Annual Review - Summary Sheet
This Summary Sheet captures the headlines on programme performance, agreed actions and learning over the
course of the review period. It should be attached to all subsequent reviews to build a complete picture of actions
and learning throughout the life of the programme.
Title:
Strengthening Tanzania’s Anti-Corruption Action
Programme Value:
£11.3m over four years (2012 – 2016).
Programme Code:
Start Date:
202770
21/2/2012
Review Date: 14/1/2015 – 31/03/2015
End Date:
31/10/2016
Summary of Programme Performance
Year
2012/13 2013/14 2014/15
B
A
A
Programme Score
H
H
H
Risk Rating
Summary of progress and lessons learnt since last review
Progress:
 All Government of Tanzania institutions report considerable operational benefits of the STACA
programme for their respective institutions. Institutions also report improved cooperative
relationships both at leadership level as well as at operational level.

In terms of programme outcomes, the most positive aspect is the improvement of the conviction
rate in corruption cases. This has remained above 50% for the past 2 ½ years, having fluctuated
around 40% for several years before that. This still represents a high number of acquittals, so
there is much more room for improvement. It is also important to note that these figures represent
mostly petty corruption cases; the conviction rate for grand corruption is much lower.

Another relatively positive development at outcome level has been the increased number of
corruption cases progressing through the courts. These numbers increased steadily from 2011 to
2013, although they dipped slightly in 2014. These numbers, and conviction rates, are likely to be
influenced by many factors other than STACA.

In terms of programme outputs, key successes include:

o
424 auditors trained in detecting fraud and corruption;
o
185 files investigated by PCCB which have their origins in NAO reports;
o
140 police officers arrested for involvement in bribery or corruption.
In 2014 good progress was made in establishing the non-financial aid components of the
programme. The Financial Liason Officer from the National Crime Agency (NCA) is now in post
and has completed his inception report. Also, the Integrity Fund (support for civil society
programming component) is now starting implementation through the Accountability in Tanzania
(AcT) programme.
Lessons learnt:
 Incremental gains can be made through capacity building on anti-corruption, but there are limits
to what can be achieved. Overall, throughout STACA there have been modest gains in the
number of corruption cases progressing through the courts, as well as in the conviction rate for
petty corruption offences. However, gains are most likely to be made in areas where there is
already some capacity, or where some political will for progress exists (e.g. prosecutions of low
level petty corruption). Overall, it is unlikely that this kind of capacity building support will bring
about a major change on grand corruption.

Some activities carried out under STACA were originally suggested by institutions; others were
initially suggested by DFID, discussed and later taken on by the institutions, including Model
Police Stations, Model Courts, and external communications. This annual review has found a
number of problems with the activities in the latter category. Often they were not implemented in
ways that were discussed with DFID. The degree of senior leadership buy-in to these activities
seems to have been weak; leaders have not communicated the importance of these activities
internally within their organisations, nor have they stressed the ‘intervention logic’ (the way in
which these activities are expected to work).

STACA was set up with the specific purpose of improving cooperation between institutions on
anti-corruption. In this it has made some limited progress. Institutions report improved
relationships at all levels, from heads of institutions down to operational level. But many old
problems remain, for example the lengthy process by which DPP gives consent for prosecution to
PCCB cases. Incentives for institutions not to cooperate with each other remain strong across the
Tanzanian public sector; resources and mandates are fiercely protected and this is especially
noticeable in a sensitive area like anti-corruption. The STACA Steering Committee has not in
itself provided a forum for resolving problems. Perhaps the best chance for supporting improved
cooperation is by funding activities which in themselves bring institutions together, such as
supporting PCCB to review NAO ‘red flags’ on corruption, or joint PCCB-DPP review of corruption
cases. This mostly means supporting activities which should be funded by recurrent costs, which
brings questions about sustainability.

In any future successor programme to STACA, it is worth considering alternative Governance
arrangements which bring in some external actors. One model worth considering is the MultiStakeholder Group of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.1 This model has been
shown to be effective in other contexts, especially in terms of building credible performance data,
collective learning2, institutional cooperation, coordination and ownership of reform programmes.

During the design of any future anti-corruption programme, besides the standard political
economy analysis, it would also be worth considering specifically how the political economy will
affect Value for Money factors.

It has been difficult to obtain reliable data under the programme. Two key institutions, DPP and
PCCB, still have difficulty agreeing on core statistics despite efforts to harmonise data over
several years. More broadly, there is no external verification of key programme data and it has
not been possible to carry out planned surveys to assess results of some STACA components.
Reliable data is critical for the reform process to be effectively managed and resources used
efficiently. Future programming needs to incorporate innovative approaches that improve data
integrity and implementation feedback. Technical assistance may also be useful in supporting
institutions to generate and monitor this performance data.

Delays in implementation have been a serious problem for STACA from the outset. Broadly
speaking there have been three different elements to the delay: (i) delay in release of DFID funds
due to long discussions on institutional workplans; (ii) delays in funds progressing through the
Ministry of Finance to institutions; (iii) delays in implementation within institutions, for example
due to long procurement processes. It may be worth considering in a more systematic way the
different factors behind these delays and how they can be mitigated.

The consultant carrying out the annual review noted that the logframe is based on a selection of
activities from the institutional workplans, rather than an assessment of overall performance
against these workplans. Strictly speaking, the output rankings do not take into account all
activities implemented under the STACA programme. However there are also benefits to
assessing performance in this way. Reporting against specific activities – even if only a sub-set of
the full picture – increases transparency to the public about the actual work that this project is
doing. Otherwise progress has to be assessed in a generic way with indicators such as “all
workplan activities implemented as planned”. With this kind of output indicator, the actual work
supported under the programme would be less clear to an outside observer. It is recommended
that the present output targets are kept for the final year of the programme, but that future
programmes should consider how to evaluate performance of all activities implemented by
partner institutions.
1
MSI Integrity, Protecting the Cornerstone: Assessing the Governance of Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative Multi-Stakeholder Groups, February 2015.
2 Kania, J. and M. Kramer. (2011) Collective Impact. Stanford
Social Innovation Review, pp. 36-41.
Summary of recommendations for the next year

The impact of delays in disbursements on programme performance needs to be reduced. This
can be achieved by aligning disbursements to the Government of Tanzania financial year and
starting the process of agreeing workplans earlier in the year.

An in-depth review should be conducted to establish the benefits of a selection of institutional
activities under STACA, in advance of any future programming. This review should include an
effort to document the extent to which institutional cooperation has been improved along the law
enforcement chain.

Institutions’ activities on external communications should be discussed at the STACA Steering
Committee. At the moment, external communications are focused on presenting institutions’
activities on anti-corruption. The Strategic Plan put forward a different strategy, involving
communication of a break with the past in specific areas at the same time as efforts to ensure
citizens perceive the changes communicated as real. Heads of Institutions should discuss
whether this is practical and if so should refocus communications for the final year to the extent
possible.

Discussions should also be held with heads of institutions on key activities where there appear to
have been difficulties in implementation, or where expected results of activities have not
materialised. These include Model Police Stations and training on Money Laundering and Asset
Recovery.

Further information from institutions is required as a follow-up to the review of procurement
carried out in September-October 2014.

The STACA logframe needs to be revised taking into account changes to Work Plans,
disbursement delays, and the decision to move the Integrity Fund to the AcT programme.

Issues in the Judiciary noted in last year’s annual review have continued into this year. It is
recommended that no further support is provided to the Judiciary under STACA.

Progress reporting across all institutions could be improved. Presently, little information is given
about the results of individual activities. This can be addressed partly through quarterly
performance meetings with institutions. More detailed reporting on progress (including financial)
should be provided in a common format.

DFID should formalise fortnightly catch-up meetings with the PCO.

The NCA financial liason officer’s work should be monitored closely in the first few months of
implementation. Programme outputs agreed in the inception report should be treated flexibly to
make use of any opportunities that may arise.

A discussion should be held with NCA on the use of the Financial Liaison Officer’s time to support
wider NCA work. While he should be encouraged to play a constructive role as a member of the
HMG team in Tanzania, this work should not take so much of his time that it is preventing him
from achieving his overall objectives.

The Integrity Fund component should be formally moved to the AcT programme in ARIES; a new
output should be added to the AcT logframe and the component should be removed from the
STACA logframe.

