Hunter: Colonial to Global 1 Prepared for “Asia

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Hunter: Colonial to Global
1
Prepared for “Asia-Pacific in the Making of America: Toward a New Global History”
© Please do not cite or circulate without permission.
“From Colonial Subjects to Global Competitors:
Post-Revolutionary Americans in China”
Phyllis Whitman Hunter
University of North Carolina Greensboro
The revolutionary experience -- a decade of political turmoil preceding the
Revolution and the fighting of a destructive war – transformed Americans from British
subjects to citizens of a new republican nation. This liberation resolved what had been an
untenable colonial position, one defined (by Peter Onuf and Eliga Gould) as a kind of
double consciousness, a “coexistence of parochial provincial identities with an allembracing British imperial identity.”1 The British surrender at Yorktown and the longawaited final ratification of the peace treaty and departure of British troops in late 1783
confirmed that Americans were no longer colonial subjects. This meant that new forms of
American identity would have to be constructed both at the center and at the margins.
I want to use this opportunity to open up an exploration of the competing interests,
or one could say discourses, that impinged upon or shaped the interactions of early
American merchants in China. Specifically, I am drawing on two particular experiences
of Samuel Shaw, the supercargo , i.e. the financial manager, for the first American
voyage to China (1784-85) aboard the Empress of China. Shaw, his business partner
Thomas Randall, Captain John Green and several others aboard the Empress had fought
against the British as officers and soldiers of the Continental forces. Now they were to
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represent the newly independent United States on a global venture. The United States’
first direct encounter with China provides what I would argue is a key moment in
articulating a new American identity. To do so, Shaw and his compatriots would have to
negotiate a tangle of competing interests from commercial imperatives of both the voyage
itself and the ruined American economy, to nascent nationalism amid imperial rivalries,
and, ultimately, confront fundamental opinions of cultural difference.
Negotiating Commerce and Nationalism:
The venture of the Empress, and those that followed, grew directly out of leading
merchants’ efforts to revive the devastated post-Revolutionary economy by opening up
new markets in Asia. The voyage was sent off by a cheering crowd on Brooklyn Heights.
Philip Freneau, known as “the poet of the Revolution,” encapsulated American
aspirations for the China Trade with verses “On the First American Ship that Explored
the Rout[e] to China, and the East-Indies after the Revolution.” Published in the New
York newspapers, Freneau’s poem, emphasized the new nation’s hard-won freedom to
sail and trade beyond the Cape of Good Hope in
“Those golden regions to explore
Where George forbade to sail before . . .
From thence their fragrant TEAS to bring
Without the leave of Britain’s king.2
The ship itself became a nationalist symbol not only of new commercial opportunities but
also a visible, moving embodiment of the country’s independence. On its return, the
voyage of the Empress was hailed as a nautical prodigy and newspapers extolled its
success as evidence of “future happy prospects of solid greatness” to “our rising
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empire.”3 For Americans at home, trade with China and other Asian regions offered not
only economic prosperity and exotic consumer goods but also national pride for a newlyformed nation now entering the global arena.
Shaw found himself the primary diplomatic representative of the Untied States in
China. He was in a tricky position. Not only did the Americans have to forge a trading
relationship with the Chinese but they had to do so within a commerce dominated by
their former enemies, the British. Ideals of American honor might demand a hostile
distance from the British. The obvious French assistance to the Americans aboard the
Empress, from a chance meeting at the Straits of Sunda to negotiating the complex
regulations the “Canton system,” might have further alienated the British.4 But the
competing imperatives of capitalism, of developing a trading relationship that requires
trust and produces a win-win outcome, encouraged the former enemies to at least observe
a formal politeness. During the eighteenth-century many believed that commerce proved
beneficial not only to the economy but to civil society as well. Contemporary historian
William Robertson wrote, “Commerce tends to wear off those prejudices which maintain
distinctions and animosity between nations. It softens and polishes the manners of men.”5
Fortunately for the Americans the British in Canton carried no grudge, expressing
themselves as “glad to see us in this part of the world.” It appears that Shaw, a great
aficionado of polite interaction, was able to develop very cordial relationships with
several of the East India Company factors. On their ships, Shaw found “it was impossible
to avoid speaking of the late war.” He noted that the British merchants and mariners even
went so far as to allow the war to have been “a great mistake on the part of their nation,”
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and they were happy it was over. According to Shaw, his British acquaintances even
asserted that if the two nations stood together, “they might bid defiance to all the
world.”6 In this alien environment, a shared culture appeared to outweigh political
differences between the British and their former subjects.
