Meinongian Theory of Moral Judgments
Matjaž Potrč and Vojko Strahovnik
Meinong held it that there exist genuine ought-beliefs underpinning moral judgment.
A neo-Meinongian theory of moral judgment based upon ought-beliefs is presented
first. Moral judgments are held to be genuine beliefs possessing constitutive moral
phenomenology. The phenomenology of intentionality thesis underlies this approach.
It is thereby opposed to treating intentionality and phenomenology in a separate
manner. The very possibility of ought-beliefs as a special kind conflicts with beliefs’
restriction to their just descriptive role. This allows for an interesting metaethical
combination of cognitivism and expressivism. Meinongian ought-beliefs come
naturally as a separate kind in the Brentanian sequence of psychological phenomena.
Their independent position is underlined by Meinong’s introduction of their
correlated objects. But one-sided detachability conception needs to have its cognitive
plausibility straightened out. The role of ought-beliefs in the work of Meinong’s pupil
Veber is reviewed.
0. Meinongian Ought-Beliefs
Meinong had a plausible sounding approach to moral judgment. In his view, moral
judgment comes entwined with ought-commitments and ought-beliefs, autonomous in
respect to other kinds of beliefs. Phenomenology of beliefs and specifically of moral
beliefs is an integral part of such an approach.
Meinong is famous for having introduced value-judgments (Werturteile),
based upon objective oughts (Sollen) as an autonomous kind of judgments.1 Initially
Meinong did not think that strivings have their own object and that their objects
similarly as objects of desires are values. But under the influence of his pupil Veber
he then introduced oughts as special, proper objects of strivings.
In the following, we will start by laying out the basics of a neo-Meinongian
approach to the moral judgment, whose main characteristics is in appropriating oughtcommitments and ought-beliefs, together with their constitutive phenomenology, as
genuine independent kind of beliefs. The neo-Meinongian approach to moral
judgment does not only help to get rid of false descriptivism and separatism
presuppositions, but also of the weird and funny names under which the currently
existing views in this area announce themselves.
Meinong’s positive view that interests us here may be read out from passages in his
GA III (15-26; 234-237; 258f; 262f; 280f; 290-294). The first level may be found in
GA III (Werthaltung und Wert, § 1), 248 f: "Der Wert eines Objectes... als dessen
Fähigkeit...wertgehalten zu werden", especially in respect to the "Wertgroesse" of the
object. (Compare p.260). The second level seems to be: "Sicher kann nur
existirendem Wert zukommen; aber ebenso gewiss ist die Bedeutung des
Wertgedankens nicht zum Geringsten darin begründet, dass sich derselbe concipiren
und anwenden lässt, ehe die Existenzfrage beantwortet ist." Further: A priori kinds of
attribution, “emancipirt” (263) from the actually existent, are sufficient for the
hypothetical (theoretical) conception of valuing. A third level is given in the
'Bologna-Artikel' (277): "obige Wertdefinition in der Form auszugestalten: Der Wert
eines O besteht in der Tatsache, dass ein S am O Interesse nimmt, nehmen könnte
oder doch vernünftiger Weise nehmen S O L LT E… die psychologische
Wertbetrachtung [ist damit] durchbrochen." We thank Wilhelm Baumgartner for his
help with this point.
1
1
I. Neo-Meinongian Ought-Beliefs
It seems an appropriate approach to our topics of Meinongian ought-beliefs that we
start with a currently proposed neo-Meinongian account. This will help us both to see
what a Meinongian approach to ought-beliefs and to moral judgment actually is, and
in positioning it at the landscape of current discussions in moral theory. Here are the
basic statements of the neo-Meinongian approach to ought-beliefs and to moral
judgment:
(B) Moral judgments consist of genuine moral beliefs.
(P) Moral judgments feature a specific and constitutive moral phenomenology.
(PI) Ought-beliefs come intertwined with moral phenomenology, and so there
is phenomenology of the intentional.
A position appropriating the above theses has recently emerged upon the scene. As
already noticed, we call it the neo-Meinongian approach to ought-beliefs and to moral
judgment. This is a straight and open talk, in opposition to the confusing
denominations under which it announces itself, such as cognitivist expressivism
(Horgan and Timmons 2006), nondescriptive cognitivism or affirmatory
nondescriptivism. We pause for a moment and ask ourselves: Where do these weird
and funny sounding names come from? The answer is that they originate in an all
embracing tradition that shows utter disrespect for the above theses, and thereby in
our view to the real nature of moral judgments that gets recognized by the
Meinongian appropriation of autonomous ought-beliefs. Neo-Meinongian view of
ought-beliefs is currently just a tiny position at the landscape. But we are confident
that its importance will increase, for the simple reason that in counter distinction to
other positions it is true to the nature of moral judgment.
