Imagining Europe: Everyday Narratives in European Border Communities.
by Heidi Armbruster , Craig Rollo , Ulrike H. Meinhof
Abstract This article examines the role of "Europe" in our border narratives. One of the most
striking parallels across our entire data set was the absence of Europe or "Europeanness" as a
self-chosen category of identification. In contrast to other categories, European references
only appeared in response to direct questions by the interviewers. This article shows how
people conceptualised Europe and the EU, once invited to do so by the interviewer. Both
Westerners (all citizens of EU member-states) and Easterners (all citizens of ascendant EU
member-states) anchored their views in distinctly local contexts. At the same time there were
many narrative and discursive overlaps on either side: Westerners often construed a
congruence between Europe and the EU and used this thematic field to define their own
national and socio-economic identity. For many Easterners the links between Europe and the
EU were much less clear and the topic provided a discursive field within which people
articulated a sense of economic and political disempowerment. In both cases Europe
generated the clearest sense of belonging only when it came into play as an out-grouping
device against immigrants who are deemed non-Europeans.
KEYWORDS: EUROPE; EUROPEAN UNION; EU ENLARGEMENT; EAST-WEST
IDENTITIES
Introduction
For hall a century, the process of European political integration has resulted in radical
transformations of the political and economic structures of many countries in Europe,
affecting millions of citizens in their public and private lives. Studies of these ongoing
processes have arisen from within every discipline of the social sciences, ranging from those
whose main interest lies with the structural, institutional or legal consequences of integration
right across to those whose main concerns are with the experiences, feelings and attitudes of
the citizens of this new and expanding geopolitical space (Dedman 1996; Eder and Giesen
2001; Heffeman 1998; Mair and Zielonka 2002; O'Neill 1996; Tagil 1999; van der Dussen
and Wilson 1993). One question has aroused particular interest in the last decade: that of
cultural identity and identification (Brinker-Gabler and Smith 1997; Cederman 2000; Delanty
1995; Goddard et al. 1994; Holmes and Murray 1999; Jenkins and Sofos 1996; Nelson et al.
1992; Paasi 2001). Alongside the political mores towards greater integration within the
current and future European Union, is there a new sense of a transnational 'community' which
the people living within the respective nation-states and sub-national regions are experiencing
and constructing? Is there, to adapt Benedict Anderson's seminal expression (1983), an
emerging 'imagined Europe' which the citizens of the current European Union and of those
countries wishing to join it, embrace and construct? Does 'Europe' create and confirm a sense
of belonging or identity for their everyday lives? And if so, how does such a European
identity relate to other more traditional forms of local, regional or national affiliations? This
concluding article will throw light on such processes by reporting the results of research on
several sets of split (former) border communities on the eastern and south-eastern borders of
the current EU, including the now dissolved former East- and West-German border. With
their geographical location on parts of the former Iron Curtain, our communities share a
remarkable geopolitical position. It is remarkable in the many changes it imposed on the daily
lives of the borderland inhabitants, but also in its wider symbolic value for European identity
after 1945. In 2000, when we conducted our research, our informants had already lived a postIron Curtain life for ten years, which had entailed new experiences of encounter and
transnational mobility. It also entailed being at the forefront of yet another geopolitical
change, namely the imminent enlargement of the EU and through this a widening and
redefining of a common European space. So what does being European mean to people living
along this border, which so recently was a geopolitical faultline and which will soon be
reduced to an internal EU boundary?
Whilst many social sciences have well-established quantitative and qualitative instruments for
measuring and assessing the legal, economic and political consequences of integration and
enlargement, it is much harder to understand and even harder still to 'measure' these processes
of identity. Existing quantitative instruments, most notably the Eurobarometer, which try to
assess the relative significance of regional, national or European identity for its informants are
deeply problematical in question design and underlying assumptions (for a detailed critique
see Bruter 2003). Our approach constitutes a radical departure in design and methodology
from traditional questionnaires and mass-surveys in several substantive ways. We assumed
and demonstrated that cultural identities and identification processes are context-dependent,
flexible, multiple, only partially conscious, potentially contradictory and discursively
constructed (see Meinhof 2002; Meinhof and Galasinski 2000, 2002a, 2002b). One major
feature in this 'context-dependency' of identity discourses which undermines quantification
efforts lies in the significance of shifting out-grouping strategies which fundamentally affect
the nature of the in-group (Galasinski and Meinhof 2002). Asking people questions of 'who
they are' or 'who they are not' will thus only tap into people's consciously held abstract
attitudes or--even more unreliably--their self-projection towards the interviewer or
questionnaire. Our highly indirect method of interviewing avoided this most of the time and
gave us access to more subtle and complex identity constructions. Framing the geopolitical
spaces and the lifetimes of our informants by photographic triggers (Meinhof and Galasinski
2000; Meinhof et al. 2002: 7-11), we elicited 60- to 80-minute conversations with our
informants--largely self-selected narratives with the interviewer's role kept low-key--which
we subsequently analysed in detail with discourse analytical methods. This approach allowed
finely tuned interpretations of the ways in which people emphasise and shift in their
identification of self and others, in-groups and out-groups. However, as will be shown below,
our approach also produced significant insights because of the lack of response to certain
photographic triggers. In such cases we used a more direct questioning technique.
