An Examination of the Discursive Devices Employed in Fact Construction:
A Discourse Analysis of Ghost Stories
Name – Timothy Reese
Supervisor – Dr. Peter Lamont
Abstract
The current study examines the discursive strategies that are used when people
attempt to establish an account as factual. This is examined with particular reference
to accounts that orientate around paranormal phenomena, and builds on previous
research in this area (Wooffitt, 1992: Wooffitt & Allistone, 2005: Lamont, 2007) by
examining accounts of ostensible ghost encounters. A discursive strategy of
‘disaffirming the stereotype’ is identified, whereby writers tend to emphasise either
aspects of the surroundings, the ghost, or their emotional state, during their account,
which are at odds with what can be thought of as a stereotypical ghost story. A
stereotypical ghost story can be considered one whereby events occur during the
night, where an anxious individual, primed by eerie surroundings, believes they have
seen or heard a ghost, and subsequently becomes frightened. It is argued that
disaffirming the stereotypical ghost story is designed to serve two functions; firstly it
is designed to disassociate the writer’s account from the easily debunked stereotype,
and secondly it is designed to create a sense of saliency, which makes the account
more memorable via the Von Restorff effect. In addition methodological issues
concerning discourse analysis and parapsychology are discussed.
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Introduction
Discourse Analysis & Fact Construction
Discourse is an ambiguous term (van Dijk, 1997) but can loosely be defined as
a continuous stretch of language containing more than one sentence, which can occur
in either conversational or narrative form (Blackburn, 1994). In turn discourse
analysis (DA) can be defined as a method of qualitative research devoted to
understanding all forms of spoken interaction and written text (Colman, 2001). DA is
qualitative in that it does not focus on numerical data, rather the data which it focuses
on is language itself. Therefore in order to understand DA and its critical perspective,
it is first necessary to understand DA’s stance towards language. According to Bhatia
et al (2008) there are two crucial factors that dissociate DA from other lines of
linguistic analysis. Firstly DA emphasises that language can be analysed on the level
of the text, as well as at a structural level, i.e. the broader semantic meaning of a text
can be analysed, as well as finer grained details such as syntax and phonetics.
Secondly DA emphasises that language ought to be considered as a tool for social
action, and is not merely a passive referential medium through which we reflect the
state of the world. The origins of this view of language are perhaps best traced back to
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s influential ‘Philosophical Investigations’ where he stated that
language can be conceived of as a series of games in which people are competing to
construct different versions of reality, which ought to be beneficial to the speaker or
writer in one way or another. In other words Wittgenstein highlighted that language
can be used to manipulate reality as opposed to merely reflect it. At first this may not
seem a particularly radical claim, as the potential of language to manipulate has long
been known, the teaching of rhetoric for example, the art of using language to
persuade or influence others, can be traced back to medieval universities (Blackburn,
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1994). However, DA argues that all discourse are socially orientated this way, and, as
noted by Austin (1962), the distinction between discourses that ‘do things’, and
discourses that merely ‘state things’ is redundant.
In its relatively brief history DA has been incorporated into a number of
different disciplines, using different approaches, and has focused on different kinds of
data. The study of DA within psychology (discursive psychology) has built upon early
work from conversation analysis (CA), and has focused on how mental states, social
events, and material objects are established in discourse (Bhatia et al, 2008). CA is a
field of study that is concerned with the norms that underlie the organization all forms
of verbal social interaction, ranging from everyday interactions between friends to
quite ‘monologic’ forms of interaction (e.g. speech making), and asserts that
interaction is both highly organised and orderly (Drew & Curl, 2008).
The present study focuses on the process of fact construction in discourse.
This has been examined by various researchers (e.g. Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Potter
& Edwards, 1990; Smith, 1990; Wooffitt, 1992; Collins & Pinch, 1993; Lamont,
2007), and focuses on the discursive devices that people employ in their attempts to
establish their version of a contentious issues as factual. A discursive device can be
defined as any phrase or feature of a discourse that is intended to influence the nature
of an interaction or account in favour of the speaker or writer. In the process of fact
construction discursive devices are used in the hope that they will help to establish the
factual nature of the speaker or writer’s account. Potter (1996) provides a
comprehensive review of the discursive devices used in the process of fact
construction, and claims that there are two main strategies which can be employed to
help establish the facticity of an account; firstly the speaker or writer needs to
establish that they are a reliable source of information, and secondly they need to
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establish that the incident which the account revolves around occurred independently
of them. Broadly speaking establishing that the speaker or writer is a reliable source
of information can be done in three ways; by emphasising that they are of sound
mind, by emphasising that that they are an expert in the particular field at hand, or by
establishing that they have no motivation to lie. The first two factors can be
accomplished by the discursive device of category entitlement. Category entitlement
is a strategy that plays upon the belief that certain categories of people are entitled to
have more or less reliable knowledge about a certain issue than most people. Anyone
belonging to the category ‘psychologists’ for example, is by expected many people to
have reliable knowledge about body language, and therefore in an account about body
language it may be beneficial for the speaker or writer to align them self with the
category psychologist. Conversely there are also categories that speakers or writers
should attempt to distance themselves from, for example ‘wishful-thinking’ or ‘not of
sound mind’, as their accounts may be undermined by association with these
categories. The third factor can be established using the discursive device of stake
inoculation. The concept of stake inoculation is perhaps best understood by
considering what Edwards & Potter (1992) refer to as the ‘dilemma of stake’, the
dilemma being that any account can be undermined as a product of the speaker or
writer’s stake or self interest. Stake inoculation negates this criticism by explicitly
stating that the account is not driven by such motivations, for example, “the
prosecution witnesses, many of them passers-by with no conceivable axe to grind,
were articulate and plausible” (Potter, 1996: p.110). In the preceding example the
emphasis of the witnesses as having “no conceivable axe to grind” is designed to
highlight the objectivity of the witnesses and their accounts, emphasising that they are
not products of stake.