Which views dominate the scene? They are called cognitivism and
expressivism. Those positions profile themselves in respect to the question whether
they do appropriate belief as figuring in moral judgment. Cognitivism holds it that
moral judgments are just beliefs or that they are based upon beliefs, whereas
expressivism thinks that moral judgments are rather expression of moral appreciation
or indignation that do not include any beliefs.2
It may seem curious at first sight to think that cognitivism and expressivism
are opposed to the neo-Meinongian view. Is it not the case that cognitivism exactly
buys beliefs, as the thesis (B) proposes? And is it not the case that expressivism bets
on phenomenology, as it is suggested by (P) of the above neo-Meinongian take on
things? So, one would perhaps just need to bring cognitivism and expressivism
together, and this would result in the neo-Meinongian theory of moral judgment.
To some extent yes. But here is trouble. First, cognitivism and expressivism
are forthcoming as opposed and as not to be integrated positions. And second, their
embracing of neo-Meinongian theses (B) and (P) is not full hearted. Yes, cognitivism
recognizes the importance of beliefs in moral judgment. But it actually does not
recognize (B) because it does not recognize genuine moral beliefs.3 “How is this
2
We omit the discussion of other non-cognitivism types such as prescriptivism.
Cognitivism accepts moral judgments as genuine judgments, but it does not accept
them as genuine kind of judgments. From this, there follow other difficulties proper to
cognitivism. Because it only accepts descriptive nature of moral judgments it is
3
2
possible?” may one ask, “Aren’t cognitivism’s beliefs operating in the area of moral
judgment, exactly?” Similarly, it can be argued for expressivism that it lacks the
constitutive side of moral phenomenology. Thereby we mean those features of moral
phenomenology that point to the experienced authority of moral judgment as
something external to ourselves, independent from our desires and strivings, objective
and directed at ourselves.4 But, isn’t expressivist approach just overwhelmingly
appropriating phenomenology, exactly? These are concerns that should be addressed.
And as already noticed, cognitivism and expressivism are opposed between
themselves in appropriating (B) and (P), contrary to the neo-Meinongian approach
that integrates those. Last but not least, they also do not buy the thesis (PI) which also
figures as an integral part of the neo-Meinongian position. But neo-Meinongian
position figures the autonomous ought-belief. And here is the main catch. Both
cognitivism and expressivism are opposed to it in that they embrace a thesis excluding
recognition of autonomous ought-belief by restricting beliefs to their descriptive role
only:
(D) Beliefs describe reality (or all beliefs aim to describe or represent the
world).
The thesis (D) is to be understood in the sense that beliefs have just the role of
describing reality, and that there is no other role to be recognized for beliefs, such as
allowing for beliefs with not just descriptive content, e.g. ought-beliefs.
By the very fact that cognitivism and expressivism come as opposed to each
other, it is also already clear that they embrace the following thesis:
(S) Phenomenology is separated from the intentional, i. e. from the cognitive.
Theses (D) and (S) are very powerful presuppositions underlying views of
cognitivism and expressivism. So they are not explicitly thematized by them, despite
that they guide their basic standpoints. It goes without saying that the neo-Meinongian
ought-beliefs approach opposes both (D) and (S). Ought-beliefs do not (in the most
direct sense) describe reality, and phenomenology is really constitutive and not
separated from them if we appropriate the (PI) thesis. The main point is that (D) and
(S) just do not allow for the recognition of autonomous ought-beliefs.
Cognitivist Expressivism as a Neo-Meinongian Position
Now that we have spelled out the neo-Meinongian standpoint with its plausible and
fresh air feeling in respect to other recently dominating views, it is on time to take a
closer look at arguments supporting this stance in the present-day metaethics.
Cognitivism and expressivism, as already noticed, are overwhelming positions
in the current moral philosophy. Yet there is the following view that recently came
upon the stage, called cognitivist expressivism5, which is a version of the (B)-(P)
committed to moral realism, a not too attractive position that is often criticized in the
contemporary metaethics.
4
For a closer description concerning phenomenology of moral beliefs see a section
dedicated to this issue further on in this paper.
5
Cognitivist expressivism is defended by Horgan and Timmons (2006) and Timmons
1999, while Bruno and Kriegel (forthcoming) defend a position called descriptivist
noncognitivism.
3
stance. It accordingly rejects tacit theses (D) and (S) guiding the current metaethical
debate. Instead of treating cognitivism and expressivism as two exclusive choices, it
tries to reconcile them in an overall positive approach.6 But if this is true, then it turns
out that cognitivist expressivism is a species of neo-Meinongian approach to the
moral judgment.
We claimed that there is an important presupposition to both cognitivism and
expressivism in the contemporary debate about moral judgment, which is embraced
but not explicitly thematized by them. Cognitivist expressivism, in counter distinction
to the just mentioned positions, tries to bring the seemingly incompatible theories of
cognitivism and expressivism together: it is a species of expressivism, and yet it
allows for moral judgments as beliefs to be its integral part. How is this possible? The
answer is provided by cognitivist expressivism’s denial of presupposition (D). Horgan
and Timmons (2006) e.g. speak about the following semantic assumption that has to
be rejected.
“All cognitive content (i.e., belief-eligible, assertible, truth-apt content) is
descriptive content. Thus, all genuine beliefs and all genuine assertions
purport to represent or describe the world.” (Horgan and Timmons 2006: 256)
One can also express this by denying that the content of all noncognitive attitudes is
nondescriptive (Bruno and Kriegel, forthcoming). But this just repeats a well-known
Meinongian claim that content and act as proper parts of experience are independent
of each other. Meinongian position therefore explicitly rejects the presupposition
grounding the modern metaethical cognitivism/expressivism divide.
