devlopment of an early warning system incorporating advanced

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Robert M. Clark Current Version Feb 20, 2003
DEVLOPMENT OF AN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM
INCORPORATING ADVANCED MONITORING AND MODELING
FOR DRINKING WATER SECURITY AND SAFETY
A Proposal Submitted to …….
This is sensitive and confidential and should not be forwarded or e-mailed.
The original e-mail should be immediately deleted twice (2 times) after a
single copy is made for review.
February 20, 2002
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Abstract.
The events of September 11, 2002 have raised national and regional concerns over the
need to protect our nation’s drinking water systems from deliberate acts of terrorism.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Region II Office and Rutgers University’s
Center for Information Management, Integration and Connectivity (CIMIC), have
responded to this concern by developing plans for a Water Security Consortium. The
consortium consisting of the USEPA, CIMIC the American Water Works Service
Company (AWWSC), the Passaic Valley Water Commission (PVWC), the North Jersey
District Water Supply Commission (NJDWSC), the N.J. Department of Environmental
Protection, and the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS), is called the Regional Drinking
Water Security and Safety Consortium (RDWSSC). It is intended to provide a prototype
institution for cooperation and communication among federal, state, and local
governments in the case of a water security emergency. It will serve a number of other
functions, including providing a test platform for the development of advanced and
evolving monitoring technologies for maintaining water security in U.S Drinking Water
Supplies.
It will also facilitate modeling assessments for the verification of water
security threats and the development of decision support systems for prompt response,
remediation and recovery to actual or perceived threats. A proposal to support research
funding for the Consortium to pursue the development of an Early Warning System to
protect source and finished water is presented.
This is sensitive and confidential and should not be forwarded or e-mailed.
The original e-mail should be immediately deleted twice (2 times) after a
single copy is made for review.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The events of September 11, 2002 raised concerns over the Nation’s critical
infrastructure including water and waste water systems. The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (USEPA) responded by establishing a Water Protection Task Force
(WPTF) composed of members of the USEPA’s Office of Water, Regional Office staff
and liaisons from other USEPA programs. The WPTF was given the responsibility for
improving the security of the nation’s drinking water and waste water infrastructure.
Security of water systems is not a new issue and the potential for natural, accidental
and purposeful contamination has been the subject of many studies. For example, in May
1998, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 that outlined a
policy on critical infrastructure protection including our nation’s water supplies.
However, it wasn’t until after September 11, 2002 that the water industry truly focused
on the vulnerability of the nation’s water supplies to security threats. In recognition of
current water security concerns President George Bush signed The Bioterrorism Act into
law in June 2002.
Water systems in the United States range from very large to very small. The WPTF
is developing a program to cover all of these systems and is working in collaboration
with the USEPA’s Office of Research and Development (ORD) by developing a
comprehensive research agenda for water security.
One of the first tasks undertaken by the WPTF was the preparation of a State-of-theKnowledge (SoK) report for the Office of Homeland Security. The responsibility for the
report was assigned to the Task Force by the National Security Council (NSC). The
report summarized the accumulated knowledge of various agencies involved in homeland
security by characterizing and assessing the nature of threat agents, and prevention,
protection, response and remediation strategies to counteract these threats.
In collaboration with the WPTF, EPA’s Office of Research and Development has
developed a Home Land Security Research Strategy Document that covers water security
research, building decontamination and rapid risk assessment. One aspect of this strategy
was the development of a National Center for Homeland Security Research (NCHSR) in
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Cincinnati, OH with the responsibility for furthering the development of technology to
enhance homeland security. A major aspect of this research is the development of
strategies and technology for protecting U.S. drinking water systems.
In June, 2002, Rutgers University and EPA’s Region II Office convened a workshop
entitled
“Monitoring and Modeling Drinking Water Systems for Security and Safety.”
Attendees from industry, local, state and Federal agencies and members from academia
discussed the state-of-the-art in the area of water system security. As a consequence of
these discussions, a consortium was formed and a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) was drafted, proposing the establishment of a Regional Drinking Water Security
and Safety Consortium (RDWSSC).
The goal of the MOU was to implement the
drinking water security recommendations of the workshop. The Consortium consisting
of Rutgers University’s CIMIC, the American Water Works Service Company
(AWWSC), the Passaic Valley Water Commission (PVWC), the North Jersey District
Water Supply Commission (NJDWSC), the N.J. Department of Environmental
Protection, the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS), and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Region II Office identified the development of early warning systems for source
and distributed water as being of critical importance. In this context, an early warning
system (EWS) is an integrated system of monitoring stations located at strategic points in
a water utilities source waters or in its distribution system, designed to warn against
contaminants that might threaten the health and welfare of drinking water consumers.
This proposal is intended to seek funding to implement this concept on a prototype basis
in the RDWSSC.
As will be discussed later in this proposal, an EWS should be
integrated or packaged with appropriate sensors and predictive modeling capability.
In December, 2002 a follow-up to the previous workshop was held to further refine
the needs for research as related to Early Warning Systems for security in drinking water.
After this meeting the Consortium representatives signed the MOU.
As the
organizational research arm for implementation of the recommendations, Rutgers
University has agreed to establish a Laboratory for Water Security (LWS) under CIMIC
to solicit research funding support for meeting the goals of the Consortium. The research
team soliciting support under the leadership of LWS includes LWS, the USGS,
AWWSC, PVWC, and NJDWSC. The USEPA Region II and the NJDEP, although
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members of the Consortium, will not participate directly in the proposal.
A more
detailed description of the nature of the threat, the Consortium’s response to that threat,
the make-up of the research team and the supporting partners and their roles are discussed
in the following section.
2. NATURE OF THE THREAT
There are nearly 60,000 community water supplies in the United States serving over 226
million people. Over 63 % of these systems supply water to less then 2.4 % of the
population and 5.4 % supply water to 78.5 % of the population. Most of these systems
provide water to less then 500 people. In addition there are 140,000 non-community
water systems that serve schools, recreational areas, trailer parks, etc.
Some of the common elements associated with water supply systems in the U.S. are
as follows:

A water source which may be a surface impoundment such as a lake, reservoir,
river or ground water from an aquifer.

