Hard Sell: Defending Kennedy's Civil Rights Record
through Edward R. Murrow's U.S. Information Agency
Gregory M. Tomlin
“It is difficult to sit diplomatically with the man of color abroad or in the United Nations when
we refuse to sit democratically with the man of color at home.” 1
Edward R. Murrow, May 1961
As dusk settled over Montgomery, Alabama, on the evening of Sunday May 21, 1961, a
rowdy crowd of white supremacists clinching rocks and Molotov cocktails surrounded the city’s
First Baptist Church (Colored). Hollering racial obstinacies, their voices quickly rose over those
singing hymns inside the house of worship. Assembled within the sanctuary were a group of
“Freedom Riders” sponsored by the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), who had paused on
their trek through the South to meet with the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. and nearly a
thousand members of his congregation.2 Although window glass shattered across the floor and
smoke thickened the air, the beleaguered occupants did not dare risk fleeing from the protection
of the church’s brick walls. Outside a small band of overwhelmed federal marshals anxiously
awaited the arrival of a battalion of Alabamian National, and together they struggled until the
following morning to disperse the crowd.3
Four days later, in his first public address as director of the United States Information
Agency (USIA), Edward R. Murrow drew attention to the detrimental impact of domestic racial
hatred on the government’s efforts to serve as the model of freedom and democracy for the world.
1
Edward R. Murrow, address before the joint session of the House and Senate of the Missouri Legislature, Jefferson
City, Missouri, May 1, 1961, Folder “ERM, Speeches, 1961,” Box 21, Entry 1069, “Office of the Director,
Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials, 1953-2000,” Record Group 306, “United
States Information Agency,” National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, Maryland; hereafter
cited parenthetically as E1069, RG306, NA.
2
Traveling by bus throughout the South, the Freedom Riders sought to generate a larger public demand that the
federal government enforce the December 1960 Supreme Court ruling in Boynton v. Virginia that declared
segregated interstate bus terminals to be unconstitutional.
3
For a study of the freedom riders, see Raymond Arsenault, Freedom Riders: 1961 and the Struggle for Racial
Justice (New York: Oxford University Press: 2006).
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
Speaking at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, the former journalist warned Americans
against summarily dismissing all foreign media coverage of anti-civil rights activities as
exaggerated communist propaganda. “To some of us the picture of a burning bus in Alabama
may merely represent the speed and competence of a photographer,” he explained, “but to those
of us in the U.S. Information Agency it means that picture will be front-paged tomorrow all the
way from Manila to Rabat.” Turning next to a more local issue, Murrow reminded the
Washingtonians about the pervasive discrimination faced by African diplomats assigned to
missions in the city. “It is bad enough that they read headlines of . . . bus burnings and
beatings,” he suggested, but “it is even worse that they find it near impossible to live in the
capital of our nation.” So as not to be confused with merely espousing official platitudes,
Murrow closed his speech by provoking further national discourse: “This is not something the
Communists did to us. We do it ourselves. . . . Is it possible that we concern ourselves too much
with outer space and far places, and too little with inner space and near places?”4
The national media carried this debate to the headlines and editorials of its newspapers
the following week. A reporter for the Des Moines Register opined, “Americans must realize
that they are in as much danger of losing the cold war in Alabama (or Iowa) as in the Congo or
Laos.”5 Increasingly in the early 1960s, Americans began to understand that domestic and
foreign policy could not be as neatly isolated from one another as the policymakers and
legislators who favored maintaining the racial status quo argued. Fifteen years earlier, with the
advent of the Cold War, President Harry Truman recognized that official rhetoric about
America’s status as “Leader of the Free World” would ring hollow if his administration did not
Edward R. Murrow, address before the National Press Club, Washington, DC, May 25, 1961, Folder “ERM,
Biography, 1964-98,” Box 23, E1069, RG306, NA.
5
“Color in Foreign Affairs,” Des Moines Register, May 28, 1961, Folder “ERM, May 1961,” Box 16, E1069,
RG306, NA.
4
2
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
confront civil rights at home, and he referred to increasing racial tensions as “America’s Achilles
heel.”6 However, neither Truman nor President Dwight Eisenhower actively sought to address
the concerns raised by leaders of the civil rights movement; their response nearly always
stemmed from the explosion of the most scandalous events that demanded some sort of executive
action to ameliorate.7
At every available opportunity, communist propaganda sought to discredit America’s
self-claimed title as model of democracy by emphasizing its racial inequality and highlighting
official measures taken to resist ending the toleration of discrimination against minorities. As
the divide between East and West widened in Europe and emerging Third World nations
compared the benefits of capitalist and communist models, civil rights became a favored topic
for communists to exploit since they “could shine a glaring spotlight on their chief adversary
and, with little effort, point out U.S. hypocrisy for the world to see.”8 Most acutely in the early
1960s, the spasm of national liberation movements in the global south gravely concerned
President John F. Kennedy and significantly influenced how he and his successors determined
the level of American involvement in the Third World.9
6
James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1996), 385; Penny Von Eschen, Race Against Empire: Blacks, Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithica:
Cornell University Press, 2007), 126.
7
Eisenhower considered his deployment of paratroopers to enforce the desegregation of Little Rock Central High
School in September 1957 to be the most “repugnant” order of his eight years in the White House; see Patterson,
413-16. Mary Dudziak argues that the president was not as concerned about improving the plight of African
Americans as he was with preserving the positive image of the United States on the global stage. Speaking publicly
about the incident, Eisenhower explained that he deployed troops in order to “restore the image of America,” saying
nothing about upholding the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. the Board of Education that declared “separate but
equal” to be unconstitutional; see Dudziak, “Birmingham, Addis Ababa, and the Image of America: International
Influence on U.S. Civil Rights Politics in the Kenney Administration,” Windows of Freedom: Race, Civil Rights,
and Foreign Affairs, Brenda Gayle Plummer, ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 183.
8
Paul Gordon Lauren, “Seen from the Outside: The International Perspective on America’s Dilemma,” Window of
Freedom, 34.
9
John L. S. Girling, America and the Third World: Revolution and Intervention (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1980), 134.
3
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
Responsibility for defending the rationale behind the Kennedy administration’s domestic
and foreign policies to people around the world fell on USIA to accomplish through the
dissemination of radio and print propaganda, as well as cultural exchanges and traveling
exhibitions. Some historians dismiss propaganda as a primary source for uncovering the
mentalities of a society since lofty rhetoric often ignores or dilutes the negative aspects of the
collective’s culture, mentalities, and policies. However, Michael Hunt argues that public rhetoric
offers historians a trove of material that reveal the recurrent themes and values shared by the
society responsible for crafting the messages, even if its members fail to live up to them.10
Accordingly, messages about the progress and opportunities of African Americans broadcasted
on USIA’s Voice of America (VOA) were not exactly fabrications but, rather, representations of
what many within American society believed to be the tenets of their national ideology.
Propaganda is a critical component of public diplomacy, a term coined in 1965 by
Edmund Gullion, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.11
Nicholas Cull defines public diplomacy as “an international actor’s attempt to conduct its foreign
policy by engaging with foreign publics” through five core components: listening, advocacy,
cultural diplomacy, exchange diplomacy, and international broadcasting.12 While traditional
diplomacy centered on a government-to-government relationship typically conducted in secret,
public diplomacy emerged as a government-to-people mode of communication that necessitated
a level of transparency unprecedented for diplomats prior to the Cold War.13
10
Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 15.
Crocker Snow, Jr., “Public Diplomacy Practitioners: A Changing Cast of Characters,” Readings on Public
Diplomacy, The Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Tufts University, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/murrow/readings/aboutpd.html.
12
Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public
Diplomacy, 1945-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), xv.
13
Walter Joyce, The Propaganda Gap (New York: Harber and Row, 1963), 57-58.