Denying (D) has as a consequence recognizing the existence of beliefs that are
not descriptive. Consequently this opens space for a version of cognitivism that
accepts moral irealism and does not succumb to an error theory like that of Mackie
(1977). Cognitivist expressivism thus occupies a middle ground between both
positions of cognitivism and expressivism. It does so by breaking traditional
cognitivism into two theses. The first is the semantic thesis that
(C1): moral judgments/statements have descriptive role (they express
propositions and can be true or false)
and the psychological thesis that
(C2): moral judgments/statements typically are or express beliefs.
C1 and C2 were held to be cornerstones of cognitivism. On the other hand traditional
non-cognitivism or expressivism denies both of these theses. But if one accepts the
above distinction two new positions arise. The first is moral fictionalism, which
accepts C1, but denies C2. According to moral fictionalism (Kalderon 2005) moral
judgments have descriptive role and they can be evaluated as true or false, but the
6
An overall methodological approach about how to reconcile the often forthcoming
opposed views (proceeding from exclusive disjunction) affirms inclusive disjunction
(Potrč forthcoming a, forthcoming b). For the area of epistemology, the inclusive
disjunction approach proposes evidentalist reliabilism (Henderson, Horgan and Potrč
forthcoming). Intuitionist particularism (Potrč, forthcoming c) includes both
generalities and particular patterns in an overall approach.
4
acceptance of these judgments does not mean that we have genuine corresponding
beliefs; they merely allow us to convey some other noncognitive attitudes. We regard
these judgments as fictions or quasi-statements. The second position and the one that
mainly interests us here is cognitivist expressivism that accepts C2 and denies C1. So
the newly established map of positions looks like this.
emotivism
prescriptivism
norm expressivism
quasi-realism
fictionalism
cognitivist expressivism
non-cognitivism
non-descriptivism
Argumentation behind this novel position that combines (psychological) cognitivism
and moral irealism is complex. Psychological cognitivism is defended by the usage of
moral phenomenology and of phenomenological argument. Moral judgments share
with beliefs their fundamental generic, phenomenological and functional features,
thus they must be accepted as beliefs. (More on that in the next section)
As we said and as we intend to demonstrate, Meinong defends a position close
to cognitivist expressivism.7 The latter introduces two different, sui generis belief
types:
(i) is-commitment beliefs
(ii) ought-commitment beliefs.
Beliefs are understood as a certain kind of affirmatory commitment state towards the
kernel descriptive content. In the case of usual beliefs we have the kernel content
(“Hillary is president”), and then we have belief’s is-commitment to the kernel
content: (“Matjaž believes that Hillary is president”). The novelty is now that we can
also have belief’s ought-commitment to the kernel content (“Matjaž believes that it
ought to be the case that Hillary is president”). We have introduced oughtcommitment beliefs besides to the is-commitment beliefs, and thereby we have
repudiated the proposition (D) that implicitly restricted beliefs to just descriptive is-
7
But it is interesting that he also dedicated a study to fictionalism, the position that
accepts C1 and denies C2. This is his theory of presumptive beliefs or of the
Annahmen, adopting a description that can be true or false (C1) without expressing
genuine beliefs (denial of (C2)). Such is the situation with fictional characters in the
framework of a story. We accept that a certain fable describes Little Red Riding Hood
(while another one describes Three Little Pigs), and we accept the truth of the
statement that Little Red Riding Hood has red cap, and the falsity of a statement that
she wears a blue cap. One can say that we have beliefs in respect to these statements,
and so this would not yet put C2 into question. But once as we realize that the
acceptance of truth and falsity of description happens in the framework of a fable, we
have to further specify rejection of the thesis C2: in the fable we do not express
genuine beliefs.
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commitment species. Now we have ought-commitment beliefs that also include moral
judgments. (cf. Horgan and Timmons 2006: 270-1)
“An ought-commitment is not a mental state whose overall content is
descriptive, representing a way the world might be; hence it is not a state of
mentally affirming that the world is such in a descriptively-represented way.
To construe moral beliefs in this manner is to mistakenly assimilate them to
descriptive beliefs, i.e., to is-commitments. Rather, an ought-commitment is a
distinct kind of mental affirmation vis-à-vis a core descriptive content. /…/
Ought-commitment is a sui generis type of mental state, while also being an
irreducible species of belief. Although the overall content of oughtcommitments is non-descriptive, nevertheless these states exhibit the key
generic features that qualify them as beliefs.”
Another important issue is the semantic assessability of moral judgments. Despite
denying descriptive role of moral judgments we can still talk about truth ascriptions to
statements with moral content as “morally engaged semantic appraisals”. Such a
solution follows contextualism and an approach to truth called truth as indirect
correspondence.8 In the strict sense moral judgments are neither true nor false (this is
in contradistinction to the error theory that in important respects is close to the
cognitivist expressivism, but holds that all moral judgments are false), despite that we
can semantically assess them within a morally engaged context. (Horgan and
Timmons 2006: 275-7). Such assessment is made possible with a notion of truth as
semantic correctness given the contextually variable semantic standards. Strict
semantic standards dictate the use of truth as direct correspondence and less strict
standards allow for amalgamation of semantic and normative appraisals.