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The second broad strategy that the producer of an account may employ to
establish the factual nature of an account is to establish that the events which the
account orientates around occurred independently of the speaker or writer. Potter
(1996) identified three strategies for achieving this; empiricist discourse,
corroboration, and vivid detail. Empiricist discourse makes use of what has come to
be known as empiricist repertoire. This is a style of discourse first identified by
Gilbert & Mulkay (1984) in their study of scientific disputes, which minimises the
involvement of the producer of the account and instead treats data as the primary
actor. This is largely accomplished through a grammatical strategy, whereby verbs
that are usually applied to human action are in fact applied to the data, for example,
“the data implies that…” Corroboration is a very persuasive strategy as it suggests
that an account is not simply a lie or a figment of the producer’s imagination. This
does not rule out the possibility of collusion however, but the probability of collusion
is usually considered highly unlikely, and therefore the probability of a corroborated
account being untrue is far less likely than an uncorroborated account. The use of
vivid detail in accounts is intended to prove that the producer was present, as only a
genuine observer will have been able to capture the particulars of a scene.
So far the nature of DA and its role in fact construction have been discussed.
However in order to appreciate the significance of the phrase ‘fact construction’, it is
necessary to understand DA’s social constructionist stance towards reality, as facts are
statements that ostensibly reflect reality.
Discourse & Reality
“When Mr. N. N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the
meaning dies” (Wittgenstein, 1953: p.20). This quote eloquently draws attention to
what Potter (1996) refers to as the ‘interactional space’ between discourse and reality.
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Reality is an ambiguous term, but can simply be defined as “that which there is”
(Blackburn, 1994: p.320). However the reason that reality is an ambiguous term is
that there is disagreement as to what ‘is’ and ‘is not’, for example whether or not
numbers or colours should be included is disputed (Blackburn, 1994). Parker (1992)
makes a useful distinction between three different levels of reality, or as he phrases
them object statuses. He named these; ontological object status, epistemological
object status, and moral/political object status. Ontological status refers to an object’s
physiology and may be considered the commonsensical notion of reality, e.g. the
physical entity that we might use the word ‘chair’ to refer to. Epistemological status
refers to the meaningful status that an object acquires through discourse, e.g. the
status that an object acquires after it is denoted as belonging to the category chair.
Lastly moral/political status refers to conceptual objects that have epistemological
status but no ontological status, and therefore can be called into being, e.g. attitudes or
intelligence.
DA can be considered a methodology which falls under the wider ideological
sphere of social constructionism. Burr (1995) claimed that it is impossible to define
social constructionism per se, but that any epistemological approach which adopts one
or more of the following characteristics at its basis could be considered social
constructionism; a critical stance towards taken-for-granted knowledge, the view that
the way we understand the world is culturally and historically specific, the view that
knowledge is sustained by social processes, and that descriptions (constructions of the
world) encourage some social actions, and discourage others. “The major thrust of
social constructionism is the claim that human beings, and all the other ‘things’
consciously present to us, are socially, and discursively produced” (Burr, 1995: p.89).
This is well illustrated by an example first brought to light by Ferdinand de Saussure
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(Potter, 1996). De Saussure claimed that objects derive their meaning from
comparisons with other similar objects, rather than reflecting a natural order of the
world. For example he cited the English word ‘river’ as deriving its meaning from
contrasts with alternatives such as ‘stream’. Here the distinction is clearly a size based
one. However in French a different distinction is made between a ‘fleuve’, which
flows into the sea, and a ‘rivière’, which flows into a lake or river. The point is that
the concepts of ‘river’ and ‘stream’ are not a naturally occurring phenomena waiting
to be realised and reflected in language. In fact these different concepts (‘river’,
‘stream, ‘fleuve’ and ‘rivière’) were constructed, and are maintained by different
societies on the basis of the differing comparisons that are made during verbal social
interactions, these objects therefore are discursively produced.
It is important to emphasise that when social constructionists claim that
objects are discursively produced and maintained, they are not claiming that an
object’s ontological status is socially produced, but that it’s epistemological and
moral/political statuses are. In the past social constructionism has been criticised (e.g.
Nightingale & Cromby, 1999) as people have wrongly ascribed it as an ontological
theory. However as Edley (2001) notes “it is actually very difficult to find occasions
where social constructionists have explicitly denied the existence of an extradiscursive realm….it is an opinion that others (i.e. realists) have attributed to them.”
(p.437).
In conclusion DA views Parker’s (1992) epistemological and moral/political
realms of reality as socially constructed and maintained phenomena. This has
significant implications for the issue of fact construction as facts are presented within
these realms and consequentially must be constructions themselves. Therefore it is the
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role of DA to identify the discursive devices that are used in the construction,
maintenance and deconstruction, of ostensible facts.
Relevance of DA to Mainstream Psychology
The most significant factor concerning DA and mainstream psychology is that
DA challenges the assumptions that underpin cognitivism. Cognitivism can be
defined as a positivist theoretical approach, which claims that all aspects of the mind
and behaviour can theoretically become fully explained through observation and
experimentation. According to cognitivism mental activity is the process of acquiring
and processing information, performed by discrete mental entities, and is normally
conceptualised in terms of rules and representations, defined in symbolic or
propositional form (Still & Costall, 1991). Behaviour is seen by cognitivism as the
output of these information processing systems. In the latter half of the twentieth
century cognitivism replaced behaviourism as the dominant influence in mainstream
psychology, and remains a highly influential theory for a large amount of current
research. Therefore any theory that stands to undermine cognitivism has potentially
detrimental consequences for much contemporary psychological research. In a review
by Edwards and Potter (1992) both cognitivism and psychology’s reliance on
cognitivism as an all explaining theory were heavily criticized (cited Willig, 2001).
These critiques can be summarised into five unfounded assumptions that cognitivism
makes, which will now be examined in turn:
i) Firstly cognitivism assumes that talk about people’s beliefs and attitudes can
be used as a direct route to their cognitions. However, as discussed in the first section
of the introduction, talk cannot be considered to be an accurate reflection of what
people are actually thinking, as socially orientated.
