„This work was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research,
CNCS – UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-RU-PD-2011-3-0079”
Institutionalization of the ethnic dimension of party competition, which manifests itself in recurrent and stable patterns of politicization of ethno-cultural differences, makes it difficult for parties to foster appeals across ethnic lines and to build multi-ethnic political organizations. The existing literature provides us with a good understanding of factors that shape party politicians´ calculations and discourage parties from taking programmatic and organizational steps to bridge ethnic divides.
Central to these calculations is the idea of the electoral costs that taking such steps can entail for parties (Horowitz, 1985; Reilly, 2001; Reynolds, 2002).
The costs logic is somewhat different for parties which define themselves primarily in ethnic terms and parties for which the ethnic dimension is one of several dimensions on which a party competes.
Ethnic minority organizations typically fall into the first category of parties. Political entrepreneurs that try to mobilize ethnic minority voters on the basis of appeals to their distinctive group needs and interests are by definition seeking to build mono-ethnic organizations. Attempts to cross ethnic boundaries in programmatic and organizational terms defies the very rationale for the existence of such parties and thus are ordinarily avoided because of the risks of identity loss and selfdestruction(Chandra, 2005; Alonso, 2007).
Mainstream parties that avoid positioning themselves as defenders of interests of one specific ethnic groups should not suffer serious identity losses from efforts to foster multiethnic appeals and recruit across ethnic lines. They are, however, often expected to refrain from doing so because electoral benefits from the pursuit of such strategies are believed to be overweighed by the costs associated with the loss of the support of their traditional voters. The latter in societies where ethnic minority identities are politicized tend to come from the ranks of the ethnic majority population. Mainstream parties´ efforts to gain the support of ethnic minority voters, this belief system suggests, will be penalized by ethnic majority voters. Mainstream parties know it and this knowledge serves as a powerful deterrent for reaching out across the ethnic divide in terms of programmatic commitments and recruitment practices.
Does this hold across the party spectrum? What type of mainstream parties and when are likely to ignore these risks and recruit minority candidates for office is the focus of investigation in this paper.
We argue that mainstream parties´ decisions to recruit minority candidates is a function of party voters´ views of the ethnic other and politicians´ calculations of electoral benefits of minority support. We expect that parties whose voter base is more accepting of the ethnic other are more likely to recruit minority candidates than parties whose electorate is less ethnically tolerant. Party voters´ attitudes toward ethnic diversity rather than the party´s generic ideological family orientation should thus shape the party´s recruitment strategies. While the profile of the party voter base determines whether minority recruitment is an option for the party, electoral rules affect the extent to which the party engages in the pursuit of minority candidates. Electoral rules that promise higher
1

returns on investments in minority recruitment should be associated with a larger presence of minority candidates in party ranks.
We examine empirical support for these propositions by analyzing party recruitment behavior in the
Romanian case. This case is representative of Eastern European countries that experienced politicization of ethnic divisions from the very start of the post-communist transition. The Romanian political process from the early 1990s has been characterized by mobilization of ethnic differences between the majority group, ethnic Romanians, and largest minority group, Hungarians. This mobilization resulted in the institutionalization of an ethnic minority party, the Democratic Union of
Hungarians in Romania (UDMR). With a varying degree of success the party has been able to secure representation on national and local levels throughout the post-communist period. Throughout this period various attempts to attract ethnic Hungarian voters have been undertaken by other political organizations positioning themselves as ethnic Hungarian parties, as well as parties that formulated their appeals primarily in non-ethnic terms. It is the minority recruitment strategies of the latter parties, labeled here as mainstream parties for lack of a better term, which are the primary object of analysis here.
The paper proceeds in the following manner. First, we describe the candidate selection data we assembled to explore the empirical support for the propositions we articulated above. Second, we discuss operationalization of our key independent variables – variation in party voters´ stands on ethnic issues and electoral design – and match the variance in these variables with the extent to which minority candidates are present in mainstream parties´ candidate rosters for parliamentary elections. Third, we extend our analysis to electoral contests at the local level – if our explanatory logic of mainstream parties´ recruiting practices is correct, we should see similar patterns of party behavior at local levels as well. We conclude by highlighting the key research findings and identifying further important questions on minority inclusion research.
Candidate selection data
We collected data on the ethnic background of all candidates that were put forward by electorally successful parties in seven out of forty one Romanian counties. These are the counties where ethnic
Hungarians constitute more than 10% of the population. The data set includes candidates both for the lower and upper chamber of the Romanian parliament, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, for all parliamentary elections since 1992. The ethnicity of candidates was estimated on the basis of candidates´ full names. In the Romanian case, Hungarian and Romanian names differ quite substantially, which permits the use of this estimation technique.
1 Individual cases where names did not provide sufficient information about the ethnic background of a candidate were further investigated and an estimate was provided on the basis of additional information about the candidate.
2
To examine party recruitment strategies at the local level we collected information on the ethnic background of all candidates for mayor´s office in the 2008 local elections in selected localities. All localities with more than 10% of ethnic Hungarian population were included in the analysis. 402 localities that fit this criterion were identified countrywide and the dataset of all party and independent candidates for mayor´s office in these localities in the 2008 elections was constructed.
2