In this article we want to explore whether and how the processes of European integration and
EU enlargement and their ideologies are translated into local people's everyday language and
narrative self-understanding. But firstly, we will trace some of the meanings of Europe and
the EU as understood in a wider international sphere since 1945. Then we will consider the
emergence of the terms 'Europe' and 'EU' in the interview data, the connotations of these
terms for our informants, and their resonance within identity narratives.
Definitions of Europe and the EU
Europe is a notoriously difficult concept to pin down. Modern geographers even dispute its
physical status as a continent (Davies 1996: 47). The generally accepted notions of where
Europe's East becomes Asia's West have shifted through time, resulting in the idea of a 'tidal
Europe'. These notions are in flux again after the collapse of the Soviet system and the
enlargement processes of primarily Western European organisations to include the states of
Central and Eastern Europe. The unresolved question of where the boundaries of Europe
actually lie is of course not simply geographical or political. It is revealed in the dilemmas
surrounding Europeanness, often particularly apparent in countries at Europe's periphery, such
as Russia, Turkey, and to some extent even Britain. Being European in these societies is about
belonging and not belonging and often seems incompatible with a national identity.
In other ways, Europe has come to acquire the status of a vague political and moral ideal. This
has been used for political motives throughout history, emerging gradually out of the concept
of Christendom. Related to this are underlying and largely uncontested notions of what
underpins a modern Europe: these suggest a political structure based on the rule of law which
upholds universal human rights; democracy by representation; a mitigated rather than a freefor-all form of capitalism and the existence of a social welfare system. The ideological weight
of these legacies and concepts can be seen in the current debates about Turkey's status vis-avis the European Union on the basis of its Muslim heritage as well as its human rights record.
Relatedly, such established ideas about common European values often serve to exclude nonEuropeans and those Europeans who have an ethnic minority background from citizenship
rights in Europe. It remains to be seen whether the visions of Europe as put forward by the
institutions such as the EU will be able truly to incorporate the multicultural composition of
most European societies (see also Lutz 1997; Martiniello 2001).
During the last century the European ideal was appealed to 'to heal the wounds after two
World Wars' (Davies 1996: 10), for example in the creation of the League of Nations. In the
second half of the century, Western European states used it as a legitimation for processes of
greater co-operation and integration with a gradual and continuous expansion from the initial
six founding members of the EEC in 1958 to the 15 states of the EU today, following the
accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995. (1) West European integration was
supported by the United States and firmly embedded in American-led finance and trade
structures (Waever 1993: 162). Hence the institutionalisation of the concept of Europe
through the European Union is complemented by a further dimension which partly overlaps
and partly dissects other transnational structures through organisations such as NATO.
The concept of 'Europe' in the Eastern countries was largely repressed after 1945, making way
for separate political and ideological structures of eastern cohesion under the leadership of the
Soviet Union and Soviet Communism. The Cold War and Superpower politics reinforced the
East-West bifurcation, and only with the end of the Cold War could a redefinition of the
European project, including 'East' and 'West', begin.
For most of its progression the EC/EU integration project was based on economic cooperation
and integration, which should provide prosperity, peace and eventually a form of political
union. It was not necessarily based on grand ideologies about 'Europeanness' or common
cultural and historical values (Waever 1993: 174). With the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the
increasing resolve to create a strong supranational European Union and a movement of 'return
to Europe' by eastern European states, new arguments and questions about the concept of
Europe and European identity have emerged in the 1980s and 1990s (Waever 1993: 204).
This continues into the present and has also taken place against the background of increasing
heterogeneity and pluralism of European societies, formed through the upsurge of regional
ethnicities within nation states and various (im-)migration movements to and across the
continent. The rise of identity politics reflects the dynamics of this situation: across the
European space, people seem concerned with the formation of insiders and outsiders, and with
struggles over political and cultural boundaries. In this context, the question as to whether
'Europeanness' can be defined on the basis of distinctive values and experiences gains its own
political force. Many of these debates take place at the elite level of political, social and
economic theory and high institutional practices at national and EU level. But how much of
this enters peoples' everyday life experiences? What does Europe or being European mean for
its diverse people? In the next section we will shed some light on the standpoints from which
ordinary people judge the meanings of 'Europe'.
Saliency of Europe as a category of identity
One of the most striking and remarkable consistencies in the data collected right across our
communities is the lack of resonance which 'Europe' has for the people we interviewed (see
also Meinhof and Galasinski 2002a). We have already pointed out that our interviews were
triggered by highly-charged photographic images of the local area in different time-spans
within the lifetimes of the oldest generation of interviewees. This use of photographs as
narrative triggers was very effective in producing narratives as free as possible from
interviewer bias. (2) However, some of the images we used specifically fore-grounded
'Europe' and the EU, such as buildings festooned with the EU flag and stars, or plaques
acknowledging funding from the European Union. These images turned out to be the least
successful in triggering narratives from our interviewees. Furthermore, 'Europeanness' was
rarely a spontaneous, self-chosen category of identification on either side of the current EU
border.
