US and Russian intelligence cooperation during the Yeltsin years
"I would like to give a toast. I believe you are all well aware of my background and
views as a so-called cold warrior. It is not my wish to go down in history as the first director of
central intelligence to come to Moscow to establish a liaison relationship between US and
Russian intelligence. I am frankly uncomfortable with any suggestion that my visit might serve
to legitimize or recognize the role of the KGB in a democratic Russia. No, I am here today
because the relationship between our two countries demands that our intelligence agencies work
together in areas of mutual interest. It is time to turn a page in our history, without forgetting our
past and present differences, in order to eliminate the threats we face in this new era. I propose a
toast for the security and the future of our two peoples."
With these words, as best I can recall them, Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates
ushered in a new chapter in the adversarial, turbulent story of US and Russian intelligence. The
September, 1992 DCI visit co-hosted by SVR Director Yevgeniy Primakov and FSB (then FSK)
Director Sergey Stepashin was not political theater, nor was it a naive event that ignored the
bitter reality of confrontation.
The CIA director was greeted by a receptive audience, at least at high levels of the
services and Russian government. It was clear that the political leadership of both countries
demanded at least a modicum of cooperation between intelligence services. For his part, DCI
Gates brought a handful of high level proposals that were designed to test whether the US and
Russian spies were prepared to roll up their sleeves do real work. Addressing intelligence gaps
on North Korea's nuclear weapons program topped his list. He proposed an unprecedented joint
operation to leverage US technology and Russian access to gather intelligence on the ground on
the status of North Korea’s nuclear program. Gates also requested information concerning the
extent of the technical penetration of the new, still unoccupied US Embassy compound, as a test
of sorts as to whether the US was viewed as a budding ally, or was still regarded as the “glavniy
protivnik” (main adversary) after the dissolution of the Soviet Union – and the breakup of the
KGB.
In laying out his proposals, Gates reasoned that if the two parties could take concrete
steps to address a few high visibility intelligence problems, it might help justify establishing a
formal relationship. For their part, intelligence czars Primakov and Stepashin were quick to
recognize the potential benefits of cooperation. They had a clear vision and sense of purpose
that were necessary to take calculated risks to advance the relationship. They joined the
negotiations and offered some suggestions of their own. As a result, even today, this historic
meeting in Moscow stands as one of the most significant achievements of enigmatic intelligence
cooperation between the US and Russia over the next two decades.
The Gates visit was reinforced by a follow-up trip to Moscow by newly appointed CIA
Director James Woolsey in October, 1993. Along with the results of director Primakov's
consultations in Washington in July of that year, these groundbreaking high level exchanges
stimulated sufficient leadership involvement to initiate a series of productive intelligence
exchanges in a growing number of areas. Transnational threats were among the highest priority
subjects that were raised; experts gathered on a regular basis in both capitals to exchange
1
information and analysis on terrorism, proliferation, narcotics and organized crime. There were
even exchanges on global warming under the umbrella of the Gore-Chernomyrdin initiative,
although it must be acknowledged that the spectacle of the old KGB and CIA officers discussing
environmental intelligence amused the wily intelligence veterans.
During these "good times" of relatively productive, constructive engagement, there was
never an illusion that either party had lost the appetite to spy on one another when the
opportunity presented itself. After all, espionage was of greater value and consequence than the
limited benefits of collaboration. It is also true that positions sharply diverged on most matters.
We tended to disagree fundamentally on the role of intelligence in serving our respective
policymakers. We were products of opposite cultures in how we approached the tradecraft of
analysis, operational modus operandi, and principles for conducting liaison work.
Nonetheless, to the credit of both sides, we never tried to paper over our differences.
While we were loathe to admit it, exchanging sharply differing perspectives sometimes produced
a better understanding of a problem than our separate views. Yevgeniy Primakov recognized the
unfulfilled potential in advancing novel ways of joining forces to tackle a concrete problem. One
day, he pondered creative ways to encourage SVR and CIA officers to work more closely
together. “My officers do not want to work with CIA officers on joint operations,” he
acknowledged, “…because it will taint them and negatively impact on their careers.” Thinking
aloud, the SVR spy chief proposed that “SVR and CIA officers work in parallel tracks towards a
common objective….we will deploy our sources and methods, and you develop your means of
access; then we can compare the results of our efforts and determine how best to proceed.” I
asked Primakov if he had a specific target or objective in mind. He paused, pensively. “Well,
this is not a formal proposal, but perhaps we can try to keep (Palestinian leader Yassir) Arafat
and (Israeli leader Yitzhak) Rabin alive.”
