John Bradley, University of Edinburgh, Nationalism, Religion and Ethnicity: The
Case of Lebanon
Nationalism, Religion and Ethnicity: the Case of Lebanon
Two weeks ago, the Economist wrote in its leader article: “It is tempting to conclude that
Lebanon never was, and never will be, a real country whose inhabitants have an
overarching loyalty to their state.”i This followed yet another crisis in Lebanon, brought
about when Hizbollah turned its military arsenal against its fellow citizens, in response to
the Sunni-majority ruling coalition’s decision to suspend Hizbollah’s telecommunications
network, and to sack the head of security at Beirut airport, who has links with the
organisation. This latest debacle – solved for the time being by an embarrassing retreat by
the Western-backed government at a meeting in Doha, shows clearly the ongoing
difficulties that Lebanon has in fostering a sense of national identity over an above its
eighteen officially recognised religious identities. But all is not lost: Elizabeth Picard,
who wrote one of the best academic studies of the civil war in Lebanon, maintains that,
“only the desire to preserve the country withstood all the rifts of war.”ii
The feature distinguishing Lebanon from other Middle Eastern countries is the presence
of a powerful Christian community with its own religious and cultural identity, an
identity that is quite distinct from that of the Arab Muslims. The Christian community is
fully integrated into the political and social structures of the state, and Christians for a
long time were able to live peacefully alongside the other religious communities present
in the country. The National Pact of Community Coexistence of 1943 legally confirmed
this society of mixed religions, which had existed for a long time. It was founded on a
democratic system which assigned an important place to the religious communities,
through a delicate system of constitutional balances aimed at impeding the state from
identifying with only one religious group. This model of interdenominational society was
the basis of Lebanese national identity and independence, a right which was affirmed as
much towards the West (personified at that time by the mandatory power, France) as
towards the East (in particular with regard to Syria and its policy to annex Lebanon).iii
Much of the current trouble dates from the civil war of 1975-1990. During that time the
state apparatus was ravaged and rendered almost useless; indeed the Lebanese state
became a shell controlled by a series of militias. Reuters state that between the thirteenth
of April 1975 and the thirty-first of December 1989, 130 000 people died as a result of
the civil war in Lebanon.iv Despite this, Michael Johnson thinks that most civilians
managed to co-operate during the years of fighting, and “many developed a strong sense
of Lebanese nationalism in reaction to the romantic ethnicities promoted by the
militias.”v But it was not simply deaths that affected the population of the country: much
has been made of the haemorrhaging of young talented people from the country as a
result of the strife. In 1989-1990 alone, 150 000 Lebanese are thought to have left the
country,vi and by 1996, Elizabeth Picard estimated that emigration had “drained off”
more than a fourth of the labour force.vii There was also massive sectarian migration:
Christians accounted for 55% of the population in the southern regions of Mount
Lebanon in 1975, but by the late 1980s they accounted for only 5%. Similarly Muslims in
the Eastern Suburbs of Beirut in 1975 accounted for about 40% of the people living there,
but by the late 1980s this also stood at 5%.viii In total, says Picard, over a third of the
country’s population “has been displaced, cut off from its resources and roots. The
country’s physical infrastructure as well as its organizational and human resources were
“destroyed, impaired, damaged, or, as in the case of skilled labor [sic], migrated
abroad.”ix Lebanon lost nearly a third of its fixed industrial capital and its infrastructure
greatly deteriorated. As Picard says, “war and neglect eroded roads, ruined hospital
equipment, the ports, water mains, electricity and the telephone network to such an extent
that experts from the World Bank…estimated the cost of repairs at more than $10
billion.”x Picard suggested in 1996 that the major problem remaining was the authority of
the state,xi and it is the reasons for this to which we now turn.