Proportionate formal submission(s) should be made to the Head of Office on how the
programme’s remaining balance is expected to be utilised
A. Introduction and Context (1 page)
DevTracker
Link
to
Business Case:
DevTracker
Link to Log
frame:
http://iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/3717452.docx
http://iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/4779689.xls
Outline of the programme
1. The main elements of the STACA programme:
i)
Support to Government of Tanzania (GoT) institutions (£9.3m). This support is intended to
improve the performance of the institutions most directly involved in tackling corruption
(the Prevention and Combatting of Corruption Bureau – PCCB, the Directorate of Public
Prosecutions – DPP, the Financial Intelligence Unit – FIU, and the National Audit Office – NAO),
supporting them to work more effectively together on the identification and handling of corruption
risk and cases. It is also intended to increase public trust and lower expectations of
corruption, especially in the Tanzanian Police and Judiciary.
ii)
An Integrity Fund (£1.2m) which is intended to provide support to a range of non-government
initiatives to strengthen integrity in Government and reduce corruption. The Integrity Fund
is being delivered through the Accountability in Tanzania programme and will work with civil
society partners to explore anti-corruption impact of broader work to promote greater
accountability. The support will enable partners both to expose particular instances of
mismanagement and possible corruption at local level, and to follow up these instances, for
example through the courts, the media or Police. This work is specifically set up as a learning
exercise, where lessons about more and less effective approaches will be collected and
documented.
iii) Support for a financial investigator from the UK’s National Crime Agency (£0.5m) to assist
law enforcement agencies to process complex international aspects of corruption cases.
The Financial Liaison Officer is intended to (a) build capacity of Tanzanian agencies to
investigate and prosecute financial crime (especially money laundering related to corruption), and
to recover stolen assets; (b) assist Tanzanian agencies with direct support in investigations of
financial crime, where requested, especially where this crime is related to corruption.
2. The Context3
Tanzania has a relatively comprehensive anti-corruption legislative and institutional framework, but
implementation is weak, and there is a low likelihood of being held to account for corrupt behaviour.
Absolute levels of corruption are hard to assess with a high degree of accuracy, as are overall trends.
Public perceptions, although not a reliable measure of absolute levels of corruption, reflect a growing
awareness of, and concern about, corruption across key sectors of government4. Petty bribery is
widespread, but it is unclear whether it is becoming more or less prevalent.5 International composite
indicators on corruption (Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Worldwide
Governance Indicators Control of Corruption indicator) show a slowly deteriorating trend over recent
years. In some institutions, geographical areas and sectors in Tanzania, corruption appears to be the
norm rather than the exception. However, no research exists which establishes whether or to what
extent corruption in Tanzania is a collective action problem or a matter of improving principals’ control
and management of agents (the Principal-Agent Problem).6
3. Basic Assumptions
The STACA programme assumptions are set out the revised Theory of Change (October 2013).
3
This section is based on the STACA Strategic Plan
Afrobarometer (2008, 2012, 2014); Views of the People (2007. 2012)
5 Transparency International (Global Corruption Barometer) suggests more people paid bribes in 2013 compared with 2011; the Views of the
People survey suggests there may have been a decline in bribe-paying between 2007 and 2012.
6
STACA Strategic Plan for Years 2013/14-2014/15, pp. 12-13.
4
Fundamentally, all capacity building programmes are based on the assumption that principals in the
relevant institutions are committed to programme goals. To the extent that programme activities focus on
tackling internal corruption, these activities assume that corruption is a ‘principal-agent’ problem, where
corruption is the exception rather than the norm in that institution.
Subordinate to this overall assessment, the programme depends on two critical assumptions:
 The first assumption is that capacity building activities chosen by institutions are effective in
improving capacity – for example that training and study visits lead to actual improvements in
knowledge and skills; that equipment procured is the right specification and there are sufficient
trained people to use and maintain it; that new IT systems function effectively, and so on.
 The second, even more critical, assumption is that once capacity is in place, there is sufficient
political will to allow it to be used. That is, if the programme is successful in improving technical
capacity, political factors do not intervene to prevent this newly-acquired expertise from being
used to take forward corruption cases.
4. Expected Results
The programme’s intended impact is reduced impact of corruption on the poor in Tanzania, as measured
by the Control of Corruption indicator (part of the Worldwide Governance Indicators) and the percentage
of Tanzanians who say they have paid a bribe in the past year (using data from Transparency
International’s Global Corruption Barometer).
The programme’s intended outcome is more active enforcement of anti-corruption laws and systems, as
measured by the number of corruption cases flowing through the courts; the conviction rate in these
cases; the level of public trust in the Police and Judiciary, and the actions of civil society partners to
expose corruption and follow up to ensure an effective response to it.
The outputs intended to contribute to the outcomes are: 1. Oversight agencies' performance and
cooperation enhanced in the fight against corruption; 2. Efforts made to strengthen public trust in the
Police and Judiciary; 3. NCA financial liaison officer assists law enforcement agencies to process
complex international aspects of corruption cases; 4. Citizens supported to demand Government
response to exposed instances of corruption, and/or to work collaboratively with Government at local
level to address problems with a corruption dimension.
5. Contribution to the Operational Plan and DFID´s International Development Objectives
Corruption impedes all three strategic objectives of DFID’s Operational Plan for Tanzania: wealth
creation, delivering the Millennium Development Goals and getting Government to work better for
Tanzanians. A recent, comprehensive review of the literature on anti-corruption commissioned by DFID
found that there was strong evidence that corruption impacts negatively on firm profitability, investment
and growth; that it is strongly assosciated with weak institutions; that it negatively affects the volume
and quality of public service delivery; and that it has a disproportionate effect on women and the poor. 7
Corruption also poses a major threat to the effectiveness of UK aid in Tanzania.
DFID’s wider engagement in Tanzania already tackles various aspects of corruption through a variety of
different interventions; for example through improved management of public finances including
procurement, parliamentary scrutiny of spending, and empowering civil society to hold government to
account. This programme focuses on improving the performance of the institutions most directly involved
in tackling corruption (Preventing and Combating Corruption Bureau – PCCB, Directorate of Public
Prosecutions – DPP, Financial Intelligence Unit – FIU, and the National Audit Office – NAO). It will help
them to work more effectively together on the identification and handling of corruption risk and cases. It
also intends to address corruption in the police and judiciary. It also seeks to complement broader work
with civil society implemented by other DFID Tanzania programmes, by tracking the potential anticorruption impact of these initiatives.
‘Why corruption matters: understanding causes, effects and how to address them: Evidence paper on corruption’,
DFID, January 2015
7
B: PERFORMANCE AND CONCLUSIONS (1-2 pages)
Annual outcome assessment
Outcome indicator
1. Increased conviction rate in corruption
cases (% of total corruption cases in
court in a given year which end in
convictions; % of total decisions which
end in convictions) (Outcome 1 in
STACA Strategic Plan)
Milestone 2014: 10% of total cases
ended in conviction; 50% of total
decisions were convictions
2. Increased number of cases presented
by PCCB to DPP; Decreased number of
cases returned for further Investigation;
Increased number of new cases in Court.
(Outcome 8 in STACA Strategic Plan)
Milestone 2014: increase in # of cases
presented to DPP, continued reduction in
# of files returned to PCCB for further
investigation; Increased number of new
cases in Court.
Performance against Milestone
Performance exceeded expectations. Available data for
2014 shows that 14% of all cases in court ended in
convictions, while 50 % of those cases which were
concluded ended in a conviction. (The difference
between the two figures is explained by the large number
of cases that do not result in either convictions or
acquittals but roll over to the following year).
3. Increased public trust in police and
judiciary (Outcome 6 in STACA Strategic
Plan)
Milestone 2014: Improvement in public
trust and decrease in expectations of
corruption in areas with model police
stations, community policing and model
courts.
Performance moderately did not meet expectations.
4. Increased number of detected,
investigated, prosecuted, decided and
adjudicated cases of money laundering
and asset recovery (Outcome 3 in
STACA Strategic Plan)
Milestone 2014: 30 investigated, 3
prosecuted, 2 decided
5. Selected civil society partners
demonstrate credible anti-corruption
results, and learn lessons about effective
ways
Milestone 2014: decision taken on
funding mechanism for support to civil
society initiatives; anti-corruption
outcome indicator agreed
Performance met expectations over the long term with
overall improvement since 2011. However, performance
in 2014 was weaker than in 2013. Also, performance on
the number of cases returned for further investigation is
weaker.
# of cases presented to DPP: 143 (2011 – baseline); 221
(2012); 358 (2013); 337 (2014)
# of cases returned for further investigation: 29 (2011 –
baseline); 96 (2013); 91 (2014)
# of new cases in court: 193 (2011); 288 (2012); 343
(2013); 238 (2014).
According to the Afrobarometer survey the % of
Tanzanians saying they trust the Police “somewhat” or “a
lot” was 60% in 2012 and again 60% in 2014.
The % of Tanzanians saying they trust the Courts
“somewhat” or “a lot” deteriorated from 74% in 2012 to
68% in 2014.
Performance moderately did not meet expectations.
According to Police statistics, the number of cases
investigated increased from 23 in 2011 to 45 in 2014, but
the number of cases prosecuted in court remained low,
with no cases in 2013 and 1 in 2014. There were two
decisions in 2013 and none in 2014.
A decision was taken on support for civil society
initiatives in 2014 and this component of STACA will now
be implemented through the AcT programme.
There is a mixed picture on achievement of outcomes. The most positive aspect of performance is the
conviction rate on corruption cases, which has improved steadily from a low base. In 2013 and 2014,
and so far in 2015, the PCCB has maintained a conviction rate of over 50%, contrasting with many years
before in which the rate hovered around 40%. This still represents a high number of acquittals and many
resources being put into failed cases. Also, the overall conviction rate of 50% is mostly achieved in petty
corruption cases; conviction rate in grand corruption cases is significantly lower.
Looking at the number of corruption cases progressing through the system, this has improved overall
through the programme but there was a reduction of cases in 2014.
New figures on public trust in the Police and Judiciary were made available by Afrobarometer this year.
The figures show that public trust in the Police has remained about the same while trust in the Judiciary
has weakened.
Broadly speaking, there seems reason to believe that some progress will be made towards key outcome
indicators around the flow of corruption cases through the system and the conviction rate in these cases.
This is positive, even if the contribution of STACA to these outcomes is unclear. However, little progress
is being made on other outcomes such as public trust of the police and judiciary. Also, it appears at
present that outcome-level progress is not leading to sustained impact on corruption, as shown in
programme impact indicators (WGI Control of Corruption indicator, Transparency International Global
Corruption Barometer).
Overall output score and description
The overall output score is A (performance met expectations). Outputs 1, 3 and 4 are ranked at A and
output 2 is ranked at B. The B in output 2 reflects weak implementation of key programme priorities in
the Police and Judiciary, particularly model police stations and model courts.
Key lessons
8

Incremental gains can be made through capacity building on anti-corruption, but there are limits
to what can be achieved. Overall, throughout STACA there have been modest gains in the
number of corruption cases progressing through the courts, as well as in the conviction rate for
petty corruption offences. However, gains are most likely to be made in areas where there is
already some capacity, or where some political will for progress exists (e.g. prosecutions of low
level petty corruption). Overall, it is unlikely that this kind of capacity building support will bring
about a major change on grand corruption.