For estimating the ethnic background of mayoral candidates the same technique was used as in the case of the dataset of parliamentary candidates.
Inputs in candidate selection calculations: voter attitudes and electoral rules
The first proposition we specified in the introduction links mainstream parties´ decisions to recruit minority candidates to their calculations of potential backlash from their voters to such recruitment practices. When the party´s voter base has little acceptance of minorities then a party decision to put minority candidates on a ballot can lead to the withdrawal of support by the party´s core voters.
Party leadership knows that and, given that electoral losses might overweigh any potential gains in terms of minority voter support, is likely to abstain from recruiting minority candidates.
Party leadership deliberation, however, might take a different turn when the voter base shares few ethnic prejudices. In such a situation, putting forward a minority candidate does not entail considerable losses in terms of core voter support but carries the promise of winning additional votes in minority communities. When party voters are predominantly tolerant and accepting of minorities, party leadership has more room for experimenting with recruitment practices in order to reach out to the ethnic minority electorate.
3
In answering the question about which parties´ voters are more tolerant of minorities, a researcher cannot rely on shortcuts. It is problematic, for example, to use party family membership or ideological orientation of parties as a proxy of their voters´ attitudes towards minorities. One illustration of such difficulties is provided by a comparison of Western and Eastern European left parties that share a social-democratic ideology. While parties of the left in Western Europe are traditionally considered to be ethnically inclusive and supportive of minorities and immigrants, communist successor parties in such countries as Romania or Bulgaria often harbor nationalistic sentiments (Ganev, 2003; Pop-Eleches, 2008).
To compare how voters of different Romanian parties differ in terms of attitudes towards minorities we rely both on original survey data and secondary analysis. One such analysis is provided in Mungiu-
Pippidi´s account of voter attitudes at the time of the 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections.
Her analysis of the attitudes of supporters of the main presidential candidates, who were all party leaders, indicates that “the voters of Vadim Tudor (PRM) share a strong nationalistic sentiment. At the same time, the supporters of Theodor Stolojan (PNL) are associated with antinationalistic sentiment.... The preference for Ion Iliescu or Adrian Nastase (PSD) does not correlate with the nationalism variable” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002) .
The analysis of party voter attitudes almost a decade later suggests a somewhat similar variation in the voter attitudes of main parties with regards to ethnic matters. Table 1 below indicates how much trust the voters of leading national parties have in ethnic Hungarians. The data come from the 2008
‘Social Cohesion and Interetnic Climate in Romania’ national survey.
Table 1 here
Of all mainstream parties, the Nataional Liberal Party (PNL) has the largest share of voters claiming that they trust Hungarians very much. A similar share of voters of the Democratic Party (PD-L) report very much trust in Hungarians. Adding shares of respondents who claimed ‘very much’ and ‘a lot’ of
3