11
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Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
Creation of USIA in 1953 as the government’s principle agency for public diplomacy
optimally provided the United States with the capacity to minimize “the danger of inadequate
definition” of its policies and actions until the agency’s closure in 1999.14 Cull considers USIA
the first global agency with the capacity to disseminate information before any private company
could afford to on its own, as witnessed in the age of the Internet and twenty-four hour satellite
news. It could be argued that the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) already provided this;
however, the British service was restricted to radio and television while USIA designed traveling
exhibits, built libraries, and published a variety of print material. Cull further adds that
international communications or intercultural relations are not purely modes of public diplomacy
until they “become the subject of an international actor’s policy.”15 This occurred when USIA
collected feedback on its messages and conducted surveys to assess international opinions of the
United States. Occasionally the tabulated results of these studies convinced members of
presidential administrations to respond more aggressively to domestic ills cited by foreign critics
as the source of their disillusion with the American government.16
Mary Dudziak argues that civil rights reform occurred for myriad reasons, but during the
Cold War it was particularly advanced by a desire to “make credible the government’s argument
about race and democracy.”17 By focusing on the civil rights events that captivated international
audiences during this 1960s, she shows how many federal reforms occurred as components of
the government’s Cold War strategy. Dudziak affirms that Kennedy had a civil rights agenda,
14
Wilson P. Dizard, The Strategy of Truth: The Story of the U.S. Information Service (Washington, DC: Public
Affairs Press, 1961), 26. The most comprehensive study of USIA during the Cold War is Cull’s work. For a study
of VOA during the same period, see Alan L. Heil, Jr., Voice of America: A History (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2003).
15
Cull, xiv-xvi.
16
Jarol Manheim explains how public diplomacy has become less of an art and more of “an applied transnational
science of human behavior” in Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of
Influence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
17
Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2000), 14.
5
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
only “its priorities were not always the priorities of the movement.”18 However, the dramatic
actions taken by members of the civil rights movement and the heinous counteractions of their
opponents generated headlines and international interest that forced the administration and, to a
lesser extent, Congress, to confront institutional racism as a moral injustice. More assertively
than Dudziak, Thomas Borstelmann considers foreign Cold War pressures responsible for slowly
transforming American society from one based on hierarchies of race and gender into one free of
legalized discrimination.19
Edward R. Murrow understood the inextricable connection between civil rights and
national security. In 1957 he had covered the Central High School standoff from Little Rock for
the Columbia Broadcasting Network (CBS). During his televised editorial, he opined that the
passage of a civil rights bill would create the greatest good for U.S. foreign policy since the
Marshall Plan.20 Throughout the duration of the curtailed Kennedy administration, policymakers
could not escape the dominating issue of race in public diplomacy. Nevertheless, Kennedy
resisted pressuring Congress to create civil rights legislation for the first two years of his
presidency, and his national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, did not open a dossier on civil
rights within the files of the National Security Council (NSC) until June 11, 1963, the date
Kennedy expressly called for civil rights legislation in a nationally-televised address spurred by
riots in Birmingham, Alabama the month prior.21
Despite the importance of the relationship between public diplomacy and Cold War
foreign policy, the efforts of USIA and Murrow to defend the federal government’s response to
18
Ibid., 156.
Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 268-69.
20
Murrow, CBS broadcast, September 10, 1957, In Search of Light: The Broadcasts of Edward R. Murrow, 19381961, Edward Bliss, Jr., ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967), 310.
21
The civil rights folders within the Kennedy administration’s National Security Council files span June 11 to
November 8, 1963; see Box 295A, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Columbia Point,
Boston, Massachusetts; hereafter cited parenthetically as NSF, JFKPL.
19
6
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
the civil rights movement during the Kennedy administration has been largely overlooked or
assessed in isolation from one another in studies on Murrow, Kennedy, and the civil rights
movement. Murrow is never mentioned in the Kennedy administration chapter of Dudziak’s
Cold War Civil Rights; neither does Borstelmann examine the contributions of USIA in The Cold
War and the Color Line.22 Cull is critical of Murrow’s tenure with USIA, opining that he cared
more about the appearance of truth in agency programming than the substance of truth.23
Biographies on Murrow provide scant analysis of his three-year tenure at USIA. Certainly the
bulk of any life history on the celebrated journalist should to focus on his twenty-five year career
with CBS, particularly his radio broadcasts from London during the Blitz and his efforts to
challenge Joseph McCarthy on his television program, See It Now. Nevertheless, none of the
authors of the three major works on Murrow’s life that have appeared since 1969 seriously
examine his USIA director files housed in the National Archives and the Kennedy Library. 24
By accepting the thesis posited by Dudziak and Borstelman’s about the centrality of Cold
War pressures on propelling civil rights reform in the United States, it seems appropriate to
closely examine Murrow’s contributions to the formation of American public diplomacy. As a
senior government official, he struggled to deal with rising racial violence amidst international
tensions exacerbated by Nikita Khrushchev, the crises in Cuba, and the emergence of dozens of
newly independent states. This paper relies heavily on USIA documents and Murrow’s personal
papers to examine one of the most internationally visible arms of the U.S. government that
deserves greater scrutiny by scholars of Murrow and Cold War public diplomacy.
USIA is cited only once in the index of Borstalmann’s work, and Murrow’s name does not appear at all.
Nicholas J. Cull, “‘The Man Who Invented Truth’: The Tenure of Edward R. Murrow as Director of the United
States Information Agency during the Kennedy Years,” Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History,
Rana Mitter and Patrick Major, eds. (London: Frank Cass, 2004).
24
Alexander Kendrick, Prime Time: The Life of Edward R. Murrow (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969);
Ann M. Sperber, Murrow: His Life and Times (New York: Freundlich, 1986); and Joseph E. Persico, Edward R.
Murrow: An American Original (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988).
22
23
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Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
In Pursuit of a More Credible Image
By 1961 the USIA faced two challenges to its credibility, one at home and another abroad.
Many Americans found the agency ineffectual at the close of the Eisenhower administration,
particularly because of incriminating charges posed by Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy
during the height of the Red Scare against “subversive” VOA broadcasters and the “proCommunist” librarians employed by the International Information Agency of the State
Department, the precursor to USIA, in its overseas libraries.25 Regardless of the Senate’s 1954
censure of McCarthy, the perception of USIA seven years later remained poor, evidenced by the
trivialization of its public image and the unapologetic slashing of its budget by Congress.
A week after Kennedy’s inauguration The New York Times assessed the agency’s service
as deplorable: “no country ever had a better story to tell or failed so lamentably to tell it well as
the United States in the sixteen years since the end of the war. . . . [USIA] has been a spectacular
disappointment from beginning to end.” The writer, James Reston, speculated that the failure
may not have rested with the directors of the agency but, rather, with Eisenhower and John
Foster Dulles, his secretary of state, for failing to include the USIA director in formulating
foreign policy. “This separation of policy and propaganda is the heart of the problem,” Reston
argued before suggesting that Kennedy could rectify the problem by making his director a
member of the NSC.26 In a widely printed editorial, an anonymous author called for USIA’s
involvement in White House deliberations: “When the policies are framed, an expert in the
molding and shaping of world opinion should be sitting in, and not merely as an observer.”27
25
Richard M. Fried, Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press,
1990), 136; and Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1998), 256-57.
26
James Reston, “Policy and Propaganda – Murrow’s Assignment,” The New York Times, January 29, 1961, Folder
“ERM, January 1961,” Box 15, E1069, RG306, NA.
27
Anonymous editorial appearing in numerous newspapers, “More than Job of ‘Telling,’” February 7, 1963, Folder
“ERM, February 1961,” Box 15, E1069, RG306, NA.
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Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
Kennedy believed that, by selecting Murrow as USIA director, he would have a highly
respected American figure who could apply his personal charisma to improve the perception and
capabilities of the beleaguered agency at home and abroad. In a personal letter, Kennedy told
William Benton that he was excited about Murrow’s imminent arrival in Washington: “We are
looking for great things from him and the USIA.”28 When Kennedy’s press secretary, Pierre
Salinger, confirmed on January 28, 1961 that Murrow had accepted the president’s nomination
for USIA director, most national newspapers hailed Murrow an excellent choice for “this sort of
interpretative, even evangelistic assignment.”29 Acclaimed for his moral courage, many
journalists speculated in their columns that Murrow would carry this quality to USIA, lending
international credence to American foreign policy.30 Influential members within the
administration also approved of the selection, including Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles
who encouragingly assured Murrow that he would “make an enormous contribution to our
foreign policy in these next few years.”31
Appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for his confirmation hearing
on March 14, 1961, Murrow sought to immediately identify himself with USIA, referring to “us”
and “we” in the agency. “All of us in the Agency,” he explained, “recognize that in spite of
electronic developments, the best form of communications is still face-to-face.” He opposed the
use of heavy-handed propaganda along the lines used by the Soviets and Chinese, advocating
instead for the skillful persuasion of the international audience. “Freedom cannot be imposed,”
Letter, Kennedy to William Benton, February 18, 1961, Folder “FG 296/A, Executive,” Box 184, White House
Central Subject File, Federal Government – Organizations; hereafter cited parenthetically as WH CSF, FGO, JFKPL.