Surface supplies generally have conventional treatment facilities including
filtration, which removes particulates and potentially pathogenic microorganisms,
followed by disinfection.

Transmission systems which include tunnels; reservoirs and/or pumping facilities;
and storage facilities.

A distribution system carrying finished water through a system of water mains
and subsidiary pipes to consumers
Community water supplies are designed to deliver water under pressure and generally
supply most of the water for fire fighting purposes. Loss of water or a substantial loss of
pressure could disable fire fighting capability, interrupt service and disrupt public
confidence.
This loss might result from sabotaging pumps that maintain flow and
pressure, or disabling electric power sources could cause long term disruption. Many of
the major pumps and power sources in water systems have custom designed equipment
and could take months or longer to replace 2 .
2.1 Vulnerability of Water Systems
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Water systems are spatially diverse and therefore, have an inherent potential to be
vulnerable to a variety of threats —physical, chemical, and biological— that may
compromise the system’s ability to reliably deliver safe water. There are several areas of
vulnerability including (1) the raw water source (surface or groundwater); (2) raw water
channels and pipelines; (3) raw water reservoirs; (4) treatment facilities; (5) connections
to the distribution system; (6) pump stations and valves; and (7) finished water tanks and
reservoirs. Each of these system elements presents unique challenges to the water utility
in safeguarding the water supply2 .
2.2 Physical Disruption
The ability of a water supply system to provide water to its customers can be
compromised by destroying or disrupting key physical elements of the water system.
Key elements include raw water facilities (dams, reservoirs, pipes, and channels),
treatment facilities, and distribution system elements (transmission lines and pump
stations).
Physical disruption may result in significant economic cost, inconvenience and loss of
confidence by customers, but has a limited direct threat to human health. Exceptions to
this generalization include (1) destruction of a dam that causes loss of life and property in
the accompanying flood wave and (2) an explosive release of chlorine gas at a treatment
plant.
Water utilities should examine their physical assets, determine areas of vulnerability,
and increase security accordingly.
An example of such as action might be to switch
from chlorine gas to liquid hypochlorite, especially in less secure locations which
decrease the risk of exposure to poisonous chlorine gas. Redundant system components
would provide backup capability in case of accidental or purposeful damage to facilities.
2.3 Contamination
Contamination is generally viewed as the most serious potential terrorist threat to water
systems.
Chemical or biological agents could spread throughout a distribution system
and result in sickness or death among the consumers and for some agents, the presence of
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the contaminant might not be known until emergency rooms reported an increase in
patients with a particular set of symptoms. Even without serious health impacts, just the
knowledge that a group had breached a water system could seriously undermine
customers’ confidence in the water supply.
Accidental contamination of water systems has resulted in many fatalities as well.
Examples of such outbreaks include cholera contamination in Peru, Cryptosporidium
contamination in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (U.S.), and Salmonella contamination in
Gideon, Missouri (U.S.). In Gideon, the likely culprit was identified as pigeons infected
with Salmonella, that had entered a tank’s corroded vents and hatches.
The U.S. Army has conducted extensive testing and research on potential biological
agents 1. Table 1 summarizes information on the agents most likely to have an impact on
water systems. Though much is known about these agents, as is evident in the table,
there is still research needed to fully characterize the impacts, stability and tolerance to
chlorine of many of these agents.
Table 1. Potential Threat of Selected Biological Agents to Water Systems1
Agent
Anthrax
Cholera
Plague
Salmonella
Shigellosis
Tuleremia
Aflatoxin
Botulinum toxins
Cryptosporidiosis
Microcystins
Ricin
Staph enterotoxins
Tetrodotoxin
T-2 mycotoxin
Hepatitus A
Saxitoxin
Type
Bacteria
Bacteria
Bacteria
Bacteria
Bacteria
Bacteria
Biotoxin
Biotoxin***
Protozoan**
Biotoxin
Biotoxin
Biotoxin
Biotoxin
Biotoxin
Virus
Biotoxin
Stable In Water
2 years (spores)
‘Survives well’
16 days
8 days, fresh water
2 – 3 days
Up to 90 days
Probably stable
Stable
Stable days or more
Probably stable
Unknown
Probably stable
Unknown
Stable
Unknown
Stable
*
Chlorine* Tolerance
Spores resistant
‘Easily killed’
Unknown
Inactivated
Inactivated 0.05 ppm, 10 min
Inactivated 1 ppm, 5 min
Probably tolerant
Inactivated 6 ppm, 20 min
Oocysts resistant
Resistant at 100 ppm
Resistant at 10 ppm
Unknown
Inactivated 50 ppm
Resistant
Inactivated 0.4 ppm, 30 min
Resistant at 10 ppm
Ambient temperature; < 1 ppm free available chlorine for 30 minutes or as
indicated
** Consisting of one cell or of a colony of like or similar cells
***Toxic to humans
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Characteristics that would enhance the potential for an agent to contaminate a drinking
or recreational water include:

Resistance to disinfectants at normal concentrations

Resistance to boiling for 1 minute

A low oral infectious dose

Easy availability

Ease to culture without sophisticated equipment

Survival in water for long periods of time

Difficult to remove by common water treatment practices
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has defined three categories of
potentially threatening organisms as listed below.
1. Category A Agents/Water Threat
a. Variola major (smallpox)
b. Bacillus antrhacis (anthrax)
c. Yersinia pestis (plague)
d. Clostridium botulinum toxin (botulism)
e. Francisella tularensis (tulararemia)
f. Filoviruses

Ebola hemorrhagic fever

Marburg hemorrhagic fever and arenaviruses

lassa (Lassa fever)

Junin (Argentine hemorrhagic fever) and related viruses
2. Category B Agents/Water Threat
a. Coxiella burnetti (Q fever)
b. Brucella species (brucellosis)
c. Burkholderia mallei (glanders)
d. Alphaviruses

Venezuelan encephalomyelitis

Eastern and western equine encephalomyelitis
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e. Ricin toxin from Ricinus communis (castor beans)
f. Epsilon toxin of Clostridium perfringens
g. Staphylococcus enterotoxin B
A subset of the List B agents includes pathogens that are food or waterborne. These
pathogens include but are not limited to:
o Salmonella species
o Sligella dysenteriae
o Escherichia coli O157:H7
o Vibro cholerae
o Cryptosporidium parvum
3. Category C Agents/Water Threats
a. Nipah virus
b. Hantaviruses
c. tickborne hemorrhagic fever viruses
d. tickborne encephalitis viruses
e. yellow fever
f. multidrug-resistant tuberculosis
Although all of the above agents (and many others) could result in very significant
health impacts, the risks vary considerably. For example, Botulinus toxin because of its
lethality in very small doses is considered to be among the most serious threats. There
are many factors that contribute to the relative risk of the various agents including
availability, lethality, stability, and tolerance to chlorine or other disinfectants.
Deininger and Meier (2000) ranked some agents and compounds in terms of their
relative factor of effectiveness, R, based on lethality and solubility using the following
equation3:
R = solubility in water (in mg/L) / (1000 × lethal dose (in mg/human))
Table 2 lists values of R for various biological agents and chemicals by decreasing
level of effectiveness (that is, decreasing degree of lethality in water).
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Many locations within the overall water supply system are vulnerable to the
introduction of chemical or biological agents.
In many cases, the most accessible
location is in the raw surface water source.
An agent introduced in a surface water source is subject to dilution, exposure to
sunlight, and treatment therefore it follows that the most serious threats are posed by an
agent introduced into the finished water at a treatment facility or within the distribution
system. Possible points of entry include the treatment plant clear well, distribution system
storage tanks and reservoirs, pump stations, and direct connections to distribution system
mains.
Table 2. Relative Toxicity of Some Poisons in Water
COMPOUND
Botulinus Toxin A
VX
Sarin
Nicotine
Colchicine
Cyanide
Amiton
Fluoroethanol, Sodium, Fluoroacetate
Selenite
Arsenite, Arsenate
Based on Deininger and Meier (2000)
R
10000
300
100
20
12
9
5
1
1
1
3.0 PURPOSE OF THE CONSORTIUM
The purpose of the Consortium is to provide a forum where federal, state and local
government agency representatives, highly talented scientists, water utility professionals,
and leaders in the area of water security can share their expertise and resources. It
provides a means of communication among federal, state and local levels of government
to address water security threats. The Consortium will also provide a test bed to study
the advanced and still evolving technologies to monitor drinking water resources and
distribution networks in order to better protect the public.
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Specifically, all parties intend to:

Participate and offer expertise as well as available facilities as appropriate,

Collaborate on the testing and evaluation of advanced technologies to monitor and
model water quality in real-time,

Attend periodic group meetings and participate in workshops.
It is envisioned that this Consortium may grow in the future to incorporate other
universities, utilities and possibly other agencies as appropriate and mutually acceptable.
There have been inquiries from outside water utilities about joining the Consortium. The
work of the Consortium will include, but not be limited to: organizing and conducting
workshops; convening seminars on relevant technology applications; developing training
opportunities for Consortium affiliated personnel; and conducting real time pilot studies.
This work will be carried out collaboratively with the participating Consortium members
utilizing a variety of analytical, modeling, real-time prototyping field sensor experiments,
and software modeling engineering approaches. It is expected that such pilot studies will
benefit the security needs of the participating water utility members by leading to future
operational implementation and validation of potential sensor technology applications
and modeling refinements.
As an immediate objective toward achieving this goal, this proposal has been
prepared to solicit funding for research that will lead to the development and
implementation an end-to-end real-time monitoring and modeling early warning pilot
system that:
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Consists of currently available state-of-the-art physical, chemical and biochemical sensors, predictive modeling tools and information infrastructure,

Provides decision makers and the public with reliable and timely assessments,

Satisfies the Consortium members requirements for reliability, scalability and
accuracy under operational field conditions,

