis: what was ‘voluntary’ association?. The above notion of ‘the
government is ourselves’ was embodied in this context to the greater extent. The
voluntary association of mutuality could not be separated from the state welfare; rather
it was an important historical and practical foundation for expanding the state welfare in
Britain, at least before the Second World War.
On the other hand, in Japan, associations of mutuality gave little impact on the
introduction and the expansion of state welfare. The perception of public relief as of
right, in general, was weak. If the relief was provided, it should be appreciated as a
‘mercy of the emperor’ in modern Japan. In contrast, obligation was imposed on the
subjects of the emperor. The Relief Ordinance was issued in 1874: it provided that ‘it is
the obligation of the subjects to help the destitute and the disabled with a feeling of
compassion’. The obligation was met in the forms of ‘mutual-aid of neighbourhood’
(Rinposoufu) as well as ‘family’ or ‘self-help’. The fundamental ideology was an
extreme version of paternalism. The emperor with absolute power was to be merciful
father as well as holy and authentic ruler. The state was taken as an enlarged ‘family’
with the patriarchal authority of the emperor. The mixture of the obligation of self-help,
family, and the local community was the basis of modern welfare in Japan.
The limitation of the system became clearer and new measures were needed around
the turn of the century. Since then the labour problem and the poverty had attracted
special attention from politicians, social reformers, and academics. After the Rice Riot
of 1918, the movement toward introducing the national insurance was facilitated. The
national insurance was first introduced in 1927, and it was enlarged as a measure to
grow up ‘sound soldiers’ in the 1930s and the 1940s. The surface of the insurance
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system was modern, but it was ‘paternalistic’. It might be interpreted as
institutionalising the extended mutuality, but the character of the mutuality was different
from that in Britain. The duty of contribution to support the poverty stricken comrade as
‘the subject’ was much more emphasised: the notion of the right to benefit was very
weak. The ‘family’ image of the state was emphasised, so the obligation of the family
member to the state. Although there was a debate over participation of the trade unions,
or agricultural unions into the administration of the state insurance, it was denied on the
ground the ‘democratic participation’ of the ‘voluntary’ association might be disturbing
the monolithic nature of the state solidarity. The strong state was underpinned by the
notion of ‘family’ image of the state and the ‘family members’ obligation’ to the state.
The local community, another important intermediate body, was also compulsorily
charged the obligation to look after neighbours, because it was a part of ‘organic’ entity,
although we do not have enough space to discuss this aspect here. In any way, the
metaphor of family had the effect of creating a strong sense of nation identity, which
resulted in forging the unique welfare regime in Japan23.
The process of establishing state welfare in Japan was very different from the
British case. In the former, the limitation of voluntary associations of mutuality did not
give any impact on introducing the state welfare at all; the reverse is the fact. Minimal
state welfare was introduced bureaucratically from the above for the purpose of keeping
social order. Little attention was paid to the role of the existing mutual aid society,.
Takashi Saguchi insisted: ‘we cannot trace the roots of Japanese social insurance into
friendly societies and trade unions’24. In this way the paternalistic and nationalistic state
23
M.Takahashi, The Emergence of Welfare Society in Japan, Aldershot, 1997, pp. 33-54; Y. Aizawa,
The Making of Social Insurance in Japan (in Japanese), Tokyo, 2003.
24 Saguchi, op. cit, p. 126.
14
welfare was introduced in Japan.
Yet, we should not overlook the common features that the role of the state should
remain ‘minimal’ even under the entirely different political regimes; the more space was
to be left for the other welfare agencies.
It is true that the state welfare was more inclusive than any other welfare measures,
but it did not necessarily solve the problem of inclusion and exclusion. Rather the state
welfare drew a new boundary between the nation and the non-nation25. The nation
within the boundary was treated better than before, but the non-nation was excluded
with more mighty power of the state. Significantly ‘the nation’ to be relieved has been
constructed in accordance with the norms defined in a series of the welfare laws.