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ii) Cognitivism also assumes that cognitions are based on perceptions, i.e. that
cognitions are representations of real objects that occur in the world. However DA
argues that objects themselves are constructed, at least on an epistemological level
through language. Consequentially rather than objects giving rise to cognitions, DA
argues that it is discourse and social interactions that give rise to objects as we are
capable of thinking of them, hence language itself should be the focal point of
research.
iii) Thirdly cognitivism assumes that an objective perception of reality, upon
which cognitions are based, is theoretically possible, and that resource saving
heuristics account for the differences between people’s perceptions. However if, as
DA states, language constructs reality rather than reflecting it, there cannot possibly
be an objective perception of reality as each individual constructs their own unique
version of reality.
iv) Furthermore cognitivism assumes that the events and objects, which people
form their attitudes towards, are one and the same. However, DA states that all events
and objects are relative to the individual. Therefore differences in expressed attitude
towards what is ontologically the same object or event can be attributed to the fact
that people are forming attitudes towards epistemologically different objects or
events, rather than the difference being due to fundamental differences between the
individuals. For example the defendant’s perception of a court case will vary greatly
from the victim’s perception of the same case.
v) Finally, cognitivism assumes that our cognitions are relatively enduring,
stable, and therefore predictable. However DA’s interpretation of language highlights
the importance of the social context in which accounts are given. DA argues that the
same person may well express significantly different attitudes about the same issue
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when in a different social situation. Therefore all we can really infer from accounts is
what people are doing with their words, rather than inferring information about their
cognitions.
These criticisms of cognitivism challenge the validity of conclusions drawn
from experiments which have been conducted within a cognitivist framework, which
accounts for a large amount of psychological research past and present. Due to these
criticisms DA should be seen as a critique of mainstream psychology, rather than just
an alternative methodology, as advocated by Willig (2001). This point is iterated by
Still & Costall (1991), whose main criticism of cognitivism is that it ignores the fact
that human behaviour takes place with and within a complex and dynamic
environment. This leads to what Still & Costall refer to as ‘the frame problem’,
whereby after a rule has been developed to explain a particular behaviour, it is
unlikely that this rule will apply in all situations, and therefore it is difficult to know
when the rule should apply and when it should not.
In conclusion if we are to accept the main tenets of DA and social
constructionism, which seem difficult to reject, we are forced to question the validity
of cognitivism as a research method. This can be attributed to two main factors.
Firstly DA conceptualizes language in a radically different way to cognitivism, and
consequently challenges cognitivism’s reliance on language as a way of inferring
people’s cognitions about ostensibly the same objects and events. Secondly DA places
an emphasis on ethnomethodological concerns, which severely distort an individual’s
behaviour. Cognitivism almost entirely ignores such concerns, and conceptualises
humans as disconnected units. Therefore the relevance of DA to psychology is that it
brings into question the validity of cognitivism, and consequently criticises
psychology’s reliance on this theoretical approach.
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Relevance of DA to Parapsychology
Parapsychology can simply be defined as the study of psi phenomena
(Colman, 2001). The term psi denotes anomalous processes of information or energy
transfer that cannot be explained by known physical or biological mechanisms (Bem
& Honorton, 1994). Psi can be split into two categories; extra-sensory perception
(ESP) and psychokinesis (PK). ESP can be defined as the experience of, or response
to, stimuli without conventional sensory contact. This can be divided into three
subcategories of; clairvoyance, telepathy, and precognition. Clairvoyance is the ability
to see things beyond the limits of orthodox sight (e.g. through walls), telepathy is the
ability to perceive another person’s mental processes, and precognition is the ability
to perceive objects or events in the future. On the other hand PK can be defined as the
movement or change of physical objects as a result of mental processes, i.e.
influencing the result of a dice roll using only the mind. Parapsychology had its
beginnings in psychical research at the end of the nineteenth century (Utts, 1991).
Psychical research concerned itself with anecdotal reports of ostensibly paranormal
phenomena. In contrast parapsychology has attempted to model itself on the natural
sciences, and hence has conducted experiments in laboratories, involving thousands of
trials with ordinary subjects, the results from which are analysed using statistical
techniques (Wooffitt & Allistone, 2005). The origins of this method of investigation
into the paranormal are usually attributed to J.B. Rhine and his associates at Duke
University who developed forced choice experiments in order to test for the existence
of psi. In particular they examined ESP with the use of Zener cards (a deck of 25
cards with 5 each of 5 different symbols) whereby participants had to either guess the
order of a randomly shuffled pack of cards (testing clairvoyance), or infer the identity
of a card from another person’s mind (testing telepathy), or guess the order before the
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pack was shuffled (testing precognition). The results obtained from these experiments
were positive, i.e. participants were guessing the correct cards more often than chance
would suggest, and were published in Rhine’s 1934 book Extra-Sensory Perception.
However largely due to the controversial nature of these results, in that they defied
conventional scientific knowledge, they were ignored by most scientists, and
attributed to either statistical error, coincidence or deception (Inglis, 1992).
Since parapsychology’s beginnings at Duke University alternative techniques
have been developed to test for the existence of psi, and in particular ESP. The most
prominent example is the ganzfeld technique which came about after a surge in
interest into altered states of consciousness during the 1960’s (Schmeidler, 1994). In a
typical ganzfeld a receiver, while lying in a comfortable chair, and in a soundproof
room, wears earphones that play white noise, and goggles that only let unpatterned
light enter the eyes. These conditions are intended to create a homogenous sensory
state, which is alleged to enhance psychic functioning (Storm & Ertel, 2001).
Meanwhile a sender in a separate room is shown either a static or dynamic visual
target which they are instructed to attempt to ‘send’ telepathically to the receiver.
During this period the receiver is asked to speak all thought aloud. After this session
either the receiver or a judge, who has heard the receiver’s articulated thoughts, is
asked to pick the target from four possibilities. In accordance with previous work,
these experiments have found above chance hit rates. At a meeting of the
Parapsychological Association in 1982 the significance of these results was discussed,
which lead to a lack of accordance between the members, most notably Ray Hyman
and Charles Honorton (Utts, 1991). After both publishing separate papers on the issue
the pair later collaborated (Hyman & Honorton, 1986), agreeing that there was an
overall unexplained effect, but disagreed as to whether this constituted evidence for
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the existence of psi. In this paper they also outlined criteria for which future ganzfeld
studies should meet, for example strict security precautions against sensory leakage.