Some activities carried out under STACA were originally suggested by institutions; others were
initially suggested by DFID, discussed and later taken on by the institutions, including Model
Police Stations, Model Courts, and external communications. This annual review has found a
number of problems with the activities in the latter category. Often they were not implemented in
ways that were discussed with DFID. The degree of senior leadership buy-in to these activities
seems to have been weak; leaders have not communicated the importance of these activities
internally within their organisations, nor have they stressed the ‘intervention logic’ (the way in
which these activities are expected to work).

STACA was set up with the specific purpose of improving cooperation between institutions on
anti-corruption. In this it has made some limited progress. Institutions report improved
relationships at all levels, from heads of institutions down to operational level. But many old
problems remain, for example the lengthy process by which DPP gives consent for prosecution to
PCCB cases. Incentives for institutions not to cooperate with each other remain strong across the
Tanzanian public sector; resources and mandates are fiercely protected and this is especially
noticeable in a sensitive area like anti-corruption. The STACA Steering Committee has not in
itself provided a forum for resolving problems. Perhaps the best chance for supporting improved
cooperation is by funding activities which in themselves bring institutions together, such as
supporting PCCB to review NAO ‘red flags’ on corruption, or joint PCCB-DPP review of corruption
cases. This mostly means supporting activities which should be funded by recurrent costs, which
brings questions about sustainability.

In any future successor programme to STACA, it is worth considering alternative Governance
arrangements which bring in some external actors. One model worth considering is the MultiStakeholder Group of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.8 This model has been
MSI Integrity, Protecting the Cornerstone: Assessing the Governance of Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative Multi-Stakeholder Groups, February 2015.
shown to be effective in other contexts, especially in terms of building credible performance data,
collective learning9, institutional cooperation, coordination and ownership of reform programmes.

During the design of any future anti-corruption programme, besides the standard political
economy analysis, it would also be worth considering specifically how the political economy will
affect Value for Money factors.

It has been difficult to obtain reliable data under the programme. Two key institutions, DPP and
PCCB, still have difficulty agreeing on core statistics despite efforts to harmonise data over
several years. More broadly, there is no external verification of key programme data and it has
not been possible to carry out planned surveys to assess results of some STACA components.
Reliable data is critical for the reform process to be effectively managed and resources used
efficiently. Future programming needs to incorporate innovative approaches that improve data
integrity and implementation feedback. Technical assistance may also be useful in supporting
institutions to generate and monitor this performance data.

Delays in implementation have been a serious problem for STACA from the outset. Broadly
speaking there have been three different elements to the delay: (i) delay in release of DFID funds
due to long discussions on institutional workplans; (ii) delays in funds progressing through the
Ministry of Finance to institutions; (iii) delays in implementation within institutions, for example
due to long procurement processes. It may be worth considering in a more systematic way the
different factors behind these delays and how they can be mitigated.

The consultant carrying out the annual review noted that the logframe is based on a selection of
activities from the institutional workplans, rather than an assessment of overall performance
against these workplans. Strictly speaking, the output rankings do not take into account all
activities implemented under the STACA programme. However there are also benefits to
assessing performance in this way. Reporting against specific activities – even if only a sub-set of
the full picture – increases transparency to the public about the actual work that this project is
doing. Otherwise progress has to be assessed in a generic way with indicators such as “all
workplan activities implemented as planned”. With this kind of output indicator, the actual work
supported under the programme would be less clear to an outside observer. It is recommended
that the present output targets are kept for the final year of the programme, but that future
programmes should consider how to evaluate performance of all activities implemented by
partner institutions.
Key actions
See ‘Summary of Recommendations for the next year’ above
Has the logframe been updated since the last review?
Yes. Minor changes were made to the logframe in December 2014 for the following reasons
 To clarify where there was ambiguity on some of the targets, as to whether the numbers referred
to cumulative or annual targets
 To bring the logframe into line with agreed workplans
 To remove the Judiciary from financial year 2014/15
Output indicator 1.7 on coordination (which tracked frequency of meeting of the Steering Committee and
National Criminal Justice Forum) was also removed during this revision, on the grounds that coordination
is better measured in tracking specific activities which are undertaken jointly (already in the logframe e.g.
PCCB review of NAO corruption ‘red flags’, DPP review of PCCB prosecutions, etc).
9
Kania, J. and M. Kramer. (2011) Collective Impact. Stanford
Social Innovation Review, pp. 36-41.
C: DETAILED OUTPUT SCORING (1 page per output)
Output Title
Oversight agencies' performance and cooperation enhanced in the fight against
corruption
Output Score
Output number per LF
1
A
Risk:
Medium
Impact weighting (%):
40
Risk revised since last AR?
N
Impact weighting % revised
since last AR?
N
Indicator(s)
1.1 NAO auditors trained in
detecting fraud and
corruption
Milestones
2014: 380 (cumulative inc 80
new auditors trained)
1.2 Effective compliance
regime used by FIU for
increasing numbers of STRs
received
2014: inspection manuals
developed for key sectors
(Banking and Insurance).
Compliance regime
communicated to moneylaundering reporting entities.
2014: 70 files investigated
annually
1.3 Case review system in
place to improve PCCB
investigation of corruption
red flags in NAO reports
1.4 Nationwide
telecommunications network
established to facilitate
information management
within PCCB
2014: 27 out of 96 district
offices connected
1.5 New Case Docket
Management System in DPP
established and effectively
used
2014: Case Docket
Management System fully
functional in 8 regions
1.6 Effective monitoring
system established to track
quality of PCCB/ DPP
prosecutions
2014: Joint DPP/ PCCB
inspection of 50 corruption
cases, which tracks the
progress of cases in the
courts, develops statistics,
monitors quality of
prosecutions and adherence
to procedures
Progress
2014: NAO report a total of 424 auditors
trained on detecting fraud and
corruption in audits, including 74 trained
in 2013/14. Also 92 auditors were
trained on fraud and corruption in
extractive industries. (A)
2014: Inspection manuals for the
banking and insurance sectors have
been developed and communicated.
Compliance regime has been
communicated to ML reporting entities
(A)
2014: 185 files were investigated in
financial year 2013/14. (A+)
2014: 26 regional offices and 19 district
offices connected. A decision was taken
by PCCB to prioritise strengthening
central servers this year and not to
extend the network. Further extension of
the network is planned for next year (B).
2014: Various actions have been taken
to bring the Case Docket Management
System forward. Hardware and software
is in place, staff have been trained and
inspection in the regions has been
carried out. However the system is still
not fully functional in 8 regions. (B)
2014: Joint DPP/ PCCB inspection of
corruption cases was conducted in 20
regions, covering a total of 456
ongoing corruption cases. (A++)
Key Points

All institutions report considerable benefits of the STACA programme for their respective
institutions, whether it concerns training, equipment or support for specific operational activities.

Key activities tracked through the logframe have been implemented as planned, with overperformance in some areas including the number of auditors trained in detecting fraud and
corruption, and the number of files investigated by PCCB which originate in NAO files. However
in other areas, changes in priorities or overestimation of institutional capacity has led to under
performance (e.g. PCCB telecommunications network and DPP case flow management system).

Certain activities have been carried out as planned but expected benefits have not been realised.
One striking example has been training in money laundering and asset recovery. Despite much
training of staff on this area, few if any corruption cases at regional and district level involve
efforts to seize and recover the proceeds of corruption. This means that even if someone is
convicted of corruption and pays a fine or goes to prison, they will usually still be able to carry on
making use of their criminally-acquired wealth. This should be discussed further at head of
institution level.

More broadly, reporting of results of individual activities has been weak. This has been a long
standing problem during the implementation of STACA. It is proposed to address this through an
in depth review of a number of STACA activities, as well as in a more informal way through
regular quarterly meetings with implementing institutions.

Generally, in field visits to district and regional offices of the various institutions followed by
interviews at headquarters, reviewers found that understanding of the logic behind certain
STACA activities was weak particularly at regional and district level. Heads of Institutions could
play a stronger role in explaining and communicating the logic of STACA activities internally.

External communication activities have not been implemented as envisaged in Work Plans and
the Strategic Plan. This is partly due to the delays mentioned above, but also a lack of shared
understanding between DFID and institutions of the purpose of these communications activities.
At the moment external communications are focused on presenting institutions’ activities on anticorruption. The Strategic Plan put forward a different strategy, involving communication of a
break with the past in specific areas at the same time as efforts to ensure citizens perceive the
changes communicated as real.

There are instances of activities where there appears not to have been a realistic assessment of
existing capacities before proceeding with the intervention. One example is the Case Docket
Management System in the DPP, where the institution’s ability to install and use this software
appears to have been overestimated, leading to delays in implementation.

