MR. MIKHAIL VISHNEVSKIY
DOCTOR OF SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INSTITUTE FOR AFRICAN STUDIES
RUSSIA
CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARD AFRICA: ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. - AFRICAN RELATIONS
The Russian foreign policy is based on an assumption that Russia is a great
nuclear power, it has interests around the globe, particularly in Africa. At the same time
international developments in the field of international relations in the beginning of the
21st century and strengthening of Russia have required reassessment of the overall
situation around Russia, rethinking of the priorities of the Russian foreign policy with due
account for the increased role of the country in international affairs, its greater
responsibility for global developments and related possibilities to participate in the
implementation of the international agenda, as well as in its development. As regards the
international situation, along with a positive trend, i.e. the strengthening of the positions
of the Russian Federation in international affairs, negative trends emerged that are to be
considered in conducting foreign policy of Russia in specific areas, as was stated in the
2008 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation1.
In accordance with the uppermost priority of the national security policy, i.e.
protection of interests of the individual, society and the state, main foreign policy efforts
should focus on achieving the following chief objectives:
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- to ensure national security, to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and
territorial integrity, to achieve strong positions of authority in the world community that
best meet the interests of the Russian Federation as one of influential centers in the
modern world, and which are necessary for the growth of its political, economic,
intellectual and spiritual potential;
- to create favorable external conditions for the modernization of Russia,
transformation of its economy along innovation lines, enhancement of the living
standards, consolidation of society, strengthening of the foundations of the constitutional
system, rule of law and democratic institutions, realization of human rights and freedoms
and, as a consequence, ensuring competitiveness of the country in a globalizing world;
- to influence global processes to ensure formation of a just and democratic world
order, based on collectiveness in finding solutions to international problems and
supremacy of international law, first of all provisions of the U.N. Charter, as well as
relations of equal partnership among States with a central and coordinating role of the
UN as the key organization governing international relations and possessing a unique
legitimacy;
- to promote good neighborly relations with bordering States, to assist in
eliminating the existing hotbeds of tension and conflicts in the regions adjacent to the
Russian Federation and other areas of the world and to prevent emergence of the new
ones;
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- to search for agreement and coinciding interests with other States and
international associations in the process of finding solutions to the tasks according to
Russia's national priorities, to establish, on that basis, a system of bilateral and
multilateral partnerships aimed to ensure stability of the international position of the
country in the face of international foreign policy volatility;
- to provide comprehensive protection of rights and legitimate interests of Russian
citizens and compatriots abroad;
- to promote an objective image of the Russian Federation globally as a
democratic state committed to a socially oriented market economy and an independent
foreign policy.
These general foreign policy principles Russia tries to address to its relations with
African countries and with other states (particularly, the US) on this continent. First of all
it should be discussed the possibility itself of such an engagement, in general, and on
Africa, in particular, between Russia and the United States .The problem is that these two
great powers have their own history and destination in this world, their own ideas what to
do to change it for better. It is not a secret that during the cold war USSR/Russia and the
United States were fierce opponents and formally or informally were engaged in
numerous local conflicts around the world. Sometimes this confrontation was very
dangerous from the point of view of peace and security on our planet like it happened in
1962 in the framework of the Caribbean crisis.
Now what has happened why one can speak about cooperation of the former
opponents on the world arena? It should be argued that the main reason for this is not a
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change of people in the supreme power in the Soviet Union/Russia in 1991-1993 and a
collapse of the socialist community (though this factor played an important role in the
international relations) but an understanding of the Russian new rulers and the American
administrations that they should find some positive elements in their relations to promote
peace and security on the Earth.
The believe that global survival is closely related to the growth of trust has at last
reached the Russian and the U.S. leaders late last century and led to their understanding
that the fabric of confidence among the nations and peoples consists of innumerable
threads of mutual engagement. But from the very beginning it was understood in different
ways in both countries. For weakened Russia this policy was an absolute necessity to
preserve its great powers status on the international arena. It is very clear that Russia with
its history cannot be less than the great power.
For the US this policy seemed to be a tool to make Russians more cooperative
with the American foreign policy after their defeat in the cold war.
It looked that President George Herbert Bush plan to make a “New World Order”
was aimed to unite all nations of the Earth under American leadership and to move them
to globalization. Its principles were adopted in 1989 during encounters of the experts of
the World Bank (I mean the so called “Washington Consensus”).