Despite these improvements subsequent meta-analyses of ganzfeld studies have
continued to produce positive results (e.g. Ben & Honorton, 1994: Storm & Ertel,
2001).
However despite consistent positive results from early Zener card tests, and
ganzfeld studies, as well as PK experiments (e.g. Radin & Ferrari, 1991) there has still
been a lack of widespread acceptance of the validity of these results and
consequentially parapsychology’s scientific status (Allison, 1979). Wooffitt &
Allistone (2005) argue that this is perhaps not surprising as controversial knowledge
is unlikely to be accepted on the back of single experiments, as sociological studies
have shown.
An alternative line of study within parapsychology has been to look at the
differences between believers and non-believers in paranormal phenomena. These can
be referred to as sheep-goat studies, whereby the sheep are believers and goats are
non-believers. In these studies the existence of psi is not at issue, and the fact that so
many people believe in these phenomena is seen as justification enough to warrant
investigation (Irwin, 1993). Typically this line of research has sought to account for
people’s belief in the paranormal in terms of some form of deficit, and over the years
belief has been linked to; childhood trauma (Ross & Joshi, 1992), fantasy proneness
(Irwin, 1991), social marginality (Bainbridge, 1978: cited Irwin, 1993), inability to
critically analyse (Gray & Mill, 1990), and probability misjudgement (Musch &
Ehrenberg, 2002) to name but a few. However results from this line of analyses have
been largely inconclusive. This has frequently been attributed to the fact that there is
not a satisfactory way of measuring people’s level of paranormal belief (Wiseman &
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Watt, 2006), largely stemming from the fact that it is difficult to decide what
constitutes paranormal, as opposed to mysterious or unexplained (Coelho, 2005: cited
Lamont, 2007).
As is hopefully apparent traditional research methods in parapsychology are
struggling to be productive. Positive results in favour of the existence of psi are not
being accepted due to their controversial nature (Wooffitt & Allistone, 2005), and
sheep-goat studies are failing to find consistent results due to the inherent difficulties
in defining and measuring paranormal belief. Therefore an alternative method of
enquiry could be particularly beneficial for parapsychology. Wooffitt & Allistone
(2005) argue that DA can be a very productive line of enquiry for parapsychology.
They argue that not only can DA shed light on the verbal descriptions offered in
ganzfeld studies and in accounts of spontaneous experiences, but also that this work
could be helpful for qualitative research on conscious experience. This line of
research, which aims to supplement quantitative research on consciousness, focuses
on vocal reports of what consciousness is like. Therefore in addition to providing
insights within the parapsychological field, DA could allow parapsychology to
establish common ground with the study of consciousness, as well as discursive
psychology. This may have the benefit of creating greater acceptance of the scientific
status of parapsychology, and it’s as yet unexplained positive findings into the
existence of psi.
Previous DA’s of Paranormal Encounters
Previous DA’s that have orientated around ostensibly paranormal experiences
have been relatively few. Much of the work in this area has come from Robin
Wooffitt who has built upon previous work by Harvey Sacks (Potter, 1996). Sacks
examined the way that people reported extraordinary experiences (i.e. hijackings,
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assassinations, plane crashes). The theoretical link between these circumstances is that
both accounts of extraordinary events and paranormal events should be designed to
resist undermining, as the speaker or writer anticipates that the account’s factual
status will be contested. These types of accounts can be undermined by three basic
strategies; identifying the speaker as not of sound mind, by identifying motivation for
the speaker to lie, or by identifying a lack of corroboration for the speaker’s account.
Sacks (1984) identified a discursive device regularly used to resist the
undermining accusation of the speaker not being of sound mind, namely the “I was
just doing X, when Y” structure. Here X stands for a very mundane activity (i.e. doing
the washing up) and Y refers to the exceptional event (i.e. a plane crash). Wooffitt
(1992) demonstrated that the “I was just doing X, when Y” structure is frequently
used in accounts of paranormal experiences and. He argued that this structure helps
the speaker to establish a sense of their own normality, by emphasising the normality
of their behaviour. In the same publication Wooffitt also demonstrated that active
voicing, the inclusion of quoted speech, is used to help construct the factual nature of
paranormal accounts by creating a sense of corroboration. For example, “and they
said ‘Oh, that wasn’t too strange an experience’ because they had heard it before”
(Wooffitt, 1992: p.158). Attributing the quote to a vague group of people, as opposed
to one particular individual, can be seen as a form of systematic vagueness, a
discursive device whereby the use of detail, which might otherwise be examined to
reveal contradictions and confusions in the account, is avoided. Therefore the use of
the pronoun ‘they’ in the above example, is not only intended to create a sense of
corroboration between multiple parties, but it also attempts to negate specific
questions which might undermine the source of the quote.
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In a more recent study by Lamont (2007), the significance of avowals of prior
scepticism was discussed. The avowal of prior scepticism could be said to take the
format, “at first I was a sceptic, but then Y”, where Y denotes a paranormal
phenomenon. This can be seen as analogous to the structure “at first I thought X, but
then I realised Y” first officially identified by Gail Jefferson, again in relation to
exceptional rather than paranormal events. However Jefferson stresses that the matter
of authorship is problematic due to the significant contributions of Harvey Sacks
(Jefferson, 2004: p.164). In this structure X denotes a common explanation (i.e. a car
backfiring to explain a load bang) and Y is the extraordinary explanation (i.e. the load
bang was due to gunfire). Avowals of prior scepticism can be interpreted in two ways.
Firstly the avowal can be interpreted as an example of what Potter phrases stake
inoculation. This is a discursive device applied when the speaker anticipates that their
account will be undermined as the product of expectation or peer-group pressure. The
explicit statements of initial scepticism implicates that the facts are so strong that they
overcame the speaker’s initial scepticism and expectations (Potter, 1996), and allow
the events to be presented as factual. Secondly the avowal can be interpreted as an
example of category entitlement, whereby the speaker or writer attempts to align
themselves with the category ‘sceptic’. The significance of this is that scepticism is
the socially expected stance towards paranormal phenomena and entitlement to the
category of ‘sceptic’ indicates that the individual is a critical thinker and of sound
mind (Lamont, 2007).