During the civil war the Maronite Christian Lebanese Forces, Druze Progressive Socialist
Party, Shi’i Amal Movement and its competitor the Islamic Movement led by Hezbollah
all built up massive independent power bases.xii Deirdre Collings suggests that the war
developed a life of its own as a “militia-run ‘war system’, dominated by those with
weapons, patrons and a vested interest in Lebanon’s continued destabilization.”xiii As
Theodor Hanf states, before the war, “only the Palestinian organisations had professional
guerrillas in any large numbers”xiv But after months and years of devastating civil
conflict, the militias assumed some of the state’s functions, “above all the collection of
revenues due to the state, forcing the state to resort to inflationary policies.”xv Georges
Corm maintains that the militias shared common goals: “divide Lebanon’s traditionally
consensual civil society along sectarian lines and paralyze the Lebanese state.”xvi Corm
highlights the following features that dominated the ‘militia-dominated’ Lebanese state:
looting,xvii militia taxes, destruction of banking, drug dealing,xviii arms dealing,xix sniping,
kidnapping and blind shelling.xx He notes a systematic elimination of freedom of
expression; assassinations; prohibition of sale of newspapers offering opposing views, xxi
and most of all, a disregard for state and religious institutions.xxii Indeed, Corm expresses
irritation that the international press “reached a zenith of intellectual laziness” by seeing
the war as Muslims versus Christians, and thus justifying the criminal violence. xxiii The
militias did provide many social services, which the state could not muster. Indeed, on
the surface, social activities were projected as responses to human need and suffering,
religious duty and party obligation. But as Judith Harik says, while this presentation was
undoubtedly valid, “it did not mask the fact that ruthless goals of community and national
hegemony were also responsible for the expansion and diversification of social
programmes.”xxiv In the face of the militias taking on many of the nation state’s roles and
responsibilities, there might seem little hope of any sense of national feeling remaining.
But Picard says that the militias “by and large failed in the tasks of institutionalizing and
legitimating their economic and political roles.”xxv In fact, she asserts that the most
tangible effect of the militias’ economic practices is to have “reduced the notion of public
good and to have crippled the legal and financial instruments of a state whose authority
had already been curtailed by ultra-liberalism.”xxvi So although the militias overran the
state, they did not successfully usurp its position. Picard sees militia control in Lebanon
as characterized by the coercive unification of populations within the same communal
space; the forced homogenization of those populations, causing the displacement of
several hundred thousand Christians and Shi’ite Muslims; and physical separation along
sectarian lines.xxvii “But,” says Harik, “in no sense were any of Lebanon’s power domains
the fully autonomous entities claimed in some quarters. Lebanon’s regions were always
loosely articulated and were simply more so under conditions of conflict.”xxviii
Nevertheless Hizbollah ensured its domination through aid distribution, an authoritarian
framework, and the ‘re-Islamization’ of society.”xxix Hizbollah has proved to be
fascinating in its evolution. As Hala Jaber says, “Since the Party of God made its
entrance into politics in 1992, it no longer depends solely on its military force for its
identity.”
xxx
Indeed, Jaber insists that despite its Islamic identity and its calls for an
Islamic republic in its manifesto, “its deputies have not focused on Islamic issues since
they were elected. Politicians and analysts are generally impressed by Hezbollah’s
performance as a political party.” xxxi Nevertheless, many Lebanese suspect that despite
demands for deconfessionalization and the adoption of majority rule, the Shi’i
community is “ambitious enough to seek to impose its legal system and orientation on the
entire population.”xxxii But, so long as the government remains incapable of fulfilling its
basic responsibilities towards its citizens, “Hezbollah will no doubt continue to expand its
social and public assistance work and to reap the rewards that spin off from these
endeavours.”xxxiii Leonard Binder states that the key to the changed political realities of
Lebanon is the changed position of the Shi’ite community: “Much depends upon whether
they [the Shi’ites] can come to…a self-understanding and upon whether or not they can
work things out with their fellow Lebanese.”xxxiv Indeed, Augustus Richard Norton says
that the real story in Lebanon is the “social and political change we usually associate with
modernization.”xxxv He continues to say that “vast numbers of Lebanese who were
previously politically moot have now found their political voice and are no longer content
to accept a political system that ignores their demands.xxxvi
In October 1989, in Taif, Saudi Arabia, fifty-eight of the seventy surviving Lebanese
deputies
approved
with
a
comfortable
margin
the
‘Document
of
National
Reconciliation’.xxxvii The Taif accord sprang from the conjugation of three major failures:
the failure of General Michel Aoun’s War of Liberation against Syria; the failure of Syria
to impose a solution acceptable to all of Lebanon’s communities, especially the Maronite
Christians; and finally, the failure of attempts to resolve the conflict through international
intervention.xxxviii Picard suggests that the Taif decision reflected a radically new, “warinduced notion of communal identity.”