trust produces rather similar results for these two parties. Two other leading mainstream parties – the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Greater Romania Party (PRM) – have considerably lower shares of respondents claiming high levels of trusts in Hungarians.
A similar pattern of attitudinal differences among supporters of mainstream parties emerges if the question concerns the voters´ attitudes not specifically towards ethnic Hungarians but to people of other ethnicity in general – besides Hungarians a large number of smaller minority groups live in
Romania. The 2007 national survey conducted in the framework of Barometrul Opiniei Publice contained a question about respondents´ acceptance of a person of another ethnicity as a neighbour.
Among mainstream party supporters, the smallest share of respondents who would not accept such a neighbour comes from the ranks of the PNL supporters (11.1%). The level of acceptance slightly decreases for supporters of PD-L (12.1%), goes further down for PSD (13.4%), and then drops very considerably for PRM (21.7%). In contrast, only 4.2% of supporters of the ethnic minority party,
UDMR, claim they would not accept a person of other ethnicity as a neighbour.
Overall, the data from various survey questions and various time periods points to PNL´s voter base as the most tolerant and accepting of the mainstream parties in ethnic terms. The voters of PD-L also appear to share high levels of ethnic tolerance. PSD´s voters come across as much less tolerant and PRM´s voters appear as the most nationalistic out of all supporters of mainstream parties. These four parties have dominated Romanian politics for most of the post-communist period.
This period has also been characterized by a high degree of electoral system stability. For almost two decades since the start of transition the rules for electing the Romanian legislature stayed the same.
These rules combined closed-list proportional representation (PR) with special provisions for minority reserved seats (RS). The PR system had a medium district magnitude: seats were allocated proportionately within each of the 42 ‘constituencies’ (41 counties plus the City of Bucharest). At minimum, each constituency received four deputies and two senators. A national level electoral threshold was established at 5% for individual parties since 1996 and was increased for blocks and coalitions in subsequent elections. These rules allowed for the continuing electoral success in PR competition of the ethnic Hungarian party, UDMR (Popescu, 2002; Birnir, 2007; Protsyk &
Matichescu, 2010).
The system was reformed prior to the 2008 parliamentary elections. The impetus for reform came from growing public dissatisfaction with the functioning of representative institutions and the weakness of links between voters and their representatives. Closed list PR rules were substituted with a complex electoral arrangement, the basis of which were single-member sub-county constituencies called electoral colleges (colegii electorale). Voters no longer voted for county-based party lists but for individual candidates nominated by parties or self-nominated. A candidate won if s/he obtained more than 50% of the vote electoral college. A complex procedure is used if no candidate wins an outright majority: a two-tier seat allocation method, using the Hare quota at the county level, and then d´Hondt formula for nationally cumulated votes and seats remaining after the county-level allocation. Seats are allocated to party candidates in decreasing order of the ratio between the absolute number of votes they received and the quota in the county where they ran.
However, the allocation mechanism assures that every seat is assigned a representative who actually ran for election in that college, and this goal is consistently prioritized over rewarding candidates with the highest number of voters . A 5% electoral threshold for each chamber and special reserved
4