When asked what is needed to improve the fight against corruption through institutional means,
staff in STACA institutions commonly refer to the need for whistleblower protection, improved
public knowledge of what is corrupt behaviour, the need to address the negative performance
consequences of tenured civil servants, as well as the weakness of meritocratic recruitment to
the civil service, and weak institutional independence.
Summary of responses to issues raised in previous annual reviews (where relevant)
 “It would not be advisable to add additional funds while existing funds have not yet been spent.
DFID should shift to making payments at six monthly intervals, instead of annually in advance,
and should recommend to institutions that they plan to spend the 2014/15 budget over 2014/15
and 2015/16 financial years.”
– DFID has made this change and now provides funding in six monthly intervals. The 2014/15
budget has also been split over the 2014/15 and 2015/16 financial years.

“Continued efforts need to be made to improve coordination. This should start with regular
meetings of the STACA Steering Committee and National Criminal Justice Forum.”
– Institutions report that coordination has improved, with strong relationships both at leadership
level as well as at operational level. This is encouraging, but many constraints remain, especially
the continuing issues around DPP consent for prosecution of PCCB cases. The programme’s
contribution to cooperation has probably been greatest in the specific areas where activities have
been funded which require institutions to work together. The STACA Steering Committee is
acting as a Governance body for this programme and not as a broader problem-solving forum.
Recommendations

An in-depth review should be conducted to establish the benefits of a selection of institutional
activities under STACA, in advance of any future programming. This review should include an
effort to document the extent to which institutional cooperation has been improved along the law
enforcement chain.

Institutions’ activities on external communications need to be discussed at the STACA Steering
Committee. At the moment external communications are focused on presenting institutions’
activities on anti-corruption. The Strategic Plan put forward a different strategy, involving
communication of a break with the past in specific areas at the same time as efforts to ensure
citizens perceive the changes communicated as real. Heads of Institutions should discuss
whether it is practical to refocus communications in this way for the final year of the programme.

Discussions should also be held with heads of institutions on key activities where there appear to
have been difficulties in implementation, or where expected results of activities have not
materialised. These include training on Money Laundering and Asset Recovery.

The STACA logframe needs to be revised taking into account changes to Work Plans,
disbursement delays, and the decision to move the Integrity Fund to the AcT programme.
Output Title
Efforts made to strengthen public trust in the Police and Judiciary
Output number per LF
2
Output Score
B
Risk:
High
Impact weighting (%):
40
Risk revised since last AR?
N
Impact weighting % revised
since last AR?
N
Indicator(s)
2.1 Sting operations in the Police
arrest and sanction those
involved in petty bribery
Milestones
2014: 105 officers arrested
(cumulative). Follow through
(e.g. dismissal, legal action)
remains strong
2.2 Model Police Stations
established and working
effectively
2014: 6 model police stations in
operation where all police forms
available and in good supply,
special officers available in
station during working hours;
police standards clearly
communicated e.g. on police
walls, in media campaigns
2.3 Community policing
partnership to fight corruption
established
2014: new community policing
initiatives operational in 6
districts (initiatives to involve the
public to a greater extent in
police activities, with a view to
building trust and reducing
corruption).
Progress
2014: 32 police officers caught
on suspicion of corruption. 28
discharged from service and
administrative measures taken
against 4. Since the start of
STACA, a total of 140 officers
have been arrested. Of these, 65
were discharged from
employment and 17 brought to
court. (A+)
2014: Four model police stations
are currently being refurbished
and another three are in the
procurement process. There has
also been some training for
officers in model police stations
but overall communications
about the model stations (both
internal and external) remain
weak. It is uncertain whether the
changes so far will lead to a
significant change in
performance in these stations.
(B)
2014: No new community
policing system at district level –
Reported progress data was
revised during HQ interview:
existing community policing
partnerships were reinforced, not
newly established. (B)
Key Points

Police performance has been mixed. Some areas of strong performance have been registered,
including sting operations. However performance on the model police stations has been weak.
This is partly a result of overambitious planning (e.g. attempting to bring in 6 model police
stations in one year). But at present the original idea behind the model police stations seems not
to have been grasped. Most discussion on model police stations is focused on refurbishment.
Physical infrastructure is currently being improved in 3 police stations, with a further 3 planned for
this year. There has also been some training of staff on customer care. But behavioural and
performance standards for the model stations have not been made clear to staff, and there has
been limited communications to the public about the standards to expect at model stations. A
prize which was discussed with DFID as being about rewarding the highest performing Police
Station has instead been used (against specific DFID advice) to reward individual officers.
Discussions at headquarters during the Annual Review confirmed that these issues will be
addressed.

Regarding community policing, the role of STACA support appears to have changed. Although
discussions during the writing of the Strategic Plan had focused on establishing new community
policing partnerships in relation to anti-corruption, during implementation this activity shifted
towards strengthening of the existing partnerships. The existing community policing partnerships
involve regular local forums which address local problems, especially security related. The role of
STACA funding has contributed to an expansion of activity, but it is not fully clear what this has
involved, and the link to anti-corruption does not seem strong.

The Police decided to shift some resources this year towards piloting an electronic ticket system
for the Traffic Police in Dar es Salaam. This seems to be a promising initiative but progress
needs to be reviewed carefully to see whether it is making a difference.

The field and head quarter interviews with the Police established that there is a clear need to
increase the flow of information from the central to the local level regarding the purpose and
strategy of STACA and the various activities. For example, some senior regional officers were
unaware of key STACA activities such as model police stations.

After last year’s annual review, a decision was taken not to provide any funds to the Judiciary in
Financial Year 2014/15, and the output indicator for the Judiciary in 2014 was removed from the
logframe. This decision was taken on the grounds of weak performance and delays in
implementing work plans, and the provision of resources intended for primary courts (computers,
motorcycles, filing cabinets, steel shelves) to district and high courts. At a high level meeting with
the Judiciary in December 2014, the Judiciary undertook to resolve all outstanding issues. Since
then, progress has been made in terms of speeding up delivery of 2013/14 workplans, but there
are still issues of resources being provided to higher courts. The Judiciary is intending to leave
some of this equipment in place and to provide additional equipment to other primary courts using
internal funding.

The concept of ‘model courts’ does not appear to have been taken on. Resources have been
provided to the courts but these have not been linked to changes in standards. Communications
with the public has focused on a national television programme, “Haki Mali Yako”, which
communicates about the work of the Judiciary but not about the specific changes envisaged in
the model courts. Also the decision to spread resources thinly (some 50 courts have benefited
from STACA resources in the past year) is likely to prevent serious introduction and monitoring of
new standards.
Summary of responses to issues raised in previous annual reviews (where relevant)

“…given the delays in implementation we propose to shift to making payments at six monthly
intervals, instead of annually in advance, and should recommend to institutions that they plan to
spend the 2014/15 budget over 2014/15 and 2015/16 financial years. Some changes to the
logframe will be required.”
– DFID has made this change and now provides funding in six monthly intervals. The 2014/15
budget has also been split over the 2014/15 and 2015/16 financial years. The logframe has also
been updated.

“Model police stations and model courts will need to be carefully monitored, especially to see if
they are being effectively communicated to the public. A survey of trust in police and judiciary at
local level, before and after the implementation of model stations and courts, would be very
helpful. However it is not clear at this stage whether the budget will be sufficient to allow this.”
– Progress in developing model police stations and model courts was monitored during the
annual review. Whilst resources have been provided to courts and police stations, these fall short
of the envisaged model station and model court ideas discussed early on in the programme. At
present they are not being effectively communicated either internally within the Police and
Judiciary, or externally to the public. Surveys of trust in police and judiciary have been carried out
by Afrobarometer in 2012 and then in 2014. However, the 2014 survey happened before any
significant work was done to introduce model police stations and courts.

“A programme of engagement with the Judiciary needs to be taken forward to make clear that
performance has to improve if the Judiciary is to remain part of the programme.”
– Senior level meetings have been held with the Judiciary to address the concerns outlined in the
previous Annual Review. An agreement was reached concerning what needs to improve,
focusing on:
o
o
o
Full implementation of 2013/14 workplan;
Assurance that all DFID resources (2011/12 to 2013/14) have been spent on primary
courts as intended;
Demonstration that the Judiciary have grasped the concept of model courts and intend to
implement this concept in full.
Recommendations

Judiciary: Given the already slow action by the Judiciary, the continued problems with provision
of resources to higher courts and the weak implementation of the model court concept, it is now
unlikely that the Model Courts will be implemented in the way envisaged. It is therefore
recommended that no further support to the Judiciary be provided under STACA.

Police: A discussion on the model police station concept should be held at head of institution
level if possible. At present these stations are not being implemented in the way originally
discussed. If the stations are to have an impact in terms of building public trust in the police, there
will be a need to set clear standards of performance that both officers and the public know and
can recognise. It would be advisable to concentrate resources for the last year of the programme
on a small number of model stations and ensure that these are really working well, rather than
trying to broaden out into any more new stations.
Output Title
NCA financial investigator assists law enforcement agencies to process
complex international aspects of corruption cases
Output number per LF
3
Output Score
A
Risk:
High
Impact weighting (%):
5
Risk revised since last AR?
N
Impact weighting % revised
since last AR?
N
Indicator(s)
3.1. Establishment of effective
NCA financial investigator role
which meets agreed output
targets
Milestones
2014: Financial Investigator in
post and completes inception
report detailing activities and
outputs that can be achieved
within 2 year timeframe
Progress
Financial Liason Officer started
work on 1 November 2014.
Inception report delivered on 17
February 2015, in line with
agreements in Memorandum of
Understanding between DFID
and NCA (A)
Key Points
 After long delays, NCA was finally able to recruit a financial liason officer (FLO) in September
2014. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in October, and the officer started work on 1
November 2014. He completed an inception report and submitted it to DFID on 17 February
2015. The inception report sets out progress to date and detailed output targets for the remaining
time of programme implementation (to 31 October 2016).

