I negate. Resolved: The United States ought to prioritize the pursuit of national
security objectives above the digital privacy of its citizens.
The 4th Amendment: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”
Observation 1: Aff has an inherent burden to advocate national security objectives.
Therefore, Aff must prove whatever he defends as national security objective truly is
U.S. national security objective with a legitimate government claim or reliable
definition.
Observation 2: To negate means to prove something wrong. Therefore, if I disprove
Aff, I am negating.
if Aff just defends national security, he A) is not only being untopical, but also B) being unfair because the only way the neg can
prepare for this debate is based on the resolution.
(Read only when my opponent has terrorist impacts) There is a clear distinction between the national security and the pursuit
of the national security objectives; unless my opponent proves that ______ is one of the main objectives of the U.S. national
security with a legitimate government claim, my opponent’s entire case falls since he is being untopical. Therefore, the Aff
must defend the pursuit of national security objectives, not simply the national security.
Observation 3: The Aff must defend NSA because a) it is the most recent and realworld example of the United States upholding national security over digital privacy
and b) discussing about NSA is key to education since it is what the topic literature
is mostly about.
My value is morality since the word “ought” implies moral obligation
There are 3 justifications
1. Although this topic does talk about national security and digital privacy, we first have to look
to morality since the resolution asks a question of moral obligation through the use of word
“ought,” therefore explaining why we need to pursue those values. Therefore, morality is an
apriority to any other values under this resolution.
2. It precludes any value that is desirable since morality always comes into the discussion
when determining an action is good or bad. Thus, achieving morality means achieving good,
which is an ultimate goal for both the society and individuals.
3. The reason we act depends on the internal moral values we have; we can never make an
action without being dependent on our moral internals. It is the only weighing mechanism
that explains why we exist.
There are 2 justifications:
First, legal force provides reciprocal and binding motivation for respecting abstract
moral rules. Jürgen Habermas1:
An autonomous morality
provides only fallibilistic procedures for the justification of norms and
actions. The high degree of cognitive [where] uncertainty is heightened by the contingencies connected
with the context-sensitive application of highly abstract rules [applied] to complex situations
that are to be described as appropriately and completely, in all relevant aspects, as possible.36 Furthermore, there is a
motivational weakness corresponding to this cognitive one. Every post-traditional morality demands a distantiation from the
1
Jürgen Habermas, Law and Morality, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, October 1, 1986. SM
unproblematical background of established and taken-for- granted forms of life. Moral judgments, decoupled from concrete
ethical life (Sittlichkeit), no longer immediately carry the motivational power that converts judgments into actions. The more
that morality is internalized and made autonomous, the more it retreats into the private sphere. In all spheres of action where
conflicts and pressures for regulation call for unambiguous, timely, and binding decisions, legal
norms must absorb
the contingencies that would emerge if matters were left to strictly moral
guidance. The complementing of morality by coercive law can itself be morally justified. In this connection K. O. Apel
speaks of the problem of the warranted expectation of an exacting universalistic morality. 37 That is, even morally
well-justified norms may be warrantedly expected only of those who can expect
that all others will also behave in the same way. For only under the condition of a general
observance of norms do reasons that can be adduced for their justification count. Now, if a practically effective bindingness
cannot be generally expected from moral insights, [Therefore,]
adherence to corresponding norms is
reasonable, from the perspective of an ethic of responsibility, only if they are enforced, that is, if they
acquire [by] legally binding force. Important characteristics of positive law become intelligible if we conceive of
[the] law from this angle of compensate[es]ing for the weaknesses of an autonomous
morality. [because] L[l]egal norms borrow their binding force from the
government’s potential for sanctions. They apply to what Kant calls the external aspect of action, not to
motives and convictions, which cannot be controlled. Moreover, the professional administration of written, public, and
systematically elaborated law relieves legal subjects of the effort that is demanded from moral persons when they have to
resolve their conflicts on their own. And finally, positive law owes its conventional features to the fact that it can be enacted
and altered at will by the decisions of a political legislature. This dependence on politics also explains the instrumental aspect
of law. Whereas moral norms are always ends in them- selves, legal norms are also means for realizing political goals. That is,
they serve not only the impartial settlement of conflicts of action but also the realization of political programs. Collective goalattainment and the implementation of policies owe their binding force to the form of law. In this respect, law stands between
politics and morality. This is why, as Dworkin has shown, in judicial discourse, arguments about the application and
interpretation of law are intrinsically connected with policy arguments as well as with moral arguments.
Legal force is the foundation of the government’s power and the guideline for how it
functions; it grants government power to give sanctions and maintain peace. Strong
government power is crucial in achieving morality because the social norms society
defines as moral cannot be enforced without it; an anarchy will simply be the
outcome. If morality were inconsistent with constitutional obligation, it would
require the nation to literally act against itself.
I contend that taking away U.S. citizens’ digital privacy in pursuit of national security
violates the 4th amendment.