seats (RS) provisions for smaller minority groups were preserved in the new electoral law(Marian &
King, 2010).
Although the impact of these changes on mainstream parties´ electoral fortunes and on the overall distribution of seats in the parliament does not appear to be large (Marian&King, 2010), new electoral rules did somewhat shift the electoral campaign balance from parties to candidates.
Competition for parliamentary seats became more candidate-oriented and incentivized parties to pay more attention to selection of candidates with strong roots in local communities. It would be logical that in electoral colleges with considerable shares of ethnic Hungarian population such candidates would come from the minority ranks. Other things being equal, one can expect that electoral system change should have led to the appearance of more minority candidates on the ballot of the main parties in the 2008 parliamentary elections compared to the previous ones.
Minority candidates in parliamentary elections
To explore whether the empirical data provides some support for our propositions regarding the effects of voter attitudes and electoral rules on parties´ recruitment decisions, we collected data on all candidates nominated by mainstream political parties in seven counties with more than a 10% share of ethnic Hungarian population. The data set includes observations from all parliamentary elections since 1992 and covers candidates both for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The results presented below are based on counts of candidates with ethnic Hungarian backgrounds. For parliamentary elections prior to 2008 the counts include all minority candidates that appear on county-based party lists, regardless of the candidate´s position on the list. It is assumed that putting such a candidate even in the lower portion of the list where the chances of being elected are low still constitutes a meaningful signal. Such a signal is intended to attract a degree of minority voters´ support. Only parties whose core voters are not likely to penalize such candidate selection decisions are expected to put ethnic Hungarians on the lists.
Table 2 summarizes the results of the analysis of candidate rosters for mainstream parties. It provides summary counts of ethnic Hungarian candidates for all seven counties included in the analysis. County-based breakdown is available in Annex I.
Table 2
As the table indicates, the National Liberal Party (PNL), which is a party with the most tolerant voter base, most frequently put ethnic Hungarians on the ballot throughout the analyzed period. This holds both for the lower and upper chambers of the parliament. The Democratic Party (PD-L) comes a distant second in terms of recruited candidates with an ethnic Hungarian background. The Social
Democratic Party (PSD) and Greater Romania Party (PRM) had very few instances of ethnic
Hungarians appearing on the party list, suggesting a lack of any systematic efforts to use political recruitment for reaching out to this minority community.
The data presented in the table provides a limited level of support for electoral rules effects, which is the second propositions articulated in the beginning of the paper. The number of minority candidates did not increase significantly after a more candidate-oriented electoral system was put in place prior to the 2008 parliamentary elections. While the 2008 elections had the largest number of
5

ethnic Hungarian candidates running on the PNL´s ticket for the elections to the Chamber of
Deputies, the 2000 elections saw more ethnic Hungarian candidates for the lower chamber from across the party spectrum. With regards to the upper chamber elections, the Senate, the number of minority candidates did not increase either for individual parties or in total for all parties in comparison to the previous elections.
Explaining the weak effects of the electoral system change can proceed along different lines. First, mainstream parties that are open to the idea of minority inclusion might have not yet adjusted their strategies to reflect the new realities of electoral competition. The 2008 electoral reform led to the establishment of thirteen electoral colleges where ethnic Hungarians constitute a majority for the elections to the lower chamber and ….such colleges for the elections to the upper chamber. It may be that one round of elections according to the new rules – the 2008 elections – was not enough for these parties to revise their approach to the selection of candidates for running in these colleges. A second potential explanation has to do with parties´ experience of minority recruitment under the old electoral rules. Annex I provides details on parties´ candidate selection decisions in individual counties. As the data presented in the Annex indicates, PNL actively recruited minority candidates for its lists in two counties where ethnic Hungarians constitute the majority of the population, Harghita and Covasna. Ethnic Hungarians constituted the majority of candidates on PNL´s list for the elections to the lower chamber in Covasna and on the party lists for the elections to the upper chamber both in Harghita and Covasna. The 2000 elections were the first national elections that the party contested not as a part of electoral alliance but alone and these candidate selection decisions suggest that the party seriously intended to compete for the support of minority voters. This attempt did not prove to be successful – the party failed to secure any seats in these counties This experience is likely to have shaped the party´s subsequent decisions. As the Annex indicates, in neither of the two subsequent parliamentary elections did the majority of PNL´s candidates in these two counties come from the ranks of ethnic Hungarian.
This analysis suggests that parties´ decisions about the choice of candidates are not a simple function of electoral rules. Learning from prior rounds of recruitment decisions and other factors might shape parties´ candidate selection practices. At the same time, the findings presented in Table 2 provide strong support for the paper´s main proposition – only parties with the most ethnically tolerant voter base are likely to experiment with minority candidate recruitment.
Minority candidates in mayoral elections
If the profile of party voters determines party willingness to reach out to minority communities and to recruit minority candidates, the differences in candidate selection practices of mainstream parties that we observed at the national level should have parallels at the local level. The National Liberal
Party should be well ahead of other mainstream parties in nominating ethnic Hungarian candidates for local offices. To investigate this proposition we identified all localities where more than 10% of population was Hungarian and studied the ethnic background of candidates for the 2008 mayoral elections in these localities. The local election law provides for the direct election of a mayor and allows both party and independent candidates to take part in a contest.
Our interest was to examine mayoral candidate nomination decisions of mainstream parties in the localities we identified. There were 402 such localities across several counties of the country. Table 3
6