To conclude, there have been a limited number of DA’s of accounts of
ostensibly paranormal phenomena. However those conducted thus far have identified
three major strategies; the “at first I thought X, but then I realised Y” structure gives
the speaker the category entitlement of ‘sane person’, active voicing allows the
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speaker to create a sense of corroboration, and an avowal of prior scepticism serves to
counters the criticism of stake, as well as enabling the speaker or writer to align
themselves with the category ‘sceptic’.
The Current Study
The Current Data
The current data are a collection of accounts of ostensible encounters with
ghosts, compiled and edited by Vivienne Rae-Ellis (1990). The accounts come from
British citizens, who responded to an appeal from Rae-Ellis in the late 1980’s for
people to send her details of any ghost encounters which they may have had. The
appeal was driven by advertisments published in various newspapers and journals.
The nature of these encounters varies markedly, and includes; apparitions, ghosts
heard, ghosts felt, ghosts smelt, as well as poltergeists, and cases of possession. The
accounts appear in their original form unless it has proved necessary to make
clarifications, avoid repetitions or shorten the text. Edited parts of the accounts are
punctuated.
The current study therefore focuses on accounts which do not occur during
talk interactions. Wooffitt (2005) claims that, ‘talk-in-interaction’ present more for the
researcher to study than accounts independent of interaction. Wooffitt argues that CA
studies offer the researcher the opportunity to examine the sophisticated and intricate
practises that occur during conversation, and that the study of independent accounts,
“invites the analyst to disattend to the interactional frameworks in which such
discourses, etc, are claimed to be present” (Wooffitt, 2005: p.179). However, it can
also be argued that interactions that occur during conversation are so complex that
conclusions drawn from them may be undermined by unknown variables. Goodwin
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(2000) for example examines how social action in talk is accomplished not only via
language but also via body language. This is a factor that goes unaccounted for in
most CA studies, and more than likely alters the nature of the interaction. The
potential effect of body language is evident when one considers the significance of
seemingly innocuous conversational grunts (sounds that are frequently used during
conversation, but are not words i.e. ‘uh-huh’). Both the significance of these grunts
and the difficulty in classifying them are discussed by Ward (2000). Therefore if
seemingly innocuous grunts can alter the nature of an interaction, it seems inevitable
that body language also alters the nature of an interaction. Although Wooffitt may
argue that grunts and body language are important resources, that the study of
independent accounts fails to attend to, it can also be argued that these factors are
potentially confounding as their significance is not yet understood and they are not yet
satisfactorily classified. This is particularly significant for studies where the data is
collected via an interview technique, as the interviewer may subconsciously divert the
nature of the interaction in a favourable way for their study. Although this may at first
seem quite unlikely, there have been numerous studies which show significant
experimenter effects in randomised control trials, which, assuming honesty on the part
of the researchers, could only have been driven by subconscious desires of the
experimenters, manifesting in selection bias (Berger & Exner, 1999). The study of
independent accounts eliminates these potentially factors, not only allowing
researchers to make more certain claims, but these accounts may also contain more
discursive devices, as other semiotic resources (e.g. body language) are unavailable to
the author.
In conclusion the current study examines naturally occurring data that took
place independently of talk interactions. Although it has been claimed that data of this
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nature offers an impoverished view of human interaction (Wooffitt, 2005), the view of
the current study is that both the study of talk-in-interaction, and accounts
independent of talk can offer valuable insights about the structure of discourse, as
both lines of study have methodological shortcomings and benefits. It is also
important to bear in mind that both types of discourse, talk-in-interaction and
independent accounts, occur frequently in our lives, and that both processes are
important in fact construction, and consequentially the study of fact construction.
Therefore to have a bias towards studying talk-in-interaction ignores a medium of fact
construction which has significance in our daily lives (i.e. via newspaper articles), and
the current paper maintains that the study of independent discourses is equally valid to
the study of talk-in-interactions.
Features of the Accounts
The accounts contained numerous incidences of the structures previously
identified by Lamont (2007) and Wooffitt (1992). One particularly salient example of
an avowal of prior scepticism comes in an account before the writer goes on to
describe their vision of a ghost:
“I was employed by a major chemical company, usually in a consultancy role to work
with teams set up to solve specific technical problems. Thus my attitude could
reasonably claim to be scientific and objective. I had little belief in magic.” (p.141)
In this instance the writer specifically states the qualities that avowals of prior
scepticism are designed to imply, namely that his attitude is ‘scientific and objective’.
Active voicing, as demonstrated by Wooffitt (1992), is primarily intended to create a
sense of corroboration. This is very well illustrated in an account where the author not
19
only presents much of his account in quotations, but also spells the parts of the
account that are voiced phonetically:
“’Old Jim got ghosts up where he live,’ said the younger man. ‘His missus be an old
witch. They sez as how she harbour them.’ He tapped the old boy on the shoulder and
shouted, ‘You got ghosts up your place, hain’t you Jim?’” (p.247)
The phonetic spelling of the quotations adds emphasis that this is an account
involving more than one personality, encouraging further a sense of corroboration.