In early 90’s the idea of cooperation with the United States on the international
arena was very popular among Soviet/Russian academics. They even collaborated with
their African and U.S. counterparts in a joint project entitled “Cooperation for
Development: Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United States.” Its participants strongly
believed in a feasibility of the development through cooperation, and they advanced a
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number of concepts and concrete projects in which the Soviet Union and the United
States could work together to promote African economic progress2.
At the same time it seems that for Russia its participation in the formation of the
New World Order means that it should develop and advance a purely pragmatic foreign
policy, particularly in regard to Africa. It was clearly stated by Russian President Dmitriy
Medvedev during his recent visit to Egypt, Nigeria, Namibia and Angola. Particularly he
said that Russia had, has and will have its interests in Africa, especially in oil and
diamonds. Russia understands that it should have to compete with others for Africa’s raw
materials, and its foreign policy pragmatism there lies in an assumption that this
competition should be peaceful, not in the 19th or 20th century’s style3.
The spheres of concrete engagement between Russia and the US on Africa can be
traced to their particular policies on the continent. On a number of occasions during the
Soviet years their interests clashed, creating additional tensions in the relationship
between the two powers: this was a case in regard to Angola, Ethiopia, Libya, etc. Today
such collisions are still possible in the trade and economic spheres (particularly such
areas as the import of raw materials, the export of consumer goods and foodstuffs, and
arms sales).
It seems that these collisions become principally possible because sometimes
being too mighty on the world arena the United States does not understand the real
interests of other nations, try to suppress their legitimate rights though the U.N. Charter
says that all countries of the world have equal rights and responsibilities on this Earth.
Formally the U.S. Administration does recognize sovereign rights of other
nations. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “with more states facing common
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challenges we have the chance and a profound responsibility to exercise American
leadership to solve problems in concert with others”. But later she added: “America will
always be a world leader as long as we remain true to our ideals and embrace strategies
that match the time”4.
As far as Russia is concerned, its security has traditionally been built on a strong
army and good relations with its neighbors on both East and West. Moreover, allegations
that Russia has no legitimate interests in Africa are not very clear to any independent
observer. Russia is really not so far away from that continent geographically as to ignore
it completely in matters of ensuring its security.
The questions of security must of course be resolved by political means in this
dangerous nuclear world. A lot of work still lies ahead for both powers. The possible
difficulties and obstacles can be overcome due to the fact that there are mutual interests
shared by both of these nations with regard to Africa including environmental protection,
preventing or resolving conflict, the fight against drug trafficking, very rare infectious
deceases, and many other concerns, as President Medvedev told President Obama in 2009
in his letter on the U.S. national holiday – Independence Day5.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century the above-mentioned spheres of mutual
interest are of great importance. In the past Russia has already engaged with the US in
conflict resolution in Africa. For instance, on April 1, 1989 Namibia began immediate
progress toward independence under Security Council Resolution 435, on the basis of an
agreement between South Africa and Angola and Cuba, brokered by the United States
with Soviet support. The Namibian success has encouraged hopes of future effective
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cooperation on other problems of the region, including the dismantling of apartheid in
South Africa itself.
From time on it is absolutely clear that the full implementation of this Resolution
became possible only with the easing of tensions in Soviet-American relations in late
80’s. The Angolan-Cuban-South African agreement, signed on December 22, 1988 in
New York, was a result of not only the goodwill of two great powers toward the tripartite
negotiations in the framework of the U.N. Security Council but also of their active
position on this issue. The United States is known to have acted as a mediator; the Soviet
Union was an observer. Both powers were members of the international commission
monitoring the observance of the agreements concluded. One of them – the AngolanSouth African agreement on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola by July 1991.
The constructive position of the USSR and the US has helped to resolve a number
of minor crises connected with the implementation of these agreements. Each of the
crises could have frustrated the process of Namibia’s de-colonization.
Normally each of the parties involved in this process was pursuing its own aims.
Namibia was seeking independence; Angola wanted guarantees of its security; Cuba
endeavored to return its soldiers home; South Africa wanted to rid itself of a burden of
the colonial war which it could not afford. The US aimed to realize its old dream of
having Cuban troops withdrawn from Angola, and the Soviet Union sought to promote a
change from confrontation to cooperation on global scale. There were evidently other
motives as well. But the prime thing in the situation was this: the different interests of the
states concerned were not mutually exclusive. For all their dissimilarity they can be
brought to a common balance. But the only way to achieve this balance was compromise.