Establishing a workable commercial relationship with the Chinese might have
proved to be an even more difficult challenge. Armed with a sea-letter from Congress
addressed to the “Most Serene, serene, most puissant, puissant, high, illustrious, noble
honorable, venerable, wise and prudent Emperors, Kings, Republicks, Princes,” (and
etcetera) that the Empress might encounter in her voyage, a hold full of ginseng, and
$20,000 in silver coins, Shaw and Green hoped that the Chinese would recognize the
Americans as a legitimate trading nation.7 The first official ceremony with the Hoppo,
the Chief of Customs (and of all trading) in the Canton region, occurred on September
14, two weeks after the Empress had anchored at Whampoa. Before any foreign vessel
could begin to unload its cargo and send goods down river to Canton for sale, the ship
had to be measured and granted a permit to trade by Chinese customs officials. This
process called “Cumsha [gift] and Measurement” had evolved into a ceremonial
procession. The Hoppo or one of his ranking officials, with a retinue including the Hong
merchants and a linguist would visit the newly arrived ships, one by one, for a formal
measurement that would be the basis for customs duties followed by an exchange of
welcome and gifts for the Hoppo whose representative was always received “with some
ceremony.” One long time China trader described Chinese officials as “men of a good
deal of dignity and ease of manner.” The captain of each vessel “would receive [them] at
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the gangway, while all hands were rigged out in their ‘Sunday suits’.” After the
measuring took place and the particulars of the vessel were recorded, refreshments were
offered, gifts promised, and then the Hoppo and his group would continue on to the next
ship. The next day a permit for “opening the hatches” would be granted and the
unloading could begin.8
Britain’s warm welcome toward their former colonial subjects may have
contributed to Chinese confusion about the Americans but Shaw, his junior partner,
Thomas Randall, and Captain John Green convinced the Chinese to grant them
autonomous trading privileges. Captain Green recorded the “Cumsha and Measurement”
on the Empress in his journal, noting “At 10 A.M., came on board the grand mandarin,
with his attendants, and the principal merchants of Canton, to measure the ship. Saluted
them with nine guns. At 11, they left the ship in order to visit and measure the other
ships.” The guns of the Empress blasted out their respect again as the Chinese departed.
The Hoppo later sent two bulls, eight bags of flour, and seven jars of country wine as a
gift for the Empress.9 Shaw added some crucial details in his Journal. He explained that
since the Empress was the first American ship that had ever visited China, “it was some
time before the Chinese could fully comprehend the distinction between Englishmen and
us.” When they realized the difference, the Chinese “styled us the New People.” The
Americans were soon known as “The Flowery Flag Devils” as opposed to British “Redhaired Devils.” Shaw then described what was, perhaps, the key factor, noting “when, by
map, we conveyed to them an idea of the extent of our country with its present and
increasing population, they were not a little pleased at the prospect of so considerable a
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market for the productions of their own empire.”10 Purser John Swift confirmed Shaw’s
impression. Writing to his father he reported that although “the Chinese had never heard
of us, . . . we introduced ourselves as a new Nation, gave them our history with a
description of our Country” and communicated “the importance and necessity of a trade
here to the advantage of both.” In Swift’s view as well, the Chinese appeared “perfectly
to understand and wish” to do business.11 In other words, the savvy Hong merchants
promptly grasped the profit potential of commerce with the United States of America.
The lure of profits quickly brought about diplomatic recognition. In this case, Shaw was
the ideal ambassador and fulfilled his role successfully, (once he accepted the restrictions
of the Canton system). In a letter to Secretary of State John Jay, written on his return to
the United States, Shaw indicated that from the first visit of the Chinese merchants at
Whampoa, the Americans were treated “in all respects as citizens of a free and
independent nation.”12 Thus we see, some eighteen thousand miles from the center of
that new nation, within customs rituals of Chinese devising, a significant performance of
American nationalism, one that would resonate at the center of government and in towns
and homes towns throughout the United States.