below summarizes the results of our analysis. For the purposes of comparison, it also includes data on candidates for the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) and the new ethnic
Hungarian party, the Civic Party. The table also reports data on the ethnic background of independent deputies.
Table 3
Consistent with our initial expectations, the National Liberal Party (NLP) was the mainstream party that most frequently nominated mayoral candidates with ethnic an Hungarian background.
Minorities were PNL´s nominees in about 11% of localities, as compared to 7.2% for the Democratic
Party (PD-L), 4.2% for the Social Democratic Party (PSD), and 2 % for the Greater Romania Party
(PRM). At the same time, PNL had the largest number of locations among mainstream parties (with the exception of PRM) where it did not field a candidate, which further highlights the significant weight of candidates with ethnic an Hungarian background in PNL´s approach to mayoral campaigns in minority-populated areas.
The table also reveals that the leading minority party, UDMR, was most active in nominating candidates in these locations. PRM, which has the most nationalistic platform among mainstream parties, was, on the other hand, the least active in fielding candidates. While UDMR had candidates in about 75% of locations, PRM put them in less than a quarter of locations. Another noticeable fact from Table 3 is the prevalence of ethnic Hungarians among independent candidates.
To examine whether there are any patterns in party decisions about when to field a candidate, we conducted a cluster analysis of party nomination decisions, taking into account the size of locality and the locality´s share of minority population. While the locality size did not prove to be consequential in influencing party decisions, distinct patterns were uncovered with respect to parties´ behavior in localities with different minority population shares. Annex II provides details on the results of this type of analysis for two mainstream parties, which, according to Table 3, were most willing to nominate mayoral candidates of ethnic Hungarian background, the Liberal National
Party (LNP) and the Democratic Party (PD-L).
The common feature of data presented in Annex II is a bell curve-like distribution of frequencies with which both parties make decisions to nominate ethnic Hungarian candidates in minority populated localities. As the figure for PNL indicates, in localities with a minority population share of thirty or less percent, the Hungarians constitute 8.7% of mayoral candidates nominated by the party. As the share of minority population in localities increases so does the frequency with which the party nominates candidates with an ethnic Hungarian background. In localities where the minority population share was between 30.9% and 72.7%, ethnic Hungarians account for almost sixteen percent of the PNL´s mayoral candidates. As the minority population share grows further, the proportion of ethnic
Hungarian candidates in PNL drops. As the data reveals, in such localities the party very rarely nominates candidates. Out of 120 locations with more than 72.7% share of ethnic Hungarian population the PNL only nominated candidates in eighteen. Nominating a candidate is a decision that requires two sides, the party and the candidate; the low number of party nominations in this type of localities might reflect the difficulties that the party faces in attracting the candidates to run on a mainstream party´s ticket.
A similar frequency distribution pattern of minority candidate nominations also characterizes PD-L´s behavior. The party is most willing to nominate minority candidates in locations with a medium share
7