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Nowadays what the two great powers – permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council can do, say, in Africa enjoying the above-mentioned Namibian experience as a
repetition paten? It seems that the most promising idea is a cooperation of Russia and the
US on the Darfur situation in the Security Council. Why particularly on this issue? It is
because this problem principally concerns not only the United States due to the fact that
there are rich oil fields there and in southern Sudan but Russia as well due to its broader
policies toward the Moslem world.
Why could not Russia and the United States be a party or mediators of a tentative
agreement of the interested sides in the Darfur conflict in the framework of the Security
Council? In this case Russia would get some guarantees of stability in the Moslem sea in
vicinity of its borders. The US would help to pacify the Sudanese internal situation; the
Darfur and southern Sudan population, in general. As gratitude it would not hinder the
American oil activities in the Sudan. The African Union that is now the third party in the
Darfur would get an opportunity to proclaim its positive role in settling the African
conflict situations and withdraw its troops from the region. The “Junjaweed militia”
would receive a real possibility to lay down arms and return to peaceful life. The
Sudanese government would get a long-awaited peace throughout the whole country.
One can argue that the Darfur Peace Agreement was already signed in Abuja,
Nigeria, on May 5, 2006 between the Sudanese Government and the principle rebel
group, the Sudan Liberation Movement. It provided for detailed, verifiable steps to
disarm and neutralize the Junjaweed and other armed militia groups and opened the way
for economic recovery and integration of the former combatants and people of Darfur
into the political process6.
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But this agreement seems not to be properly carried on by all its parties and the
African Union as a broker cannot make them follow their own commitments. That is why
it is desirable to invite China to be a party to this tentative agreement because for the
recent years this nation got a very big stake in the Sudanese oil industry and can
positively influence on all the interested sides of the Darfur conflict.
In principle, however, the decision to work with the United States in such
scenarios should be determined on a case-by-case study based on a thorough calculation
of circumstances and interests.
Another field for a Russian-American engagement in the Third World, impossible
during the Cold War years – joint military intervention in order to keep in power, or to
restore, the old democracies of the Third World.
One can argue that Russia’s participation in joint military actions with the US
does not correspond with its state interests because in the eyes of the world public
opinion Russia will be linked to those methods of using power that are traditionally
associated with the U.S. foreign policy. Also, along with this danger, there is a risk that
Russia might be perceived as a dependent “junior partner” of this superpower. This is
why the best solution for Russia could be a participation in multilateral coalition actions,
preferably within the framework of the United Nations. For instance, as it happened in
the Sudan when the Russian peace-keeping forces of 200 servicemen strength with four
MI-8MT cargo-assault helicopters got a mission to air support of the U.N. rapid
deployment forces, to provide air reconnaissance, transportation of reserves, rescuer
operations, etc.3
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It looks that arms transfer issue is closely connected with an idea of the RussianAmerican participation in military multilateral coalitions, particularly in the framework
of the Security Council. The efforts of Russian – U.S. engagement regarding arms
transfer to Africa should focus to begin with on the continent’s conflict situations in
which both powers have at least an indirect involvement. Such situations produce the
strongest incentives for the US and Russia to work together to control the arms transfers.
This is especially true when both powers feel that they have high political or strategic
stakes in the general region in which a conflict might be going on.
The U.S.-Russian endeavors to collaborate with respect to arms transfers to Africa
should be linked with other joint measures. African attitudes toward mutual
understanding of the two powers in the sphere of arms transfers would plainly be crucial
to the success of these undertakings. The steps to persuade African countries that these
efforts would take into account their security concerns as well would therefore be
essential.
Finally the U.S.-Russian attempts at cooperation on arms transfers to Africa
should not be viewed as strictly bilateral enterprises. It is clear that the US and Russia
should work together in the framework of the Security Council to involve other major
powers in such activities to the degree possible.
It is safe to assume that many Africans, even in the highest positions, feel very
positively about Russia. Russian diplomacy in this favorable environment should be
focused on addressing the aspirations of African states, and it should ignore minor
differences in order to restore its former moral authority in Africa. If the United States
considers Africa to be a very important continent, for Russia it holds an identical status,
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from the perspective of political engagement in the world arena and the standpoint of
economic and commercial cooperation. Moreover, its position can be expected to
improve even further following the anticipated upturn of the Russian economy in the
years to come.