29
Press clippings, Folder “ERM, January 1961,” Box 15, E1069, RG306, NA.
30
Press clippings, Folder 5, “Biographical Material, Clippings, 1960-65,” Box 10, Edward R. Murrow Papers,
Mount Holyoke Archive, Dwight Hall, Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Massachusetts; hereafter cited
parenthetically as ERMP, MHA.
31
Letter, Chester Bowles to Murrow, January 11, 1961, Folder “1961, A-G,” Box 26, Edward R. Murrow Papers,
Tufts University Archive, Tisch Library, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts; hereafter cited parenthetically
as ERMP, TUA.
28
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Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
he opined, “it must be sought for, and frequently fought for.”32 Arkansas Senator J. William
Fulbright, the committee chairman, asked Murrow if he had any initial recommendations for
improving the agency. Murrow emphasized the need for the agency’s headquarters to become
more flexible in supporting the unique requirements and requests of individual country posts,
improving the signal strength of VOA, and carefully analyzing the audience and purpose of
every film production. For these reasons, Murrow told the committee that he planned to request
an increase in funding in his first budget request.33
Based on Murrow’s well know documentaries on farming and migrant workers, some of
the committee members raised concern that as director, he would have USIA focus more on the
controversial aspect of American society in lieu of propagating its strong points. Iowa Senator
Bourke B. Hickenlooper voiced his concern that such an approach defied good salesmanship.
Who, he wondered, would try to sell a machine by pointing out its deficiencies? Specifically, he
pointed to the recognized success of communist propaganda which completely omitted the abject
failures of its own system, from totalitarianism and human rights violations to lower standards of
living and depressed economies. Murrow reminded the committee that the CBS investigative
stories, which they referred to, were produced for a domestic audience, and in targeting a foreign
one, he intended for USIA to focus on emphasizing the desirable and progressive aspects of
America. However, he noted that controversial national debates needed to be discussed as well;
it was a matter of “editorial balance” to present the truth: “One of our dilemmas arises from the
fact that we are operating . . . an open pluralistic society, where we cannot conceal our
32
Statement by Edward R. Murrow at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing Regarding His Nomination
as Director, USIA, March 14, 1961, Folder “ERM Nomination to be the Director, USIA, 1961,” Box 14, E1069,
RG306, NA.
33
Nominations of Edward R. Murrow and Donald M. Wilson, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate, March 14, 1961, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), Folder “ERM
Nomination to be the Director, USIA, 1961,” Box 14, E1069, RG306, NA.
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Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
difficulties or our controversies, even though we would like, and if we do not report them
responsibility and accurately, they will be reported by other sources and, perhaps, distorted.”34
This remained one of Murrow’s primary rebuttals to Congressional or public criticism
during his tenure as director about how his agency incorporated controversial discussions into
informational programming. If a USIA film or VOA broadcast did not present a view of
something like the civil rights movement, the agency allowed independent journalists and
foreign propagandists to present a distorted picture with no U.S. rebuttal. Murrow maintained
that presenting unsavory details about America society not only worked towards establishing and
securing the credibility that he hoped his agency could establish; it was also about providing the
most convincing scoop in order to counter competing medias.
Settling in as director, Murrow told his staff that he believed the agency had two roles,
both slightly different from its original charter under the Eisenhower administration. It needed to
not merely inform but persuade foreign audiences about the merits of the America way of life
and its policies, and it needed to provide the president with expert advice on how emerging
policy would influence foreign opinion.35 As a critical task, Murrow wanted USIA to establish
long-term strategic objectives and resist living in the present like a traditional news agency. In
an internal memo prepared in May 1961, Murrow outlined that “we need long-range planning
with a full recognition that the principle of flexibility must always apply.” The agency would
always need to react to explosive stories and counter communist propaganda; however, from the
beginning of his tenure as director Murrow knew that effective public diplomacy required the
delivery of a sustained, albeit dynamic, message. Flexibility, coupled with an established
strategic end state, would improve the chances of success: “We must be able to take the broad
34
Ibid.
Thomas C. Sorensen, The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda (New York: Harper & Row, 1968),
141.
35
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Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
general outlines of foreign policy, resolve the inconsistencies to the point that they are
explainable, and then proceed in a thoughtful but flexible manner to pursue the aims and
objectives which we seek.”36
Murrow believed that platitudes insufficiently promulgated America’s message to the
world. He reminded the House Appropriations Subcommittee that funding for his agency went
beyond paying for broadcasts: “An information problem must be much more than a
compendium of words. It must go to and become part of the people it is trying to reach.”37 He
also demanded greater cooperation between the various branches of USIA, including the film,
exhibition, and book divisions, and VOA. In a memorandum to his staff, Murrow specified their
obligation to synchronize efforts with one another in order to ensure their “maximum
effectiveness” as the psychological instrument of U.S. foreign policy.38 Being particularly
sensitive to the mentalities of diverse Third World audiences, Murrow tried to justify his request
for a larger budget before the House Appropriations Subcommittee just one week after his
confirmation: “In emphasizing programs in the newly emerging and less-developed areas, the
Agency intends to use its information tools and techniques to show the peoples of those areas the
parallels between the American revolutionary heritage, American aims and motivations, and
their own aspirations.”39
The distribution of propaganda, Murrow emphasized need not be a nefarious pursuit, and
he shared this view with a reporter from the Miami Herald: “I don’t mind being called a
Memorandum, Murrow to Turner B. Shelton, subj: “Proposal by Stuart Schulberg,” May 17, 1961, Folder “ERM,
Memorandum and Correspondence, 1961-63,” Box 18, E1069, RG306, NA.
37
Murrow, Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives,
March 14, 1962, Folder “ERM, Presidential Statements, 1953-63,” Box 14, E1069, RG306, NA.
38
Memorandum, Murrow to Staff, April 22, 1963, Folder “USIA, General, 1/61-6/61,” Box 290, NSF, JFKPL.
39
Murrow, Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives,
March 27, 1961, Folder “ERM, Presidential Statements, 1953-63,” Box 14, E1069, RG306, NA.
36
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Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
propagandist.”40 Speaking with another journalist Murrow opined, “We [in USIA] operate on
the assumption that everything we do is subject to comparison. . . . In order to be credible,
you’ve got to be complete.”41 Writing to agency employees, Murrow reminded them that “truth
is the best propaganda.”42 Murrow acknowledged the difference between the American image
and the nation’s ideals, and he required subordinates to focus on portraying the latter because
that would reflect the continuing evolution of American society and democracy. Speaking
directly about the growing tensions surrounding the civil rights movement, he reminded the
House Appropriations Subcommittee, “We must never take the attitude that we have reached the
complete and final conclusion in all our problems, social, economic, and political.”43
Garnering congressional support remained the bane of Murrow’s directorship. During
annual budget hearings, Murrow made his case before the subcommittee chaired by
Congressman John J. Rooney from Brooklyn. Biographer Joseph Persico colorfully notes that
“if the USIA was treated like the bastard at a family reunion, Rooney was the mean-spirited
stepfather.”44 The representative’s distain for foreign outreach made him a curious chairman of
the committee responsible for the budgets of both State Department and USIA. During
Murrow’s first appearance to March 1961, the two sparred over each new expansion to the
budget, with Rooney appearing incredulous to every addition. When Murrow explained that he
wanted to open a library in Kuwait, a leading national oil supplier, the congressman stopped the
director, asking, “Ku-what?”45 Rooney slashed the budget proposal, infuriating Murrow.
Murrow, quoted in Philip Meyer, “How U.S. Is Getting Its Message Abroad,” The Miami Herald, April 29, 1962,
Folder “ERM, January-June 1962,” Box 17, E1069, RG306, NA.
41
Arthur Herzog, “A Visit with Edward R. Murrow,” Think, October 1962, Folder “ERM, July-December 1962,”
Box 17, E1069, RG306, NA.