xxxix
Insecurity, dispersion of families,
generational differences, the loss of socio-economic criteria at a time of disintegration,
the paralysis and subsequent breakup of the state structure, “all contributed to the
reevaluation of the religious community as final molder [sic] of identity.” xl Johnson has
much to say about the Taif Accord. He asserts that it is worrying that the new Lebanon
has been constructed along the same confessional lines as the old.xli Perhaps the most
important feature of Lebanon’s postwar political system is that under the terms of Taif
the political imbalance in favour of Christians was changed. The powers of the Maronite
president were limited, the power of the prime minister and the speaker of the
parliamentary assembly were extended, and the ratio of Christian to Muslim members of
parliament was changed from 6:5 to an equal representation of the two communities. But
the presidency is still reserved for a Maronite Christian, the premiership for a Sunni
Muslim, and the seats in parliament for the different sects according to their rough size in
the population. Johnson says that, “there is an obvious injustice here, in that the Shi’a are
now the largest sect; and according to the conventions of the original confessional
compact, they ought to be given the presidency instead of the chair of the parliament.” xlii
But the real problem, says Johnson is the “continuance of the confessional principle in
political representation.”xliii
But the Document of National Reconciliation does reaffirm that Lebanon is a country
where various communities coexist,xliv eliminates sectarian criteria for recruitment of
public servants and suggests steps to abolish sectarianism.xlv Also, the accord was the
means for ending the civil war, and thus was important for that reason alone. But Makdisi
points to Lebanon’s ‘unstable political equilibrium’: the Taif accord did not bring about a
“major rupture in a system that embodied elements of instability, but only a necessary
adjustment, which at the time was considered essential for ending the civil war.” xlvi More
important even than this, though, has been the case of Syria. As’ad Abukhalil asserts that
throughout the war, “Syrian policy in Lebanon consistently sought to prevent a decisive
victory by any of the Lebanese combatants.”xlvii Then, as Picard points out, even the
Document of National Reconciliation granted the “intrusive protector a formula of
allegiance that rattles the ear of many: ‘may they [the Syrians] be thanked!’”xlviii But even
more damaging than Syria’s exploitation of a country it helped to ruin was the military
and political control it exercised over Lebanon after the war ended. xlix Johnson refers to
this control as ‘neopatriarchy’.l Nevertheless, in signing the treaty, “Syria formally
recognized Lebanon,”li which was a great step forward in promoting authentic Lebanese
nationalism. Although the treaty of brotherhood had virtually turned Lebanon into a
Syrian protectorate, “it also had – conversely and for the very first time – officially
acknowledged Lebanon as an ‘independent republic’ and not a breakaway sanjak.”lii This
was to pave the way for the 2005 withdrawal, but in the meantime, the civil war had left
Lebanon overrun with Syrian army officers and intelligence agents. Syria in effect threw
the Taif agreement out of the window, fearing that the implementation of its reforms
might see Syria’s role in Lebanon curtailed.liii Meanwhile, the most important issue that
lingers on the national consciousness is that the civil war highlighted the fact that the fate
of the Palestinians in Lebanon needed to be resolved.liv As Kail Ellis suggests, as long as
Lebanon’s Palestinians remain in desperate circumstances, “their presence will continue
to undermine Lebanon’s political stability and security.”lv
So what of Lebanese nationalism outside of the confessional structure? During the civil
war the state was almost destroyed, and was left as a pitiful shell; the pawn of the
militias. Meanwhile, the marginalised Shi’a minority became a powerful, vocal majority,
but in fact the Shi’ites were not the only marginalised group to make an impact as a result
of the war. Significantly women were at the forefront of the peace movement in the
1980s. Wives and mothers of hostages taken by the militias formed multiconfessional
groups to press for the release of their men and to support each other. As Michael
Johnson says, “in their struggles against the war, such women literally shamed those
fighters and leaders who peddled hatred, selfishness and domination.”lvi Added to this
one must remember the incredible events of the ‘Cedar Revolution’ in 2005 when many
Lebanese came together to help to drive out the Syrian presence in the country. There
may be great religious divides in Lebanon, but those who see the government as pawns of
the USA, and Hizbollah as agents of Iran, would do well to observe that the symbol of
the Cedar tree is as important to most Lebanese as is their confessional flag or affiliation.