Russia does not want to contain or struggle with anyone in Africa or around this
continent. The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation assumes that
Russia should follow a peaceful policy toward other countries of the world and maintains
that Russia should try to find peaceful solutions to international disputes. In particular,
Russia would like to have good relations with the United States (including, of course,
within the African arena). In the final analysis, there is only one fundamental principle
for future Russian-American engagement on Africa – mutual and constructive
cooperation in addressing Africa’s acute problems.
One of them is a fight against terrorism and piracy. Though President Barack
Obama has refused to combine fight against terrorism with the American vital foreign
interests (as did his predecessor President George W.Bush)7, it is clear that terrorism and
especially one of its forms – piracy is still a problem of great concern for the U.S.
Administration. Particularly in June 2009 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has approved
a shipment of 40 tons of munitions to aid Somali government to cope with the Moslem
insurgents and pirates8.
In principle the US has a tool to fight against terrorists and pirates –
African Unified Combatant Command or AFRICOM. It was composed by order of
President George W. Bush in February 2007 to pursue American military postures in
Africa. It is argued that the problems of the military policy of the United States in African
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countries are traditionally regarded in American literature as part of a strategy aimed at
creating a favorable climate for the promotion of Washington’s interests on the continent
so rich in natural and manpower resources. It is believed that prior to the disintegration of
the USSR the United States pursued, first and foremost, military-strategic aims in Africa.
On January 1, 1983, the Central Command (CENTCOM) was set up. Its zone covered the
territory of 25 countries by May 1, 2002, including 11 states of Africa (Egypt, Djibouti,
Kenya, Somalia, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea)9.
Nowadays CENTCOM, just as other strategic military commands of the United
States (among them EUROCOM and PACIFICOM), plays a major role in the
implementation of the global policy of the United States. They are especially important
for the defense of the strategic land, sea and air communication lines which could be
used, in an event of military operations, for transporting troops and cargoes, as well as for
protecting the routes of supply of mineral raw materials so vital for the American
economy.
According to American experts (for instance, a group of members of the Council
on International Relations in New York headed by Professor Jennifer Whitaker), the
United States is interested, along with other matters, in a control over the shipping from
the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and Babb-el-Mandeb to the Arabian
Sea. No less important for the United States are sea routes from the eastern part of the
Pacific, past Cape Horn (or the Panama Canal), and also via the South Atlantic, past Cape
of Good Hope to the Indian Ocean10.
It is evident that to replenish the supplies of food, fuel and water, the American
warships patrolling the above-mentioned strategic sea communication lines have to use
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local resources, that makes the United States to create friendly regimes in the coastal
countries, including those in Africa.
In times of the Cold War this strategy was implemented by modernizing or
building U.S. military objects which were used, as a rule, jointly with the local
authorities. In Egypt they were Cairo West, Wadi Kena, Luksor, Aswan, Ras Banas (on
the Red Sea shore), military objects in the vicinity of the Farafra Oasis, near Mersa
Matruh and in the district of El Alamein (on the shore of the Mediterranean). In Kenya
the port of Mombasa was modernized to make it suitable for receiving large vessels. In
Somalia the port and airfield in Berbera were reconstructed, and the runway of the latter
was prolonged to over four kilometers so that it can now receive all types of modern
military aircraft. In Sudan military bases were built in Suakin (on the Red Sea shore), ElFasher (near the border with Libya and Chad) and in Dongola (north of Khartoum). In
Morocco military objects were established in Tangier, Sidi Yahya, Sidi Buknadele, Ben
Gerir and Ben Sliman. An agreement was concluded between the United States and
Morocco on “strategic accord”11.
In the 1990s these bases were either closed down temporarily or transferred to the
management of the receiving side.
It was supposed that all these objects were intended for the rapid deployment of
the forces to be used within the framework of CENTCOM and EUROCOM. According
to the U.S. Department of Defense, the zone of responsibility of the latter includes
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, the
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho,
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Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, the South African
Republic, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe12.
The air and naval bases have been built on Diego Garcia Island in the Indian
Ocean capable to receive the B-52 strategic bombers and nuclear submarines. These
military objects were used three times: in 1991 during the “Desert Storm” operations in
the Persian Gulf, in 2001 during the operation against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and in
2003 during the war in Iraq.