There were also many examples of the “I was just doing X, when Y” structure, as first
identified by Sacks (1984) and developed by Wooffitt (1992), for example:
“I was washing up one Sunday afternoon on a hot Summer’s day when I heard
footsteps coming down the hallway. I was drying a plate at the time.” (p.46)
There were multiple examples with highly detailed descriptions of seemingly
immaterial aspects of the encounter. In the previous example the detail that the writer
was doing the washing up on a ‘Sunday afternoon on a hot Summer’s day’ should not
really have any bearing on the facticity of the account, but is included nonetheless. An
interesting aspect of this description of a ‘hot Summer’s day’, is that it does not really
set the seen for what one might image to be a stereotypical ghost story, i.e. events
occurring in the dark where anxious individuals, primed by eerie surroundings,
become terrified after they believe they have seen or heard a ghost. This is the pattern
of events that most people expect when they are told ghosts stories. This is well
20
illustrated by a quotation from Rae-Ellis, which is in fact the first sentence of the
preface:
“When I began researching material for this book, my picture of ghosts and their
surroundings was the traditional one: a grove of dark forbidding laurels guarding the
door of some ancient pile, mist swirling around the battlements, and inside the
ubiquitous figure of a Grey Lady or a Laughing Cavalier gliding along dusty corridors
before disappearing through a solid brick wall.” (p. IX)
This highlights the fact that even people who are open-minded to the existence
of ghosts have this preconceived notion of a stereotypical ghost story, and is verified
by numerous incidents in the book where writers stipulate that the nature of their
experience was contradictory to their conception of ghost encounters, for example:
“I always used to imagine a haunted house to look like those in the Vincent Prince
films,” she wrote “a rambling old stone house, standing in its own grounds,
surrounded by tall dark trees, not a little urban terrace house like mine….Hardly the
setting for a ghost story.” (p.185)
The fact that the quote from the preface was the first sentence of the book that
many people will read implies that the disaffirmation of a stereotypical ghost story
may be an important discursive device. Throughout the book there are instances of
writers emphasising aspects of their encounter that are contrary to the stereotype,
although they do not always explicitly state that these features were contrary to their
expectations, as in the example above. These may either describe aspects of the
21
surroundings, the ghost, or the emotional state of the writer, and can be found in all
the varieties of ghost stories that Rae-Ellis delineated. In one example the author goes
to great lengths to describe what some might consider an almost utopian summer’s
day before describing an experience of being possessed later that evening whilst
driving:
“The day was beautiful. Vivian and I started out for East Woodburn in the highest of
spirits. It is always nice to get out of the ‘brick jungle’ and out into the country. Our
route took us over the Whannie Moors. Clouds were scudding across a blue sky and
all was right with the world. We arrived at East Woodburn full of the joys of life.
After being entertained by a dear old lady of eighty-eight we went along to see
the village show. Set out in the village hall were all the exhibits on which much love
and care had been lavished: leeks looking more like ship’s masts, carrots of immense
proportions, flowers lovingly arranged, jams and cakes displayed with pride. Children
were running round, parents greeting one another, the vicar beaming proudly, and
outside the local men were throwing horse shoes over a stick in a sort of quoits
game.” (p.136)
What is interesting is that her activities during the day, and the nature of the
day itself, should have no real bearing on events that happened later that evening, yet
they are described in considerable detail at the beginning of the account, setting a
scene which seems at odds with the nature of the rest of the account.
As is to be expected the nature of the ghosts, both physiological and character
based, are mentioned in virtually all the accounts. The stereotypical expectation of a
22
ghost is usually a wispy vague figure, intent on terrifying unsuspecting mortals, as
noted by Brian Inglis in the introduction:
“The mind’s eye picture of a ghost for most of us is a transparent wraith, floating
around…But this type, though occasionally reported, is a relative rarity. More
commonly apparitions, as the name implies, seem to be reel people…the wraith is
generally regarded as being the earthbound spirit of someone who has died, usually a
violent death….condemned to haunt” (p. XVI)
Here Inglis not only reaffirms the expectations that people have of ghosts, as
expressed by Rae-Ellis (p. IX), but also draws attention to the fact that they are
expected to be malevolent, having suffered a ‘violent death’. The word ‘haunt’ is of
particular significance as it orientates towards an image of victims being scared, or
disturbed. When one also considers that, “haunted buildings are the commonest
source of ghost stories” (Rae-Ellis, 1990: p.147), it is easy to see why ghost
encounters are typically thought of as frightening experiences. However in many of
the accounts the authors disaffirm the stereotype that ghosts are wispy and
malevolent, for example:
“He was leaning against the window sill and looking lovingly at the sleeping boy. It
only seemed to be for a second, but it was all very real and not in the least
frightening.” (p.67)
Here the writer highlights both the ‘very real’ and ‘loving’ nature of the ghost,
who she recognised as the boy’s grandfather. The writer also draws attention to the
23
fact that her experience was not ‘in the least frightening’. This disaffirms another
expectation that people have of ghost stories, namely that they are scary, and that
consequentially the experient finds the encounter duly frightening. Again there are
numerous instances in the book where writers emphasise their lack of fear during the
encounter, for example:
“Strangely, I felt no sense of fear, although I cannot claim to have particularly strong
nerves” (p.183)
In conclusion a particularly salient feature of the accounts was that the writers
often emphasised aspects of their encounter that disaffirmed the stereotypical vision
of a ghost encounter. This was done by emphasising; aspects of the scene, aspects of
the ghost or aspects of the experient’s emotional state. Often these details are
immaterial to the rest of the account, hence their inclusion can be considered some
what illogical; therefore the reason for their inclusion justifies further examination.
Function of Disaffirming the Stereotype
A prominent feature of the stereotypical conception that people have of ghost
stories (whereby events occur in the dark, and anxious individuals primed by eerie
surroundings become terrified after they believe they have seen or heard a ghost) is
that an account of this nature is quite easily debunked, or at least held as contentious.
Darkness could quite easily be used to question what people claim to have seen,
especially if they are claiming to have seen vague, wispy figures that were only
briefly present. If the individual was anxious it also becomes easy to claim that what
they think that they saw or heard was just a product of an overly active imagination,
and a reaction of terror would confirm this notion. Therefore by distancing their
24
account from the easily debunked stereotype, the writer is able to resist their account
being undermined. This explanation as to the reason why people emphasise aspects of
their encounter that disaffirm the stereotypical ghost story is in line with the
philosophy of Jacques Derrida. Derrida stated that the anxiety of, “being caught by
the game” (Derrida, 1988: p. 109), i.e. creating a negative impression of oneself, leads
to logical flaws in people’s accounts, as they overemphasise or ignore certain aspects
of it in an attempt to quash negative inferences being made of them. Therefore in the
accounts at hand writers overemphasise aspects of their accounts which thwart the
traditional ways that ghost stories are debunked, as they are anxious that their account
may be debunked itself.
Another function of the disaffirmation of the stereotypical ghost story is that it
gives the account a salient quality, which may have two main functions. Firstly the
account is less likely to be dismissed as an outright lie, because if someone were to
make up a ghost story most people would expect it to follow the stereotypical format.