The objective of this work, as set out in the Memorandum of Understanding, is to strengthen anticorruption enforcement in Tanzania by enhancing the ability of Tanzanian agencies to investigate
and prosecute financial crime linked to corruption.

Progress since the start of implementation:
o The financial liason officer has established a workplace within the PCCB Headquarters.
o He has established good working relationships with the Asset Tracing and Recovery Unit
in PCCB and is providing direct hands on support to that unit.
o He is also working with the PCCB Director of Investigations to set up training for staff from
regional offices on asset identification and recording.
o He has introduced himself to the DPP and his head of the Asset Recovery, with a view
towards promoting stronger cooperation between DPP and PCCB throughout the
investigations process.
o He has also discussed the possibility of providing support to FIU, although there seems to
be limited demand for this.
o He has worked well to track and coordinate those providing support to Tanzania in the
area of anti-money laundering and asset recovery, including World Bank/ UNODC Stolen
Asset Recovery initiative; Swiss Development Cooperation; the US Treasury; and the US
Africa Command.

At this point in time, it seems that the greatest demand for the financial liason officer’s services
will come from PCCB.

In the first two months of the FLO’s time in Tanzania he has also been called on to support NCA
on certain tasks related to its broader mandate.
Summary of responses to issues raised in previous annual reviews (where relevant)

“Encourage NCA to move as quickly as possible to recruit the officer.” – This recommendation
was actioned by DFID staff and the officer was recruited in September 2014.
Recommendations
 The Financial Liaison Officer’s work should be monitored closely in the first few months of
implementation. Programme outputs agreed in the inception report should be treated flexibly to
make use of any opportunities that may arise.

A discussion should be held with NCA on the use of the Financial Liaison Officer’s time to
support wider NCA work. While he should be encouraged to play a constructive role as a
member of the HMG team in Tanzania, this work should not take so much of his time that it is
preventing him from achieving his overall objectives. This is especially important as he is 100%
funded by DFID using Official Development Assistance.
Output Title
Citizens supported to demand Government response to exposed instances of
corruption, and/or to work collaboratively with Government at local level to
address problems with a corruption dimension
Output number per LF
4
Output Score
A
Risk:
High
Impact weighting (%):
15
Risk revised since last AR?
N
Impact weighting % revised
since last AR?
N
Indicator(s)
4.1. Citizens provided with
information about extent of
corruption, scandals, standards
to expect in government offices,
how to report corruption etc (e.g.
through local or national media,
community meetings, etc)
4.2 Citizens take action in the
fight against corruption by e.g.
joining campaign, sending SMS,
participating in local-level
problem-solving initiatives
Milestones
2014: decision taken on funding
mechanism for support to civil
society initiatives; output
indicators agreed
2014: decision taken on funding
mechanism for support to civil
society initiatives; output
indicators agreed
Progress
2014: Decision taken on funding
mechanism to support civil
society initiatives: this will be
done through the Accountability
in Tanzania (AcT) programme.
Output indicators have been
agreed. (A)
2014: Decision taken on funding
mechanism to support civil
society initiatives: this will be
done through the Accountability
in Tanzania (AcT) programme.
Output indicators have been
agreed. (A)
Key Points
 This component was subject to significant delays in earlier years of the programme, principally
due to the failure of the procurement for the Integrity Fund. This year progress has been made in
deciding how to deliver this component and for this reason it is now scoring an A.

In the first few months of the year, options were investigated to turn this component into a largescale impact evaluation. Discussions were held with Evaluation Department, the World Bank and
Twaweza, a well-regarded Tanzanian NGO. However it was ultimately judged not to be possible
to implement this approach, due to the absence of suitable local partners.

In the light of this, a decision was taken to implement this component through the Accountability
in Tanzania (AcT) programme. The component will provide support to existing AcT partners’ work
on building accountability, but will more explicitly track the effects of this work in terms of building
integrity and fighting corruption.

This approach will make use of AcT’s capable civil society partners who have already developed
experience in exposing instances of misuse or mismanagement of funds at local level. The
STACA funds will enable partners to continue their work in exposing these kinds of cases, and to
devote more resources into following up them up, for example through the courts, the media or
Police. This work is specifically set up as a learning exercise, where lessons about more and less
effective approaches will be collected and documented.

To maximise synergies with previous work carried out under AcT, and also to ensure that there is
no artificial dividing line between STACA-funded and AcT-funded partners going forward, the
STACA non-government funds (£1.2 million) are planned to be transferred to AcT. This output
would thus fall away from the STACA logframe and a new output will be added to the AcT
logframe to cover the STACA-funded work.
Summary of responses to issues raised in previous annual reviews (where relevant)

“Conduct discussions with potential suppliers to scope out what is feasible within the present
market in Tanzania and internationally. Subject to these discussions, rewrite the Terms of
Reference for the Integrity Fund and restart the procurement process.”
- A discussion was held with all suppliers who had been eligible to bid for the work to find out why
they had not bid. This led to the decision to restructure this component and implement it through
the AcT programme.
Recommendations