Since the 1990s in connection with the changing of the global intentions of
Washington, the significance of the military-political aspect of the US strategy in Africa
considerably increased. Washington began to pay major attention to the formation of the
“inter-African peacekeeping forces”.
In August 2001, the Pentagon evolved a Strategy for the Sub-Saharan Africa13. It
envisaged the possibility of the participation of US armed forces in guarding the places of
mining and transporting strategic raw materials from African countries (oil, gold,
diamonds, copper, bauxites, uranium, manganese and cobalt), as well as fighting drug
trafficking, and carrying on peace-making operations.
After September 11, 2001, the United States has revised its global plans. Just as in
the times of the cold war, the African continent again became important militarily and
strategically. At the same time, Washington’s rivalry with other major world powers
intensified as their interests in African natural wealth, primarily fuel-and-power resources
increased. The terrorist acts in New York and Washington forced American statesmen to
change their attitude and attach greater importance to African countries. Professor Peter
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Schraeder of the Chicago Loyola University regarded them as “the second front” in the
global war against terrorism14.
Pentagon paid special attention to the countries of North and East Africa because
they were close geographically, culturally and religiously to the regions of the Middle
East, that were considered at that time as the “centers of global terrorist activity” on vast
territories from Morocco to Indonesia15.
In this context, the U.S. Department of Defense has worked out and implemented
several programs regarding African countries. The first of them concerned the activity of
the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa. Its purpose was to fight the cells of alQaeda and its supporters in East Africa – Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and
Somalia16. More than 1,000 troops of the US Special Forces took part in land operations.
The combat Group-150 patrolled coastal waters. It consisted of American, German,
Spanish and British warships. Along with them, the region was also patrolled by a special
CIA aircraft “Predator”, whose task was to track and destroy terrorists17.
In this connection it should be noted that during the Bush Administration the
Republic of Djibouti was at the peak of the struggle against terrorism in the region18. The
“Radio Sawaa”, which broadcasts round the clock in Arabic to Sudan and the countries of
the Middle East, is stationed there. Although no official information is published on this
matter, Djibouti is still regarded as one of the biggest recipients of American military
aid19.
Another regional program of ensuring security in African countries initiated by
the Pentagon after September 11, 2001, was the Pan-Sahelian Initiative. At first, four
countries took part in it – Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Its aim was to prevent the
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al-Qaeda terrorists who left Afghanistan after the American military action, as well as
their supporters in Iraq, to set up well-armed and well-trained units of Islamic militants,
receiving ample financial assistance from their patrons20.
In practice, the implementation of this initiative proceeded in the form of the U.S.
Special Forces taking part in joint operations with local armed units to search and destroy
“Islamic terrorists”. The operating American-African units have army trucks and special
equipment (Global Positioning System) making it possible to determine the exact
location of objects to be destroyed. With the consent of the American side and the
participation of US army contingents, these units have carried out several successful
operations, one of them being the capture of the leaders of the “Groupe Salatiste pour la
Predication et le Combat” based in Algeria21.
Then the U.S. Department of Defense has come to the conclusion that the PanSahelian Initiative should include a greater number of African countries than it was
planned in 2001. As a result, this program was changed into the Trans-Saharan Counter
Terrorism Initiative. Apart from the four already-mentioned African countries, it now
includes Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Senegal and Nigeria. To implement the US military
plans in this region, it attaches special significance to the participation of Senegal, the
most important French-language partner of the United States in sub-Saharan Africa, as
well as Algeria, where trans-Saharan routes intersect22.
The third military program directly dealing with Africa was launched in 2003
under the name “East Africa Counter Terrorism Initiative”. It includes such countries as
Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The implementation of the program is
supervised by the U.S. Department of State. The aim of the program is to smash the
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terrorist network of al-Qaeda in East Africa and preclude its operations in the region,
such as the attacks on the US Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and on Israeli
tourist targets in Mombasa (Kenya) in 2002. Within the framework of this program the
“Safe Skies for Africa Initiative” is implemented, protecting the security of air
communications in the region. The U.S. East African Aviation Security Advisor is
stationed in Nairobi (Kenya) who officially coordinates all activity in the region within
the framework of this initiative23.