Confronting Cultural Difference:
During his months in Canton, Shaw faced an even more critical diplomatic
dilemma: an international incident with the potential for catastrophic consequences. The
affair began with a simple courtesy, one of those nine-gun naval salutes. On November
24, 1784 a British “country ship” -- that is, a ship sent by private British merchants
resident in India, not an official East India Company vessel from London – called the
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Lady Hughes, captained by W. Williams with George Smith as supercargo, following
long-time European and American custom, offered a salute as some gentlemen departed
the vessel. Unfortunately, one of the shells hit a Chinese sampan nearby killing one
Chinese and injuring several others. Even though this was obviously an unfortunate
accident, the Chinese demanded that the British turn over the gunner for questioning.
Shaw explained, according to his limited understanding of Chinese law, that “blood must
answer for blood.” The British, to protect the sailor, claimed that he had “absconded.”
The Chinese then asked for a substitute gunner to be turned over to them.13
This puzzling request revealed the difference between European and Chinese
systems of justice. In China, at the time, responsibility was a collective obligation.
Anyone in a given community could be held liable for actions of any other member of the
group. Following this principle, the Hong merchants could be held accountable and
punished for actions of the foreigners under their aegis. By the same token, another
gunner would be equally responsible for the death of the Chinese victim. This is difficult
to comprehend for those of us accustomed to a legal system and set of values organized
around individual guilt or innocence. Since careful assessment of individual actions were
not crucial to the Chinese sense of justice, they had no independent judicial system; the
local magistrate and his staff – think sheriff, police chief, or mayor – both investigated,
prosecuted, and tried accused criminals, which meant no trial by jury, no lawyers to
represent defendants. As a result, justice was swift and order was restored quickly. 14
In attempting to shield the gunner, the British may have been influenced by some
ominous incidents that had occurred previously. In 1773 in Macao, the Portuguese tried
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and acquitted an Englishman accused of killing a Chinese resident. The Chinese believed
their authority held sway since the victim was Chinese. They re-tried the accused
Englishman, found him guilty and executed him. In 1780, the Chinese took over a case
involving two Europeans, insisting that if the crime had taken place on Chinese soil, they
had jurisdiction. In this case, a French seaman had killed a Portuguese sailor during a
quarrel on shore leave in what some said was self-defense. In this case, since both men
were sailors on British ships, by European understanding the British would be in charge.
The Frenchman took refuge with the French Consul, who, after several days, gave him up
to the Chinese. According to Shaw, the Chinese “on being told that what the man had
done was agreeable to the law of self-defense . . . understood the matter very well,” but
had to “examine him before their tribunal,” after which he would be “restored unhurt.”
But instead, he was executed the next morning, strangled in public in front of the
factories with “no trial of Common Justice,” as the foreign community watched
helplessly. This angered and frightened the British contingent, who found themselves “in
a worse Situation than are the subjects of a Tyrannical Government – for we are liable to
all the Severity and Injustice of Arbitrary Law, and yet do not enjoy its privilege or
Protection.” The memory of that arbitrary execution was, according to Shaw, “fresh in
the mind of every one” as they attempted to shield the “accidental” gunner from Chinese
authorities.15
In the face of what the Europeans and Americans agreed was a breach of the “rule
of law,” a rule prized as an important feature of “civilized” government, deep cultural
suspicions between the Chinese and their foreign sojourners revealed themselves. Fierce
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imperial rivals such as the British and the French joined together against the Chinese
“Other.” Each action by the Westerners and reaction by the Chinese raised the stakes
even higher. A Chinese official, accompanied by the Hong merchants, visited Mr. Pigou,
head of the East India Company and British factory, again requesting a gunner be made
available for questioning “to satisfy the Laws of the Country.” Pigou explained that he