of ethnic Hungarian population. An interesting feature of PD-L´s approach to nomination of minority candidates is a much higher minority population share threshold for starting to actively seek minority candidates. PD-L starts doing so when the minority population share hits almost 40%, while PNL is willing to engage more actively in recruitment of minority candidates immediately after the share of ethnic Hungarians in the population crosses 30%.
Overall, the analysis undertaken of candidate selection decisions by mainstream parties on the local level confirms our conclusions from the examination of parliamentary recruitment practices. The
Liberal National Party (PNL), which has the most ethnically tolerant voter base among all mainstream parties, was the most open to the idea of recruiting minority candidates both at national and local levels. Other mainstream parties´ willingness to nominate mayoral candidates with ethnic minority backgrounds also closely corresponds to these parties´ recruitment practices at the national level.
Conclusion
The paper attempted to contribute to our understanding of mainstream parties´ behavior with regards to ethnic minority constituencies in situations where ethnic differences are politicized. We hypothesized that certain types of mainstream parties might find it to be in their interest to reach out to minority communities and engage in practices intended to bridge ethnic divides. We considered party recruitment strategies as an important manifestation of such practices and launched a systematic examination of ethnic profiles of candidates that mainstream parties nominate in minority populated areas.
Our findings provide strong support for our initial expectation that parties which face little opposition from their voter base to ethnically inclusive rhetoric and policies have strong incentives to engage in minority recruitment. Such recruitment practices carry the promise of winning additional votes
(ethnic minority votes) for these parties without risk of losing any support from the parties´ core constituencies in the majority population. These incentives might lead parties to behave in ways which are different from prescriptions that stem from party membership in ideological party families.
The membership of the Liberal National Party (PNL) in the liberal party family, for example, would suggest that the party practices ‘ethnicity- blind’ approachs to building linkages with voters – liberal parties do not ordinary compete on ethnic issues. Yet PNL´s recruitment practices, especially in the
2000 elections, which were the first elections the party contested as a stand-alone force, point to the deliberate use of minority candidates as a way to attract ethnic vote. The question whether mainstream parties´ appeals to minorities in general and minority-friendly recruitment practices in particular have an effect on voting behavior of minorities has remained largely outside the scope of this paper and, of course, should be an important area for further research.
The analysis undertaken in the paper did not detect considerable effects of electoral rule changes on parties´ recruitment behavior. The introduction of a more candidate-oriented electoral system did not significantly transform mainstream parties´ approach to the nomination of candidates for parliamentary office in minority populated areas. The fact that the new electoral rules are still more in line with a proportional rather than majoritarian approach to seat allocations has probably shaped parties´ decisions to maintain the existing practices of recruitment for parliamentary office. The paper also produced interesting findings on party recruitment strategies in local campaigns, which are guided by an explicitly majoritarian logic of electoral competition. Party decisions about the
8

selection of minority candidates for mayoral office have been demonstrated to be linked to the localities´ minority population size in a non-linear fashion.
The PD-L
The PSD
The PNL
The UDMR
The PRM
Very much
14.3%
8.5%
15.3%
20.0%
6.7%
Level of trust in Hungarian
A lot
41.8%
37.0%
39.8%
58.2%
26.7%
Some
26.0%
30.3%
22.9%
18.2%
20.0%
Very little
17.9%
24.2%
22.0%
3.6%
46.7%
Total
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
Valid* percentage for the entire sample
10.4% 37.5% 29.7% 22.5%
Source : Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities (ISPMN), ‘Social
Cohesion and Interetnic Climate in Romania’, November 2008
100.0%
CAMERA DEPUTATILOR SENAT
FDSN/PDSR/PSD
1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 Total 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 Total
0 1 1 1 0 3 0 0 1 1 0 2
PNT-CD
FSN/PD/PDL
PRM
PNL
TOTAL
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
4
1
1
0
4
7
0 na
2 0
0
1
2 na
0
0 1
6 11
6 20
2
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0 1
0 7
2 10
0 na na
1 0 1
0
3
4
0
2
3
1
12
19
2
4
S ource: Authors´ calculations on the basis of Central Electoral Bureau´s records
9

The PSD
Romanian Hungarian Unidentified No candidat
56.1% 4.2% 3.2% 36.4%
Total
100%
The PD-L
The PNL
The PRM
60.0%
47.3%
24.4%
7.2%
10.9%
2.0%
2.7%
1.2%
1.0%
30.1%
40.5%
72.6%
100%
100%
100%
The UDMR
The Civic Party
Independents
0.70%
0%
11.9%
73.40%
28.20%
17.6%
2.20% 23.60%
0.20% 71.60%
1.5% 69.0%
100%
100%
100%
Source: Authors´ calculations on the basis of Central Electoral Bureau´s records
10