Unfortunately, the idea was deemed too bold –perhaps it was too original – for Langley’s
taste. On other occasions, the Russian side was skeptical of US proposals that would guide the
relationship into uncharted waters. But in spite of the reluctance of both sides to embrace the
relationship, there were times when it was obvious that for certain select problems of mutual
self-interest, we could be stronger working together than we could be working alone. One such
set of unusual circumstances arose in spring, 1993. An intelligence volunteer, or “walk in” to a
US Embassy (located outside the former Soviet Union) informed the CIA of an alleged plot to
assassinate President Yeltsin. The sourced claimed to be a member of a Chechen hit team that
planned to attack the President during an upcoming speech at the Kremlin grounds.
The reporting was briefed to President Clinton, who ordered that the information be
passed immediately to President Yeltsin. After this was done, CIA and FSB officers met in FSB
Headquarters in Lubyanka, under the watchful gaze of Yuriy Andropov, to coordinate a joint
operation to resolve the threat. Based on the agreements that were reached during this meeting, a
combined team of CIA and FSB officers traveled under cover from Moscow to a third country to
collect and assess intelligence concerning the threat. In course of an intense flurry of activity,
they determined that the source had fabricated the plot.
2
The team’s determination that the threat was not real was a relief. However, the results
of the joint operation did not diminish the significance of the team’s achievement. CIA and FSB
had demonstrated that they could work together in a fast breaking and murky situation; officers
displayed a high degree of professionalism in working together to neutralize what they regarded
to be a possible threat to the life of the President.
In the months that followed, “shag s’ shagom” (step by step) became the motto for liaison
officers who worked hard to promote a joint agenda to define areas of mutual interest.
Professional respect between individuals - not trust - was the vital ingredient in the modest
successes of these efforts to produce concrete liaison results. This mixed record was put to the
ultimate test during the tense hours leading to the coup attempt by a hardliner faction led by
Ruslan Khasbulatov and Aleksandr Rutskoi against President Yeltsin in October 4, 1993.
My phone rang at home on a beautiful fall day in Moscow. It was Valentin Klimenko, an
FSB Colonel General, and one of the CIA station’s principal liaison contacts. His mood was
grim. I strained to hear him, as he calmly said: “ Rolf, I must see you right away. Come alone.
Do not come to Lubyanka. Take the metro. Meet me on the corner of the metro stop at
Dzerzhinsky Square.” He took a breath. “And please hurry.” I took the unusual precaution of
telling Ambassador Thomas Pickering about my rendezvous with the FSB - in case I did not
return. Whose side was the KGB on, I wondered?
I emerged from the metro at Dzerzhinsky Square with my surveillants in hot pursuit. They
seemed more anxious and clueless than me – what a twist of fortunes, I chuckled. Valentin and a
colleague caught me on the way to the meeting site. He firmly pressed his hand into mine. “We
have a problem,” he explained. “When the President received his morning briefing, he asked us
(FSB) why CIA officers were meeting with coup plotters in the (Russian) White House.”
Klimenko looked me in the eye: “We replied that we do not know.” The President asked:
“Whose side is CIA on? Is the United States for me, or against me?” The veteran
counterintelligence officer paused for effect, before adding. “What should we tell him? He
needs your answer now.”
I exhaled a sigh of relief. The answer was easy. There was no need to seek guidance from
the Embassy or from Washington. “Please assure President Yeltsin that the United States is in
his corner. The US firmly supports the Russian Government.” I informed Klimenko that
meetings between US Embassy officers and hardliners were part of CIA’s efforts to keep
Washington informed about events that were unfolding rapidly in Moscow. “Good!” Valentin
exclaimed, with evident satisfaction. “Now tell Washington this: the Russian military will
imminently undertake the necessary measures to resolve the crisis. Get your officers out of the
White House in the next two hours, or they will be caught in the crossfire, or be taken hostage by
the hardliners.”