These minimal or non-existent reactions to the European triggers are significant precisely
because they contrast with the general success of the method in eliciting narratives of great
thematic variation. Visual images of 'Europe' and the EU were not picked up as narrative
cues, sometimes even to the point of complete departure from the subject 'in sight'. Generally
and for most of our interviewees we have to conclude that Europe was an abstract category,
conceptually vague and experientially intangible. Quite a number of interviewees declared
there and then not to know anything about the subject or not to be interested, and the topic
was not expanded any further. Others pondered on the subject for a while, usually after being
asked a direct question by the interviewer, a technique we used only towards the end of the
interview after the more indirect method of photographic triggers and indirect questions had
been exploited to the full. At this stage, interviewers asked, for instance, whether people
identified themselves as Europeans, what their associations with 'Europe' and the 'EU' were,
and what they felt about EU enlargement. Thus, being more or less members of the 'defining
communities' themselves, interviewers clearly co-produced the Europe narratives. Only a few,
exceptional identifications with 'Europeanness' were not elicited by images and questions.
As a result of this (lack of) response by almost the entire informant sample, this article is
largely concerned with discussing those narratives which our conversation partners produced
when directly asked about Europe and EU enlargement. Inevitably, this direct question
presented interviewees with a whole range of discursive meanings. It hinged, for instance, on
the idea of Europe as a bounded entity, the idea of a common supranational institutional
structure, on the idea of political and economic power (e.g. to define state borders as
categories of inclusion/exclusion), on the conceptualisations of 'East' and 'West', and on ideas
about cross-border movement and migration. Consequently this question triggered responses
about self-understandings and self-positionings within these discursive fields. Being
confronted with the idea of changing and redefining larger political and economic boundaries,
people engaged in an activity of defining and constituting boundaries themselves, often in a
wider symbolic context. The Europe which emerged from our interview data was seen
primarily through the prism of enlargement, and more narrowly through the imminent
prospect of their own or their neighbouring country's membership of the EU. This is an
important qualification: unlike the internationalism stressed in elite discourses, these Europe
narratives were decidedly local, often only weighing one's own gain or profit against that of
one's immediate neighbour. What they clearly show is that the standpoints of our informants
are modelled by local experience and historical context.
Narrative content
A comparative view of our data shows some differences of attitude towards Europe that
represent the old political split between 'East' and 'West'. We have therefore chosen to
approach our comparative outlook by clustering and comparing Western and Eastern
communities. This approach highlights the lasting significance of 'East'/'West' identities and
their role in negotiating the meanings of the 'new' Europe.
As we will show, ethno-nationhood, class and political subjecthood/citizenship were prevalent
categories of identity in our European narratives. These categorisations gave shape to a range
of constitutive 'others'--most often conceptualised as threats--but which did not remain stable
across the narratives of our informants. In other words, the nature of the insider and outsider
group often shifted not only from one informant to another but also within the narrative of the
same informant. The imminent reconstitution of EU boundaries and redefinition of 'Europe'
often mobilised people's reflections on the socio-economic conditions they experienced in
past and present and which they envisioned to experience in the future (such as access to
economic and educational resources, healthcare, housing, employment, political rights etc).
These were often couched in a language of anxiety and scepticism, but also of hope and
optimistic expectation. In particular, discourses about the potentially even greater facility of
cross-border mobility and movement after enlargement gave rise to highly ambivalent
discourses for people on either side of the borderline. In general people's narratives about
'Europe' were often 'family discourses'. Unlike the key narratives explored in Meinhof (2002),
which were often generationally specific, narrative tropes on Europe were often shared among
family members.
Inevitably we can identify differences between those informants who locate themselves within
a member-state and those who are non-members but belong to the ascendant nations poised to
join the EU in the near future. Many of our interviewees on the Western side drew on a
conceptual link between 'Europe' and the 'EU', often by agreeing or not agreeing with this
overlap. A positive attitude to Europe often meant being in favour of the EU as a
political/economic institution or in some cases specifically favouring the transnational new
space which would unite the territory on either side of the border after accession (see for
example the informant in Meinhof and Galasinski 2002a: 76). In this sense one might say that
a certain 'discursive power' about Europe has become prevalent (also Goddard et al. 1994:
26). For our interviewees on the eastern side of the border, however, the synonymy Europe =
EU was clearly problematic. On the one hand, as in the western data, Europe was often used
as shorthand for the EU, to which they do not yet belong ('Europe doesn't want us', 'We're not
ready for Europe'). On the other hand, an insistence that they lie within central Europe (as
opposed to Eastern Europe) is, for example, a strong element in the rationale for joining the
EU in the first place. This ambivalence leads to several contradictions in interviewees' usage
of the term, as we will soon see.
