Annual Report of the Integrity
Commissioner
2014–2015
ISSN 1835-1603 (print); ISSN 2205-3077 (0nline)
Contact ACLEI
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity
GPO Box 605
Canberra ACT 2601
AUSTRALIA
Phone: (02) 6141 2300; +61 2 6141 2300
Fax: (02) 6230 7341; +61 2 6230 7341
Corruption Hotline: (02) 6141 2345; +61 2 6141 2345
Email: contact@aclei.gov.au
Copies of this Report are available on ACLEI’s website, www.aclei.gov.au, at Reports, submissions
and speeches.
Enquiries about the content of this Report should be directed to the Annual Report Coordinator.
Acknowledgements
Produced by: Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity
Designed by: GRi.D Communications, Canberra, ACT
Printed by: New Millennium Print, Fyshwick, ACT
© Commonwealth of Australia 2015
With the exception of the Coat of Arms and where otherwise stated, all material presented in this
document is provided under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Australia licence
(www.creativecommons.org/licenses). This license only applies to material as set out in this
document.
This publication should be attributed as the Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15.
The terms under which the coat of arms may be used can be found on the website of the Department
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, at www.dpmc.gov.au/pmc/publication/ commonwealth-coatarms-information-and-guidelines
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
14 October 2015
The Hon. Michael Keenan MP Minister for Justice
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600
Dear Minister
I am pleased to give you the ninth Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner, concerning the
operations in 2014–15 of the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity, as required by
section 201(1) of the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006.
In addition, as indicated in this report, I certify that:
 ACLEI has prepared fraud risk assessments and fraud control plans
 ACLEI has in place appropriate fraud prevention, detection, investigation and reporting mechanisms
that meet its specific needs, and
 I have taken all reasonable measures to deal appropriately with fraud relating to ACLEI.
ACLEI had no incidences of suspected fraud in 2014–15.
In compiling this Report, I have had regard to section 206 of the Law Enforcement Integrity
Commissioner Act which relates to considerations about the content of Annual Reports of the Integrity
Commissioner. I have also had regard to the Requirements for Annual Reports, approved for 2014–15
by the Parliamentary Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit.
In my opinion, the Report is suitable for presentation to the Parliament. Yours sincerely
Michael Griffin AM
Integrity Commissioner
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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REPORTING CORRUPTION
How to report a corruption issue
The Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) investigates corruption issues
involving staff members and former staff members of the Australian Border Force and the Department
of Immigration and Border Protection (and the former Australian Customs and Border Protection
Service), the Australian Crime Commission (and the former National Crime Authority), the Australian
Federal Police (including ACT Policing), the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre
(AUSTRAC), the CrimTrac Agency and prescribed aspects of the Department of Agriculture.
Any information provided to ACLEI is received in the strictest confidence.
A person providing information about a corruption issue to ACLEI does not have to give a name, but
should be aware that information given anonymously may be more difficult to investigate. If a person
does not want to give his or her name, he or she may provide an alias and should arrange a way for
contact to be made.
The Integrity Commissioner seeks to ensure that all corruption issues are addressed properly. All
information provided to ACLEI is assessed for its suitability for investigation and may be retained or
collated with other information to inform decision-making at a later date.
Sometimes it may be preferable to pass the information provided (or part of it) to another government
agency better suited to investigate it. If that action may cause a concern, it can be discussed with
ACLEI at the time of providing the information.
A person who refers a corruption issue to ACLEI may elect to be kept informed of how the Integrity
Commissioner deals with that issue. If an investigation is commenced,the Integrity Commissioner
would—in appropriate circumstances—also advise the person of the investigation outcome. It may
not, however, be possible to provide progress reports, as this action could jeopardise the
effectiveness of the investigation.
Corruption issues can be reported to ACLEI by any of the following means:
Hotline: (02) 6141 2345; +61 2 6141 2345
Email: contact@aclei.gov.au
Online: www.aclei.gov.au
Fax:
Post:
(02) 6230 7341; +61 2 6230 7341
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity
GPO Box 605
Canberra ACT 2601
AUSTRALIA
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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GUIDE TO THE REPORT
This Annual Report provides details of the operations of the Integrity Commissioner and the
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity for the financial year ending 30 June 2015. Its
purpose is to inform the Parliament and members of the public about ACLEI’s role and performance.
The Report is presented in the following six parts:
PART ONE — OVERVIEW
Part One of the Annual Report provides an overview of ACLEI’s role and achievements. This part
contains the Integrity Commissioner’s review, which summarises ACLEI’s impact during the year,
and the agency overview, which describes ACLEI’s role, priorities, powers, and organisational
structure.
PART TWO — PROGRESS TOWARDS OUTCOMES
This part sets out ACLEI’s performance in detecting, investigating and preventing corrupt conduct
during the reporting year, measured against the expectations set for ACLEI in the 2014–15 Portfolio
Budget Statements. It also provides an overview of ACLEI’s financial performance.
An overview of corruption issues notified and referred to the Integrity Commissioner, a summary of
completed investigations, a description of ACLEI’s contribution to strengthening Australia’s integrity
framework and a report on patterns and trends in law enforcement corruption are also reported here.
PART THREE — MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
This part of the Annual Report provides a synopsis of ACLEI’s corporate management, governance
and accountability.
PART FOUR — FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
ACLEI’s audited accounts are presented in this part.
PART FIVE — APPENDICES
The appendices provide information about:
 presentations given by the Integrity Commissioner and ACLEI staff
 additional statistics, and
 significant changes affecting ACLEI’s operating environment.
PART SIX — INDEX
This part includes the:
 compliance index, and
 alphabetical index.
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ACRONYMS USED IN THIS REPORT
AACF
Australian Anti-corruption Commissions Forum
AAIs
Accountable Authority Instructions
ABF
Australian Border Force
AC
Companion of the Order of Australia
ACBPS
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
ACC
Australian Crime Commission
ACLEI
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity
ACT
Australian Capital Territory
AFP
Australian Federal Police
AM
Member of the Order of Australia
AO
Officer of the Order of Australia
APA
Agency Policy Advice
APS
Australian Public Service
APSC
Australian Public Service Commission
AS
Australian Standard
ASEAN
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AUSTRAC
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre
CEO
Chief Executive Officer
Cth
Commonwealth
CSC
Conspicuous Service Cross
DIBP
Department of Immigration and Border Protection
EL
Executive Level
FMA Act
Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997
FOI
Freedom of Information (as in FOI Act)
GST
Goods and Services Tax
HOCOLEA
Heads of Commonwealth Operational Law Enforcement Agencies
ICAC (NSW)
Independent Commission Against Corruption (NSW)
ICT
Information and Communications Technology
IIP
Interagency Integrity Program (AFP)
IPS
Information Publication Scheme
ISO
International Organisation for Standardisation
JTF
ACLEI/ AFP Joint Taskforce, based in Sydney
KPIs
Key Performance Indicators
LEIC Act
Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006
LEIC
Regulations
Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Regulations 2006
MP
Member of Parliament
NBSA
National Border Strategic Assessment
NSW
New South Wales
PGPA Act
Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013
PID Act
Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013
PIDs
Public Interest Disclosures
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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PPP
Program for Personal Performance
PSM
Public Service Medal
SES
Senior Executive Service
UNCAC
United Nations Convention against Corruption
WHS
Work Health and Safety (as in WHS Act)
GLOSSARY
Some terms in this report are used for convenience or illustration, while others may have a particular
meaning in the LEIC Act. The list below is intended to provide a general guide as to the use of each
term.
Term
Corruption enabled
crime
Corruption handshake
Corruption issue
Meaning
Organised criminal networks may seek to use corrupt government
insiders to gain access to information, or to facilitate or hide criminal
activity. The potential harm caused by corruption enabled border
crime is particularly significant.
The potential relationship between organised crime and a corrupt or
compromised law enforcement official.
A corruption issue arises when the Integrity Commissioner becomes
aware of information that a person who is (or has been) a staff
member of a law enforcement agency, is engaging, has (or may have)
engaged, or will (or may at any time in the future) engage in corrupt
conduct.
Not every corruption issue that has been notified or referred to the
Integrity Commissioner will have substance.
Crown jewel strategy
Displacement
(of corruption risk)
Informant
Law enforcement
agency
Notification
(of a corruption issue to
the Integrity
Commissioner)
Referral
(of a corruption issue to
The term corruption issue is defined in section 7 of the LEIC Act. The
meaning of engages in corrupt conduct is codified in section 6.
An assets-based risk management approach which aims to identify
and protect an agency’s most important commodities in terms of
its ability to deliver its core business—including from discovery,
destruction, manipulation or misuse by organised crime or other
corruptors. In the law enforcement context most ‘crown jewels’ would
comprise vital operational information.
When an agency with a high level of inherent corruption risk
strengthens its integrity arrangements, corruption risk may be
displaced to another agency with which it has close operational
relationships, as organised crime groups seek easier entry points to
gain the information or advantage they require.
A person who makes an allegation about possible corrupt conduct or
gives information about a corruption issue to the Integrity
Commissioner. See Chapter 2 for more information.
An agency which is subject to the Integrity Commissioner’s
jurisdiction. In 2014–15, these agencies were the ACC (and the
former National Crime Authority), the ACBPS, the AFP, AUSTRAC,
the CrimTrac Agency and prescribed aspects of the Department of
Agriculture. Other agencies may be added by regulation.
The term law enforcement agency is defined in section 5 of the LEIC Act.
A corruption issue is notified when an allegation or information
concerning an agency in the Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction
comes from the head of that agency (see section 19 of the LEIC Act).
A corruption issue is referred when an allegation or information comes
from any source, other than as a notification from the head of an agency
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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the Integrity
Commissioner)
Staff members of law
enforcement agencies
Vertical collusion
in the Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction (see sections 18 and 23 of
the LEIC Act).
People (including secondees) who are employed by agencies subject
to the Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction. In some cases,
contractors may also fall into this category.
The term staff members of law enforcement agencies is defined in
section 10 of the LEIC Act.
A corrupt network that extends between Commonwealth and Statelevel officials in law enforcement or public sector environments.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL ........................................................................................................... 4
REPORTING CORRUPTION ........................................................................................................... 5
GUIDE TO THE REPORT................................................................................................................ 6
ACRONYMS USED IN THIS REPORT ............................................................................................ 7
GLOSSARY..................................................................................................................................... 8
PART ONE—OVERVIEW ..................................................................................................... 14
SNAPSHOT ................................................................................................................................... 15
CHAPTER 1—INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER’S REVIEW ............................................................. 17
Border corruption ........................................................................................................................ 17
Investigation tools ....................................................................................................................... 17
Extended jurisdiction .................................................................................................................. 18
Partnerships ............................................................................................................................... 18
Business improvement ............................................................................................................... 19
Looking forward .......................................................................................................................... 20
Achieving results together .......................................................................................................... 20
CHAPTER 2—AGENCY OVERVIEW ............................................................................................ 21
Jurisdiction ................................................................................................................................. 21
Role ............................................................................................................................................ 21
Integrity partnership .................................................................................................................... 22
Strategic priorities ....................................................................................................................... 22
Independence............................................................................................................................. 22
Responsibilities and powers ....................................................................................................... 23
Detection .................................................................................................................................... 25
Strengthening integrity ................................................................................................................ 26
Organisational structure.............................................................................................................. 27
PART 2—PROGRESS TOWARDS OUTCOMES ................................................................. 28
Portfolio Budget Statements—Planned outcomes ...................................................................... 29
Factors influencing performance................................................................................................. 30
Performance reporting framework .............................................................................................. 31
Performance analysis ................................................................................................................. 31
Performance summary ............................................................................................................... 34
Financial performance ................................................................................................................ 49
CHAPTER 4—STRENGTHENING INTEGRITY SYSTEMS ........................................................... 53
Identifying corruption risks and vulnerabilities ............................................................................. 53
Adding to anti-corruption safeguards .......................................................................................... 56
Raising awareness ..................................................................................................................... 57
LEIC Act agency initiatives ......................................................................................................... 60
Building partnerships against corruption ..................................................................................... 62
Engaging internationally ............................................................................................................. 64
CHAPTER SIX—ASSESSMENTS AND INVESTIGATIONS ......................................................... 66
Notes on recording practices ...................................................................................................... 66
Total workload ............................................................................................................................ 67
Where corruption information came from .................................................................................... 67
How workload was dealt with ...................................................................................................... 70
ACLEI investigations .................................................................................................................. 73
Use of information-gathering powers .......................................................................................... 75
Investigations conducted by other agencies ............................................................................... 77
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Concluded issues ....................................................................................................................... 80
Assessments pending ................................................................................................................ 81
Issues carried forward to 2015–16 .............................................................................................. 81
Legal proceedings ...................................................................................................................... 82
CHAPTER 6—REPORTS TO THE MINISTER .............................................................................. 85
Investigation reports ................................................................................................................... 85
Previous recommendations ........................................................................................................ 86
Special reports under section 204 of the LEIC Act ...................................................................... 87
CHAPTER 7—PATTERNS AND TRENDS .................................................................................... 88
Corruption enabled border crime ................................................................................................ 88
Lessons from North America ...................................................................................................... 90
Key observations ........................................................................................................................ 91
Managing change ....................................................................................................................... 92
CHAPTER 8—CORPORATE MANAGEMENT .............................................................................. 94
Management overview................................................................................................................ 94
Governance practices ................................................................................................................. 94
Management of human resources ............................................................................................ 100
Management of financial processes.......................................................................................... 105
Information management and technology ................................................................................. 106
Facilities management .............................................................................................................. 107
Other corporate issues ............................................................................................................. 107
CHAPTER 9—ACCOUNTABILITY ............................................................................................. 109
Parliamentary Joint Committee on ACLEI ................................................................................. 109
Senate Estimates ..................................................................................................................... 110
External accountability for the use of powers ............................................................................ 110
Commonwealth Ombudsman ................................................................................................... 111
Public interest disclosures ........................................................................................................ 112
Auditor-General ........................................................................................................................ 112
Freedom of information............................................................................................................. 113
Operational accountability ........................................................................................................ 113
Integrity assurance measures ................................................................................................... 114
PART FOUR—FINANCIAL STATEMENTS ....................................................................... 118
PART FIVE—APPENDICES ............................................................................................... 166
APPENDIX 1—PAPERS AND PRESENTATIONS ...................................................................... 167
APPENDIX 2—ADDITIONAL STATISTICS................................................................................. 169
APPENDIX 3—CHANGES IN ACLEI’S OPERATING ENVIRONMENT ...................................... 178
PART SIX—INDEX ............................................................................................................. 183
COMPLIANCE INDEX ................................................................................................................. 184
ALPHABETICAL INDEX ............................................................................................................. 187
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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Figures
FIGURE ONE: ACLEI’s organisational structure as at 30 June 2015 .................................... 27
FIGURE TWO: ACLEI outcome framework—2014–15 Portfolio Budget Statements ............ 29
FIGURE THREE: ACLEI’s assessment and investigation workload over time ...................... 67
FIGURE FOUR: Trends in notifications to ACLEI .................................................................. 69
FIGURE FIVE: Trends in referrals to ACLEI .......................................................................... 69
FIGURE SIX: Concluded issues—trend data ........................................................................ 81
FIGURE SEVEN: Strategies for dealing with corruption risk at the border ............................ 89
FIGURE EIGHT: The effectiveness paradox ......................................................................... 90
FIGURE NINE: ACLEI’s risk management framework .......................................................... 98
FIGURE TEN: ACLEI integrity policy framework ................................................................. 115
Tables
TABLE ONE: Performance snapshot—effectiveness of the reporting system.................................... 35
TABLE TWO: Performance snapshot—assessments are prioritised ................................................. 37
TABLE THREE: Performance snapshot—investigations are conducted professionally ..................... 39
TABLE FOUR: Performance snapshot—law enforcement agency investigations .............................. 42
TABLE FIVE: Performance snapshot—improving resistance to corruption ........................................ 44
TABLE SIX: Performance snapshot—awareness-raising .................................................................. 45
TABLE SEVEN: Performance snapshot—handling personal information .......................................... 47
TABLE EIGHT: Resources available to ACLEI .................................................................................. 50
TABLE NINE: Agency resource statement 2014–15.......................................................................... 51
TABLE TEN: Expenses for Outcome One ......................................................................................... 52
TABLE ELEVEN: Sources of information about corruption issues in 2014–15................................... 68
TABLE TWELVE: Total workload—how notifications, referrals and own initiative
investigations were dealt with ............................................................................................................ 70
SUB-TABLE 12A: Corruption issues under investigation during 2014–15 ......................................... 70
SUB-TABLE 12B: Corruption issues concluded during 2014–15 ....................................................... 72
SUB-TABLE 12C: Assessments in progress at 30 June 2015 ........................................................... 72
SUB-TABLE 12D: Total workload in 2014–15 ................................................................................... 73
TABLE THIRTEEN: Investigations (including joint investigations) commenced by
ACLEI in 2014–15, by nature of allegation ........................................................................................ 73
TABLE FOURTEEN: Use of coercive information-gathering powers—three year trend ..................... 75
TABLE FIFTEEN: Use of intrusive and covert information-gathering powers— three year trend ....... 76
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TABLE SIXTEEN: Corruption issues dealt with as internal investigations or as other government
agency investigations during 2014–15............................................................................................... 79
TABLE SEVENTEEN: Age of corruption issues being investigated by other
agencies at 30 June 2015 ................................................................................................................. 80
TABLE EIGHTEEN: Age of corruption issues being carried forward to 2015–16 ............................... 82
TABLE NINETEEN: Outcomes of prosecutions in 2014–15 .............................................................. 83
TABLE TWENTY: Reports provided to the Minister ........................................................................... 85
TABLE TWENTY-ONE: Staffing profile at 30 June 2015 ................................................................. 102
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PART ONE—OVERVIEW
SNAPSHOT
CHAPTER 1 Integrity Commissioner’s review
CHAPTER 2 Agency overview
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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SNAPSHOT
2014–15 highlights
Leadership
 Mr Philip Moss ended his statutory term as Integrity Commissioner on 22 July 2014.
 From 23 July 2014 to 18 January 2015, Mr Robert Cornall AO was Acting Integrity Commissioner.
 Mr Michael Griffin AM commenced as Integrity Commissioner on 19 January 2015.
Capability
 ACLEI further built the capacity of the Sydney-based ACLEI/Australian Federal Police Joint
Taskforce—which had first commenced in June 2014—to lead large anti-corruption investigations.
 ACLEI improved its capacity in key functions—such as assessments and investigations, legal
counsel, corruption prevention and governance—by strategic planning and additional recruitment.
 An independent audit of ACLEI’s anti-corruption controls concluded that its preventative measures
and integrity culture either approach or are equivalent to leading best practice.
Corruption enabled border crime
 Working with a range of partners, the Joint Taskforce is leading important and complex investigations
to counter corrupt conduct at the border.
 ACLEI convened a workshop of LEIC Act agencies to examine vulnerabilities and indicators of
corrupt conduct at the border.
 ACLEI contributed to the classified National Border Strategic Assessment 2014.
 The Integrity Commissioner addressed the Border Five Group Integrity Dialogue, hosted by the
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service for border agencies from Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.
 ACLEI and the ACC travelled to Canada and the United States of America on a fact-finding visit to
law enforcement and border agencies to exchange information and strengthen intelligence flows
relating to corruption and organised criminal exploitation in border environments.
 ACLEI provided strategic and technical advice on integrity practices for the establishment of the
Australian Border Force within the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.
Strengthening integrity systems
 ACLEI provided expert advice to inform ACC intelligence reports, including the classified Organised
Crime Threat Assessment 2015.
 The Acting Integrity Commissioner, Mr Robert Cornall AO, circulated an occasional paper Corruption
risk in the Public Service—lessons from law enforcement corruption investigations to Australian
Public Service agency heads.
 ACLEI contributed to Australian Government policy development relating to protective security
reforms, fraud control, the protection of sensitive law enforcement and anti-corruption investigation
information and organised crime.
 ACLEI made 18 awareness-raising presentations to staff members of LEIC Act agencies, and a
further nine presentations to other audiences.
 The Integrity Commissioner published three presentations—on the subjects of integrity leadership
and corruption enabled border crime—on the ACLEI website.
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 The Integrity Commissioner’s investigation reports made observations relating to corruption
vulnerabilities associated with limited supervision, ‘back office’ staff, (particularly information and
communications technology ‘super users’) and drug testing as a detection method.
Investigation outcomes
 ACLEI investigations resulted in the convictions of two staff members of LEIC Act agencies, and four
other people for corruption-related offences during 2014–15.
 Corruption-related offences against an additional LEIC Act agency staff member were established
with no conviction recorded.
 Two additional convictions for providing false or misleading evidence—relating to coercive hearings
held by the Integrity Commissioner—were secured.
The year in numbers
2012–13
2013–14
2014–15
Mandatory notifications from heads of agencies
56
69
70
Referrals from other sources
21
23
29
Own initiative identifications of corruption
issues
2
1
1
ACLEI investigations commenced in the year
(including joint investigations)
11
23
42
Total ACLEI investigations underway during
the year (including joint investigations)
31
45
75
Hearings held
20
17
7
‘Notices to produce’ issued
28
31
32
Use of electronic surveillance powers
(by ACLEI)
16*
39
5
0
3
1
80*
67*
95
Reports to the Minister
5
2
3
Convictions recorded as a result of ACLEI
investigations
4
11
8
Corruption issues under investigation by other
agencies under the LEIC Act framework
109
105
127
Investigation reports from other agencies,
reviewed by ACLEI
39
16
51
Presentations about integrity and
corruption prevention
46
31
27
Published submissions to Inquiries and
policy consultations
5
3
6
$7.711m
$8.384m
$9.685m
29
36
38
Controlled operations authorised
Corruption issues concluded
Resources available to ACLEI
Staffing establishment
(not including investigation and surveillance
services purchased or provided at no cost by
other agencies)
*These figures are different to the 2013–14 snapshot, owing to clerical error.
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CHAPTER 1—INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER’S REVIEW
The Integrity Commissioner’s review surveys ACLEI’s impact through the reporting
year and canvasses the prospects and challenges for the year to come.
Eight hundred years ago on the other side of the world, in the context of a political crisis, King John
of England agreed to cede some of his monarchical power. Magna Carta—or ‘The Great Charter’—
has since been one of the philosophical and legal cornerstones of many of the world’s great
democracies, including Australia’s.
Two principles stand out today: that every person shall be subject to the law regardless of their
station or status, and that all ‘free men’ shall have the right to justice and a fair trial. In short, Magna
Carta stands for fairness and against the arbitrary use of power.
Upon taking up my appointment as Integrity Commissioner on 19 January 2015, it was apparent to
me that the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity has at its heart the desire to
protect the rule of law, by safeguarding the integrity of law enforcement agencies. More broadly,
ACLEI plays a role in standing against corruption so that it may not gain a foothold or be met with
any form of acceptance.
This 2014–15 Annual Report—which is ACLEI’s ninth—reflects the efforts made by a talented staff
that is dedicated to achieving those ends.
Border corruption
The protective roles of law enforcement and border agencies involve combatting an active opponent.
Australia is an attractive market for transnational criminal enterprises. Well-established illicit markets,
and well-organised clandestine distribution networks—many run by outlaw motorcycle gangs—are
factors that help to regulate supply, price and profit.
The profits at stake can be considerable. For instance, from wholesale prices below
$2000 per kilogram in South America, a kilogram of cocaine at much lower levels of purity can be
worth more than $200,000 if landed in Australia. This margin is significantly higher than in other
developed countries, including the United States and United Kingdom, and the same pattern is
repeated across other illicit drug types.
In order to make these profits, organised crime groups must circumvent regulatory and law
enforcement controls. Though criminal methods are numerous, seeking corrupt assistance from
relevant law enforcement and regulatory officials is one available strategy, made affordable by high
profit margins. Recent surges in the liquidity of organised crime groups—together with a growth in
influence of transnational crime groups that use aggressive methods—have added force to the
emergence of corruption enabled border crime as a specific risk.
In May 2015, ACLEI led a visit to North American counterparts to compare notes on their long
experience with corruption enabled border crime. The delegation, which included a senior officer
from the Australian Crime Commission, received briefings from counterpart agencies about the
corruption threat in the USA and Canada. Although many of the prevailing factors differ, it is apparent
that Australia can expect continued—and perhaps increasing—corruption pressure from illicit import
and money-laundering enterprises.
Investigation tools
Most criminals intend that their activities should remain hidden. The menace of law enforcement
corruption is that trusted insiders can—directly or indirectly—help to cover up the crimes of others.
However, many of the tools used to fight corruption can impinge on civil liberties.
During the year, the Australian Parliament debated whether to make a new law to require
telecommunications companies to retain metadata for a minimum period of two years. Such data is
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
17
invaluable to law enforcement investigators generally, but particularly to anti-corruption investigators
whose subjects can be acutely aware of counter-surveillance techniques. Stored metadata—high
level information abstracted from historical phone and internet traffic records—allows ACLEI to build
an intelligence picture about criminal linkages, to bring about a breakthrough in an investigation. It is
painstaking work, but necessary to gather evidence of hard-to-detect corruption.
Following careful deliberation and broad community consultation, the Telecommunications
(Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015 was passed, and received Royal
Assent on 13 April 2015. The Act—which commences on 13 October 2015—also introduces rigorous
accountability measures. I consider them a welcome development.
A second enactment passed in 2014–15 resolves uncertainty that had arisen in recent years about
ACLEI’s (and the Australian Crime Commission’s) coercive investigation powers, whereby a number
of cases in senior courts had questioned the use of those powers when criminal charges are
underway or in prospect. Accordingly, in June 2015, the Federal Parliament passed amendments to
clarify the situation, thereby preserving the Integrity Commissioner’s ability to hold hearings in a
broad range of situations, subject to certain limits on gathering or disseminating information relating
to accused persons.
As Integrity Commissioner, I am mindful of the privilege and statutory power afforded to me and to
ACLEI’s investigators, and I recognise the Parliament’s care in scrutinising—and ultimately
approving—both of these new measures. I intend that ACLEI’s own accountability will be a hallmark
of my tenure as Integrity Commissioner, and I look forward to a continuing engagement with the
Parliamentary Joint Committee on ACLEI to ensure that is the case.
Extended jurisdiction
A great deal of work was completed in the year to prepare for the inclusion in ACLEI’s jurisdiction of
the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) from 1 July 2015. At that time, the
Department—including the new Australian Border Force (ABF)—completed the final stages of its
integration with, and replaced, the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service.
ACLEI was pleased to receive significant supplementary resourcing in the May 2015 Budget—enough to
double ACLEI’s operational capability—to support this additional programme. Since the full effect of this
change on ACLEI’s workload is unknown, a review of ACLEI’s resourcing will take place after 18 months to
inform decisions for the 2017–18 Budget.
The extended jurisdiction—which includes DIBP’s visa issuing function—will mean that ACLEI has
greater visibility of those government assets that may form a part of the corruption enabled border
crime spectrum. This whole-of-agency approach to jurisdiction also means that delineations in the role
of a DIBP employee will not artificially preclude an ACLEI investigation, as might have been the case if
only some employees were included.
However, having regard to the very broad scope of DIBP and ABF roles, ACLEI will need to continue to
exercise careful judgement if it is to keep its operational focus on detecting and combatting those
corruption issues that have the greatest potential to undermine law enforcement effectiveness. As is
the case with the existing agencies in the Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction—such as with the
Department of Agriculture, which has a border presence, but does many other things that are not
related to law enforcement integrity risk—it will not be appropriate, preferable, logical or feasible for
ACLEI to investigate all types of corruption that may arise in the DIBP context.
ACLEI’s engagement with DIBP during this transition has been positive at all levels, and I look
forward to working closely with that Department’s leadership group to further embed its integrity
culture at a time of significant change and risk.
Partnerships
ACLEI’s ability to manage a substantial workload and be effective depends very much on forming
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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cooperative working relationships with other agencies.
During the year, ACLEI and the Australian Federal Police continued to develop a Joint Taskforce in
Sydney to investigate corrupt conduct at the border. The AFP made up to three teams of
investigators available for the purpose, enabling ACLEI to increase its capacity to deal with complex
instances of corruption enabled border crime. Such cases—which are characterised by intermittent
criminal activity, distributed networks (in which participants may not be aware of all aspects of a
criminal operation), and care to avoid detection—are necessarily protracted.
The taskforce model is showing great promise and will be expanded in 2015–16 with the permanent
deployment of a team of ACLEI investigators and analysts into Sydney, including the recruitment of a
Director of Investigations to lead ACLEI’s Sydney operations and relationships. ACLEI will also
continue to strengthen its Canberra operations base, which remains an important part of ACLEI’s
operating strategy and its ability to act independently of jurisdiction agencies, when warranted.
The importance and efficacy of partnerships in the ACLEI model is evidenced in other ways. For
instance, during the year an ACLEI staff member commenced a 12-month placement with the
Department of Agriculture’s Fraud and Anti-Corruption Team, to add to that agency’s capability at a
time of heightened activity. Similarly, ACLEI benefitted from the skills and experience of a secondee
drawn from DIBP and one from the New South Wales Police Integrity Commission.
Such interactions help ACLEI to better understand the operating environments of the agencies that
fall under the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006, and to add skills or capability with
strategic impact.
Many other examples of ACLEI’s partnership approach are set out in Chapter 4 of this report—
Strengthening integrity systems.
Business improvement
A challenge in assessing corruption issues is to process information quickly. ACLEI has always given
priority to credible and serious matters, yet delays in processing other information can inconvenience
LEIC Act agencies, which have a strong interest in dealing with instances of potential misconduct in a
timely way.
In the context of a growing jurisdiction, additional resources were allocated in 2014–15 to appoint a
workflow manager. The immediate impact of this appointment is evident in assessment statistics—
96% of corruption issues received in 2014–15 were assessed within 90 days, compared with 71%
the previous year. Even more pleasing, the bulk of those assessments were made within a matter of
days of ACLEI receiving them.
This improvement in case handling was also supported by the development of new guidelines, which
draw together ACLEI’s assessment experience gained over the eight years since the agency
commenced. In particular, the guidelines make it clear that it is open to an ACLEI decision-maker to
decide that investigations can occur outside of the LEIC Act context when other mechanisms—such
as a complaint handling or disciplinary framework—may be better suited to the task. This approach
enables ACLEI’s skills and expertise to remain focused on high impact issues that are more likely to
threaten law enforcement integrity and in which the Integrity Commissioner’s statutory powers would
be more likely to play a decisive role.
To further support these objectives, and to reflect a maturing integrity system, the Minister for Justice
agreed to bring forward an amendment to the LEIC Act to allow the Integrity Commissioner and an
agency head to reach agreement on the definition of ‘serious corruption’ for that agency. The
intention is that, through this mechanism, agency heads would have greater guidance about what
matters are likely to require intervention by the Integrity Commissioner, having regard to the risk
factors that are specific to each agency. This measure received strong support from an independent
review of ACLEI conducted during the year by Mr Peter Hamburger PSM.
The relevant legislation, the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Powers, Offences and Other Measures)
Bill 2015, was introduced into the Parliament in March 2015.
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Looking forward
ACLEI’s operating environment is always dynamic, and the 2015–16 year is already shaping up as a
year of challenge across three main fronts.
First, it will be a significant undertaking for ACLEI to expand permanently into both Sydney and
Canberra, and to retain its systems of control, culture and ethos.
Secondly, the extension of jurisdiction to include DIBP can be expected to put ACLEI staff and
systems under pressure, until those changes are normalised and become integrated into agency
business practices. In the medium term, both of these strategic changes can be expected to increase
ACLEI’s effectiveness and contribution to the law enforcement integrity system.
The third challenge relates to ACLEI’s work tempo. At the close of the reporting year, ACLEI has its
highest ever number of investigations on foot—48 separate operations, involving 70 corruption
issues—all in different stages of development. This is a significant workload, and one which
exercises every area of the agency: investigations, intelligence, legal, corporate and strategic
engagement.
It is the nature of operational work that only a few of those investigations will lead to prosecutions or
findings of corrupt conduct, despite careful effort. On a better measure, a good proportion of cases
can be expected to generate actionable intelligence for agencies, whether in a disciplinary or
corruption prevention context. In other instances, doubt about a person’s integrity can be laid to rest.
I will continue to keep ACLEI’s activities aligned to its strategic objectives. ACLEI prepared a
Corporate Plan in 2014–15 to assist with this task, and I have since prepared a four-year plan to set
out ACLEI’s priorities for 2015–16 through to 2018–19. The ACLEI Corporate Plan is available on the
ACLEI website.
Achieving results together
ACLEI has a track record of making a positive difference in the Australian Government integrity
system. It has made valuable contributions in recent years across all three of its impact measures:
detect, disrupt, deter.
As later chapters of this report set out, ACLEI has a number of important prosecutions to its name (a
further nine in 2014–15), it has been influential in shaping anti-corruption policy and practice, and has
shown itself to be fit to partner with those agencies that seek out strategic advice and assistance to
fight corruption.
In reflecting on these achievements, it is appropriate for me to recognise my predecessors—
Professor John McMillan AO, Mr Philip Moss and Mr Robert Cornall AO—each of whom has left his
imprint on ACLEI. In February 2015, at a ceremony in Parliament House, the Minister for Justice, the
Hon. Michael Keenan MP, presented commemorative certificates to the previous Integrity
Commissioners to mark their respective tenures.
The event was attended by LEIC Act agency heads, as well as the Hon. Philip Ruddock MP, who—
as Attorney-General—established ACLEI. It was fitting also that the event was hosted by the
Parliamentary Joint Committee on ACLEI, which itself has made a great contribution to developing
the law enforcement integrity system.
It was well noted on that occasion that ACLEI’s operating model is based on integrity partnership—
the concept that ACLEI should create an environment in which agency heads want to engage with
ACLEI, rather than as a matter of obligation only.
Having now experienced that mode of operation, and felt the strength of support for ACLEI’s mission
from government, parliamentary and civil society partners, I am convinced that there is no better way
to tackle the fight against law enforcement corruption.
Michael Griffin AM
Integrity Commissioner
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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PART 1
CHAPTER 2—AGENCY OVERVIEW
This chapter provides an overview of ACLEI’s role, responsibilities, priorities and
structure.
ACLEI supports the Integrity Commissioner to provide independent assurance to government about
the integrity of prescribed law enforcement agencies and their staff members, by detecting,
investigating and preventing corrupt conduct. The office of the Integrity Commissioner, and ACLEI,
are established by the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (the LEIC Act).
Jurisdiction
The agencies subject to the Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction in 2014–15 were the Australian
Crime Commission and the former National Crime Authority, the Australian Customs and Border
Protection Service (ACBPS), the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Transaction Reports and
Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), the CrimTrac Agency, and prescribed aspects of the Department of
Agriculture.
With the integration of the ACBPS and the Department of Immigration and Border Protection
(DIBP)—including the establishment of the Australian Border Force within that Department—the
Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction was extended to include the whole of the DIBP from 1 July
2015.
Other agencies with law enforcement functions may also be added by regulation.
Role
The Integrity Commissioner’s primary role is to investigate law enforcement related corruption issues,
giving priority to serious and systemic corruption. ACLEI collects information and intelligence about
corrupt conduct and corruption risk in support of this function.
The Integrity Commissioner can investigate any information or allegation which indicates that corrupt
conduct has occurred, is occurring, or may be likely to occur. The heads of the agencies under
ACLEI’s jurisdiction must notify the Integrity Commissioner of corruption issues in their agencies as
soon as practicable after they become aware of them. Information about corruption may also come
from members of the public, the Minister, members of law enforcement and other government
agencies, and from ACLEI’s own detection initiatives.
In addition, the Minister may request the Integrity Commissioner to conduct a public inquiry into all or
any of the following matters:
 a corruption issue
 an issue about corruption generally in law enforcement, or
 an issue or issues about the integrity of staff members of law enforcement agencies.
The Integrity Commissioner must consider the nature and scope of corrupt conduct revealed by
investigations, and report annually on any patterns and trends in corruption in Australian Government
law enforcement agencies and other government agencies that have law enforcement functions (see
Chapter 7—Patterns and trends).
ACLEI also aims to understand corruption and prevent it. When, as a consequence of performing his
or her functions, the Integrity Commissioner identifies laws of the Commonwealth or administrative
practices of government agencies that might contribute to corrupt practices or prevent their early
detection, he or she may make recommendations for those laws or practices to be changed.
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Integrity partnership
The LEIC Act establishes a framework whereby the Integrity Commissioner and the heads of the
agencies in the LEIC Act jurisdiction can deal with corrupt conduct jointly and cooperatively. The
arrangement recognises both the continuing responsibility that the law enforcement agency heads
have for the integrity of their staff members and the role that the Integrity Commissioner—as
independent decision-maker—plays in the law enforcement integrity framework.
Strategic priorities
ACLEI seeks to work innovatively and cooperatively with its partners to detect, disrupt and deter
corrupt conduct in the agencies in the Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction. Under the LEIC Act, the
Integrity Commissioner must also give priority to serious or systemic corruption issues in those
agencies.