This component should be moved to the AcT programme and the logframe and ARIES updated
accordingly.
D: VALUE FOR MONEY & FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE (1 page)
Key Cost Drivers and performance
The key underlying cost drivers relate to: personnel (principally the overheads for the PCO and the cost
of National Crime Agency staff), procurement, and delivery of activities in workplans (training, travel,
consultancy, etc).
These cost drivers are the same as stated in the Business Case, but the personnel costs for the
managing agent has been removed and the amount of technical assistance envisaged has reduced (the
only TA currently provided through the programme is the NCA officer).
In terms of performance against these drivers, the management costs of the PCO, at around 8% of the
Government component, are lower than those anticipated for the Management Agent. The cost of the
NCA member of staff was also negotiated down 30% compared with the original figure quoted (which
had been benchmarked against other DFID and NCA offices).
More detailed data on unit costs of actual items procured through the Government systems is not
available as part of standard reporting. This is a problem for all financial aid programmes working with
the Government of Tanzania. However this year DFID decided to go beyond minimum requirements and
carried out a review of STACA procurement. This involved reviewing files for one procurement per
institution, and some benchmarking of items procured was carried out. This found that most items were
quoted at similar to market prices, for example comparing with prices in South Africa quoted on the
internet. But one particular piece of IT equipment procured by the DPP appeared very expensive when
compared with South African prices and this is being followed up. A number of other queries also
surfaced through this review and further information is required from institutions to clear up these issues.
VfM performance compared to the original VfM proposition in the business case
Indicator
Performance to date/ Comment
Effectiveness (how well our outputs will achieve our desired outcome)
% of low income households paying
Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer (TI-GCB)
bribes and the % of the public that
appears to shows a slight increase in the prevalence of petty
encounter police, judiciary or magistrates
bribery between 2011 and 2013 According to the survey the
and pay a bribe. (both measures
number of Tanzanians who had paid a bribe in the past year rose
expected to decrease)
from 49% in 2011 to 56% in 2013. Of those who had come into
contact with the Judiciary, the number of people saying they paid
a bribe rose from 46% (2011) to 52% (2013), while the equivalent
figures for the Police were 48% (2011) to 62% (2013). There is no
GCB data for 2014.
% of targeted citizens who believe that
Government is committed to tackling
corruption in the public sector and/or %
that are willing to complain about
corruption. (both measures expected to
increase)
TI-GCB again shows worsening picture between 2011 and 2013,
but there is no new data for 2014. The % of Tanzanians who
believe the Government is effective in the fight against corruption
reduced from 32% (2011) to 26% (2013). The number of
Tanzanians who say that they would be prepared to report an
incident of corruption fell from 89% (2011) to 71% (2013). In fact,
the number of incidents of corruption that are reported is much
lower than either of these figures suggests.
Number of corruption cases reported
and/or % of reported cases investigated
by PCCB and/or % of investigated cases
that are accepted for prosecution. (all
measures expected to increase)
In 2013 (last year for which stats are available), 5,456 allegations
were received by PCCB. This is higher than 2011 and 2012 but
still lower than the high of 8,235 in 2007. In the first half of 2014
(Jan-June) the figure was 2,765 allegations, approximately the
same as 2013 on a month-by-month basis. The number of
completed investigation files rose from 868 in 2011 to 1100 in
2013 – but only 391 cases were investigated from Jan-June 2014.
The number of new cases in court rose from 193 in 2011 to 343
cases in 2013, subsequently falling to 337 in 2014.
Number of complaints concerning the
police and judiciary that are received and
acted on (expected to increase in the
short term as confidence grows in
reporting mechanism, then decrease in
long term as complaints reduce)
Police: Reduced from 314 complaints in 2012, to 260 complaints
in 2013 (37 about corruption), and 178 in 2014 (20 about
corruption). No information about whether complaints acted on.
Judiciary: No data available.
Indicator
Performance to date/ Comment
Efficiency (how our inputs are converted into outputs)
Increase in the number of fraud cases
In 2012 (calendar year), NAO submitted 18 special audit reports
detected by NAO as a result of staff
to various state bodies for follow up, including 8 reports which
trained on fraud detection, new fraud
were passed to law enforcement bodies (PCCB, DPP or Police).
detection system being installed and
forensic/special audits conducted
In 2014 (calendar year) NAO submitted 8 special audit reports to
state bodies, of which 4 were submitted to law enforcement
bodies (PCCB or Police).
Increase in number of complex corruption Data not available for ‘complex cases’ as no definition of these
cases detected and prosecuted as a
cases exists in the Tanzanian system. Looking at grand corruption
result of PCCB, FIU and DPP staff being
cases more broadly, numbers seem to be determined more by the
trained
uncovering of large public scandals than by skills of PCCB or
other staff. E.g. a large number of corruption cases (approx. 15)
were taken on in 2008, mostly relating to the EPA scandal. Most
of these cases remain in the courts. In recent years (2012-14)
only around 3-5 new grand corruption cases have been taken on
per year, but the discovery of the IPTL escrow scandal has again
led to a spike in numbers. This number is probably therefore a
poor indicator of skills development funded by STACA.
Decrease in perceptions of corruption in
Data not available. Few studies measure perceptions of corruption
traffic police in pilot areas as a result of
specifically in the traffic police. The Views of the People study
measures introduced by programme
2012 found that 76% of those surveyed believed the traffic police
were affected by corruption ‘a lot’. This study has not been
repeated since 2012.
Economy (inputs being purchased at the appropriate quality and right price)
Overhead costs of the managing agent
No management agent has been recruited. Management costs of
will be monitored. These should not
the PCO, at around 8% of the Government component, are lower
exceed 10% of the cost of the
than those anticipated for the Management Agent.
programme, as benchmarked against
programmes with similar management
structures
Unit costs for the provision of technical
assistance and training will be monitored
to ensure high quality assistance at a
reasonable price. The managing agent
will be asked to benchmark this against
the equivalent provided in Tanzania and
internationally.
No technical assistance provided in FY 2013/14. Costs of NCA
officer benchmarked against other DFID and NCA offices. Using
this process,a figure for full costs was calculated and quoted but
this was reduced by some 30% through the negotiation process.
The indicators of effectiveness currently appear to show a deteriorating trend, although it would be
unrealistic to expect these figures to be going in the right direction until some time after programme
implementation. There has only been around 1 year of implementation since the programme was revised
in mid-2013.
There is some cause for moderate optimism in that some of the programme’s outcome indicators are
being achieved (principally speed of flow of corruption cases through the system and conviction rate in
corruption cases). The STACA theory of change sets out some potential causal links between these
measures and programme inputs and outputs. However there are many other factors which influence
these indicators and the contribution of STACA is not fully clear.
The difference between the relatively positive progress on outcome indicators and less positive
performance on the effectiveness indicators above is explained by the fact that several of the
effectiveness indicators are pitched at impact rather than outcome level. This does however point to a
potential weak link in the Theory of Change, as positive progress on outcomes is not necessarily leading
to positive progress at impact level. This is most likely related to the fact that overall levels and
perceptions of corruption are influenced by a wide range of factors outside the control of the STACA
programme.
A more accurate assessment of STACA’s effectiveness would require some more detailed data on the
intermediate effects of STACA outputs (e.g. impact of training and equipment on case flow and
conviction rate) – but this data is not readily available and will be difficult to gather within the timeframe
of this programme. Some information at this level will be gathered through research work in 2015.
On efficiency, there is some general assurance in that programme outputs continue to be achieved
(with some variance between outputs – see sections above) at prices agreed in workplans. The choice of
outputs in the STACA logframe (usually the direct result of inputs e.g. number of auditors trained) leads
to a fairly clear causal link between inputs and outputs. In this sense value for money would appear to be
being achieved. But it is harder to make a more nuanced judgement in terms of a comparison in the
levels of efficiency between this programme and other programmes. That would require tracking unit
costs at output level (e.g. cost per NAO auditor trained, cost per PCCB office connected to the PCCB
intranet). The main problem, again, is that financial reporting at the level of detail required is not currently
provided by the Government. It might be possible to include indicators of this sort in a successor
programme to STACA.
The indicators on economy generally show a positive picture. Also, the total financial aid package is
being spent according to budget, as is the Integrity Fund. However again, in future, more detailed
information could be gathered if it was provided by Government – for example on specific unit costs such
as cost of training venues, equipment such as computers and motorcycles, reviewing whether these
compare with market prices in Tanzania.
Assessment of whether the programme continues to represent value for money
Overall there is insufficient information to come to a definitive conclusion on Value for Money. On the
basis of information available, it would appear that is there is some assurance of the economy of the
programme. On efficiency there is basic assurance that workplans are being delivered on budget and
most output targets are being achieved, but it is much harder to give a statement on the relative
efficiency of this programme compared with others. In terms of effectiveness, the picture is quite unclear
with some positive and some negative signs.
Quality of financial management
Government component
All narrative, financial and audit requirements have been met to date. However, there are concerns as to
the quality of the financial reporting made available through the PCO and the fact that, often, expenditure
exactly matches budget. The new quarterly meetings with the institutions are expected to help establish
closer monitoring of spending progress, with regular reporting by institutions through a common
template.
Key findings from the 2011/12 and 2012/13 audit reports detailed in the last annual review, have been
followed up as follows:
 Incorrect payment of VAT amounting to TSh 35m. This has been taken up by PCO and the
institutions, but progress has been very slow. FIU and PCCB are understood to have written to
the TRA requesting a refund, but the status of the judiciary is unknown. The procurement review
led to concern that the police may have paid VAT on a procurement of motorbikes; as part of the
follow-up by the PCO, we have been continually informed verbally that VAT was not paid, but the
promised exemption certificate has not been seen. The issues around VAT will continue to be
followed up at the Technical Committee and Steering Committee.
 Payments in advance. Since the next audit reports are pending, we have been unable to
ascertain whether this practice has continued to occur. However, the message was given in the
subsequent technical and steering committees that this was unacceptable.
 Other concerns included unauthorised viring of funds from one activity in the work plans to
another (Judiciary); delayed procurement processes (Judiciary, Police, DPP, PCO); and
submission of incorrect financial information (Judiciary, FIU). These issues were discussed at
committee meetings, where institutions committed to correct their behaviour going forward.
The special audit of STACA PCO revealed some weakness in internal control which allows the STACA
Chairperson (Director of Public Prosecutions) and Director General (DG) PCCB to be passed over for
financial authorization relating to PCO, with two other authorizers potentially having powers to initiate,
approve and authorize payments..
The 4th Steering Committee in May 2014 recommended the Chairperson and DG PCCB (or their
delegates) both be mandatory signatories on payment requests from the STACA Programme
Coordinator. Practically speaking, this only meant removing the PCO Co-ordinator as a delegate for the
Steering Committee Chairperson (DPP) and replacing him with the Steering Committee Chairperson
(Deputy DPP). Cheques, meanwhile, are signed (following the above authorisation process) by the Chief
Accountant (or delegate) of the PCCB (where the PCO’s account is held) and the PCO Co-oridinator or
Financial Expert
Meanwhile, to strengthen the internal control system within the PCO, it was recommended to employ an