However, on both sides we find vague and ambiguous notions of what Europe and the EU
stood and stands for. Equally, on both sides the question of EU enlargement generated
reflections about the future. The vista of the future, common to both sides, was a language of
prospects, expectations, opportunities, hopes and fears. This proved to be the main language
through which people on both sides reflected on Europe and the EU. People expressed their
expectations and fears both in terms of personal as well as collective life and experience. Thus
on the one hand, we found many similar concerns on either side of the border. However,
despite such sharedness of concerns there was a difference in how these were articulated and
narrativised through distinctly local experiences and historical contexts.
In order to explore these differences and their implied issues of 'East" and 'West', we will
present both sides separately. Based on an overall assessment of all our data which dwell on
the question of Europe we suggest the following generalisation: Westerners view Europe and
the EU either through the prism of their nation or their region, sometimes through both. Seen
through the prism of the region alone, Europe is often understood as a critical reflection of the
dominance of state nationalism (this was particularly evident in some of the data from Eastern
Germany and Italy). In contrast, the prism of the nation foregrounds issues of superiority and
their own nation's positionality within differently ranked EU states. Easterners reflect Europe
predominantly through the prism of nation, and not through the region: here, however, this
reflection dwells on notions of inequality and dependency.
Narrativisation
Current members
Our 'western' interviewees belong to the current EU member-states of Germany, Italy and
Austria. Whereas West Germany and Italy were among the founding members of the EEC in
1958, the people of East Germany joined the EC with unification in 1990 and Austria became
a member only in 1995.
In the extracts below, people's sense of their experience of 'Europe' is strongly related to their
sense of being German, Italian or Austrian nationals and to the perceived relationship of their
nation with other nation-states or intra-national regions. In all cases this entails perceptions
and evaluations of political and economic power.
Extract 1: Martin Weiss (20) and Martina Schwarz (20), former German-German border,
Bavarian side (ex-FRG)
MW: Well Fischer said he was deliberately not talking as foreign secretary and so on but as a
private person and he means that that you have to create a core Europe out of the
economically strong countries and then others that you have a certain quality level in the
European Union and I think that is very good because one can't force equality because it's
obvious that Germany is erm from the economic point of view differently positioned than
Poland and that is not going to change just like that and that one has a few states too which
are a bit above the others exactly like in the United Nations the Security Council and the other
members that is a good concept.
MS: Because if you want to get everyone on the same level you can't get the others up so
quickly that means you have to SCALE DOWN on something and that is against progress.
Because other countries like the USA or Japan or someone else they don't care what we if we
stagnate they don't care they are happy about it.
Both speakers identify with Germany as an economically and politically strong state and
position the country in relation to poorer Poland and the more powerful 'USA or Japan'.
Unequal economic strength and capitalist competitiveness are portrayed as an acceptable
status quo ('one can't force equality'; 'and that is not going to change just like that'), which
provides the only sensible model for the distribution of political power in the EU. The
justification for such constitutional inequality--more votes for the rich--is gained by adopting
a narrative trope of progress and decline, according to which the poor stand in the way of
economic progress and can therefore not be treated as equals.
Extract 2: Gregor, Barenstein, German side of German-Czech Border (ex-GDR)
I: Europe?
G: Mh.--ONE thing about it makes sense perhaps. But the EURO is complete shit if you don't
mind me saying so. you (grins)--and: whether it will be good for our region when--well when
THOSE come here who offer cheap labour, it's already quite bad here. For young people
especially there is absolutely no future. It's going to be a--how shall I put it?--an old people's
home here. Young people leave. Apprenticeships and so on and so forth and once they find
something they stay there. Many go to the old lander.--I have two daughters myself. Firstly
it's such a struggle here to get an apprenticeship anyway. Normally you don't get anything
here anyway. Well yes and then: well I can see it in our neighbourhood and also among our
friends, young people stay away if they can get a job somewhere, here they don't get anything.
And then: if that gets better in a united Europe? The Czechs will come over here too.
Especially then they win come. I don't know.--well and the Euro: if you look at it it doesn't
look good.--well and that's why I would have liked to keep the hard mark (smiles).