did not have command over a country [private] ship and directed them to address Captain
Williams or the supercargo George Smith directly. Smith gave assurances that he would
not leave Canton abruptly. Two days of debate passed. On November 26, Puankhequa,
the leading Hong merchant, who had been assigned to the Empress of China, informed
the foreign supercargoes that the gunner (or his substitute) must appear before the
“Tribunal of the Fouyuen.” The gunner would be taken to the tribunal by armed
soldiers.16
The Westerners responded that “the appearance of Armed men in any of the
Factories could not be admitted; It would be very alarming to Europeans.” That night the
Chinese caved in. At 11 p.m. Chinese officials came again to the factory and agreed that
the gunner would be examined by the Namhoi Hien at the factory without the use of
soldiers or force. Shaw viewed this as a full concession. He explained that the Chinese
merchants and mandarins had “told Mr. Pigou that they were satisfied, and that, as the
gunner had absconded, there would be no further trouble about it.” Everyone breathed a
sigh of relief.17
But the next morning they learned to their “utmost surprise” that British
supercargo George Smith, “lured” out of his factory late that night by a “pretended
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message from Puankhequa,” had been seized and marched under “a guard of Soldiers
with drawn Swords” into the city of Canton -- the city where foreigners were forbidden to
go. Needless to say, “this act filled the supercargoes with alarm.” Trade halted
immediately. The Hong merchants retreated behind the city walls, all the Chinese
compradors and servants left the factories, and all traffic on the river stopped. The
Americans and Europeans watched with alarm as several of the Emperor’s gun boats took
up positions in front of the factories. The avenues leading to the Quay were barricaded
and filled with soldiers. The foreigners, surrounded by armed men and guns pointing in
their direction from warships on the river, realized that “our personal safety was not
altogether free from danger” as they gathered together to plan a response. They managed
to smuggle messages to the ships at Whampoa with orders “to ‘send up their pinnaces
(small boats) manned and armed.’”
After being fired upon from Chinese forts along the river, the pinnaces from the
Empress and other foreign ships at Whampoa arrived during the evening of the third day,
pushing their way through the Chinese gun ships without incident. The sailors joined the
merchants held hostage in the factories. Even though an argument could easily have been
made that this was a British problem alone, “the Europeans unanimously agreed to make
it a common cause” to resist Chinese demands. Shaw and Randall offered full American
support. Later, the Chinese did, indeed, attempt to draw away support and isolate the
British – with little success.18
A “petty mandarin” delivered a copy of the Fouyuen’s Mandate expressing
annoyance with the delays: “Three days are now elapsed, & you have not sent me this
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Gunner which denotes on your part a resistance to our Laws.” The Chinese agreed to
release Mr. Smith as soon as the gunner arrived. The Fouyuen exhorted the Europeans “to
conform yourselves to my Mandate, and shew no token of resistance.” If not, he
threatened to “range my Troops with Musquets & Artillery . . . to cut off your retreat.”
He concluded with a warning: “If you dare in our Country to disobey & infringe our
Laws, consider well that you may not repent when it is too late.”19
The next morning the Consuls of all nations agreed to send a protest to the
Governor (Fouyuen) and request that he release supercargo Smith. That evening the
Fouyuen summoned a representative of each nation to appear before him; Shaw
represented the Americans. Two mandarins escorted the group to a pagoda “in a part of
the suburbs not frequented by the Europeans.” We can only imagine that trip through the
dark unfamiliar streets, the men not knowing if, or when, they might return to their
factories, or to their families thousands of miles away. Shaw recounted how, at the
pagoda, “a mandarin of war” led them through “two ranks of soldiers armed with long
scymitars.” The mandarin, bowing on one knee, “announced us” to the Fouyuen .20 The
Chinese leader spoke, reminding the group that his quarrel was with the English. After
their anxious trek into alien parts of the city, Shaw noted that the Westerners’ solidarity
and “zeal [to oppose the Chinese] seemed to be not a little abated.” On being told again
that the gunner had absconded, the Fouyuen replied “No matter, he must be produced.”