In particular, the Integrity Commissioner’s strategic focus is on corruption issues which:
 may indicate a suspected link between law enforcement and organised crime
 involve suspected conduct, such as the private use of illicit drugs, which would undermine an
agency’s law enforcement functions
 bring into doubt the integrity of senior law enforcement officers and managers
 relate to law enforcement activities that have a higher inherent corruption risk
 warrant the use of the Integrity Commissioner’s information-gathering powers, including hearings, or
 would otherwise benefit from independent investigation.
Accordingly, ACLEI aims to pursue those investigations which are most likely to yield the highest
strategic contribution to maintaining and improving integrity in law enforcement agencies.
ACLEI also contributes to the design and implementation of the corruption awareness- raising,
prevention and detection activities of the agencies in the Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction and
strives to capture and share corruption prevention insights as broadly as possible.
ACLEI’s outcome, programme, objective and performance measures are detailed in the AttorneyGeneral’s Portfolio Budget Statements 2014–15 and are summarised at Chapter 3—Performance
overview.
Independence
The Integrity Commissioner is a statutory officer and the head of ACLEI. ACLEI is part of the
Attorney-General’s portfolio. The Minister for Justice is responsible for the administration of the LEIC
Act.
Impartial and independent investigations are central to the Integrity Commissioner’s role. Under the
LEIC Act, the Minister may ask the Integrity Commissioner to conduct a public inquiry, but cannot
direct how any inquiry or investigation will be conducted.
The LEIC Act contains measures to ensure that the decisions of the Integrity Commissioner remain
free from political interference. For instance, the Integrity Commissioner:
 is appointed by the Governor-General and cannot be removed arbitrarily
 is appointed for up to five years, with a maximum sum of terms of seven years
 can commence investigations on his or her own initiative
 can make public statements, and
 can release reports publicly.
In these ways, the Integrity Commissioner maintains an independent relationship with government.
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Responsibilities and powers
Investigation options
The Integrity Commissioner decides independently how to deal with any allegations, information or
intelligence about possible corrupt conduct concerning staff members of the agencies in ACLEI’s
jurisdiction. The Integrity Commissioner is not required to investigate every corruption issue that
arises in Commonwealth law enforcement. Rather, the Integrity Commissioner’s role is to ensure that
indications and risks of corrupt conduct in law enforcement agencies are identified and addressed
properly.
The Integrity Commissioner may choose from a range of options in dealing with a corruption issue.
The options are to:
 investigate the corruption issue independently
 investigate the corruption issue jointly with another government agency
 refer the corruption issue to the law enforcement agency for internal investigation (with or without
management or oversight by ACLEI)
 refer the corruption issue to the AFP—or in the case of secondees, to another agency, such as a
State integrity agency, or another government agency—for investigation, or
 take no further action.
The Integrity Commissioner will investigate only when there is advantage in ACLEI’s direct
involvement—for example, if an independent investigation would be beneficial or if the use of
coercive powers would be desirable and proportionate.
Chapter 5—Assessments and investigations sets out how corruption issues were dealt with during
2014–15.
Investigative powers
A challenge faced by ACLEI is that those officers subject to investigation by the Integrity
Commissioner are likely to be well-versed in law enforcement methods, and may be skilled at
countering them in order to avoid scrutiny. As a consequence, the Integrity Commissioner may use a
range of special powers and methods in order to investigate corrupt conduct, including:
 notices to produce information, documents or things
 summons to attend an information-gathering hearing, to answer questions and give sworn evidence,
and to produce documents or things
 covert investigation methods:
–telecommunications interception
–electronic and physical surveillance
–controlled operations
–assumed identities
–scrutiny of financial transactions, and
–access to specialised information databases for law enforcement purposes
 search warrants
 right of entry to law enforcement premises and associated search and seizure powers
 arrest (relating to the investigation of a corruption issue), and
 integrity testing (for corruption issues within the ACC, the ACBPS/DIBP and the AFP).
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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It is an offence not to comply with notices, not to answer questions (or not to answer truthfully) in
hearings, or otherwise to be in contempt of ACLEI. A person who is in contempt of a proceeding
under the LEIC Act may be brought before a court for the contempt to be dealt with by that court.
In addition, the Integrity Commissioner may issue directions to prevent disclosure by any witness
summonsed to a hearing, any other person present, or any recipient of a notice to produce about the
nature and existence of ACLEI investigations. This measure is designed to avoid collusion between
witnesses and prevent other forms of compromise that may arise, were the existence of an ACLEI
investigation to become known prematurely.
Non-disclosure directions are also one of the means by which the Integrity Commissioner can protect
whistleblowers.
Monitoring of agency investigation outcomes
This Report uses the term agency investigation to describe those investigations where:
 the Integrity Commissioner decides not to commence an ACLEI investigation and instead refers a
corruption issue to an agency in ACLEI’s jurisdiction for internal investigation (with or without ACLEI
oversight or management), or another agency for it to investigate, or
 an agency in ACLEI’s jurisdiction—with the Integrity Commissioner’s knowledge and consent—
continues an internal investigation into an issue which has not been identified as a significant
corruption issue under the LEIC Act.
In these circumstances, the investigating agency provides the Integrity Commissioner with a report at
the conclusion of each investigation. The Integrity Commissioner may make comments or
recommendations to the head of the agency to which the corruption issue relates, on any matter
relating to or arising out of the report or out of the relevant investigation.
If the Integrity Commissioner is not satisfied with the response or proposed actions of an agency
head, the Integrity Commissioner may provide his or her view, and reasons for this view, to the
Minister. The Integrity Commissioner may also provide the material to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for presentation to each House of the Parliament.
Investigation reports
Investigations completed by the Integrity Commissioner result in a report to the Minister. In most
circumstances, a copy of the report is also provided to the head of the law enforcement agency
concerned.
A report made to the Minister can be published by the Integrity Commissioner when the Integrity
Commissioner considers that to do so would be in the public interest. If a public hearing were held as
part of the investigation, or if a public inquiry were requested by the Minister, the Minister must cause
the Integrity Commissioner’s report to be laid before each House of the Parliament.
The Integrity Commissioner’s reports on investigations must include findings and the evidence or
material on which those findings are based. In addition, the Integrity Commissioner can express
opinions and make recommendations regarding, for example, disciplinary or other management
action concerning a member of a law enforcement agency.
The LEIC Act also encourages the Integrity Commissioner to consider measures that would remedy
any practices which may give rise to corrupt conduct, or hamper its detection.
The Integrity Commissioner is authorised to explore such issues in reports and to make
recommendations accordingly.
The Integrity Commissioner’s Annual Report is required to include a summary of each investigation
completed during the year, and any recommendations made (see Chapter 6— Reports to the
Minister).
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Prosecutions, civil actions and disciplinary action
If, through investigating a corruption issue, the Integrity Commissioner discovers admissible evidence
of an offence or a liability to civil penalty, or evidence that would be admissible in a proceeding under
the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) (or a State or Territory equivalent), the evidence must be given
to the authority authorised to bring the relevant proceeding or a police force.
The Integrity Commissioner must also bring to an agency head’s notice evidence of a breach of duty
or misconduct by a staff member. This requirement arises when the Integrity Commissioner is
satisfied that the evidence may justify terminating a staff member’s employment or initiating
disciplinary proceedings and that the evidence is, in all the circumstances, of sufficient force to justify
his or her doing so.
Under the LEIC Act, a person may be required to give information or to produce documents or things
that may incriminate him or her. Self-incriminatory information obtained by the use of a coercive
power is not admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings or proceedings for the imposition or
recovery of a penalty against that person.
However, the information, document or thing is admissible against the person in:
 disciplinary proceedings
 civil proceedings under Commonwealth, State or Territory proceeds of crime legislation
 proceedings for a non-compliance offence under the LEIC Act (such as an offence of disclosure; or
failure to attend, take an oath, answer questions or produce documents or things at a hearing; or to
provide information, documents or things in response to a notice under the LEIC Act), and
 proceedings for an offence under the Criminal Code (Cth) that relates to the LEIC Act—namely,
providing false or misleading information or documents or obstructing Commonwealth public officials.
DETECTION
Identifying corruption risk indicators
As similar operating environments may also have similar corruption risks and vulnerabilities, ACLEI
makes strategic use of its investigations to inform the detection of corrupt conduct. For example,
ACLEI examines whether corruption indicators or vulnerabilities observed
in one operational environment may be present in other, related, environments. For this purpose,
ACLEI works with the agencies in the LEIC Act jurisdiction to bring together and analyse information
about the factors that may allow—or indicate—corrupt conduct and target areas at risk.
Receiving and disseminating information about corrupt conduct
An important feature of the LEIC Act is that it requires the head of an agency in ACLEI’s jurisdiction
to notify the Integrity Commissioner of any information or allegation that raises a corruption issue in
his or her agency. However, the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture is required to notify the
Integrity Commissioner only of corruption issues that relate to staff members who are prescribed
under the LEIC Act.
The LEIC Act also enables any other person, including members of the public, other government
agencies or the Minister, to refer a corruption issue to the Integrity Commissioner. Special legislative
arrangements make it lawful for staff members of the law enforcement agencies in the Integrity
Commissioner’s jurisdiction to provide information about corruption direct to ACLEI.
ACLEI is authorised under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 to receive
information about any corruption issue (involving an agency within the LEIC Act jurisdiction) that may
be identified by other integrity agencies or law enforcement agencies as a result of their
telecommunications interception activities.
The Integrity Commissioner may disclose information to the head of a law enforcement agency, or
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
25
other government agency, if satisfied that, having regard to the functions of the agency concerned, it
is appropriate to do so.
The Integrity Commissioner is exempt from the operation of the Privacy Act 1988, reflecting the
importance of ACLEI’s information collection and intelligence sharing role.
Providing information to ACLEI
ACLEI uses the term informant to refer to a person, including a member of the public or a staff
member within an agency, who provides information about a corruption issue or possible corrupt
conduct.
The Integrity Commissioner acknowledges the need to take account of the personal interest of
people who approach ACLEI, and of the circumstances and frame of mind in which they may come
forward. Accordingly, ACLEI endeavours to be sensitive and helpful to informants. However, ACLEI
does not have a complaint handling role, and ACLEI’s investigations are not oriented specifically to
achieving a personal remedy or resolution for an informant.
ACLEI takes all possible care to protect the identities of people who provide information to the
Integrity Commissioner. Each case is managed carefully, including consultation with informants
about issues that may affect them. In addition, the LEIC Act contains provisions to protect
whistleblowers and other informants from victimisation or harassment.
Corruption enabled crime
A significant threat to law enforcement is that organised criminal networks may seek to use infiltration
and compromise tactics to facilitate unlawful activities. The Integrity Commissioner uses the phrase
corruption handshake to describe the potential relationship between organised crime and a corrupt or
compromised law enforcement official who may facilitate criminal activity. The potential harm caused
by corruption enabled border crime is particularly significant.
The concept explains how enforcement agencies and ACLEI investigate the corruption handshake
from complementary perspectives. Law enforcement agencies lead the collection of intelligence
about organised crime, and this information can provide insights about corrupt conduct and
corruption risk. Likewise, integrity investigations—by examining the conduct of law enforcement
officers—can yield new information about the activities and methods of criminal groups. ACLEI
investigations (including joint investigations under the LEIC Act) have led to actionable intelligence
for policing agencies, and assisted with the arrest and prosecution of criminals.
Accordingly, ACLEI engages with the operational core business areas of the agencies in the Integrity
Commissioner’s jurisdiction, as well as with their professional standards units, to share information
about organised crime operations and to work together to counter threats to law enforcement
integrity. Cooperative arrangements with other law enforcement and State integrity agencies are
similarly important to achieving these outcomes. ACLEI also works closely with the ACC’s National
Criminal Fusion Capability to inform one another’s detection operations.
Strengthening integrity
Among the objects of the LEIC Act is to maintain and improve the integrity of staff members of law
enforcement agencies. In support of this object, ACLEI seeks to make it more difficult for corrupt
conduct to occur in those agencies, and more likely that it would be detected. To this end, ACLEI
develops and shares insights from its investigations and intelligence collection activities to help
protect law enforcement operations from the prospect of corruption.
Corruption prevention
One of the functions of the Integrity Commissioner under the LEIC Act is to prevent corrupt conduct
in law enforcement agencies. ACLEI works with the agencies in the Integrity Commissioner’s
jurisdiction to assist them to strengthen their integrity frameworks, including by helping to identify
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
26
areas of corruption risk or vulnerability and to find effective mitigation strategies. For example, ACLEI
develops corruption prevention tools, provides advice on corruption detection and deterrence
measures, assists with risk assessment initiatives and contributes to agency education and
awareness-raising activities.
ACLEI convenes the Community of Practice for Corruption Prevention, which aims to bring corruption
prevention practitioners of LEIC Act agencies together with a wide range of anti-corruption experts.
ACLEI also endeavours to keep up to date with relevant research to maintain expertise in corruption
prevention, to provide a high standard of assistance to its integrity partners.
Policy initiatives
ACLEI contributes its knowledge about corruption risk and deterrence measures to assist the
development of government anti-corruption policy. This contribution to broader policy development
aligns with ACLEI’s investigation, intelligence and corruption prevention responsibilities and supports
the delivery of the Integrity Commissioner’s functions.
Anti-corruption cooperation
Cooperative relationships with other Commonwealth, State and Territory Government agencies are
necessary for ACLEI to achieve its aims. In particular, ACLEI maintains productive relationships with
key partners in Australia’s integrity and law enforcement system. ACLEI is also part of an
international community of anti-corruption agencies and makes an active contribution in this sphere.
More detailed information about ACLEI’s approach to strengthening integrity can be found in Chapter
4—Strengthening integrity systems.
Organisational structure
As at 30 June 2015, ACLEI had funding for an average staffing level of 38 people, including the
Integrity Commissioner. From 1 July 2015, ACLEI’s average staffing level increased to 52.
FIGURE ONE: ACLEI’s organisational structure as at 30 June 2015
More information about ACLEI’s staffing and organisational structure can be found in
Chapter 8—Corporate management.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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PART 2—PROGRESS TOWARDS
OUTCOMES
CHAPTER 3 Performance statement
CHAPTER 4 Strengthening integrity systems
CHAPTER 5 Assessments and investigations
CHAPTER 6 Reports to the Minister
CHAPTER 7 Patterns and trends
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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CHAPTER 3—PERFORMANCE STATEMENT
This chapter summarises ACLEI’s performance against objective measures set by
government and gives an overview of ACLEI’s financial resources.
As the Accountable Authority of ACLEI, the Integrity Commissioner is satisfied that this Statement is
based on properly maintained records, accurately reflects ACLEI’s performance and complies with
relevant requirements set out in the LEIC Act and Regulations.
The Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) provision requiring
agencies to prepare annual performance statements will take effect for the reporting period
commencing on 1 July 2015. Nonetheless—to the extent possible—ACLEI has applied the principles
set out by the PGPA Act for the 2014–15 reporting period.
Portfolio Budget Statements—Planned outcomes
In 2014–15, annual reporting by Australian Government agencies was based on the outcome and
programmes structure, as set out in the Portfolio Budget Statements. The Statements, which are
authorised by Ministers and published as part of the annual Budget process (see
www.budget.gov.au), specify the outcomes, strategies, programme objectives and deliverables that
government expects each agency to achieve in any given year.
By reporting performance against outcomes and programme expectations, each agency
demonstrates to the Parliament that the funding it has received has been spent effectively and
efficiently to achieve the Government’s objectives.
ACLEI had one outcome, one outcome strategy, one programme and one programme objective in
2014–15.
FIGURE TWO: ACLEI outcome framework—2014–15 Portfolio Budget Statements
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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ACLEI’s deliverables for 2014–15—Portfolio Budget Statements
The Portfolio Budget Statements also establish a set of deliverables for each programme
administered.
 Corruption issues are promptly brought to the attention of the Integrity Commissioner for independent
assessment and decision on how each issue should be dealt with (either by ACLEI, by the agency to
which the issue relates, or by another agency).
 When appropriate, ACLEI independently investigates corruption issues, giving priority to conduct that
constitutes serious corruption or systemic corruption.
 When appropriate, the Integrity Commissioner uses statutory intrusive and coercive informationgathering powers to assist in investigations.
 ACLEI analyses and reports on patterns and trends in law enforcement corruption.
 ACLEI recommends changes to laws and to agency practices and procedures to improve integrity in
law enforcement, and to detect and prevent corruption more effectively.
 ACLEI enhances corruption prevention initiatives, such as the assessment of corruption risk and
raising awareness about corruption deterrence, thereby helping to build corruption-resistant work
cultures.
 Staff members of law enforcement agencies are made aware that information about corruption can
be referred with confidence to the Integrity Commissioner.
Factors influencing performance
Corruption enabled border crime
In May 2014, the Government decided to consolidate the Australian Customs and Border Protection
Service and the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) into a single Department,
and to establish within that Department a single front-line operational border agency—the Australian
Border Force—from 1 July 2015.
ACLEI was allocated $1 million in the 2014–15 Budget to identify and target corruption risk factors
associated with the transition, reinforcing the Government’s—and ACLEI’s—emphasis on fighting
corruption enabled border crime. Accordingly, on 1 June 2014, ACLEI and the AFP established a
Joint Taskforce (the JTF) in Sydney.
In addition, the Customs and Other Legislation Amendment (Australian Border Force) Act 2015—
which received Royal Assent on 20 May 2015—includes a measure that brought the DIBP into the
Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction on a whole-of-agency basis from 1 July 2015. Preparation for
and implementation of this measure was a priority activity during the reporting year across all areas
of ACLEI.
Leadership transition
The second major factor was the transition to a new Integrity Commissioner after Mr Philip Moss’
statutory term as Integrity Commissioner ended on 22 July 2014. Mr Robert Cornall AO was Acting
Integrity Commissioner from 23 July 2014 until the appointment of Mr Michael Griffin AM.
Mr Griffin commenced as Integrity Commissioner on 19 January 2015 and was formally inaugurated
on 12 February 2015 by the Minister for Justice, the
Hon. Michael Keenan MP.
Corporate Plan 2014–15
In October 2014, the Acting Integrity Commissioner, Mr Robert Cornall AO, issued a Corporate Plan
for ACLEI, setting out nine strategic priorities for the remainder of 2014–15:
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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 applying resources to highest effect
 fully establishing ACLEI’s presence in Sydney
 addressing the ‘detection challenge’
 preventing corruption
 engaging with other agencies
 building capability and improving performance
 legislative amendments to improve the efficient and effective operation of the LEIC Act
 implementing Government priorities, and
 minimising enterprise risk.
These priorities have informed this chapter’s analysis of ACLEI’s performance.
Performance reporting framework
The Portfolio Budget Statements adopt a system of reporting performance information that is based
on Key Performance Indicators, which show how, in a given reporting period, ACLEI has progressed
toward meeting its outcome and objective. The LEIC Act and the Law Enforcement Integrity
Commissioner Regulations 2006 also require comprehensive reporting about ACLEI’s activities.
The following pages provide an overview of ACLEI’s progress towards strengthening integrity in law
enforcement agencies during the reporting period, measured against the KPIs.
Chapters 4 to 7 and Appendices 1 and 2 of this Report provide greater detail about ACLEI’s
performance and achievements during the year, including trend data when applicable. Crossreferences to this more-detailed information are provided in the tables in this chapter. In addition, a
compliance index can be found at Part 6 of this Report.
Performance analysis
Overall, ACLEI performed strongly against its performance indicators in 2014–15. In particular,
improvements were observed in areas which had experienced weaker performance in previous
years, such as managing assessments and external investigations. Despite an increasingly high
investigations workload, ACLEI significantly improved its assessment rate of notifications and
referrals, reviewed a larger-than-usual number of agency investigation reports received during the
reporting period, and concluded one-third more corruption issues than in the previous year. ACLEI
also continued to strengthen its governance arrangements.
Work continues on some key issues, including:
 timeliness in concluding or reconsidering investigations
 settling Standard Operating Procedures across high-risk agency practices
 building in-house legal capability
 embedding a risk management philosophy across all areas of operation, and
 continuing to ensure cooperative external relationships are fostered.
In 2014–15, ACLEI made progress towards its objective—to make it more difficult for corruption in
law enforcement agencies to occur or remain undetected—in the four key delivery and enabling
areas of ACLEI’s work—namely: detect, disrupt, deter and capability.
Detect
ACLEI is working with an ever-widening range of partners to identify and deal with corrupt conduct
and corruption risk. For example, ACLEI convened a workshop of LEIC Act agency partners to
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
31
examine corruption enabled border crime and how the corruption risk landscape is changing. The
outcomes of the workshop informed a later information-gathering delegation by ACLEI and the ACC
to the United States and Canada to learn about how those countries deal with corruption risk and
what trends may affect Australia in the future. It is intended that ACLEI will enhance its detection
capability in 2015–16 as a result of lessons learned—for instance by investing in Human Source
Management.
ACLEI also provided expert advice to the classified National Border Strategic Assessment 2015
(NBSA) coordinated by the ACBPS, and to the ACC’s classified Organised Crime Threat
Assessment 2015.
Disrupt
ACLEI again placed emphasis on developing operational partnerships, particularly through the
Sydney ACLEI/AFP Joint Taskforce. The JTF is leading several important and complex
investigations, in which LEIC Act jurisdiction agencies and other law enforcement partners are
cooperating to counter any corrupt conduct that may threaten the integrity of Australia’s borders.
A Joint Management Group with senior representation from both ACLEI and the AFP was
established to manage the JTF.
New assessment guidelines—referencing the Integrity Commissioner’s strategic
investigation priorities—improved consistency in decision-making and helped to ensure that ACLEI’s
operational efforts are targeted to the areas of highest risk and harm to law enforcement integrity.
Eight prosecutions relating to ACLEI investigations resulted in convictions, while the offence in one
further matter was recorded as established without conviction. In other matters, the Integrity
Commissioner disseminated evidence or information to allow agencies to manage risk or take
disciplinary action.
Deter
During the year, the Integrity Commissioner’s insights about corruption vulnerabilities, the treatment
of corruption risk and integrity leadership contributed to LEIC Act agency training and corruption
control arrangements. These insights were also shared more broadly, through an occasional paper to
heads of Australian Public Service agencies, speeches and presentations to a diverse range of
audiences, and in investigation reports to the Minister. Additionally, ACLEI worked through the
Community of Practice for Corruption Prevention and individually with LEIC Act agencies to
strengthen anti-corruption arrangements in those agencies.
Contributing to anti-corruption policy and legislation is another way in which ACLEI helps to ensure
that anti-corruption settings remain matched to changing corruption risks and threats. For instance,
the integration of the ACBPS and the establishment of the Australian Border Force created a new
opportunity for the DIBP to reframe its emphasis on integrity. Accordingly, ACLEI provided strategic
and technical advice on integrity procedures for the consolidated Department.
Capability
The transition to Mr Michael Griffin AM as Integrity Commissioner was achieved smoothly and
without compromise to outcomes, due in large part to the preparatory efforts made by Integrity
Commissioner Moss and Acting Integrity Commissioner Cornall.
Using strategic recruitments—and by working with partner agencies, particularly the AFP—ACLEI
built the capacity of the Sydney JTF to lead large joint taskforce investigations. ACLEI’s capacity in
other key enabler areas—such as legal, corporate services, corruption prevention, relationship
management, policy and governance, as well as assessments and investigations—was also
bolstered by purposeful recruitment and planning.
Robust financial and management controls provide the basis for assurance that resources have been
directed efficiently, effectively and ethically to the achievement of its objectives. Accordingly, ACLEI
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
32
strengthened further its governance arrangements in a number of areas during the year with the
issue of Accountable Authority Instructions under the PGPA Act and improved audit and risk
management regimes. The practices and standing arrangements of the ACLEI Governance Board
were also adjusted to be better attuned to changes in entity risk.
As to staff culture, ACLEI continued to emphasise compliance with its integrity programme,
particularly through training and auditing. An audit of ACLEI’s anti-corruption controls—conducted by
an external auditor—concluded that preventative measures and integrity culture either approach or
are equivalent to leading best practice. These outcomes were replicated in ACLEI’s results from the
APSC State of the Service Survey for 2015.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
33
Performance summary
KPI ONE
The corruption notification and referral system is effective
Why does this measure matter?
If sound anti-corruption arrangements concerning law enforcement agencies are in place, public
confidence in those agencies can be maintained. Moreover, an active detection culture contributes to
corruption deterrence and the reinforcement of an agency’s professional standards.
The preparedness of the LEIC Act agencies to notify corruption issues to the Integrity
Commissioner—and to share other information concerning corruption risks and indicators— signifies
healthy and positive agency cultures that resist corruption. Similarly, the referral of corruption issues
direct to ACLEI by members of the public, law enforcement agency staff members and by other
government agencies demonstrates confidence that there will be an appropriate response to
information or concerns about integrity.
How did ACLEI meet this measure?
The effectiveness of the integrity system is demonstrated, in part, by the number of corruption issues
notified by agency heads to the Integrity Commissioner. Seventy notifications were received in 2014–
15, compared to 69 notifications in 2013–14 (the first year of the Integrity Commissioner’s extended
jurisdiction relating to AUSTRAC, the CrimTrac Agency and the Department of Agriculture).
Diversity in the sources of information can also be an indicator of effectiveness. The Integrity
Commissioner was referred a total of 29 issues in 2014–15 (including 24 from other government
agencies), compared to 23 referrals in 2013–14 and 21 in 2012–13. ACLEI notes there is a
significant variation in the number of referrals from year to year, even after taking into account
fluctuations arising from extensions to the LEIC Act jurisdiction (see Figure Five, Chapter 5—
Assessments and investigations).
In the following ways, ACLEI fosters those connections that are most likely to yield actionable
information.
 ACLEI endeavours to support detection of corrupt conduct within the LEIC Act jurisdiction. For
example, ACLEI works with LEIC Act agencies to build fraud and corruption detection capability.
 During the reporting period, ACLEI convened a workshop of LEIC Act agencies to examine the
indicators of corruption enabled border crime and corruption vulnerabilities at the border. ACLEI’s aim
is to build awareness and capability for detection and managing corruption risk in high-risk operating
environments.
 Information received through notifications and referrals is also complemented by intelligence gained
through other means. In 2014–15, ACLEI continued to work with the ACBPS and the ACC National
Criminal Intelligence Fusion Capability to identify emerging leads.
 The ACLEI/AFP Joint Taskforce, based in Sydney, capitalises on partnerships with Commonwealth
and State agencies to detect corrupt conduct at the border, to share understanding about where
vulnerabilities lie and to bring intelligence forward that may indicate corruption in border
environments.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
34
TABLE ONE: Performance snapshot—effectiveness of the reporting system
MEASURE
PERFORMANCE SNAPSHOT
FURTHER
INFORMATION
Law enforcement
agencies notify
ACLEI of
corruption issues
in a timely way.
70 notifications were received during the year,
compared to 69 in 2013–14.
Chapter 5—
Assessments and
investigations (see
Where corruption
information came
from)
Chapter 4—
Strengthening
integrity systems (see
Identifying corruption
risks and
vulnerabilities)
During assessment of each corruption issue, ACLEI
considers the length of time between an agency’s
becoming aware of the issue and notifying it to
ACLEI. ACLEI had no concerns about the timeliness
of notifications in the reporting period.
Agencies discuss possible notifications with ACLEI on
a regular basis.
LEIC Act agencies continue to indicate high levels
of confidence generally in the way ACLEI operates,
and demonstrate close alignment with ACLEI’s anticorruption role and the LEIC Act framework.
ACLEI continues to work with the ACC in relation to
its National Criminal Intelligence Fusion Capability, to
develop corruption detection methods and identify
emerging leads in LEIC Act agencies.
ACLEI convened a workshop of LEIC Act agencies
New frontiers: corruption enabled border crime to
examine vulnerabilities and indicators of corrupt
conduct at the border.
Other agencies
provide
information about
corruption issues
to ACLEI.
24 referrals were received from other government
agencies, compared to 15 in 2013–14. This growth is
significant, since it relates to an important stream of
reliable information coming from partner agencies.
Through the ACLEI/AFP Joint Taskforce based in
Sydney, ACLEI engaged with a range of law
enforcement agencies to obtain and share information
about corruption risk in LEIC Act agencies.
Other government and law enforcement agencies
regularly consult ACLEI to discuss potential referrals.
ACLEI is seen as
viable for reporting
information about
corruption.
Five referrals from members of the public or other
sources were received in 2014–15. A further 163
individuals or groups made enquiries that were out of
ACLEI’s jurisdiction.
ACLEI worked with LEIC Act agencies to ensure that
indicators of corrupt conduct are recognised and that
staff members know how to report to ACLEI.
ACLEI’s role in countering corruption as an enabler of
criminal activity is recognised in the National Organised
Crime Response Plan 2015–18 (released in May 2015).
ACLEI is cited in the ACC Organised Crime in
Australia 2015 report.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
35
KPI TWO
ACLEI assesses all notifications and referrals of corruption issues in a timely way
Why does this measure matter?
Some assessments are time critical because target identification and opportunities for real time
evidence collection may rely on a prompt response from ACLEI. Timeliness in completing these
assessments is also important in order to allow the relevant agency to respond to any operational
risks that may arise from corruption issues.
Timeliness in assessing information is also one measure that appropriate action is being taken, and
is a basis for confidence in the integrity system.
How did ACLEI meet this measure?
The Integrity Commissioner allocates resources based on an objective assessment of priority. All
information provided to ACLEI is given a preliminary assessment upon receipt, and action taken
accordingly. Urgent work is prioritised ahead of work that is less time critical. In this way, ACLEI
applies a risk management approach to achieve its objectives and ensure the proper use of public
resources.
In early 2014–15, ACLEI recruited a specialist workflow and assessments officer to ensure the
systems in place to manage assessments are efficient and appropriately take into account the
Integrity Commissioner’s priorities and risk to LEIC Act agencies. As a result, despite the ongoing
high operational tempo, ACLEI completed 120 assessments in the reporting period. In 2013–14,
ACLEI completed 75 assessments and 77 were completed in 2012–13.
Due to the complexity of the issues presented, assessments require varying levels of analysis. As a
benchmark, ACLEI aims to complete 75% of all assessments within
90 days of receipt of a notification or referral. In 2014–15, 83% (being 99 matters) of the
120 assessments completed met the 90-day benchmark, compared to 64% in 2013–14 and 75% in
2012–13.
Of those notifications and referrals that were both received and assessed in the reporting period,
96% were assessed within 90 days. A significant proportion—84%, or 81 matters—were completed
within 30 days of receipt.
With the addition of a new jurisdiction in 2015–16—namely, the DIBP—ACLEI anticipates a dip in
assessment performance as it takes time to understand the dimension and scope of the new
agency’s operating environment.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
36
TABLE TWO: Performance snapshot—assessments are prioritised
MEASURE
PERFORMANCE SNAPSHOT
FURTHER
INFORMATION
Upon receipt, ACLEI
assesses information
about corruption to
determine how each
issue should be dealt
with.
All notifications and referrals are subject to initial
assessment upon receipt, to determine each one’s
priority. ACLEI’s assessment and prioritisation
process includes such factors as the reliability of
information, susceptibility of the issue to
investigation, opportunity for real time evidence
collection, and seriousness and impact of the issue.
Chapter 5—
Assessments and
investigations (see
How workload was
dealt with)
Credible information
about corruption is
prioritised.
A guideline was issued during 2014–15 to ensure
the Integrity Commissioner’s strategic priorities are
taken into account during assessments and when
making decisions about commencing investigations.
When assessments uncover information which
relates to existing operations, corruption issues may
be added to those operations.
83% (99) of a total of 120 assessments completed
during 2014–15 were assessed within 90 days of
receipt.
96% (92 of 96) of notifications and referrals received
in 2014–15, for which assessments were completed
in the reporting year, were finalised within 90 days of
receipt. 84% (81) were completed in 30 days.
At the close of the year, 15 assessments were under
assessment or awaiting formal allocation.
Risks relating to the
operating context of
law enforcement
agencies are taken
into account and, in
appropriate
circumstances,
mitigation strategies
are agreed with the
agency concerned.
The assessment and prioritisation process considers
the impact of the corruption issue on an agency.
Issues with a clear potential to affect agency
operations receive a higher priority.
Decisions are
communicated to
affected agencies in a
timely way.
During 2014–15, ACLEI communicated decisions
about notifications and referrals promptly.
Operating risks relating to investigations—and any
mitigation strategies—are discussed routinely
between agency staff and ACLEI.
When appropriate, ACLEI communicates with the
agency concerned or disseminates information to
assist it to manage operating risks while
investigations continue. Various disseminations of
information of this nature were made during the
reporting period.
ACLEI also maintains open communication
channels and holds regular meetings with LEIC Act
agencies to allow urgent matters to be brought
forward when necessary.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
37
KPI THREE
ACLEI’s investigations are conducted professionally and efficiently, and add value
to the integrity system
Why does this measure matter?
ACLEI uses covert and intrusive investigation methods and has access to sensitive law enforcement
information.
For this reason, ACLEI has a duty to ensure—and to demonstrate—that its investigations are
targeted to the most serious issues, are well-managed, solutions-oriented and constructive, that
resources are directed appropriately and efficiently, and that powers are used lawfully and
proportionately.
Similarly, the public must be assured that the resources afforded to ACLEI by government have been
used for the purpose intended—namely, to make it harder for corrupt conduct in law enforcement to
occur or remain undetected—and to their best effect.
How did ACLEI meet this measure?
In order to ensure that ACLEI continues to pursue those investigations which are most likely to yield
the highest contribution to maintaining and improving integrity in law enforcement agencies, the
2014–15 Portfolio Budget Statements outline the Integrity Commissioner’s strategic investigation
priorities. These priorities are also reflected in ACLEI’s Corporate Plan and Corruption Issue
Assessment Guidelines, both of which were issued in 2014–15 for the first time.
Independent assurance to the Australian Government about the integrity of Commonwealth law
enforcement agencies and their staff is achieved primarily through investigation reports and briefings
made by the Integrity Commissioner to the Minister. The purpose of investigation reports and
briefings is to ensure that the Minister is informed about—and able to respond to—any concerns
about corrupt conduct that could challenge public confidence in law enforcement agencies or
undermine their effectiveness.
ACLEI’s Legal Practice provides advice to the Integrity Commissioner and investigators about the
lawful use of powers, including surveillance and telecommunications interception. ACLEI also
maintains a dedicated position to provide guidance and support to staff on the accountable use of
surveillance powers, and to manage the function.
ACLEI continues to update and review the effectiveness of governance arrangements for
investigations. In 2014–15, a consultant was engaged to review information-sharing protocols for
staff seconded to ACLEI, to inform this growing area of practice. Agency authorisation and delegation
instruments were also remodelled and refreshed.
The Executive Director Operations advises the Integrity Commissioner about the allocation of
ACLEI’s operational resources and the governance and progress of investigations. A LEIC Act
provision—whereby the Integrity Commissioner may reconsider how a corruption issue should be
dealt with—allows ACLEI to maintain its focus on serious and systemic corruption issues and allows
the Integrity Commissioner to take account of new information as it arises.
In 2014–15, the Integrity Commissioner and Acting Integrity Commissioner reconsidered and
discontinued ACLEI investigations relating to three corruption issues. In each instance, consideration
was given to disseminating collected evidence to relevant agencies, in accordance with the LEIC Act
and other relevant legislation. In a number of other cases, the Integrity Commissioner reconsidered
the type of investigation undertaken, for example to enter into joint investigations or instead to refer a
matter for internal investigation by an agency.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
38
TABLE THREE: Performance snapshot—investigations are conducted professionally
MEASURE
PERFORMANCE SNAPSHOT
FURTHER
INFORMATION
Investigations adhere
to standards set by
the Integrity
Commissioner.
Investigations are governed by strategic and tactical
investigation plans and are overseen by the
Executive Director Operations and the Integrity
Commissioner.
Chapter 2—
Agency overview
(see Strategic
priorities)
The Integrity Commissioner is involved at critical
decision points in each investigation.
Chapter 9—
Accountability (see
Internal
accountability)
For major joint investigations, the Integrity
Commissioner or Executive Director Operations
convene management meetings with the heads of
partner agencies, to receive operational briefings.
Notice Guidelines and Hearing Guidelines are
published on ACLEI’s website, to ensure that people
who may be the subject of the exercise of the
Integrity Commissioner’s coercive powers are
informed about their rights and obligations.
ACLEI’s delegations and authorisations were
reviewed during the reporting period.
Additional arrangements are in place to manage
operations of the Joint Taskforce, based in Sydney,
including a Joint Management Group with senior
representation from both ACLEI and the AFP.
ACLEI investigations
are properly
managed.
The Integrity Commissioner receives a weekly
briefing about current operations.
The Integrity Commissioner and Executive Director
Operations review the management of each
investigation at key milestones, such as the exercise
of powers, to ensure the effective use of intelligence
and other resources, and adherence to operational
policies.