This is what makes cognitivist expressivism a viable option at the landscape of
possibilities, which have earlier excluded it because of tacitly appropriating the
presupposition (D), allowing just for the descriptive role of beliefs. Motivation behind
this move is twofold. The first motive figures theoretical, metaethical advantages of
moral irealism over unpopular moral realism. The second motive is that such position
accords better with our ordinary moral thought and with moral phenomenology. A
closer look reveals that moral phenomenology supports only the acceptance of the
thesis C2, i.e. that moral judgments are genuine beliefs and it does not support the
rejection of their descriptive role. The latter move is supported by the “old”
ontological, semantical and epistemological metaethical arguments against moral
realism. We now turn to the phenomenology of beliefs and specifically to oughtbeliefs. We will try to outline what makes moral judgments or ought-beliefs genuine
beliefs, and further what makes them unique.
Phenomenology of Moral Judgment
We now present phenomenology of moral judgment, according to the thesis (P). (B)
and (P) are then integrated in the thesis figuring the phenomenology of the intentional
(PI). The thesis (P) says:
(P) Moral beliefs in moral judgments feature a specific and constitutive moral
phenomenology.
8
Fot this see Horgan and Potrč 2000, 2006; Potrč and Strahovnik 2004 and 2005.
6
Accepting the thesis that moral beliefs are specific ought-beliefs, as based upon the
ought-commitment in respect to the kernel content that they involve (B), and thus not
as equivalent to the exclusively descriptive role of beliefs (denial of (D) and of (C1)),
has the specific moral phenomenology of such beliefs as its constitutive part. We will
now first take a look at the phenomenology of belief, and then further at the specific
phenomenology of moral belief. Notice that even the first step, the phenomenology of
belief, was not considered by either cognitivism or expressivism. Thus neither of
these positions accepts (P). But this is actually rooted in both these positions also
tacitly refusing to accept thesis (PI) and by their tacitly appropriating presupposition
(S). This means that cognitivism and expressivism first tacitly accept the thesis that
phenomenology is separated from the intentional. And then it is natural not to be
concerned with the issue of moral phenomenology. This is countered by cognitivist
expressivism’s adoption of (P).
As promised, we will first take a look at the phenomenology of belief,
following the presentation in (Horgan Timmons 2006:263–5). At the first stage we
will take a look at the phenomenology of beliefs as such, and additionally we will also
fulfill the assignment of taking a look at the phenomenology of ought-beliefs, as these
are more directly involved into our inquiry. This will prepare the ground for our
assessment of the more specific what-it’s-likeness features proper to moral beliefs.
Let us start.
(1) Following my observation of the night sky I come down to my occurrent
belief that the object which I observe is a satellite and not a star. And as I glimpse at
the surrounding of my house I come down to my belief that a cat is approaching my
house over the lawn.
There is also the experience of psychologically coming down at some issue as
related to ought-beliefs. Say that I am not decided yet what opinion I should take in
respect to some issue, such as whether caring for environment is important. Once as I
eventually decide though that this is the way to go, I phenomenologically come down
at the issue in question. In fact, many of our moral judgments present cases of
automatically coming down at some issue in one’s experience of moral judgment,
such as is the case with the known example of glimpsing at hoodlums setting a cat on
fire just for their fun, and immediately occurrently coming down with the ought-belief
in respect to the wrongness of such an act.
(2) The phenomenological experiencing of beliefs as categorizing some object
is another characterization of beliefs. In the area of ought-beliefs and moral
judgments, one similarly phenomenologically experiences one’s coming down in
categorizing a certain issue as being right or wrong.
(3) The experience of beliefs’ categorization shows the characteristics of
involuntariness. As I look through the window I involuntarily form a belief that we
have a rainy day today. This involuntariness of beliefs’ categorization also
characterizes the moral rightness assessment of my ought-belief in respect to settling
of the environmentalist issues, and the wrongness assessment of the hoodlums act.
(4) The phenomenological felt involuntariness of beliefs’ categorizing
involves their experiencing as the ones that have rational authority in that this
categorization is grounded in reasons. My perceptual experience of touching the keys
and feeling their smooth texture together with the appropriate response to my tactile
pushes at the time that I type this text is automatically experienced by myself as a
sufficient reason for entertaining my occurrent belief that there is the keyboard now in
my lap.
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And the experience of categorizing some issue as being morally correct or
wrong is also forthcoming with moral authority, felt as quite independent from my
subjective deliberative concerns. The external authoritative phenomenological feel of
such experiences is thus coming in the shape of external moral authority, similarly as
the factual beliefs’ experience also shows its external authority in respect to my
eventual subjective reasons.
(5) Finally, the occurrent belief is phenomenologically experienced as being
apt for assertion by a sentence in the declarative mode. This is also in value for
ought-beliefs and for moral beliefs.