42
Murrow, “Director Spells out USIA Philosophy to House Group,” USIA Correspondent, Aril 1963, Folder “ERM,
April 1963,” Box 17, E1069, RG306, NA.
43
Murrow, Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, March 27, 1963.
44
Persico, 478.
45
John J. Rooney, quoted in Persico, 479.
40
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Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
Congress remained unconvinced that the United States needed to spend significant
money to sell itself abroad. Perhaps, if Murrow served under President Lyndon Johnson in 1968,
the general consensus would be different, but, prior to the quagmire of Vietnam and the eruption
of communist revolutions in the global south, many American elites did not question their
country’s greatness. Mindful of America’s moral victory in defeating fascism in World War II,
many in Congress considered communist to be monolithically evil and assumed that the rest of
the world agreed with them. Murrow’s efforts to raise domestic support was bound to be
constrained by this mentality, and it was inevitable that he would also face a certain degree of
wariness from policymakers within the Kennedy administration, particularly when Murrow
advocated for selling the “truth” about the civil rights movement.
The truth, nonetheless, remained a mercurial term during the Kennedy administration,
particularly concerning how to respond to the civil rights movement and explain the rationale for
both action and inaction. Senior members of the Kennedy administration argued over the
importance of civil rights in formulating public policy and public diplomacy. Just as Murrow
experienced apathy, if not downright antipathy, from Congress, domestic policy advisors
recognized that in 1961 the Democratic Congress would not support robust civil rights
legislation. However, policymakers routinely weighed the impact of inaction against their
strategy for winning the Cold War.
From 1946 through the mid-1960s, the U.S. government explained the speed of civil
rights reform as a “natural” American process that should not be rushed or condemned:
“democratic change, however slow and gradual, was superior to dictatorial imposition.”46 Early
USIA publications wrote starkly about slavery, not to shock foreigners about how such an evil
institution once thrived in the United States, but to indicate that the American people accepted
46
Cold War Civil Rights, 13.
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Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
the free exchange of ideas and history while communists skewed versions of their own.
Secondly, by detailing the story of nineteenth-century slavery, readers were encouraged to view
contemporary minority struggles as a sign of progress.47
Kennedy’s dilemma became more complex, however, because demonstrations at home
coincided with dozens of African colonies gaining their independence. By 1961 the African
continent rapidly began to transform into a collage of nation-states which eased the diplomatic
burden of the United States from having to tolerate the colonial administration of Africa by its
European allies in order to ensure their continued support in NATO. Nevertheless, independence
did not guarantee that emerging African nations would join the anticommunist bloc, and failure
to promote tolerance at home threatened to turn emerging African states away from siding with
the West in the Cold War. Kennedy faced a delicate challenge at home: in order to encourage
gradual change to de facto segregation, he needed to temper the efforts of civil rights advocates
in order to minimize their provocation of white supremacists responsible for the heinous acts that
captured the attention of inquiring Africans.48
Although several fledgling states claimed to pursue a nonaligned existence, many
analysts at the CIA and State Department doubted the feasibility of a newly-independent African
state to remain nonaligned. The advisors remained convinced that if the United States failed to
support and nurture them, then surely the Soviets or Chinese would encroach to establish
communist governments, just as they bankrolled the North Vietnamese support for the Viet Cong
47
One such pamphlet published in 1950 was The Negro in American Life; see Cold War Civil Rights, 50-51.
Tapes of Oval Office conversations reveal that while Kennedy recognized the wrongs committed by American
citizens against African Americans, he grew frustrated with civil rights leaders for failing to appreciate the popular
and political opposition to advancing legislative reform. In their compilation book of tape transcripts related to civil
rights, Jonathan Rosenberg and Zachary Karabell do not believe that it is fully possible to determine whether
Kennedy worried more about correcting a moral wrong or the domestic political ramifications of not dealing with
the worsening issue. “Had Kennedy not believed that the political climate had changed such that ignoring civil
rights was no longer politically feasible,” they argue, “it is difficult to imagine he would have acted as he did;”
Rosenberg and Karabell, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Quest for Justice: The Civil Rights Tapes (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 2003), 14.
48
15
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
in South Vietnam. If the U.S. government did not foster relationships with these states,
Secretary of State Dean Rusk anticipated that Moscow would “make the most of its opportunity
to develop divisions within the free world and to be the champion of the colored races.”49
Borstelmann considers John and Robert Kennedy as “cool-headed pragmatists” who
remained wary of the moral idealism of many of their liberal Democrat friends.50 Evidence of
this can be seen in his policy towards Angola and South Africa. During a period where
independence movements removed the yoke of imperialism from most African nations, Kennedy
chose not to strongly condemn Portuguese colonialism in Angola or apartheid in South Africa for
strategic reasons. Portugal permitted the U.S. Air Force to utilize the Azores as an air base, and
a stable white government in South Africa guaranteed the United States continued access to the
gold mines which stabilized the global capitalist monetary system.51
Harris Wofford, special assistant to the president for civil rights from 1961-62, believed
that Kennedy did not seek to seriously resolve civil rights issues until the violence of 1963
“brought the matter to a head so forcefully that he could not put it aside.”52 Even when Kennedy
did advocate for ending discrimination, Wofford remains critical, arguing that until June 1963
the president delivered public pronouncements or issued executive orders in response to specific
embarrassing occurrences in the South rather than chart a long-term strategy for fundamentally
altering social and political mentalities.
Two of Kennedy’s greatest posthumous champions, Schlesinger and Ted Sorensen,
concede that the president considered civil rights a political issue rather than a moral one until
the violence in Birmingham in 1963. However, they also defend Kennedy’s record by arguing
49
Dean Rusk, quoted in Borstelmann, 136.
Borstelmann, 138.
51
Ibid., 150-54.
52
Harris Wofford, Of Kennedys and Kings: Making Sense of the Sixties (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1980) 103.
50
16
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
that as a pragmatist, the president recognized that he would fail to convince a majority in
Congress to support such legislation. Having observed the failure of a proposed civil rights law
to pass the Senate in 1957, Kennedy “had read the arithmetic” of the new Congress and decided
to rely on executive orders as the only viable alternative to doing nothing at all.53 Historian
James Patterson contends that Kennedy defended his conservative policy agenda during the first
two years of his administration by reminding critics he did not receive a mandate in 1960.54
While Kennedy selectively utilized his executive power to correct certain aspects of
institutional racism, Murrow faced the challenge of defending the president’s civil rights policy
to the world. The director encouraged his journalists and public affairs officers to discuss the
challenges central to the domestic debate in their international discourse.
In a Redbook
magazine interview, Murrow argued that the chances of increasing national security only came
through outreach and not ignoring the unpleasant issues, to include a discussion on racism.55
“We cannot be effective in telling the American story abroad,” he reaffirmed after leaving office
in 1964, “if we tell it only in superlatives.”56
Conscious of the value of film, particularly in countries with high illiteracy rates, Murrow
expressed surprise when he learned that his agency had never produced a documentary on the
ordinary life of an African American.57 In his first full month as director, he tasked the agency’s
53
Arthur, Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Muffin,
1965), 930; and Theodore C Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 255-56. In his second memoir,
written nearly forty years after the first, Sorensen provides a less favorable portrayal. Sorensen calls Kennedy
“slow” to respond to the immoral problem of racial discrimination in America; it was not considered a high priority
during his tenure in the Senate, and a civil rights agenda was nonexistent during the first year of the presidential
administration; see Sorensen, Counselor: A Life at the Edge of History (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), 270-71.
54
Congress rejected Kennedy proposals for public health insurance and the creation of an Urban Affairs
Department, indicating that it would be impossible to secure approval for civil rights legislation; see Patterson, 466.
55
Murrow, quoted in “American Reality,” Redbook, February 1961, p. 96, Folder “ERM, February 1961,” Box 15,
E1069, RG306, NA.
56
Murrow, quoted in Jean White, “Luster Rubbed off on USIA,” The Washington Post, March 15, 1964, Folder
“ERM January-June 1964,” Box 17, E1069, RG306, NA.
57
Letter, Murrow to Morris Ernst, March 28, 1961, Folder “ERM, Memorandum and Correspondence, 1961-63,”
Box 18, E1069, RG306, NA.