ACLEI continued to maintain a dedicated staff
member to coordinate the use of intrusive powers
and other warrant-based activity.
Chapter 5—
Assessments and
investigations
Chapter 6—
Reports to the
Minister
Chapter 9—
Accountability (see
Internal
accountability)
ACLEI reviews regularly the deployment of
investigation resources against strategic priorities.
Of the 75 corruption issues under investigation by
ACLEI during the year, three were reconsidered and
discontinued. Other investigations were
reconsidered and dealt with in other ways.
Various disseminations of information were made
while investigations continued—for example, to
assist in managing operational risk, to provide
criminal intelligence, or to enable disciplinary action
concerning serious breaches of duty.
ACLEI continued to work closely with the
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions to
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
39
ensure that briefs of evidence prepared by ACLEI
were of a high standard and adhered to the
Commonwealth Prosecution Policy and the Model
Litigant Obligation.
Eight prosecutions arising from ACLEI investigations
resulted in convictions during the reporting period.
Investigation reports
provided to the
Minister are of high
quality.
Three investigation reports were given to the
Minister in 2014–15.
Advice is provided to
the Minister in a
timely way.
Mindful that the decisions of the Integrity
Commissioner must remain free from political
interference, the Integrity Commissioner kept the
Minister and the Attorney-General’s Department
appropriately informed of matters relating to ACLEI
and its investigations, to the extent that
administrative action or legislative amendment may
be required (see KPI Five for examples).
All reports to the Minister contained observations
about corruption risk and provided the basis for the
Minister to be satisfied that the issues investigated
had been dealt with appropriately and
proportionately.
All briefings to the Minister met appropriate
standards and were provided within agreed time
frames.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
Chapter 6—Reports
to the
Minister
Chapter 2—Agency
overview (see
Independence)
Chapter 4—
Strengthening
integrity systems
(see Adding to anticorruption
safeguards)
40
KPI FOUR
ACLEI monitors corruption investigations conducted by law enforcement agencies
Why does this measure matter?
Under the LEIC Act framework, the Integrity Commissioner may refer corruption issues for internal
investigation by an agency in the LEIC Act jurisdiction, or—when a Commonwealth crime is
evident—ask the AFP to investigate a corruption issue or issues relating to another LEIC Act agency.
At the conclusion of such an investigation, the agency head or the AFP Commissioner provides a
report to the Integrity Commissioner, who may make recommendations and comments concerning
the investigation or outcome.
ACLEI’s scrutiny of agency investigation reports provides assurance that internal investigations
under the LEIC Act are conducted properly, and is a safeguard to ensure that agencies exercise their
responsibility for the integrity of their own staff members. This process also enables agencies to keep
ACLEI informed about corruption risks and allows the Integrity Commissioner to focus ACLEI’s
efforts on investigations for which the Integrity Commissioner’s independence or powers under the
LEIC Act would be necessary.
How did ACLEI meet this measure?
In 2014–15—following concerns expressed by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ACLEI—new
arrangements were implemented to communicate regularly with agencies about the progress of
internal investigations. Monthly meetings were held with the AFP and ACBPS (which have the bulk of
internal investigations), while investigations being conducted by other agencies were monitored on a
case-by-case basis. This engagement provides a more effective mechanism for agencies to inform
ACLEI of any factors that may delay an investigation and for ACLEI to assure the Integrity
Commissioner that agencies have the necessary capabilities to conduct investigations relating to the
types of corruption risk that each agency faces.
This effort resulted in the receipt from agencies of a higher than usual number of investigation reports
and in the discontinuation of two investigations, with the agreement of the Integrity Commissioner.
In 2014–15, ACLEI received and reviewed 51 reports of completed agency investigations during the
reporting period, compared with 16 in 2013–14 and 39 in 2012–13. In one additional instance, the
Integrity Commissioner considered that use of ACLEI’s coercive powers may assist in bringing
forward additional evidence, and decided to commence an ACLEI investigation.
At the beginning of July 2015, seventy-four agency internal or other government investigations were
in progress (85 had been in progress at the beginning of 2014–15, and 71 at the start of 2013–14).
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
41
TABLE FOUR: Performance snapshot—law enforcement agency investigations
MEASURE
PERFORMANCE SNAPSHOT
FURTHER
INFORMATION
All agency corruption
investigation reports
provided to ACLEI for
review are assessed
for intelligence value
and completeness.
51 agency investigation reports were received and
reviewed in the year. Two agency investigations
were discontinued.
Chapter 5—
Assessments and
investigations (see
Investigations
conducted by other
agencies)
On review of one additional report, the Integrity
Commissioner reconsidered how the corruption
issue should be dealt with and commenced an
ACLEI investigation.
Regular discussion with LEIC Act agencies
continued to help to develop a picture of corruption
risk in the jurisdiction.
Information from agency investigation reports was
added to ACLEI’s intelligence holdings.
ACLEI liaises
regularly with the
agencies’
professional
standards units.
In 2014–15, ACLEI staff and agency professional
standards units continued to meet regularly to
assess caseload and discuss agency
investigations.
Senior ACLEI staff gave induction briefings to
new AFP Professional Standards investigators
and other staff.
Professional standards staff of all six agencies in
the LEIC Act jurisdiction attend the Community of
Practice for Corruption Prevention, convened by
ACLEI.
Chapter 5—
Assessments and
investigations (see
How workload was
dealt with)
Chapter 4—
Strengthening
integrity systems
(see Raising
awareness and
Building partnerships
against corruption)
To foster high standards, an ACBPS staff member
was seconded to ACLEI and an ACLEI investigator
was seconded to the Department of Agriculture.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
42
KPI FIVE
ACLEI contributes to policy development and law reform in accountability and
corruption prevention relating to law enforcement
Why does this measure matter?
Government policy settings influence the corruption deterrence environment, and may affect the
threat environment—for instance, when new law enforcement methods or powers are introduced,
new corruption risks or opportunities can arise.
Accordingly, an important function of the Integrity Commissioner—as the only Commonwealth
agency head with a sole focus on defeating corruption—is to advise the Australian Government and
the Parliament about patterns and trends in corruption risks in law enforcement, and to recommend
any changes to law and policy or to agency practices and procedures that may be desirable.
How did ACLEI meet this measure?
ACLEI draws insights from investigations to inform corruption prevention advice to LEIC Act agencies
and to make policy contributions to government and in other forums.
ACLEI’s investigations informed several policy initiatives in the reporting period—including data
retention legislation, extension of jurisdiction to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection,
countering risks concerning the private use of illicit drugs by public servants and law enforcement
officers, fraud control, handling of self-incriminatory evidence and security vetting.
Additionally, in 2014–15, ACLEI and the Integrity Commissioner:
 made six public submissions to parliamentary inquiries, including into integrity at the border and the
establishment of the Australian Border Force within the Department of Immigration and Border
Protection
 contributed to the ACC Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2015
 convened a workshop of LEIC Act agencies to map current and emerging corruption risks and
vulnerabilities at Australia’s border
 again participated as a member of the Border Management Group—a high level inter-departmental
committee of agencies which work in the border environment—and contributed anti-corruption
insights to that Group’s National Border Strategic Assessment, and
 captured and promulgated corruption prevention insights to a variety of law enforcement and
Australian Public Service agencies, including by issuing an occasional paper and by making public
presentations.
More information about ACLEI’s contribution to anti-corruption policy can be found in Chapter 4—
Strengthening Integrity Systems, under Adding to anti-corruption safeguards.
The Integrity Commissioner’s investigations also contribute to the integrity system by providing an
independent view of the corruption risks that an issue may illustrate, whether or not corrupt conduct
is found. For this reason, investigation reports may contain recommendations or suggestions to
strengthen an agency’s resistance to corruption, or improve the law enforcement integrity framework
more generally. The Integrity Commissioner may also decide to make an investigation report public,
by placing it on the ACLEI website, at www.aclei.gov.au.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
43
TABLE FIVE: Performance snapshot—improving resistance to corruption
MEASURE
PERFORMANCE SNAPSHOT
FURTHER
INFORMATION
Each investigation
addresses corruption
risk and, when
warranted, makes
recommendations for
improvement in
corruption prevention
or detection
measures.
In each of the three investigation reports given to the
Minister in 2014–15, the Integrity Commissioner or
Acting Integrity Commissioner made observations
about the integrity principle involved, how corruption
may arise or how it may be dealt with. Two of these
reports have been made public.
Chapter 4—
Strengthening
integrity systems
(see Raising
awareness)
Submissions that
relate to corruption
prevention or
enhancing integrity
may be made to
government or in
other relevant
forums.
ACLEI made six public submissions to Australian and
State Government or Parliamentary inquiries and
provided policy input to several other inquiries and
initiatives.
The Acting Integrity Commissioner, Mr Cornall,
issued a paper to heads of Australian Public Service
agencies outlining lessons and insights about
corruption control that have arisen from ACLEI
investigations.
ACLEI contributed to government policy development
in relation to, for example, fraud control, corruption
risk at the border, the threat from organised crime
and protective security reforms.
Chapter 6—
Reports to the
Minister
Chapter 4—
Strengthening
integrity systems
(see Adding to anticorruption
safeguards and
Building
partnerships
against corruption)
ACLEI remained in contact with stakeholders and
State integrity counterparts, to provide a basis for
confidence and currency in ACLEI’s advice.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
44
KPI SIX
Staff members of law enforcement agencies are made aware of ACLEI’s role
Why does this measure matter?
ACLEI’s awareness-raising efforts are intended to convey to law enforcement agency staff members
the importance that the Australian Government places on stamping out corruption.
This effort also helps to instil shared values and create a law enforcement culture in which individuals
(particularly supervisors) are able to recognise the indicators of corrupt behaviour and are willing to
report information appropriately.
How did ACLEI meet this measure?
ACLEI promotes itself specifically in law enforcement agencies, and more broadly, using a variety of
strategies, including an internet presence (www.aclei.gov.au), speeches, presentations and the
distribution of a promotional pamphlet and other publications.
LEIC Act agency staff also become aware of ACLEI through promulgation of investigation
outcomes—for example, newspaper articles and agency internal communications. During 2014–15,
the Integrity Commissioner and ACLEI staff made 27 presentations to selected audiences (see
Appendix 1—Papers and presentations). The purpose of these outreach activities is to draw attention
to ACLEI’s role in the integrity framework and to build broad and diverse partnerships to further
ACLEI’s anti-corruption work.
TABLE SIX: Performance snapshot—awareness-raising
MEASURE
PERFORMANCE SNAPSHOT
FURTHER
INFORMATION
Marketing and other
awareness-raising
activities are in place,
including joint
initiatives with other
agencies.
ACLEI’s website and information pamphlet describe
how the Integrity Commissioner and ACLEI detect,
disrupt and deter corrupt conduct in Commonwealth
law enforcement agencies, and provide information
about how to report suspected corruption to the
Integrity Commissioner.
Chapter 4—
Strengthening
integrity systems
(see Raising
awareness)
ACLEI reissued its pamphlet during the year to
reflect changes to its jurisdiction.
Appendix 1—
Papers and
presentations
LEIC Act agencies inform their staff about ACLEI’s
role and impact. For example, during the reporting
period, the CEO of the Australian Customs and
Border Protection Service and the AFP
Commissioner both issued all-staff emails relating to
the outcomes of ACLEI investigations.
ACLEI assisted the CrimTrac Agency to design an
integrity awareness training package, with an online
component.
Two investigation reports, one summary of an
unpublished report and several of the Integrity
Commissioner’s speeches from 2014–15 have been
made public on ACLEI’s website.
The Integrity Commissioner or ACLEI officers made
18 presentations to staff of agencies in ACLEI’s
jurisdiction to assist integrity training initiatives
or to raise awareness of corruption risk.
In appropriate circumstances, ACLEI issues media
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
45
releases relating to arrests.
Targeted
presentations about
integrity are made to
diverse audiences.
The Integrity Commissioner or senior ACLEI staff
made nine presentations to seven domestic and
international audiences during the year. These
presentations focused on corruption enabled border
crime, integrity leadership and culture, integrity as an
organisational asset and corruption prevention
capacity building.
Appendix 1—
Papers and
presentations
In December 2014, ACLEI’s Community of Practice
for Corruption Prevention held a panel discussion on
Private conduct, Public conflict.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
46
KPI SEVEN
ACLEI handles personal information appropriately
Why does this measure matter?
ACLEI’s detection and investigation roles rely on the collection of sensitive law enforcement,
personal and other information. ACLEI has been granted significant powers to gather such
information. This information is valuable to organised crime and to corrupt law enforcement officers,
who may wish to manipulate, destroy or use it to undermine a legitimate law enforcement outcome.
Additionally, if potential partner agencies did not have a basis for confidence in the security of
ACLEI’s information holdings, those agencies would be reluctant to engage in taskforces with ACLEI,
share information or cooperate on other projects. Witnesses and other informants—who may include
members of the public and staff members of law enforcement agencies—are also more willing to
share information with ACLEI if they can be confident that it would be handled appropriately and that
reputations are protected from unfair harm.
Accordingly, ACLEI needs to have in place robust security and integrity measures, to remain a
trusted and effective guard against corruption.
How did ACLEI meet this measure?
The Integrity Commissioner publishes Information Guidelines under Hearings, notices
and information guidelines on the ACLEI website, www.aclei.gov.au, to provide information about
how ACLEI obtains, handles, uses or disseminates information gathered through investigations.
Most investigations are managed from a secure operations facility in Canberra, where physical and
technical features allow information to be stored, accounted for and shared in private. Investigations
under the Sydney joint taskforce arrangements also operate from secure premises.
ACLEI also has arrangements for access to a number of law enforcement databases from ACLEI’s
secure operations facility. Such access is governed through agreements and memoranda of
understanding. ACLEI’s Professional Standards Officer performs regular and random audits of
access to these databases, as well as to ACLEI information holdings. The results of these audits are
reported to the Integrity Commissioner and, when relevant, to the agency concerned.
ACLEI’s Fraud and Corruption Control Plan 2014–2015 communicates to all staff members their
obligations and responsibilities in relation to information management and security. During 2014–15,
ACLEI delivered training to all staff members on information security as part of its rolling mandatory
training programme. A subsequent internal audit by KPMG confirmed the appropriateness of ACLEI’s
integrity arrangements.
TABLE SEVEN: Performance snapshot—handling personal information
MEASURE
PERFORMANCE SNAPSHOT
FURTHER
INFORMATION
Regular audits are
undertaken to ensure
compliance with legal
obligations and better
practice policy for
information handling.
ACLEI handles information—including exhibits—
within a secure environment, segmented into areas
requiring different levels of access.
Chapter 8—
Corporate
management (see
Governance
practices,
Management of
human resources,
Information
management and
technology and
Facilities
management)
ACLEI conducted an audit of items held in the exhibit
room during the year, to ensure records were up to
date and properly maintained. A ‘nightsafe’ was also
installed to ensure
24-hour access to safe storage for exhibits.
Access to other agencies’ databases is governed
through memoranda of understanding. Each ACLEI
officer has a unique identifier and all access is
logged. ACLEI has in place authorisation and audit
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
47
mechanisms to satisfy the database owner’s
requirements. A further point-in-time audit of ACLEI
accesses to these databases was conducted during
the reporting period.
Chapter 9—
Accountability (see
Internal
accountability)
ACLEI carried out a risk review of external databases
to inform the design of a strengthened audit
programme in 2015–16.
In 2014–15, ACLEI introduced more-regular and
random audits of staff accesses to ACLEI information
holdings and documents.
The results of all information-handling audits and
reviews are reported to the Integrity Commissioner
and Executive.
ACLEI’s minimum security classification for ongoing
staff remains at Negative Vetting Level 2 (Top
Secret).
ACLEI complies with the Australian Government
Protective Security Policy Framework, which
contains a classification system for controlling
storage and access to official information and
documents.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
48
Financial performance
ACLEI’s audited 2014–15 Financial Statements appear in Part 4 of this Annual Report. Some notable
features of the accounts reflecting ACLEI’s performance and efficiency are summarised in this
section.
As shown in Table Eight, the total resources available to ACLEI in 2014–15 were $10.154m,
providing for an estimated staff establishment (average staffing level) of
thirty-eight. This allocation included amounts provided as appropriations in the Federal Budget
(represented in the annual Portfolio Budget Statements), those transferred to ACLEI by other
agencies as receipts, and provision for depreciation and amortisation.
In 2014–15, $1.7m (or approximately 18% of staffing resources) originated from funding measures
which had been due to lapse at the conclusion of the reporting year. Of that amount, $1m was
temporary transitional funding—provided to ACLEI under the Smaller Government – strengthen and
enhance Australia’s border protection services measure—to assist ACBPS with preparations in
2014–15 for the establishment of the Australian Border Force. The balance ($0.7m) related to an
extension of ACLEI’s jurisdiction two years previously—to include AUSTRAC, CrimTrac and the
Department of Agriculture—and was subject to further review and consideration in the context of the
2015–16 Budget.
A review for the Minister for Justice was conducted in September 2014 by Mr Peter Hamburger PSM,
who recommended continuation (and some extension) of the various funding measures that had
been due to lapse. Mr Hamburger’s recommendation to the Minister was subsequently addressed in
the 2015–16 Budget.
However, in the 2014–15 year, this situation led to ACLEI taking a conservative approach to
recruitment of ongoing staff, with greater weight applied to adaptive management strategies. These
measures included temporary and casual employment (including secondments) and purchasing of
services from other entities, particularly the AFP (in relation to the initial establishment of the Joint
Taskforce in Sydney).
In ACLEI’s operating context—which involves dealing with sensitive law enforcement information—it
is also necessary to ensure that staff are security cleared to an appropriate level, which caused
recruitment delays in some cases. Even so, ACLEI had an average staffing level of 30.6 during
2014–15.
Achieving accurate budget forecasting is an ongoing challenge for ACLEI, which has applied for an
operating loss in four of its nine years of operation. This variation can be more pronounced in a small
agency that allocates a high proportion of its budget to salaries.
At the end of 2014–15, ACLEI recorded an operating surplus, attributable to the agency, of $1.424
million. The primary cause of the operating surplus was difficulty experienced in filling temporary
vacancies and supplier expenses that were lower than anticipated (relating to the Sydney Joint
Taskforce).
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
49
TABLE EIGHT: Resources available to ACLEI
2013–14
Resources
Average
staffing level
2014–15
2015–16
Estimated
expenses1
Revised
estimated
expenses2
Actual
expenses3
Estimated
expenses2
Revised
estimated
expenses4
Actual
expenses3
Estimated
expenses4
$’000
$’000
$’000
$’000
$’000
$’000
$’000
7,615
8,853
8,077
10,154
10,206
8,878
12,314
34
36
25.2
38
38
30.6
52
1 Budgeted estimates are based on Table 2.1: Budgeted expenses for Outcome 1, ACLEI, Portfolio Budget Statements 2013–14,
Budget Related Paper No. 1.2, Attorney-General’s Portfolio, p 70.
2 Budgeted estimates are based on Table 2.1: Budgeted expenses for Outcome 1, ACLEI, Portfolio Budget Statements 2014–15,
Budget Related Paper No. 1.2, Attorney-General’s Portfolio, p 98.
3 Actual expenses include Original Budget, Revenue from government, and Budgeted Operating Loss approvals made by the Minister
for Finance on an annual basis.
4 Budgeted estimates are based on Table 2.1: Budgeted expenses for Outcome 1, ACLEI, Portfolio Budget Statements 2015–16,
Budget Related Paper No. 1.2, Attorney-General’s Portfolio, p 97.
Table Nine sets out the total resources available to ACLEI during the year, including:
 unspent appropriations from previous years (which require permission from the Minister for Finance
to be used in any year), and
 unspent departmental non-operating equity injections from previous years.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
50
TABLE NINE: Agency resource statement 2014–15
Actual available
appropriation for
2014–15
$’000
Payments
made
2014–15
$’000
Balance
remaining
2014–15
$’000
(a)
(b)
(a) – (b)
Departmental appropriation
9,610
8,536
1,074
Previous years’ outputs
3,074
-
3,074
(1,356)
-
(1,356)
75
75
-
11,403
8,611
2,792
-
-
-
-
--
-
Total Available Annual
Appropriations and Payments
11,403
8,611
2,792
Total net resourcing and payments
for ACLEI (A + B)
11,403
8,611
2,792
Ordinary Annual Services1
Adjust previous years’ outputs2
s 74 Relevant agency receipts
Total ordinary annual services
A
Other services3
Equity injections
Total other services
B
1
Appropriation Bill (No.1) 2014–15. This amount may also include prior year departmental appropriation and s 74 relevant
agency receipts.
2
Adjustment made to prior year appropriations to show total departmental appropriation available at 1 July 2014.
3
Prior year departmental non-operating equity injections.
Table Ten shows the net cost of ACLEI’s Outcome and Programme. As previously noted, the net
result for ACLEI’s outcome was an operating surplus of $1.276 million (refer also to Note 16 of the
Financial Statements, Net Cost of Outcome Delivery).
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
51
TABLE TEN: Expenses for Outcome One
Expenses for Outcome One
Outcome 1—Independent assurance to the
Australian Government that Commonwealth
law enforcement agencies and their staff act
with integrity, by detecting, investigating and
preventing corruption.
Budget1
2014–15
$’000
Actual
Expenses
2014–15
$’000
Variation
2014–15
$’000
(a)
(b)
(a) – (b)
9,685
8,309
1,376
469
569
(100)
Total for Programme 1.1
10,154
8,878
1,276
Total expenses for Outcome 1
10,154
8,878
1,276
2013–14
2014–15
25.2
30.6
Programme 1.1: Detect, investigate and
prevent corruption in prescribed law
enforcement agencies; assist law enforcement
agencies to maintain and improve the integrity
of staff members
Departmental expenses
Departmental appropriation2
Expenses not requiring appropriation in the
Budget year
Staffing
Average Staffing Level (number)
1 Full-year budget, as presented to the Parliament at Budget 2014–15, in respect of the reporting period.
2 Departmental appropriation combines ‘Ordinary annual services (Appropriation Bill No. 1)’ and ‘Revenue from
independent sources (s 74)’.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
52
CHAPTER 4—STRENGTHENING INTEGRITY SYSTEMS
This chapter describes ACLEI’s contribution to the law enforcement integrity
framework.
The objects of the LEIC Act include to prevent corrupt conduct in law enforcement agencies and to
maintain and improve the integrity of staff members of law enforcement agencies. In support of these
purposes, ACLEI looks for opportunities to strengthen integrity systems by sharing insights into how
to manage and deal with corruption risk.
In particular, ACLEI seeks to build resistance to corruption in LEIC Act agencies by:
 building systemic capacity to identify corruption risks and vulnerabilities
 adding to anti-corruption safeguards by strengthening laws, policy and practices
 raising awareness and understanding about corruption and how to deal with it, and
 building partnerships against corruption.
Many of ACLEI’s activities during 2014–15 show results across more than one category.
Identifying corruption risks and vulnerabilities
In high risk environments—especially where sensitive information is held or law enforcement interdiction
decisions are made—agencies must expect to find instances of corrupt conduct, and be sceptical of
detection systems if they do not reveal any evidence of it. ACLEI seeks to work with LEIC Act agencies to
build awareness and capacity to identify key law enforcement corruption threats and vulnerabilities. This
combined effort helps to ensure the notification and referral system is geared to the greatest threats to
law enforcement integrity and that agency line managers have the tools to manage corruption risk.
In recent years, ACLEI’s detection strategy has been moving to a more open exchange of data,
information and intelligence with a wider range of partners. As a result, ACLEI is both a beneficiary of
and contributor to the development and analysis of criminal intelligence, as it pertains to corruption in
law enforcement.
The following points describe ACLEI’s 2014–15 contribution to building systemic capacity to identify
corruption risks and vulnerabilities. Chapter 7—Patterns and trends discusses further some of the
corruption risk factors identified by ACLEI during the year.
 ACLEI and the AFP’s Joint Taskforce (JTF) in Sydney was established in June 2014 to detect and
investigate corruption enabled border crime, allowing a whole-of-environment approach to finding and
dealing with vulnerabilities. See Partnerships, later in this chapter, for more information about the
JTF.
 In 2014–15, ACLEI continued to work with the ACC to use the National Criminal Intelligence Fusion
Capability to inform anti-corruption investigations and identify emerging leads.
 During the reporting period, ACLEI provided strategic or technical advice for Fraud and Corruption
risk assessments or development of control plans to the ACC, AUSTRAC, the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP), in preparation for the
inclusion of that Department within the Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction.
In 2015–16, ACLEI intends to convene an expert panel on fraud and corruption control planning, to
strengthen peer review of LEIC Act agency anti-corruption arrangements.
 In June 2015, the Integrity Commissioner attended a meeting of the Department of Agriculture Audit
Committee to discuss corruption risks and treatments. ACLEI plans to extend this programme to
other LEIC Act agencies in 2015–16.
 ACLEI worked with the Attorney-General’s Department to identify ways to detect and guard against
corruption risk from staff members with high levels of information access and permissions (such as
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
53
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) administrators). A Community of Practice for
Corruption Prevention workshop on the subject is also planned for 2015–16.
 In 2014–15, ACLEI provided expert advice to the classified National Border Strategic Assessment
2015 (NBSA), coordinated by the ACBPS. The NBSA is a whole-of-government intelligence
assessment of the environment relevant to the management of Australia’s border. It focuses on the
strategic shifts in the major threats and external vulnerabilities, including a forecast of key trends and
emerging issues over the following two years, and informs resource deployment and strategic
decision-making for border agencies. ACLEI contributed information about corruption as an enabler,
where systemic vulnerabilities might be found, and the importance of using ‘active’ integrity
measures—such as proactive audit activity, drug testing and integrity testing—as well as ‘passive’
measures, such as professional reporting and complaints mechanisms.
 ACLEI and ACC officers travelled to the United States and Canada on a fact-finding visit
in May 2015. The purpose of the visit was to exchange information about corruption enabled border
crime and strengthen related intelligence flows among law enforcement and border agencies about
corruption and organised criminal exploitation at the border. The Australian delegation met with 13
law enforcement and border agencies in the two countries. The focal point was a multi-agency
workshop on the theme of corruption enabled border crime, held at the Embassy of Australia
in Washington DC, which was hosted by the Australian Federal Police and attended by Australia’s
Ambassador to the United States, His Excellency the Hon. Kim Beazley AC. ACLEI and the ACC
have since been invited to discuss their observations with the Parliamentary Joint Committees on
Law Enforcement and ACLEI in August 2015. Chapter 7—Patterns and trends describes some of the
delegation’s findings.
 ACLEI shared considerations about the potential cost of law enforcement corruption to the Australian
economy for the ACC’s classified Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2015 report. The report
provides a profile of serious and organised crime in Australia, together with the context in which
organised crime operates in Australia. Its aim is to provide information to respond to the threat of
organised crime. An unclassified version, Organised Crime in Australia 2015, is available to the public
on the ACC website.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
54
Corruption enabled border crime workshop
In March 2015, ACLEI convened a workshop of LEIC Act agencies, with the objective to map
current and emerging corruption vulnerabilities in the border environment, taking into account
relationships with other crime enablers (such as money-laundering) and to understand how the
corruption risk landscape is changing. Participants included senior officers from integrity and
operational branches of the ACBPS, ACC, ACLEI, AFP, AUSTRAC, the Department of Agriculture
and the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.
The workshop quickly established the common view that corruption is one of the ways that criminal
entities may seek to move illicit goods, cash or substances across the border, in either direction.
Participants observed that corruption is—perversely—most likely to be used when more direct
methods of defeating border controls are perceived as less likely to be successful. For example
when border controls and law enforcement are at their most effective, there is a high value for
‘inside’ information that would help overcome border interdictions.
Using compromise, grooming, bribery, coercion or other methods, crime groups may seek to recruit
insiders in one of three broad categories.

‘Gatekeepers’, who may or may not work on the front line. Gatekeepers have access to and can
manipulate official processes, such as rosters or inspections. They have the ability to ‘wave
goods through’ or set up the environment to avoid detection of an illicit activity.

‘Facilitators’—for example, people with access to databases or information technology systems
who can obtain or manipulate information. This group also can help others ‘hide their tracks’.

‘Advisers’, who can advise on how to exploit existing border vulnerabilities or evade detection, or
act as brokers to provide introductions to contacts and networks.
The group noted that, as border agencies harden their workforces against corruption, it is probable
that criminal groups will seek easier targets in State or Commonwealth agencies with close
operational relationships, the wider public sector, contractors or the private sector (the displacement
effect). For this reason, there is a need to monitor organised crime activity at the border and the
extent to which they may be using corruption as a method.
Workshop participants agreed that opportunities exist to strengthen the border by making more
advantageous use of the breadth of information gathered through anti-corruption investigations.
The workshop informed preparations for the ACLEI/ACC delegation to the United States and
Canada to gather information about the corruption enabled border crime threat in those countries,
and to gain an insight into emerging threats for Australia.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
55
Adding to anti-corruption safeguards
LEIC Act agencies
ACLEI’s overall strategic objective is to make it more difficult for corrupt conduct to occur, or to
remain undetected. For this reason, ACLEI and the agencies in the LEIC Act jurisdiction work
together to strengthen deterrence and detection arrangements. An example is the Community of
Practice for Corruption Prevention, through which anti-corruption practitioners in the LEIC Act
agencies learn from ACLEI and one another. ACLEI also engages with agencies individually to
contribute to the design of their integrity frameworks, and—in turn—to benefit from their experiences
in a variety of integrity-risk environments.
 The Integrity Commissioner’s investigation reports (summarised in Chapter 6—Reports to the
Minister) include observations aimed at developing the capacity of agencies to detect, deal with, and
deter corrupt conduct. In 2014–15, these observations related to corruption vulnerabilities associated
with limited supervision, back room staff (particularly ICT ‘super users’), and the value of drug testing
as a detection method.
 During the year, the Department of Agriculture worked with ACLEI to identify corruption vulnerabilities
in its operating environment. The Department has since implemented a range of measures to
strengthen integrity further, including by:
– revising secondary employment policies
–
reviewing the control of regulatory stamps and seals, and
–
making arrangements for additional measures, such as staff rotation, to address specific
risks.
 The ACBPS consulted ACLEI during the development of internal integrity testing procedures.
 ACLEI made available to LEIC Act agencies an internal policy on social media use by ACLEI staff
members, developed in the reporting year. The policy—which was informed by the expertise of
members of the Community of Practice for Corruption Prevention—describes the dangers to integrity
that could arise (including that crime groups may identify and target staff members through their
online profiles) and sets out the Integrity Commissioner’s expectations of staff when they use social
media for personal or professional purposes.
 As part of an internal audit of corruption controls, ACLEI piloted a scenario-based integrity survey with
ACLEI staff. The survey methodology is based on research by the Sellenger Centre for Research in
Law, Justice and Social Change at the Edith Cowan University in Western Australia and seeks to
capture attitudes to professional values as a measure of workplace integrity culture. ACLEI intends to
develop the methodology further in 2015–16 with a view to sharing it with Community of Practice
agencies. Information about the results of the survey as applied to ACLEI in 2015 can be found in
Chapter 9—Accountability, under Integrity assurance measures.
Contribution to anti-corruption policy
ACLEI works with the LEIC Act agencies, the Attorney-General’s Department and other government
agencies to develop or refine policy settings with the aim of strengthening the broader integrity
environment and ensuring that anti-corruption legislative measures remain matched to changes in
risk. As the only Commonwealth agency whose sole purpose is the defeat of corruption, ACLEI also
participates in government consultations on matters relating to wider anti-corruption policy.
 In 2014–15, the Integrity Commissioner and ACLEI contributed to policy development or provided
advice in relation to corruption enabled border crime, in the context of the establishment of the
Australian Border Force within the Department of Immigration and Border Protection, including what
elements of the ACBPS integrity framework should continue to apply in the DIBP.
 A significant event in the reporting year was the passage through the Parliament of measures to
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
56
ensure that telecommunications providers retain relevant data for a period of two years, which
designated law enforcement and integrity agencies can access for reasonable cause. Historical
telecommunications data is an essential anti-corruption tool, since it helps to expose otherwise hardto-detect corrupt collaborations. The Integrity Commissioner, Mr Griffin, appeared as a witness before
the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, which inquired into the merits of the
Bill.
 ACLEI is a member of an Inter-Departmental Committee on Protective Security Strategic Reforms.
ACLEI contributes observations relating to:
–
insider threat arising from multiple causes (including corruption and criminal infiltration)
–
‘the enduring lie’ (relating to the reliance on the honesty of individuals who have an incentive
to hide a personal secret to retain their jobs), and
–
the consequent need for multi-channel strategies to deal with the ‘difficult-to-detect’
problem—for example auditing, data matching, drug testing, and testing for alignment with
organisational values.
 ACLEI also made policy contributions to the Australian Government’s anti-corruption frameworks,
relating to:
–
fraud control, in relation to whistleblower arrangements to detect and prevent fraud against
the Government and corruption pertaining to corporate crime
–
the appropriate protection of anti-corruption intelligence and investigation information under
the Freedom of Information Act 1982
–
the uses to which self-incriminatory evidence gathered through coercive means during an
anti-corruption investigation may be put, and
–
improving the operation of the LEIC Act and its Regulations.
The Integrity Commissioner made public submissions to six inquiries during 2014–15:
 Review of Police Oversight in NSW, conducted by Mr Andrew Tink AM—24 June 2015
 Inquiry into the Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment (Powers) Bill 2015, Senate Legal and
Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee—1 June 2015
 Inquiry into the integrity of Australia’s border arrangements, Parliamentary Joint Committee on
ACLEI—28 May 2015
 Inquiry into the Australian Border Force Bill 2015 and the Customs and Other Legislation Amendment
(Australian Border Force) Bill 2015, Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs—
27 March 2015
 Inquiry into the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill
2014, Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security—
16 January 2015, and
 Inquiry into prosecutions arising from Independent Commission Against Corruption investigations,
Parliament of New South Wales Committee on the Independent Commission Against Corruption—
7 August 2014.
The Integrity Commissioner’s public submissions are available on ACLEI’s website,
www.aclei.gov.au, under Reports, submissions and speeches.
Raising awareness
ACLEI’s awareness-raising activities have a number of strategic aims. In the first instance, members
of the public and staff members of the agencies in the LEIC Act jurisdiction must be aware of—and
have confidence in—the Integrity Commissioner and ACLEI for them to consider ACLEI as a viable
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
57
avenue for reporting suspected corrupt conduct. Second, awareness-raising supports LEIC Act
agency efforts to maintain high integrity cultures—based on shared professional standards—where
corrupt conduct is not tolerated.
In addition, ACLEI aims to assist LEIC Act agencies to improve the ability of supervisors and staff
members to recognise the visible indicators that corrupt conduct may be occurring, and to know how
to escalate concerns appropriately.
ACLEI also makes use of opportunities presented by conferences and engagement with government
agencies and academics to raise awareness about corruption risks and vulnerabilities and to give
prominence to integrity policy matters.
During 2014–15, ACLEI achieved these objectives in the following ways.
Information products
 ACLEI’s website, www.aclei.gov.au, describes how the Integrity Commissioner and ACLEI detect,
disrupt and deter corrupt conduct in Commonwealth law enforcement agencies, and provides
information about how to report suspected corruption to the Integrity Commissioner.
 ACLEI updated its promotional pamphlet to take account of the change to its jurisdiction from 1 July
2015, namely the inclusion of the DIBP and Australian Border Force. ACLEI has since made the
pamphlet available to the integrity units of all six LEIC Act agencies. The pamphlet is also available
for download on ACLEI’s website, under About us.
Sharing insights
 In December 2014, the Acting Integrity Commissioner, Mr Cornall, circulated to Australian Public
Service agency heads an occasional paper Corruption risk in the Public Service—lessons from law
enforcement corruption investigations in which he outlined observations arising from ACLEI’s
investigations which may have relevance to the contemporary public service and could inform
integrity leadership.
 ACLEI provided advice to CrimTrac for its design of an integrity awareness training suite of packages
for its employees (including some contractors). At the close of the reporting period, CrimTrac was
finalising the online component, including a proposed interview with the Integrity Commissioner, Mr
Griffin.
 ACLEI was one of several agencies that contributed to the design of a template Fraud Awareness eLearning Training Package developed by the Attorney-General’s Department to assist
Commonwealth entities to meet the requirements of section 10 of the Public Governance,
Performance and Accountability Rule 2014 (Preventing, detecting and dealing with fraud). The Fraud
Awareness Package is available free of charge to Australian Public Service agencies.
 At the invitation of the agencies concerned, the Integrity Commissioner and ACLEI officers made—in
total—18 targeted awareness-raising presentations to staff members, managers, anti-corruption
practitioners and operational audiences in LEIC Act agencies. These presentations are listed at
Appendix 1—ACLEI presentations.
 Two presentations by the Integrity Commissioner, Mr Griffin—addressed to senior officers and
managers in the AFP and Department of Agriculture—dealt with the subject of integrity leadership.
