Castle’s Choice: Autonomy and Transcendence*
“Mr. Castle,” said Frazier very earnestly, “let me ask you
a question. I warn you that it will be the most terrifying
question of your life. What would you do if you found
yourself in possession of an effective science of behavior?
Suppose you suddenly found it possible to control the
behavior of men as you wished. What would you do?” …
“What would I do,” said Castle thoughtfully, “I think I
would dump your science of behavior in the ocean.”
(B. F. Skinner, Walden Two)
The
“manipulation
argument”
is
supposed
to
show
that
a
Compatibilist definition of free will/autonomy (I plan on
treating these terms as synonymous) must be false, since it
would
be
others.
consistent
with
an
agent
being
controlled
by
That is, if an agent all of whose actions are
causally determined has as much control over what she does
as, say, a victim of brainwashing, then, surely, she lacks
a
free
will.
There
is
no
difference,
the
argument
continues, between the amounts of control exercised in the
two cases.
Thus, Compatibilism is false: a definition of
autonomy that is consistent with causal determinism makes
it impossible to specify the autonomy entailing difference
between a “naturally” determined agent and a subject of
covert, non-constraining control.
I shall argue, however,
that such a difference does exist: that only a naturally
determined agent would be able to subvert the wills of
others.1
1
The
clear:
challenge
find
a
issued
way
to
here
refute
to
the
the
claim
Compatibilist
that
the
determination of agency is tantamount to CNC.
is
causal
Moreover,
this challenge cannot be met by responding with a Frankfurt
case: a situation in which things have been surreptitiously
arranged
so
something
that
that
an
he
agent
manages
is
to
unable
do
‘on
to
avoid
doing
his
own’,
thus,
becoming responsible for it despite his inability to act
otherwise.2
inconsistent
For,
even
with
if
causal
autonomy
determinism
because
it
is
not
eliminates
the
ability to do otherwise per se, it may yet entail that no
agent can exercise the enough control over her behavior to
be autonomous, an implication of which would be a lack of
alternatives on anyone’s part.3
In other words, the fact
that in a causally determined world one could under no
circumstances act differently than one does is perhaps only
symptomatic
of
the
reason
why
such
a
world
would
lack
autonomous agents: forces beyond anyone’s control would be
ultimately responsible for how everyone ‘turns out’.
Thus,
the compatibilist must show that the way that an agent
would
be
experiences
naturally
such
as
determined,
her
upbringing
via
and
the
effect
formal
of
education
upon the expression of her genome, would leave unimpairedindeed foster- an ability that CNC would destroy.
2
What
follows is an attempt to define this ability.
I shall
argue that a naturally determined agent is autonomous for
being able to “subvert” the will of others, something that
a
victim
of
CNC
could
not
accomplish.
I
begin
by
considering several alternatives to this position.
I
A victim of CNC would be unable to develop her values
‘all by herself’.
Others would instill some of them and
she would, thus, end up willing differently than she might
have sans their influence on her life.
what entails her loss of autonomy?
Is this impairment
Does a person develop a
free will only if she has been completely uninfluenced by
others?
An
affirmative
answer
here
would
definition of autonomy that is too narrow.
a
requirement
determined
on
agent’s
being
autonomous
character
could
not
entail
a
It would impose
that
a
naturally
satisfy,
for
the
efforts of others would be responsible for at least some of
her
values
impervious
as
to
well.
attempts
Autonomy
does
to
one’s
shape
not
require
character;
being
as
we
shall see, it is the ability to respond to such attempts in
a certain way that is necessary.
Perhaps it is the ability to respond to any value
instilling
experience
with
all
of
one’s
“original”
capacities being intact and unmodified that is constitutive
3
of a free will.
The suggestion here is that an agent’s
will could be free, yet informed by the values of others,
as long as they have played no role in the development of
her faculties.
agent’s
But anyone who would naturally determine an
values
development
of
would
her
also
be
intellectual
likely
to
capacities.4
affect
No
one
the
is
capable of responding to every value instilling experience
having the cognitive wherewithal that she would have had in
any
event,
since
potential
casualty of such learning.
reactions
are
an
inevitable
Thus, this definition is also
too narrow.
The position that an agent is autonomous only if she
would
“take
responsibility”
actions shares this defect.
for
the
‘springs’
of
her
The idea here is that neither
a specific set of capacities and/or values is required for
autonomy, but the willingness to accept praise/blame for
whatever determines one’s conduct.5 A victim of CNC, on this
view, lacks a free will because she would deem others, not
herself, responsible for her motives, were she apprised of
having been manipulated.
In other words, since there is a
cause of her actions of which she is unaware and hence, for
which
cannot
take
responsibility,
she
fails
to
be
autonomous, regardless of the fact that it is approximate.