Therefore accounts that deviate from this pattern are more difficult to dismiss as lies.
Secondly the quality of saliency makes any object or event more memorable. This is
known as the Von Restorff effect, named after Hedwig Von Restorff who originally
identified the effect in 1933 (Colman, 2001). In the current study the implication is
that that the reader of a non-typical account is more likely dwell upon the account, as
it will be less easily forgotten, and cannot merely dismiss the account out of hand.
The quality of saliency may also serve another selfish interest of the writer, namely
that their account be remembered above others, or even that their account was more
likely to be published by Rae-Ellis.
In conclusion the establishment of an account as non-stereotypical is designed
to have two effects. Firstly it attempts to distances the account from the easily
25
debunked stereotypical chain of events, and secondly it is designed to make the
account in question salient from other accounts. This makes the account more difficult
to forget, which hinders the reader from dismissing the account out of hand without
first dwelling upon it.
Discussion
Implications of the Results
The current study found that in accounts of ostensible ghost encounters,
writers consistently emphasised aspects of their experiences that disassociate it from
the stereotypical ghost story. A stereotypical ghost story can be considered one that
occurs during the night, whereby an anxious individual, primed by eerie surroundings,
thinks that they have seen or heard a ghost, and subsequently becomes frightened.
Writers disassociate their account from the stereotypical one either by emphasising
aspects of the surroundings, the ghost, or their mental state that were at odds with the
stereotypical format. It is argued that this is designed to perform two functions; firstly
it distances the account from the easily debunked stereotype, and secondly it is
intended to establish the account as salient. In turn these functions make the account
more likely to be considered as factual, and more difficult to be forgotten.
The results should be considered as a further advancement within the grander
study of fact construction. By applying the method of DA to the topic of fact
construction it is hoped that researchers will be able to identify the discursive devices
that people employ to make an account of an ambiguous event appear factual.
Increased knowledge about these devices should make it easier for people to assess
ostensibly factual explanations of events. This has the potential to be highly beneficial
26
for disciplines that attempt to discover the factual explanation for unknown
occurrences or phenomena, namely; science, law and the media.
Weaknesses of the Current Study
The current study focuses on a collection of accounts of ostensible ghost
encounters from a book titled, “True Ghost Stories of Our Own Time” compiled and
edited by Vivian Rae-Ellis. This provides a naturally occurring data set that excludes
the possibility of unaccounted for semiotic cues, most notably body language,
distorting the nature of the data. However, there are nevertheless features of the book
which could have altered the nature of the data. Firstly, and most importantly, the
accounts were written by members of the public who knew that the recipient of their
accounts, Rae-Ellis, was a believer in the existence of ghosts. This is significant
because, as noted by Potter (1996), the reason that accounts of paranormal phenomena
can be beneficial to the study of fact construction, is that the speaker or writer expects
the accounts to be accepted with a degree of cynicism, and therefore designs their
account to resist undermining. However as the writers of the accounts knew that their
accounts would be received by someone who believed in ghosts, designing their
accounts to resist being undermined may not have been their primary concern,
therefore the discursive devices identified may have been designed for another, less
obvious, purpose. Secondly Rae-Ellis acknowledges in the preface that she accepted
all the accounts in good faith, and “relied on the fundamental honesty of people” (p.
XII). Although the current study is not concerned with the ontological existence of
ghosts, it may have been a confounding factor if some of the accounts were written by
people who do not actually believe that they have had a ghost encounter, as their
motive whilst writing may purely have been to get their account published, rather than
present their account as factual, and therefore they may have embellished their
27
account. Finally Rae-Ellis also states in the introduction that some of the accounts
have been shortened, however it is not always explicitly obvious in which accounts
this has and has not occurred. Shortening a text may significantly alter its nature;
therefore unedited versions of the accounts may have allowed more dependable
conclusions to be drawn.
Weaknesses of Discursive Psychology
As with all methodological approaches in the social sciences DA has
weaknesses as well as strengths. For example the ‘frame problem’ as referred to by
Still & Costall (1991) in relation to cognitivism, whereby it is not clear in which
social context a rule should apply, could also be applied to DA. Potter (1996) states
that studies of accounts of paranormal phenomena ‘trade upon’ the scepticism with
which they are commonly greeted, claiming that they are designed to resist
undermining. However this line of reasoning makes the assumption that the producer
of the account always designs their account to resist undermining, which may not
necessarily be the case. For example if the producer of the account had reason to
believe that the recipient of the account also believed in the particular phenomena at
hand, they may in fact design their account with the primary objective of establish a
bond between the themselves and the recipient. According to this line of reasoning
discursive devices such as vivid detail could be reinterpreted as a device designed to
help the recipient of an account empathise with the speaker or writer, rather than a
devise merely employed to prove that the speaker or writer was at the scene. This
could be achieved either by the fact that vivid descriptions allow the recipient to
imagine themselves in the similar situation, or by the fact that descriptions give the
speaker or writer the opportunity to express the type of personality that they wish to
personify, as they can choose which aspects of the scene to describe, and what style of
28
adjectives to use. Therefore one criticism of DA is that the intended function of a
discursive device is highly debatable, and may vary depending on the context in
which it is delivered.
The above criticism hints at a broader criticism of DA, namely that its view of
the action orientation of language can be seen as quite one dimensional, regarding
discourses as a largely machiavellian tool, whereby individuals are considered to use
discourse to either establish themselves as superior, or others as inferior. For example
in the study of fact construction discursive devices are considered either to be
designed to establish the speaker or writer’s account as factual, or undermine another
person’s account as untruthful. However this view of language ignores an additional,
arguably more fundamental, action orientation of language, namely its ability to
create and maintain relationships, as discussed by Dunbar (1997). According to this
line of reasoning seemingly mundane descriptions can be considered as social tools
used to encourage empathy between the speaker or writer of an account and its
recipient, and consequently it may again be necessary to reconsider some of the
conclusions drawn from DA. For example Wooffitt (1992) noted the seemingly
mundane nature of some of the actions described in the, “I was just doing X when Y”
structure, which he claimed are designed to present the speaker or writer as normal.