The presentations are available on the ACLEI website, www.aclei.gov.au.
 Mr Griffin spoke about integrity culture in a panel on Law Enforcement integrity at the AFP
Interagency Integrity Program in June 2015. Separately, ACLEI’s Executive Director Operations also
presented to the Program: Lessons from Operation Heritage/Marca. As in previous years, an ACLEI
staff member also participated as a student, at the invitation of the AFP.
 ACLEI staff members made four corruption prevention presentations to three Australian government
audiences—namely, the corruption enabled border crime workshop, the Commonwealth Fraud
Liaison Forum and two presentations to the Australian Public Service Ethics Contact Officer Network.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
58
 In November 2014, the Executive Director Operations and Director Investigations (Canberra)
addressed the Tenth National Investigations Symposium in Sydney, on the topic of Corruption
investigators, the integrity imperative. The presentation described how ACLEI applies what it has
learned about how to establish and maintain a culture of integrity to ensure the success of its own
objectives.
 ACLEI is again a partner agency sponsor of the biennial Australian Public Sector
Anti-Corruption Conference, which has an important role in raising awareness about and building
expertise in countering corruption. This year’s conference will be hosted by the Queensland Crime
and Corruption Commission in Brisbane in November 2015. ACLEI is scheduled to participate in a
panel discussion about corruption control planning and the Integrity Commissioner will speak to the
topic of integrity leadership.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
59
LEIC Act agency initiatives
ACLEI’s long-term impact may, in part, be gauged by how the agencies in the
Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction respond to changes in corruption threat and
vulnerability. This section provides a selection of examples about how LEIC Act
agencies acted on their individual corruption‑ risk profiles to further develop their
anti-corruption frameworks in 2014–15.
ACC awareness-raising
A key integrity strategy is to ensure staff and supervisors are attuned to the prospect that corrupt
conduct could occur among their trusted colleagues, and to apprise them of changes in risk.
The ACC Integrity Assurance Team raises awareness through the agency’s online weekly newsletter.
Articles in 2014–15 included an explanation of the ‘trusted insider’ threat, reminders to disclose all
conflicts of interest and a series of case studies—from information reported in the media—covering illicit
drug use, fraud and unlawful disclosure of information. Feedback received through the ACC integrity
survey indicated that staff found the articles to be informative, interesting and relevant to the ACC
operating environment.
The AFP Interagency Integrity Program
Corruption is adaptable. Strengthening the integrity regime in one area may drive organised crime
and corrupt officials to look for weaknesses in other related areas. For this reason, agencies that
work together closely or that share law enforcement information need to have confidence in the
others’ anti-corruption arrangements. Accordingly, LEIC Act agencies participate in—or lead—efforts
to build the law enforcement integrity system overall.
The Australian Federal Police Professional Standards Command hosts the annual Interagency
Integrity Program. The program aims to build a network of anti-corruption practitioners in partner
agencies, by focusing on enhancing integrity leadership and decision-making. The Program is
supported by a range of State, Commonwealth and international government and law enforcement
agency participants. It contributes to developing a law enforcement community with enhanced skills
in strategic integrity management and high levels of corruption resistance.
ACLEI participated by providing guest speakers. An ACLEI staff member was a student on the
course.
AUSTRAC integrity framework
Each public service agency has its own distinctive fraud and corruption risk profile, inherent to its
core business. However, conventional fraud risk analyses often focus on generic process
vulnerabilities or on administrative and financial matters (such as credit card or procurement fraud).
During 2014–15, AUSTRAC established that its business depends on three core asset groups:
Information and information technology systems, People and people-related processes, and
Resources and other assets. Identifying these assets provided a straightforward framework to
examine the complex fraud and integrity risks—both external and internal—that could threaten the
delivery of AUSTRAC’s outcomes for government.
The information generated helped AUSTRAC to review its IT systems and existing controls. Further,
with the aim of fully understanding the corruption threat, AUSTRAC reviewed and categorised staff
positions and roles for their vulnerability and attractiveness to external compromise. The outcomes of
this review will be used to inform fraud and corruption prevention and monitoring activities.
AUSTRAC’s approach is based on ACLEI’s ‘Asset Protection Model’—as set out in the Integrity
Commissioner‘s 2013–14 Annual Report—and is an excellent adaptation to meet the needs of a
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
60
specialised operating environment.
Department of Agriculture integrity measures
Much of the Department of Agriculture’s workforce is dispersed across Australia, working in regional
and border (sea and airport) locations. Functional or geographic isolation can make it more difficult to
maintain a common professional culture—leading to sub-cultures or misplaced loyalties—and
creates challenges for supervision (see Chapter 7—Patterns and trends).
The Department’s program to broaden the base of its integrity measures in 2014–15 included an annual
integrity declaration and a mandatory online integrity training module to be competed by all staff.
These efforts aim to ensure that Agriculture staff members across Australia are aware of the
Department’s values and corruption risks and their related obligations. They also provide the
mechanism for integrity discussions between staff and supervisors and for staff to inform the
Department of integrity challenges.
CrimTrac Integrity Program
When government agencies provide fraud or ethics-awareness training to staff, it is best practice to
refer to their roles and the specific risks that workgroups may encounter. This practice helps to
overcome the perceptions that fraud or corruption control is a corporate or financial matter, and that it
is “someone else’s problem”.
In 2014–15, CrimTrac produced a three-phased integrity training program using adult education
principles to pull together the concepts of integrity, fraud and security.
Phase One involves annual mandatory online learning, and Phase Two is a face-to-face CrimTrac Integrity
Awareness training package for groups. Phase Three is a team-based facilitated discussion focused on
identifying local-level fraud, corruption and security risks and ensuring team members know how to
recognise and report suspected corrupt conduct.
The training program is supplemented by an online integrity intranet page. Continually being added
to, this page provides integrity-related information—including for example training resources,
reporting mechanisms, policies, guides and delegations.
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service innovative detection mechanisms
As the sophistication of organised crime increases, corrupt conduct is likely to become more difficult
to discover using conventional means, such as audits, randomised controls, staff vetting or
examination of records. New and different ways must be found to detect indications that corrupt
conduct may be occurring.
To meet this challenge, from November 2013—and throughout 2014–15—the then Australian Customs
and Border Protection Service (working closely with the ACC and ACLEI) operated Taskforce Pharos.
The objective of the Taskforce was to identify hard to detect corruption in the Service. The Taskforce
focused on generating new leads and finding indicators of possible corruption by using a range of
analysis, assessment and data comparison methodologies across various data sources.
This project is an example of LEIC Act agencies cooperating to bring together and analyse information
to detect corrupt conduct and target areas at risk. The model is expected to inform future corruption
detection projects built on sharing and analysing information.
Department of Immigration and Border Protection integrity framework and policies
Changes in administrative arrangements or policy can affect the corruption-risk profile associated
with government or law enforcement functions. It is important that agencies—to the extent possible—
prepare for the changes in risk that inevitably accompany adjustments to operating strategy.
Accordingly, with the Government’s decision in May 2014 to create the Australian Border Force
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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within the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) from 1 July 2015, work
commenced in both the DIBP and ACBPS to develop a framework to meet the integrity needs of the
new arrangements.
During 2014–15, following review of existing policies in both agencies and staff consultations, a
framework of new integrity policies was developed for the integrated Department. These policies
include: the requirement for staff to hold national security and employment suitability clearances; a
prohibition on working under the influence of alcohol and taking illicit drugs at any time; drug and
alcohol testing; mandatory reporting of serious misconduct and corruption; restrictions on secondary
employment; targeted integrity testing; and restrictions on the use of personal mobile electronic
devices in certain operational work areas. ACLEI provided technical and strategic advice to the
review.
Building partnerships against corruption
Cooperative relationships—with the agencies in the Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction, with other
integrity agencies, with government agencies at Commonwealth, State and Territory levels, and
internationally—assist ACLEI to counter law enforcement corruption and to play a role in
strengthening Australia’s integrity arrangements more generally, including at the border. Accordingly,
ACLEI endeavours to establish and maintain productive relationships with key partners in Australia’s
integrity system.
Community of Practice for Corruption Prevention
ACLEI convenes the Community of Practice for Corruption Prevention as a forum for corruption
prevention practitioners from the agencies in the LEIC Act jurisdiction to share good practice and
experience, generate and discuss new ideas to prevent corrupt conduct, and to carry out joint
projects. The meeting provides a venue to speak frankly about challenges, what works in corruption
control and in what circumstances. A major benefit of the Community of Practice is that it sets in
motion significant out-of-session interaction between individual agencies. These interactions
continued in 2014–15.
The Community of Practice for Corruption Prevention met three times during the reporting period, at
meetings hosted by AUSTRAC, the Attorney-General’s Department and ACLEI. Of particular interest
was a panel discussion, held in November 2014, entitled Private conduct, Public conflict. The panel
dealt with the management of conflicts of interest caused by differences between some officials’
private values or behaviours (such as illicit drug taking) and their official roles as public servants or
law enforcement officers. On the panel were speakers from ACLEI, the Australian Public Service
Commission, the Australian Government Solicitor and the ACC.
Additionally, in June 2015, the Australian Taxation Office offered a presentation about innovative
work to identify integrity risks or hotspots through examining diverse sources of data. At the same
meeting, ACLEI’s Executive Director Operations provided observations about corruption risk and its
treatment arising from the ACLEI/ACC corruption enabled border crime delegation to the United
States and Canada.
In 2014–15, the Community of Practice was strengthened by the inclusion of the DIBP, the Australian
Public Service Commission and the Australian Taxation Office as standing members.
Since the number and diversity of participants has also grown with the extension of the Integrity
Commissioner’s jurisdiction, ACLEI intends to restructure the Community of Practice in 2015–16,
to ensure that it remains relevant, dynamic and useful.
State integrity agencies
The relationships between ACLEI and State integrity agencies were maintained and strengthened in
2014–15. The Integrity Commissioner and other ACLEI staff continued to meet with the heads and
operations staff of these agencies to exchange information about corruption risks and emerging
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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patterns and trends.
 The Integrity Commissioner is a member of the Australian Anti-corruption Commissions Forum
(AACF), which includes the principals of anti-corruption agencies across Australia. The Forum’s aim
is to improve the effectiveness of individual organisations, identify strategic challenges, and work
cooperatively to identify ways to deal with these challenges. The New South Wales Independent
Commission Against Corruption hosted a meeting of AACF principals in May 2015 to discuss issues
of common interest. At ACLEI’s invitation, the Deputy Secretary of the Attorney-General’s
Department, Ms Katherine Jones, updated integrity agency heads on recent amendments to
Commonwealth laws relating to data retention.
 In December 2014, the Integrity Commission of Tasmania hosted a meeting of senior executives
from all AACF member organisations, for the purpose of sharing information about changes in
operating environments of each agency and to enable cooperative efforts when appropriate. An
important outcome of this meeting was the establishment of a consultative group comprising legal
officers from each agency to provide a community of expertise in this important area of practice. The
first legal consultative group meeting was held in Adelaide in July 2015.
 Reciprocal bilateral engagement with State integrity agencies continues. For example:
ACLEI and the NSW ICAC have consulted on approaches to corruption prevention
–
the ACLEI/AFP Joint Taskforce, based in Sydney, has benefited from considerable support
and assistance from the New South Wales Police Integrity Commission
–
in April 2015, the Western Australia Corruption and Crime Commission provided an ACLEI
officer with training on operations management software, and
–
ACLEI participated in two research projects being conducted by the Queensland Crime and
Corruption Commission.
The Integrity Commissioner recognises and appreciates State integrity agencies’ willingness to share
expertise and work together with ACLEI.
Joint Taskforce—countering corruption enabled border crime
Towards the end of the 2013–14 reporting period—in consultation with the ACBPS—ACLEI and the
AFP jointly established a Joint Taskforce (JTF) to detect, disrupt and deter serious and organised
criminal activity at the border, particularly the importation of illicit substances and commodities.
ACLEI’s role in the JTF is to focus on corrupt activity involving staff members of agencies in the
Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction.
The JTF is based in Sydney and hosted by the AFP. This arrangement places investigators in close
proximity to border operations and allows swift, flexible and efficient responses to operational
requirements and new leads, including any generated by the ACBPS or other partner agencies.
The Sydney location also positions the JTF well to form operational relationships with a broad range
of law enforcement and integrity agencies in NSW, such as the Police Integrity Commission, the NSW
Crime Commission and the NSW Police Force.
Commonwealth agencies
Many Commonwealth agencies share the responsibility for maintaining and contributing to the
integrity of Australian Public Service agencies. The Integrity Commissioner participates actively as a
member of this community and passes on insights from ACLEI’s work that may also apply to the
wider Australian Public Service. To that end, the Integrity Commissioner engages closely with the
agencies in the LEIC Act jurisdiction, the Attorney-General’s Department and the Australian Public
Service Commissioner.
 The Integrity Commissioner is a member of the Heads of Commonwealth Operational Law
Enforcement Agencies (HOCOLEA). Membership of HOCOLEA allows ACLEI to work closely with a
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
63
broad range of agencies on corruption risks and threats to law enforcement outcomes. For example,
in May 2015, the Integrity Commissioner and Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Border
Protection led a discussion about managing corruption risk at the border. In addition, HOCOLEA
members are examining options to enhance information sharing for law enforcement purposes.
 The Integrity Agencies Group, which is a network of senior APS leaders with varying roles in the
fields of integrity and ethical decision-making, is convened twice a year by the Australian Public
Service Commissioner. In 2014–15, topics discussed included: managing inappropriate associations,
public interest disclosures, employment screening, corruption risk and the public sector integrity
framework.
 During 2014–15, ACLEI again participated in the Border Management Group, an inter-departmental
high-level committee of agencies that work in border environments. ACLEI’s contribution assisted this
group to consider integrity aspects of border reforms, and take account of the threat from corruption
enabled border crime. In turn, ACLEI’s participation enabled it to understand better the border
environment, offer timely and useful comment on corruption risk, and to focus its own investigations
to best effect.
The non-government anti-corruption community
The Integrity Commissioner and ACLEI staff members meet from time to time with researchers,
academics, representatives of non-government organisations (such as Transparency International
Australia), and others with an interest in preventing corruption. These relationships allow ACLEI to
engage in broader dialogue about addressing corruption risk and strengthening integrity systems.
ACLEI acknowledges the positive contribution that these individuals and organisations make to
public debate about how to counter corruption.
Engaging internationally
Corruption enabled border crime is an ongoing threat to law enforcement integrity in Australia.
Organised crime groups use corrupt connections to facilitate criminal activity, including in the
trafficking of illicit goods and substances across international borders. Accordingly, combating
corruption—like fighting organised crime—requires cooperative efforts across many countries.
ACLEI contributes to many of Australia’s existing international anti-corruption efforts in partnership
with the Attorney-General’s Department, ACC, AFP, DIBP and Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade. The Integrity Commissioner thanks these agencies for their assistance in keeping ACLEI
informed of international developments in integrity arrangements and supporting ACLEI’s contact
with integrity agencies in other countries.
Integrity links with other countries
ACLEI engages with anti-corruption and integrity agencies in other countries as opportunities arise,
in order to exchange knowledge about combating and preventing corruption and how to convert
lessons learned from investigations into lasting improvements to integrity systems.
For example, ACLEI is a member of the Anti-Corruption Agency Forum, which is convened by the
Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission of the Republic of Korea. The forum provides a venue
for policy dialogue among the heads of anti-corruption agencies who lead collaborative efforts in the
fight against corruption in the Asia-Pacific region. Through its participation, ACLEI seeks to broaden
existing relationships and learn from other anti-corruption institutions in Australia’s region.
From time to time, ACLEI also receives requests to meet with or provide briefings to international
delegations with an interest in law enforcement corruption risk or in Australia’s anti-corruption framework.
ACLEI collaborates with the Anti-Corruption Section of the Attorney-General’s Department and the AFP in
relation to such requests and meetings. During 2014–15, the Integrity Commissioners (Mr Moss and Mr
Griffin), Acting Integrity Commissioner (Mr Cornall), or senior ACLEI staff members met with or provided
briefings to:
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
64
 the Chief Commissioner of the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority of Nepal
 a Commissioner of the Public Service Commission of South Africa
 participants in the Indian Police Service Mid Career Training Program, 2014
 the Director-General of the Agency Against Corruption, Ministry of Justice, Taiwan
 the Chair of the New Zealand Independent Police Conduct Authority
 the Chief Inspector of Police, Hong Kong Complaints Against Police Office
 Indonesian participants in the Bringing Australian Government Understanding to Students (BAGUS)
Programme for Australia Awards Scholarship recipients, and
 the Director of Internal Compliance, Indonesian Directorate General of Customs and Excise.
In 2014–15, the ACBPS and Department of Immigration and Border Protection also coordinated
international cooperation relating to integrity in the border environment. These efforts follow the
designation of border and customs corruption as an integrity priority for G20 economies, at their
meeting in Brisbane in 2014.
In February 2015, the Integrity Commissioner, Mr Griffin, spoke to the Border Five 2020 Group
Integrity Dialogue, hosted by the ACBPS. The Border Five Group is a forum for the heads of
Customs agencies from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States
of America to discuss and share lessons learned about strategic priorities, challenges and other
topics of common interest. The Group has identified five priority areas of cooperation, with Australia
leading the Integrity dialogue. Mr Griffin’s address to the Dialogue, Building a corruption resistant
system—which discusses the threat from organised crime and the importance of integrity
partnerships—is available on ACLEI’s website under Reports, submissions and speeches.
International treaties
The Attorney-General’s Department coordinates policy relating to international treaties concerning
transnational crime and corruption.
 ACLEI participates in an Inter-Departmental Committee on anti-corruption, convened by the AttorneyGeneral’s Department, which coordinates government agency responses to international anticorruption treaties and mechanisms. ACLEI contributes observations based on its operational
experience, about corruption risks, the threat environment and implications for control arrangements.
 Since 2008, ACLEI has contributed technical experts to each Australian Government delegation to
the biennial Conference of States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption
(UNCAC). The next Conference is scheduled for 2015–16. During the reporting period, ACLEI
contributed to Australia’s comments on the revised States Parties self-assessment checklist for cycle
2 of the Implementation Review Mechanism under UNCAC.
 In October 2014, the American Bar Association—which works with UNCAC signatories and AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation member economies “to implement sustainable and impactful anticorruption programming”—used resources provided by ACLEI in a presentation to police from the
ASEAN region at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
65
CHAPTER SIX—ASSESSMENTS AND
INVESTIGATIONS
This chapter sets out information about the corruption issues dealt with by ACLEI in
2014–15.
Notes on recording practices
Corruption issues
Corruption issues can take the form of pieces of information or allegations that suggest corrupt
conduct within a LEIC Act agency. They vary significantly in terms of their credibility, accuracy and
susceptibility to investigation. It is important to note that not every corruption issue, after proper
assessment or investigation, will lead to corrupt conduct being established. An increase or decrease
in notifications and referrals, therefore, should not be taken to indicate an increase or decrease in the
prevalence of corrupt conduct or corruption risk.
Duplicate sources of information
Sometimes, the same or substantially similar information relating to an agency in ACLEI’s jurisdiction
is provided to the Integrity Commissioner from different sources. For example, ACLEI may be
informed about a corruption issue from the agency concerned (a notification) and from another
government agency (a referral). The situation reflects:
 the practice of law enforcement agencies to work together in joint arrangements or in the same
operational environment, leading to additional opportunities for possible corrupt conduct to be
revealed, and
 a broadening awareness of ACLEI and its role in the Commonwealth law enforcement integrity
framework.
This situation occurred twice in 2014–15. Accordingly, relevant tables in this chapter have been
adjusted to avoid overstatement. ACLEI has removed duplicate notifications that correspond to a
referral already made, or vice versa, as the case may be.
Since the LEIC Regulations prescribe reporting of a specific kind, the tables in
Appendix 2—Additional statistics have not been amended in this way. Similarly, the
Key Performance Indicator report in Chapter 3—Performance statement uses the unmodified data as
a basis for evaluation of the timeliness of ACLEI’s assessment process (see KPI Three).
Ambiguous information
Some information received can be difficult to attribute to a particular agency until further assessment
is made. Such instances have been excluded from the statistics in this chapter and will be reported in
future reports, if warranted.
Out of jurisdiction information
A number of approaches are made to ACLEI each year, primarily from members of the public,
enquiring about ACLEI’s jurisdiction or seeking assistance of other kinds. Although the LEIC Act
does not require ACLEI to report on information received that is out of jurisdiction, these approaches
are still recorded and evaluated.
There were contacts about ‘out of jurisdiction’ matters from 163 individuals or groups during 2014–15, a
number of whom contacted ACLEI on more than one occasion. One individual contacted ACLEI in excess of
620 times during the reporting period, another individual contacted ACLEI more than 160 times, and a third
individual contacted ACLEI more than 80 times.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
66
Total workload
ACLEI dealt with a total of 252 corruption issues during the reporting year.
In addition to 70 notifications and 29 referrals made to the Integrity Commissioner, ACLEI’s workload
during 2014–15 included one own initiative investigation (which commenced in the reporting year)
and 152 other corruption issues carried forward from previous years.
The trend in ACLEI’s total workload is illustrated in Figure Three. The graph also shows that 157
corruption issues have been carried forward to the 2015–16 year.
FIGURE THREE: ACLEI’s assessment and investigation workload over time
2006–07 figures are for the six-month period after ACLEI’s commencement.
The ACBPS was added to the LEIC Act jurisdiction on 1 January 2011. AUSTRAC, CrimTrac and the Department of Agriculture were
added on 1 July 2013.
The 2013–14 Annual Report incorrectly showed 150 corruption issues would be carried forward to 2014–15. The correct number was
152.
Where corruption information came from
This year’s new work of 100 corruption issues is slightly greater than the 93 issues received in 2013–
14—which was the first year that ACLEI’s jurisdiction included AUSTRAC, CrimTrac and the
Department of Agriculture.
Table Eleven sets out the number of notifications and referrals about possible corrupt conduct that
ACLEI received during the year, and the number of own initiative corruption issues identified. As
noted above, the table also includes a correction factor to control for duplicate information provided
to ACLEI from more than one source, or where key information was ambiguous.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
67
NOTIFICATIONS
TABLE ELEVEN: Sources of information about corruption issues in 2014–15
Notification by
law enforcement
agency heads
[s 19(1)]
OWN INITIATIVE
REFERRALS
Minister [s 18]
Other people or
government
agencies [s 23]
ACLEI
intelligence /
‘own initiative’
investigation
[s 38(1)]
Subtotal
Less duplicates
(information provided
by more than one
source) and Others
(agency undefined)
Total
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
Other
TOTAL
33 (28)
3 (1)
32 (33)
0 (5)
2 (2)
1 (0)
-
71 (69)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
-
1 (0)
18 (11)
3 (0)
7 (8)
1 (3)
0 (1)
0 (0)
1 (0)
30 (23)
1 (0)
0 (1)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
-
1 (1)
52 (39)
6 (2)
40 (41)
1 (8)
2 (3)
1 (0)
1 (0)
103 (93)
1 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
3 (0)
51 (39)
6 (2)
39 (41)
1 (8)
2 (3)
1 (0)
0 (0)
100 (93)
Numbers in (brackets) are for the 2013–14 reporting year.
Notifications
Under the LEIC Act, the heads of agencies in the Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction are required to
notify the Integrity Commissioner of corruption issues that relate to their respective agencies. The
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture is required to notify the Integrity Commissioner only of
those corruption issues that relate to the staff prescribed under the LEIC Regulations.
ACLEI continues to work closely with each agency to assist them to meet notification obligations.
This process includes discussion of matters when it is not clear whether a notification could or should
be made. This close ongoing engagement helps to ensure that ACLEI is made aware of information
that may illustrate corruption risk or would otherwise inform ACLEI’s intelligence picture.
In 2014–15, ACLEI received 70 notifications, which is consistent with the previous year’s figure (69
issues). Figure Four shows the trend of the data since ACLEI’s commencement in December 2006,
noting that ACLEI’s jurisdiction was extended twice over that period.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
68
FIGURE FOUR: Trends in notifications to ACLEI
2006–07 figures are for the six-month period after ACLEI’s commencement.
The ACBPS was added to the LEIC Act jurisdiction on 1 January 2011. AUSTRAC, CrimTrac and the Department of Agriculture were
added on 1 July 2013.
Referrals
The Minister may refer a corruption issue to the Integrity Commissioner. In addition, any other
person, company or government agency may provide information to the Integrity Commissioner
about possible corrupt conduct.
Figure Five charts the number of referrals received each year since ACLEI’s commencement and
shows the variation in this information source from year to year.
FIGURE FIVE: Trends in referrals to ACLEI
2006–07 figures are for the six-month period after ACLEI’s commencement.
The ACBPS was added to the LEIC Act jurisdiction on 1 January 2011. AUSTRAC, CrimTrac and the Department of Agriculture were
added on 1 July 2013.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
69
How workload was dealt with
Table Twelve summarises the way in which ACLEI dealt with each of the 202 corruption issues that
were active in 2014–15:
 Sub-Table A shows all issues that, due to a decision of the Integrity Commissioner, resulted in some
form of investigation
 Sub-Table B summarises the way issues were concluded
 Sub-Table C shows the assessments in progress at 30 June 2015, and
 Sub-Table D totals the number of issues dealt with in 2014–15.
The information, trends and patterns shown in these Sub-Tables are discussed in the rest of this
chapter.
TABLE TWELVE: Total workload—how notifications, referrals and own initiative
investigations were dealt with
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
SUB
TOTAL
ACLEI
investigation
[s 26(1)(a)]
13 (10)
3 (2)
9 (2)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
25 (14)
ACLEI joint
investigation
[s 26(2)]
23 (14)
3 (1)
18 (14)
5 (2)
1 (0)
0 (0)
50 (31)
Public Inquiry at
request of the
Minister [s 71]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Agency
investigation
managed by
ACLEI
[s 26(1)(b)(i) or
26(1)(d)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Agency
investigation
overseen by
ACLEI
[s 26(1)(b)(ii) or
26(1)(e)]
3 (1)
0 (0)
1 (1)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
4 (2)
Referred to AFP
for investigation
(with oversight)
[s 26(1)(c)(ii)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
N/A
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
1 (0)
47 (34)
4 (3)
40 (34)
0 (1)
1 (0)
0 (0)
UNSUPERVISED
GOVERNMENT
AGENCY
INVESTIGATIONS,
WITH OUTCOME TO
BE REVIEWED (IN
MOST INSTANCES)
BY ACLEI
SUPERVISED INVESTIGATIONS
ACLEI INVESTIGATIONS
SUB-TABLE 12A: Corruption issues under investigation during 2014–15
ACLEI satisfied
that agency
notifying a
significant issue
should
investigate
(without
TOTAL
75 (45)
5 (2)
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
92 (72) 122 (103)
70
supervision)
[s 26(1)(b)(iii)]
Total
Referred to AFP
for investigation
(without
supervision)
[s 26(1)(c)(iii)]
1 (2)
0 (0)
N/A
0 (0)
0 (1)
0 (0)
1 (3)
ACLEI satisfied
that agency
notifying a not
significant issue
should continue
to investigate
(without
supervision)
[s 22(1)]
3 (4)
1 (2)
24 (20)
0 (2)
1 (0)
0 (0)
29 (28)
State integrity
agency to
investigate
conduct of a
secondee
[s 29(6)(b)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
90 (65)
11 (8)
92 (71)
5 (5)
3 (1)
1 (0)
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
202 (150)
71
SUB-TABLE 12B: Corruption issues concluded during 2014–15
B1: ACLEI
INVESTIGATIONS
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
TOTAL
2* (5)
1 (0)
1 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
4* (5)
2 (6)
1 (1)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
3 (7)
4 (11)
2 (1)
1 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
7 (12)
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
TOTAL
23 (3)
4 (1)
24 (8)
0 (3)
0 (1)
0 (0)
51 (16)
2 (1)
0 (0)
0 (3)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
2 (4)
25 (4)
4 (1)
24 (11)
0 (3)
0 (1)
0 (0)
53 (20)
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
TOTAL
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (4)
0 (1)
0 (1)
0 (0)
1 (6)
24 (17)
0 (1)
9 (11)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
33 (29)
[s 31(4)(a)(i)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
Subtotal (B3)
24 (17)
0 (1)
11 (15)
0 (1)
0 (1)
0 (0)
35 (35)
53 (32)
6 (3)
36 (26)
0 (4)
0 (2)
0 (0)
95 (67)
FINALISED
ACLEI investigation
finalised
[s 55 report to Minister]
ACLEI investigation
discontinued
[s 42 reconsideration]
Subtotal (B1)
B2: REVIEWS OR
REFERRALS FINALISED
External reports accepted
by ACLEI [s 66]
External agency
investigations discontinued
by Integrity Commissioner
[s 42 reconsideration]
Subtotal (B2)
B3: CONCLUDED
FOLLOWING
ASSESSMENT
Did not raise a corruption
issue within the meaning of
the LEIC Act
Decided to take no further
action (after assessment)
[s 31(2)(b) or 32(2)]
Has been, is, or will be, the
subject of investigation by a
law enforcement agency
Total concluded issues (B1
+ B2 + B3)
SUB-TABLE 12C: Assessments in progress at 30 June 2015
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
TOTAL
6 (18)
1 (0)
8 (11)
0 (2)
0 (1)
0 (0)
15 (32)
Issues under
assessment at close
of reporting year
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
72
SUB-TABLE 12D: Total workload in 2014–15
(Su((Sub-Tables A + B3 + C)
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
TOTAL
120 (100)
12 (9)
111 (97)
5 (8)
3 (3)
1 (0)
252 (217)
Numbers in (brackets) are for the 2013–14 reporting year.
*One report—Investigation Report 01/2015—relating to two corruption issues.
ACLEI investigations
In general, an allegation or information which raises a corruption issue is accepted for investigation
when assessment indicates that the information is reliable and able to be investigated, and when
there is a public interest in the Integrity Commissioner’s direct involvement. Section 27 of the LEIC
Act sets out the criteria to which the Integrity Commissioner must have regard when deciding how to
deal with a corruption issue.
The Integrity Commissioner may decide to investigate solely, or may engage with another
government agency in a joint investigation. Partners in joint investigations may be any of the six
agencies in the Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction, or any Commonwealth, State or Territory
government agency.
As shown in Sub-Table Twelve A, ACLEI investigations into 75 corruption issues were active during
the reporting period. Table Thirteen further shows that investigations into 42 of these corruption
issues commenced during 2014–15.
Table Thirteen also sets out the nature of the corruption issues that led to the commencement of
investigations in 2014–15. Reflecting ACLEI’s prioritisation model—which includes examination of
possible links to organised crime—the dominant corruption issue category remains abuse of office.
TABLE THIRTEEN: Investigations (including joint investigations) commenced by ACLEI in
2014–15, by nature of allegation
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
TOTAL
21 (11)
4 (0)
10 (6)
3 (2)
1 (0)
0 (0)
39 (19)
Pervert the course of
justice [s 6(1)(b)]
1 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
2 (0)
Corruption of any other
kind [s 6(1)(c)]
1 (1)
0 (1)
0 (2)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (4)
23 (12)
4 (1)
11 (8)
3 (2)
1 (0)
0 (0)
42 (23)
Abuse of office
[s 6(1)(a)]
Total
Numbers in (brackets) are for the 2013–14 reporting year.
At 30 June 2015, ACLEI had 48 separate operations underway (relating to 68 corruption issues),
including 34 operations that were commenced in 2014–15 (concerning 39 corruption issues)—see
Issues carried forward to 2015–16 in this chapter. As a comparison, there had been 20 operations
current at the end of June 2014, concerning 33 corruption issues
This increase in operational activity stems in part from growth in ACLEI’s capacity, primarily arising
from additional resources provided by the AFP and DIBP to support the Sydney Joint Taskforce
(JTF), as well as to the filling of some key operational positions in Canberra, late in the 2013–14
reporting period.
As significantly, the increase reflects improvements in detection and intelligence collection, both by
ACLEI and by LEIC Act agencies. For example, ACBPS Taskforce Pharos—a data matching
initiative with the ACC National Criminal Fusion Capability—has brought forward a steady stream of
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
73
intelligence for investigation. Similarly, strengthened partnerships across the law enforcement
community—including with State law enforcement agencies—have generated valuable new leads
and actionable referrals.
Priority investigations
ACLEI maintains a multi-disciplinary workforce with core skills in investigation management,
intelligence collection and analysis, technical surveillance and legal counsel. Other skill sets—for
example physical surveillance, forensic financial analysis or human source management—are
presently obtained through cooperative arrangements with other agencies, including joint
investigations.
Partnering with other agencies (the concertina model) provides:
 options to ensure that serious and systemic issues are investigated using the most appropriate
combination of powers, jurisdiction and law enforcement methodologies
 access to the specialist capabilities of a range of law enforcement partners, and
 an operational surge capacity when needed.
The actual powers and resources applied to each investigation varies daily—as new evidence comes
to light, as investigations progress and as they are reassessed against operational and strategic
priorities. The deployment of resources is managed by ACLEI in close consultation with investigative
partners, as appropriate to each investigation.
The resources available for all ACLEI investigations include:
 in Canberra: an ACLEI operations intelligence and investigations team, including seconded
investigators or specialists from other agencies as required
 in Sydney: the ACLEI/AFP Joint Taskforce including an ACLEI operations team and two AFP Serious
and Organised Crime investigations teams
 a physical surveillance team (tasked by ACLEI and hosted by the ACC)
 a pool of technical surveillance monitors, and
 operational partners in joint taskforces or individual investigations.
This resourcing level allowed ACLEI to progress twelve priority operations across the course of the
year. The remaining investigations were in various stages of development, such as intelligence
collection, brief of evidence preparation or prosecution.
Joint investigations
ACLEI’s ability to undertake joint investigations is an important part of the LEIC Act framework.
For example, this approach is used when:
 an investigation is linked to a broader criminal investigation in which other agencies have an interest
 an investigation covers a range of misconduct and corruption issues that may require close
management by the agency concerned, or
 particular requirements exist to ensure that the law enforcement agency can maintain operational
security and manage associated risks to its core business.
Joint investigation arrangements also enable the resources available to ACLEI to expand rapidly—for
instance, in response to the challenges of real time evidence collection or to enable rapid deployment
to locations interstate. Another benefit is that investigators and intelligence analysts are able to come
together in taskforce arrangements, thereby sharing and developing skills across the anti-corruption
system.
Fifty corruption issues were subject to a joint investigation arrangement in 2014–15, of which 30
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
74
commenced during the year.
Concluding ACLEI investigations
The Integrity Commissioner concluded investigations into four corruption issues during the year by
way of three reports to the Minister. These investigation reports are summarised in Chapter 6—
Reports to the Minister.
As indicated in Sub-Table Twelve B1, investigations into a further three corruption issues were
reconsidered and closed, taking account of practical and public interest factors such as the:
 value of evidence gathered to date
 resources required to collect further evidence
 prospect of being able to reach a conclusion if evidence were available
 relative priority of the issue being examined, and
 disruption or deterrent effect of an ACLEI investigation.
Use of information-gathering powers
When investigating a corruption issue under section 26(1)(a) of the LEIC Act, or conducting a public
inquiry under section 71, the Integrity Commissioner can use a range of investigation powers.
Coercive information-gathering powers
The Integrity Commissioner’s coercive information-gathering powers are set out in Part 9 of the LEIC
Act. These powers require a person to produce documentary evidence or appear as a witness and
answer questions truthfully at a hearing. A notice to produce or a summons to attend a hearing can
be issued only in relation to ACLEI investigations or joint investigations. It is an offence not to comply
with a notice or summons, and not to answer questions, or not to answer truthfully.
Between 1 July 2014 and 30 June 2015, the Integrity Commissioner issued and served six
summonses in relation to two investigations and held seven hearings, including one hearing for
which the summons had been issued in the previous year. On two further occasions, ACLEI
continued hearings commenced in 2013–14.
The Integrity Commissioner also issued 32 notices to produce information, documents or things, in
relation to 10 investigations (including one investigation for which both notices and hearings were
used). The three-year trend in the use of information-gathering powers is shown in Table Fourteen.
TABLE FOURTEEN: Use of coercive information-gathering powers—three year trend
2012–13
2013–14
2014–15
Notice to provide information or produce
documents or things [s 75]
28
31
32
Summons to attend a hearing to give
evidence and/or
produce documents or things [s 83]
21*
17*
6
Hearings conducted [s 82]
20
17
7*
*Summonses and hearings:

in 2012–13, one summons was revoked, and two were issued for hearings that were conducted in 2013–14

in 2013–14, one summons was served but no hearing was conducted and one was issued for a hearing conducted in 2014–15,
three additional summonses issued in 2013–14 were not served, due to operational developments, and

in 2014–15, two additional hearings continued that had been commenced in 2013–14.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
75
Other information-gathering powers
The Integrity Commissioner has certain intrusive and covert powers for the purpose of investigating
possible corrupt conduct. The decision to use a particular power or method is based on operational
considerations, relating to which method may best fit an investigation plan, having regard to privacy
considerations. As may be seen in Table Fifteen, ACLEI used these information-gathering powers
nine times in 2014–15, as part of investigation strategies relating to two investigations.