The stepping up of American military political activity in Africa, observed
recently, has contributed to the expansion of the US military-technical aid to the countries
of the continent. The point is of the Program of International Military Education and
Training (IMET) within whose framework African countries send their officers to the
United States for study. Apart from its purely military character, this program is also of
political significance, inasmuch as during their training African military officers are
educated in the spirit of great respect for American might, policy and culture, and upon
return to their respective countries they become advocates and promoters of the US
policy in Africa.
There is another program developing in Africa after the terrorist attack against the
United States in 2001. It is called the Foreign Military Financing Program – FMF. Within
its framework Washington grants friendly regimes American military equipment and
hardware, which will enable them “to strengthen and modernize their defense capacity,
render safe their borders and territorial waters, provide for their other needs in the sphere
of security, improve their interaction with the American armed forces in the struggle
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against terrorism24. For instance, in 2006 eight countries took part in this program –
Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda25.
In 2006 the Bush administration initiated another program – Global Peace
Operations Initiative (GPOI), which took the form of the ACOTA program (African
Contingency Operations Training and Assistance). This program replaced the African
Crises Response Initiative (ACRI) in force since 199626. The main distinction of ACOTA
from ACRI is that the former is aimed at training servicemen for offensive operations in
the African Horn region. An example of such an operation is a participation of the
Ethiopian army in the onslaught on the capital of Somalia – Mogadishu in early 2007 in
order to free the city from the units loyal to the Alliance of Islamic Courts and coming
out against the Provisional transition government of Somalia. American planes repeatedly
bombed targets on the territory controlled by the Alliance27.
In East Africa the ACOTA program is implemented in the form of the Counter
Terrorism Initiative (EACTI Initiative), and in the Pan-Sahelian region – as the Counter
Terrorism Initiative in the Sahara region (PSI and TSCTI Initiatives). The main recipients
within the ACOTA program are Mali, Niger, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda28.
According to the Commander of the NATO forces in Europe, General James
Jones, the main aim of the US military activity in Africa is to create a “community of
bases which would allow the Pentagon to realize the premise of the National Security
Strategy of the United States for dealing preventive strikes on the heavens of terrorism”29.
From a military-political point of view, the growing interest of the United States
in African countries at present can be explained by the need to create the necessary
military infrastructure, and also a system of relations guaranteeing free access to the
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sources of mineral raw materials on the continent. In this connection another statement by
General James Jones evokes a certain interest. He said that Africa is important for both
NATO and the United States. Strike airborne groups and expeditionary forces should not
be on constant six-month duty in the Mediterranean. They should spend half that time on
the coast of West Africa30.
As is emphasized in the White House document “African Policy”, the U.S.
administration intended to form coalitions with such “key” countries for the American
strategy in Africa as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia for joint actions in the
region. It is expected that military units from these countries will form the backbone of
the future contingents within the framework of the African Union or on another collective
basis, which will carry on military operations on the African continent31.
Various situations could be chosen as pretexts for such actions. For example, the
US naval forces have intensified patrolling the coastal waters of Somalia and a number of
other states in the region in order to counteract the threat of terror against American
interests in Africa, first of all the maritime ones. Because of piracy the Somalia waters
are most dangerous.
At the same time it should be emphasized that the US military and militarypolitical efforts to defend American interests in Africa are also made through the allied
countries on the continent. According to the new version of the National Security
Strategy of the United States, these countries should be able to ensure effective
management of their economy and state apparatus, and also to popularize American
interpretation of democracy and the need to fight terrorism in other African countries. An
important role is given to the African Union as a continental organization called upon to
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contribute to the political stability and economic development of African states,
especially those where civil wars have been quelled with American military-political
participation, and where power has gone over to the forces which are thankful to the
United States for its support in the past.
The peak of the military and military-political activity of the Pentagon in Africa
was reached when in 2007 President Bush decided to set up the Unified Combatant
Command for Africa (Africa Command). Explaining his decision, the U.S. President
declared that the new command would bolster cooperation between the United States and
African countries, bring peace to the peoples of the continent and contribute to their
economic and humanitarian progress. The United States intends to closely cooperate with
the leaders of African countries within the framework of the Africa Command32.
In principle the AFRICOM could become a mighty weapon in the Pentagon hands
against all the U.S. strategic enemies in Africa. But the problem is if they exist in reality.