Internal Audit Function. The Steering Committee agreed to employ the PCCB’s Internal Audit Unit and
Pre –audit for internal review of the PCO’s financial transactions and such an audit was carried out in
Winter 2014/15.
The next set of audit reports were expected by 31st March 2015 and progress has been followed up
regularly since the new year, but it has become clear that these will not now be received until after the
Easter break (i.e. by 10th April at the earliest), missing the general government deadline. Follow-up will
continue and DFID will release no further funds until the reports have been received and reviewed.
Regarding performance against budget and forecast, the programme’s implementation delays have been
much discussed elsewhere here and in previous reviews. However, the recent decision to delay the
release of the second 2014/15 payment until the (Tanzanian) 2015/16 financial year (where it will be
rebudgeted) has positive value for money implications, as opposed to rushing to release and spend the
money within the original timeframe.
This arrangement has necessitated an extension of the Memorandum of Understanding with the
Government from 31st March 2015 to 30th June 2016, a change which is being finalised at the time of
writing.
Regarding the overall programme budget, there is now an outstanding balance, as a result of
1) Potential removal of Judiciary and withholding of entire 2014/15 payment (saving of £300,000)
2) Finalisation of NCA component budget below that envisaged when cost extension requested in
2014 (saving of at least £196,266)
At least some of this will likely be used to fund the research currently being procured for, and possibly for
other consultancy work in the programme’s last year and a half. All such reallocations will be cleared
with the Head of Office.
NCA component
A problem has arisen with regard to the financial management of the NCA officer’s costs, despite quite a
lot of discussion before the MoU was signed. DFID has still not received an invoice – in the two months
since the end of the project’s first quarter – and the only evidence of expenditure seen is a raw
spreadsheet of all the costs charged by the FCO to the NCA’s charge code – no evidence or estimate of
the costs incurred directly by the NCA has been given.
The Programme Manager is now taking this forward with the office manager in Nairobi, to ensure that
DFID gets the information it requires to perform sufficient scrutiny of the project’s expenditure. Once the
procedure has been clarified, the original quarterly schedule will be applied.
Integrity Fund
DFID has confidence that, in moving these funds to the AcT programme, they will be well managed by
KPMG (AcT fund manager), who have effectively managed fiduciary risk under that programme for the
last six years. We have just approved a 2015/16 grants allocation from KPMG and, while we are still
waiting for an overall budget profile, have confidence that they will monitor underspend closely and make
considered requests for reallocation if and when they become necessary.
Date of last narrative financial report
Date of last audited annual statement
September 2014
March 2014
E: RISK (½ page)
Overall risk rating: High
Overview of programme risk
Risk Description
Impact
on
Success
(L,M,H)
Probability
(L,M,H)
Mitigating Actions
(in Business Case)
Update March 2015
Risk
1
Programme relationships
negatively impacted by
wider pressures building in
GBS/SBS relationship
around underlying
principles etc.
H
M
- Strong communication of results
- Strong relationship with the heads of
implementing institutions
There have been pressures in the
relationship with Government
connected to the GBS and the
IPTL case. These have not
significantly impacted on the
programme to date.
Risk
2
Low political will means that
capacity
built
through
STACA cannot be used
H
M
- GBS dialogue intended as a test
political will, focusing on the willingness
of the Government to pursue the active
fight against corruption.
- Progress against outcome indicators
will give an objective sense of whether
the fight against corruption is
progressing
- Non-government component of the
programme will help to some extent but
will not deliver political will on its own
This risk is critical to the success
of the programme and almost
amounts to a ‘killer risk’ (high
probability, high impact). The only
thing preventing this is the fact that
there is political will, up to a point,
to prosecute lower level corruption.
Mitigating strategies are being
employed but ultimately this is a
very difficult risk for DFID to
mitigate.
Risk
3
The UK seen as not being
the right bilateral donor to
lead on an anti-corruption
programme because of its
own
recent
corruption
record
in
relation
to
Tanzania
M
M
- Provide world class expertise – if the
product is useful, this will overcome
concerns
- The recent introduction of the UK
Bribery Act may help to counter the
negative impressions of the UK on
corruption
This has not been an issue.
Institutions are grateful for the
support and do not raise issues of
the UK’s record on anti-corruption.
Risk
4
The Judiciary is not fully
committed to working with
the UK on tackling
corruption and may
therefore block work in this
area
M
H
- programme of support to the judiciary
will only take place under strict
conditions including clear commitments
from the judiciary themselves (to be
initiated through early high-level
engagement with the Chief Justice)
- the programme’s focus on the primary
courts may offer a less contentious
entry point than seeking to tackle higher
level corruption
Working with the Judiciary has
been very challenging. DFID has
put in place a series of high level
meetings with the Judiciary to
address weak performance.
Funding for 2014/15 has been held
back.
Risk
5
Programmes
supporting
police reforms or working
across the security and
justice sectors are normally
categorised as high-risk.
The possibility of high level
political/public criticism is
present especially in the
event of allegations of a
human rights breach
M
H
- Capitalise on the Inspector General of
Police’s commitment to act. Ensure that
interventions supported have a clear
benefit to the police and judiciary
- Closely monitor progress and be
prepared to alter the programme or
cease support if there is no traction
- monitor closely (through CGA and
other mechanisms) HR record of police
There have not been any
allegations of human rights
breaches during the time of
programme implementation.
However risks of working with the
Police remain and some problems
have emerged through the
programme, including weak
implementation of model police
stations. These will be addressed
through engagement with the
police at a high level.
Risk
6
Consultancies do not
deliver the high quality work
needed
M
M
- clear specification of consultancy
requirements and outputs will help
mitigate this risk
- use of results based management,
checking that milestones have been
achieved before disbursing next
payment.
DFID has only procured one
consultancy under the programme:
this annual review. DFID is
required to approve ToR for all
consultancies procured by
institutions but institutions often
neglect to do this. This will be
taken up at the Steering
Committee.
Risk
7
Corruption is uncovered in
the programme,
undermining its credibility
and forcing DFID to
suspend funding
M
H
- due diligence of NCJF and project
partners before disbursing funding
- development of clear workplans with
measurable results, and payment by
results
- annual audits with in-depth checks on
high risk spend such as procurement
and workshops
- DFID will authorise any procurement
over £100,000
- annual reviews to look at corruption
prevalence and risk, and whether
managing risk adequately
- publish information on support given
to each institution, and establish
complaints mechanism to facilitate
reporting of any abuses.
No evidence of corruption in the
programme has been found.
However due to the high risk, a
review of procurement under the
programme was carried out this
year which identified a number of
issues which need clarification.
Risk
8
Risk that capacity building
initiatives are not effective
in improving capacity. For
example risk that training is
low value or does not lead
to improvements in
knowledge and skills; that
equipment is the wrong
specification, is delivered to
the wrong location or that
people are not trained to
use it, etc.
H
M
- close scrutiny and discussion of
workplans before approval
- keep requests for equipment and
study tours to a minimum except where
there is a very strong case
- suggest other changes to improve
effectiveness (e.g. publication of
research and studies)
- PCO to step up work on monitoring
and delivery of workplans
- request for DFID to attend a higher
number of STACA-sponsored events
- use NCA advisor to provide support to
institutions in designing activities
- increase frequency of field visits
Mitigating measures are being
implemented, but due to the sheer
number of activities it is difficult to
monitor them as much as would be
ideally desirable. DFID’s main risk
mitigation measure is the approval
process for workplans. The new
review of procurement also
provides some deterrent. The NCA
adviser may be able to provide
some quality assurance, but only if
institutions choose to involve him
in training events.
One specific new measure taken this year to mitigate risk of funds not being used as intended was the
introduction of a review of procurement in the six institutions supported under STACA. Procurement
officers in each institiution were visited and one procurement per institution was selected for review.
Common issues across institutions included weak filing, with important documents often missing, and the
fact that often only files for 1-2 procurements were available for review at the time of the visit. The review
led to a series of questions which are still with institiutions for response.
Outstanding actions from risk assessment
There are no further outstanding actions to follow up.
F: COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS (½ page)
Delivery against planned timeframe
Delivery of STACA activities under the Government component (outputs 1 and 2) have been delayed for
reasons discussed above. The programme has adjusted spending according to reality and as a means
to manage risks. Outputs 3 and 4 have been subject to considerable delays in previous years but this
year these components have commenced delivery within the planned timeframes.
Performance of partnership (s)
Partnerships appear to be functioning reasonably well, with the exception of the partnership with the
Judiciary. Some institutions (FIU, NAO, Judiciary) have repeatedly failed to send representatives to
technical and steering committee meetings in 2014.
The relationship with the PCO has remained cordial over the past year and the previous weekly catch-up
meetings have, in practice become considerably less frequent, with ‘surges’ at key times, e.g. work plan
review, annual review or prior to technical/steering committee meetings. With the introduction of the
delivery plan, DFID has decided to formalise meetings with PCO as fortnightly rather than weekly, but
with additional meetings with institutions every quarter.
There are concerns about the time taken by the PCO to follow up certain requests made by DFID (e.g.
VAT, procurement review, exchequer receipts, outstanding documents); however, it is appreciated that
they often have difficulty following up with, and extracting information from, the institutions themselves
and DFID does not wish to micro-manage the PCO. The Programme Manager recently instituted the
process of taking minutes from DFID-PCO meetings to help ensure understanding of outstanding issues.
The Programme Manager has also requested the PCO to share documentation electronically wherever
possible, as this has been a weakness in the past, though largely rectified for key documentation earlier
this year.
The partnership with NCA regarding the financial liaison officer has also been good. There are two
issues which need to be managed: (i) financial management – principally regular invoicing of DFID,
covered under Section D, ‘Quality of financial management’ and (ii) use of the FLO’s time for NCA
business where the link with this programme is weak or unclear, covered under Output 3.
Asset monitoring and control
The level of assets purchased by the programme varies considerably by institution, from constituting the
vast proportion of its budget (Judiciary) to none at all (FIU). The PCO has also spent a significant
proportion of its budget on physical assets, most notably its vehicle and refurbishment of its office space.
Concerns regarding the Judiciary’s handling and distribution of its assets have been covered elsewhere
(and in last year’s review). While DFID has no reason to believe there have been similar problems in any
other institution, it has since requested full assets registers from each institution, collection of which will
be co-ordinated by the PCO. This will be particularly important as the programme draws to a close, when
the head of office will need to agree the programme team’s proposal for asset disposal.
The PCO has compiled an asset register relating to its own budget and a copy of this has been received
and reviewed and queries sent back regarding some equipment that appears to missing from the list.
This will also help with the enhanced financial scrutiny of the PCO’s expenditure against budget planned
for this final year.
Regarding the Financial Liaison Officer, DFID’s standard MoU template for use with other UK
government departments contains no information on handling of assets, so this will be followed up by the
Programme Manager for clarification.
Assets procured under the Integrity work through the AcT programme will be disposed of under the
procedure recently agreed under that programme (generally expected to involve transfer to grantees).
G: CONDITIONALITY (½ page)
Update on partnership principles (if relevant)
There are no conditionalities – Business Case, para. 5.6.
H: MONITORING & EVALUATION (½ page)
Evidence and evaluation