Ensures the continued safety and security of drinking water in source waters and
in distribution networks within our region and within our nation for future
generations.
4. PROPOSED RESEARCH/SCOPE OF WORK
The proposed research will consist of three separate but closely related tasks. The first
task will focus on the development of a prototype EWS based on current monitoring,
sensing and modeling technology utilizing a portion of the distribution network of one of
the Consortium’s utility members and the source water of two others. This task will be
managed by the USGS in collaboration with the three water utilities.
The second task will focus on the integration of the data generated by the
monitoring stations with appropriate predictive modeling capability. Water, both in
streams and reservoirs and in the distribution system moves in complex temporal and
spatial patterns. Modeling provides a mechanism for understanding these complexities.
This task will be managed by CIMIC.
The third task focus on the development and deployment of advanced and as yet
undeveloped sensors and development of “cutting edge” modeling systems using the
prototype EWS data and information. This task will be the responsibility of the LWS.
As mentioned previously several utilities have inquired about as the possibility of
joining the Consortium. If possible these requests will be accommodated, in such a way
as to not disturb ongoing research projects.
A tailored collaboration between a
monitoring vender and the American Water Works Association Research Foundation is
also being explored and is discussed in Appendix _
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4.1 REEARCH TO DEVELOP AN EWS
The consortium has been established in one of the most complex water systems in the
United States (Figure 1), consisting of three watershed management areas. Water is
withdrawn from the various surface sources in the watersheds and then either used
directly by a utility or distributed through a number of inter-ties to other utilities. As can
be seen in Figure 1, there are numerous surface water supplies in the three watersheds.
This interconnectivity makes the water system a very good candidate for inclusion in a
research program to develop an EWS. As mentioned earlier the USGS will manage this
research task in collaboration with the three water utilities.
Objectives of this task include:

Subtask 1: Define sensor installation test sites to maximize the benefit of existing
monitoring stations currently operated by PVWC, American Water Works, NJDWSC,
USGS and/or NJDEP. USGS monitoring stations would include river gauging,
rainfall, and water quality monitoring stations.

Subtask 2: Field test chemical and/or biological sensors that are applicable to the
potential water quality issues of concern which would include the development and
implementation of a Quality Assurance and Quality Control program for each sensor
evaluation.

Task 3: Develop long-term operation and maintenance costs as well as a cost-benefit
analysis for successful sensor technologies evaluated as part of this project.