17
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
film division to produce a documentary on the work of the Civil Rights Commission, a
congressional organization that he deemed “completely bi-partisan in nature.”58 In August he
approved production for a second documentary focused on African Americans entitled, The
Negro American – A Progress Report” In lieu of celebrating enormously successful African
Americans, Murrow wanted to depict average citizens and avoid mentioning incidents of racial
violence. The removal of images from Little Rock or Birmingham would, he believed, not create
an “exciting picture but . . . a more or less calm presentation of the facts as they exist regarding
the progress of the American Negro and not an appeal to the emotions on this subject.”59
This desire to present a “calm presentation” did not bode well with many proponents of a
more robust civil rights movement who expected USIA to explain to the world the intent behind
the dramatic demonstrations budding across the United States. However, Murrow seemed
careful not to fuel policy fires that Kennedy sought to avoid. There would be occasions when the
agency would focus on the movement, evidenced by the Civil Rights Commission documentary.
However, the agency also focused on more urbane topics in an effort to provide the balance that
Murrow envisioned. He continued to value the “jazz ambassadors” and cultural performances
that enjoyed tremendous success during the 1950s, and he reminded the president that the United
States was the only nation to “export its underprivileged” to demonstrate certain aspects of
American culture.60
Even if many Americans continued to disagree with Murrow’s method for presenting
civil rights in its propaganda, a complementary problem emerged that threatened to disgust new
Memorandum, Murrow to Turner B. Shelton, June 12, 1961, Folder “ERM, Memorandum and Correspondence,
1961-63,” Box 18, E1069, RG306, NA.
59
Memorandum, Murrow to Shelton, August 21, 1961, Folder “ERM, Memorandum and Correspondence, 196163,” Box 18, E1069, RG306, NA.
60
Memorandum, Murrow to Kennedy, March 21, 1961, Folder “USIA, 1960-5/61,” Box 91, POF, JFKPL. For a
study of 1950s jazz ambassadors, see Penny M. Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play
the Cold War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).
58
18
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
African states: discrimination against African diplomats assigned to Washington, DC. Refusals
to rent houses to diplomats, to seat them in restaurants, or to permit them to use highway rest
stops between Washington and New York City, voiced an alarmed Murrow, could “lose us as
much influence as anything the Soviets might do.” This concern was central to his speech at the
National Press Club on May 1961. The actions of Americans towards Africans contradicted the
policy expectations delivered in Africa by American diplomats: “We would have them join our
company of honorable men in defending against encroachment of our dedication to dignity and
freedom. But it is a dignity to which we will not fully admit them.”61 Life magazine
documented a typical prejudicial incident to occur during the first year of the Kennedy
administration. When a reporter asked a waitress working at a Washington diner why she
refused to serve the Chad ambassador to the United States, she replied, “He looked like just an
ordinary run of the mill nigger to me. I couldn’t tell he was an ambassador.”62
Murrow raised the issue of discrimination against African diplomats while appearing on
Eleanor Roosevelt’s television program, Prospects of Mankind. “Unless and until we can
demonstrate in this country a broadening and abiding concern for equality and justice under the
law,” he argued before a national audience, “we are not going to be able to convince people
abroad that we in this country are by example doing what we are urging them to do” When
prodded by another guest to say whether discussing racism through USIA media would hurt
America’s image, Murrow flatly rejected the suggestion, insisting that telling the truth caused
less damage to America’s image than by obfuscating the critical domestic issue. Mrs. Roosevelt
61
62
Murrow, speech before the National Press Club, May 24, 1961.
“Big Step Ahead on a High Road,” Life, December 8, 1961, 32-33.
19
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
agreed, concluding her program by commenting, “We cannot do good propaganda unless we
have something good on which to base it.”63
In a report sent to the House Education and Labor Committee in June 1961, Murrow cited
racial violence as outweighing the value of USIA programming. World-wide headlines
presenting a “stark picture” of Freedom Riders being jailed and assaults against African
Americans overwhelmed “the attempts of serious and well-informed foreign journalists to put
events in perspective,” let alone USIA news forums.64 Appearing before the committee, Murrow
explained, “We cannot make good news out of bad practice.”65 Even if objective journalists
attempted to explain the larger American story or national objections to state-level violence, it
was impossible for such reporting to gain as much notice as the shocking photos that preceded
the headlines or to counter embellished anti-U.S. editorials. USIA researchers found that Soviet
and Chinese broadcasts directed to the Third World devoted considerable time to editorials on
the “rampant racism” found in America.66
When considering the plight of African Americans, Murrow’s concerns were broader
than the consequences of policy in terms of international public opinion. Beyond the strategic
necessity for correcting the racial divide in the United States, Murrow made it clear that he
hoped to see improvements for moral reasons as well. He explained to the House Education and
Labor Committee: “I think it would be a mistake to base our action against discrimination
mainly on the ground that our image abroad is being hurt. We should attack this problem
Transcript, “America’s Propaganda Capabilities,” Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt: Prospects of Mankind, May 26, 1961,
Folder “ERM, Television Appearances, 1961,” Box 21, E1069, RG306, NA.
64
Murrow, quoted in anonymous, “Dixie Violence Dealt U.S. Sharp Blow, Murrow Says,” The Louisville Times,
June 24, 1961, Folder “ERM, Biography, 1964-98,” Box 23, E1069, RG306, NA.
65
Murrow, quoted by David Lawrence, “U.S. ‘Image’ Abroad,” Philadelphia Bulletin, June 26, 1961, Folder “ERM,
June 1961,” Box 16, E1069, RG306, NA.
66
“Murrow Says Race Violence Hurts U.S. Image Abroad,” Philadelphia Bulletin, June 25, 1961, Folder “ERM,
June 1961,” Box 16, E1069, RG306, NA.
63
20
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
because it is right that we do so. To do otherwise, whatever the overseas reaction might be,
would violate the very essence of what our country stands for.”67
Recognizing the international backlash to the perceived lethargy to American reform,
Murrow released a memo in November 1961 detailing a reactionary strategy for his agency. He
believed that he could apply tactics from his sparing with McCarthy to counter attacks on
American foreign policy. Chiefly, this entailed speaking directly and openly about the criticism
raised by the opposition, not name-calling but, rather, tempered and rational addresses. Murrow
recommended that Kennedy conduct a series of television talks akin to Roosevelt’s Fireside
Chats for two reasons: the public responded positively to Kennedy, and the president could
inform the public about government initiatives not covered in the international press. Murrow
also recommended ways to saturate a global audience with Kennedy’s message by reproducing
copies in film and print for U.S. Information Service (USIS) facilities, and by encouraging
cabinet members to reiterate the points in their own addresses.68 Further, he called upon the
State Department to hold more press conferences, step-up its production of information
pamphlets, and to require policy officers to be educated to not regard the media as an adversary
but as an enabler. As a career journalist, Murrow believed that international press could be an
ally: “Hard news, consonant naturally with national security, should be made more freely
available, and frequent backgrounders should be given by top officials who can offer intelligent
evaluations of world events.”69
“Negro Leaders Seek Halt in Freedom Ride Testing,” The New York Times, June 25, 1961, Folder “ERM, June
1961,” Box 16, E1069, RG306, NA.
68
USIA was known overseas as USIS. The agency did not go by USIS at home so that it would not be confused
with the U.S. Immigration Service.
69
Memorandum, Murrow to Dean Rusk, subj: “Proposed Campaign to Ensure Public Understanding of United
States Foreign Policy,” November 14, 1961, Folder “ERM, Announcements, 1961,” Box 18, E1069, RG306, NA.
67
21
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
Assessing the application of his recommendations a month later, Murrow observed that
most accomplishments were intangible. Nonetheless, he lauded his agency for working more
seamlessly as a single unit which he likened to having created a “wrist” for the fingers
represented by the various departments such as VOA and the film division.70 Returning from an
inspection tour of USIS facilities in Africa in January 1962, Murrow spoke at a celebration for
the 100th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation where he connected the civil rights
movement to the Civil War: “underlying the issues of slavery was a relationship of status
between black and white. The nation one century later is still engrossed in realigning that
relationship.” Murrow considered the domestic trials at home essential to improving the United
States, not just its international image but also in the quality of life for all of its citizens. He also
hoped that leaders in emerging African countries would appreciate this when choosing a side in
the Cold War: “This land of ours - - born in revolution, tempered in struggle, united in blood,
nurtured amid hope, and seasoned with responsibility - - the rising nations of Africa see more
than just history alone.” Hope and a model for self determination, Murrow believed, was the
image his agency sought to amplify around the world.71
Seeking to better inform the world about the civil rights movement, Murrow directed the
five-volume report published by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in 1961 to be distributed
to every USIS library. He also enlisted the help of African-American celebrities to visit African
countries to speak with common people and the press. In the summer of 1962, for example, poet
Langston Hughes cut the ribbon at the opening of a new USIS library in Accra.72
“The Fight for Men’s Minds,” New York Journal, December 3, 1961, Folder “ERM, December 1961,” Box 17,
E1069, RG306, NA.