As in previous years, powers exercised under warrants obtained by other agencies in the context of
joint investigations with ACLEI are not reported in this table.
TABLE FIFTEEN: Use of intrusive and covert information-gathering powers—
three year trend
2012–13
2013–14
2014–15
Power of entry without warrant (section
105, LEIC Act)
0
1
0
Search warrant (Part 9, Division 4, LEIC
Act)
0
4*
3
Telecommunications (interception and
access) warrant
10
25
3
Surveillance devices warrant (may include
multiple devices)**
6
14
2
Controlled operation authorisation (Part
1AB of the Crimes Act 1914)
0
3
1
Assumed identity authorisation (Part 1AC
of the Crimes Act 1914)
0
0
0
Total
16
47
9
*Two search warrants obtained in 2013–14 were not executed, due to operational developments.
**Surveillance warrant numbers do not include renewals.
Integrity testing
Covert integrity tests simulate opportunities for corrupt conduct to examine the behaviour of individuals
in a controlled and observed situation. The Law Enforcement Integrity Legislation Amendment Act 2012
introduced the ability for ACLEI and the ACC, ACBPS and AFP to conduct targeted integrity tests on
staff members of those three agencies. The Customs and Other Legislation Amendment (Australian
Border Force) Act 2015 extends this integrity measure to apply to all staff members of the Department
of Immigration and Border Protection on the consolidation of the ACBPS into that Department (from 1
July 2015).
The Integrity Commissioner must be informed of any integrity test that has been authorised by an
agency head. All four agencies (including ACLEI) are also required to report to the Minister each year
on the number and nature of integrity tests undertaken.
To preserve the effectiveness of the investigation method and its value as a deterrent to corrupt
conduct, the number and nature of integrity tests conducted is not made public. The Integrity
Commissioner briefs the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ACLEI each year about integrity testing
operations. The briefing is provided in private.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
76
Investigations conducted by other agencies
When an allegation or information raises a corruption issue, one option available to the Integrity
Commissioner is to refer the issue to another government agency for investigation.
A key principle that underpins the LEIC Act model is that each agency head retains primary
responsibility for the integrity of his or her agency. Accordingly, it is important that agencies have the
capacity and appropriate capability to conduct investigations internally, proportionate to their risk.
The LEIC Act provides for the Integrity Commissioner to decide whether a corruption issue should be
dealt with internally by an agency or in another way. For instance, corruption issues can be referred
to:
 an agency within the LEIC Act jurisdiction for an internal investigation relating to the conduct of each
agency’s own staff or appointees
 the AFP (for a criminal investigation, if the corruption issue does not relate to the AFP)
 a State or Territory home agency (concerning the conduct of a secondee from that agency)
 a State or Territory integrity agency (concerning the conduct of a secondee in the jurisdiction of that
agency to investigate), or
 any other Commonwealth government agency (concerning a secondee from that agency).
In addition, under section 22(1) of the LEIC Act, a law enforcement agency must continue to
investigate a corruption issue that is not designated as significant, unless the Integrity Commissioner
decides to deal with the issue in a different way.
At the conclusion of any investigation of a corruption issue conducted by a Commonwealth
government agency, a report must be provided to the Integrity Commissioner.
Management of the external workload
Since the bulk of internal investigations are with the AFP and ACBPS, the progress of investigations
is discussed at monthly meetings between each of those agencies and ACLEI. Internal investigations
being conducted by other agencies are monitored on a case-by-case basis. This engagement
provides a mechanism for agencies to apprise ACLEI of any factors that may impede or delay an
internal investigation.
In 2014–15, as Table Sixteen shows, 127 corruption issues were being dealt with externally to ACLEI
using the LEIC Act framework as a basis (compared with 105 in
2013–14). These corruption issues—which at the close of the reporting year were in various stages
of investigation or reporting by external government agencies—represents just over half of the 252
corruption issues dealt with during 2014–15. This result is comparable to previous years (48% in 2013–
14; 53% in 2012–13; 55% in 2011–12; 41% in 2010–11).
Section 66 reports
The Integrity Commissioner may comment on, or make recommendations about, any matter relating
to or arising out of an investigation report which has been prepared by a Commonwealth government
agency in accordance with section 66 of the LEIC Act. This arrangement:
 allows the Integrity Commissioner to assure himself or herself that investigations external to ACLEI
have been conducted appropriately
 enables ACLEI’s intelligence holdings to be updated
 provides an opportunity and basis for the Integrity Commissioner to make suggestions to strengthen
the integrity system against any systemic risk that may have been identified, and
 facilitates transparency of process and enables an independent view to be reached about each
outcome.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
77
Table Sixteen shows that, during the reporting year, ACLEI received and reviewed 51 reports
(compared with 16 in 2013–14; 39 in 2012–13; 25 in 2011–12; 18 in 2010–11; and six in 2009–10).
This significant improvement reflects the additional resources that ACLEI directed to this task during
the year, as well as a maturing of the way various LEIC Act agencies provide reports to ACLEI as
part of their usual business processes.
Even so, due to their complexity, it is noted that investigations of this type can be protracted and
require careful management. In one instance—not reflected in Tables Twelve or Sixteen—the
Integrity Commissioner considered that the use of ACLEI’s coercive powers would assist in furthering
an investigation that had been the subject of an internal investigation report. In that case, the Integrity
Commissioner used the reconsideration provisions of the LEIC Act to commence an ACLEI
investigation. That investigation was ongoing at the close of the reporting year.
In other instances, ACLEI commented on draft reports or made suggestions for additional actions to
be taken to improve assurance.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
78
TABLE SIXTEEN: Corruption issues dealt with as internal investigations or as other government agency investigations during 2014–15
INVESTIGATION IN PROGRESS
AUSTRA
INVESTIGATION DISCONTINUED
CrimTrac ACBPS
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
3 (1)
0 (0)
1 (1)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
N/A
0 (0)
26 (31)
1 (3)
27 (27)
0 (1)
0 (0)
0 (4)
AUSTRA
ACC
AFP
Ag
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
N/A
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
0 (0)
2 (0)
0 (0)
0 (3)
N/A
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (1)
0 (0)
0 (1)
13 (16)
0 (0)
1 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
29 (37)
1 (4)
41 (44)
0 (0)
2 (0)
1 (0)
C
ACC
AFP
Ag
CrimTrac ACBPS
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
19 (3)
N/A
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
2 (1)
0 (0)
0 (3)
0 (0)
AUSTRA
CrimTrac
TOTAL
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
4 (2)
N/A
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
3 (0)
13 (4)
0 (1)
0 (0)
0 (0)
92 (72)
1 (0)
0 (0)
N/A
0 (0)
0 (1)
0 (0)
1 (3)
0 (0)
3 (0)
1 (1)
11 (4)
0 (2)
0 (0)
0 (0)
29 (28)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
23 (3)
4 (1)
24 (8)
0 (3)
0 (1)
0 (0)
C
C
Agency investigation
managed by ACLEI
[s 26(1)(b)(i) or 26(1)(d)]
Agency investigation
overseen by ACLEI
AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS
Ag
UNSUPERVISED
AFP
SUPERVISED AGENCY
ACC
INVESTIGATIONS
ACBPS
REPORT RECEIVED AND REVIEWED
[s 26(1)(b)(ii) or 26(1)(e)]
Referred to AFP for
investigation (with
oversight) [s 26(1)(c)(ii)]
Integrity Commissioner
satisfied that agency
notifying a significant issue
should investigate
[s 26(1)(b)(iii)]
Referred to AFP for
investigation [s 26(1)(c)(iii)]
Integrity Commissioner
satisfied that agency
notifying a not significant
issue should continue to
investigate [s 22(1)]
Another integrity agency,
police force or relevant
government agency to
investigate conduct of a
secondee
[s 29(6)(b)]
Subtotal
127 (105)
Total
74 (85)
2 (4)
51 (16)
Numbers in (brackets) are for the 2013–14 reporting year.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
79
At the close of the reporting year—as shown in Table Seventeen—74 corruption issues were being
dealt with by other agencies, down from 85 at the end of 2013–14. Of those internal investigations
underway, 32 (or 44%) had commenced in 2014–15, reflecting the relatively contemporary nature of
the external caseload.
TABLE SEVENTEEN: Age of corruption issues being investigated by other agencies at
30 June 2015
Year of
origin*
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
TOTAL
2010–11
0 (6)
0 (1)
1 (3)
N/A
N/A
N/A
1 (10)
2011–12
3 (17)
0 (2)
5 (14)
N/A
N/A
N/A
8 (33)
2012–13
6 (9)
0 (1)
8 (14)
N/A
N/A
N/A
14 (24)
2013–14
7 (5)
0 (0)
10 (13)
0 (0)
1 (0)
0 (0)
18 (18)
2014–15
13
1
17
0
1
1**
33
29 (37)
1 (4)
41 (44)
0 (0)
2 (0)
1 (0)
74 (85)
Total
Numbers in (brackets) are for the 2013–14 reporting year.
* ‘Year of origin’ refers to the year in which a corruption issue was first notified or referred to ACLEI, rather than the date of
commencement of an investigation.
** Being investigated by the AFP.
Concluded issues
A corruption issue is concluded when the Integrity Commissioner:
 completes an investigation and gives a report to the Minister
 refers a corruption issue to another government agency for investigation under ACLEI management
or oversight, and the investigation is subsequently completed
 receives a satisfactory final report relating to a corruption issue investigated by another government
agency without ACLEI’s management or oversight
 refers a corruption issue about a secondee to a non-Commonwealth agency for investigation, and
does not retain an interest in the outcome, or
 decides, either at first instance or upon reconsideration, that no investigation or further investigation is
warranted.
Sub-Table Twelve B summarises the manner in which issues were concluded during the reporting
year, and Figure Six shows the trend since ACLEI’s commencement. Ninety-five corruption issues
were concluded in these ways in 2014–15, compared to 67 in 2013–14 and 80 in 2012–13. ACLEI’s
closure rate—a measure of efficiency: the ratio of matters closed to matters opened—in 2014–15
was 94% (72% in 2013–14, 103% in 2012–13).
The closure rate for corruption issues varies between years as the result of several factors, including:
 variations in the volume and scope of corruption issues notified or referred to ACLEI
 complexity of the investigations being conducted in any year
 progress of the external workload (comprising matters sent to other agencies for internal
investigation), and
 the resources available to ACLEI to advance and, ultimately, close its own cases.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
80
FIGURE SIX: Concluded issues—trend data
2006–07 figures are for the six-month period after ACLEI’s commencement.
Issues not investigated
Not all corruption issues notified or referred to the Integrity Commissioner are investigated. Of the
252 corruption issues dealt with in 2014–15, thirty-five were concluded without further investigation
(see Sub-Table Twelve B3).
In 33 of these instances—after assessment—the Integrity Commissioner decided that investigation
was not warranted, for example because the information was dated or lacked corroboration or there
were no realistic lines of inquiry (and any investigation, therefore, was unlikely to lead to a conclusion
being reached). In these circumstances, ACLEI retains the information as part of agency intelligence
holdings.
In another instance, preliminary enquiries by ACLEI established that the issue either did not amount
to corrupt conduct or did not involve members of agencies within ACLEI’s jurisdiction, or both. In
another matter, the issue was already the subject of investigation by a law enforcement agency and
an ACLEI investigation was not considered necessary.
Assessments pending
All allegations and information received by ACLEI are prioritised upon receipt to determine credibility,
urgency, and the susceptibility of the issues to investigation. This prioritisation system assists ACLEI
to manage its workflow and respond appropriately.
At the close of the reporting period, 15 corruption issues were in the assessment phase, as shown in
Sub-Table Twelve C. The bulk of these were notifications or referrals provided towards the end of the
reporting period. Decisions about how these issues will be dealt with will be made as soon as
possible during 2015–16.
Issues carried forward to 2015–16
At the close of the reporting year, 157 corruption issues were carried forward to 2015–16. These
issues were distributed as follows:
 68 investigations by ACLEI, including 46 investigations being conducted jointly with other government
agencies
 69 internal investigations being conducted by LEIC Act agencies, without supervision by ACLEI
(ACBPS/DIBP–26, ACC–1, AFP–40, AUSTRAC–2)
 four internal investigations being overseen by ACLEI (ACBPS/DIBP–3, AFP–1)
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
81
 one AFP investigation of another agency, being overseen by ACLEI, and
 15 notifications and referrals under assessment.
Table Eighteen shows in which year each of these 157 issues was notified or referred to the Integrity
Commissioner, or when an own initiative investigation was commenced, providing an indication of
their duration. ACLEI’s case-mix retains a relatively young profile, which reflects an ongoing effort to
close older cases and to give priority to investigations that have a high prospect of obtaining a
conclusive outcome.
TABLE EIGHTEEN: Age of corruption issues being carried forward to 2015–16
Year of
origin*
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
TOTAL
2010–11
1 (6)
0 (1)
3 (4)
N/A
N/A
N/A
4 (11)
2011–12
4 (18)
1 (3)
9 (18)
N/A
N/A
N/A
14 (39)
2012–13
11 (17)
0 (1)
11 (20)
N/A
N/A
N/A
22 (38)
2013–14
15 (27)
0 (1)
23 (29)
4 (4)
1 (1)
0 (0)
43 (62)
2014–15
36
5
29
1
2
1
74
67 (68)
6 (6)
75 (71)
5 (4)
3 (1)
1 (0)
157 (150)
Total
Numbers in (brackets) are for the 2013–14 reporting year.
Legal proceedings
Section 201 of the LEIC Act requires the Integrity Commissioner to record in the Annual Report
particular information relating to legal proceedings in the reporting period. These items are detailed
below.
Prosecutions
Corruption in law enforcement agencies often involves collusion between corrupt or compromised
law enforcement officials and other people, including organised crime—the so-called corruption
handshake. ACLEI’s investigations—particularly Operation Heritage/Marca—have demonstrated the
importance of such networks to the success of corrupt enterprises.
Accordingly, ACLEI’s investigations may give rise to prosecutions of staff members of LEIC Act
agencies and—particularly in the case of joint investigations—of members of the public or employees
of other government agencies.
When the Integrity Commissioner, in the course of an investigation, discovers admissible evidence of
an offence, the evidence must be given to the relevant prosecution authority or to a police force.
Nine prosecutions relating to investigations by the Integrity Commissioner—including joint operations
with other law enforcement agencies—were finalised during the reporting period.
These prosecutions arose from three separate operations and involved offences relating to:
 abuse of public office
 unauthorised access to restricted data
 conspiracy to import a commercial quantity of a border controlled precursor
 bribery, and
 providing false or misleading evidence in an ACLEI hearing.
Table Nineteen summarises the results of prosecutions finalised in 2014–15. Eight prosecutions arising
from ACLEI investigations were before the courts at the end of
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82
June 2015.
TABLE NINETEEN: Outcomes of prosecutions in 2014–15
Prosecutions
finalised
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
Other
people
TOTAL
Convictions for
corruptionrelated
offences**
2 (2)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
4 (8)
6 (10)
Convictions for
offences
arising from
hearings
2 (1)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
2 (1)
Offence
established, no
conviction
recorded
0 (1)
0 (0)
1 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (1)
Acquittals
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Total
4 (4)
0 (0)
1 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
4 (8)
9 (12)
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
Other
people*
TOTAL
Corruptionrelated
offences
1
0
1
1
0
0
5
8
Offences
arising from
hearings
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Prosecutions
carried
forward to
2015–16
1
0
1
1
0
0
5
8
Before the
courts at
30 June 2015
Numbers in (brackets) are for the 2013–14 reporting year.
* People who do not fall within the definition of staff members of law enforcement agencies at section 10 of the LEIC Act. The figure for
2013–14 includes one conviction relating to a former staff member of the Department of Agriculture. At the time the charges were
brought forward, the Department of Agriculture was not a LEIC Act agency.
** Includes two matters for which guilty verdicts had been recorded but sentences had not yet been determined at the end of the
reporting period (1 ACBPS, 1 Other people).
Sentences
During the reporting period, a former staff member of the ACBPS received an effective sentence of
nine years’ imprisonment with a nonparole period of six years for four offences—two counts of abuse
of public office, one of bribery of a Commonwealth public official and one of conspiracy to import a
commercial quantity of a border controlled precursor.
Convictions were also recorded in 2014–15 against two (now former) ACBPS officers for providing
false or misleading information to the Integrity Commissioner in a hearing. The officers were charged
with providing false or misleading information to a Commonwealth official under section 137.1 of the
Criminal Code (Cth), which carries a maximum penalty of 12 months’ imprisonment. Both officers
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83
were released on bonds to be of good behaviour: one for 18 months and one for two years.
Confiscation proceedings
No matters were commenced by ACLEI under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) (or a State or
Territory equivalent) during 2014–15.
Enforcement orders
No applications were made to the Federal Court of Australia for delivery of a witness passport or for
an arrest (see sections 97–101 of the LEIC Act).
Other court proceedings
No applications for orders of review in respect of matters arising under the LEIC Act were determined
or otherwise disposed of in 2014–15. Defendants in criminal prosecutions issued two subpoenas to
ACLEI and one to the Integrity Commissioner during the reporting period.
A summary of court proceedings affecting ACLEI’s operating environment appears at Appendix
Three of this report.
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CHAPTER 6—REPORTS TO THE MINISTER
This chapter summarises the investigation reports submitted to the Minister during
2014–15, and records agency responses to the Integrity Commissioner’s
recommendations.
Investigation reports
The Integrity Commissioner’s investigations may result in a report to the Minister. In most circumstances, a
copy must also be given to the head of the agency to which the investigation relates.
Regulation 20(e) of the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Regulations 2006 requires a
summary of the outcomes of the investigations completed during the reporting period, with any
recommendations and any action taken, to be presented in the Integrity Commissioner’s Annual
Report. In addition, Regulation 20(e) requires the Annual Report to record the commencement and
outcomes of any disciplinary proceedings, criminal proceedings or civil penalty proceedings resulting
from these investigations.
If the Integrity Commissioner decides to make public a report to the Minister, it is published on ACLEI’s
website, www.aclei.gov.au, under Reports, submissions and speeches.
During 2014–15, the Acting Integrity Commissioner, Mr Robert Cornall AO, provided two reports of
concluded investigations to the Minister. These reports are summarised in this chapter.
A third report made in July 2014 by the then Integrity Commissioner, Mr Philip Moss, was reported in
his 2013–14 Annual Report.
TABLE TWENTY: Reports provided to the Minister
Report
number
Report title
Date provided to
the Minister
03/2014
A joint investigation into the conduct of an Australian Crime
Commission employee who avoided a drug test (previously
reported in the 2013–14 Annual Report)
21 July 2014
04/2014
Operation Barden—an investigation into the supervision by
the Australian Federal Police of a traveller with internallysecreted drugs
23 December 2014
01/2015
Operation Helix—a joint investigation into alleged drug use by
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service ICT
employees
15 January 2015
Report 04/2014 Operation Barden—an investigation into the supervision by the Australian
Federal Police of a traveller with internally-secreted drugs
In the course of their duties, law enforcement officials can have ready access to items—such
as seized illicit drugs—that are portable and valuable and which the owner may be keen to discard or
disown. This situation creates an opportunity for corrupt conduct to occur—whether by theft,
intimidation or agreement—and not be reported.
One protection an agency can employ against concerns arising from this prospect is to have well
developed procedures that reduce the opportunity for corrupt conduct to occur undetected. The best
protection for staff members is to follow these procedures meticulously.
In October 2012, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service officers discovered anomalies in
a traveller’s abdomen. The traveller was subsequently detained in hospital under the supervision of
two Australian Federal Police appointees. An x-ray revealed
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
85
41 or 42 pellets of drugs. One of the AFP officers retrieved 29 pellets from the traveller’s bed pan,
away from the sight of the traveller and the other AFP officer. This situation could have provided an
opportunity for the officer to take some of the pellets.
The AFP’s initial inquiries showed that the traveller had attempted to flush the contents of the bedpan down a toilet, but had been restrained. As a precautionary measure, the AFP notified the
Integrity Commissioner of this corruption issue in April 2014. In light of the officers’ duties to interdict
illicit drugs at the border, Mr Robert Cornall AO, then Acting Integrity Commissioner, decided to
investigate.
Following investigation, there arose no evidence that either AFP officer engaged in corrupt conduct in
relation to this matter. Mr Cornall considered it most likely that the traveller successfully destroyed
some of the pellets.
This investigation serves as an example in which an agency and its staff acted correctly in bringing to
attention what appeared to be suspicious events and in which subsequent investigation was able to
allay those suspicions.
The report into this investigation is available on ACLEI’s website, www.aclei.gov.au, under Reports,
submissions and speeches.
Report 01/2015 Operation Helix—a joint investigation into alleged drug use by Australian
Customs and Border Protection Service ICT employees
This report resulted from allegations about possible illicit drug use concerning two Information and
Communication Technology (ICT) staff members of the ACBPS, and their undeclared relationships
with criminal contacts.
While this investigation did not result in a clear outcome, it nevertheless illustrated the risk that ICT
staff with high levels of access to official information—for instance, through privileged or ‘super user’
database access—may put themselves in a position where they could be subjected to corrupt
compromise. After careful examination, no evidence was obtained of any compromise to the
functions of the ACBPS. Having regard to other processes then underway, Mr Cornall reserved
indefinitely his findings in relation to the conduct of the two staff members.
In order to protect law enforcement methods, this investigation report has not been made public.
Previous recommendations
ACLEI takes an interest in how agencies respond to recommendations and suggestions made by the
Integrity Commissioner.
Report 03/2014 A joint investigation into the conduct of an Australian Crime Commission
employee who avoided a drug test
This investigation report was provided to the Minister in July 2014 by the then Integrity
Commissioner, Mr Philip Moss. The report into this investigation is available on ACLEI’s website,
www.aclei.gov.au, under Reports, submissions and speeches.
The investigation concerned the conduct of an ACC staff member who had resigned suddenly to
avoid a random drug test. Mr Moss made two recommendations.
1. Having regard to the role of the ACC as a primary law enforcement agency of the Australian
Government, consideration should be given to placing its drug testing program on a stronger
legislative footing.
ACLEI notes that, at the close of the 2014–15 reporting period, the Australian Crime Commission Act
2002 is being reviewed. ACLEI has proposed that this matter should be considered in that context.
2. Consideration should also be given as to whether there are other high-risk Australian Government
agencies or programs to which a drug testing program should be introduced. For example, it may be
desirable to create a legal framework, whereby a condition of maintaining a security clearance
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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brings with it—at least in particular instances—the obligation to submit to a drug testing program.
ACLEI understands that the Government is monitoring changes in risk and will keep this issue under
review. For instance, with effect from 1 July 2015, a drug testing programme has been established
across the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.
Special reports under section 204 of the LEIC Act
Section 204 of the LEIC Act provides that the Integrity Commissioner may, at any time, give the
Minister a special report on the operations of the Integrity Commissioner or on any matter relating to,
or arising in connection with, the performance of the Integrity Commissioner’s functions or the
exercise of the Integrity Commissioner’s powers. The Minister is required to cause such a report to
be laid before each House of the Parliament within fifteen sitting days after receiving it.
During 2014–15, the Integrity Commissioners and Acting Integrity Commissioner gave no special
reports to the Minister.
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CHAPTER 7—PATTERNS AND TRENDS
This chapter summarises ACLEI’s observations about the law enforcement
corruption risk environment.
The LEIC Act requires the Integrity Commissioner to report annually on the nature and scope of
corruption in Australian Government law enforcement agencies, and any patterns and trends, which
have come to his or her attention during the year.
ACLEI uses these observations and insights to inform its detection strategies and corruption
prevention practices.
Corruption enabled border crime
ACLEI is an important part of the anti-corruption strategies put in place by agencies to safeguard and
strengthen law enforcement integrity at the Australian Government level. In the eight-and-a-half
years since ACLEI’s commencement in December 2006, the risks to integrity have changed
significantly—for instance, the corruption threat posed by organised crime groups has worsened as
the capability of those groups has grown in sophistication.
ACLEI has changed in that time also, as successive Australian Governments have added resources,
powers and jurisdiction to ensure ACLEI’s capabilities remain matched to the threat. In 2014–15—
with the benefit of resources provided by LEIC Act agencies and additional Budget funding—ACLEI
sharpened its focus on corruption enabled border crime.
Changing risk
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Australia remains among the world’s
most lucrative illicit drug markets (UNODC World Drug Report 2014, pp 37–8). Cocaine and
crystalline methamphetamine ‘ice’ are the two illicit drugs most commonly imported into Australia (by
value). Domestically, the ‘street’ selling price of one kilogram of ice can reach up to $320,000, with
one kilogram of cocaine reaching prices up to $250,000 (Source: ACC, Illicit Drug Data Report 2013–
14, pp 45,102).
Since at least 2011, these sustained high prices and profit margins, together with diminishing prices
in other markets, have been attracting new crime groups to Australia. Several of these groups
routinely use corruption (bribery, extortion and infiltration) as a business cost in the other countries in
which they operate, and these profits increase their capacity to do so.
With high profits at stake, the main corrupt commodity sought by organised crime is information about
law enforcement capabilities, methods, personnel and systemic vulnerabilities. Several instances of
specific information being released to criminals have been detected by ACLEI and other law
enforcement agencies. ACLEI has also observed that corrupt public officials are themselves sometimes
involved in criminal activity, as well as in concealing the crimes of others.
Corruption risk levels at the border can be affected by a range of internal and external factors relating
to the organised crime business model:
 reward—the profits to be made in illicit markets
 liquidity—the resources available for organised crime groups to offer bribes or conduct compromise
operations
 capability—the sophistication of methods and reach of organised crime groups
 incentive—the value to criminals of corrupt commodities such as law enforcement information, direct
assistance and corruptly-obtained visas
 opportunity—relative weaknesses (uncontrolled or uncontrollable vulnerabilities) in border
arrangements, systems and people, and
 risk—the perceived effectiveness of deterrence arrangements, driving strategic choices between
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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methods (or inaction).
Figure Seven shows how corruption-resistance strategies can help to control these risk factors
FIGURE SEVEN: Strategies for dealing with corruption risk at the border
The ‘effectiveness paradox’
As Figure Eight shows, corruption is one of several ways in which criminal entities could seek to
move illicit goods, cash or operatives across the border, in either direction. It is a paradox that
corruption is more likely to be used as a tactic when simpler methods of defeating border controls are
perceived as less likely to be successful. In other words, when border controls and law enforcement
are at their most effective—and while illicit profits remain lucrative—there is a high value for ‘inside’
information that would help to defeat border controls.
In combination, these factors suggest that, as Australia reinforces its border control environment—for
example through the establishment of the Australian Border Force—
care will need to be taken to ensure that the risk of methodical attempts by organised
crime to cultivate ‘corrupt government insiders’ is mitigated sufficiently.
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FIGURE EIGHT: The effectiveness paradox
Lessons from North America
As is the case in Australia, both Canada and the United States have been under sustained pressure
from organised crime groups, including pressure relating to corruption enabled border crime. In May
2015, officers from ACLEI and the ACC travelled to these countries to study the corruption enabled
border crime exposure in those countries, to gain an insight into emerging threats for Australia and
how these risks may be dealt with.
Multi-channel detection methods
The ACLEI/ACC delegation learned that a proactive and systematic approach to investigations and
intelligence gathering is an effective way to deal with criminal exposure at the border. In particular,
multiple capabilities and intelligence feeds—such as covert human source management, physical
and technical surveillance and interception—appear to be necessary to grasp the corruption picture
and to find evidence of corruption when certain indicators are present.
This ‘multi-channel’ approach appears to be crucial to countering the sophistication of criminal and
corruption methods (particularly encryption and anti-surveillance techniques) being used to evade
detection.
In 2015–16, ACLEI plans to invest further in developing its covert human source capacity.
Intelligence and inter-agency cooperation
An important observation arising from the delegation was that opportunities exist to use the network
of agencies that are members of the Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction (as well as other partner
agencies) to build a rich intelligence picture and inform more-effective responses to corruption
enabled border crime. In particular, it may be possible to enhance collaborative interagency
operational and intelligence relationships, as well as prevention initiatives. Such a strategy could
unlock more access to data, information and intelligence across State and Commonwealth agencies
whose investigations may link to the Australian border.
This observation is also the basis for a growing awareness among LEIC Act and other border
agencies that many risks are held in common or related, and—specifically—that integrity
vulnerabilities are a shared concern. The possibility exists that LEIC Act agencies operating at the
border may in the future work together to integrate risk assessments and corruption control plans,
capitalising on the different sources of information to which each agency has access.
ACLEI will also continue to work with the ACC and State anti-corruption and law enforcement agencies to
foster information-sharing arrangements and to generate new leads.
Identification of at-risk employees
A number of North American agencies indicated to the delegation that they are deploying advanced
analytics and analysis to mitigate their own corruption risks, for example by identifying triggers and
indicators (including specific behaviours) among staff members. This strategy allows for direct
supervisor engagement with employees based on data analysis and for early intervention and
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management to prevent potential integrity or corruption risks from being realised. It also provides
integrity review units with a more systematic way to identify and assist vulnerable individuals.
ACLEI already engages with agencies to develop assessments and intelligence about areas of risk
aggregation. This work will continue in 2015–16.
Working with industry
Corruption enabled border crime also has civilian dimensions. That is to say, private sector workers
in the maritime and aviation sectors can be vectors for corruption—including by being the
instruments of compromise of public officials who work in the same places.
Increasingly, in both North America and in Australia, law enforcement’s response to organised crime
involves working collaboratively with industry partners, in the border environment as well as in a
range of other key sectors of the economy. This strategy requires agencies with public sector
integrity frameworks to work with private sector bodies, which have varying degrees of understanding
about the organised crime threat, and in which profit and integrity motives are intertwined (and
sometimes in potential conflict).
Some North American authorities told the delegation they have used criminal intelligence to harden
the operating environment against organised crime infiltration by vetting prospective workers in the
maritime and aviation sectors, and by removing individuals who have links to—or may themselves
be—criminals.
In Australia, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection is presently piloting a ‘trusted
trader’ programme, informed by the success of such initiatives in other countries. The programme
has the dual goals of improving efficiency at the border and building private sector capacity to build
resilience against organised crime. The aim is to provide an incentive for agencies to develop and
adopt auditable controls in return for streamlined customs transactions. The DIBP trusted trader
programme is a good example of how business incentives can double-up as corruption prevention
measures.
Key observations
ACLEI’s investigations are a source of contemporary information about corruption risks.
The following issues or vulnerabilities, many of which are interlinked, were observed during the year.
Dispersed workforces
A feature of several of the agencies in the Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction is that some
proportion of their staffs are geographically dispersed, particularly those with interdiction functions at
the border. This type of work profile introduces some additional risk factors which, unmanaged,
would present a heightened corruption risk overall.
Regionally-based or dispersed employees may be no more susceptible to corrupt conduct than
centrally located colleagues. However, they may have less-easy access to organisational or
supervisory supports and training and—consequently—be more likely to attempt to manage risk
themselves.
Officers with border interdiction functions (wherever they are located) have access to information and
the discretion to make decisions that affect the profitability of both legal businesses and illicit
enterprises. If they work in regional, isolated or mobile environments, they may have more-frequent
interactions with the people or industries they are required to regulate than with the agency that
employs them, and they may be exposed to significant pressure from some groups. Particularly if
supervision is off-site or officials work alone, there may be opportunities for self-initiated corrupt
conduct—for instance, soliciting bribes or kick-backs, or trafficking illicit goods.
Local sub-cultures may arise in geographic or functional teams, resulting in incongruence of values
with the wider organisation or variation in work practices (such as record-keeping or decisionmaking), which would obscure corruption if it were to occur. Close bonds (misplaced loyalties) may
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also prevent officials from recognising or reporting corrupt conduct if they were to observe it among
their colleagues.
The LEIC Act agencies with dispersed workforces recognise these risks and keep under review
those measures designed to protect the integrity of their employees.
Protecting key commodities
Australian Government agencies are charged with delivering specified outcomes or products for the
communities they serve. Agencies are naturally concerned with managing the most important
commodities, processes and capabilities that enable them to deliver these outcomes. If any of these
vital components were threatened, the agency’s ability to perform its core business would be
compromised. In law enforcement agencies, such ‘crown jewels’ may take the form of highly
sensitive law enforcement information—for example, the identities of undercover operatives.
Due to the nexus of law enforcement and border interdiction functions and the illicit aims of organised
crime groups, these commodities are often the target of corrupt activity. As part of their integrity
frameworks, ACLEI encourages LEIC Act agencies to use ‘crown jewel strategies’—by giving priority
to protecting their core business assets from discovery, destruction, manipulation or misuse by
organised crime or other corruptors.
This insight—which is consistent with the ‘match measures to risk’ principle—informs ACLEI’s advice
to agencies developing fraud and corruption control plans.
Information and Communications Technology roles
One of the ways that government agencies manage risk is to use information and communications
technology (ICT) to detect irregular transactions and deliver information efficiently across distances.
This emerging environment—with more emphasis on computer-based controls, a greater reliance on
intelligence-led interdiction and information concentrated in databases—means that a corrupt official
with ICT access has a commodity of value to corruptors.
ICT sections within agencies that have law enforcement roles pose unique integrity and security
challenges, because of staff members’ technical expertise, wide system access and authorities. Due
to their access privileges, these staff members are sometimes referred to as ICT ‘administrators’ or
‘super users’. Depending on their roles, they may have access to sensitive law enforcement
information and the ability to grant database access to other people. Moreover, they may have the
technical skills to conceal wrongful access or unauthorised disclosure of information. These factors
make them attractive targets for compromise by criminal groups.
ACLEI’s Operation Helix, recorded at Chapter 6—Reports to the Minister dealt with the potential
corruption of staff members of the ACBPS with ICT roles who, it was suspected, had undeclared
relationships with criminal contacts. Other ACLEI investigations, still in progress, are following similar
themes.
To address these concerns, ACLEI will convene a meeting of ICT Security Advisors from LEIC Act
agencies in the second half of 2015.
Managing change
ACLEI’s 2012–13 Annual Report contained the observation that good governance—comprising
robust accountability systems, high professional standards and watchful supervision—helps to
mitigate the risk that systemic corrupt conduct could undermine an agency’s capability to achieve its
legitimate outcomes.
ACLEI has also observed at various times that, in normal circumstances, it can take a decade or
more to embed a durable anti-corruption framework that sustains a resilient, professional culture. At
the end of the reporting period, LEIC Act agencies were either driving new policies or in the midst of
significant structural change. For instance:
 the ACBPS and DIBP have been integrated into a single agency from 1 July 2015, with a consequent
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refreshment of Senior Executive leadership
 the Australian Border Force was established within the DIBP from 1 July 2015
 the Department of Agriculture is preparing for the implementation of the new Biosecurity Act 2015,
dealing with down-sizing of its workforce, and received a new Secretary in 2014–15
 the Australian Federal Police and AUSTRAC both received a new head of agency in 2014–15
 the Australian Crime Commission is undergoing restructuring, and
 the organisational arrangements for the administration of the CrimTrac Agency were under review.
ACLEI recognises that large structural change may result in increased corruption risk in
organisations—either by creating unanticipated vulnerabilities or because of the time it takes to build
a new organisational culture and common values, and the need to deal with the disenchantment and
misalignment of values that can sometimes arise.
The counterpoint to this situation is that organisational change is also a point in time in which agency
heads can build-in anti-corruption measures into new structures and integrate them early into routine
business practice and planning. For example, it would be appropriate for agency audit committees—
which have influential roles in determining governance settings and monitoring agency risks—to
consider how each agency’s role and functions may give rise to particular vulnerabilities and to be
apprised of emerging threats to integrity and governance.
ACLEI plans to engage with LEIC Act agency audit committees in 2015–16, to discuss these risks
and opportunities.
Building anti-corruption capability
At the centre of ACLEI’s Corruption Prevention practice is the principle that its role should be to
foster the anti-corruption capability of LEIC Act agencies. The Community of Practice for Corruption
Prevention is one way in which ACLEI has achieved that goal over the last five years.
As that body has matured, a cohort of multi-disciplinary corruption prevention specialists has begun
to emerge. The next step in the development of that resource is to apply that expertise by conducting
peer reviews of the way LEIC Act agencies approach the task of fraud and corruption control
planning.
Insights gained from this exercise will be collated and promulgated, including in a joint panel
presentation (with the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption) at the 2015
Australian Public Sector Anti-Corruption Conference in November.
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CHAPTER 8—CORPORATE MANAGEMENT
This chapter provides an overview of ACLEI’s corporate management and
governance practices, financial and human resource frameworks, security
arrangements and information technology infrastructure.
The Integrity Commissioner is the statutory head of and Accountable Authority for ACLEI and is
responsible for governing ACLEI in a way which promotes the efficient, effective, economical and
ethical use and management of public resources. The Integrity Commissioner is also mindful that, as
an integrity agency, ACLEI’s own internal arrangements should set an example of effective
governance.