There is great pride in this small nation, and the fact that Lebanon has come to the brink
of returning to civil war several times over the last few months, but has not succumbed to
that, is a testament both to the fact that the Lebanese cannot stomach another major war,
and also value the integrity of their country. If another civil war does break out, it will
undoubtedly be as a result of excessive foreign meddling in Lebanon: something with
which the population is all too familiar. The most important thing to remember is that
though religion plays a vital role in the identity of individual Lebanese people, when it
comes to group and perceived national interest the most extraordinary alliances can
spring up: at the moment the government is a coalition of Sunni Muslims, right wing
Christian parties and Druze. That government came into power with the support of
Hizbollah, who are now trying to bring it down. Meanwhile, today, the pro-Syrian
opposition includes, with Hizbollah, those Christians, Sunni Muslims and Druze who had
flourished under Syrian patronage, and are now excluded from the centre of power, as
well as the Free Patriotic Movement, led by Maronite Michel Aoun, who led the last
uprising of the civil war against Syria, but now feels disenfranchised by the new political
system. Added to this is the complication of the 2006 war between Israel and Hizbollah.
The latter’s prestige was greatly enhanced by its ‘defeat’ of the Israeli forces, but many in
Lebanon are simply angry that Hizbollah provoked an unnecessary war in the first place.
Here, the war fatigue of many in Lebanon becomes clear: as people simply want to
rebuild their country and become prosperous once more. In a sense, Lebanese nationalism
is summed up by the 70 000 strong state army. It is multi-confessional, and wary of being
infected by sectarianism. But it is also weak, and no match for the forces of Hizbollah. It
is a mystery how it holds together, but somehow it continues to do so.
In conclusion, I undertook to try and draw broader lessons from the experience of
Lebanon, and it is certainly worth attempting to do that, with the caveat that particularly
in terms of its constitution, Lebanon remains unique. The issue of ethnic and religious
nationalism, versus nationalism which is centred on loyalty to the nation state is
extremely apposite in the modern world. The complex make-up of the Iraqi population
and its continued ethnic and religious violence is the most pronounced example, but
similar issues are being faced as close to home as the USA, Holland and here in the UK.
In his book ‘The Multiculturalism of Fear’ Jacob Levy paints a sometimes bleak picture
of a world coming to terms with multiculturalism. He identifies several areas which must
be addressed. The first is that forcible inclusion of a minority in a nationalist discourse is
untenable. The second is that the forcible exclusion of a minority is dangerous. The other
areas relate to the problems arising from the intermingling of existing ethnic
communities, especially if such interaction is stigmatised.lvii In terms of the example of
Lebanon, we can observe that the Shi’a (though not a numerical minority, it is still a
minority in terms of its disenfranchisement), are included in a national pact which they
see to be irrevocably unfair; that the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are not recognised
as citizens, and that since the civil war, people have been wary of living outside their own
strictly defined ethnic or religious area. Will Kymlicka also recognises the difficulties
posed by such matters. He suggests that the modern concept of ‘treating people as
individuals’ is often just a cover for ethnic and national injustice. Indeed, we cannot
ignore people’s ethnic differences, and ways must be found for these distinctions to be
acknowledged and taken account of. In the case of Lebanon, this is very pertinent as the
state simply cannot ignore the different minorities that make up the population. But
Kymlicka insists that there should be limits on such rights – in particular, one minority
should not dominate another, and nor should a group’s rights enable it to oppress its own
members.lviii Surely this can be exemplified by Hizbollah, although other groups in
Lebanon are guilty too. Kymlicka concludes that: “at present, the fate of ethnic and
national groups around the world is in the hand of xenophobic nationalists, religious
extremists, and military dictators. If liberalism is to have any chance of taking hold in
these countries, it must explicitly address the needs and aspirations of ethnic and national
minorities”lix Lebanon remains a potentially glorious example of the attempt to meet
these ‘needs and aspirations’. It is a liberal democracy built on a model of religious
freedom and representation for all. Sadly this delicate balance has come up against many
challenges, most of them bloody. But when looking at addressing these pressing issues of
multiculturalism and nationalism, politicians and academics alike would do well to look
to the example of Lebanon both for things to avoid, and also for successes. Religion
remains at the heart of nationalism in Lebanon, but there is still, sixty years on, a true
sense of pride amongst Lebanese in the mountains and the cedars; in the great sea vistas
and the beautiful countryside; in the magnificent rebuilding of Beirut and in the effort to
make this exceptional political experiment work one day.