A major paper published by DFID in January 2015, ‘Why corruption matters: understanding causes,
effects and how to address them’, attempts to summarise the state of the evidence on anti-corruption
programming. This paper does not present new research on anti-corruption but summarises the results
of other research. Key points relevant to STACA include:
 Both current conceptual models of corruption (principal-agent and collective action) may have
their uses in explaining corruption in particular contexts. DFID’s emerging view that the collective
action model may be more applicable than the principal-agent model for characterising many
aspects of corruption in Tanzania informed the redesign of the programme in 2013, especially
new aspects such as model police stations and the new proposed approach to external
communications. However in practice these initiatives remain the minority of STACA initiatives
and these initiatives have not been fully taken on by institutions. Many STACA activities are still
based on a principal-agent model of corruption.
 Research on anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) has mostly tended to argue that these are
ineffective. However methodological limitations reduce the credibility of this evidence. Several
studies start from the premise that agencies have failed and attempt to discuss why, without
defining failure or reviewing evidence on this. More research is needed to establish where ACAs
are more and less effective, and how donors can best support .
 Transparency and accountability initiatives by civil society have had some success, but mainly in
terms of intermediate goals (e.g. complaint mechanisms are used, corruption is exposed) and not
so much in terms of ultimate outcomes (e.g. reduction of corruption, improvement of services).
This tends to reinforce the approach that is being taken in the integrity fund component of STACA
that will be implemented through AcT. This work will seek to track through where and how
success in terms of intermediate goals is leading to success in terms of ultimate outcomes.
An evaluation of STACA was planned but due to changes in the design of STACA and the limited
success of some aspects of the programme, it has been decided to focus this piece of work on the
components of the programme which appear most promising, with a view towards informing future
programme design. It is likely that this work will not be a full evaluation but a high quality review. Terms
of Reference are currently being reviewed by headquarters and by the SEQAS facility, with a view
towards contracting in May 2015.
Overall, it is difficult to say with certainty the effects of the STACA programme at this stage, as the
reporting tends to cover implementation of agreed activities and it is hard to tell the impact these have
had in practice. The review of STACA mentioned above should contribute to a more detailed
understanding of the effects of the programme. One notable issue in the Theory of Change is that while
there is some positive progress at outcome level, this is not leading to a reduction in public perceptions
of corruption according to impact indicators. This may be partly explained by the time delay in impact
indicators. However it may also indicate that overall levels and perceptions of corruption are influenced
by many larger factors outside the STACA programme.
A range of suggestions for future programming have been suggested throughout the Annual Review in
conjunction with the Annual Review issues raised above. These are primarily based on a review of
current STACA experiences, and the Reviewer´s expertise in anti-corruption programming. Many of
these concern programme data collection, programme structures and management, results framework
modalities, as well as how these require a different approach.
Monitoring progress throughout the review period
All STACA institutions have expressed great benefits of the STACA programme. Feedback from ultimate
intended beneficiaries – Tanzanian citizens – was sought in the Annual Review through meetings with
religious leaders and civil society groups in Mtwara and Lindi regions, and a meeting with civil society
organisations in Dar es Salaam. Views expressed differed widely, with some reporting that the situation
on corruption had worsened (Lindi) and others reporting it had improved (Mtwara). The subjective view
of the reviewers was that this was likely to have been related to the set-up of the meetings rather than
indicating any more definite trends in the regions concerned. Where meetings were held in the presence
of many police officers, those consulted said that the situation had improved. Where meetings were held
without police, views tended to be more critical.
The Annual Review was carried out in January-March 2015 by Fredrik Eriksson (Independent
Consultant), Justin Williams (DFID Tanzania), and Joseph Payne (DFID Tanzania), working with Henry
Martin, Gethseman Mkumbo, and Oscar Hossea (STACA-PCO).
The review team carried out a desk review of key documents including:
•
Business Case;
•
Logical Framework;
•
Strategic Plan;
•
Progress Reports;
•
Individual Institutional Workplans;
•
Procurement Report;
•
Institutional Audit Reports.
The team carried out semi-structured interviews with Heads of Agencies (Steering Committee Members)
and working-level staff directly involved in implementation (Technical Committee Members/ Focal Points)
at all six implementing institutions.
The team also visited Mtwara and Lindi regions (including a visit to Nachingwea district). This visit
allowed the team to:
•
Meet representatives of the six institutions at regional/district level, as well as key nongovernment actors;
•
Monitor delivery of STACA activities (including goods and services), and review
overall impact of STACA at regional/district level;
•
Understand progress and challenges in the fight against corruption at regional/district
level;
•
Understand reasons for success or difficulties faced by anti-corruption initiatives at
regional/district level.
Smart Guide
The Annual Review is part of a continuous process of review and improvement throughout the programme cycle. At
each formal review, the performance and ongoing relevance of the programme are assessed with decisions taken
by the spending team as to whether the programme should continue, be reset or stopped.
The Annual Review includes specific, time-bound recommendations for action, consistent with the key findings.
These actions – which in the case of poor performance will include improvement measures – are elaborated in
further detail in delivery plans. Teams should refer to the Smart Rules quality standards for annual reviews.
The Annual Review assesses and rates outputs using the following rating scale. ARIES and the separate
programme scoring calculation sheet will calculate the overall output score taking account of the weightings and
individual outputs scores
Description
Outputs substantially exceeded expectation
Outputs moderately exceeded expectation
Outputs met expectation
Outputs moderately did not meet expectation
Outputs substantially did not meet expectation
Scale
A++
A+
A
B
C
Teams should refer to the considerations below as a guide to completing the annual review template.
Summary Sheet
Complete the summary sheet with highlights of progress, lessons learnt and action on previous recommendations
Introduction and Context
Briefly outline the programme, expected results and contribution to the overall Operational Plan and DFID’s
international development objectives (including corporate results targets). Where the context supporting the
intervention has changed from that outlined in the original programme documents explain what this will mean for
UK support
B: Performance and conclusions
Annual Outcome Assessment
Brief assessment of whether we expect to achieve the outcome by the end of the programme
Overall Output Score and Description
Progress against the milestones and results achieved that were expected as at the time of this review.
Key lessons
Any key lessons you and your partners have learned from this programme
Have assumptions changed since design? Would you do differently if re-designing this programme?
How will you and your partners share the lessons learned more widely in your team, across DFID and externally
Key actions
Any further information on actions (not covered in Summary Sheet) including timelines for completion and team
member responsible
Has the logframe been updated since the last review? What/if any are the key changes and what does this
mean for the programme?
C: Detailed Output Scoring
Output
Set out the Output, Output Score
Score
Smart Guide
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Enter a rating using the rating scale A++ to C.
Impact Weighting (%)
Enter the %age number which cannot be less than 10%.
The figure here should match the Impact Weight currently shown on the logframe (and which will need to be
entered on ARIES as part of loading the Annual Review for approval).
Revised since last Annual Review (Y/N).
Risk Rating
Risk Rating: Low/Medium/High
Enter Low, Medium or High
The Risk Rating here should match the Risk currently shown on the logframe (and which will need to be entered on
ARIES as part of loading the Annual Review for approval).
Where the Risk for this Output been revised since the last review (or since inception, if this is the first review) or if
the review identifies that it needs revision explain why, referring to section B Risk Assessmen
Key points
Summary of response to iprogrammessues raised in previous annual reviews (where relevant)
Recommendations
Repeat above for each Output.
D Value for Money and Financial Performance
Key cost drivers and performance
Consider the specific costs and cost drivers identified in the Business Case
Have there been changes from those identified in previous reviews or at programme approval. If so, why?
VfM performance compared to the original VfM proposition in the business case? Performance against vfm
measures and any trigger points that were identified to track through the programme
Assessment of whether the programme continues to represent value for money?
Overall view on whether the programme is good value for money. If not, why, and what actions need to be taken?
Quality of Financial Management
Consider our best estimate of future costs against the current approved budget and forecasting profile
Have narrative and financial reporting requirements been adhered to. Include details of last report
Have auditing requirements been met. Include details of last report
E Risk
Output Risk Rating: L/M/H
Enter Low, Medium or High, taken from the overall Output risk score calculated in ARIES
Overview of Programme Risk
What are the changes to the overall risk environment/ context and why?
Review the key risks that affect the successful delivery of the expected results.
Are there any different or new mitigating actions that will be required to address these risks and whether the
existing mitigating actions are directly addressing the identifiable risks?
Any additional checks and controls are required to ensure that UK funds are not lost, for example to fraud or
corruption.
Outstanding actions from risk assessment
Describe outstanding actions from Due Diligence/ Fiduciary Risk Assessment/ Programme risk matrix
Describe follow up actions from departmental anti-corruption strategies to which Business Case assumptions and
risk tolerances stand
F: Commercial Considerations
Delivery against planned timeframe. Y/N
Compare actual progress against the approved timescales in the Business Case. If timescales are off track provide
an explanation including what this means for the cost of the programme and any remedial action.
Performance of partnership
How well are formal partnerships/ contracts working
Are we learning and applying lessons from partner experience
How could DFID be a more effective partner
Smart Guide
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Asset monitoring and control
Level of confidence in the management of programme assets, including information any monitoring or spot checks
G: Conditionality
Update on Partnership Principles and specific conditions.
For programmes for where it has been decided (when the programme was approved or at the last Annual Review)
to use the PPs for management and monitoring, provide details on:
a. Were there any concerns about the four Partnership Principles over the past year, including on human
rights?
b. If yes, what were they?
c. Did you notify the government of our concerns?
d. If Yes, what was the government response? Did it take remedial actions? If yes, explain how.
e. If No, was disbursement suspended during the review period? Date suspended (dd/mm/yyyy)
f. What were the consequences?
For all programmes, you should make a judgement on what role, if any, the Partnership Principles should play in
the management and monitoring of the programme going forward. This applies even if when the BC was approved
for this programme the PPs were not intended to play a role. Your decision may depend on the extent to which the
delivery mechanism used by the programme works with the partner government and uses their systems.
H: Monitoring and Evaluation
Evidence and evaluation
Changes in evidence and implications for the programme
Where an evaluation is planned what progress has been made
How is the Theory of Change and the assumptions used in the programme design working out in practice in this
programme? Are modifications to the programme design required?
Is there any new evidence available which challenges the programme design or rationale? How does the evidence
from the implementation of this programme contribute to the wider evidence base? How is evidence disaggregated
by sex and age, and by other variables?
Where an evaluation is planned set out what progress has been made.
Monitoring process throughout the review period.
Direct feedback you have had from stakeholders, including beneficiaries
Monitoring activities throughout review period (field visits, reviews, engagement etc)
The Annual Review process
Smart Guide
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