Especially, nationality was crucial for becoming the recipients of the new state welfare
measures. Moreover, the notion of nationality usually entailed a stronger bias to some
peoples than before; the bias was associated with literacy. As the result, the state welfare
was harsher for some groups, especially the ethnic minority. For example, in Britain, in
the debates of the Alien Act of 1905, Prime Minister, A. Balfour had said: ‘We have the
right to keep out everybody who does not add to the strength of community—the
industrial, social, and intellectual strength of the community’26. After the introduction of
the National Insurance Act, a Home Office circular of 1912 explained: ‘a person who
can have no claim to be invested with the full rights of British nationality in the United
Kingdom if he has not identified with the life and habits of the country to the extent of
P. Thane, ‘The British Imperial State and the Construction of National Identities’, in B. Melman
ed., Borderlines: Genders and Identities in War and Peace, 1870-1930, Routledge, pp. 29-46. As to
the problem of inclusion and exclusion in the pension administration, see, my paper (the
Administration), and M. Jones, ‘The 1908 Old Age Pensions Act; the Poor Law in New Disguise’, K.
Laybourn ed., Social Conditions, Satus and Community, Sutton Press, 1997.
26 D. Feldman, Englishmen and Jews: Social Relations and Political Culture, 1840-1914, Yale
University Press, 1994, p. 287.
25
15
becoming reasonably proficient in the language’. 27 Jewish people without being
naturalised were sometimes out of the state pensions. In Japan as a late-comer imperial
state, the more cruel racial discrimination occurred against the Asian immigrants, in
particular the Korean and the Chinese, many of whom were often enforced to move
from their native country against their will. There were many cases that those ethnic
groups in both counties were protected better in voluntary provisions or by the Poor
Law 28 : one of the pension officers said ‘The Poor Law makes no distinction of
nationality, and an alien who becomes destitute is just as much entitled to relief as a
natural-born English citizen’29. The residual role of the Poor Law was the characteristic
feature of British welfare system.30 The development of welfare was neither linear nor
progressive in a simple way.
Inclusion and exclusion in welfare were overlapped in such a complicated way.
Each social group had its own cultural identity, and it drew a social boundary between
self and the others. In the field of welfare, the excluded persons outside the border were
cared by the other agencies which had often wider coverage and were more inclusive in
the nature. A new system was introduced, and the new identity, in turn, was constructed.
The cultural identity again strengthened the institutional framework of the new welfare
system. The state had more mighty power than the other welfare agencies; it resulted in
more protection and more constraint, or more inclusion and stronger exclusion.
27
Ibid, p. 376.
R. Kalman, ‘The Jewish Friendly Societies of London, 1793-1993’, Jewish Historical Studies, vol.
33, 1995, pp. 141-161; V. Lipman, A Century of Social Service, 1859-1959: the History of Jewish
Board of Guardians, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959; D. Feldman, op. cit., ch. 11, 12, and 13.
29 London County Council, Minutes of Evidence, 1909, p. 628.
30 J.Harris, ‘From Poor Law to Welfare State?: a European Perspective’, in D. Winch and P.K.
O’Brien eds, The Political Economy of British Historical Experience 1688-1914, Oxford University
Press, 2002.
28
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The perception of the British model and the welfare state formation in Japan
Lastly, the foreign experience was important for the ‘welfare state formation’ in
Japan: above all the perception of the European welfare reforms was crucial. A reform
movement for modernisation (the Meiji Restoration) took place in the 1860. The
reformers sought to introduce a series of the Western culture to modernise the ancient
regime of Japanese society: constitution, laws, political institutions, military
organisation, and economic system were introduced from Prussia, France, and Britain.
The ‘advanced’ and ‘progressive’ image of ‘the Western’ culture, in general, played a
decisive role.