Subtask 4: Evaluate existing monitoring efforts, both on-line and grab, to aid in
establishing response characteristics with existing data collection efforts as well as to
establish correlations with new technology sensors.
 Subtask 5: Establish appropriate response procedures for mitigation of potential
contamination events as identified by the early warning sensors and/or grab sample
data.
Because all of the utilities are regulated and have ongoing programs for monitoring there
will be some unique features associated with each utilities research contribution as
described in the following paragraphs.
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4.1.1 NJDWSC
The North Jersey District Water Supply Commission (NJDWSC) of the State of New
Jersey (NJDWS) is a public body corporate and politic of the State of New Jersey,
organized and existing pursuant to NJSA 58:5-1 et seq and is one of the largest drinking
water purveyors in the State of New Jersey. NJDWSC is unique as it can provide all
aspects of a water supply system (source water, pumping station, reservoir, treatment
plant, storage tank, and transmission/distribution systems). This gives NJDWSC the
ability to monitor and model the water supply system from source to tap.
NJDWSC provides treated water on a wholesale basis to Passaic Valley Water
Commission, as well as supplying wholesale treated water to its many contracting
municipalities and raw water to United Water New Jersey (Figure 2). NJDWSC’s
Wanaque/Monksville Reservoirs System is located in northern Passaic County, New
Jersey. The Reservoir system beginning with Upper and Lower Greenwood lakes drains
a 95 square mile watershed covering parts of Orange and Rockland counties in New York,
and Passaic County in New Jersey. The Wanaque/Monksville Reservoirs System is New
Jersey's largest (in terms of population served) water supply system. The system provides
a safe yield of 173 million gallons per day to approximately 2 million people in 90 towns
and cities in the northern half of the state. Additionally, there are two pump stations
designed to pump up to 250 million gallons per day of water from the Pompton/Passaic
Rivers and 150 million gallons per day from the Ramapo River into the Wanaque
Reservoir. These rivers are the supplementary sources of water supply to the
Wanaque Reservoir. NJDWSC’s Water Treatment Plant/Operations Center is located in
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FIGURE 2- SCHEMATIC OF NJDWSC SYSTEM
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Wanaque, NJ, where the raw water is pumped from the Wanaque Reservoir then purified
and filtered to ensure its safety and potability.
Current NJDWSC Water Quality Monitory Program
This proposal is consistent with the ongoing monitoring and modeling of NJDWSC’s
comprehensive reservoir water quality management plan which consists of:
o Real Time Water Quality Data Collection. Five computerized water quality
sensor packages (Hydrolab© Datasonde with three Remote Underwater Sampling
Stations by Apprise Technologies, Inc.) have been deployed at the following
locations: Wanaque South Pump Station, Ramapo Pump Station, and three
strategic points within the Wanaque Reservoir. Multiple water quality parameters
(pH, temperature, dissolved oxygen, conductivity, turbidity, chlorophylla) are
collected at different depths from the surface to the bottom of the water column.
o Reservoir and Stream Water Quality Test Programs. Grab sample testing consists
of:
 Daily lab algae and bacteria tests at the Water Treatment Plant’s intake.
 Weekly lab algae species and cell count tests at various locations and
depths within the Wanaque and Monksville Reservoirs during the growing
seasons.
 45 strategically selected locations throughout the watershed of the
reservoir system and the Ramapo/Pompton/Passaic Rivers.
o Performing Monthly Wanaque Water System Flow Mass Balance and Nutrient
Loading Analyses. With the information collected by the water quality
monitoring programs, the monthly reservoir mass balance and nutrient loading
analyses are prepared. The nutrient loading will be used as the basis for
formulating a short and long-term reservoir management action plan.
o Computer model simulations for forecasting (up to 12 months ahead) reservoir
storage level and Ramapo/Wanaque South pumping operations.
o Computer model predictions of the impounding reservoir water quality profiles.
o Finished (Treated) Water Test Program. NJDWSC routinely monitors the quality
of water throughout its distribution system ultimately leading to the tap.
NJDWSC conducts extensive testing throughout the service area. Testing is
performed at its fully NJDEP and USEPA Certified Water Quality laboratory.
NJDWSC’s Objectives
NJDWSC’s goals for the proposed research are as follows:
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o Install and operate the state-of-the-art continuous monitoring systems at field
locations throughout the entire water supply system.
o Install, operate and evaluate the FlowCAM system. The FlowCAM is a state-ofthe-art instrument that automatically counts, images, and analyzes the
microorganisms in the water for providing instant detection of the existence of
harmful bacteria or algal blooms, (including those associated with toxicity) and
the issuance of an early warning.
o Install, operate, and evaluate the ability of an automated biological monitoring
system/approach that meets with the goals of the EPA’s Environmental
Monitoring for Public Access and Community Tracking (EMPACT) program.
o Evaluate the accuracy of the data generated by the field instruments.
o Evaluate and install a data telemetry/remote control system to provide real-time
access to data and allow for remote operation of the monitoring systems.
o Determine if long-term operation of these monitoring systems is logistically
feasible and cost-effective.
o Determine that the system functions smoothly and reliably in a real-life setting.
o Develop predictive models for drinking water security and safety.
The parameters to be measured include (continuous measurement) measures of water
quality (pH, temperature, dissolved oxygen, specific conductivity, turbidity, and
chlorophylla) as well as microorganisms species and concentration in the water. These
parameters will communicate time-relevant data that will assist in making securityrelated and environmentally responsible decisions.
The information will provide crucial data to the improvement of water quality
simulation models that will be utilized for the purpose of security. The proposed project
is designed to supplement water quality monitoring activities currently in progress. This
project will assist in determining baseline water quality through definition of hydrologic
conditions. It will also assist in improving our understanding of water supply sources and
pollutant loading. The data will support key water supply security and operation
decisions. When the project is concluded, similar real-time monitoring stations could be
installed at other key locations throughout the state of New Jersey and the U.S.
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NJDWSC using its staff, equipment, supplies, computer software, subcontractors, etc
will perform following tasks:
o Develop Monitoring and Quality Assurance Project Plan – To ensure that water
quality data are collected, transferred to the LWS, and managed in a manner
consistent with appropriate data quality standards.
o Installation – Provide oversight on the installation of data retrieval and
instrumentation.
o Calibration, Operation and Maintenance – Assist in performing routine
equipment maintenance at each site as stipulated by the manufacturer, verifying
the water surface elevation, confirming the system is operating properly, and
taking a series of measurements at the sites to develop base line.
o Data Analysis will consist of reviewing the data for accuracy and consistency
quarterly.
NJDWSC will maintain and assist in maintenance of monitoring stations. NJDWSC will also
cooperate with the LWS and provide support to ensure real-time access to monitoring data in the
LWS database.
The Consortium will provide several unique test sites for evaluating existing and
emerging sensors and monitors. This activity supports and complements the EPA in house
testing program for water quality sensors and monitors.
NEED RESOURCE INFORMATION AND SPECIFIC DETAIL ON PROPOSED
RESEARCH
4.1.2 PVWC
The Passaic Valley Water Commission (PVWC) owns and operates the Little Falls Water
Treatment Plant (LFWTP) located in Totowa, New Jersey. The LFWTP is in the process
of being upgraded from a conventional treatment process to a high-rate ballasted sand
pretreatment process, ozone disinfection process and biological filtration. The upgrade is
scheduled to be completed in the year 2004.
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Three raw water sources are available to the LFWTP, including Point View
Reservoir water, Pompton River water and Passaic River water (see Figure 1). Point
View Reservoir water is obtained at the Plant intake by gravity; however, this supply can
only be utilized on an emergency basis in July and August. The Point View Reservoir is
refilled by pumping Pompton River water at the Jackson Avenue Pump Station.
Downstream of the Jackson Avenue Pump Station is the Wanaque South Pump Station;
this pump station is utilized to pump Pompton River water to either North Jersey
District's Water Supply Commission (NJDWSC) Wanaque Reservoir and to the LFWTP
intake. Passaic River water is fed by gravity to the LFWTP intake which is located
downstream of the confluence of the Passaic and Pompton rivers (Figure 3).
Either, or a combination of, these raw supplies is treated at the LFWTP. In
addition, finished water supplied to PVWC by NJDWSC is also distributed to the Totowa
facility. The two finished water supplies, either directly or as a blend, are distributed to
PVWC's retail and wholesale customers which represent a population of over 750,000.
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FIGURE 3.-SCHMATIC OF PVWC SYSTEM
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PVWC’s primary goal is to participate in field tests to determine viable options for online sensor technology that can be utilized to predict chemical and/or biological
anomalies either in the source or finished water supplies.
PVWC is in the process of completing a plant upgrade project that includes the
installation of 4 sourcewater monitoring stations and 2 finished water monitoring stations.
The data collected will be routed to the LFWTP’s Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) software program. The on-line monitoring stations will be utilized
to supplement grab sample data collected throughout the watershed as well as for the
finished water supplies.
The sourcewater monitoring stations will be located at the Jackson Avenue Pump
Station, Wanaque South Pump Station and at the Little Falls Water Treatment Plant
intake. In addition, an identical monitoring station will be installed at the post-recycle
stream for the LFWTP influent which represents a blend of the raw sourcewater and the
plant recycle streams prior to any treatment. Each sourcewater monitoring station will
include the installation of on-line sensors for the collection of the following water quality
data:

alkalinity

temperature

UV absorbance

particle counts

dissolved oxygen

pH
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turbidity
Finished water on-line monitoring stations will also be installed at the LFWTP to
monitor the quality of the LFWTP finished water as well as the quality of the finished
water supplied by NJDWSC. The sensors to be installed for the LFWTP finished water
include:

total organic carbon

dissolved oxygen

free chlorine residual

turbidity

pH

UV absorbance

particle counts
The sensors to be installed at the LFWTP for the finished water supplied by NJDSWC
include:

free chlorine residual

turbidity

total organic carbon

pH
PVWC proposes to evaluate available on-line chemical and/or biological sensors
at the Wanaque South Pump Station and at the two finished water supply monitoring
stations located at the LFWTP. Data collected for the field sensors can be routed through
the Commission’s SCADA system for data analysis purposes. On-line data can be
extracted from the SCADA Genesis software program and grab sample data can be
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extracted from the Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS) Labworks
software program to develop the proper data analysis of the field sensors and any
required supplemental comparisons with PVWC’s on-line sensors or grab sample data.
PVWC is also installing a neural Network Software program manufactured by Ward
Systems, Inc. that may also be utilized to supplement the overall data analysis. The data
analysis can be supplemented with rainfall, stream flow and other water quality data
currently being collected by USGS.
PVWC supplies finished water to American Water Works that consists of either finished
water obtained from the LFWTP, finished water obtained from NJDWSC, or a blend of the two
finished supplies. It may be possible to field test sensor’s within American Water Works
distribution system and/or within PVWC’s distribution system. PVWC does not have any
existing on-line monitoring stations within the distribution system but does have an established
grab-sample monitoring program. As part of this project PVWC will install _ sampling and
monitoring systems.
NEED COST AND MANPOWER INFORMATION ON INSTALLATION OF
ADDITIONAL MONITORING
4.1.3 HADDON HEIGHTS WATER SYSTEM (AWWSC)
The Haddon Heights water system is part of the New Jersey-American Water Company
which in turn part of the American Water Works Service Company, Inc. (AWWSC).
AWWSC is the largest publicly traded U.S. Corporation devoted exclusively to the
business of water. Its 6,500 associates provide water, wastewater and other related
services to 15 million people in 27 U.S. states and three Canadian provinces.The New
Jersey American Water Company provided an average of 43.55 mgd to approximately
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91,200 customers in their combined Burlington, Camden and Haddon service areas in
2001. Of the total customers, approximately 65,700 are in the Haddon system, 19,000
are in the Burlington system, and 6,500 are in the Camden system. Approximately 90
percent of the customer base is residential, 8.4 percent is commercial, 0.5 percent is
comprised of the other public authority category, and nearly 0.1 percent is industrial. The
fire service classification amounts to approximately 1 percent of the customer base.
At the end of 2001, there were 13 resale customers in the Burlington, Camden and
Gloucester Counties area that purchased water from NJAWC. The Burlington and
Haddon systems were interconnected via the regional pipeline from the Delaware
Valley Regional Water Treatment Plant in 1996. The Camden system was also
connected to the regional pipeline in late 1996 via 24-inch and 30-inch transmission
main that is routed through a part of the Haddon system. Therefore, the three systems
are being analyzed as one combined system. The combined service area of these three
systems includes portions of Burlington and Camden Counties. Many of the
municipalities served directly by NJAWC have already reached build-out. Most of the
remaining growth in the system is projected to occur in a few of the municipalities in
Burlington County, and in Voorhees, Gloucester and Cherry Hill Townships in
Camden County. A significant portion of the projected growth in usage is likely to
occur as additional re-sale usage to the growing municipalities outside of the NJAWC
service area.
The Haddon Height system will provide the basis for the distribution system monitoring
research program (Figure 4).
NEED MORE DETAIL ON THE SYSTEM, AS FOLLOWS:
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I. SIZE AND PRODUCTION
II. NUMBER OF CUSTOMERS
III. EXISITING MONITORING AND COMPLAINCE DETAILS
IV. CURRENT WATER QUALTIY MODELING PROGRAM
V. PLANS FOR INSTALLING ADDITIONAL MONITORING SYSTEMS AS
PART OF PROJECT
4.1.4 USGS
The role of the USGS as part of the consortium will be to work with the three water
utilities, primarily NJDWSC and PVWC to conduct the following activities:

Conduct reconnaissance of field conditions for optimal location of EWS locations.
Ideally, a prototype EWS at a water utility would include at least three stations—one
upstream from the surface-water intake, one near the intake, and one in the
distribution system. At first, one station will be selected in order to test the proof of
concept for collection of data and then be expanded to other stations as the sample
collection method is resolved.

Design and construct/upgrade gaging stations to house EWS equipment. Existing
structures will be used where available to minimize costs. Existing structures may
need to be expanded to house all of the needed electrical equipment, plumbing, and
sensors. Heating and air conditioning may be needed to ensure calibrated sensor
operation at all temperatures and field conditions.

Install, operate, and maintain real time monitoring equipment using available and
state-of-the-art sensors and background water-quality characteristics and for
biochemical agents that may be used as threats to drinking water safety.

Continuously or intermittently monitor water quality from the EWS. The testing and
evaluation monitoring design would include 3 tiers of data collection:
o Level 1 would include real-time monitoring of stream elevation and/or
streamflow discharge, temperature (T), pH, dissolved oxygen (DO), specific
conductance (SC), turbidity, ORP, chlorophyll to monitor background
conditions and to look for significant changes in background conditions. This
would require at least a years worth of data collection to determine
background conditions.
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o Level 2 would include deployment of specific probes either continuously or
just after a significant change in background levels that may suggest the
presence of a contaminant from an accidental or intentional spill.
o Level 3 would include the collection of a sample if a specific probe indicates
the possible presence of a contaminant of concern. This sample will be
collected using an automatic sampler such as refrigerated automatic ISCO
sampler. This sample wouod then be obtained by USGS or the water for
delivery and analysis to an appropriate laboratory for confirmation.