Gregor too adopts a narrative trope of decline when asked about Europe and, like the narrators
above, sees the topic through an economic prism. In contrast to the Bavarian narrators
however, but comparable to many other East Germans, he refers to his own, his town's and his
region's socio-economic grievances and their experience with economic decline and outmigration to the 'old Bundeslander'. In relation to this state of affairs 'united Europe' does not
offer hope but rather the prospect of further insecurity and loss, aggravated by the imminent
immigration of the neighbouring much poorer Czechs. (3)
Extract 3: Irka Kalzmann, middle generation, Eisenkappel, Austria
An interesting topic al:/alto/altogether.--here we had the I mean
the: referendum where you were asked about joining the EU yes or
no.--and after that also about the members of the EU parliament you
were asked WHO HOW.--on the first as well as on the second occasion
I voted against it. I am against the EU. And the second time I have:
I didn't even go to vote even though I was a supervisor--at the
polling station. I didn't even vote because I said I was: against
the EU b/bef/before. And now I am not interested either about who:
goes there because it's such a topic:/I don't like the EU. Even
though on the other hand/I say to myself/it's not bad: if I can
use: well a common currency. I mean: it saves you money and makes
things easier. Of course if you don't have to wait at border
crossing points or wait in queues and so on. Erm: I have to wait or
I have to declare goods well: and: MANY other things as well. Common
sense tells me that. But on the other hand--I have to say that
because of these: border openings and especially with these:
southern states criminality is very--high. And no one can deny that
and I always say this if something like this gets discussed. Once
you open the newspaper--or you turn on the TV. It's only foreigners.
And only foreigners--mainly--well I believe you can see that 90% are
Yugoslavs, Kosovo Albanians Rumanians--less of those because they
don't come up here so much. Well they are--no matter whether you
look at Austria or if you look at the criminality in Germany or
Switzerland or well: in: other European states wherever they reach.
Well this: th/this is really terrible.
Irka Kalzmann's narrative reflects the fairly recent accession of Austria to the EU and
shows its contested nature. As many interviews with our Austrian informants (on the Slovene
as well as Hungarian border) show, the sanctions imposed by the EU because of the rightwing
election success in 1999 revived anew the membership question. She voices strong oppostion
to EU membership, juxtaposing it however with some advantages. Unlike the previous
narrator's, her knowledge is not explained as experiential: while the reasons for her dislike of
the EU first remain unexplained, its advantages are based on 'common sense'. The main
argument, however, is made with regard to 'border-openings' in general, whose threatening
nature is explained by a racist discourse about migrating criminals from 'southern states'. This
assertion is authorised by the reference to media reports about the criminal nature of
'foreigners'. Extract 4: Gialli (17), Gorizia, Italy
G: Well, what can I say? I hope that there will be an overcoming of the national dimension,
with the EU, and I hope that in 15 years we win be able to create a strong cohesion, to be
European citizens, and not only Italian citizens, to go around, to live, to work, to look after
our health, freely, in the EU, I hope this will be real, and I hope we will overcome the local
dimensions, in which each nation wants to gain more and more money; now they don't want
to collaborate, but I trust in the EU and I trust in its growth, I'm not afraid of the opening to
the East, at least for the nearer nations of the East.
I: Do you feel integrated or feel that you are accepted from a professional point of view in a
national context, international context or more?
G: I hope in a European sense rather than in a national one.
I: And now do you feel more Friulian, more Italian, or more European?
G: No, I don't feel Italian, I feel Friulian and European.
I: Why not Italian?
G: Well, I know the present situation, I already think about Europe, and I think about a
Europe in which it will not matter whether you are Italian, but the regional characteristics will
be crucially important, and then the belonging to the United States of Europe.
This narrative recorded in Gorizia on the Italian-Slovene border represents a positive, if not
utopian outlook. Italian nationhood (and nationalism) and Friulian regionalism are played off
against each other, with the EU promising an emphasis on the latter and therefore bearing a
'liberating' future for Friulians. Here the evolutionist trope is clearly one of progress, not on
the basis of preserving a status quo but on the basis of overcoming it. Interestingly, such
discourses also occurred several times in earlier interviews on the eastern German border with
Poland, when informants in the town of Guben articulated a strong regional identity (the
federal state of Brandenburg) and for the EU, or even the EU as the only identification,
leaving Germany out of the equation. (4) In striking contrast to the first extract (from 'western
Germany' which has had EU membership for the same length of time as Italy), the EU is
envisioned as an ideal human project that rises above economic concerns and leads to equality
among members.
These 'western' extracts are not entirely representative, in the sense that they stand for
everyone's views in the individual narrator's community. Our data also bears evidence for
other, differently accentuated or more negative or positive personal opinions. However, if one
looks at the terms of debate people draw on, or their narrative tropes and plots, many parallels
emerge that make comparison within as well as across communities possible. As we have
seen, all narrators tell a tale of development and change, either drawing on metaphors of
progress or decline. Relatedly, all present themselves as movers or stayers of some sort, as
people who undergo change themselves or who remain unchanged.
What seems important with regard to understanding the link between personal experiences
and larger, public or collective institutions like the EU, the state, or indeed the state border, is
the sense of identification or disidentification with symbols of power that these narratives
entail. In the first extract, the narrators' experience is rooted in the shared ethnicity with the
majority members of their state. They come from Bavaria but above all identify themselves as
'Germans', which corresponds with a powerful and privileged form of nationhood. This
emerges narratively in the assumption of a homogenous nation, the identification with the
foreign secretary's statement and the assumption of a collective 'we', implying Germany and
other powerful nations. There is a complete absence of any references to the region, the
former border or to personal experience that might complicate the picture. Instead the plot is
guided by a supposedly commonsense principle: economic power should equal political
power.