However if we consider one of the examples used by Wooffitt to illustrate this point it
becomes clear that it can be reinterpreted as a device intended to encourage empathy,
or at least sympathy. In the following example a woman is describing one of several
visions she had of her husband following his death, “I was just looking at the coffin
(X) and there was David standing there (Y)” (Wooffitt, 1992: p.123). Here ‘I was just
looking at the coffin’ is considered as a mundane description, however it seems
obvious that if this supposedly mundane description was replaced by another one, i.e.
29
‘I was just doing the washing up’ the effect of the sentence would be very different, as
the description used orientates around a highly emotional action; looking at a loved
ones coffin. Therefore it is proposed that that the description, ‘I was just looking at
the coffin’ can be reinterpreted as a discursive device designed to encourage empathy
and the formation of a bond, as most people can relate to the ordeal of attending a
funeral of a loved one. DA’s do not seem to consider this action orientation of
language, and therefore could be overlooking or misidentifying important discursive
devices, and as the aim of DA is to understand all forms of spoken interaction and
written text (Colman, 2001), this can be considered a major methodological flaw.
The reason for DA’s lack of consideration for this aspect of the action
orientation of language could be attributed to the fact that DA does not seem to
consider language from an evolutionary perspective. This lack of consideration of
evolutionary theory also highlights problems with some of DA’s criticisms of
cognitivism. For example the second unfounded assumption of cognitivism, as noted
by Willig (2001), is the claim that objects give rise to cognitions. In contrast DA
states that it is discourse and social interactions that give rise to objects as we are
capable of thinking of them, hence language itself should be the focal point of
research. However it seems more likely that both these processes are occurring in
parallel. If we are to consider the human brain as a product of evolution, then objects
must have given rise to cognitions at some stage before language evolved, and more
than likely continue to do so. Therefore DA should view itself as a complimentary
methodology to cognitivism, rather than one that stands in direct opposition to it, as
both methods offer insights into the organisation of language and the organisation of
the brain, the two of which are inextricably connected.
30
As outlined above, another weakness of DA is the nature of its overtly critical
stance towards cognitivism and mainstream psychology, as advocated by Willig
(2001). For example Wooffitt (1992) criticises the cognitivist explanation for the
existence of precise detail in ‘flashbulb memories’. These can be defined as vivid and
detailed memories of dramatic events (Eysenck & Keane, 2000), such as the
assassination of JFK, whereby people have very distinct memories of where they were
and what they were doing etc at the time of the event. Wooffitt (1992) claims that
cognitivist psychology attributes the nature of these memories to the fact that the
emotional significance of the event triggers a special neural mechanism, as originally
argued by Brown & Kulik (1977) (cited Eysenck & Keane, 2000). However
subsequent research (Bohannon, 1988: cited Eysenck & Keane, 2000) has
demonstrated convincingly that flashbulb memories are no different to any other
memory, and that they gain their vivid nature because the events which they are about
tend to be of high public or personal interest. As a consequence these events appear
very frequently in the media, or in conversations, and are replayed frequently in the
mind of the individual just after the incident, and then begin to appear less frequently
as time from the event passes. This process is in fact a very effective way to
remember any fact or incident; very high initial exposure, followed by diminishingly
frequent exposure. Therefore Wooffitt’s criticism of cognitive psychology’s
explanation of flashbulb memories was in fact a criticism of a dated theory that was
not accepted by most cognitive psychologists at the time. In addition the subsequent
theory that superseded the original theory of Brown & Kulik (1977) can be seen as
congruent with DA’s view of expressed memories as constructions, as it is argued that
these vivid memories are also constructed on a cognitive level by post event feedback.
This can be seen as congruent with DA as it emphasises the constructed nature of
31
memories on a cognitive level, and highlights the significance of the discourse used
about an event by the media, or peers in the construction of memories. This reflects
badly on DA as any methodology which stands to criticise another, as DA does to
cognitivism (Willig, 2001), should be well informed of the current theories of the
methodology that it is appraising.
In conclusion a major weakness of DA is that stipulating the function of
discursive devices that are identified is highly subjective, and may be subject to the
frame problem, as identified by Still & Costall (1991), whereby the function of a
device may change depending on the social context in which it is delivered. In
addition DA fails to consider language from an evolutionary perspective.
Consequentially it has not paid sufficient attention to the action orientation of
language in the formation and maintaining of bonds, and may have misinterpreted
some discursive devices, most noticeably vivid descriptions. Finally DA’s overtly
critical stance towards cognitivism is unproductive and reflects badly on DA, as some
of the criticisms of cognitivism are flawed.
Suggestions for Future Research
Within parapsychology there has been a movement away from attempting to
establish whether or not psi exists. This is well exemplified by the research of Susan
Blackmore who began her investigations into the existence of psi in the late 1970’s as
an adamant believer in the existence of psi. However by 1987 Blackmore submitted
that due to methodological limitations, the question of whether or not psi exists is
‘unanswerable’, and by 1998 Blackmore came to the conclusion that psi most
probably does not exists, and ceased her research in the field (Blackmore, 2001). The
logical conclusion to the problems highlighted by Blackburn would be for
parapsychology to concentrate its research onto the nature of belief and believers, as
32
these are still significant social phenomena. Since research into the differences
between believers and non-believers has been problematic (Wiseman & Watt, 2006),
largely due to lack of an adequate method for measuring levels of paranormal belief,
the current study advocates further research into the nature of accounts of belief, as
there already exists a mass of readily available data in this area. The study of
spontaneous accounts in particular is advocated, as not only may these offer insights
into the phenomenology of paranormal encounters, but also DA of these accounts
may be beneficial for the broader study of fact construction and, as noted by Wooffitt
& Allistone (2005), allow parapsychology to collaborate with other research areas
within psychology, which may in turn encourage the acceptance of parapsychology as
a science.
In an analogous fashion, it is recommended that discursive psychology should
incorporate theories from other fields of psychology, most notably evolutionary
psychology, in order to gain a better understanding of the functions that language
evolved to serve, and therefore gain a better understanding of the functions of
discourse.
33
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