It looks like that at the moment the US has no such ones in Africa and appearance of
AFRICOM as a strategic command on this continent has no reason at all. It is silly to use
huge masses of regular troops and Navy forces against African insurgents or even pirates
in Somalia who employ the speed boats much more effectively than the USS from the 5th
Fleet are commissioned.
It became quite evident after the Obama Administration came to office. The
patrolling USS could do nothing against the pirates’ speedy boats and the “Maersk
Alabama” sailors to prevent a capture of their captain by the pirates. The “Sea Seals”
squadron could liberate the captain but under the order of President Obama himself. At
that time there was a general fear that the US would be blamed in the intervention in the
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internal affairs of the independent state – Somalia with the political consequences
worldwide.
The “Maersk Alabama” case showed all the ineffectiveness of AFRICOM for the
African security and the urgent need to develop some continental strategy to ensure it.
And such strategy is being developed in the framework of the African Union Peace and
Security Council.
In conclusion it should be stated that obviously there are fields for RussianAmerican engagement in Africa (for instance, against piracy). The real problem lies in
confidence. At the beginning of this decade there were also much talk on its importance
for peace and security in general and in Africa, in particular. As President Obama said in
Moscow in July 2009:”There is the 20th-century view that the United States and Russia
are destined to be antagonists, and that a strong Russia or a strong America can only
assert themselves in opposition to one another. And there is a 19th-century view that we
are destined to vie for spheres of influence, and that great powers must forge competing
blocs to balance one another. These assumptions are wrong”33.
If so, in the multipolar world that clearly exists now, Russia and the US could
find fields for mutually fruited engagement in international relations, particularly in
Africa – this vast continent where there is a space for all the interested parties – both big
and small.
1
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, July 12,
2008, P. 1.
2
Cooperation for Development: Africa, the Soviet Union and the United States, Moscow, Progress
Publishers, 1991
3
http://blog.kremlin.ru/post/22/transcript.
4
The U.S. Department of State. Secretary’s Remarks: Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign
Relations, Wash., July 15, 2009, P.1.
5
http://www.kremlin.ru/text/news/2009/07/219002.shtml.
6
The U.S. Department of State. Darfur Peace Agreement. Fact Sheet, Wash. May 8, 2006.
21
22
3
www.president.ru , February 10, 2006.
http://news.mail.ru/politics/2702601/print/.
8
The Washington Post, June 27, 2009.
9
US CENTCOM. Mission statement. 20 May 2002, p. 2. (http://www.centcom.mil/who-we-are/missionstatement.asp).
7
“Africa and the United States Vital Interests. A Council on Foreign Relations Books”. N.Y.:
New York University Press, 1978, p. 128.
11
“American Expansionism”, p. 582; Cooperation for Development: Africa, the Soviet Union and
the United States. Moscow: Novosti Publishers, 1991, p. 38.
10
12 http://www.eucom.mil/ADR/index.htm. -18 June 2003.
13 DoD Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa. August 2001. http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/isa/africa/africa-strategydraft.pdf
Schraeder, P. North and East Africa as “Second Fronts” in the Bush Administration’s War on Terrorism.
A Presentation Paper for 49th Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Nov. 16-19, San
Francisco, California, p. 8.
15
Ibid.
16
Feickert Andrew. The U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism. Afghanistan, Africa, the
Philippines and Columbia. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress. Feb. 4, 2005,
pp. 7-8.
17
Ibid.
18
The U.S. Department of State. The Congressional Budget Justification. Foreign Operations.Fiscal year
2006 (further on cited as “Bush Administration foreign Aid Request for 2006”), Wash., 2005, p.253.
19
Ibid.
20
The International Herald Tribune, P. May 12, 2004.
21
Schraeder, P., op.cit., p.8.
22
Bush Administration Foreign Aid Request for 2006, pp.268-269.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
VOA News. Wash. 25 July 2002.
27
www.allafrica.com, January 18,2007.
28
Ibid.
29
The U.S. Central Command International Contributions to the War on Terrorism. Wash. 19 August 2003
– http://www.cent- com.mil/operations/coalition/joint.htm.
30 www.allafrica.com-April 15, 2004.
14
31 The White House. Africa Policy, pp.3-4 – www.whitehouse.gov.
32
33
The U.S. Department of State. The White House Press Release. February 6, 2007.
The Washington Post, July 7, 2009.
22