Donohue2 writes:
The National
Security Agency’s recently revealed surveillance programs undermine the purpose of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which was established to prevent this kind of overreach. They violate the
Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. And
they underscore the dangers of growing executive power. The intelligence community has a
history of overreaching in the name of national security. In the mid-1970s, it came to light that, since the 1940s, the NSA had
been collecting international telegraphic traffic from companies, in the process obtaining millions of Americans’ telegrams that
were unrelated to foreign targets. From 1940 to 1973, the CIA and the FBI engaged in covert mail-opening programs that
violated laws prohibiting the interception or opening of mail. The agencies also conducted warrantless “surreptitious entries,”
breaking into targets’ offices and homes to photocopy or steal business records and personal documents. The Army Security
Agency intercepted domestic radio communications. And the Army’s CONUS program placed more than 100,000 people under
surveillance, including lawmakers and civil rights leaders. After an extensive investigation of the agencies’ actions, Congress
passed the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to limit sweeping collection of intelligence and create rigorous
oversight. But 35 years later, the NSA is using this law and its subsequent amendments as legal grounds to run even more
invasive programs than those that gave rise to the statute. We’ve learned that in April, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Laura K. Donohue, [Professor of Law at Georgetown Law and the Director of Georgetown’s Center on National Security and
the Law] “NSA Surveillance may be legal – but it’s unconstitutional,” The Washington Post, June 21st, 2013. SM
2
Court (FISC) ordered Verizon to provide information on calls made by each subscriber over a three-month period. Over the
past seven years, similar orders have been served continuously on AT&T, Sprint and other telecommunications providers.
Another program, PRISM, disclosed by the Guardian and The Washington Post, allows the NSA and the FBI to obtain online
data including e-mails, photographs, documents and connection logs. The information that can be assembled about any one
person — much less organizations, social networks and entire communities — is staggering: What we do, think and believe.
The government defends the programs’ legality, saying they comply with FISA and its amendments. It [would] may be right,
but only because FISA has ceased to [be] provide a meaningful constraint. Under the traditional FISA, if the government wants
to conduct electronic surveillance, it must make a classified application to a special court, identitying or describing the target.
It must demonstrate probable cause that the target is a foreign power or an agent thereof, and that the facilities to be
monitored will be used by the target. In 2008, Congress added section 702 to the statute, allowing the government to use
electronic surveillance to collect foreign intelligence on non-U.S. persons it reasonably believes are abroad, without a court
order for each target. A U.S. citizen may not intentionally be targeted. To the extent that the FISC sanctioned PRISM, it may be
consistent with the law. But it
is disingenuous to suggest that millions of Americans’ emails, photographs and documents are “incidental” to an investigation
targeting foreigners overseas. The telephony metadata program raises similar concerns. FISA did not
originally envision the government accessing records. Following the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, Congress allowed
applications for obtaining records from certain kinds of businesses. In 2001, lawmakers further expanded FISA to give the
government access to any business or personal records. Under section 215 of the Patriot Act, the government no longer has to
prove that the target is a foreign power. It need only state that the records are sought as part of an investigation to protect
against terrorism or clandestine intelligence. This means that FISA can now be used to gather records concerning individuals
who are neither the target of any investigation nor an agent of a foreign power. Entire databases — such as telephony
metadata — can be obtained, as long as an authorized investigation exists. Congress didn’t pass Section 215 to allow for the
wholesale collection of information. As Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-Wis.), who helped draft the statute, wrote in the
Guardian: “Congress intended to allow the intelligence communities to access targeted information for specific investigations.
How can every call that every American makes or receives be relevant to a specific investigation?” As
a
constitutional matter, the Supreme Court has long held that, where an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, search and seizure may
occur only once the government has obtained a warrant, supported by
probable cause and issued by a judge. The warrant must specify the places to be searched and items to
be seized. There are exceptions to the warrant requirement. In 1979 the court held that the use of a pen register to record
numbers dialed from someone’s home was not a search. The court suggested that people who disclose their communications
to others assume the risk that law enforcement may obtain the information. More than three decades later, digitization and the
explosion of social-network technology have changed the calculus. In the ordinary course of life, third parties obtain massive
amounts of information about us that, when analyzed, have much deeper implications for our privacy than before. As for
Section 702 of FISA, the
Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect foreigners from
searches conducted abroad. But it has never recognized a foreign intelligence exception to
the warrant requirement when foreign-targeted searches result in the
collection of vast stores of citizens’ communications. Americans reasonably expect that their
movements, communications and decisions will not be recorded and analyzed by the government. A majority of the Supreme
Court seems to agree. Last year, the court considered a case involving 28-day GPS surveillance. Justice Samuel Alito suggested
that in most criminal investigations, long-term monitoring “impinges on expectations of privacy.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor
recognized that following a person’s movements “reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious,
and sexual associations.” [The FISC is supposed to operate as a check. But it is a secret court, notorious for its low rate of denial.
From 1979 to 2002, it did not reject a single application]. Over the past five years, out of nearly 8,600 applications, only two
have been denied. Congress has an opportunity to create more effective checks on executive power. It could withdraw Sections
215 and 702 and introduce new measures to regulate intelligence collection and analysis. There are many options. James
Madison put it best: “In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this:
you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”