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Rienner, 1994
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Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2002
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Harik, Judith Palmer Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism London: I.B. Tauris &
Co., 2005
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Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000
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Jaber, Hala Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance London: Fourth Estate, 1997
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I.B. Tauris & Co., 2001
Khalili, Laleh ‘A Landscape of Uncertainty: Palestinians in Lebanon’ in Middle East
Report ‘Inside Syria and Lebanon’, No. 236, Vol. 35, No. 3: Fall 2005 pp34-39
Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995
Levy, J.T. The Multiculturalism of Fear Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000
Makdisi, Samir The Lessons of Lebanon: the economics of war and development London:
I.B. Tauris & Co., 2004
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University of Texas Press, 1987
- Hezbollah Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007
O’Ballance, Edgar Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92 London: Macmillan Press, 1998
Picard, Elizabeth Lebanon: A Shattered Country – Myths and Realities of the Wars in
Lebanon trans. Franklin Philip, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1996
Ranstorp, Magnus Hizb’Allah in Lebanon London: Macmillan Press, 1997
Sallouk, Bassel ‘Syria and Lebanon: A Brotherhood Transformed’ in Middle East Report
‘Inside Syria and Lebanon’, No. 236, Vol. 35, No. 3: Fall 2005 pp14-21
Endnotes
i
The Economist, 17th May 2008 p. 16
Picard, Elizabeth Lebanon: A Shattered Country – Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon trans.
Franklin Philip, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1996 p149
ii
iii
iv
v
Cf. Breger, M. J. (ed.) The Vatican-Israel Accords Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004
O’Ballance, Edgar Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92 London: Macmillan Press, 1998 p216
Johnson, Michael All Honourable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon London: I.B. Tauris & Co.,
2001 p227
vi
Hanf, Theodor Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation London: I.B.
Tauris & Co., 1993 p605
vii
Picard, Elizabeth Lebanon: A Shattered Country – Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon trans.
Franklin Philip, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1996 p142
viii
Khalaf, Samir, ‘Culture, Collective Memory and the Restoration of Civility’ in Collings, Deirdre (ed.)
Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction London: Lynne Rienner, 1994 p277
Statistics from Salim Nasr ‘New Social Realities and Postwar Lebanon’ in Samir Khalat and Philip Khoury
(eds.) Recovering Beirut: Prospects for Urban Reconstruction Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993
ix
Saidi, Nasser H., ‘The Economic Reconstruction of Lebanon: War, Peace & Modernization’ in Collings,
Deirdre (ed.) Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction London: Lynne Rienner, 1994 p195
x
Picard, Elizabeth Lebanon: A Shattered Country – Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon trans.
Franklin Philip, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1996 p142
xi
Ibid p172
xii
Harik, Judith, The Public and Social Services of the Lebanese Militias, Oxford: Centre for Lebanese
Studies, 1994 p2
xiii
Collings, Deirdre, ‘Introduction’ in Collings, Deirdre (ed.) Peace for Lebanon? From War to
Reconstruction London: Lynne Rienner, 1994 p6
xiv
Hanf, Theodor Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation London: I.B.