But the same thing would be true of an agent whose values
4
and/or
capacities
had
been
naturally
determined:
as
results (say) of an upbringing of a certain type.
the
That
one’s parents chose to (attempt to) instill in one their
values rather than others would not be an experience that
one could take credit
determine
one’s
for having, even though it would
behavior.
The
willingness
to
take
responsibility for the ‘springs’ of one’s action is, thus,
not definitive, of autonomy.
II
We have seen that autonomy does not require having all
of one’s original capacities intact.
Let us explore, then,
the possibility that a free will entails being capable of
doing a single thing.
The difference we have been looking
for, I believe, is that a naturally determined agent, but
not a victim of CNC, could subvert the will of anyone who
shaped
her
attitudes.
Natural
determinism,
unlike
CNC,
would not impose upon an agent a set of values that she
would have to ‘live with’ for the rest of her life: e.g.,
an upbringing sans CNC would not leave an indelible mark
upon a child’s character.
suggested
here,
entails
influence of others.
A free will, on the view being
the
ability
to
“transcend”
the
By destroying this ability, CNC would
render an agent subject to the will of another, depriving
her of her autonomy.
Accordingly, CNC would be insidious,
5
not
because
it
would
determine
a
victim’s
values,
but
because it would leave her controllable by others.
What does it mean to say that an agent can transcend
the influence of others?
Is it that she is able to “shed”
any attitude or belief that they have instilled?6
agent
be
able
to
overcome
the
effects,
Would an
say,
of
an
irreligious upbringing if (and only if) she could still
develop faith?
That is:
T1 Necessarily, a person P can transcend the
attitudinal influence of another person P* iff
there are values v and v* and advantage a such
that i) v was instilled in P by P*, ii) v* is not
consistent with v, iii) P understands what it
would mean to adopt v* in order to secure a and
knows how to bring it about, iv) P would adopt v*
in order to secure a were he to intend to, and v)
P could become motivated by the desire to secure
a.7
To see why this definition is too broad, consider the
case of Mary, whose adoption of a particular creed will be
the response that had been intended by those who are also
responsible for her having grown up irreligious: they have
arranged things so that this transformation will occur.8
(Their
story.)
“evangelizing”
requires
a
dramatic
conversion
Despite being able to shed her irreligiousness,
Mary is still ‘under the sway’ of those parties, given her
inability to act against their will.
6
To be autonomous, she
would have to be able, not only to supplant the attitudes
that they have instilled in her, but replace them with ones
that they did not intend for her to adopt.
That is, she
must be able to subvert their plans for her:
T2 Necessarily, a person P can transcend the
attitudinal influence of another person P* iff
there are values v and v* and advantage a such
that i) v was instilled in P by P*, ii) v* is not
consistent with v, iii) P understands what it
would mean to adopt v* in order to secure a and
knows how to bring it about, iv) P would adopt v*
in order to secure a were he to intend to, v) P
could become motivated by the desire to secure a,
and vi) P* does not intend that P adopt V
Adding the new condition for transcendence makes it
clear that, in desiring autonomy, it is ultimately other
persons’ control from which one wishes to be free: the
ability to shed any particular attitude being necessary but
not sufficient for its achievement.
A member of Walden
Two, e.g., would be incapable of doing something to escape
his
conditioners’
influence:
conform to their plans.
his
actions
would
have
to
Natural determinism, on the other
hand, would leave this ability intact: a normal upbringing,
e.g.,
allows
a
child
parents ‘stand for’.
to
repudiate
everything
that
her
What also emerges from this account
is that an autonomous agent is not herself responsible for
having a free will.
Credit here should go to those persons
who refrained from doing something that would have rendered
7
her subject to their will: she owes her autonomy to their
willingness to be transcended- to provide her with guidance
without
determining
her
character
(leaving
aside
her
relation to God, which will be discussed below).
What if the possibility of an agent satisfying T2’s
definiens is remote?
What if it is highly unlikely that
she will abdicate an attitude that someone has instilled in
her in favor of one that he had not intended for her to
adopt?
Would she then still remain in his control-thus
failing to be autonomous- despite being able to transcend
his influence?
would
contend
An advocate of the manipulation argument
that
if
a
naturally
determined
agent
satisfies the definiens of T2 only because of what happens
in
a
“distant”
(physically)
possible
world,
then
her
ability is not robust enough to distinguish her from a
victim of CNC.
T2, then, appears to be too narrow, as
those satisfying its definiens would yet be limited.
But an unexercised instance of the ability entailed by
T2
still
affords
its
possessor
freedom
from
others’
control.9 A good parent, even as she respects her child’s
autonomy, may still wish to instill in him certain valuesfor his own well-being.