71
Murrow, speech before the annual dinner of the Lincoln Group of D.C., Washington, DC, February 10, 1962,
Folder “ERM, Speeches, 1962-1967,” Box 20, E1069, RG306, NA.
72
Murrow, statement before the Subcommittee on Africa Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives,
March 5, 1963, Folder “ERM, March 1963,” Box 17, E1069, RG306, NA.
70
22
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
Although modifications to agency operations occurred in 1961 and 1962, the bulk of the
American populace paid little attention to the calls for social reform made by Murrow. Civil
rights was still not a priority for the administration that was consumed handling other pressing
matters, notably the debate over the nuclear test ban treaty. The effects of the civil rights
movement on the Cold War resurfaced, however, in October 1962 when Kennedy was
confronted with the first major racial riots of his presidency. Foreign interest in the American
South spiked after news stories and images arose concerning rioting in Oxford, Mississippi when
segregationists tried to prevent Air Force veteran James Meredith from enrolling in the
University of Mississippi on October 1. The violence led to the death of one foreign reporter
from the London Daily and injured 166 federal marshals. For the first time in his administration,
Kennedy followed Eisenhower’s precedent from Little Rock and deployed 5,000 troops to
restore order.73 Murrow quickly invited leaders from CORE and the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and Attorney General Kennedy to speak on VOA
about the federal response. Robert Kennedy tried to explain the limits of federal authority:
“What the world saw in Mississippi was a democratic nation putting its house in order. It was
proof of our intent to live not by rule of men but by rule of law.”74
Once the president intervened to enforce Meredith’s enrollment, USIA reported that
foreign media coverage of the violence precipitously diminished. According to the agency’s
research department, those surveyed in Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East lauded the
president’s decision to intervene in the issue of Mississippi’s refusal to abide by federal law.
While coverage may have ended, the damage had been done to USIA’s efforts to provide a
positive view of civil rights progress since Kennedy’s inauguration. Public opinion polls
73
74
Borstelmann, 159.
Robert F. Kennedy, quoted in The Word War, 175.
23
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
conducted by USIS in Africa found the majority of people surveyed recommending that
“education rather than law was required to liquidate racial prejudice” and that the U.S. image
would not improve until this scourge was erased. Indeed, the analysis continued to rank racial
prejudice as the “chief blemish on the image of the American people abroad,” not only by people
residing in communist countries but by those in allied countries as well.75 Buried in the report,
the authors identified an international media trend that would continue to resurface each time
another major dispute emerged between a southern state and the federal government:
“The generally restrained assessments of developments in Mississippi presented in
editorial comments, however were overshadowed by the massive news reporting on the
incident. Despite the factual nature of news coverage based primarily on Western wire
services, the vivid portrayal in news reports and wire photos of the more sensational
aspects on the incident – such as the rioting and bloodshed – may well have left a more
lasting impression on the less palatable aspects of the racial situation in the U.S.”76
Indeed, the president received acclamations for his resolve, but many foreign observers,
especially in Africa, continued to wonder when decisive changes would occur. An editorial in
the Ashanti Pioneer newspaper from Ghana typified African opinion of the matter: “The
University of Mississippi is daily proving to be a disgrace to the United States and to Humanity.
. . . But we must say again that this hatred of another human being because of his skin is a mark
of the brute in the jungle.”77 Still, Kennedy was not prepared to call for civil rights legislation;
USIA Research and Reference Service, Report R-109-62 (A), subj: “Media Comment on the Mississippi Crisis,”
October 5, 1962, Folder “USIA, 7/62-12/62,” Box 91, POF, JFKPL.
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
75
24
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
of the thirty-one major pieces of legislation Kennedy introduced in 1962, none specifically
addressed the issue.78
In their own coverage of Oxford, USIA did not ignore the casualty numbers but
concentrated on explaining the federal response to state resistance. Speaking to an audience in
North Carolina, Murrow defended the necessity of his agency drawing attention to the violence,
in part to place the story within the proper context that the foreign press often sensationalized. In
its own broadcasts, VOA had the capacity “to show the positive virtues of a bad vice, to indicate
that its very isolation highlights the progress this land is making.”79 One of the critical elements
that USIA attempted to clarify was the separation of powers between states and the federal
government. Compared to the centralized government systems adopted by most new states in
Africa, the rights of American states seemed cumbersome to many overseas. For the agency, it
was more than a technical point; it was a crucial element for understanding the perceived lack of
progress. Under Murrow’s guidance, VOA broadcasts and informational pamphlets attempted to
convince their foreign audience that the executive branch of the U.S. government was working as
productively as it could given the limits of its power.
In early 1963 USIA continued to showcase the life of the “typical” African American
through the distribution of a pamphlet entitled “Success Stories from America,” which heralded
the lives of individual blacks who would not typically gain notoriety in the press. Less interested
in countering reports of violence, the pamphlets sought to bring attention to some of the other
nineteen-million African Americans whose families were fully integrated into U.S. society.80
“Summary Description of President’s Major Legislative Proposals,” February 7, 1962, Folder Cabinet Meetings,
2/8/1962, Box 92, POF, JFKPL.
79
Murrow, speech before the 23rd Annual Distinguished Service Award Banquet, Kinston Junior Chamber of
Commerce, Kinston, North Carolina, February 11, 1963, Folder “Speeches, 1961-63,” Box 121, ERMP, TUA.
80
Murrow, statement before the Subcommittee on Africa Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 5, 1963.
78
25
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
Speaking with members of Congress in March 1963, Murrow told them that he was pleased with
the progress made by his agency but recognized that more work needed to be done:
“In my vineyard, given the increased professionalism and effectiveness of USIA, our
desire and need to improve still more, the increased recognition of the role of information
and cultural activities in the conduct of our foreign affairs, and the growing appreciation
of the limitations as well as the potential of this instrument – given these things,
gentlemen, I believe USIA will continue to contribute to increasing measure to the
security of the United States and the development of a peaceful world.”81
However, the view from Murrow’s vineyard darkened two months later when the greatest
incident of racial violence during Kennedy’s presidency exploded onto the headlines of the
international press and communist propaganda.
Birmingham: The Story Heard Around the World
On May 3, 1963 more than 3,000 African Americans, including nearly 1,000 children and
teenagers, organized a civil rights march through the Birmingham, Alabama. With his prison
already teeming, city police chief and white supremacist Theophilus “Bull” Connor ordered his
officers to disperse the peaceful crowd through intimidation and assault. Patterson considers the
violence in Birmingham “pivotal” at home and abroad because it was the first protracted
demonstrated televised live.82 Riveting photographs of police dogs snarling at children and fire
hoses pummeling teenagers quickly appeared on the covers of international newspapers and
communist propaganda. A wave of protests across the United States followed the violence in
Birmingham during the final week of May, indicating that African-American discontent was not
limited to the South. The Justice Department tallied forty-three demonstrations in fifteen states,
81
Murrow, statement before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, House of
Representatives, March 28, 1963, Folder 21, “Broadcasts, etc., 1960-1963,” Box 8 ERMP, MHA.
82
Patterson, 480.