The second extract from the 'East German' border is more complex. The narrator lives in a
community that shares ethnicity with the majority members of their nation-state (if only
newly gained), but is different and disadvantaged with regard to economic prosperity. In
narrative, this materialises in the representation of a non-homogenous nation: he identifies the
region as opposed to the 'old states', represents local socio-economic grievances and refers to
personal anxiety and struggle. Gregor's plot is led by the enforced disappearance of the
German mark ('I would have liked to keep the mark') and the subsequent loss of economic
security and of the community's young people who are forced to move elsewhere for work.
The third extract from the Austrian-Slovene border is equally based on the experience of
shared ethnicity with other Austrians and on the assumption of a homogenous nation, albeit in
a relationship of tension with the EU. Here too the narrator feels part of a bounded national
in-group, also by virtue of strongly identifying against the supranational EU. Her plot is
guided by the motif of personal feelings and actions by which she asserts powerful public
narratives and privileged subject positions: Austrian independence (vis-a-vis the EU),
Austrian nationals who can enjoy easy border-crossing travel, and racist media reports about
'foreigners'.
The fourth extract is the only one that is not steeped in the experience of a shared dominant
ethnicity--here a regional Friulian minority status stands opposed to the Italian national
'centre'. The narrator disidentifies with Italy, but identifies with a collective European 'we' and
a personal Friulian 'I'. He envisions a harmonious relationship between Friaul and Europe
which will generate a form of supranational 'citizenship'. Again this plot is guided by a
principle: that the overcoming of nationalism will ensure freedom and equality.
This summary shows that the differences of these narratives are rooted in the locally specific
experiences and concerns of our narrators. Contrary to what one might expect, the question of
Europe did not raise many grand commitments to Europeanness and only very little
imaginative activity as to what that might mean. Even the positive and idealistic Gorizian
narrative is clearly set in a local experience.
We can see, however, that for all of our 'western' interviewees the question of Europe
triggered reflections about nationhood and self-positionings vis-a-vis one's own nation-state.
Their dis/identifications reflected not only a sense of how much power they assigned to their
nation, but also where they stood as individual citizens with regard to a powerful (however
qualified) national centre. The West German and Austrian narrative established an
uncomplicated relationship in this regard; the East German and Italian extract revealed a more
complicated view. Interestingly, it is only these two extracts where the narrators imagine
themselves as cross-border movers and as people who undergo change: East German
movement into the more prosperous West and the Friulian movement into the de-nationalised
European space. Whereas in the first case this is presented as a curse, in the second it emerged
as a promise.
These reasonings on individual citizenship and nationhood (and the sense of security or
insecurity this entailed) also related to 'outside' threats. It was in this sense that the Europe
question was turned into an out-grouping device: all narrators refer to the former communist
East (Poland, Czech Republic, Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Albania, Romania) and even the
idealistic Gorizian limits his vision of freely moving and exchanging Europeans to the 'nearer
states of the East' and makes a case for 'membership'. In all cases these 'outsiders' are
imagined as predisposed cross-border movers who provide threats to one's sense of security
and belonging.
Applicant states
The data we draw on from the Eastern side of the current EU border were all collected in
states which are in the so-called 'first wave' of applicants and will all provisionally join the
EU during 2004. These states are Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. At the
time of the interviews, public debates around enlargement were largely focused on potential
dates of accession and the fulfilment of the stringent criteria required of applicant states.
Enlargement thus became a national issue, seen through the national media, often in terms of
direct comparisons with the direct neighbour across the EU border. This comparison and the
often painful experience of rapid socio-economic upheaval in the previous decade are the foils
against which our interviewees attempt to understand what EU membership might mean to
them. They express fears of exploitation and dominance, often tapping into discourses which
are centuries old. But hopes of rapid economic improvement are also prevalent. In the extract
below, a middle-aged inhabitant of the Polish town of Zgorzelec reflects on the hurdles to EU
membership from a position of marked inferiority:
Extract 5: Kajetan Grom, middle generation, Zgorzelec, Poland
KG: Eeh for this for what for Europe one needs to grow up.
I: Really? Haven't we grown up?
KG: I think not. We haven't. We as Poles here I mean in this region.
I: I see.
KG: No.
I: Why is that?
KG: I was I saw myself how everything is organised. Over there somebody will say that this
is for this and this is for that and it is like this. And in our (place) come on!
I: I see.
KG: No no this is because there is no discipline at all in our nation. I mean here. There isn't.
Everyone does everyone thinks about themselves, is an egotist. Everyone is an egotist because
they think about themselves only about their own business, but Europe?
In this extract Europe is used as an out-group, synonymous with the current Western
European EU, and is a positively-loaded aspirational term used to contrast with the perception
of the speaker's own national in-group. The distinction is drawn in terms of maturity; Poland
is a child which 'needs to grow up' with 'no discipline at all' and where 'everyone is an egotist'.