She would want him, e.g., to abhor
criminality.
free
Valuing
will,
forswear CNC to achieve this end.
8
however,
she
would
She would undoubtedly
make it extremely difficult for him to become a criminal.
Nevertheless, so long as she does not use CNC (or some
other form of domination), he remains autonomous; she has
not ‘crushed his will’.
In the unlikely event that her
influence puts him at a disadvantage, he could repudiate it
in favor of an attitude that he would not be able to adopt
but for her willingness to be overcome, so as to grant him
a free will.
Until such time, he should not be thought of
as failing to be autonomous for maintaining an attitude
that is serving him well.
T2 defines the object of the desire for a free will:
to be beyond the control of those thought not to have one’s
best interest ‘in mind’.
Unlike the members of Walden Two,
those who satisfy the definiens of T2 are those for whom
“the question of freedom,” to use Skinner’s phrase, could
arise: they would be able to question the wisdom and/or
motives of their conditioners.
(physical) possibility.
For them, subversion is a
Moreover, T2 allows for akrasia,
as it does not entail that an autonomous agent would shed
an attitude in every possible world in which holding it is
disadvantageous.
Is T2, perhaps, too broad still?
Is it not possible
to have one’s will impaired by “blind forces”?
What of an
agent whose values are radically altered by a neurological
9
disorder?
Has she not suffered a loss of autonomy?10 Not if
she retains the ability to reacquire her old values or
develop new ones.
since
blind
Here, it would be enough to satisfy T1,
forces
cannot
intend
that
someone
develop
attitudinally to suit their purposes, which is why it is
hard to think of them as capable of exerting control over
anyone.
A neurological disorder that radically alters an
agent’s values “acts” against her will, for sure.
Yet, it
need not ‘break her will’; it can leave her capable of
resisting its influence.
III
It
has
probably
not
escaped
the
reader’s
attention
that T2 entails a solution to the problem of freedom and
foreknowledge.
As
formulated
by
St.
Augustine,
problem runs as follows:11
1. If God knew what I was going to do in a given
situation, then my action was necessary.
2. If my action was necessary, then it was not
freely willed.
3. Thus, if God knew what I was going to do in a
given situation, then my action was not freely
willed.
4. God
knew
what
I
was
going
to
situation in which I found myself.
10
do
in
every
this
5. Thus, none of my actions were freely willed.
As
Linda
Zagzebski
points
out,
the
Compatibilist
solution to this problem can be stated in one sentence:
premise 2 is false.12 This claim can be bolstered, however,
by appealing to T2.
Think
of
God
as
having
made
Castle’s
choice,
forswearing the use of CNC to insure that people act in
accord with His will.
He granted us free wills, then, in
the sense that we could do things that He did not intend,
should they seem advantageous.
commandments,
it
is
something
of
which
himself.
Or,
to
not
one
put
it
Even if one does obey His
because
was
transgressing
rendered
another
way,
them
was
by
God
incapable
God,
having
left
intact one’s capacity for rebellion, is not responsible for
the righteous person’s following of His dictates: only if
He
had
guaranteed
that
course
of
conduct
would
it
be
something for which He, not she, would be praiseworthy.
Instead
of
just
obeying
the
commandments
in
the
actual
world, she would have obeyed them in every possible world.
God chose instead to create possible worlds in which a
righteous person does contravene His will, seeing there the
commandments as disadvantageous.
Thus, she can transcend
His influence, making her autonomous (at least in relation
to Him).
Of course, God would know, whether or not an
11
agent is (actually) going to exercise her ability to rebel
against
His
authority
entails
the
necessity
Nevertheless,
possession
in
He
of
is
particular
of
not
that
a
whatever
in
gets
control
ability.
On
situation,
of
the
done
which
therein.
her,
given
her
other
hand,
the
question of opportunity also arises here: would a sinner
facing
punishment
have
a
legitimate
excuse
for
his
wrongdoing in that his exercises of his ability to rebel
were determined by factors beyond his control?
Fairness
would seem to require that a sinner be given the chance to
atone, hence the idea of purgatory.
In that case, however,
the ‘deck would seem to be stacked’ in a sinner’s favor: it
is hard to imagine someone choosing to rebel when facing
eternal damnation.13 I may set this issue aside, however, as
my
goal
was
to
establish
that
those
who
do
obey
the
commandments do so of their own free will, even if their
obedience is determined.
Conclusion
Natural
determinism
is
not
tantamount
to
CNC.
T2
defines an ability possessed only by those who have not
been
subjected
controlled
by
to
CNC.
anyone
Such
else.
agents
Thus,
they
control of themselves; they are autonomous.