26
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
including sizeable protests in Chicago and Philadelphia. An NAACP spokesman announced that
Los Angeles would be the next “target of a Birmingham style campaign” to end segregation.83
Observing the imagery brought by non-USIA sources to their countries, elites in many
decolonized African states reexamined the fidelity of the American system over the Soviet’s. In
particular, heads of state from the Organization of African Unity met on May 22 in Addis Ababa
to debate uniting with the non-alignment movement. The failure of U.S. public diplomacy to
counter the independent media and communist propaganda threatened to deter nascent African
states from integrating into democratic economic and security alliances.84
The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research reported that, compared to
Meredith’s ordeal the year prior, Soviet broadcasting related to the civil rights violence
multiplied seven fold during the Birmingham riots. It was also nine times greater than during the
Freedom Riders ordeal in May 1961, and eleven times greater than during the Little Rock crisis
of 1957. Soviet propaganda centered on four points: racism is an inevitable part of the capitalist
system; the lethargy of the federal government to respond to segregation demonstrated their
implicitness; it is hypocritical of the United States to call themselves leader of the Free World;
and the treatment of domestic minorities is indicative of what American think of Asians,
Africans, and Latin Americans in their native lands. Curiously, however, the report noted that
while wildly exaggerated stories appeared in Third World newspapers and radio programs, the
tone of the Soviet editorials was surprisingly tame. In Pravda, for instance, “distortion has been
mainly through selectivity of facts and direful ignoring of important factors such as the
separation of federal and state authority.” The analysts hypothesized that rising tensions within
Transcript, Washington Report, CBS, June 2, 1963, Folder “ERM, Memorandum and Correspondence, 1962-63,”
Box 18, E1069, RG306, NA.
84
Cold War Civil Rights, 169-70.
83
27
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
the Soviet Bloc about the treatment of their own ethnic minorities may have led to the somewhat
gentle treatment.85
Perhaps Soviet propagandists feared that if pushed too far, USIA would begin a
counterpropaganda campaign seeking to exacerbate ethnic tensions within the USSR by pointing
out how Moscow oppressed those on the periphery of Russia. The report also considered that the
Soviets worried that the Chinese would use the issue to garner support in the Third World by
calling attention to the Soviet mistreatment of its own minorities. Regardless, Dudziak observes
that Soviet exploitation of American racial prejudices in its own propaganda ensured that the
subject would remain a significant consideration in Cold War foreign policy, and the inability of
policymakers to control the media eventually caused them to support civil rights reform.86
Clearly, the scope of the violence and coverage necessitated a more decisive response by the
administration than ever before.
Kennedy recognized that he needed to pursue a more aggressive civil rights agenda by
calling racism a moral blithe and introducing legislation to end institutional forms of segregation.
He planned to draw attention to the debate in order to show a global audience that democracy
could work to correct serious deficiencies. As his advisors prepared an outline for civil rights
legislation, Kennedy tasked Ted Sorensen to prepare a speech. Not only would the president
present his case to Congress but, also, to the American people. Sorensen recounted the
significance of Birmingham in his first memoir: “And President John Fitzgerald Kennedy,
Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Research memorandum, subj: “Soviet Media
Coverage of Current U.S. Racial Crisis, June 14, 1963, Folder “Civil Rights, 6/11/63 – 6/14/63,” Box 295A, NSF,
JFKPL.
86
Cold War Civil Rights, 250.
85
28
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
recognizing that the American conscience was at last beginning to stir, began laying his own
plans for awakening that conscience o the need for further action.”87
In his televised national address from the Oval Office on June 11, Kennedy reminded his
fellow countrymen that the United States was engaged in a worldwide struggle to “promote and
protect the rights of all who wish to be free.” When he deployed troops to Berlin or Vietnam, he
did not only send white soldiers. “It ought to be possible, therefore,” he argued, “for American
students of any color to attend any public institution they select without having to be backed up
by troops.” He wanted people to stop considering this as a regional issue; it was an American
issue encountered in every city from San Francisco to New York. For the first time publicly, he
also defined the advancement of civil rights as a moral issue, one “as old as the Scriptures and as
clear as the American Constitution.” As in his inaugural address, Kennedy had challenged his
fellow Americans to do more for their country, and on June 11 he specified one of their duties:
“It is not enough to pin the blame on others . . . a great change is at hand, and our task, our
obligation, is to make that revolution, that change, peaceful and constructive for all. Thos who
do nothing are inviting shame as well as violence. Those who act boldly are recognizing rights
as well as reality.”88
Borstelmann observes that Kennedy’s national address was never intended purely for a
national audience; the president directed his message about how he intended to respond to the
domestic “moral crisis” to an international audience as well.89 A cable to all U.S. embassies
encouraged American diplomats to draw responses to questions pertaining to civil right from the
87
Kennedy, 489.
Kennedy, televised speech, the White House, June 11, 1963, Folder “Civil Rights, 6/11/63 – 6/14/63,” Box 295A,
NSF, JFKPL.
89
Borstelmann, 162.
88
29
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
transcripts of the president’s speech.90 Ambassadors to African countries met with presidents
and prime ministers to explain Kennedy’s new policy agenda after June 12. President Kayibanda
of Rwanda responded to a briefing from the American ambassador by suggesting that it would be
“highly regrettable” if Kennedy continued to “play into the hands of anti-American propagandist
especially Soviets and CHICOMS” by failing to be decisive about correcting segregation.91
While the State Department cabled embassies and consulates, VOA broadcasted the
address live worldwide, and USIA radio-teletyped it to 111 posts for distribution to news media.
The three regional USIS printing plants, located in Manila, Beirut, and Mexico City, produced
leaflets with translations of the speech for rapid distribution. USIA’s film department created a
newsreel with speech excerpts that were transported by air to USIS libraries.92
On June 14 Murrow reported to the president that the international press “almost
unanimously” approved of his charge to the American Congress and people. African coverage
was especially favorable. The Nigerian Morning Star hailed Kennedy as the president who “will
go down in history as one of the greatest champions of the rights of man that ever lived,” and the
Oran La Republique opined that “it is certain that segregation will be vanquished finally.”93 The
peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 also lent credibility to the
promises he made in his June 11 address.94
For the first time in a Kennedy administration cabinet meeting, civil rights legislation
appeared as an agenda item on June 19. The proposed bill would require all public
Circular 2143, Dean Rusk to all American diplomatic and consular posts, June 14, 1963, Folder “Civil Rights,
6/11/63 – 6/14/63,” Box 295A, NSF, JFKPL.
91
Cable, U.S. Embassy Kigali to Dean Rusk, June 26, 1963, Folder “Civil Rights, 6/19/63 – 7/9/63,” Box 295A,
JFKP. The folder also contains cables from twelve other ambassadors stationed in Africa.
92
USIA, “20th Review of Operations: January 1 – June 30, 1963,” p. 5, Folder “Reports, 1960-1965,”Box 121,
ERMP, MHA.
93
Memorandum, Murrow to Kennedy, subj: “Reactions to Your June 11 Civil Rights Speech, June 14, 1963, Folder
“USIA, 4/63-6/63,” Box 91, POF, JFKPL.
94
USIA, Research and Reverence Service, Report R-98-63 (R), subj: “Public Opinion trends in Western Europe in
the Wake of the Cuban Crisis,” July 1963, Folder “USIA World Wide Survey, 7/63,” Box 91, POF, JFKPL.
90
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Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
establishments to serve people regardless of race, authorize the federal government to more
aggressively participate in lawsuits to end school segregation, and offer greater protection for
voters. During the meeting Kennedy tapped his brother to present the legislation.95 The
president told African-American leaders that, on account of taking a stance, “this issue could cost
me the election, but we’re not turning back.”96 The same day, speaking before an Advertisers
Federation of America convention, Murrow insisted that USIA “must reach the African, setting
forth U.S. policy in terms the African can understand and appreciate.”97
While the cabinet convened, USIA’s Research and Reference Service released a report on
the “Recent Worldwide Comment on the U.S. Racial Problem.” Polls taken in preparation for
the report identified Kennedy’s June 11 address as decisively turning popular opinion in Africa
towards the president, instilling a belief that the administration was determined to fight for
reform and saw the challenge as a moral issue: “The Administration’s move toward a solution to
the civil rights problem elicited widespread acclaim and support in media comment through the
free world. . . . The Administration has established firmly the impression that it is dedicated to
achieving racial equality in the U.S.” African media highlighted the president’s “courage” and
“firmness in the face of political risks,” and some even compared Kennedy to Lincoln.
However, the analysts were cautious and noted the “strong note of skepticism” that indicated that
if permanent corrections to segregation did not occur, the favorable views of the administration
could easily reverse. Negative views often affiliated American racism with South African
apartheid, and strong military ties between the United States and South Africa increased
suspicion over America’s true intention in Africa. In addition, African reaction from the outset
“Suggested Agenda for the Cabinet Meeting, Wednesday, June 19, 1963 at 10:00 a.m.,” June 17, 1963, Folder
“Cabinet Meetings, 7/26/62 – 9/23/63,” Box 92, POF, JFKPL.