There are thus several phenomenological features that distinguish beliefs from
other types of mental states. As these features are also shared by ought-beliefs and
moral beliefs, we can conclude that moral judgments are genuine beliefs.
Thereby, we have laid out a case for phenomenology of moral judgments. But
we have not yet come to endorse the thesis (B) claiming that moral judgments consist
of genuine moral beliefs. In order to endorse such a possibility we have to lay down
some distinctive features of ought-beliefs, underlying the specific moral judgments.
This we will do by again following the exposition in (Horgan and Timmons 2006)
who themselves quote as their guide (Mandelbaum 1955).
Direct ought-beliefs, specific for moral judgments, include judgments about
one’s own moral experiences, while remote ought-beliefs include judgments about
someone else’s moral experiences. What is characteristic for their phenomenology?
Direct moral ought-beliefs show phenomenology of felt demand, itself
consisting from experiences of origin and direction. As I confront some moral issue
and as I form an ought-belief in respect to it, I experience the obligation as coming to
me in an objective manner (felt demand), from certain circumstances in which I find
myself (origin), and as directed towards myself (direction). Authority and objectivity
is an integral part of the phenomenology coming along with this. This is why such a
felt demand is experienced as motivationally hot, through an ought-commitment.
These are not the characteristics of is-beliefs with their is-commitments.
From these phenomenological remarks we can see why the modern divide
between cognitivism and expressivism cannot accommodate moral phenomenology.
The belief-like phenomenological aspects of moral judgments support cognitivism,
while motivational phenomenological aspects support expressivism. Neo-Meinongian
position that searches for the middle ground has a better chance of accommodating
phenomenology. But as a crucial step, we can point to the justification offered for the
introduction of ought-beliefs. In search for this we now turn to the Meinongian
tradition.
II. Meinongian Ought-Beliefs
We now present Meinongian conception of ought-beliefs, with some critical scrutiny
on the menu. First, we take a look at the autonomy of ought-beliefs in the sequence of
mental phenomena. Then we suggest that one-sided detachability principle guiding
this sequence should be straightened up by adopting morphological rationalism in the
area of moral judgment, thereby providing cognitive plausibility in support relations.
Meinongian theory of objects also sustains autonomy of ought-beliefs. We finally
take a look at Meinongian ought-beliefs in Veber’s work.
8
Autonomy of Meinongian Ought-Beliefs in the Sequence of Mental Phenomena
Meinongian ought-beliefs come naturally as an autonomous kind in the Brentanian
sequence of mental phenomena.
Brentanian school of which Meinong is a part adopted the following sequence
of mental phenomena:
presentations -> thoughts -> desires
There are many variations and elaborations of the above schema. But the main idea is
that there are three kinds of basic mental phenomena. Of these two, thoughts and
desires offer complex mental phenomena, whereas presentations are simple and
elementary.
It is natural to conceive of thoughts as beliefs, coming in judgments. They
may be described as beliefs that such-and-such is the case, thus as is-beliefs. This
means that they have an is-commitment to the kernel content. If the kernel content
figures the sentence “Hillary is president”, then the is-commitment supports an isbelief in respect to this kernel content.
Desires may be conceived as beliefs as well. But they come about as involving
an ought-commitment to the kernel content. This then produces ought-beliefs, such as
my belief that it ought to be the case that Hillary is the president. By the way the
discussed case involves presentations of Hillary and of being a president.
This shows that the above sequence of mental phenomena introduces the
autonomous status of ought-beliefs in a quite natural manner.
Notice that the sequence has presentations in its basis, these being integrated
into the factual structure of the kernel content. Now, there may be different
commitments in the judgment to the ensuing facts, such as is-commitment and oughtcommitment. The schema clearly supports independence of each of these and it
thereby supports the autonomy of the adjoined ought-beliefs forthcoming in the moral
judgment. Is- or ought-commitment succeeds in respect to the fact, say Hillary is
president, and not to the presentation. Yet the presentation is in the basis and while iscommitment is to the fact, the-ought commitment is to the value-belief related to the
fact. So moral judgment as ought-beliefs attuned judgment is different from what we
may call the factual judgment or the is-beliefs attuned judgment. Quite clearly, the
above sequence supports the existence of two independent and autonomous kinds of
beliefs: the first ones involved in thoughts and the second ones in desires. So the
overall Brentanian sequence of mental phenomena supports the autonomy of oughtbeliefs.
Providing Cognitive Plausibility to Ought-Beliefs
Now let us take another look at the Brentanian sequence of mental phenomena such
as depicted above. There are arrows in it that merit some comment. We have already
said that beliefs are complex mental phenomena, involving presentations coming as
building blocks into their structure. This sounds plausible and it explains the first
arrow.
The second arrow points from cognitive beliefs to desires. In our interpretation
this would mean that is-beliefs would come as building-blocks into ought-beliefs. But
this does not seem to be so easily interpreted as in the former case, for it would be
strange to claim that several is-beliefs form the structure of ought-beliefs. One-sided
detachability is the principle guiding structure of the sequence figuring mental
phenomena. Here it goes. There may be a creature entertaining presentations only.