12
are
are
not
being
wholly
in
Robert Kane has proposed that an agent develops a free
will by performing a series of undetermined actions.
That
one’s character has been formed in this way is what makes
one “ultimately responsible” for the actions that are its
(determined)
manifestations.14
The
above
account
suggests
that the genesis of a free will should not be looked at in
this
way.
It
should
be
seen,
instead,
as
having
been
endowed by those significant others (including God, if one
is a theist) who made Castle’s choice in regards to one’s
life.
Notes
*
As an undergraduate, I had the good fortune of taking an
intellectual history course from Albury Castell.
The
highlight of the course for me (and, I think, for him)
was his recounting of the public debates he had with B.
F. Skinner on the subject of free will.
Years later,
while reading Walden Two, I was pleased to discover that
the character opposing Skinner’s views-
“Mr. Castle”-
seemed to have been named with my teacher in mind.
This
paper is dedicated to his memory.
1. This
argument
is
given
by
Derk
Pereboom
in
“Source
Incompatibilism and the Nature of Moral Responsibility,”
presented at the APA Eastern Division Meeting (2002): 69;
Michael
Della
Rocca,
13
“Frankfurt,
Fischer,
and
Flickers,” Nous 32, (1998): 99-105; and Tomas Kapitan,
“Autonomy
and
Perspectives
Manipulated
14,
ed.
Freedom,”
James
E.
(in
Philosophical
Tomberlin,
Malden,
MA:
Blackwell Publishers, 2000): 81.
2. The
original
“Alternate
Frankfurt
appears
in
Harry
Possibilities
and
Moral
Frankfurt’s
Responsibility,”
Journal of Philosophy, LXVI (1969): 829-39.
Since then
the
increasing
literature
exponentially.
on
this
Here
subject
are
sides of the debate.
several
has
been
articles
from
both
David Widerker, “Libertarianism
and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative
Possibilities,”
181-204,
Alternate
David
The
Philosophical
Copp,
“Defending
Possibilities:
Review
the
104
(1995):
Principle
Blameworthiness
and
of
Moral
Responsibility,” Nous 31 (1997): 441-456, Alfred L. Mele
and David Robb, “Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases,”
The
Philosophical Review 107 (1998): 97-112 and the present
author, “___________,” _______________: ______.
3. Pereboom, op. cit., 2-5.
4. Kapitan, op. cit. p. 89, raises this objection against a
similiar sufficient condition for autonomy proposed by
Al Mele in Autonomous Agents (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1995) pp. 173-187.
14
5. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza advance this thesis
in
Responsibility
and
Control
(Cambridge:
Cambridge
University Press, 1998), pp. 210-13.
6. Mele’s term.
7. Conditions
iii-iv
are
presented
by
Mele
(149-50)
as
“points on which compatibilists and incompatibilists can
agree.”
8. This case is adapted from one given
by Kapitan (op.
cit., 89-90) as a counterexample to Mele’s claim that
having sheddable attitudes entails being autonomous.
9.
Cf. John Perry “Is There Hope for Compatibilism?”
In
Freedom and Determinism, ed. Joseph Keim Campbell and
Michael O’Rourke, (Seven Bridges Press, 2004) pp. 231254.
10. Al Mele raises this objection in Autonomous Agents, pp.
168-169.
11. On Free Will, Book III, ch. ii.
12. Linda Zagzebski, “Recent Work on Divine Foreknowledge
and Free Will,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, ed.
Robert Kane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.
48-9.
13. That is to say, I am committed here to the theological
view known as “universalism”- what Keith DeRose calls
the
“Really
Good
News.”
15
Cf.
Thomas
Talbott,
The
Inescapable Love of God (Universal Publishers, 1999) and
Phillip Gulley and Thomas Mulholland, If Grace is True:
Why
God’s
Love
Will
SanFrancisco, 2003).
notion
of
problem:
agent
whether
Save
Person
(Harper:
It should also be noted that the
causation
or
Every
not
does
one
has
not
help
the
solve
power
to
this
cause
oneself to resist a certain temptation, one may find it
unfair that others did not have face it or anything
comparable- that they had it easier in comparison to
one.
14. Robert
Kane,
“Responsibility,
Luck,
and
Chance:
Reflections on Free will and Indeterminism,” The Journal
of Philosophy XCVI (1999): 218-19 and The Significance
of Free Will, (New York: Oxford, 1996): 10-14, 33-37.
Cf.
my
“Free
Will
and
Indeterminism:
Robert
Kane’s
Libertarianism (Journal of Philosophical Research, 2005)
for a rebuttal of Kane’s position.
16