The metro ride back to the Embassy seemed like an eternity. My surveillance team had
disappeared. I briefed the Ambassador and we apprised Washington of Yeltsin’s decision to take
military action. Measures were initiated to protect the Embassy population in anticipation of the
counter-coup.
3
True to Valentin’s word, tanks began rolling into position throughout Moscow within a
couple of hours. The US Embassy was quickly engulfed in the cross fire between Russian
military forces and hardliners who had taken up positions in the buildings that surrounded the
American compound. As intense gun battles flared, American Embassy personnel and families
sought sanctuary in the basement of the compound. A small detachment of young Marines,
outfitted in full battle gear, positioned themselves behind a makeshift barricade of furniture that
was all that stood between the outside world and helpless Embassy staff. I vividly recall these
young men’s faces, grim and determined to fight to the last man if the rebels that were roaming
the Embassy grounds launched an attack on the underground sanctuary.
Late that night, the CIA station was directed to dispatch officers to the Ambassador’s
residence at Spaso House in order to establish an alternative command post with satellite
communication with Washington. The Embassy was cut off from the outside world and unable
to report on coup developments. I led a three man team of CIA officers who broke out of the
compound’s garage in a single vehicle, under cover of darkness. It was chaos. Miraculously, we
navigated a circuitous route through acrid smoke and bodies littering the streets to Spaso House,
without incident. In short order, we sent our first cable reporting on the situation in Moscow.
As dawn approached, the security situation in central Moscow continued to deteriorate.
Spaso House had become a gathering point for a number of Embassy reporting officers, as well
as for Russian national employees who had shown up for work on this day, just as they did every
day. But there was nothing normal on this day. Elite Russian forces battled snipers, building by
building, in the high rises that overshadowed the residence. Sporadic gun fire rained down on
the compound. Armed rebels entered the grounds of the residence and broke some windows. I
sent all Russian nationals home, where they would be safe. I called the Ambassador to advise
him to be prepared for the possibility that the Spaso command post would be overrun and
officers taken hostage by hardliners. The unflappable Ambassador offered a surprising
suggestion: call liaison, inform them of our plight, and ask for help. It seemed like a desperate
gambit, but lacking any better ideas, we heeded his advice.
In short order, the phone rang. An FSB officer noted that his organization had received our
request, and that he had a message to pass on behalf of General Stepashin. He said that a group
of well-armed, plain clothed FSB officers were enroute to Spaso House to provide protective
security for us. “However,” he continued, “they will perform their task. You perform yours.
There is a line that separates you from them. Do not cross this line. They will not cross it.
Make eye contact to exchange bona fides -- no more. Understood”?
“Understood,” I replied. “And thank you.” “You’re welcome.” Our FSB detail remained
silent partners for the duration of the crisis.
We all became witnesses to how history is actually made. I learned that there is nothing predetermined about the course of a nation’s destiny. I learned that history does not make people;
people make history. Russian political, military, and intelligence officers, as well as ordinary
citizens, determined Russia’s future through the decisions they made in a crisis. If the same
people had made different decisions, it would have dramatically changed the future course of
4
events. In this moment of truth, US and Russian interests converged.
Ah, it would make for a good Hollywood ending, if only the story ended here. But no
story about US and Russian intelligence would be complete without a descent into intrigue,
betrayal and deception that has characterized the world’s second oldest profession since
gentlemen began reading each other’s mail centuries ago.
When word reached Moscow that CIA traitor Aldrich Ames had been arrested on
February 23, 1994, I secretly hoped to be expelled and declared persona non grata so I’d never
have to work with Russian intelligence again. The Ames affair was a sensation in Washington.
The CIA was being attacked by all sides of the political spectrum. It seemed only logical when
Langley decided to sever liaison ties in the aftermath of the arrest of a Russian mole in the CIA.
As usual, the emotional entanglements of espionage held both sides in a vise-like grip. Within
days of the arrest, a senior CIA delegation announced its intention to visit Moscow in a last ditch
effort to negotiate a solution that might avert mass, tit for tat expulsions -- and worse, if the
Ames affair was allowed to escalate into a global, spy versus spy war waged in the shadows.