9
But if there is a creature entertaining thoughts, necessarily it should be first able to
possess presentations entering into these. So, presentations are in relation of one-sided
detachability in respect to thoughts. Similarly, thoughts are in relation of one-sided
detachability in respect to desires. There is a possible creature entertaining thoughts
only, but not desires. Whereas each creature that entertains desires (ought-beliefs)
also needs to have ability of previously entertaining thoughts (is-beliefs).9
One-sided detachability principle has contributed to the recognition of the
autonomous status of ought-beliefs. But as already stated it is questionable that isbeliefs would build the structure of ought-beliefs. All that autonomy requires is just
that those two kinds come as independent from each other. The one-sideddetachability principle also lacks cognitive plausibility. It namely invites a picture
according to which there are levels of dependency involved into each judgment, moral
judgment being more dependent on such assortment of levels as the factual judgment.
But this seems to be in opposition to the statement of simple autonomy accorded to
the ought-beliefs and to their related moral judgments.
It seems cognitively implausible that moral judgment and ought-belief would
retrace all the rows of underlying presentations and factual beliefs at the time they get
produced. In order to counter this, we propose first to take a look at ought-beliefs
again. In the area of morality ought-beliefs have to do with principles and with
acknowledging what is morally right or wrong. So moral principles seem to be
involved into moral judgment. Now, some people have opposed this, under the
presupposition that the involvement of principles would require their explicit
appearance. And in our case this would require explicitly retracing steps at the
founding levels in the one-sided detachability sequence. But a more plausible
proposal seems to go like this. Presentations and even thoughts may be involved into
desires, as we would grant to the one-sided detachability approach. Ought-beliefs, i.e.
generalities do not appear out of thin air, they are sustained by the underlying stuff.
But this does not succeed in a direct way and rather it happens in an indirect
procedural manner, with the support from the cognitive background. Such an
approach to generalities (here ought-beliefs) was proposed under the name of
morphological rationalism (Horgan and Timmons 2007), according to which
generalities (ought-beliefs) have their efficacy (rationalism), supported by the
morphological multi-dimensional dynamical background of the cognitive system.
Ought-beliefs are thus not supported level-like and in a tractable manner, as it is
supposed by the principle of one-sided detachability. They are rather supported
dynamically and form the cognitive background as this is proposed by morphological
rationalism.
Theory of Objects and Autonomy of Meinongian Ought-Beliefs
Meinong's theory of objects provides another pillar in support of ought-beliefs
autonomy. Meinong is best known for his theory of objects. We believe that his
theory of objects that distinguishes him from other members of the Brentanian school
also contributes to the recognition of autonomous ought-beliefs. Exactly how it does it
is the question at which we will take a closer look in the next section as we present
Meinongian ought-beliefs as elaborated by Meinong's pupil France Veber. It should
be sufficient right now just to mention that Meinong's Slovene pupils Mally, Schwarz
and Veber developed theory of ought-beliefs both in the inferential and in the
9
This statement should be restricted with the claim that this is not in value for very
simple desires that are only based upon presentations.
10
metaphysical sense. But here we propose to take a quick look at the beginning of the
theory of objects, asking then what their nature may tell us in support of autonomous
ought-beliefs.
Veber reports (Veber 1921, Potrč and Vospernik 1996) that theory of objects
was first proposed by Meinong in his booklet (1896) dealing with the law of the
psychophysicist Weber (no relation to France Veber). Weber's law states correlation
between the increase in physical stimulus (increase of illumination, of weight, in
loudness as a physical variable) and between its sensed impact. Variations in the
physical stimulus are correlated by sensing of just noticeable differences. The
differences (Verschiedenheiten) as adjoined to these are perceived by subjects not as
something subjective, but as objective, quite independent from their own will. These
differences are the first discussed case of Meinongian objects. Notice their felt
independence in one's psychological approach to them.
Meinong elaborated his idea of the existence of objects later on. First, notice
that objects figure in his solution of the intentional directedness question. Meinong
decided for objects and not for contents to be correlates of intentional acts. He later
developed the idea of independently existing objects as correlates to each of
psychological phenomena figuring in the Brentanian sequence. Let us just say that
also ought-beliefs are directed at their correlated objects. Those are matters the
intentional act is directed at, but it is directed at them as at something objective. It
seems to us that this objectivity of correlated objects underlies the autonomy of oughtbeliefs, and that in this sense they support the autonomy of moral judgment. This
accords well with the phenomenology of moral judgments as described above.
Meinongian Ought-Beliefs in Veber's Work
The role of ought-beliefs in the work of Meinong's pupil Veber is reviewed.
We conclude by pointing out how it was not a coincidence that Meinong's pupils
Mally and Veber developed deontic logic and moral judgment approaches based upon
Meinongian insight into the autonomy of ought-beliefs.
Let us come back to the Brentanian tripartite schema of psychological
experiences leading from presentations to thoughts and then to desires. Both
presentations and thoughts are on the cognitive side of mental phenomena, and one of
their relations figures passivity of presentations as opposed to the active role of
thoughts in respect to them. On the right, emotive side of the schema however, we
only have desires. Where are the active counterparts to these on the emotive side?