Around the turn of the twentieth century, politicians, social reformers, and
academics paid urgent attention to the labour problem and poverty. Although their
stances were different to each others, they were common in seeking the resolutions in
the experiences of Europe, particularly Germany and Britain. They were obsessed with
the ‘backwardness’ of Japanese ‘social policy’, although the word meant rather ‘labour
policy’ at the moment. They studied the British labour policy as ‘pioneering attempt’ to
‘preserve the value of labour forces’, i.e. the Factory Acts, and the German social policy
as the successful example of social insurance. They learned the Poor Law and the
Elberfelt system as a local public assistance as well. In the late-nineteenth century,
Japanese scholars and bureaucrats learned social researches of Charles Booth and
Seebohm Rowntree, and they embarked on the similar researches by themselves in the
big cities, which made clear of the extent of social problem in Japan. Settlement
movement was also organised by intellectuals and students as a result of study on
Toynbee Hall, although the movement was converted into enhancing obligatory
community help rather than social reform.
17
Yet, they admired the German model in particular, because the political regime of
empire was acceptable to them: in fact, the constitution had been introduced from
Germany. Bismarck Social Insurance, and the welfare reforms based on the social right
ideas in the Weimar Republic were also studied well. In the late 1930s, Nazi Germany
gave a big impact on Japanese public health reform: Wohlfahrtswesen or
Wholfahrtsphlege were imported and utilised to in Japan. The ruling class preferred a
hierarchical and ordered society to a liberal society. As the Japan’s state sought to be
stronger, so became its ideological link with German welfare idea; diplomatic and
military strategy promoted the linkage. From the 1930s warfare and welfare went
hand-in-hand; welfare was taken an necessary investment into ‘human capital’ useful to
the war effort. Welfare was entirely incorporated into wartime mobilising strategy of the
state. The aim of welfare became monolithic. In the end, both countries forcefully
brought the neighbour nations into misery under totalitarian regime.
It was after the war that the effort of reorganising welfare started, which was closely
associated with the political imperatives of democratising the Japanese regime. At this
moment, the British model was crucial. It was perceived as ‘advanced’, ‘pioneering’ and
‘ideal’ accompanying the image of ‘democratic’ political regime. The bureaucrats and
social scientists uncritically praised the Bveridge Report, and tried to imitate the
proposals in the Report almost intact. The Report was represented as one of the symbols
of building democratic regime after the war. The ‘national minimum’ became
fashionable among them; the state responsibility was emphasised. The words of ‘social
solidarity’ and ‘mutuality’ were admired. But, paradoxically enough, these words tended
to be interpreted as stressing the duty of the nation to the society, but not vice versa.31
31
K.Tamai, Inventing the Prevention of Poverty: a Study of Modern Social Policy (in Japanese),
18
In the formation of Japanese ‘welfare state’, the perception of British model was
much more influential than the past experience of mutuality in its own society. In that
sense, civil society was separated from the state in the Japanese welfare reform.
Vitalising the civil society in the ‘welfare state’ has been and still remains a most
important issue in Japan.
The brief survey shows that the perception of foreign welfare reform played a
crucial role in Japan. But the state never pursued any specific type of welfare regime.
The primal concerns of social reformers, bureaucrats, and intellectuals waved in
accordance with historical conditions, from British to German, from German to British,
and the middle way between them. Moreover, the perception itself was constructed by
the necessity of reform in reality. Above all, political stability was the primary interest
for reformers, and foreign welfare measures, institutions, and agencies were depicted in
the forms adaptable to the primary interest. Friendly society was the good example; it
was one of the typical voluntary associations in Britain, but the character was
transformed in Japan.
Conclusion
Mutuality was reality and construction in history. Although mutuality in civil
society has been often idealised, the historical reality was different from the ideal. It is
sometimes described that independent individuals voluntarily assembled in the
association to help each others, and played a great role of mutual-aid with little support
from the state in modern world. The associations would be the origins of NGO or NPO
organisations, which were expected to be re-vitalised in the contemporary welfare
Kyoto, 1992, esp. ch. 7.