Tauris & Co., 1993 p331
xv
Ibid p359
Corm, Georges, ‘The War System: Militia Hegemony & Reestablishment of the State’ in Collings,
Deirdre (ed.) Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction London: Lynne Rienner, 1994 p215
xvii
Ibid p216
xviii
Ibid p217
xix
Ibid p218
xx
Ibid p219
xxi
Ibid p220
xxii
Ibid p221
xxiii
Ibid p225
xxiv
Harik, Judith, The Public and Social Services of the Lebanese Militias, Oxford: Centre for Lebanese
Studies, 1994 p51
xvi
xxv
Picard, Elizabeth, ‘The Political Economy of Civil War in Lebanon’ in Heydemann, Steven (ed.) War,
Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000 p307
xxvi
xxvii
Ibid p318
Picard, Elizabeth, ‘The Political Economy of Civil War in Lebanon’ in Heydemann, Steven (ed.) War,
Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000 p308
xxviii
Harik, Judith, The Public and Social Services of the Lebanese Militias, Oxford: Centre for Lebanese
Studies, 1994 p51
xxix
Picard, Elizabeth Lebanon: A Shattered Country – Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon trans.
Franklin Philip, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1996 p153
xxx
Jaber, Hala Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance London: Fourth Estate, 1997p210
xxxi
Ibid
xxxii
Picard, Elizabeth Lebanon: A Shattered Country – Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon trans.
Franklin Philip, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1996 p166
xxxiii
Harik, Judith Palmer Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2005 p93
xxxiv
Ibid
xxxv
Norton, Augustus Richard Amal and the Shia: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1987 p8
xxxvi
Ibid
xxxvii
Picard, Elizabeth Lebanon: A Shattered Country – Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon trans.
Franklin Philip, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1996 p156
xxxviii
Maila, Joseph, ‘The Ta’if Accord: An Evaluation’ in Collings, Deirdre (ed.) Peace for Lebanon? From
War to Reconstruction London: Lynne Rienner, 1994 p32
xxxix
Picard, Elizabeth Lebanon: A Shattered Country – Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon trans.
Franklin Philip, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1996 p157
xl
Ibid
xli
Johnson, Michael All Honourable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon London: I.B. Tauris & Co.,
2001 p231
xlii
Ibid p232
xliii
Ibid
xliv
Maila, Joseph, ‘The Ta’if Accord: An Evaluation’ in Collings, Deirdre (ed.) Peace for Lebanon? From War
to Reconstruction London: Lynne Rienner, 1994 p35
xlv
Ibid p36
xlvi
Ibid p166
xlvii
Abukhalil, As’ad, ‘Determinants and Characteristics of Syrian Policy in Lebanon’ in Collings, Deirdre
(ed.) Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction London: Lynne Rienner, 1994 p131
xlviii
Picard, Elizabeth Lebanon: A Shattered Country – Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon trans.
Franklin Philip, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1996 p167
xlix
Ibid p168
l
Johnson, Michael All Honourable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon London: I.B. Tauris & Co.,
2001 p249ff
li
Hanf, Theodor Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation London: I.B.
Tauris & Co., 1993 p618
lii
O’Ballance, Edgar Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92 London: Macmillan Press, 1998 p217
Sallouk, Bassel ‘Syria and Lebanon: A Brotherhood Transformed’ in Middle East Report ‘Inside Syria
and Lebanon’, No. 236, Vol. 35, No. 3: Fall 2005 pp14-21
liv
Khalili, Laleh ‘A Landscape of Uncertainty: Palestinians in Lebanon’ in Middle East Report ‘Inside Syria
and Lebanon’, No. 236, Vol. 35, No. 3: Fall 2005 pp34-39
liii
lv
Ellis, Kail C., ‘Epilogue’ in Ellis, Kail C. (ed.) Lebanon’s Second Republic: Prospects for the Twenty-First
Century Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2002 p206
lvi
Johnson, Michael All Honourable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon London: I.B. Tauris & Co.,
2001 p256
lvii
lviii
lix
Levy, J.T. The Multiculturalism of Fear Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000 pp.15-18
Cf. Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995
Kymlicka, W. Multicultural Citizenship Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995 p. 195