Management overview
Management and staffing structure
ACLEI is comprised of two branches, each headed by a Senior Executive Service officer.
The Operations Branch, headed by the Executive Director Operations, Ms Sarah Marshall, focuses
on intelligence and investigations activities, including operational engagement with partner agencies.
The Executive Director Operations is supported by the Directors of three sections:
 Investigations
 Intelligence, and
 Joint Taskforce.
The Secretariat Branch, headed by the Executive Director Secretariat, Mr Nicholas Sellars, focuses
on ACLEI’s corporate governance and management, business improvement, corruption prevention
programme and integrity policy responsibilities.
The Executive Director Secretariat is supported by the Directors of three sections:
 Corporate Services
 Legal Practice, and
 Strategic Engagement.
Governance practices
The key elements of the governance framework that apply to ACLEI are specified in the Public
Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act) and the Public Governance,
Performance and Accountability Rule 2014 (PGPA Rule). The PGPA Act replaced the Financial
Management and Accountability Act 1997 (FMA Act) progressively from 1 July 2014.
Accordingly, ACLEI reviewed and updated its delegations and internal controls during the reporting
period to meet the requirements of the PGPA Act and the PGPA Rule.
During 2014–15, a range of management controls were in place or reviewed to ensure the Integrity
Commissioner’s responsibilities as the Accountable Authority under the PGPA Act and PGPA Rule
were met, including:
 Accountable Authority Instructions (AAIs) (known as Chief Executive’s Instructions under the FMA
Act) that set out ACLEI’s policy and procedures for financial transactions and accountability
 financial delegations and authorisations, consistent with the Accountable Authority Instructions
 risk management and fraud and corruption control frameworks
 a range of Agency Policy Advices to guide staff on governance matters
 the 2014–15 Corporate Plan, and
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 an Audit Committee which scrutinises practices and performance and provides advice to the Integrity
Commissioner about corporate and financial management, risk management and governance.
The Integrity Commissioner meets weekly with the Executive Directors to discuss and oversee
agency operations.
The Executive also meets monthly as a Governance Board and considers reports from Directors
relating to ACLEI’s budget, staff and resource allocation, risk, strategic planning and performance.
Audit Committee
The ACLEI Audit Committee is established in accordance with section 45 of the PGPA Act and
section 17 of the PGPA Rule and is an important component of ACLEI’s governance arrangements.
Its charter is to provide independent assurance and assistance to the Integrity Commissioner on
ACLEI’s risk, control and compliance framework and its financial statement responsibilities.
The Audit Committee meets at least five times a year. The Audit Committee is appointed by the
Integrity Commissioner and is responsible for providing advice relating to:
 financial reporting, including reviewing the annual audited financial statements
 performance reporting, including the framework for developing and reporting Key Performance
Indicators and the annual Performance Statement
 systems of risk oversight and management, including the enterprise risk management framework, the
process for developing and implementing fraud control arrangements, and
 internal control systems, including:
–
the overall control environment, as reflected in ACLEI’s governance, risk management
and compliance arrangements
–
internal audit resourcing and coverage in relation to key risks, and
–
reviewing internal and external audit reports, advising the Integrity Commissioner of any
significant issues and monitoring implementation of agreed actions.
The Audit Committee may also advise the Integrity Commissioner on the exercise of executive
powers and is authorised to obtain any information to perform its role from any employee or external
party and to access any documents held by ACLEI.
As at 30 June 2015, ACLEI’s Audit Committee comprised three external members and one internal
member. The Committee is chaired by one of the external members:
 Mr Darren Box (Chair), First Assistant Secretary, Department of Human Services
 Ms Joann Corcoran, Acting Chief Information Officer, Attorney-General’s Department
 Brigadier James Gaynor CSC, Deputy Inspector General, Australian Defence Force, and
 Mr Nicholas Sellars, Executive Director Secretariat, ACLEI.
During the reporting period, three Audit Committee members finished their appointments:
 Mr Oliver Winder PSM (Chair and independent member)
 Ms Jenny Morison (independent member), and
 Mr Anthony Coles (Attorney-General’s Department and independent member).
The Integrity Commissioner acknowledges the important work of the Audit Committee and thanks all
present and previous members for their efforts during the reporting period.
The Auditor-General is also invited to nominate a representative to attend each meeting as an
observer. ACLEI’s Corporate Services Section provides secretariat services to the Committee.
The Audit Committee’s oversight, largely coming from outside ACLEI, allows for the objective
appraisal of the performance of ACLEI’s accountability systems. The strong external representation
also provides a wide breadth of experience in management and governance, thereby improving
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outcomes.
During 2014–15, the Audit Committee reviewed or monitored:
 internal and external audit activity and monitored progress against previous audit recommendations
 the 2013–14 Financial Statements
 ACLEI’s financial performance and endorsed the Financial Statements Preparation Plan and Risk
Assessment for 2014–15,
 the agency’s internal compliance framework for the 2014–15 PGPA Compliance Report
 internal governance arrangements including ACLEI’s Strategic Risk Management Policy and
Framework, Enterprise Risk Register, Business Continuity Planning, Fraud and Corruption Control
and the rolling mandatory training programme, and
 ACLEI’s compliance with the Protective Security Policy Framework.
The Committee also considered issues papers presented by ACLEI including—for example—
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Continuity Planning and testing, the outcomes of
a bomb threat scenario desktop exercise and possible implications for ACLEI of issues affecting
integrity agencies in other jurisdictions.
Internal audit
ACLEI’s Director of Corporate Services is accountable to the Integrity Commissioner for the
operation of the internal audit function and reports to the Audit Committee on internal audits. In
consultation with the Audit Committee, ACLEI focuses internal audit activity on areas which pose the
greatest risk to its functions.
In 2014–15, internal audits focused on ACLEI’s arrangements for:
 managing exhibits
 pre-employment recruitment practices
 controls in place to prevent internal corruption, and
 data loss prevention.
Internal audit of exhibit management
Careful and accountable handling of evidence is crucial to achieving sound investigative outcomes
and successful prosecutions. ACLEI’s exhibit management framework was last audited in the 2012–
13 reporting period. In 2014–15, ACLEI commissioned an additional audit to determine progress
made to address the issues raised in 2013.
The 2014–15 audit report provided the Integrity Commissioner with assurance about the continuing
effectiveness of ACLEI’s exhibit management system. ACLEI has accepted the two
recommendations made to enhance monitoring and staff guidance.
Internal audit of pre-employment recruitment practices
ACLEI is alive to the prospect that members of corrupt networks or criminal groups might try to obtain
employment in the agency to gain access to its information holdings or to influence investigations.
Poor screening prior to employment would leave ACLEI exposed to these risks. Accordingly, this
audit sought to gauge if ACLEI’s employment screening processes are adequate to assess the
integrity, identity and credentials of an applicant.
The audit remarked positively on ACLEI’s practice of considering a range of risk factors when
determining what checks to perform prior to making an offer of employment. The report made six
recommendations aimed at further systematising and recording pre-employment checks. ACLEI has
accepted and actioned all recommendations.
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Internal audit of controls in place to prevent internal corruption
ACLEI plays an important role in safeguarding the integrity of some of Australia’s premier law
enforcement and border agencies. Weak integrity systems or poor professional standards would
present a threat to confidence in ACLEI and to its operational effectiveness. For this reason, ACLEI
has stringent internal systems and processes in place to ensure staff members are aware of their
responsibilities and to provide guidance on proper conduct. These arrangements are described in
more detail in Chapter 9—Accountability under Integrity assurance measures.
The audit reviewed ACLEI’s internal processes and systems to determine if any arrangements
required strengthening. In particular, ACLEI asked the auditors to assess its integrity controls and
staff awareness arrangements against better practice methods for maintaining high professional
standards.
The audit rated ACLEI as “approaching or equivalent to leading best practice” for 11 of 12 integrity
measures relating to framework, culture, training and controls. For the last measure—how ACLEI
deals with integrity breaches in practice—ACLEI had no recent examples to audit.
A number of suggestions were put forward to ensure that integrity arrangements continue to be
effective as ACLEI’s operating environment changes. These suggestions include ways to deal with
growing staff numbers, point-in-time and ‘hotspot’ checks and improvements to documentation.
As part of the audit, ACLEI commissioned a tailored staff survey—based on anonymous responses—
measuring organisational culture and values. Overall, the survey results suggest that ACLEI has a
robust integrity culture based on shared professional values. It also provided valuable information to
inform the further development of ACLEI’s internal
anti-corruption arrangements (see also Chapter 9—Accountability, under Integrity assurance
measures).
Internal audit relating to data loss prevention
ACLEI’s Information and Communications Technology services and infrastructure are provided by
the Attorney-General’s Department under a Memorandum of Understanding (see Information
management and technology, later in this chapter). During the reporting period, ACLEI—with the
agreement of the Department—commissioned an audit to provide additional assurance that ACLEI
data hosted by Departmental systems is secure, and to determine whether software planned for
implementation would allow:
 the Department to monitor and report access to ACLEI data by staff with ICT administrator privileges
 for classified attachments to unclassified e-mails to be automatically detected, blocked and reported,
and
 for automatic notifications to be sent to ACLEI when ‘critical’ or ‘crown jewel’ documents are
accessed.
As relevant information was not yet available at the time of the audit, the auditors could not provide
assurance about the proposed software. However, they observed that the Department was taking
steps to incorporate additional security and detection measures into the project scope. Progress
made since the audit was conducted allows ACLEI to be confident that, when fully implemented, the
software would provide a high level of assurance.
The auditors also provided a number of suggestions relating to the contents of security reports to
ACLEI and related clauses for future agreements between ACLEI and the Department.
Business planning
ACLEI’s mandate is set by the objects of the LEIC Act and outlined in the Strategic Direction
Statement contained in the Portfolio Budget Statements. Business plans are linked to section plans
and individual agreements under the Program for Personal Performance. Weekly Executive meetings
and regular all-staff meetings are used to refine or update plans to take account of changing
circumstances.
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In October 2014, the Acting Integrity Commissioner, Mr Robert Cornall AO, issued a corporate plan
setting out ACLEI’s objects and role, operating environment, and strategic priorities for 2014–15.
Using these principles as a base, the Integrity Commissioner, Mr Michael Griffin AM, has since
issued a corporate plan which sets out priorities for 2015–16 and through to 2018–19.
ACLEI’s corporate plan is available on its website, www.aclei.gov.au, at About ACLEI.
Agency risk management
As with other Australian Government agencies, ACLEI’s corporate risks include financial
management, business continuity and fraud and corruption control. In addition, ACLEI faces
particular risks which arise from its role of investigating corrupt conduct in Australian Government law
enforcement agencies.
As effective control measures must be in place across the whole range of risks, ACLEI’s system of
management aims to scrutinise and strengthen agency compliance and performance with regard
to—for example—appropriate and lawful use of powers, security of information, proper handling of
evidence and operational safety. These management systems also focus on maintaining ACLEI’s
integrity (including by protecting ACLEI against possible compromise or infiltration).
ACLEI’s Strategic Risk Management Policy and Framework aims for a structured and consistent
approach to identifying, analysing and mitigating risk.
FIGURE NINE: ACLEI’s risk management framework
Under the Risk Management Framework, the ACLEI Professional Standards Officer maintains an
Enterprise Risk Register and makes monthly status reports to the Executive on individual risks.
Operational and strategic risks feed into the Register through section-level risk management plans
which are reviewed fortnightly.
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ACLEI’s top ten enterprise risks at July 2015
 safety and security: threat or injury to staff members, witnesses or ACLEI operations
 information security: leaks or inadvertent disclosures, compromise to information and evidence
 security compromise: engaging staff with potential security risk
 risk culture: failure to declare and to manage staff conflicts of interest, or poor awareness of
agency risks
 bullying and harassment: intimidating or behaving inappropriately to a colleague or
other person data integrity: compromise or destruction of data or systems
 interagency relationships: breakdown or diminishing in quality, threat to partnerships
 agency capability—detection: missed opportunities to detect corruption, failure to develop
agency capabilities
 agency capability—skills and priorities: failure to develop skills and resources needed to
perform functions
 agency capability—delivery and effectiveness: not sharing information, compromise to
investigations and outcomes
ACLEI also maintains a Business Continuity Plan to prepare ACLEI staff and systems to respond to a
wide range of events, including loss of physical infrastructure or information technology and
communications capabilities. These arrangements focus on the retention and accessibility of
information in the event of a disaster to allow the resumption of business within appropriate time
frames.
Fraud and corruption control
Drawing on ACLEI’s knowledge about corruption prevention and control, ACLEI uses a number of
strategies to identify and address fraud or corruption risks. ACLEI’s Fraud and Corruption Control
arrangements will be reviewed in 2015–16 to ensure continued consistency with the requirements of
section 10 of the PGPA Rule and the Commonwealth Fraud Control Policy.
ACLEI’s Fraud and Corruption Control Plan 2014–2015 is available at www.aclei.gov.au, under
Accountability.
The Plan is informed by the outcomes of an independent fraud and corruption risk assessment. It is
designed to be used by ACLEI staff members at all levels to assist them to fulfil their obligations as
agency employees and members of the Australian Public Service. It describes the control measures
in place and each person’s responsibilities for guarding against fraud and corrupt conduct. Staff are
provided references to relevant legislation and ACLEI governance documents, such as the ACLEI
Integrity Policy and associated Agency Policy Advices (see Chapter 9—Accountability). Importantly—
from the outset—the Plan informs staff members about the true nature of the integrity threats they
are likely to face. The underlying premise is that integrity—professional standards—is an important
agency asset which requires active management, and that this asset is worthy of protection in its own
right.
ACLEI’s financial processes and systems of delegation, approval and acquittal are designed to
minimise the risk of fraud occurring or—should it occur—of remaining undetected. ACLEI also has
the in-house expertise to investigate fraud. In addition, the LEIC Act provides for the independent
investigation of any suspected corrupt conduct by an ACLEI staff member (see Chapter 9—
Accountability).
Observations from internal audits, together with suggestions made by the Australian National Audit
Office as part of its annual audit of financial statements, also inform continuous improvement of the
fraud and corruption control framework.
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The Integrity Commissioner’s certification relating to ACLEI’s fraud control arrangements appears in
the letter of transmittal on page iii of this Annual Report.
No fraud was detected or alleged at ACLEI during 2014–15.
Management of human resources
The Integrity Commissioner deploys ACLEI’s staff according to strategic priority and to make the best
use of their capabilities and skills and the most efficient use of government resources.
ACLEI’s productivity
ACLEI’s Enterprise Agreement 2012–2014 contains strategies to encourage continuous
improvement in organisational and individual productivity and performance. These strategies include:
 linking incremental salary advances to the achievement of performance targets under ACLEI’s
Program for Personal Performance (described under Staff performance and development in this
chapter)
 improving the alignment between business practices and processes, people management,
information technology and the work environment
 encouraging a workplace culture that is respectful, supportive and efficient
 continuing to review work practices with the objective of streamlining processes
 supporting the digital transition strategy which aims to improve agency efficiency and business
continuity, and
 providing a range of flexible work practices to assist employees to balance their personal
responsibilities and objectives with organisational priorities.
In 2014–15, ACLEI continued to draw on external relationships and partnerships to achieve its
corporate objectives and to make the most efficient use of its resources. For instance, staff of the
Attorney-General’s Department contributed advice, guidance and practical support in relation to
information technology and information management projects and management of ACLEI’s website.
The Integrity Commissioner appreciates the support provided by the Attorney-General’s Department.
ACLEI uses flexible strategies to respond to fluctuations in workload and maintain or improve
productivity.
 ACLEI applies a ‘concertina model’, in conjunction with partner agencies, to respond to fluctuations in
investigative workload, drawing on external resources and skills to supplement its capabilities when
needed:
–
by seconding assistance from other agencies to provide specialised or additional
investigative or analytical capabilities for specific investigations, and
–
by drawing on the expertise of partner agencies in joint investigations or taskforces to assist
with telecommunications interception and surveillance activities.
The value of this model as the basis for ACLEI’s operational activities has been recognised in
external reviews of ACLEI’s staffing and resources, in 2013–14 (the Scheetz Review) and in 2014–
15 (the Peter Hamburger Review).
 A pool of skilled casual staff can respond at short notice to work on specific projects or intermittent
activities. This pool includes recently retired public servants with relevant experience and trained
telecommunications interception and surveillance monitors.
 Consultants with specialist expertise are engaged as necessary.
A 2014–15 productivity initiative was the launch of the ACLEI intranet, which provides staff with
more-efficient access to up-to-date information—such as Agency Policy Advices, forms, guides and
templates.
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As described in this chapter under Electronic records management, ACLEI’s digital transition strategy
also aims to use digital record-keeping to improve agency efficiency and business continuity.
Staffing profile and remuneration
At 30 June 2015, ACLEI had funding through appropriations and receipts for 38 full-time equivalent
staff positions.
Staffing levels fluctuate during any year. However, ACLEI concluded the reporting period with 28 fulltime employees, including the statutory position of Integrity Commissioner. One additional staff
member is employed on a part-time basis.
For different periods during the year, ACLEI seconded additional staff from other agencies to assist
in specific investigations. ACLEI also employed a number of staff on a casual or temporary basis at
various times.
No ACLEI employees identified as Indigenous at 30 June 2015.
Most ACLEI employees are based in Canberra. At the end of the reporting period, three staff
members were based in the Joint Taskforce in Sydney and ACLEI had commenced recruiting to fill
additional investigations and intelligence positions in Sydney.
ACLEI’s staffing profile is weighted to Executive Level staff, due to three factors:
 managing risk in a small agency
 the experience and high skill levels required to investigate law enforcement corruption, and
 the ‘concertina model’ of operation, within which ACLEI staff members manage and coordinate the
contributions of the specialist staff of other agencies and lead joint investigations under the LEIC Act.
ACLEI reviews all vacant positions to ensure their consistency with the APS Work Level Standards.
Table Twenty-One sets out ACLEI’s salary bands for each classification level, provides a breakdown
of gender and employment types and includes acting arrangements as at 30 June 2015. The table
also provides comparative data from 30 June 2014. Casual and seconded staff members, and staff
on unpaid or workers’ compensation leave, are not included in the table.
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TABLE TWENTY-ONE: Staffing profile at 30 June 2015
ONGOING
CLASSIFICATION
NON-ONGOING
TOTAL
MALE
FEMALE
MALE
FEMALE
Statutory office holder
(Integrity Commissioner)
1 (1)
—
—
—
1 (1)
SES Band 1 ($200,904)
1 (1*)
1 (1*)
—
—
2 (2)
EL 2 ($116,397 – $131,157)
3 (3)
2 (1+2*)
1 (0)
—
6 (6)
EL 1 ($94,682 – $115,062)
4 (4)
2 (1)
4 (1)
0 (2)
10 (8)
APS 6 ($74,232 – $85,274)
1+2* (1*)
1 (2)
1 (1)
0 (0)
5 (4)
APS 5 ($68,733 – $72,882)
—
3 (1)
—
0 (1)
3 (2)
APS 4 ($61,621 – $66,909)
—
1 (1)
—
1 (0)
2 (1)
APS 3 ($55,291 – $59,675)
—
—
—
0 (1)
0 (1)
APS 2 ($48,545 – $53,830)
—
—
—
—
—
APS 1 ($42,893 – $47,406)
—
—
—
—
—
12 (10)
10 (9)
6 (2)
1 (4)
29 (25)
Total
22 (19)
7 (6)
Figures in (brackets) are for staffing numbers at 30 June 2014.
* Higher duties or acting appointment.
Acting Integrity Commissioner
The office of the Integrity Commissioner is a statutory position, occupied by an appointee for a
maximum sum of seven years. The statutory term of the then Integrity Commissioner, Mr Philip
Moss, ended on 22 July 2014.
The Minister appointed Mr Robert Cornall AO to act as Integrity Commissioner from
23 July 2014 to 18 January 2015.
Non-salary benefits
Benefits available to all ACLEI staff include an employee assistance programme (providing free
confidential counselling), free influenza vaccinations, a reimbursement programme for spectacles,
and conference and study leave (discussed further under Staff performance and development).
ACLEI also offers financial assistance to staff for approved health and well-being activities and
equipment.
Performance payments
ACLEI does not have a system of performance payments.
Senior Executive remuneration
As a statutory officer, the salary and allowances of the Integrity Commissioner are determined by the
Remuneration Tribunal. The Tribunal’s determinations are published on its website,
www.remtribunal.gov.au.
Remuneration for SES positions in ACLEI is determined by the Integrity Commissioner, taking into
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account previous experience, qualifications and achievements and comparisons with SES officers in
other agencies.
Workplace agreements
The ACLEI Enterprise Agreement 2012–2014, which sets out many of ACLEI’s employment
conditions, covers all ACLEI employees below the level of SES. The Agreement, which commenced
on 19 September 2012 and nominally expired on 30 June 2014, is available on ACLEI’s website,
www.aclei.gov.au. At the end of the reporting period, ACLEI was making arrangements to put a new
Agreement in place. Three employees have Individual Flexibility Arrangements in place to take
account of specific circumstances.
Security requirements
All ACLEI positions are Designated Security Assessment Positions, and all employment at ACLEI is
contingent on obtaining and maintaining a satisfactory security assessment. Having regard to the
threat environment in which ACLEI and its partners operate, the Integrity Commissioner requires that
the minimum clearance for all ongoing ACLEI staff is Negative Vetting Level 2. Any person with a
security clearance below Negative Vetting Level 2 may only access information classified to the level
of his or her clearance.
Upon commencement, ACLEI staff members are required to submit declarations relating to personal
associations and private interests and to update those declarations annually or more often as their
personal circumstances change. This requirement aims to ensure that any potential conflicts of
interest associated with ACLEI employment are identified and appropriate action is taken. More
information about ACLEI’s procedures to ensure ACLEI’s integrity is maintained is at Chapter 9—
Accountability, under Integrity assurance measures.
Mandatory security awareness training is provided to all ACLEI staff as part of an ongoing training
programme.
Staff performance and development
ACLEI aims to maintain a multi-disciplinary and flexible workforce to enable the agency to deal
effectively with the types of corruption issues that may arise in law enforcement. For these purposes,
ACLEI maintains core skills in investigation management, intelligence collection and analysis,
technical surveillance monitoring, legal counsel (for example, as counsel assisting at coercive
information-gathering hearings), corruption prevention, policy development and corporate
management.
ACLEI focuses on three aspects of staff performance and development:
 ensuring staff have the skills required to perform to the standard required in their areas of expertise
and can contribute more broadly to a multi-disciplinary and flexible workforce
 ensuring staff have the requisite skills to build and assure integrity throughout the organisation (see
Chapter 9—Accountability, under Integrity assurance measures), and
 assisting staff development for career progression, noting the limitations on internal placements and
acting opportunities in an agency of ACLEI’s size.
ACLEI’s Program for Personal Performance (PPP) is part of its staff development and retention
strategy. The PPP provides the basis for managing the performance of staff, and for aligning
individual efforts and development with the achievement of operational and business objectives. The
PPP also links staff performance to incremental salary advancement.
Staff members may be eligible for support under ACLEI’s Studies Assistance Policy. The Policy
provides for leave to undertake formal study which is consistent with the individual’s work
responsibilities or assists with career development.
ACLEI’s learning and development strategy includes a rolling programme of mandatory training
(based on generic needs and risk) and targeted courses (based on staff development needs
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identified in the PPP).
The mandatory training programme—which supplements the induction training provided to new
staff—reinforces staff awareness of core Australian Public Service values, skills and competencies,
including records management and security, financial management, fraud and anti-corruption control,
staff security training and workplace health and safety. In addition, the programme requires all staff to
attend training specific to ACLEI’s law enforcement and anti-corruption context, such as countersurveillance, operation of relevant legislative frameworks and integrity reporting.
Under the learning and development strategy, training and support for senior staff in management
and leadership skills continued into 2014–15, including executive coaching. ACLEI staff members
also received external training or refresher courses in topics such as corruption prevention, financial
and operational systems administration, financial management, and rehabilitation case management.
Investigations and intelligence staff members also received technical training relevant to their roles.
Workplace diversity
ACLEI’s Workplace Diversity Program 2015–2019, issued in January 2015, is intended to sustain a
working environment which is fair, free from discrimination and respectful of the diversity of
employees and the community. Accordingly, ACLEI encourages the recruitment and participation of
staff members from the wider community and has measures in place to eliminate employmentrelated disadvantages on the basis of:
 gender
 race or ethnicity
 family responsibilities, and
 disability.
The Workplace Diversity Program aims to:
 ensure recruitment practices are based on APS Employment Principles, are open and are consistent
with diversity principles (to ensure that potential candidates are not excluded on an unfair or arbitrary
basis)
 encourage employees to be aware of, and committed to, workplace diversity principles
 encourage employees to help foster a diverse workforce
 create a supportive environment that is sensitive to the diversity of the workforce
 ensure employees are afforded reasonable opportunities to develop their work skills
 fully utilise ACLEI programmes to help employees balance work and personal life, and
 provide accurate information on workplace diversity to the Integrity Commissioner and to the
Australian Public Service Commissioner, for the annual State of the Service report.
Work Health and Safety (WHS)
The Corporate Services Section manages ACLEI’s Health and Safety Management Arrangements in
accordance with the Work Health and Safety Act 2011. Under these Arrangements:
 a trained health and safety staff representative speaks for the health and safety interests of ACLEI
staff
 the Employee Assistance Programme provider is available to staff for free confidential professional
counselling
 WHS is a standing item at regular all-staff meetings, and
 fire wardens and first aid officers are appointed to ensure staff safety and well-being.
WHS issues—such as personnel security and workstation design—are taken into account when, for
operational reasons, staff must work irregular hours or are deployed to other locations.
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ACLEI also pays attention to the risks to health and safety that may arise from the nature of ACLEI’s
work or the exercise of the Integrity Commissioner’s powers—for example, executing warrants or
carrying out physical surveillance. ACLEI makes plans for the treatment and management of
foreseeable risks to the health and safety of staff and others that may occur in such activities.
In 2014–15, ACLEI again provided staff members with ergonomic workstation assessments and all
recommended changes were implemented. There were no notifiable WHS incidents and no WHS
investigations during 2014–15 arising from ACLEI’s activities. No notices were given to ACLEI under
Part 10 of the WHS Act.
Management of financial processes
As a measure to protect the public revenue, Australian Government agencies are required to be
accountable for their financial practices and use of relevant money. Accordingly, transparency
measures and independent auditing are used to monitor ACLEI’s adherence to guidelines and
ensure that financial management arrangements are robust and conducted with propriety.
Financial Statements
ACLEI again achieved an unmodified audit finding for its 2014–15 Financial Statements, which are
set out in Part Four of this Annual Report. ACLEI recognises the Australian National Audit Office’s
expertise in scrutinising the preparation of the 2014–15 Financial Statements.
Purchasing
The Commonwealth Procurement Rules, the Integrity Commissioner’s AAIs and the PGPA Act and
PGPA Rule provide the framework for ACLEI’s decisions concerning the purchase of goods and
services.
ACLEI uses procurement methods which are efficient and cost-effective and which take account of
ACLEI’s security needs, specialised role and size. Value for money is always the guiding principle in
selecting providers of goods and services. ACLEI also participates in mandatory whole-ofgovernment coordinated procurement, such as travel.
Consultants
Consultants are engaged when specialist skills are unavailable within ACLEI (or are not obtainable
without diverting resources from higher priority tasks) or when independent research, review or
assessment is required. Consultants are typically engaged to investigate or diagnose a defined issue
or problem, carry out defined reviews or evaluations, or provide independent advice or information to
assist in ACLEI’s decision-making.
Prior to engaging consultants, ACLEI takes into account the abilities and resources required for the
task, the skills available internally, and the cost-effectiveness of engaging external expertise. The
decision to engage a consultant is made in accordance with the PGPA Act and PGPA Rule, the
Commonwealth Procurement Rules and relevant internal policies, including the AAIs.
In 2014–15, ACLEI’s total actual expenditure on consultancy contracts was $126,477 (including
GST). ACLEI entered into 10 new consultancy contracts involving total actual expenditure in 2014–
15 of $95,263 (including GST). Another four ongoing consultancy contracts were active during the
year, involving total actual expenditure in 2014–15 of $31,214 (including GST).
Annual reports contain information about actual expenditure. Information on the value of government
contracts and consultancies is available on the AusTender website,
www.tenders.gov.au.
Exempt contracts
Government agencies are required to report each year whether contracts have been exempted from
publication in AusTender on the basis that publication would disclose exempt matters under the
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Freedom of Information Act 1982. There were no such exemptions in 2014–15.
Australian National Audit Office access clauses
No contracts over $100,000 were let that did not provide for the Auditor-General to have access to a
contractor’s premises.
Procurement initiatives to support small business
ACLEI supports small business participation in the Commonwealth Government procurement market.
Small and Medium Enterprises and Small Enterprise participation statistics are available on the
Department of Finance’s website: www.finance.gov.au.
ACLEI’s procurement practices support participation by small and medium enterprises through:
 using the Commonwealth Contracting Suite for low-risk procurements valued under $200,000, and
 encouraging all staff to use payment card processes whenever possible and appropriate, thereby
making more-timely payment to suppliers.
Legal services expenditure
The Legal Services Directions 2005, issued by the Attorney-General under the Judiciary Act 1903,
require agencies to report expenditure on legal services during the year. ACLEI’s annual reports
concerning legal services expenditure can be found at ACLEI’s website, www.aclei.gov.au, under
Accountability.
In summary, ACLEI’s expenditure on external legal services (solicitors’ fees) in 2014–15 was $38,661.41
(excluding GST). No costs were recovered. Internal legal employee expenses, comprising salaries and
on-costs, are estimated to be $508,452.56 (excluding GST).
Information management and technology
ACLEI and the Attorney-General’s Department have a Memorandum of Understanding relating to
ACLEI’s ICT requirements. Under that arrangement, ACLEI procures and owns the necessary
infrastructure and equipment, while the Department provides Help Desk services, technical expertise,
file backup and system security management. In addition, the Department assists with ACLEI’s
electronic records management and hosts the ACLEI website.
This arrangement provides several advantages to ACLEI, including a high level of service at
reasonable cost, access to the Department’s full range of expertise, access to computer applications
which otherwise would be cost-prohibitive, data backup and business continuity and assurance with
regard to ICT security.
Electronic records management
ACLEI uses a specially-created segmented version of the Attorney-General’s Department’s
Electronic Document Management System, rated Protected.
ACLEI’s digital transition strategy aims to improve efficiency by introducing digital
record-keeping in compliance with the Australian Government Digital Transition Policy. In each of the
three years between 2011 and 2013, all Australian Government agencies were required to assess
their compliance with National Archives of Australia record-keeping and information management
capability requirements. From 2014–2017, Australian Government agencies will continue to submit
annual check-up assessments to the National Archives.
ACLEI’s 2014 assessment showed that in all three areas (optimising business outcomes, addressing
risk and managing business systems), ACLEI’s benchmark scores were better than or equal to the
average scores for the 168 agencies that participated.
In 2014–15, ACLEI continued to provide electronic document and information management training
to staff, developed a number of online training modules available through the ACLEI Intranet, and
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implemented the digital coding and approval of credit card statements and a business classification
system for electronic record-keeping.
Access to law enforcement databases
ACLEI has arrangements—including inter-agency agreements, memoranda of understanding, and
technical infrastructure—to enable authorised operational staff and taskforce members to access
various law enforcement databases. The development of ACLEI’s information access arrangements
continues to be a focus for the agency.
Facilities management
ACLEI endeavours to ensure that its facilities are matched to the type of high-end investigations
which are the Integrity Commissioner’s focus. ACLEI’s infrastructure must support the use of the
Integrity Commissioner’s information-gathering powers, intelligence collection and analysis and
investigations that involve multi-agency taskforces.
ACLEI’s secure operations facility in Canberra includes a hearing room, a surveillance monitoring
room and legal and taskforce suites. ACLEI’s hearing room is a joint-use facility and is available for
other agencies to use, as appropriate. During 2014–15, other government agencies used the hearing
room on a number of occasions.
The lease for the Canberra premises will expire in June 2016. Accordingly, during the reporting
period, ACLEI has begun the process of identifying its long-term facilities requirements and
identifying accommodation options.
The joint ACLEI/AFP taskforce, based in Sydney, is presently housed by the AFP. This arrangement
will be reviewed in the context of the 2017–18 Federal Budget.
Facilities security
ACLEI has physical security measures in place to protect ACLEI staff, information, and assets. For
example, mail items are scanned and opened in a contained environment before being brought onto
ACLEI’s premises. Due to the nature of ACLEI’s work and the sensitivity of information it holds,
ACLEI’s operations facility contains supplementary security measures, such as separate storage for
personal electronic devices and sound attenuation (so that classified information may be discussed
securely). The facility is segmented into separate secure areas with differing levels of access.
In accordance with the mandatory requirements of the Australian Government Protective Security
Policy Framework, ACLEI has a range of protective security policies, procedures and measures in
place. ACLEI’s security risks and measures are assessed regularly under ACLEI’s Strategic Risk
Management Policy and Framework.
Other corporate issues
Environmental performance
ACLEI’s role and activities do not relate directly to ecologically sustainable development. However,
ACLEI employs the following methods to make the best use of resources, reduce energy
consumption and promote sustainability.
 Purchasing decisions: preference is given to environmentally-friendly products when purchasing or
leasing office supplies, machines and equipment.
 Reducing paper consumption: when possible, documents are printed or reproduced using both sides
of the paper and this setting is the default on all networked printers. Routine office procedures, such
as leave approval and travel requisition, are performed electronically. A follow-you-print feature allows
users to nominate before printing which print requests may be deleted, thereby reducing waste. The
ongoing digitisation of ACLEI’s records is also continuing to reduce paper consumption.
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 Recycling arrangements: all toner cartridges are recycled through the supplier. ACLEI uses waste
recycling services for all unclassified paper waste. ACLEI also arranges to recycle as much waste
material as possible (including plastics and foam packaging) during any construction works or ICT
upgrades.
 Reducing energy consumption: ACLEI’s secure operations facility has low energy lighting installed
throughout. ACLEI’s desktop PCs automatically power down at night.
 Minimising travel: subject to operational requirements, ACLEI uses video- and teleconferencing
technologies to reduce the need for staff travel between the Canberra office and the Joint Taskforce,
located in Sydney.
Changes to disability reporting in Annual Reports
Since 1994, Commonwealth departments and agencies have reported on their performance as policy
adviser, purchaser, employer, regulator and provider under the Commonwealth Disability Strategy. In
2007–08, reporting on the employer role was transferred to the Australian Public Service
Commission’s State of the Service Report and the APS Statistical Bulletin. These reports are
available at www.apsc.gov.au. From 2010–11, departments and agencies have no longer been
required to report on these functions.
The National Disability Strategy 2010–2020, which replaces the Commonwealth Disability Strategy,
sets out a ten-year national policy framework to improve the lives of people with disability, promote
participation and create a more inclusive society. A high level two-yearly report will track progress
against each of the six outcome areas of the Strategy and present a picture of how people with
disability are faring. When available, these reports will be published at www.dss.gov.au.
Advertising and market research
ACLEI did not conduct any general advertising, market research, polling, direct marketing or any
other form of advertising campaign during the reporting period.
Internet presence
The ACLEI website, www.aclei.gov.au, provides information about ACLEI and the role of the
Integrity Commissioner. Inquiries about ACLEI, including reporting a corruption issue, can be sent to
ACLEI by email at contact@aclei.gov.au.
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CHAPTER 9—ACCOUNTABILITY
This chapter describes ACLEI’s internal and external accountability regimes.
The powers and authority provided by Parliament to the Integrity Commissioner are substantial. A
variety of safeguards ensure that these powers are used lawfully, fairly and appropriately. Some of
these measures take the form of external checks, while others are administered by the Integrity
Commissioner as the head of ACLEI.
Parliamentary Joint Committee on ACLEI
Part 14 of the LEIC Act establishes the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Commission
for Law Enforcement Integrity. The duties of the Committee are to:
 monitor and review the Integrity Commissioner’s performance of his or her functions
 report to both Houses of the Parliament, with such comments as it thinks fit, on any matter connected
with the performance of the Integrity Commissioner’s functions, or relating to ACLEI, that the
Committee considers should be directed to the attention of Parliament
 examine each Annual Report, as well as any special reports, and report to the Parliament on any
matter appearing in, or arising out of, any of those reports
 examine trends and changes in law enforcement in so far as they relate to corruption or integrity
generally in Commonwealth Government agencies with law enforcement functions, and
 report to the Parliament on any changes that the Committee thinks desirable to the Integrity
Commissioner’s functions or powers, the procedures followed by the Integrity Commissioner or
ACLEI’s structure.