When a Frenchman tried to defend the actions of the English, he was silenced. The
Fouyuen declared that “it was only in consideration of the other nations that the English
were not on this occasion a lost people.” With those ominous words, he offered tea,
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which was declined, and gifts of silk “in token of amity,” which were accepted. And the
chastened men were guided, through a maze of streets, back to their factories.21
The blockade continued all through the next day. A handful of boats were
permitted to head down to Whampoa under Chinese protection, signaled by a red flag at
the bow. One of these carried a message from the British supercargo Smith “by order of
the mandarins,” asking Captain Williams to produce the accused gunner. Who knows
what pressure had forced Smith to capitulate and ask for the unfortunate gunner. But the
Chinese linguist charged with delivering the letter was so frightened when he saw the
imposing British ships with guns run out of their ports ready to fire, that he turned tail
and headed back to Canton without delivering the order.22
The following day, a British boat under a Chinese flag took the linguist to
Whampoa again. After several uneasy hours of negotiation, five English boats set out to
Whampoa under Chinese protection to find the gunner and bring him back. At sunset
they returned with the unfortunate gunner, who was taken to the pagoda by a
representative from each nation. The mandarins assured the group that Smith, the
imprisoned supercargo, would be returned that night and that the gunner would be held
“until the Emperor’s pleasure should be known. ” Restrictions on trade were lifted
immediately. The armed pinnaces of the American and European nations returned to
Whampoa. After nine days trade resumed on December 6; the Lady Hughes, under
Captain Williams, with thankful supercargo George Smith back on board and with
hopeful thoughts for the gunner still in Chinese hands, sailed from Whampoa on
December 7, 1784 . Like all the “foreign devils,” Shaw breathed a sigh of relief and
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noted, “Thus ended a very troublesome affair.” 23
In spite of his relief, Shaw penned a strong critique of his fellow consuls and
supercargoes. Shaw observed that, during meetings at the factory, the “gentlemen said
they considered it a common cause,” but no specific plan had been adopted. He
concluded that the affair “commenced in confusion, was carried on without order, and
terminated disgracefully.” If “private interests” could “have been for a moment
sacrificed to the general good” and “the rights of humanity,” an honorable conclusion
might have been reached. Shaw stood ready to make a common cause with the British in
spite of seven years of war against them. When confronted with the radically different
and by implication ‘inhumane’ laws of the Chinese government, the bond of cultural
affinity took precedence over national feeling. Had the several nations put up a strong,
united front, Shaw believed, they would have prevailed. But “as it did terminate,” he was
forced to agree with the Chinese observation – “‘Truly, all Fanquois [Fan Kwae = foreign
devils] have much lose his face in this business.”24
Troubles did not end there for the Americans. Even though they believed that the
Chinese understood and respected them as a separate sovereign nation, a slip of a pen
caused a further crisis in commerce and identity. Puankhequa, the Hong merchant in
charge of the Empress, had recorded her as a British country ship. This may have been an
effort on his part to avoid the lavish gifts the Hoppo and others would have expected
from a country attempting to establish trading privileges for the first time – gifts the
Americans were in no position to offer. Since the British had been at the center of
controversy during the Lady Hughes affair, the Chinese delayed in issuing Grand Chops
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to British vessels including (mistakenly) the Empress. The Grand Chop was the final
document attesting that all the required duties, fees, and customs charges due to the
Chinese had been paid in full. Without the chop, the Empress could not leave Whampoa
with her cargo of costly goods.25
Once again the French came to the rescue. Shaw and Randall quickly prepared a
“memorial” for the Consul of France who promised to present it the next day. The
document explained Pankekqua’s mistake, and announced to the Chinese that “we are
Americans, a free, independent, and sovereign nation, not connected with Great Britain,
nor owing allegiance to her, or any other power on earth but the authority of the United
States alone.” They concluded, “We pray the Chinese to consider us in that view, and
grant our passports accordingly.” The next day they received a letter from the French
Consul, M. Vieillard, declaring the mistake had been corrected and, the day after,
received their Grand Chop. American national identity stood reaffirmed, thanks in part to
the French assistance.26 Throughout their stay in China, Shaw and his fellow Americans
had to navigate a tangle of interlocking constraints and desires to construct their position
as legitimate global competitors in the Canton trade. In doing so, they affirmed United
States as a sovereign nation on the world stage not only to the trading community in
China but to themselves and their countrymen at home.