96
Kennedy, 506.
97
Murrow, speech before the 59th Annual Convention, Advertising Federation of America, Atlanta, Georgia, June
19, 1963, Folder ERM, May-June 1963, Box 17, E1069, RG306, NA.
95
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Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
had been largely emotional and displayed little interest in or understanding of legal questions and
the American constitutional system. They did not care about statutory separations of power
limiting federal management of state governments; they only cared about ameliorating the plight
of their “dark brothers” in the United States.98
The Elusive Balance of Truth
While demonstrating a degree of forwardness in addressing major incidents of racial
violence via USIA news sources, Murrow did not encourage his agency to draw attention to
every single act of violence. Rather, he wanted his journalists to only discuss what other
overseas sources discussed in their papers and programs. A limited “official use” memo
prepared by John Pauker of the agency’s office of policy on July 26, 1963 described how VOA
and other agency news sources would report acts of racial violence: “Local disturbances which
are not likely to be exploited abroad should not be reported. Our positive emphases are intended
to keep the national goal in sight - - even when other sources of information, however motivated
in their reporting of developments, tend to obscure that goal.” Murrow approved circulation of
the document, scrolling in long-hand on his personal copy, “John Pauker – This is very good
paper. ERM.”99
The strategy outlined in this paper seems less duplicitous when considering the
skepticism and confusion encountered by the agency’s overseas audience. Pauker cites three
specific challenges: a “genuine misunderstanding” by foreigners to the complexities of
American society; commercial media dwelling on “sensational developments” while overlooking
the nonviolent, legal aspects of the movement; and “deliberate distortion by our enemies [to
USIA, Research and Reference Service, Report R-135-63 (A), “Recent Worldwide Comment on the U.S. Racial
Problem,” July 19, 1963, Folder “Civil Rights, 6/19/63 – 7/9/63,” Box 295A, NSF, JFKPL.
99
Emphasis in original text; USIA, News Policy Note No. 28-63, subj: “Civil Rights and Race Relations,” July 26,
1963, Folder “ERM, T.V., Radio Requests, 1963,” Box 22, E1069, RG306, NA.
98
32
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
foment] an impression of pervasive injustice and intolerance in the United States.” The positive
emphasis in the agency’s coverage of racial issues was not intended to “gloss over negative
developments” but, instead, Pauker argues, to counter the misinform foreigners received that
created a skewed view of the United States.100
The policy staffer articulated the agency’s mission: “Our essentially corrective task is to
do everything possible to offset the effect of distortions and misrepresentations, dispel
misunderstandings born of ignorance, incomplete information and oversimplification, and thus,
where possible, obtain sympathetic understanding and support of interested nations for the
national government’s civil rights efforts.” Recognizing, as Murrow frequently said in his public
addresses, that the civil rights movement was not ephemeral, Pauker provided a “secondary
corrective task” for the agency’s news division. In lieu of apologizing for incidents where state
or local authorities frustrated the efforts of civil rights leaders, he wanted the journalists to
explain the protests, sit-ins, and demonstrations as “inevitable by-products” of a democratic
society learning to become more tolerant and supportive of equal rights for all its citizens.101
Pauker assessed the impact of Kennedy’s June 11 televised address to the nation, where
the president directed “full and active Administration support” to advance the movement. He
knew that many well-meaning agency journalists would want to concentrate on the struggles and
progress in the months ahead, but Pauker worried that they would muddle their message that
American society was growing more tolerant if they threw every aspect of the struggle into their
daily reports. If too much attention was given to the violence, even if equal time was devoted to
100
101
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
the droll legal process, most foreign observers would be captivated by the vivid imagery of the
violence and ignore learning about the “dull reading” of nonviolent headlines.102
Since the commercial media would devote plenty of ink and airtime to sensationalize
racial tension, Pauker explained that the agency needed to “redress the balance by seeking to
assure that the ‘progress’ and the ‘results’ are indeed increasingly visible.” While many lesser
acts of violence would be omitted from the agency’s coverage, the memo directed journalists to
report each new instance of integration in order to convince the audience that these were not
anomalies but, rather, part of a “mounting trend” in America to treat blacks as equals. Further,
the agency needed to showcase the involvement of state legislatures, whites, church groups,
professional associations, and women’s groups in the movement so as to depict it as a broader
social alliance. Personal stories, as seen with the documentaries showing average African
Americans, were also important to Pauker because they helped convey the message that a
solution to segregation could not be solved solely by executive orders and court rulings; the
government could not correct “complex human relations problems wholly or finally.”103
Pauker also warned agency leaders to be cautious in their optimism for how quickly
tolerance would emerge in American society. As an executive agency, he particularly warned
against speculating on congressional votes for specific legislation. USIA’s job was to explain
the policies of the present presidential administration, not to attempt to sway the outcome of
domestic political matters. Similarly, based on the input of Area Policy Officers in the agency,
Pauker called for basic educational material on the functionality of the federal system to better
explain why Kennedy could not simply appoint local authorities to replace white supremacists.104
102
Ibid.
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
103
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Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
The long-term strategy for USIA, which Murrow first outlined in May 1961, heavily
influenced Pauker’s memo. The policy paper addressed the agency’s perpetual challenge of
balancing the truthful presentation of news events with the ideals of U.S. society in its
propaganda. If Murrow had permitted his personnel to continue presenting information as they
had during the 1950s, they would not have established the rapport with their international
audience necessary to make their presentation of Kennedy’s June 11 speech sound credible.
While the agency may have simply stated that racism is bad and not representative of the country
at large during the Eisenhower administration, Murrow required his agency to acknowledge that
tension existed in the United States and then detail how the limitations of federal democracy for
expediently correcting institutionalized segregation. When discrimination against African
diplomats and the riots in Oxford were headlining in the international media, the various
information arms of USIA explained the steps taken by the Kennedy administration without
exaggerating their effects. Subsequently, when the violence in Birmingham captivated and
horrified international observers, they did not immediately reject listening to VOA or frequenting
USIS libraries. This may appear as a modest link, but it was essential to the efficacy of public
diplomacy during the Kennedy administration and the result of Murrow’s interest in generating a
focused dialogue between the U.S. government and average people around the world.
Tom Sorensen, the director of policy under Murrow and a twelve-year veteran of USIA,
argues that the agency gave little thought to American racism until Murrow became director.
Murrow understood the correlation between the credibility of America’s leadership in Africa and
Asia and its treatment of blacks at home. Sorensen identified the director’s three-pronged
guidance for discussing civil rights: face the problem head on, report race relations in depth, and
treat African Americans as equal participants in a multiethnic society in lieu of a constantly
35
Gregory M. Tomlin, Hard Sell
comparing them to freed slaves.105 Murrow argued with Southern senators, who objected to
USIA taking American racism head on in its informational programs, by pointing out that people
will be more receptive to positive information when they also hear bad news from the same
source. Although racism remained too entrenched in American society for Murrow’s public
engagements to extract, his approach to conducting public diplomacy proved more genuine than
his predecessor’s. His legacy for improving the U.S. posture overseas seems more
consequential, which is most appropriate for someone administering 2,000 hours of broadcasts a
day in sixty languages, films to 600 million people in 104 countries, and over 300 cultural
exhibits. 106 As a Soviet commentary stated, USIA had “no equal in other capitalist countries . . .
[it] extols the American way of life on every road crossing . . . [and] provokes sleepless nights in
socialist countries.”107 Indeed, propaganda provided by USIA during the Kennedy
administration helped to foster the transnational dialogue that enabled foreign pressures
identified by Dudziak and Borstelmann to influence domestic policy during the Cold War.
105
The Word War, 171-73.
USIA fact sheet prepared for Murrow’s appearance on Open Mind, September 17, 1963, Folder “ERM, T.V.,
Radio Requests, 1963,” Box 22, E1069, RG306, NA.
107
Soviet media quotes in Donald Wilson, statement before the Subcommittee on Departments of State, Justice, and
Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, October 29, 1963,
Folder “Correspondence, 1953-1968,” Box 120, ERMP, TUA.
106
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