With limited exception, the Integrity Commissioner must give the Committee information it requests
about an investigation or about ACLEI’s performance. With the agreement of the Committee, this
information may be provided in private—for example, to avoid the compromise of an ongoing
investigation or to protect the reputations of individuals against unfair criticism. During 2014–15, the
Committee met in private once with Acting Integrity Commissioner Cornall and once with Integrity
Commissioner Griffin to receive briefings in connection with its inquiries.
Membership
The Committee consists of up to ten members of the Parliament, with five members appointed by the
Senate and five members appointed by the House of Representatives.
In July 2014, Committee members included: Mr Russell Matheson MP (Chair), Senator Catryna Bilyk
(Deputy Chair), Senator Sean Edwards, the Hon. Justine Elliot MP, the Hon. Christian Porter MP,
Senator Barry O’Sullivan, Senator Glenn Sterle, Mr Jason Wood MP and Mr Tony Zappia MP.
The Hon. Christian Porter MP left the Committee on 12 February 2015 and
Mr Steve Irons MP joined on the same day.
Accordingly at the end of June 2015, the Committee comprised: Mr Russell Matheson MP (Chair),
Senator Catryna Bilyk (Deputy Chair), Senator Sean Edwards, the Hon. Justine Elliot MP,
Mr Steve Irons MP, Senator Barry O’Sullivan, Senator Glenn Sterle, Mr Jason Wood MP and
Mr Tony Zappia MP. One Senate appointment was unfilled.
Examination of the Integrity Commissioner’s Annual Report
The Committee’s examination each year of the Integrity Commissioner’s Annual Report gives ACLEI
a valuable external view of each year’s efforts and achievements, and provides a basis to inform
improvements to ACLEI’s work.
On 27 November 2014, the Acting Integrity Commissioner and other senior ACLEI staff members
appeared as witnesses at a public hearing as part of the Committee’s examination of the Integrity
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Commissioner’s 2013–14 Annual Report. The Committee’s report was presented to the Parliament
on 1 June 2015.
In its report, the Committee acknowledged the ongoing challenges of ACLEI’s extended jurisdiction
and signalled its continued intention to monitor ACLEI’s management of the number of investigations
being carried forward over multiple years. The Committee observed that “ACLEI’s 2013–14 report
reflects its strong presence within the Commonwealth’s law enforcement and integrity landscape…”.
A copy of the Committee’s report can be obtained from its website at www.aph.gov.au.
Committee inquiries
At the close of the reporting period, two inquiries initiated by the Committee were underway:
 Inquiry into ACLEI’s jurisdiction (commenced 6 March 2014), and
 Inquiry into the integrity of Australia’s border arrangements (commenced 5 March 2015).
The terms of reference, published submissions and hearing transcripts can be found on the
Committee’s website at www.aph.gov.au. ACLEI’s submissions can also be found on ACLEI’s
website, www.aclei.gov.au, under Reports, submissions and speeches.
Senate Estimates
Estimates of government expenditure are referred to Senate Committees as part of the annual
Budget cycle. This opportunity to examine government administration is an important part of
Parliamentary scrutiny of the Executive.
ACLEI, as part of the Attorney-General’s portfolio, responds to the Senate Standing Committee on
Legal and Constitutional Affairs. The Acting Integrity Commissioner appeared and provided evidence
to the Committee on 20 November 2014, and responded to subsequent questions on notice. The
proceedings of Senate Committee hearings and responses to questions on notice are published on
the Parliament of Australia website, www.aph.gov.au.
Listing of file titles
ACLEI complies with Senate Order J.270, as amended on 3 December 1998 (J.265). Indexed lists of
file titles are placed on the ACLEI website, excluding any file titles or parts of file titles that relate to
internal administration or would disclose commercial in confidence, personal, law enforcement or
national security matters.
The listings, produced twice yearly, are available at www.aclei.gov.au, under Accountability.
External accountability for the use of powers
A range of checks and balances is in place to ensure that ACLEI is accountable for the use of
particular law enforcement powers. In combination, these requirements ensure that the granting and
use of powers are subject to processes that ensure their proper and appropriate use.
Authorisation
Many of the Integrity Commissioner’s powers require prior approval by an external authority—usually
a Judge, a Magistrate or a Member of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal—before they can be
exercised. Examples include:
 a search warrant (section 108 of the LEIC Act, Part 3–5 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, or Part
IAA of the Crimes Act 1914)
 a warrant to use a surveillance device (Surveillance Devices Act 2004)
 a warrant to intercept telecommunications or to gain access to stored communications
(Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979)
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 an order that a person deliver his or her passport to the Integrity Commissioner
(section 97 of the LEIC Act), or
 an arrest warrant (section 100 of the LEIC Act).
Reporting and monitoring
The use of certain powers requires reports to be made to the Attorney-General or the Minister with
responsibility for law enforcement, as appropriate, and in some cases to the Parliament. These
reports are required under the following enactments:
 the Surveillance Devices Act
 the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act
 Part IAB of the Crimes Act (controlled operations)
 Part IABA of the Crimes Act (integrity testing)
 Division 6, Part IAC of the Crimes Act (assumed identities), and
 Division 2, Part IACA of the Crimes Act (witness identity protection certificates).
With the exception of reports into integrity testing, which are not made public, the Integrity
Commissioner’s annual reports into the use of these powers, or links to these reports, can be found
on ACLEI’s website, www.aclei.gov.au, under Accountability.
Judicial review
The authorities and powers of the Integrity Commissioner and ACLEI are generally open to review
before the courts, as with any other government agency exercising law enforcement powers. For
instance, an application may be made under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977
for orders of review in respect of a decision of an administrative character made by the Integrity
Commissioner or ACLEI under Commonwealth legislation.
In addition, the admissibility of the evidence collected through the exercise of a power may be
subject to review by a court in the course of a criminal proceeding.
There was no judicial review of an ACLEI decision or action during 2014–15.
Commonwealth Ombudsman
The Commonwealth Ombudsman contributes to ACLEI’s accountability in four important ways—
namely, independent investigation of complaints about ACLEI, own motion investigation into matters
of administration concerning ACLEI, monitoring of ACLEI’s compliance with legislation in relation to
the use of certain powers, and oversight of ACLEI’s handling of Public Interest Disclosures (PIDs)
and investigating ACLEI PIDs in appropriate cases.
Complaint handling
A person dissatisfied with a matter of administration concerning ACLEI can complain to the Integrity
Commissioner. Should the matter remain unresolved, the person may refer his or her complaint to
the Commonwealth Ombudsman who will decide how the matter will be handled. A person may also
complain direct to the Ombudsman. In 2014–15, the Ombudsman did not contact ACLEI in relation to
any complaints.
Own motion investigations
The Ombudsman may decide to inquire into matters of administration on his or her own motion.
During 2014–15, the Ombudsman did not inform the Integrity Commissioner of any such
investigations.
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Inspections and monitoring
ACLEI’s records of its use of certain covert powers are subject to inspection by, and report to, the
Commonwealth Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is required to report six-monthly or annually to the
relevant Minister (and in some cases to Parliament) on the comprehensiveness and adequacy of
ACLEI’s records relating to the use of these powers.
The records that are subject to inspection relate to powers exercised under the following legislation:
 the Surveillance Devices Act
 the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act, and
 Part IAB of the Crimes Act (controlled operations).
During the reporting period, the Ombudsman inspected ACLEI’s telecommunications interception
and surveillance devices records for the periods January–June 2014 and
July–December 2014, and controlled operations records for the period January to June 2014. The
Ombudsman made no recommendations and suggested instead that ACLEI amend its processes to
record more clearly its compliance with certain sections of the Surveillance Devices Act and the
Crimes Act.
Under section 218 of the LEIC Act, the Ombudsman is required at least once a year to provide a
briefing to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ACLEI about the Integrity Commissioner’s
involvement in controlled operations. The Committee meets in private for this purpose.
Public interest disclosures
The Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 aims to promote the integrity and accountability of the
Commonwealth public sector, encourage and facilitate the making of public interest disclosures by
public officials, ensure that public officials who make disclosures are supported and protected from
adverse consequences relating to the disclosures, and that disclosures are properly investigated and
dealt with.
Under the PID Act, the Ombudsman also has responsibility for, amongst other things:
 setting the standards that agencies need to follow in dealing with PIDs (in conjunction with the
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security)
 investigating PIDs in appropriate cases
 overseeing or monitoring the way agencies handle PIDs, and
 providing an annual report on the operation of the PID Act to the Minister for tabling in the Parliament.
The Integrity Commissioner has issued an Agency Policy Advice to guide staff and managers in
making and dealing with disclosures under the PID Act.
No matters were dealt with as PIDs by ACLEI during the reporting year.
Auditor-General
The Auditor-General is responsible under the Auditor-General Act 1997 for providing auditing
services to the Parliament and public sector agencies such as ACLEI. The Australian National Audit
Office supports the Auditor-General, who is an independent officer of the Parliament.
ACLEI’s audited financial statements are presented in Part Four of this Annual Report.
As well as financial audits, the Auditor-General may conduct performance audits of selected areas of
public administration. The ANAO has extensive powers of access to Commonwealth documents and
information to support this role.
The Auditor-General did not undertake any performance audits relating to ACLEI during 2014–15.
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Freedom of information
The Freedom of Information Act 1982 provides the legislative framework for access to information in
the possession of the Australian Government and its agencies.
Agencies subject to the FOI Act are required to publish information as part of the Information
Publication Scheme. Each agency must display on its website a plan showing what information it
publishes in accordance with these requirements. ACLEI’s IPS entry and FOI disclosure log can be
accessed through icons on ACLEI’s homepage at www.aclei.gov.au.
Freedom of Information statistics
In 2014–15, ACLEI received ten valid requests under the FOI Act for access to documents, and no
requests for amendment or annotation of personal records. The Information Commissioner did not
commence any new reviews of ACLEI decisions made under the FOI Act. One review, commenced
in 2012–13, remains under active consideration by the Office of the Australian Information
Commissioner.
Operational accountability
The Integrity Commissioner expects ACLEI staff members to maintain high standards of investigation
practice and accountability. This expectation guides ACLEI’s development of policies and practices.
Operational procedures
The Integrity Commissioner makes it a priority to establish clear policies and procedures to guide
ACLEI’s work, to set appropriate standards, and to communicate expectations.
The Executive Director Operations oversees all investigations, which are governed by the use of
strategic and tactical investigation plans. The Integrity Commissioner and Executive Director
Operations review the progress of each investigation at key milestones to ensure the effective use of
intelligence, powers and other resources, and adherence to operational guidance.
A number of the Integrity Commissioner’s investigations are undertaken jointly with other agencies.
To ensure that each investigation is conducted in a coordinated and accountable way, ACLEI
manages actively all joint investigations, convening regular meetings with operational and senior staff
and receiving formal briefings as necessary. For significant matters, the Integrity Commissioner also
meets with the heads of the agency concerned.
The Joint Taskforce, based in Sydney, is established through a joint agency agreement between
ACLEI and the AFP, in consultation with the DIBP. The Taskforce works with a range of law
enforcement partners to target corruption-enabled border crime. Taskforce operations are governed
by a Joint Management Committee, which includes ACLEI’s Executive Director Operations and the
AFP National Manager Organised Crime and Cyber.
Use of powers
Any proposal to use coercive information-gathering powers is subject to the written approval of the
Integrity Commissioner. ACLEI’s Legal Practice provides advice relating to the lawful use of powers,
authorisations, surveillance and telecommunications interception. ACLEI’s Legal Practice also
monitors relevant case law related to the use of coercive and other powers to ensure that ACLEI
operates within legal precedent. The Assistant Director Operational Support assists in the
management of ACLEI’s exercise of covert information-gathering powers and provides guidance to
staff on accountability.
As far as practicable, ACLEI seeks to assist and inform people subject to coercive informationgathering powers (that is, those who receive a summons to attend and provide evidence at a hearing
or a notice to produce documents, information or things). For this purpose, the Integrity
Commissioner publishes notes and guidelines on ACLEI’s website at www.aclei.gov.au, under
Hearings, notices and information guidelines. These documents include:
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 Hearing Guidelines, to inform and guide the conduct of appearances and legal representation in
connection with hearings before the Integrity Commissioner, and are designed to promote the
efficient and effective conduct of hearings
 Notice Guidelines, which are intended to inform a person, or their legal counsel, of their rights and
obligations when they receive a notice to produce under section 75 of the LEIC Act
 Information Guidelines, which describe some of the statutory and procedural considerations used
when deciding how ACLEI obtains, handles, uses or disseminates information in the exercise of the
Integrity Commissioner’s information-gathering functions under the LEIC Act, and
 guidance and forms for witnesses called before a coercive information-gathering hearing, who may
be eligible for legal or financial assistance.
These documents are reviewed from time to time to ensure their currency and to take into account
changes in legislation and in ACLEI’s operating environment.
Information management
The information gathered through the use of the Integrity Commissioner’s coercive, covert or
intrusive investigation powers is sensitive. ACLEI staff members are required to manage such
information accountably and securely. Standard operating procedures and mandatory training are
among the means by which ACLEI communicates these expectations to staff and provides guidance
on information-handling, record-keeping and maintaining privacy and confidentiality.
ACLEI also has in place arrangements with a number of agencies for authorised operational staff and
taskforce members to access various law enforcement databases from ACLEI’s secure operations
facility. ACLEI’s access is governed through agreements or memoranda of understanding, setting out
the terms under which access is provided by each agency. In addition, each ACLEI officer has a
unique identifier and all access is logged. For each database, ACLEI has in place authorisation and
audit mechanisms to satisfy the database owner’s security requirements. Any material downloaded is
stored securely on ACLEI’s official files in accordance with security classification requirements.
ACLEI conducts regular internal audits in order to ensure that staff members handle personal and
sensitive information accountably and securely. In 2014–15, ACLEI conducted a point-in-time audit of
access over three months to all external databases and performed a risk review to inform a
strengthened audit regime to be introduced in 2015–16. Additionally, ACLEI introduced random
auditing of access to ACLEI’s own information holdings and verified classification practices relating to
the secure storage of information.
Integrity assurance measures
While the business of ACLEI is focused outward on the integrity of the agencies subject to the
Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction, ACLEI staff can only discharge their duties effectively if ACLEI
has clear and effective internal governance arrangements, and a strong culture of personal and
organisational integrity.
Accordingly, ACLEI expects all staff members to demonstrate high levels of personal integrity and
cultivate positive behaviours in themselves and their colleagues. Staff must be aware of integrity
risks—whether to themselves or to ACLEI—and adhere to a range of reporting obligations to ensure
that these risks are identified, reported, assessed, managed and reviewed.
ACLEI’s Professional Standards Officer is responsible for maintaining and refining ACLEI’s
governance and risk framework, and for ensuring that staff members understand and comply with
their integrity responsibilities. The Professional Standards Officer reports to the Integrity
Commissioner monthly—or more often for matters requiring special attention—on risk, governance
and integrity matters.
Additionally, Agency Policy Advices (APAs) establish processes and controls for
resource management and for maintaining standards of staff conduct. The APAs are subject to
regular review to ensure they remain current and relevant to ACLEI’s operations and environment.
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An overarching ACLEI Integrity Policy APA sets out an integrity framework, shown at Figure Ten, to
promote professional standards and mitigate integrity risk. The ACLEI Integrity Policy applies to all
ACLEI staff members, including secondees from other agencies and the Integrity Commissioner. The
policy and framework bring together key aspects of ACLEI’s governance, performance and
accountability obligations, and reinforce the importance for ACLEI of building and managing integrity
as a key agency asset.
FIGURE TEN: ACLEI integrity policy framework
The governance, performance and accountability features of the Integrity Framework include
structures and processes intended to create a workplace in which professional standards and
accountability are valued and reinforced. Some of these features are described below.
 Six integrity-related APAs form the basis of the framework, to guide staff members in recognising risk
and to assist them to meet their reporting obligations.
 The APAs are reinforced by integrity, security and fraud training as part of ACLEI’s rolling mandatory
training programme. All staff members—including casual staff and the Integrity Commissioner—must
participate.
 The Professional Standards Officer conducts one-on-one integrity interviews with all new staff
members and provides advice to staff as needed. The Officer also provides a monthly report to the
Executive about declarations and contact reports received.
 ACLEI’s Program for Personal Performance includes quarterly reminders to update declarations and
an annual integrity discussion between supervisors and staff members. This measure provides
regular structured opportunities to consider and discuss integrity issues and obligations and promotes
good work practices and ethical behaviour.
 The confidentiality requirements for ACLEI staff (section 207 of the LEIC Act), the relevant provisions
of the Public Service Act 1999 (including the APS Values and Code of Conduct) and related
misconduct procedures are brought to the attention of staff at the commencement of employment or
secondment to ACLEI. These obligations and procedures are reinforced regularly in mandatory
training.
 ACLEI’s Fraud and Corruption Control Plan 2014–2015 outlines the responsibilities of staff members
and managers in relation to governance. The Plan is available on ACLEI’s website,
www.aclei.gov.au.
Additionally, during 2014–15, ACLEI managed its organisational and staff integrity in the following
ways.
 The Integrity Commissioner issued a new Social Media APA, aimed at ensuring staff members are
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able to identify the integrity risks associated with personal use of social media—for example,
exposure to organised criminals seeking to target ACLEI employees online—and to take reasonable
steps to mitigate those risks. Additionally, the APA clarifies authorisation requirements for official
purposes (such as to gather information during an investigation) and the Integrity Commissioner’s
expectations of ACLEI staff when using social media outside of work.
 The Professional Standards Officer carried out a review of reporting patterns to provide assurance
that all staff members are complying with the declarations and contact report regimes and, as part of
a formal communication strategy, reminded staff of their responsibilities and obligations.
 The contact reporting regime was refined to involve supervisors and managers in receiving reports,
thereby acknowledging their responsibilities for managing staff and business risks. As part of this
project—and to improve business continuity measures—ACLEI established a centralised electronic
mailbox for contact reporting.
 ACLEI’s intranet site, launched in November 2014, provides staff with direct access to integrityrelated information, policies and forms.
Audit of anti-corruption controls
During the 2014–15 reporting period, ACLEI commissioned an independent audit of its anti-corruption
controls. The auditors observed that—although there was no recent case data to assess how ACLEI
deals with integrity breaches—ACLEI’s integrity framework, training and controls either approach or
are equivalent to leading best practice. ACLEI has accepted the auditors’ suggestions to ensure that
integrity arrangements remain effective over time—including strategies to scale the framework as
ACLEI grows, adopting ‘point-in-time’ and ‘hotspot’ checks and improving documentation.
The audit included a specially-designed anonymous survey of staff attitudes to organisational culture
and values. The survey found that ACLEI has a strong integrity culture, underpinned by shared
professional values and a ‘don’t self-manage risk’ approach. In general, staff members are confident in
ACLEI’s detection regime and believe that appropriate action would be taken in the case of integrity
breaches. The Integrity Commissioner will use the survey results to inform ongoing efforts to maintain
and further strengthen ACLEI’s integrity culture.
This survey will also act as a benchmark for future assessments of ACLEI’s integrity culture.
More information about ACLEI’s internal governance arrangements, including audits, corporate and
financial accountability controls can be found at Chapter 8—Corporate management.
Dealing with corruption issues relating to ACLEI
From time to time, there may be a need to investigate allegations or information that raise a
corruption issue relating to a member of ACLEI’s staff, or the Integrity Commissioner. These issues
are described in the LEIC Act as ACLEI corruption issues.
The LEIC Act enables the Minister to make arrangements to have ACLEI corruption issues dealt with
by the Integrity Commissioner or independently by a Special Investigator. A Special Investigator can
exercise the same powers as the Integrity Commissioner.
Under the LEIC Act, the Minister must not refer the ACLEI corruption issue to the Integrity
Commissioner if it concerns the Integrity Commissioner or an Assistant Integrity Commissioner.
In order to ensure the independence of the investigation, the appointment of a Special Investigator is
made by the Minister and any associated administration is provided by the Attorney-General’s
Department. When ACLEI bears the cost of a Special Investigation, that cost is disclosed in the
Integrity Commissioner’s Annual Report for reasons of transparency and accountability.
After completing an investigation into an ACLEI corruption issue, the Integrity Commissioner or Special
Investigator must give the Minister a report containing findings, the evidence upon which those findings
are based, and any recommendations, or—if the report is from the Integrity Commissioner—any actions
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that have been taken or are proposed.
The Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Regulations 2006 (at Regulation 22) require
particulars of ACLEI corruption issues to be published in the Integrity Commissioner’s Annual Report
(see Appendix 2—Additional statistics). Accordingly, when applicable, this chapter would contain a
summary of the outcomes of any investigation into an ACLEI corruption issue.
No ACLEI corruption issues were concluded during 2014–15.
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PART FOUR—FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
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119
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120
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
121
Statement of Comprehensive Income
for the period ended 30 June 2015
2015
$'000
2014
$'000
4A
4B
4C
4D
4E
4,494
3,796
569
4
15
8,878
3,962
3,573
533
4
5
8,077
5A
5B
75
48
123
672
52
724
123
(8,755)
9,610
724
(7,353)
7,679
855
326
Notes
NET COST OF SERVICES
Expenses
Employee benefits
Suppliers
Depreciation and amortisation
Finance costs
Write-down and impairment of assets
Total expenses
Own-Source Income
Own-source revenue
Sale of goods and rendering of services
Other revenue
Total own-source revenue
Total own-source income
Net cost of services
Revenue from Government
Total comprehensive income/(loss) attributable to the
Australian Government
5C
The above statement should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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Statement of Financial Position
as at 30 June 2015
2015
$’000
2014
$’000
62
2,778
2,840
67
3,150
3,217
348
303
2
43
696
709
466
25
25
1,225
3,536
4,442
9A
9B
148
277
425
325
490
815
10A
10B
991
166
1,157
942
162
1,104
1,582
1,954
1,919
2,523
1,440
1,110
2,863
1,110
(596)
1,954
(1,450)
2,523
Notes
ASSETS
Financial assets
Cash and cash equivalents
Trade and other receivables
Total financial assets
Non-financial assets
Land and buildings
Property, plant and equipment
Intangibles
Other non-financial assets
Total non-financial assets
7A
7B
8A,C
8B,C
8D,E
8F
Total assets
LIABILITIES
Payables
Suppliers
Other payables
Total payables
Provisions
Employee provisions
Other provisions
Total provisions
Total liabilities
Net assets
EQUITY
Contributed equity
Reserves
Retained surplus / (accumulated
deficit)
Total equity
The above statement should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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Statement of Changes in Equity
for the period ended 30 June 2015
Retained
earnings
2015
2014
$’000
$'000
Opening balance
Balance carried forward from previous period
Adjustments1
Adjusted opening balance
Comprehensive income
Surplus/(Deficit) for the period
Total comprehensive income
Total comprehensive income attributable to
Australian Government
Transactions with owners
Distributions to owners
Returns of capital
Other - Omnibus Repeal Day (Autumn 2014) Act 2014
Other - Statute Stocktake (Appropriations) Act 2013
Contributions by owners
Departmental capital budget
Total transactions with owners
Closing balance as at 30 June
Closing balance attributable to Australian Government
Asset revaluation
surplus
2015
2014
$’000
$’000
Contributed
equity/capital
2015
2014
$’000
$’000
Total
equity
2015
2014
$’000
$’000
( 1,450)
( 1)
(1,451)
(1,776)
(1,776)
1,110
1,110
1,110
1,110
2,863
2,863
5,481
5,481
2,523
(1)
2,522
4,815
4,815
855
855
326
326
-
-
-
-
855
855
326
326
855
326
-
-
-
-
855
326
-
-
-
-
(1,423)
-
(2,618)
(1,423)
-
(2,618)
(596)
(596)
(1,450)
(1,450)
1,110
1,110
1,110
1,110
(1,423)
1,440
1,440
(2,618)
2,863
2,863
(1,423)
1,954
1,954
(2,618)
2,523
2,523
The above statement should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes.
1
Adjustments relate to rounding against Retained Earnings.
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Cash Flow Statement
for the period ended 30 June 2015
Notes
OPERATING ACTIVITIES
Cash received
Appropriations
Sale of goods and rendering of services
Net GST received
Total cash received
Cash used
Employees
Suppliers
Section 74 receipts transferred to OPA
Total cash used
Net cash from/(used by) operating activities
11
INVESTING ACTIVITIES
Cash used
Purchase of property, plant and equipment
Total cash used
Net cash used by investing activities
FINANCING ACTIVITIES
Cash received
Contributed equity
Total cash received
Net cash from financing activities
Net increase/(decrease) in cash held
Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of the
reporting period
Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the reporting
period
7A
2015
$’000
2014
$’000
8,606
75
204
8,885
7,424
78
138
7,640
(4,408)
(4,368)
(75)
(8,851)
34
(3,919)
(3,610)
(75)
(7,604)
36
(39)
(39)
(39)
(105)
(105)
(105)
-
-
(5)
67
(69)
136
62
67
The above statement should be read in conjunction with
the accompanying notes.
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Schedule of Commitments
as at 30 June 2015
2015
$’000
2014
$’000
45
45
93
93
486
10
496
496
451
995
31
1,026
1,026
933
BY MATURITY
Commitments receivable
Other commitments receivable
Within 1 year
Between 1 to 5 years
Total other commitments receivable
Total commitments receivable
45
45
45
47
46
93
93
Commitments payable
Operating lease commitments
Within 1 year
Between 1 to 5 years
Total operating lease commitments
486
486
509
486
995
Other Commitments
Within 1 year
Between 1 to 5 years
Total other commitments
Total commitments payable
Net commitments by maturity
10
10
496
451
23
8
31
1,026
933
BY TYPE
Commitments receivable1
Net GST recoverable on commitments
Total commitments receivable
Commitments payable
Other commitments
Operating leases2
Other
Total other commitments
Total commitments payable
Net commitments by type
Notes:
1. Commitments are GST inclusive where relevant.
2. Operating leases included were effectively non-cancellable.
Operating Leases
Lease for Office Accommodation
Each lease is individual and may be subject to automatic percentage increase depending on the terms of the agreement.
The period of the accommodation lease is still current and an option to renew is not available.
The entity expects to enter into new office lease arrangements during the 2015–16 reporting period.
Other Commitments
Service payments are subject to annual CPI variation. The original contract period ended on 27 October 2014 and the
entity exercised the 12 month extension option with this extension ending on 27 October 2015.
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Table of Contents - Notes
Note 1: Summary of Significant Accounting Policies
Note 2: Events After the Reporting Period
Note 3: Net Cash Appropriation Arrangements
Note 4: Expenses
Note 5: Own-Source Income
Note 6: Fair Value Measurements
Note 7: Financial Assets
Note 8: Non-Financial Assets
Note 9: Payables
Note 10: Provisions
Note 11: Cash Flow Reconciliation
Note 12: Senior Management Personnel Remuneration
Note 13: Financial Instruments
Note 14: Financial Assets Reconciliation
Note 15: Appropriations
Note 16: Reporting of Outcomes
Note 17: Budgetary Reports and Explanations of Major Variances
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Note 1: Summary of Significant Accounting Policies
1.1 Objectives of the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity
The Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity is an Australian Government controlled
non-corporate Commonwealth entity. It is a not-for-profit entity. The role of the Australian Commission for Law
Enforcement Integrity is to detect and prevent corrupt conduct and to investigate corruption issues, in prescribed law
enforcement agencies with law enforcement functions.
The agencies presently prescribed are: the the Australian Crime Commission and the former National Crime Authority, the
Australian Federal Police, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, the CrimTrac Agency, prescribed
aspects of the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Immigration and Border Protection* (including the
Australian Border Force).
* The Australian Customs and Border Protection Service ceased on 30 June 2015, and the Australian Border Force and
Department of Immigration and Border Protection joined the Integrity Commissioner's jurisdiction on 1 July 2015.
The entity is structured to meet the following outcome:
Outcome 1: Independent assurance to the Australian Government that Commonwealth law enforcement agencies and their
staff act with integrity, by detecting, investigating and preventing corruption.
The continued existence of the entity in its present form and with its present programs is dependent on Government policy
and on continuing funding by Parliament for the entity's administration and programmes.
Entity activities contributing to this outcome are classified as departmental. Departmental activities involve the use of
assets, liabilities, income and expenses controlled or incurred by the entity in its own right.
1.2 Basis of Preparation of the Financial Statements
The financial statements are general purpose financial statements and are required by section 42 of the Public
Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013.
The financial statements have been prepared in accordance with:
a) Financial Reporting Rule (FRR) for reporting periods ending on or after 1 July 2014, and
b) Australian Accounting Standards and Interpretations issued by the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) that
apply for the reporting period.
The financial statements have been prepared on an accrual basis and in accordance with the historical cost convention,
except for certain assets and liabilities at fair value. Except where stated, no allowance is made for the effect of changing
prices on the results or the financial position.
The financial statements are presented in Australian dollars and values are rounded to the nearest thousand dollars unless
otherwise specified.
Unless an alternative treatment is specifically required by an accounting standard or the FRR, assets and liabilities are
recognised in the Statement of Financial Position when and only when it is probable that future economic benefits will flow
to the entity or a future sacrifice of economic benefits will be required and the amounts of the assets or liabilities can be
reliably measured. However, assets and liabilities arising under executor contracts are not recognised unless required by
an accounting standard. Liabilities and assets that are unrecognised are reported in the Schedule of Commitments or the
Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets Note (if applicable in the reporting period).
Unless alternative treatment is specifically required by an accounting standard, income and expenses are recognised in the
Statement of Comprehensive Income when and only when the flow, consumption or loss of economic benefits has
occurred and can be reliably measured.
The Australian Government continues to have regard to developments in case law, including the High Court's most recent
decision on Commonwealth expenditure in Williams v Commonwealth [2014] HCA 23, as they contribute to the larger body
of law relevant to the development of Commonwealth programmes. In accordance with its general practice, the
Government will continue to monitor and assess risk and decide on any appropriate actions to respond to risks of
expenditure not being consistent with constitutional or other legal requirements.
1.3 Significant Accounting Judgements and Estimates
In the process of applying the accounting policies listed in this note, the entity has made the following judgements that have
the most significant impact on the amounts recorded in the financial statements:
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leave provisions involve assumptions based on the likely tenure of existing staff, patterns of leave claims and payouts,
future salary movements and future discount rates. The appropriate Commonwealth bond rate has been used as the
future discount rate. See Note 1.8 for further information,
 the fair value of the building, property, plant and equipment has been taken to be the market value of similar assets or
depreciated replacement value as determined by an independent valuer, and
 the cost of making good properties leased by the entity is based on estimates of completing such remedial work. In
some instances the actual cost to complete make-good work may not match estimated costs.
No accounting assumptions or estimates have been identified that have a significant risk of causing a material adjustment
to carrying amounts of assets and liabilities within the next accounting period.
1.4 New Australian Accounting Standards
Adoption of New Australian Accounting Standard Requirements
No accounting standard has been adopted earlier than the application date as stated in the standard.
The budgetary reporting disclosures, as required under AASB 1055 Budgetary Reporting, applies to the entity as a not-forprofit entity within the General Government Sector where budgeted information about controlled items is separately
identified as relating to the entity within the budgetary information presented to Parliament. For the purposes of this
disclosure, the entity's 2014-15 Portfolio Budget Statements has been used.
All other new, revised, amending standards and/or interpretations that were issued prior to the sign-off date and are
applicable to the current reporting period did not have a financial impact, and are not expected to have a future financial
impact on the entity.
Future Australian Accounting Standard Requirements
All other new, revised, amending standards and/or interpretations that were issued prior to the sign-off date and are
applicable to future reporting period(s) are not expected to have a future material impact on the entity's financial
statements.
1.5 Revenue
Revenue from Rendering of Services
Revenue from rendering of services is recognised by reference to the stage of completion of contracts at the reporting
date. The revenue is recognised when:
a) the amount of revenue, stage of completion and transaction costs incurred can be reliably measured, and
b) the probable economic benefits associated with the transaction will flow to the entity.
The stage of completion of contracts at the reporting date is determined by reference to services performed to date as a
percentage of total services to be performed.
Receivables for goods and services, which have 30-day terms, are recognised at the nominal amounts due less any
impairment allowance. Collectability of debts is reviewed at the end of the reporting period. Allowances are made when
collectability of the debt is no longer probable.
Resources Received Free of Charge
Resources received free of charge are recognised as revenue when, and only when, a fair value can be reliably
determined and the services would have been purchased if they had not been donated. Use of those resources is
recognised as an expense. Resources received free of charge are recorded as either revenue or gains, depending on their
nature.
Contributions of assets at no cost of acquisition or for nominal consideration are recognised as gains at their fair value
when the asset qualifies for recognition, unless received from another Government entity as a consequence of a
restructuring of administrative arrangements (Refer to Note 1.7).
Revenue from Government
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Amounts appropriated for departmental appropriations for the year (adjusted for any formal additions and reductions) are
recognised as Revenue from Government when the entity gains control of the appropriation, except for certain amounts
that relate to activities that are reciprocal in nature, in which case revenue is recognised only when it has been earned.
Appropriations receivable are recognised at their nominal amounts.
1.6 Gains
Sale of Assets
Gains from disposal of assets are recognised when control of the asset has passed to the buyer.
1.7 Transactions with the Government as Owner
Equity Injections
Amounts appropriated which are designated as ‘equity injections’ for a year (less any formal reductions) and Departmental
Capital Budgets (DCBs) are recognised directly in contributed equity.
Other Distributions to Owners
The FRR requires that distributions to owners be debited to contributed equity unless it is in the nature of a dividend.
1.8 Employee Benefits
Liabilities for ‘short-term employee benefits’ (as defined in AASB 119 Employee Benefits) and termination benefits due
within twelve months of the end of the reporting period are measured at their nominal amounts.
The nominal amount is calculated with regard to the rates expected to be paid on settlement of the liability.
Other long-term employee benefits are measured as the net total of the present value of the defined benefit obligation at
the end of the reporting period minus the fair value at the end of the reporting period of plan assets (if any) out of which the
obligations are to be settled directly.
The stage of completion of contracts at the reporting date is determined by reference to services performed to date as a
percentage of total services to be performed.
Receivables for goods and services, which have 30-day terms, are recognised at the nominal amounts due less any
impairment allowance. Collectability of debts is reviewed at the end of the reporting period. Allowances are made when
collectability of the debt is no longer probable.
Resources Received Free of Charge
Resources received free of charge are recognised as revenue when, and only when, a fair value can be reliably
determined and the services would have been purchased if they had not been donated. Use of those resources is
recognised as an expense. Resources received free of charge are recorded as either revenue or gains, depending on their
nature.
Contributions of assets at no cost of acquisition or for nominal consideration are recognised as gains at their fair value
when the asset qualifies for recognition, unless received from another Government entity as a consequence of a
restructuring of administrative arrangements (Refer to Note 1.7).
Revenue from Government
Amounts appropriated for departmental appropriations for the year (adjusted for any formal additions and reductions) are
recognised as Revenue from Government when the entity gains control of the appropriation, except for certain amounts
that relate to activities that are reciprocal in nature, in which case revenue is recognised only when it has been earned.
Appropriations receivable are recognised at their nominal amounts.
1.6 Gains
Sale of Assets
Gains from disposal of assets are recognised when control of the asset has passed to the buyer.
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1.7 Transactions with the Government as Owner
Equity Injections
Amounts appropriated which are designated as ‘equity injections’ for a year (less any formal reductions) and Departmental
Capital Budgets (DCBs) are recognised directly in contributed equity.
Other Distributions to Owners
The FRR requires that distributions to owners be debited to contributed equity unless it is in the nature of a dividend.
1.8 Employee Benefits
Liabilities for ‘short-term employee benefits’ (as defined in AASB 119 Employee Benefits) and termination benefits due
within twelve months of the end of the reporting period are measured at their nominal amounts.
The nominal amount is calculated with regard to the rates expected to be paid on settlement of the liability.
Other long-term employee benefits are measured as the net total of the present value of the defined benefit obligation at
the end of the reporting period minus the fair value at the end of the reporting period of plan assets (if any) out of which the
obligations are to be settled directly.
1.11 Cash
Cash is recognised at its nominal amount. Cash and cash equivalents includes:
a) cash on hand, and
b) demand deposits in bank accounts with an original maturity of three months or less that are readily convertible to
known amounts of cash and subject to insignificant risk of changes in value.
1.12 Financial Assets
The entity classifies its financial assets as receivables. The classification depends on the nature and purpose of the
financial assets and is determined at the time of initial recognition.
Financial assets are recognised and derecognised upon 'trade date'.
Effective Interest Method
The effective interest method is a method of calculating the amortised cost of a financial asset and of allocating interest
income over the relevant period. The effective interest rate is the rate that exactly discounts estimated future cash receipts
through the expected life of the financial assets or, where appropriate, a shorter period.
Income is recognised on an effective interest rate basis except for financial assets that are recognised at fair value through
profit and loss.
Receivables
Trade receivables and other receivables that have fixed or determinable payments that are not quoted in an active market
are classified as ‘receivables’. Receivables are measured at amortised cost using the effective interest method less
impairment. Interest is recognised by applying the effective interest rate.