These are now proposed as strivings. But let us start with the distinction between
emotions according to their content.
Veber's Ethics10 distinguishes four basic types of emotions: hedonic, aesthetic,
logical and axiological (or evaluative). The first two are based on presentations,
whereas the last two also involve thoughts or beliefs. The axiological positive or
negative emotion (for example enjoyment and sorrow, or respect and disrespect) is
also called evaluation and non-evaluation or dis-evaluation. Intentional objects of
10
Veber's ethics as a logic of instinctive reason may be briefly characterized as ethics
of moral conscience. Conscience is defined as disposition for material and formal
correctness of our emotions and strives, especially evaluative or axiological emotions
and strives in narrow sense. Correct axiological emotions and strivings are the final
end of our moral and ethical lives. Immorality is therefore incorrectness of axiological
instinctive reason.
11
axiological emotions are values and disvalues in a narrow sense. Ethical or moral
emotions are a sub-set of axiological emotions.
A moral agent may respect or disrespect a person according to his or hers
beliefs about this person, involving the beliefs that this person is such and such, and
that he or she did this act or failed to do some other act. Such emotive experiences
ascribe ethical value or disvalue (goodness or badness) to objects of the
corresponding thought foundations. Because axiological emotion is based on
thoughts, a directly appropriated object of axiological emotions may only be facts. A
joyful experience by an agent in virtue of her possession of the money directly aims at
the fact concerning this possession of money, and only indirectly at the presentation
of the money. In respect to quantity of thoughts as psychological fundaments one can
distinguish between valuing and disvaluing in the strict sense on the one side and
hopes and fears on the other side. This latter distinction aims at the difference
between thoughts that are genuine beliefs or judgments and between assumptions or
neutral thoughts. For example, joy or sorrow may be experienced only on the basis of
genuine judgments, while on the other hand if our thought is neutral, one can
experience only hope or fear. As already mentioned two fundamental ethical emotions
are respect and disrespect, which do not aim at physical or irreal phenomena, but at
psychological phenomena, especially persons or facts about persons.
Objectual-foundations of emotions are values. The objects of axiological
emotions are values in the narrower sense. While investigating the relation between
the two Veber begins with a psychological conception of the value and of values.
Valuable or invaluable is everything which stands or is able to stand as an object of
axiological emotion. Consequently, anything that is an object or may be an object of
respect and disrespect is psychologically ethically valuable. The correctness of
axiological emotion thus depends on factuality of those emotions.
Veber approaches apsychological value through the analysis of the meaning
proper to evaluative judgments and to moral judgments. Evaluations such as "This is a
good car" or "This is a kind and good person" have a meaning different form the
meaning that is attained through ascription of some non-valuable feature (such a
reliability or benevolence) to the object in question or again that is different to what
pertains to our experience of that object (such as experience of joy or respect). These
judgments ascribe to objects in question a value that is independent from our
experience. Value in the apsychological sense is thus "an independent quality as the
object of axiological emotion" (Veber 1923: 233) and it is not to be confused neither
with the axiological emotion itself nor with the possibility of such an emotion.
Axiological striving fundamentally depends upon emotions. Hence one can
only strive towards or reject what one values or disvalues. The appropriated objects of
striving can only be the facts which were already previously determined in their
value; consequently the objects of ethical or moral striving can only be those facts
that are determined in their ethical or moral value. The structure of striving is very
similar to the one of emotion; one can distinguish between strivings for physical,
psychological and irreal phenomena, between striving for the thing itself or for the
thing in relation to another thing, between hedonic, aesthetic, logical and axiological
strivings. (256-265) Proper objects of striving are oughts that may be positive or
negative. An ought is a special quality of the phenomena, for which "everybody
without axiological striving is in principle blind". That is clear form the ordinary
cases of ought-beliefs such as "You ought to do this", or "You ought not to lie", or
"You ought to love your nation". These are evidently based upon the axiological
striving presupposing (e)valuation. (Veber 1923: 268-272)
12
The difference between psychological and apsychological conception of
oughts is crucial for axiological strivings and also for axiological oughts. According
to the psychological conception, an axiological ought is everything that may become
an object of axiological striving. A phenomenon has an axiological ought in the
psychological sense in the case as one experiences positive or negative axiological
striving towards it.
An ought-belief or striving for something to happen does not mean simply that
somebody strives towards this. It also aims at the object itself. In the same way as the
apsychological value, the apsychological ought of a certain phenomenon is an
independent objectual quality, not to be mistaken for the positive or negative striving;
it is a direct object of that striving.