19
debates32. But those organisations had a definite borderline of inclusion and exclusion.
The line was made stronger by the cultural discourse of their identity. The sense of
belonging was underpinned by the sense of moral superiority, and it was always
visualised through the cultural tools, such as membership certificates, badges, sashes,
and parades. The visualised image of the membership contributed to clarify the
borderline more vividly. It resulted in the stronger solidarity and stability of the society,
which contributed to creating reliability of mutual-aid society. The cultural power was
indispensable to institutionalise mutuality.
However, the excluded became problematic in terms of making stronger ‘imperial
race’; the eyes to those excluded was the driving force of the welfare reform in early
twentieth century Britain. The state power was mobilised to reform total structure of
welfare. At this moment, the most important was how to justify the state intervention.
The answer is the analogy between the friendly society and the state. The key word was
that ‘the government is ourselves’; the state was the extended entity of mutuality. The
identities of voluntary associations and the state synchronised in this way. Society and
the state were not separable in the cultural term, but rather identical; a strong identity
could create a strong solidarity of the nation. The power of culture was important in this
way. But the structure of inclusion and exclusion was also transplanted in the state
welfare in the same time, and it was reproduced in the wider extent with the mightier
power of the state. More people came under the umbrella of state welfare, but more
strongly non-nation was excluded from the state welfare. Paradoxically enough, the last
resort for them were voluntary associations. The institution and the discourse of
32
P. Hirst, Associative Democracy, Polity Press, 1994; R.D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work:
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton University Press, 1993; do., Bowling Alone: the Collapse
and Revival of American Community, Simon Shuster, 2000.
20
mutuality interacted in a complex way to make the welfare state. The welfare state
could not be interpreted in the simple progressive model.
Although the comparison between Britain and Japan was insufficient, some points
might be suggested even from the brief observation. There were mutual-aid associations
in Japan, but their mutuality was entirely different from British one. It was more
circumscribed by the character of civil society, although recent studies critically warned
us not to idealise the British civil society33. Work ethic and royalty to the company was
signified, and the coordination with those was taken into account to establish the
‘voluntary’ associations. The transplantation of mutuality into state welfare was also
circumscribed by the unique notion of the state. The state was taken as ‘family’, and the
nation’s obligation to the state was emphasised. Therefore, stress was put on policing
rather than active participation in the field of welfare. The comparative study of the
relationship between mutuality and state welfare could suggest the characteristic feature
of the relationship between society and the state in each country.
Moreover, this examination suggested the complex relationship between the reality
and perception of the foreign experience. In the case of Japanese welfare state formation,
the perception of the British model played a crucial role. Yet the perception was
constructed; the idealised image of British experience as the symbol of modernity or
democracy was grafted with the reality of unreformed society. This brought the
contradiction in the welfare system: the minimal and paternalistic state combined with
thin layer of voluntary associations, which charged the welfare burden upon family and
company. Although high rate of economic growth could conceal the contradictions, the
33
F. Trentmann, Paradoxes of Civil Society: New Perspectives on Modern German and British
Society, Bergahn, 2000; J. Harris, Civil Society in British History: Ideas, Identities, and Institutions,
Oxford University Press, 2003.
21
existence of a big hole in the Japanese welfare system was recognised after the
economic prosperity has gone away. Now new perception of welfare proper for the
Japanese society was needed, and a rich cultural image of our future society is
indispensable.
The historical relationship between mutuality and state welfare raised the new
question: how much mutuality will be perpetual after dissolving the institutions of the
welfare state.
22
Minoru Takada is affiliated to Kyushu International University. Research field: the making of British
welfare state. Publications: 'The Administration of Old Age Pensions and the Intermediate Bodies in
Britain, 1909-18', KIU Journal of Economics and Business Studies, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 123-235. 'The
Ancient Order of Foresters Friendly Society and the Old Age Pensions in Early Twentieth-century Britain',
KIU Journal of Economic and Business Studies, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 99-134.
23