Annex I. A County distribution of main Parties´ Candidates with ethnic Hungarian background for
Camera Deputatilor
Year
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008
Judet Arad Cluj Salaj Bihor Satu -Mare Mures Covasna Harghita
10,67 17,4 23,04 25,96 35,19 39,3 73,79 84,61
FDS
PNT-CD
FSN
PRM
PNL
1
PDSR
PNT-CD
PD
PRM
1
1
1
1
PNL
PDSR
PNT-CD
PD
PRM
PNL
PSD
PNT-CD
PD
PRM
PNL
PSD
PNT-CD
PD
PRM
PNL
Total
1
2 1 0 1
1
1
1
4
1
1
4
1
1
1
8
1
2
3
0
6
0
0
20
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
4
Total
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
1
1
1
1
1
11

Annex I. B County distribution of main Parties´ Candidates with ethnic Hungarian background for
Senat
Judet Arad Cluj Salaj Bihor Satu -Mare Mures Covasna Harghita
Year
FDSN
10,67 17,4 23,04 25,96 35,19 39,3 73,79 84,61 Total
PNT-CD
FSN
0
0
1992
PRM
PNL
0
0
PDSR
PNT-CD
0
0
PD
PRM
1 1
0
2
1996 PNL
PDSR 1
0
0
2000
PNT-CD
PD
PRM
PNL
PSD
PNT-CD
1
1
3 4
1
7
1
1
1
1
0
PD
PRM
0
0
2004 PNL
PSD
1 1 1
0
3
2008
PNT-CD
PD
PRM
PNL
Total
1
1 0 0 0 1
1
1
5 4 8
1
0
0
0
2
19
12

Annex II. Distribution of mayoral candidate nominations by PNL and PD-L (clustering by localities´ shares of minority population)
13

Reference List
Alonso, S. (2007). Enduring ethnicity: the political survival of incymbent ethnic parties in
Western Democracies. In J.M.Maravall & I. Sanchez-Cuenca (Eds.), Controlling Governments: Voters,
Institutions, and Accountability ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Birnir, J. K. (2007). Ethnicity and electoral politics. Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge
University Press.
Chandra, K. (2005). Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability. Perspectives on Politics, 3, 235-
252.
Ganev, V. I. (2003). The Politics of Ethnci Reconciliation in Bulgaria. In H.F.Carey (Ed.),
National Reconciliation in Eastern Europe ( Boulder: Eastern European Monographs.
Horowitz, D. (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkley: University of California Press.
Marian, C. G. & King, R. F. (2010). Plus +ºa change: Electoral law reform and the 2008
Romanian parliamentary elections. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 43, 7-18.
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2002). Politica dupa comunism. Bucuresti : Editura Humanitas .
Pop-Eleches, G. (2008). Post-Communist Successor Parties in Romania, paper presented at
Association for Study of Nationalities Meeting, New York, 10th April.
Ref Type: Unpublished Work
Popescu, M. (2002). Romania: Stability Without Consensus. In S.Birch, F. Millard, M. Popescu,
& K. Williams (Eds.), Embodying democracy: electoral system design in post-Communist Europe ( New
York: Palgrave.
14

Protsyk, O. & Matichescu, L. M. (2010). Electoral rules and minority representation in
Romania. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 43, 31-41.
Protsyk, O. & Sachariew, K. (2008). Ethnic Data Collection: The Case of Civil Service in
Eastern Europe Flensburg, Germany: ECMI Issue Brief .
Reilly, B. (2001). Democracy in divided societies : electoral engineering for conflict
management. Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press.
Reynolds, A. (2002). The Architecture of Democracy. Constitutional Design, Conflict
Management and Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.
1 For a discussion of the utility of this estimation method see, for example, Protsyk & Sachariew (2008).
2 The example of DEKANY ALEXANDRU TIBERIU, PNL´s candidate for Chamber of Deputies on the party list in
Arad, illustrates how additional information was sought to determine the candidate´s ethnic background. The candidate´s first name is a typical Hungarian name, while the last name suggests ethnic Romanian origins. The person´s CV was procured from the website of the organization where he works. The CV contained information about this person´s ethnic self-identification, which, in this case, was Romanian.
3
The ability of party leaders to decide on candidates is a variable in itself. When we refer to party leadership here we mean any party decision making structures that control the candidate selection process.
15