Field-scale testing of new sensor probes developed by Federal and State Laboratories
and the private sector. As new technology becomes available, sensors will be
deployed in the field alongside of the background water-quality characteristics. These
sensors should be laboratory- and bench-scale tested at other locations such as the

Generate and manage a stream of high quality real time water-quality data that would
benefit the water companies in making decisions regarding plant operations with
respect to water pumping and treatment options. Supply the data in table and
graphical format over time at appropriate intervals.

Test and evaluate different sampling and installation techniques for reliability and
maintenance including (a) pumped flow through methods and (b) in situ. (Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Real time continuous water-quality monitoring stations (A) pumped flow
through; (B) in situ.
Source: http://water.usgs.gov/pubs/wri/wri004252 or Wagner and others, 2000

Evaluate the optimal In stream (depth and width) locations for the placement of the
probes in streams to account for In stream mixing and to ensure that the water supply
is being protected from potential contamination from accidental and intentional spills.

Evaluate previously conducted time of travel studies to determine optimal locations
of upstream EWS stations in the source water. Make recommendations for future
locations of EWS stations.

Statistical interpretation of real-time data to evaluate relations between stage, waterquality characteristics, and other sensor data to predict possible contamination of
source water.

Provide technical guidance on the installation, operation, and maintenance of the real
time monitoring equipment for deployment in other areas of the United States.
Supporting Personnel
In order to conduct this research the USGS will require a full time hydrologist as project
chief, the District Water-Quality Specialist part-time, a part-time hydrologist for technical
assistance, and water-quality technicians for installation, operation, and maintenance of
the various EWS stations. The work tasks for the project chief will include (1)
coordination of project activities with consortium members and project staff, (2)
reconnaissance of appropriate field sites, (3) design of sampling stations, (4) purchasing
of appropriate equipment, (5) maintenance of QA/QC of data stream, (5) statistical
interpretation of the relations of water-quality data to determine background conditions in
relation to seasonal and hydrogeologic conditions, (6) developing methods to determine
sampling frequency for Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 sampling protocols and (7)
documenting and publishing procedures and results. See section 10.0 for more details.
5. Modeling and Information Management Research
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CIMIC (Center for Information Management, Integration and Connectivity) is a research
center at Rutgers-Newark whose objectives are to (i) identify, develop, and demonstrate
new applications and be instrumental in the transfer of technology to sponsor
organizations; (ii) foster a multi-disciplinary research program that brings together
researchers from a diverse set of areas including computer science, information science,
environmental sciences, geological sciences, and healthcare; (iii) sponsor technical
workshops and seminars that address timely research challenges, and (iv) serve the
community through outreach activities by providing education and mentor programs for
inner city youths. These CIMIC objectives are consistent with the purpose of
participating in a Regional Drinking Water Safety and Security Consortium for
prototyping real-time monitoring and modeling systems technologies.
CIMIC will provide overall direction and project management and will conduct
requirement studies utilizing the above mentioned consortium field testing sites to
compare the specifications of the monitors as provided by the vendors, against actual
field scale performance. Validation will be based on grab sample and other comparative
techniques. A major task in this research effort will be the integration of distribution
system models, with monitoring and sensing systems.
NEED SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES AND RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS AND TIME
LINES
6. SENSOR AND MODELING RESEARCH
LWS will study and help redesign the underlying information network to make use of the
evolving applications of mobile wireless and satellite communication systems. Some
potential spin-off research includes the following studies:
a. Modeling simulation studies to determine where in the distribution system,
online monitoring sensors would be most effective
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b. Development of real time decision support systems for the monitoring
network
c. Studies on data handling and validation including:

User data requirements

Data quality objectives

Visualization and graphical representation of information

Real-time reporting and decision support

Compliance reporting
d. Research on:

Predictive modeling

Expert systems and knowledge management

Coupling models with SCADA systems
a. Optimal location of monitoring stations
Research into the application of mobile communication and grid field computing for the
integration of water quality modeling techniques with real time monitoring information
from a vast array of advanced sensors to create an early warning system
There is a significant research effort being pursued by Private, Non Profit and
Government Laboratories intended to develop more robust and reliable sensors for use in
water supply. The research team, through the Laboratory for Water Security will conduct
workshops and symposia in an attempt to identify where this research is being conducted.
The Consortium will establish a series of study groups to evaluate the status of sensors
that are close to field application. Sources of this information include: EPAs ETV
program, Sandia National Labs, Battelle, the US Army, the US Airforce, and the Office
of Naval Research. Promising technologies will be placed on a fast-track to assess their
potential for field application in water supplies. Part of this effort will be working with
vendors to develop prototype systems for testing in the selected field locations
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Most of the research proposed in Task 1 and 2 are based on near term approaches to
monitoring and sensing. LWS will also focus on conducing research that is “on the
cutting edge”.
For example, Satellite technology may prove useful for identifying
chemical and biological warfare agents in source water or for rapid transmission of data
from monitoring stations.
NEED LIST OF SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES AND RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
AND TIME LINES
7.0 PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Project management and coordination will be the overall responsibility of CIMIC/LWS
in collaboration with USGS, and the associated water utilities. It is anticipated that
progress meetings will be held with all the research team twice per year. In addition, to
the research activities conducted as part of this proposal an advisory council will be
established consisting of representatives from the US EPA, NJDEP, and organizations
such as the American Water Works Association, the Association of Metropolitan Water
Agencies, National Association of Water Companies and the National Water Research
Institute.
It is anticipated that the Advisory Council will meet annually and may be
called together to respond to special circumstances.
CIMIC, in collaboration with the Consortium, will establish in CIMIC a research
laboratory (Laboratory for Water Security, LWS) within the guidelines established by
Rutgers University. The CIMIC Director will serve as the Director of the Laboratory.
LWS’s Steering Committee which will consist of a member from each Consortium
participating organization as designated by that organization’s signing body, except for
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USEPA, which will not be a member of the LWS. USEPA will, however, provide a
liaison to the LWS. The Steering Committee shall have the following responsibilities:

To review programmatic policies, priorities, and research and development
objectives and make recommendations to the Consortium concerning these
matters,

To receive an annual progress report of the LWS programs and activities from the
Director and make appropriate recommendations to CIMIC and the Consortium,

To review and recommend revisions to this Agreement, including inclusion of
other institutions.
8.0 EXPECTED BENEFITS FROM RESEARCH
Emergency planning by water utilities is not new. The American Water Works
Association publishes a manual on emergency planning (AWWA_) and the State of
California has developed extensive emergency guidance for water utilities because of the
potential devastation associated with earth quakes. Presidential Decision Directive 63
requires that federal agencies implement plans to protect the Nations Infrastructure and
the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 requires that all drinking water utilities serving 100,000
people or more, must conduct vulnerability assessments. However in times of extreme
crisis it is one thing to have plans in place to deal with a threat, and it is something else to
have functioning systems that provide for communication with all levels of government
and the resources to deal with it. The results of this research will yield a prototype
institutional structure and robust hardware and software systems to assist in identifying a
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water security threat and then to respond and mitigate it. Beyond security issues the
Federal Government is also placing increased emphasis on the need to manage water
quality in distribution networks. The proposed monitoring and modeling systems will
provide the potential for utilities to exercise real time control on water quality from the
source water to delivery point in the network.
WILL ADD MORE DISCUSSION
9.0 REFERENCES
1. Burrows, W.D., and S.E. Renner. 1999. “Biological Warfare Agents as Threats to
Potable Water.” Environmental Health Perspectives, 107(12): 975-984.
2. Clark, R.M., and R.A. Deininger. 2000. “Protecting the Nation’s Critical
Infrastructure: The Vulnerability of U.S. Water Supply Systems.” Jour. of Contingencies
and Crisis Management, 8(2): 73-80.
3. Deininger, R.A. and P.G. Meier. 2000. “Sabotage of Public Water Supply Systems.” In
Security of Public Water Supplies. Edited by R.A. Deininger, P. Literathy, and J.
Bartram. NATO Science Series, 2. Environment - Vol. 66. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
4.Wagner, R.J., Mattraw, H.C., Ritz, G.FF., and Smith, B.A., 2000, Guidelines and
Standard Procedures for Continuous Water-Quality Monitors: Site Selection, Field
Operation, Calibration, Record Computation, and Reporting: Water-Resources
Investigations Report 00-4252.
HAVE A LOT OF REFERENCES TO ADD
10.0 RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
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10.1 Equipment Requirements
Manufacturer's of field sensors to be tested would need to provide the following
equipment and services for each sensor to be tested:

supply instrument and all associated appurtenances, including spare parts

provide installation of instrument and all associated appurtenances, including
integration with existing SCADA hardware and software

provide a Quality Assurance and Quality Control Program, including health and
safety issues

provide training of PVWC staff for operation, maintenance and trouble shooting of
instrument

provide data analysis

provide on-site service for repair of instrument, including all travel expenses, labor
and equipment
10.2 In-Kind Services
The water utilities will provide the following resources:
o Technical staff review of project reports and data collection efforts
o On-going support of installed field sensors, including routine preventative
maintenance and calibration services
o Laboratory analytical support for supporting grab sample data
o Data trending support using SCADA
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10.3 Summary of Required Resources
Table 1. Estimated project costs
Costs1
Item
Human resources1
Year 1
Year 2
250,000
Project chief (FT)
Hydrologist (PT)
Water-quality specialist (PT)
Per station costs1
Installation costs for probes per
station2
YSI 5-parameter mini-monitor
Chlorophyll a
ORP
ISCO auto sampler
…Communications
Stage measurements
Operation and maintenance of
probes and sample collection
devices per station2
Stage measurements
Installation if needed
Operation and maintenance
$15,000
to $25,000
depending
on number
and types
of probes
$38,000
to 50.000
10,000
6,000
New construction
In-situ
Pumped flowthrough
Upgrades to gaging house
?
?
?
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Vehicles
Travel
1
Costs include all overhead. Costs in Year 1 and Year 2 would be adjusted due to
inflation and number of stations in operation.
2
Costs include human resources for technicians to install and program. These costs will
be highly variable depending on the site.
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Table 2. Estimated costs for equipment per station
Costs1
Item
Rental per year
Purchase
Communications
Telemetry (DCP)
Telephone or cellular
Radio
Background probes
YSI 5 parameter
Chlorophyll a
Oxidation Reduction
Potential
ISCO refrigerated
programmable auto sampler
AC and heating
18,000
2,000
5,000
18,000
1,500
$5,500
Shelter
NA
NA
Plumbing
1
5,000
500
2,000
Site specific
Site specific
Costs include all overheads
NEED MORE COMPLETE TABLE OF RESOURCES AND A DETAILED TIME
LINE
37
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