A uni-directional progression might be inferred from this analogy; children with time become
adults. But its force clearly lies in the assertion of difference and the difficulties involved in
overcoming them, with some doubt as to whether this is even possible.
Extract 6: Ana Strel, middle generation, Jezersko, Slovenia
Our political situation is just down to zero and if you follow the
papers or the news programme the TV this is obvious there is no
(sighs) we are not yet ripe for Europe.--also Europe will not
accept us: eh: as chaotic as we are. Certainly not.--a PITy right
because after all we are still in Europe--although we are more on
the BALkans than/more DOWN than up but (reconstructed)
right--I think that we are/that we are REALLY the most developed
--republic of former Yugoslavia and eh:--we are rather advanced in
science as we have a lot of SCIENtists and also a LOt of CLEver
people--ONly the leadership is not the right one--isn't it. And I
think that many people would agree with me in that.--I don't know
what it win be like.
In the extract above, it is clear how ambivalent the term Europe is for this middle-aged
woman from the Slovenian town of Jezersko. In her first few phrases she uses the word
Europe three times. The first two instances refer only to the current EU, something which
Slovenia aspires to become part of, but which remains elusive. This elusiveness is explained
again in terms of maturity, order and superiority/inferiority. As in extract 5 above, the EU is
seen as a benchmark of maturity and order with which to contrast one's own nation ('we are
not ripe for Europe', 'as chaotic as we are'). The other obstacle is seen as the EU's rejection
('they won't let us in'). Immediately in the next line, Slovenia's claim to Europeanness is then
stressed in a more geographical sense ('after all we are still in Europe') where the borders of
Europe have clearly expanded. Their limits are, however, then exposed with the introduction
of another Other: in this case the Balkans, and to some extent synonymously, the former
Yugoslavia, both of which are used to exemplify a negatively-charged non-Europeanness.
Ana establishes a continuum at whose ends are the mutually exclusive Europe and the
Balkans and tries to negotiate Slovenia's position on this continuum, at one point establishing
its Balkan-ness ('Although we are more on the Balkans') which again is negatively valued
('more DOWN than up'). She then tries to establish a superior position within this Balkanness:
'We are REALLY the most developed--republic of former Yugoslavia'. This state of advanced
development is described in terms of having scientists and educated people. Implicitly,
Slovenia's claim to Europeanness is thus strengthened, a point mirrored in some interviews
elsewhere along the border. For example, a German woman from Gorlitz referred to Poland's
universities as a reason why it should be admitted.
But there is no clear sense of progression in time. In the end, Ana is unable to predict the
future and identifies another group who might be to blame for Slovenia's lack of progress:
their national political leaders. This again is typical for the Eastern side of the border: a lack
of faith in the abilities of the national elite to protect the national interest, whether negativelymarked as corruption or more neutrally as inexperience.
Extract 7: Lujza Seres, 77, Pinkamindszent, Hungary
Heaven [lit: the cuckoo] knows. Everything. You hope and are afraid
too. No? [laughs] There will certainly be something which won't turn
out as expected. But well, who knows? You can never know. Who knows,
we might also be abandoned, or it [= EU] might also collapse, because
it will collapse just like all the other firms, won't it? I think
so. Well, who knows what will come of the world. We'll stay in our
place, whether it be good or bad.
Lujza's extract shows several features typical of many of our older-generation
interviewees. Her extract is full of uncertainty ('you can never know', 'who knows?') which is
markedly fatalistic. This is a woman who has experienced so many radical changes in her
lifetime that she doubts the permanence of any event. The EU and the process of
Enlargement, which elsewhere seems irrevocable, uni-directional and permanent, is seen as
transient and fragile ('or it might also collapse'). The EU is linked directly to the economic
experience of the last decade and the consequences of the transformation to a market-based
economy ('just like all the other firms'). The only permanence she holds on to is her
rootedness to her life in the village, come what may. Enlargement is not something she
expects to gain from, but something which will bring only more uncertain upheavals. Extract
8: Zdenek, young generation, Vejprty, Czech Republic
I: And what about the European Union, is there any help or not?
Z: It will help us I would say.
I: Will it be better?
Z: I would say yes and I don't know if, according to me the Germans would be the loser that
[laughs] in my opinion it will be such hrrr everyone will rush there and I don't know and the
Germans what: everyone will want to go and work there I suppose and perhaps on the
contrary that some companies will come here I don't know--well I would want it and it will be
interesting.
I: Well and you will join the border police and the EU will come.
Z: I don't know, I will be jobless [laughs].
Zdenek's extract here is interesting as an example of a young-generation interviewee who sees
several possibilities in the enlargement process, not all of which are negative. Again,
uncertainty is emphasised, but not in quite the fatalistic, paralysing sense of Lujza above.