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NOTES
1
Eliga H. Gould and Peter S. Onuf, eds., Empire and Nation : The American Revolution in the
Atlantic World (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 7. I would argue for a more
cohesive transatlantic identity in the mid-eighteenth-century at least among urban elites in North
America but that does not eliminate the duality especially for Americans dealing with other
British colonies or with restrictive trade regulations.
Philip Freneau, “On the First American Ship, (Empress of China, Capt, Greene) that Explored
the Rout[e] to China, and the East-Indies, after the Revolution,” in Poems Written and Published
during the American Revolutionary War, third edition, vol. II (Philadelphia: Lydia Bailey, 1809),
181-82. Freneau had written a pre-revolutionary work, “The Rising Glory of America,” that
referred to “Britain’s sons” spreading dominion from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Philip Freneau,
A Poem, on the Rising Glory of America (Philadelphia: Printed by Joseph Cruikshank, for R.
Aitkin, bookseller, opposite the London-Coffee-House, in Front-Street., M,DCC,LXXII [1772]).
2
3
May 18, 1785, Massachusetts Centinel; May 16, 1785, New Jersey Gazette; May 18, 1785,
Freeman’s Journal; May 18, 1785 Political Intelligencer [New Brunswick, N.J.]
For the best explanation (in English) of the “Canton System” that governed trade procedures in
the only Chinese port open to foreigners during this period see Paul A. Van Dyke, The Canton
Trade : Life and Enterprise on The China Coast, 1700-1845 (Hong Kong : Hong Kong
University Press, 2005) passim.
4
5
William Robertson, View of the Progress of Society in Europe (1769) quoted in Albert O.
Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its
Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 61.
6
Shaw, Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, 164.
7
Sea-letter for the Empress of China from the Congress of the United States, January 30, 1784,
reprinted in Philip Chadwick Foster Smith, The Empress of China (Philadelphia: Philadelphia
Maritime museum, 1984), 70-71.
W. C. Hunter, The ‘Fan Kwae’ at Canton before the Treaty Days 1825-1844 (London: Kegan
Paul, Trench, & Co., 1882, reprint. ed. Taipei: Ch’eng-wen Publishing Co., 1965), 99, 101
8
This is the only extant entry for Green’s journal during the stay at Whampoa. Quoted in
Samuel Shaw, The Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, The First American Consul at Canton with
A Life of the Author by Josiah Quincy (Taipei: Ch’eng-Wen Publishing Company, 1968.
Originally pub. Boston: Crosby and Nichols, 1847), 177.
9
10
Shaw, The Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, 183; Hunter, The ‘Fan Kwae’ at Canton, 63
11
John White Swift to John Swift, 3 Dec 1784, Hildeburn Papers, Historical Society of
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Pennsylvania, quoted in Smith, Empress of China, 154.
12
Samuel Shaw to John Jay, New York, May 19, 1785 reprinted in Appendix A, The Journals
of Major Samuel Shaw, 337-38.
13
Hosea Ballou Morse, ed. The Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China 16351834, vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 99; Shaw, The Journals of Major Samuel Shaw,
186-87
14
Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1990),
123-26; Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China II: 101
15
Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China, vol. II: 59 and 99, 60;
Shaw, The Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, 186-87
On the role of a cultural “Other” in the shaping of national identity see Linda Colley, Britons:
Forging The Nation, 1707-1837 ( New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
16
17
Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China II: 99-100; Shaw, The
Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, 187
18
Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China II: 100-101; Shaw, The
Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, 187
“Mandate of the Fouyuen Sune of Quantong acting as Tsongtoc of the provinces of Quantong
and Quansi, to the Chief of the English and to the rest of the English;” quoted in Morse, The
Chronicles of the East India Company, II: 102
19
20
Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China II: 103; Shaw, The
Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, 189
21
Shaw, The Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, 189-90
22
Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company trading to China II: 103-04
23
Shaw, The Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, 191-92, 195; Morse, The Chronicles of the East
India Company trading to China II: 105
24
Shaw, The Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, 195
25
Each Grand Chop would be verified at Bocca Tigris. Van Dyke, The Canton Trade, 32-33.
26
Shaw, The Journals of Major Samuel Shaw, 192-95
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