According to Veber every duty is an ought. In psychological sense it is related
to the positive or to the negative ethical striving. In the apsychological sense a duty
and the so-called judgments of duty aim their attention towards objects of striving. A
duty to perform or to abstain from certain acts is a positive or negative apsychological
ought of these acts, which presupposes their moral or ethical value. (Veber 1923:
310)11
“Do we find among our judgments and beliefs also such judgments and beliefs
that we experience just on the basis of the parallel value striving towards phenomena
or on the basis of phenomena’s rejection that again come with their own specific
senses, not to be found with other judgments and beliefs? Everyday experiences
confirm again that we also actually possess such specific beliefs, corresponding in
value striving to the once described value beliefs in the value emotions. Here belong
all of those beliefs that we express in given cases by the sentences: This should
happen! This should not happen! ... You should not do this! You should not leave
from here! And so on. Here again we face interesting exclamations whose direct
psychological background is built in the lucky case by special beliefs, yet beliefs that
differ from the former mentioned value beliefs in that they require for their necessary
and direct psychological basis the corresponding strivings that something should
happen, that someone should stay in his actual place, shouldn’t do such and such …
and that by those and similar beliefs we again ascribe to the mentioned and similar
facts a special property, which now however is not identical to their ‘value’ or
‘nonvalue’, but to that special side that we express by the usage of the word ‘ought’,
which is actually targeted by all other imperative and optative linguistic forms
belonging here, that may now be named in a general and precise way not by ‘value’
and ‘nonvalue’, but again as the positive and the negative ‘ought’ (Sollen) of all those
phenomena that are there as mediate appropriated objects of the value striving or
rejection.” (Veber 1923: 268-9)
Nature of Moral Judgment according to Meinongian Approach and according to
the Current Moral Theory
A concluding remark is due in order to mark some differences between the
Meinongian approach to moral judgment and between the current strands pertaining
to moral theory, such as cognitivism and expressivism.
11
Veber adopted his theory about moral status of acts from Meinong and he
distinguishes between: (i) virtuous or honorable acts; (ii) correct or acceptable acts;
(iii) permissible acts; and (iv) impermissible acts. Beside to these we may also speak
about morally neutral acts.
13
Meinongian approach by Franc Veber stresses strivings as the basis of moral
judgment or of duties.12 These are phenomenologically different from thoughts. Thus,
duties are oughts, and duty-judgments are ought-judgments. According to the onesided detachability principle one cannot have ought-strivings without having the
correlated thoughts. What are these thoughts? They are ought-beliefs. You have to
have the belief about something so that this belief can then be the basis of your
striving. Emotion is phenomenologically fuller than thought, but it is not motivational
or action-directing. This is the characteristics of strivings though.
Brentano, Meinong and Veber knew that in moral judgments there are not just
beliefs and thoughts. Moral judgments are phenomenologically different from the
usual is-beliefs that are there in descriptive judgments.
Cognitivism and expressivism do not provide an answer to the following
question. If moral judgments are beliefs, why are they phenomenologically different
from ordinary beliefs? My belief about my duty will motivate me, whereas the belief
that there is a pen here will not necessarily motivate me, and certainly not in the
manner in which the former belief will.
What would Brentano, Meinong and Veber endorse in the
cognitivism/expressivism dispute? They buy desires and expressivism, so that the
duty is an ought and that moral judgment is a striving. But why do they talk about
ought-beliefs as the basis of strivings? Expressivist treats the kernel content with the
emotional coming-down (»Blah!« for stealing, »Hurray!« for helping an older lady).
Meinongians may be at first expected to have this as well. But they do not. They have
instead: »I ought to evade stealing«, »I ought to help elders«. Ought-belief is in the
basis of moral striving, the feeling of duty. The map of the positions therefore looks
something like this.
content (vsebina)
attitude (dej)
traditional cognitivism
descriptive
belief
traditional
noncognitivism/expressivism
nondescriptive
desire or some other noncognitive
attitude
nondescriptive cognitivism
nondescriptive
belief
descriptive
noncognitivism/fictionalism
descriptive
desire or some other noncognitive
attitude/supposition
Meinong/Veber
connected with an ought as
the proper object of striving
striving as a basis of ought-belief
Cognitivism has just beliefs, whereas Meinongians have strivings, coming
along with motivations. Veber and Meinong, it is true, do not use much of the whatit's-like phenomenology talk, and they rather mention kinds of experiences. But they
knew that moral judgment should not be restricted to the descriptive belief and that it
rather involves specific beliefs on the side of desires and strivings.
Summary
12
Strivings, according to Veber, are active in respect to desires on the emotional side,
in the same sense as thoughts are active in respect to presentations on the cognitive
side of psychological experiences. Veber considered this as the basis for an important
extension of the theory of objects in relation to moral judgments.
14
We have shown in which way phenomenology of moral judgment is central to the
Meinongian approach to moral judgment. The crucial point is rejection of the
presupposition (D) and introduction of the genuine ought-commitment moral beliefs.
These moral beliefs are recognized in their specificity by their constitutive moral
phenomenology, not forthcoming in the case of is-commitment beliefs.
Meinongian moral phenomenology recognizes independent existence of moral
realm of objects, paralleled by the psychological underlying descriptive area. It also
appropriates the constitutive role of phenomenology, from the very start, by
appropriating the overall Brentanian theses figuring phenomenology of intentionality
and intentionality of phenomenology (Horgan and Tienson 2002, Potrč 2002).
One-sided detachability however, is a genetic, and therefore not an essential
part of the Meinongian story. This may be straightened by embracing the genuine
autonomy of moral judgment related ought-commitment beliefs, as proposed by
cognitive expressivism.
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