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Po Garden
Researcher
Unit for Social and Environmental Research (USER) ,Faculty of Social Sciences,
Chiang Mai University
po@sea-user.org
Title of Paper: Thai case study on flood in Chiang Mai
Abstract
Chiang Mai city flooded five times between August and November 2005. It was the most disastrous
rainy season in decades. The recently developed early warning system was in place but using it was a
tough learning experience for both the people and the bureaucracies. Its credibility was first challenged
and later its usefulness was proven. Questioned were raised about appropriate preparations to mitigate
flood damage. Bureaucracies and local government struggled to meet public expectations. They
reorganized. They came up with plans and they reacted opportunistically.
Community radio played a crucial part with a week long quid pro quo sessions in bringing
understanding about the warning system to the public. It also helped officials to better help flood
victims. It gave local government politicians more voice as they struggled to meet their constituents
expectations. In a later flood event there were also long sessions that helped the public understand the
limitations of the warning system.
The next flood episode was different. Rain was concentrated on the mountainous parts north west of
Chiang Mai. Unlike the previous flood water did not began over flow the banks of the Ping River. The
river had monitoring stations and flood levels could be measured six-seven hours before reaching
Chiang Mai. Instead the water rushed down the mountains to the west of the city overwhelming drains
and flowing down roads and even across bridges into town..
In the last major flood event that year, Chiang Mai city was well warned and well prepared for
Typhoon Damray. Banks of sand bags were erected and military forces were assigned to look after it.
The commercial business area was protected, but at a cost to people down stream from it. Water came
to them faster and deeper. Mobs were tearing down sandbags bank just as others struggled to keep
them intact. Much of the effort to mitigate flood damage was wasted. The warning gave time for
governments to redistribute the risk and some perceived it to be unfair.
In the epilogue, the floods stimulated reorganization of politics and bureaucratic re- organizations
which were further complicated by political stalemate and subsequent coup at the national level. What
emerged as a biggest single project in 2007 was a Royal Irrigation effort to modernize Ping river
management by tearing down traditional weirs and replacing them with a modern irrigation dam with
water gates. Academic and NGOs protested on grounds that seem primarily symbolic. The farmers
whose livelihoods depend on traditional weirs questioned the irrigation department’s technical
competency and the effectiveness of the modern structures.
In 2005 a new level of expectation for the performance of local governments to manage flood was
raised and it also opportunistically struggled to meet the challenge. Chiang Mai municipality
ambitiously dredged Ping river and later it was quickly engulfed in corruption scandal over the dredged
sand which could be used for construction. Never the less, in 2007 municipality mayor election
candidates boasted on what they did in 2005 with pictures of themselve in chest high water.