Профессора: А

Professor: A.v.Bremzen
Tatiana Giesbrecht
Victoria Stepanova
Alexander Tonis
Irina Khovanskaya
This course continues NES Game Theory sequence. It covers topics left behind in Game
Theory I. It first finishes the exposition of noncooperative game theory and then introduces
main concepts cooperative and evolutionary game theory, as well as some more specific
topics such as common knowledge and matching. It concludes by discussing mechanism
design and implementation problem.
There will be 4 or 5 problem sets counting for 20% of the grade. Final exam counts for the
other 80% of the grade.
Main textbooks:
1. В.И.Данилов, Лекции по теории игр. Москва. РЭШ. 2002
2. R. B. Myerson, Game Theory (Analysis of Conflict), Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge,
London, England, 1991
3. M. Osborne, A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.,
Additional literature:
4. D.Fudenberg, J.Tirole, Game Theory. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1991
5. J.M. Weibull, Evolutionary Game Theory. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1995
6. A.E.Roth, M.A.Sotomayor, Two-sided matching, Cambridge Univ. Press, New York, NY,
Tentative lecture plan:
Week 1. Coarsenings of Nash equilibrium: rationalizable strategies, correlated equilibria.
Markov equilibria.
Week 2. Cooperative game theory. Core, Shapley value, kernel, nucleolus.
Week 3. Lattice theory. Tarski fixed point theorem for lattices. Monotone comparative statics
and LeChatelier theorem.
Week 4. Two-sided matching.
Week 5. Evolutionary games. Evolutioary stable strategies, replicator dynamics.
Week 6. Common knowledge, agreeing to disagree. No-trade theorem.
Week 7. Mechanism design, full implementation. King Solomon problem. Maskin theorem.
Other implementation concepts.