Senior CIA officer John MacGaffin headed the small delegation that descended on SVR
headquarters at Yasenevo on the outskirts of Moscow. Traditional pleasantries were curtailed, as
both sides got to the heart of the matter. “These things happen.” Primakov shrugged, trying to
lighten the mood. “It’s the nature of the business.” MacGaffin flashed a disarming smile, before
curtly countering, “Things will get ugly. That’s inevitable. The question is how can we contain
the damage? How can we avoid an escalation that could harm the broader, bilateral
relationship?”
It was clear that MacGaffin had not come to Moscow to sue for peace, but to underscore
the need for cooler heads to prevail in order to ensure things did not spiral out of control. It was
essential to re-open the liaison channel, if for no other reason than it served an even more vital
purpose in keeping things in perspective in times of trouble. From this period, I learned much
about the importance of not letting personal emotions cloud one’s judgment in dealing with the
human factor of espionage. I also developed a deeper appreciation for the “wilderness of
mirrors” that intelligence officers are sentenced to dwell in, as immortalized by American poet
TS Eliot in this passage from “Gerontion.”
“After such knowledge, what forgiveness?
Think now
History has many cunning
passages, contrived corridors
and issues, deceives with
whispering ambitions, guides
us by vanities.”
In the weeks and months that followed the Ames arrest, American and Russian
intelligence services were once again at war. Liaison cooperation proved to be an indispensable
channel of communication. A page was taken from informal contacts between the KGB and CIA
in the so-called “Gavrilov channel” in the mid 1980’s. Russian and American
counterintelligence officers would meet to set limits on certain extremes of behavior by agreeing
5
on unwritten “rules of the game.” Similarly, in the post-Ames period, issues were often clarified,
and sometimes resolved before they became destructive. There was a shared sense that lest
intelligence become art for art’s sake, it must be reigned in to serve a larger cause. As bad as
things were between US and Russian intelligence, they could have been much worse.
Indeed, important initiatives offset continuing counterintelligence feuds, and helped
elevate the stature and scope of the liaison relationship. Louis Freeh became the first FBI
director to pay an official visit to Moscow when he established liaison relations between US and
Russian law federal enforcement agencies on July 4th, 1994. The positive and purposeful
atmosphere during director Freeh’s talks with his FSB host, Sergey Stepashin, was reminiscent
of the successful Gates visit almost two years earlier. In addition, Director of Defense
Intelligence James Clapper had quietly formalized a liaison relationship between DIA and its
Russian counterpart, the GRU.
By the end of 1994, US and Russian special services were in direct contact and were
exchanging views and information directly in a number of areas of vital interest to the national
security of both countries. There was a leadership consensus that it was necessary to support a
long term process of expanding intelligence cooperation. There was a joint recognition that the
relationship should be built on the edifice of self-interest – doing things based on a calculation of
the risks versus benefits to do so.
Yet, it has not been easy to avoid becoming victims of our own history. As a
counterintelligence officer wistfully reminded me during the 1994 July 4th holiday celebration at
Spaso House, “Maybe we were better off in the good old days, before we got to know one
another on an intimate basis. The myths of the KGB and CIA are bigger than the realities, aren’t
they?” I said nothing. There was nothing to say. After two tours of duty in Moscow, one in the
USSR, and one in Russia, I was worn out. It was time to go home.
Today, as I reflect on these auspicious times, both sides have been slow to adapt to the
realities of the post cold war. It is plain common sense to join forces to combat nuclear and
biological terrorism. Both countries face daunting terrorism and proliferation threats as we head
into an uncertain future. We live in a world of the super-enabled individual, consisting of people
and groups who aspire to wield the power of states. Malicious actors seek nothing less than to
challenge world order. In the 21st century, there is more that unites the US and Russia, than
divides us. In this spirit, I believe it is the duty of US and Russian special services to apply the
same skills and dedication that have been so creatively applied to work against one another, to
working together to secure a better world for our children.
The shared experiences of the Yelstin years reveal that such cooperation is possible,
desirable, and necessary, but only when our intelligence and law enforcement services have the
vision and courage to stick to the harder path of constructive engagement. No matter how
elusive and frustrating that building trust between old adversaries might be, our intelligence
services must not allow the inevitable bumps in the road to be used as a convenient excuse to
abandon the quest for a strategic partnership between our two countries.
6