Zdenek takes on some of the common fears of the Other, in this case his German neighbours
across the border from his Czech village. The image of the invading mass crossing the border
in search of work is raised, only to be undermined by the prospect of inward investment and
more employment for his own area. This he values positively ('well I would want it'). The
interviewer then highlights the paradox of his own position, wanting to join the border police
which will soon no longer exist.
Common to all the extracts above, and to most of the narratives collected on the eastern side
of the border, is a sense of uncertainty, powerlessness and disenfranchisement. There are
many examples where the interviewee responds positively to the idea of 'Europe' in a vague,
general sense, but this is followed up with professions of ignorance, uncertainty or lack of
interest. In some cases this was clearly a distancing strategy, a signal that they do not wish to
engage with the issue. In others the interviewee shows a willingness to follow the debate,
mainly through the national media (see the start of extract 6), and a desire to forma conclusion
about it but cannot decide between 'those on the one hand who say it will be good, and then
the others who say it will be bad'. Alibis are often used to excuse their lack of clarity: 'Even
the cleverest don't know'.
In general, most Eastern interviewees were uncertain about their future in the new Europe,
and all agreed it is something which will happen to them and not something which they will
be active in shaping. Figures of power are referred to, often obliquely as an ill-defined 'they',
or not at all. In some cases a national elite is mentioned, but it is often dismissed as corruptor
its power is seen as relative and ambivalent, especially vis-a-vis the European Union.
Conclusion
We have argued in our paper that as a lived concept of everyday experience Europe and the
EU do not enter the narratives of people on the current EU's Eastern and South-Eastern border
even when confronted with the visible signs of the EU's positive presence (support for
regional or transregional developments). As an in-grouping device it remains curiously empty
with the local and historical context overriding the larger transnational issues of transcending
national structures. In all cases the European Union provided some prism for people's
identification, positive or negative, with a stronger implicit overlap between the EU and
Europe on the western side and a more ambivalent and explicit double-vision on the eastern
side. Underlying all these narratives about the future of the EU, especially for those who live
on its current eastern margins, are threads of insecurity and fear mixed with some sense of
promise of a better economic existence. Narratives were invariably complex, often ambivalent
and by no means clearly divided according to positive or negative evaluations. They would
certainly be difficult to capture by blunt instruments such as ticking a box about being either
pro or contra the EU or Europe. Even though people often phrased their views in terms of pro
or contra opinions, there was no clear-cut match between a pro-European stance and a liberal
discourse, nor did a contra-European stance neatly match an anti-liberal discourse. While
positive views of Europe could be couched in highly elitist, exclusivist discourses, negative
views were sometimes articulated within visions of a free and borderless transnational society.
People discursive|y construct implicit in-groups of 'us' at those points when explicit outgrouping devices against 'them' are most prevalent. Europeans east and west seem to feel a
sense of belonging to some vague notion of Europe most actively when they draw a line
against less privileged outsiders who have not quite earned the right of an entry ticket.
Notes
(1) Brief overview of EU history: 1949 Council of Europe (and NATO); 1958 EEC (France,
Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg, West Germany); 1967 EC; 1973 accession of UK,
Ireland, Denmark; 1981 accession of Greece; 1986 accession of Spain and Portugal; 1990
accession of East Germany with German unification; 1992 EC becomes EU; 1995 accession
of Austria, Sweden and Finland; May 2004 expected accession of inter alia Poland, Czech
Republic, Hungary and Slovenia.
(2) For more on the use of photographs in interviews see Meinhof and Galasinski (2000).
(3) See also the articles by Wastl-Walter et al. and Holly et al. in this special issue.
(4) The German/Polish border towns of Guben/Gubin and the Bavarian/Thuringian
communities of Tiefengrun and Hirschberg were studied by Meinhof and Galasinski in 1999
2000 in a smaller ESRC-funded study preceding the EU Framework project (cf. Meinhof and
Galasinski 2000, 2002a).
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Author details
Heidi Armbruster was a Research Fellow on the EU Border Identities Project and is currently
Lecturer in German Social and Political Studies at the University of Southampton. She may
be contacted at:
School of Modern Languages
University of Southampton
Southampton
SO17 1BJ
UK
E-mail: H.Armbruster@soton.ac.uk
Craig Rollo was a Research Assistant on the EU Border Identities Project at the University of
Southampton.
E-mail: cr121@gmx.de
Ulrike H. Meinhof is Professor and Chair of German and Cultural Studies at the University of
Southampton, and Co-ordinator of the EU Border Identities Project.
School of Modern Languages
University of Southampton
Southampton
SO17 1BJ
UK
E-mail: U.H.Meinhof@soton.ac.uk
-1Questia Media America, Inc. www.questia.com
Publication Information: Article Title: Imagining Europe: Everyday Narratives in European
Border Communities. Contributors: Heidi Armbruster - author, Ulrike H. Meinhof - author,
Craig Rollo - author. Journal Title: Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Volume: 29.
Issue: 5. Publication Year: 2003. Page Number: 885+. COPYRIGHT 2003 Commission for
Racial Equality; COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group