Impairment of Financial Assets
Financial assets are assessed for impairment at the end of the reporting period.
Financial assets held at amortised cost - if there is objective evidence that an impairment loss has been incurred for
receivables, the amount of the loss is measured as the difference between the asset's carrying amount and the present
value of estimated future cash flows discounted at the asset's original effective interest rate. The carrying amount is
reduced by way of an allowance account. The loss is recognised in the Statement of Comprehensive Income.
1.13 Financial Liabilities
Financial liabilities are classified as either financial liabilities ‘at fair value through profit and loss’ or other financial liabilities.
Financial liabilities are recognised and derecognised upon ‘trade date’. The entity has no Financial Liabilities at fair value
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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through profit and loss.
Other Financial Liabilities
Supplier and other payables are recognised at amortised cost. Liabilities are recognised to the extent that the goods or
services have been received (and irrespective of having been invoiced).
1.14 Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets
Contingent liabilities and contingent assets are not recognised in the Statement of Financial Position but are reported in the
relevant schedules and notes. They may arise from uncertainty as to the existence of a liability or asset or represent an
asset or liability in respect of which the amount cannot be reliably measured. Contingent assets are disclosed when
settlement is probable but not virtually certain and contingent liabilities are disclosed when settlement is greater than
remote.
The entity has no Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets (2014: nil).
1.11 Cash
Cash is recognised at its nominal amount. Cash and cash equivalents includes:
a) cash on hand, and
b) demand deposits in bank accounts with an original maturity of three months or less that are readily convertible to
known amounts of cash and subject to insignificant risk of changes in value.
1.12 Financial Assets
The entity classifies its financial assets as receivables. The classification depends on the nature and purpose of the
financial assets and is determined at the time of initial recognition.
Financial assets are recognised and derecognised upon 'trade date'.
Effective Interest Method
The effective interest method is a method of calculating the amortised cost of a financial asset and of allocating interest
income over the relevant period. The effective interest rate is the rate that exactly discounts estimated future cash receipts
through the expected life of the financial assets or, where appropriate, a shorter period.
Income is recognised on an effective interest rate basis except for financial assets that are recognised at fair value through
profit and loss.
Receivables
Trade receivables and other receivables that have fixed or determinable payments that are not quoted in an active market
are classified as ‘receivables’. Receivables are measured at amortised cost using the effective interest method less
impairment. Interest is recognised by applying the effective interest rate.
Impairment of Financial Assets
Financial assets are assessed for impairment at the end of the reporting period.
Financial assets held at amortised cost - if there is objective evidence that an impairment loss has been incurred for
receivables, the amount of the loss is measured as the difference between the asset's carrying amount and the present
value of estimated future cash flows discounted at the asset's original effective interest rate. The carrying amount is
reduced by way of an allowance account. The loss is recognised in the Statement of Comprehensive Income.
1.13 Financial Liabilities
Financial liabilities are classified as either financial liabilities ‘at fair value through profit and loss’ or other financial liabilities.
Financial liabilities are recognised and derecognised upon ‘trade date’. The entity has no Financial Liabilities at fair value
through profit and loss.
Other Financial Liabilities
Supplier and other payables are recognised at amortised cost. Liabilities are recognised to the extent that the goods or
services have been received (and irrespective of having been invoiced).
1.14 Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets
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Contingent liabilities and contingent assets are not recognised in the Statement of Financial Position but are reported in the
relevant schedules and notes. They may arise from uncertainty as to the existence of a liability or asset or represent an
asset or liability in respect of which the amount cannot be reliably measured. Contingent assets are disclosed when
settlement is probable but not virtually certain and contingent liabilities are disclosed when settlement is greater than
remote.
The entity has no Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets (2014: nil).
Leasehold improvements and infrastructure are depreciated over a straight-line basis over the lesser of the useful life or
improvements or the unexpired period of the lease, including any applicable lease option available.
Depreciation rates (useful lives), residual values and methods are reviewed at each reporting date and necessary
adjustments are recognised in the current, or current and future reporting periods, as appropriate.
Depreciation rates applying to each class of depreciable asset are based on the following useful lives:
Leasehold improvements and
infrastructure
Furniture
Equipment
2015
2014
Lower of useful life
Lower of useful life
or lease term
or lease term
5 to 19 years
5 to 19 years
3 to 8 years
3 to 8 years
Impairment
All assets were assessed for impairment at 30 June 2015. Where indications of impairment exist, the asset’s recoverable
amount is estimated and an impairment adjustment made if the asset’s recoverable amount is less than its carrying
amount.
The recoverable amount of an asset is the higher of its fair value less costs to sell and its value in use. Value in use is the
present value of the future cash flows expected to be derived from the asset. Where the future economic benefit of an
asset is not primarily dependent on the asset’s ability to generate future cash flows, and the asset would be replaced if the
entity were deprived of the asset, its value in use is taken to be its depreciated replacement cost.
Derecognition
An item of property, plant and equipment is derecognised upon disposal or when no further future economic benefits are
expected from its use or disposal.
1.17 Intangibles
The entity's intangibles comprise purchased software. These assets are carried at cost less accumulated amortisation and
accumulated impairment losses.
Software is amortised on a straight-line basis over its anticipated useful life. The useful life of the entity's purchased
software is 3 years (2014: 3 years).
All software assets were assessed for indications of impairment as at 30 June 2015.
1.18 Taxation/Competitive Neutrality
The entity is exempt from all forms of taxation except Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT) and the Goods and Services Tax (GST).
Revenues, expenses and assets are recognised net of GST except:
a) where the amount of GST incurred is not recoverable from the Australian Taxation Office, and
b) for receivables and payables.
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Note 2: Events After the Reporting Period
There are no events after the balance date which have the potential to effect significantly the ongoing structure and
financial activities of the entity.
Note 3: Net Cash Appropriation Arrangements
Total comprehensive income less depreciation/amortisation expenses previously
funded through revenue appropriations1
Plus: depreciation/amortisation expenses previously funded through revenue
appropriation
Total comprehensive income - as per the Statement of Comprehensive Income
2015
$’000
2014
$’000
1,424
859
(569)
(533)
855
326
Notes:
1.
From 2010–11, the Government introduced net cash appropriation arrangements, where revenue appropriations for
depreciation/amortisation expenses ceased. The entity now receives a separate capital budget provided through
equity appropriations.
Capital budgets are to be appropriated in the period when cash payment for capital expenditure is required.
Note 15B, Departmental Capital Budgets, details the entity's annual appropriation capital expenditure.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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Note 4: Expenses
2015
$’000
2014
$’000
3,556
3,096
344
293
301
4,494
337
224
305
3,962
166
259
2,492
444
14
3,375
174
281
2,335
318
48
3,156
73
73
119
119
Services rendered in connection with
Related parties
External parties
Total services rendered
Total goods and services supplied or rendered
2,242
1,060
3,302
3,375
2,177
860
3,037
3,156
Other suppliers
Operating lease rentals—external parties
Minimum lease payments
Workers compensation expenses
Total other suppliers
Total suppliers
405
16
421
3,796
402
15
417
3,573
Note 4C: Depreciation and Amortisation
Depreciation
Leasehold improvements
Property, plant and equipment
Total depreciation
362
184
546
362
144
506
Amortisation
Intangibles
Total amortisation
Total depreciation and amortisation
23
23
569
27
27
533
Note 4A: Employee Benefits
Wages and salaries
Superannuation
Defined benefit plans
Defined contribution plans
Leave and other entitlements
Total employee benefits
Note 4B: Suppliers
Goods and services supplied or rendered
Business operating expenses
Information and communications technology
Professional and legal
Travel and employee development
Other
Total goods and services supplied or rendered
Goods supplied in connection with
Related parties
External parties
Total goods supplied
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Note 4: Expenses (continued)
Note 4D: Finance Costs
Unwinding of discount
Total finance costs
Note 4E: Write-Down and Impairment of Assets
Net write-down of non-financial assets
Total write-down and impairment of assets
2015
$’000
2014
$’000
4
4
4
4
15
15
5
5
2015
$’000
2014
$’000
75
75
672
672
2
-
46
48
41
11
52
9,610
9,610
7,679
7,679
Note 5: Own-Source Income
Own-Source Revenue
Note 5A: Sale of Goods and Rendering of Services
Rendering of services in connection with
Related parties
External parties
Total sale of goods and rendering of services
Note 5B: Other revenue
Other - interest received
Resources received free of charge
Remuneration of auditors
Other professional services
Total other revenue
Revenue from Government
Note 5C: Revenue from Government
Appropriations:
Departmental appropriations
Total revenue from Government
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Note 6: Fair Value Measurements
The following tables provide an analysis of assets and liabilities that are measured at fair value.
The different levels of the fair value hierarchy are defined below.
Level 1: Quoted prices (unadjusted) in active markets for identical assets or liabilities that the entity can access at measurement date.
Level 2: Inputs other than quoted prices included within Level 1 that are observable for the asset or liability, either directly or indirectly.
Level 3: Unobservable inputs for the asset or liability.
Note 6A: Fair Value Measurements, Valuation Techniques and
Inputs Used
Fair value measurements
at the end of the reporting period
2015
$'000
2014
$'000
348
709
Category
(Level
1, 2 or 34)
For Levels 2 and 3 fair value measurements
Valuation
technique(s)2
Inputs used
Range
(weighted
average)
Sensitivity of the fair value
measurement to changes in
unobservable inputs
10.00% 12.5%
(12.06%)
per annum
A significant increase (decrease) in
this consumed economic benefit /
obsolescence of the asset would result
in a significantly lower (higher) fair
value measurement.
9.92% 25.0%
(20.96%)
per annum
A significant increase (decrease) in
this consumed economic benefit /
obsolescence of the asset would result
in a significantly lower (higher) fair
value measurement.
Non-financial assets3
Leasehold improvements1
Level 3
Depreciated
replacement
cost (DRC)
Property, plant and equipment1
251
352
Level 2
Market
approach
Property, plant and equipment1
52
114
Level 3
Depreciated
replacement
cost (DRC)
Total non-financial assets
651
1,175
Total fair value measurements of assets
in the Statement of Financial Position
651
1,175
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
Replacement
Cost New
(price per
square meter)
Consumed
economic
benefit /
Obsolescence
of asset
Adjusted
market
transactions
Replacement
Cost New
(price per
square meter)
Consumed
economic
benefit /
Obsolescence
of asset
137
The entity procured valuation services from Australian Valuation Solutions (AVS) and relied on valuation models provided by AVS. AVS provided written assurance to the entity that
the model developed is in compliance with AASB 13.
1. The entity did not measure any non-financial assets at fair value on a non-recurring basis as at 30 June
2015.
2. There have been no changes to the valuation techniques for assets in the property, plant and equipment class. In instances where sufficient observable inputs, such as market
transactions of similar assets, were (were not) identified in this financial year, the valuation technique was changed from a DRC (Market) approach to a Market (DRC) approach.
3. Fair value measurements
The entity's assets are held for operational purposes and not held for the purposes of deriving a profit. The current use of all NFAs is considered their
highest and best use.
4. Recurring and non-recurring Level 3 fair value measurements - valuation
processes
The entity tests the procedures of the valuation model as an internal asset materiality review at lease once every 12 months, with a formal valuation undertaken once every three
years. If a particular asset class experiences significant and volatile changes in fair value—where indicators suggest that the value of the class has changed materially since the
previous reporting period—that class is subject to specific valuation in the reporting period, where practicable, regardless of the timing of the last specific valuation.
The weighted average is determined by assessing the fair value measurement as a proportion of the total fair value for the class against the total useful
life of each asset.
Note 6B: Level 1 and Level 2 Transfers for Recurring Fair Value Measurements
There have been no transfers between levels of hierarchy during the year (2014: no transfers between levels of hierarchy).
The entity's policy for determining when transfers between levels are deemed to have occurred can be
found in Note 1.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
138
Note 6: Fair Value Measurements (continued)
Note 6C: Reconciliation for Recurring Level 3 Fair Value Measurements
Recurring Level 3 fair value measurements - reconciliation for assets
Non-financial assets
Leasehold
Property, plant
improvements
& equipment
2015
2015
2014
2014
As at 1 July
Total gains/(losses) recognised in net cost of services 1
Total gains/(losses) recognised in other comprehensive income2
Purchases
Sales
Issues
Settlements
Transfers into Level 33
Transfers out of Level 34
Adjustments5
Total as at 30 June
Changes in unrealised gains/(losses) recognised in net cost of services for assets held at the end of the reporting period 4
Total
$'000
$'000
$'000
$'000
709
709
114
114
(362)
1
348
709
(62)
52
114
201
5
$'00
0
823
(424
)
1
400
-
-
-
-
201
4
$'00
0
823
-
823
1. These gains/(losses) are presented in the Statement of Comprehensive Income.
2. These gains/(losses) are presented in the Statement of Comprehensive Income.
3. There have been no transfers between levels of the hierarchy during the year.
4. These unrealised gains/(losses) are presented in the Statement of Comprehensive Income.
5. Adjustments relate to rounding against Gross book value and/or Accumulated depreciation and impairment
The entity's policy for determining when transfers between levels are deemed to have occurred can be found in Note 1.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
139
Note 7: Financial Assets
2015
$’000
2014
$’000
62
62
67
67
8
8
6
6
Appropriations receivables
Existing programs
For Departmental Capital Budget
Total appropriations receivables
2,730
2,730
2,230
844
3,074
Other receivables
Statutory receivables—GST
Total other receivables
Total trade and other receivables (net)
40
40
2,778
70
70
3,150
Trade and other receivables (net) expected to be recovered
No more than 12 months
Total trade and other receivables (net)
2,778
2,778
3,150
3,150
2,778
3,135
2,778
15
3,150
Note 7A: Cash and Cash Equivalents
Cash on hand or on deposit
Total cash and cash equivalents
Note 7B: Trade and Other Receivables
Goods and services receivables in connection with
Related parties
Total goods and services receivables
Trade and other receivables (net) aged as follows
Not overdue
Overdue by
0 to 30 days
Total trade and other receivables (net)
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
140
Note 8: Non-Financial Assets
Note 8A: Land and Buildings
Leasehold improvements
Fair value
Accumulated depreciation
Total leasehold improvements
Total land and buildings
2015
$’000
2014
$’000
1,385
(1,037)
348
348
1,385
(676)
709
709
No indicators of impairment were found for leasehold improvements.
Leasehold improvements are expected to be disposed of within the next 12 months as part of the entity's lease agreement
to restore the premises to their original condition. Provision for
make-good is reflected in Note 10B.
Note 8B: Property, Plant and Equipment
Furniture
Fair value
Accumulated depreciation
Total furniture
273
(117)
156
245
(74)
171
Infrastructure
Fair value
Accumulated depreciation
Total infrastructure
213
(158)
55
231
(115)
116
Equipment
Fair value
Work in progress
Accumulated depreciation
Total equipment
Total property, plant and equipment
230
(138)
92
303
151
105
(77)
179
466
No indicators of impairment were found for property, plant and equipment.
Items under property, plant or equipment are expected to be sold or disposed of within the next
12 months as part of the entity's lease agreement to restore the premises to their original condition. Provision for makegood is reflected in Note 10B.
Revaluations of non-financial assets
No revaluations were completed during the reporting period. The entity undertakes valuations in accordance with the
revaluation policy stated at Note 1.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
141
Note 8: Non-Financial Assets
Note 8A: Land and Buildings
Leasehold improvements
Fair value
Accumulated depreciation
Total leasehold improvements
Total land and buildings
2015
$’000
2014
$’000
1,385
(1,037)
348
348
1,385
(676)
709
709
No indicators of impairment were found for leasehold improvements.
Leasehold improvements are expected to be disposed of within the next 12 months as part of the entity's lease agreement to restore the premises to their
original condition. Provision for
make-good is reflected in Note 10B.
Note 8B: Property, Plant and Equipment
Furniture
Fair value
Accumulated depreciation
Total furniture
273
(117)
156
245
(74)
171
Infrastructure
Fair value
Accumulated depreciation
Total infrastructure
213
(158)
55
231
(115)
116
Equipment
Fair value
Work in progress
Accumulated depreciation
Total equipment
Total property, plant and equipment
230
(138)
92
303
151
105
(77)
179
466
No indicators of impairment were found for property, plant and equipment.
Items under property, plant or equipment are expected to be sold or disposed of within the next
12 months as part of the entity's lease agreement to restore the premises to their original condition. Provision for make-good is reflected in Note 10B.
Revaluations of non-financial assets
No revaluations were completed during the reporting period. The entity undertakes valuations in accordance with the revaluation policy stated at Note 1.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
142
Note 8: Non-Financial Assets (continued)
Note 8C: Reconciliation of the Opening and Closing Balances of Property, Plant and Equipment
Reconciliation of the opening and closing balances of property, plant and equipment for 2015
Leasehold
Improvements
$’000
As at 1 July 2014
1,385
Gross book value
(676)
Accumulated depreciation and impairment
1
Adjustments1
Total as at 1 July 2014
710
Additions
Purchase or internally developed
(362)
Depreciation
Disposals
Net write-down of non-financial assets
Total as at 30 June 2015
348
Total as at 30 June 2015 represented by
Gross book value
Accumulated depreciation and impairment
Total as at 30 June 2015
1
1,385
(1,037)
348
Furniture
$’000
Infrastructure
$’000
Equipment
$’000
Total
$’000
245
(74)
(3)
168
231
(115)
116
256
(77)
179
2,117
(942)
(2)
1,173
31
(43)
6
(61)
2
(80)
39
(546)
156
(6)
55
(9)
92
(15)
649
273
(117)
156
213
(158)
55
230
(138)
92
2,101
(1,450)
651
Adjustments relate to rounding against Gross book value and/or Accumulated depreciation and impairment
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
143
Note 8: Non-Financial Assets (continued)
Note 8C: Reconciliation of the Opening and Closing Balances of Property, Plant and Equipment
Reconciliation of the opening and closing balances of property, plant and equipment for 2014
As at 1 July 2013
Gross book value
Accumulated depreciation and impairment
Total as at 1 July 2013
Additions
Work in progress
Depreciation
Disposals
Net write-down of non-financial assets
Total as at 30 June 2014
Total as at 30 June 2014 represented by
Gross book value
Accumulated depreciation and impairment
Total as at 30 June 2014
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
Leasehold
Improvements
$’000
Furniture
$’000
Infrastructure
$’000
Equipment
$’000
Total
$’000
1,385
(314)
1,071
245
(36)
209
231
(57)
174
172
(46)
126
2,033
(453)
1,580
(362)
(38)
(58)
105
(47)
105
(505)
709
171
116
(5)
179
(5)
1,175
1,385
(676)
709
245
(74)
171
231
(115)
116
256
(77)
179
2,117
(942)
1,175
144
Note 8: Non-Financial Assets (continued)
2015
$’000
2014
$’000
82
(80)
2
2
82
(57)
25
25
2015
$’000
2014
$’000
82
(80)
2
2
82
(57)
25
25
Note 8D: Intangibles
Computer software—purchased
Accumulated amortisation
Total computer software
Total intangibles
No indicators of impairment were found for intangible assets.
No intangibles are expected to be sold or disposed of within the next 12 months.
Note 8: Non-Financial Assets (continued)
Note 8D: Intangibles
Computer software—purchased
Accumulated amortisation
Total computer software
Total intangibles
No indicators of impairment were found for intangible assets.
No intangibles are expected to be sold or disposed of within the next 12 months.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
145
Note 8: Non-Financial Assets (continued)
2015
$’000
2014
$’000
Note 8F: Other Non-Financial Assets
Prepayments
Total other non-financial assets
43
43
25
25
Total other non-financial assets - are expected to be recovered in:
No more than 12 months
Total other non-financial assets
43
43
25
25
2015
$’000
2014
$’000
Note 9A: Suppliers
Trade creditors and accruals
Operating lease rentals
Total suppliers
124
24
148
292
33
325
Suppliers expected to be settled
No more than 12 months
More than 12 months
Total suppliers
148
148
292
33
325
Suppliers in connection with
Related parties
External parties
Total suppliers
76
72
148
51
274
325
Note 9B: Other Payables
Wages and salaries
Superannuation
Lease incentive
Unearned income
Other
Total other payables
186
24
62
5
277
141
17
128
200
4
490
Other payables expected to be settled
No more than 12 months
More than 12 months
Total other payables
277
277
428
62
490
No indicators of impairment were found for other non-financial assets.
Note 9: Payables
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
146
Note 10: Provisions
2015
$’000
2014
$’000
Note 10A: Employee Provisions
Leave
Total employee provisions
991
991
942
942
Employee provisions expected to be settled
No more than 12 months
More than 12 months
Total employee provisions
46
945
991
157
785
942
Note 10B: Other Provisions
Provision for restoration
Total other provisions
166
166
162
162
Other provisions expected to be settled
No more than 12 months
More than 12 months
Total other provisions
166
166
162
162
Provision for
restoration
$’000
162
4
166
Total
$’000
162
4
166
Carrying amount 1 July 2014
Additional provisions made
Unwinding of discount or change in discount rate
Closing balance 30 June 2015
The entity currently has one (2014: 1) agreement for the lease of premises which has a provision requiring the entity to
restore the premises to their original condition at the conclusion of the lease. The entity has made a provision to reflect the
present value of this obligation which is expected to be realised within the next reporting period.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
147
Note 11: Cash Flow Reconciliation
2015
$’000
2014
$’000
62
62
-
67
67
-
Reconciliation of net cost of services to net cash from/(used by) operating activities
Net cost of services
Revenue from Government
(8,755)
9,610
(7,353)
7,679
Adjustments for non-cash items
Depreciation/amortisation
Net write-down of non-financial assets
Receivables returned to OPA
569
15
(1,423)
533
5
(2,618)
372
(18)
2,293
(2)
(177)
(212)
49
4
34
134
(617)
(22)
4
36
Reconciliation of cash and cash equivalents as per Statement of Financial Position
to Cash Flow Statement
Cash and cash equivalents as per:
Cash Flow Statement
Statement of Financial Position
Discrepancy
Movements in assets and liabilities
Assets
(Increase)/Decrease in net receivables
(Increase)/Decrease in other non-financial assets
Liabilities
Increase/(Decrease) in supplier payables
Increase/(Decrease) in other payables
Increase/(Decrease) in employee provisions
Increase/(Decrease) in other provisions
Net cash from/(used by) operating activities
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
148
Note 12: Senior Management Personnel Remuneration
2015
$
2014
$
558,808
22,425
581,233
664,102
52,540
716,641
Post-employment benefits
Superannuation
Total post-employment benefits
91,949
91,949
106,615
106,615
Other long-term employee benefits
Annual leave
Long-service leave
Total other long-term employee benefits
47,844
24,287
72,130
53,470
28,219
81,689
-
-
745,313
904,946
Short-term employee benefits
Salary
Other allowances
Total short-term employee benefits
Termination benefits
Termination benefits
Total termination benefits
Total senior executive remuneration expenses
The total number of senior management personnel that are included in the above table are four individuals (2014: four
individuals).
During the 2015 reporting period, Mr Michael Griffin AM was appointed as Integrity Commissioner and two senior executive
appointments were also made.
Prior year remuneration has been restated due to the change in reporting and disclosure requirements. The restated value
for 2014 now includes part-year remuneration for substantive senior executives and acting arrangements.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
149
Note 13: Financial Instruments
Note 13A: Categories of Financial Instruments
Financial Assets
Loans and receivables
Cash and cash equivalents
Trade and other receivables
Total financial assets
Financial Liabilities
Financial liabilities measured at amortised cost
Trade creditors
Total financial liabilities measured at amortised cost
2015
$'000
2014
$'000
62
8
70
67
6
73
148
148
325
325
Note 13B: Net Gains or Losses on Financial Assets
There is no net gain/loss from financial assets in 2015.
(2014: No net gain/loss from financial assets).
Note 13C: Net Gains or Losses on Financial Liabilities
There is no net gain/loss from financial liabilities in 2015.
(2014: No net gain/loss from financial liabilities).
Note 13D: Fair Value of Financial Instruments
The entity's aggregate net fair values of the identified financial instruments are the same as their carrying amounts (as
disclosed in Note 13A).
Note 13E: Credit Risk
The entity has endorsed policies and procedures for debt management (including the provision of credit terms), to reduce
credit risk. In most instances, debtors for the entity are other Government entities and therefore present minimal credit risk.
The carrying amount of financial assets, net of impairment losses, reported in the Statement of Financial Position
represents the entity's maximum exposure to risk.
Maximum exposure to credit risk (excluding any collateral or credit enhancements)
Financial assets carried at amount not best representing maximum exposure to
credit risk
Receivables
Cash and cash equivalents
Trade and other receivables
Total financial assets carried at amount not best representing maximum exposure
to credit risk
Financial liabilities carried at amount not best representing maximum exposure to
credit risk
At amortised cost
Trade creditors
Total financial liabilities carried at amount not best representing maximum
exposure to credit risk
62
8
67
6
70
73
148
325
148
325
The entity holds no collateral to mitigate against credit risk.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
150
Note 13: Financial Instruments (continued)
Note 13E: Credit Risk (continued)
Credit quality of financial assets not past due or individually determined as impaired
Receivables
Cash and cash equivalents
Trade and other receivables
Total
Not past due
nor impaired
2015
$'000
Not past due
nor impaired
2014
$'000
Past due or
impaired
2015
$'000
Past due or
impaired
2014
$'000
62
8
70
67
6
73
-
-
61 to 90 days
90+ days
$'000
-
$'000
-
61 to 90 days
90+ days
$'000
-
$'000
-
Ageing of financial assets that were not past due nor impaired in 2015
0 to 30 days
Trade and other receivables
Total
$'000
8
8
31 to 60
days
$'000
-
Ageing of financial assets that were not past due nor impaired in 2014
0 to 30 days
Trade and other receivables
Total
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
$'000
6
6
31 to 60
days
$'000
-
151
Note 13: Financial Instruments (continued)
Note 13F: Liquidity Risk
The entity's financial liabilities only include trade creditors. Any exposure to liquidity risk is based on the notion that the entity will have difficulty in
meeting its obligations associated with financial liabilities. This possibility is highly unlikely due to appropriation funding, internal processes and
procedures put in place to ensure there are appropriate resources to meet the entity's financial obligations.
Maturities for non-derivative financial liabilities in 2015
At amortised cost
Trade creditors
Total
On
demand
$'000
within 1
year
$'000
between
1 to 2
years
$'000
between
2 to 5
years
$'000
more
than 5
years
$'000
Total
$'000
148
148
-
-
-
-
148
148
On
demand
$'000
within 1
year
$'000
between 1
to 2 years
$'000
between 2
to 5 years
$'000
more than
5 years
$'000
$'000
325
325
-
-
-
-
325
325
Maturities for non-derivative financial liabilities in 2014
At amortised cost
Trade creditors
Total
Total
The entity had no derivative financial liabilities in either 2015 or 2014.
Note 13G: Market Risk
The entity does not participate in transactions in foreign currencies and as such is not exposed to market risk as a result of changes in exchange rates.
The entity only has indirect exposure to interest rates and as such the impact on creditor costs is not significant.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
152
Note 14: Financial Assets Reconciliation
2015
Not
es
Total financial assets as per Statement of Financial
Position
Less: Non-financial instrument components
Appropriation receivable
Other receivables
Total non-financial instrument components
Total financial assets as per financial instruments note
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
7B
7B
$'000
2014
$'000
2,840
3,217
2,730
40
2,770
70
3,074
70
3,144
73
153
Note 15: Appropriations
Note 15A: Annual Appropriations ('Recoverable GST exclusive')
Annual Appropriations for 2015
AFM
$'000
Section
74
$'000
Section
75
$'000
Total
appropriation
$'000
Appropriatio
n applied in
2015
(current and
prior years)
$'000
9,610
-
75
-
9,685
(8,604)
1,081
-
9,610
-
75
-
9,685
(8,604)
1,081
-
Appropriation Act
Departmental
Ordinary annual
services
Other services
Equity
Total departmental
Annual
Appropriation1
$'000
PGPA Act
Section 51
determinations
Variance2
$'000
$'000
3
Notes:
In 2014–15, there were no appropriations quarantined.
1 In 2014–15, there was no adjustment that met the recognition criteria of a formal addition or reduction in revenue (in accordance with the Public
Governance, Performance and Accountability (Financial Reporting) Rule 2015 Part 6 Division 3) but at law the appropriations had not been amended
before the end of the reporting period.
2
3
In 2014–15, the variance represents the balance remaining from unspent annual appropriations, movement in section 74 receipts and prior year
unspent appropriations.
Refer Note 15C for total appropriation receivable at 30 June 2014.
In 2014–15, there were no section 51 determinations
that constitute a permanent loss of control.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
154
Annual Appropriations for 2014
Appropriation Act
Departmental
Ordinary annual services
Other services
Equity
Total departmental
Total
appropriation
Appropriation
applied in
2014 (current
and prior
years)
Variance2
FMA Act
Annual
Appropriation
$'000
Appropriations
reduced1
$'000
AFM
$'000
Section 31
$'000
Section 32
$'000
$'000
$'000
$'000
7,679
-
-
75
-
7,754
(7,496)
258
7,679
-
-
75
-
7,754
(7,496)
258
Notes:
1 In 2013–14, there were no appropriations quarantined or reduced.
Appropriations reduced under Appropriation Acts (No.1, 3 and 5) 2013–14: sections 10, 11, 12 and 15 and under Appropriation Acts (No.2 ,4 and 6)
2013–14: sections 12,13 and 14. Departmental appropriations do not lapse at financial year-end. However, the responsible Minister may decide that
part or all of a departmental appropriation is not required and request the Finance Minister to reduce that appropriation. The reduction in the
appropriation is effected by the Finance Minister's determination and is disallowable by Parliament.
2
In 2013–14, the variance represents the balance remaining from unspent annual appropriation, movement in section 31 receipts and prior year
unspent appropriations.
Refer Note 15C for total appropriation receivable at 30 June 2014.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
155
Note 15: Appropriations (continued)
Note 15B: Departmental and Administered Capital Budgets ('Recoverable GST exclusive')
Capital Budget Appropriations applied in
2015
(current and prior years)
2015 Capital Budget Appropriations
Appropriation
Act
Annual Capital
Budget1
$'000
Departmental
Ordinary annual services Departmental Capital Budget1
Total departmental capital
budget
PGPA Act
Section 75
$'000
Total Capital
Budget
Appropriations
$'000
Payments for
non-financial
assets2
$'000
Payments
for other
purposes
$'000
Total
payments
$'000
Variance2
$'000
-
-
-
39
-
39
(39)
-
-
-
39
-
39
(39)
Notes:
1 Departmental Capital Budgets are appropriated through Appropriation Acts (No. 1, 3 and 5). They form part of ordinary annual services, and are not
separately identified in the Appropriation Acts. For more information on ordinary annual services appropriations, please see Note 15A: Annual
Appropriations.
Payments made on non-financial assets include purchases of assets, expenditure on assets which has been capitalised, costs incurred to make good
an asset to its original condition, and the capital repayment component of finance leases.
2
In 2014–15, the variance represents prior year DCB drawn and applied. Refer Note 15C for total
appropriation receivable at 30 June 2014.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
156
Capital Budget Appropriations applied in 2014
(current and prior years)
2014 Capital Budget Appropriations
Appropriation
Act
Annual
Capital
Budget
$'000
Departmental
Ordinary annual services Departmental Capital Budget1
Total departmental capital
budget
FMA Act
Section 32
$'000
Total Capital
Budget
Appropriations
$'000
Payments for
non-financial
assets2
$'000
Payments for
other
purposes
$'000
Total
payments
$'000
Variance2
$'000
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Notes:
1 Departmental Capital Budgets are appropriated through Appropriation Acts (No. 1, 3 and 5). They form part of ordinary annual services, and are not
separately identified in the Appropriation Acts. For more information on ordinary annual services appropriations, please see Note 15A: Annual
Appropriations.
Payments made on non-financial assets include purchases of assets, expenditure on assets which has been capitalised, costs incurred to make good
an asset to its original condition, and the capital repayment component of finance leases.
2
In 2013–14, there were no material variances.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
157
Note 15: Appropriations (continued)
Note 15C: Unspent Annual Appropriations ('Recoverable GST exclusive')
2015
$'000
2014
$'000
-
213
Appropriation Act (No.1) - Capital Budget (DCB) - Non-Operating 2010–111
Appropriation Act (No.1) 2011–121
-
395
436
Appropriation Act (No.1) - Capital Budget (DCB) - Non-Operating 2011–121
Appropriation Act (No.1) 2012–13
-
379
712
270
599
1,861
62
2,792
70
270
599
67
3,141
DEPARTMENTAL
Appropriation Act (No.1) 2010–111
Appropriation Act (No.1) - Capital Budget (DCB) - Non-Operating 2012–13
Appropriation Act (No.1) 2013–14
Appropriation Act (No.3) 2013–14
Appropriation Act (No.1) 2014–15
Cash and cash equivalents
Total departmental
1
On 16 October 2014, the Omnibus Repeal Day (Autumn 2014) Act 2014 received Royal Assent.
This Act operated to repeal all annual Appropriation Acts from 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2012, effective
as of 17 October 2014.
The repealed amounts are shown in the Statement of Changes in Equity as Transactions with
Owners, Returns of Capital.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
158
Note 16: Reporting of Outcomes
There is only one outcome for this Agency, as detailed in Note 1.1.
Note 16A: Net Cost of Outcome
Delivery
Outcome 1
2015
$’000
Departmental
Expenses
Own-source income
Net (cost)/contribution of outcome
delivery
2014
$’000
Total
2015
2014
$’000
$’000
8,878
123
8,077
724
8,878
123
8,077
724
(8,755)
(7,353)
(8,755)
(7,353)
Outcome 1 is described in Note 1.1. Net costs shown include intra-government costs that were
eliminated in calculating the Budget Outcome.
Note 16B: Major Classes of Departmental Expenses, Income, Assets and Liabilities by
Outcome
Outcome 1 is described in Note 1.1. Major classes of Departmental Expenses and Income are
shown in the Comprehensive Income Statement and major classes of Departmental Assets and
Liabilities are shown in the Statement of Financial Position.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
159
Note 17: Budgetary Reports and Explanations of Major Variances
The following tables provide a comparison of the original budget as presented in the 2014–15
Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS) to the 2014–15 final outcome as presented in accordance with
Australian Accounting Standards for the entity. The budget is not audited.
High level explanations of the causes of the major variances (rather than the nature) have been
provided below. Major might be considered as including:
· when it is greater than +/- 10% of the original or revised
budget for a line item, or
· when it is greater than +/- 2% of the relevant sub-total, i.e. total expenses, total income, total
assets or total liabilities where the amount is material.
Explanations may consolidate multiple line items, including across Statements or Schedules.
However, each line item that the explanation relates to, including those affecting the Statement of
Changes in Equity, are disclosed.
Note 17A: Departmental Budgetary Reports
Statement of Comprehensive Income
for the period ended 30 June 2015
Actual
$'000
Budget
Estimate
Original
Variance
4A
4B
4C
4D
4E
4,494
3,796
569
4
15
8,878
5,257
4,428
469
10,154
(763)
(632)
100
4
15
(1,276)
5A
5B
75
48
123
75
75
48
48
123
(8,755)
9,610
75
(10,079)
9,610
48
1,324
-
855
(469)
1,324
Notes
NET COST OF SERVICES
Expenses
Employee benefits
Suppliers
Depreciation and amortisation
Finance costs
Write-down and impairment of assets
Total expenses
Own-Source Income
Own-source revenue
Sale of goods and rendering of services
Other revenue
Total own-source revenue
Total own-source income
Net cost of services
Revenue from Government
Total comprehensive income/(loss) attributable
to the Australian Government
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
5C
160
Note 17: Budgetary Reports and Explanations of Major Variances (continued)
Statement of Financial Position
as at 30 June 2015
Actual
Notes
$’000
Budget
Estimate
Original
7A
7B
62
2,778
2,840
281
5,298
5,579
(219)
(2,520)
(2,739)
348
303
2
43
696
447
228
19
23
717
(99)
75
(17)
20
(21)
3,536
6,296
(2,760)
9A
9B
148
277
425
329
841
1,170
(181)
(564)
(745)
10A
10B
991
166
1,157
1,091
159
1,250
(100)
7
(93)
Total liabilities
Net assets
1,582
1,954
2,420
3,876
(838)
(1,922)
EQUITY
Contributed equity
Reserves
Retained surplus / (accumulated deficit)
Total equity
1,440
1,110
(596)
1,954
3,259
1,110
(493)
3,876
(1,819)
(103)
(1,922)
ASSETS
Financial assets
Cash and cash equivalents
Trade and other receivables
Total financial assets
Non-financial assets
Land and buildings
Property, plant and equipment
Intangibles
Other non-financial assets
Total non-financial assets
8A,C
8B,C
8D,E
8F
Total assets
LIABILITIES
Payables
Suppliers
Other payables
Total payables
Provisions
Employee provisions
Other provisions
Total provisions
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
Variance
161
Note 17: Budgetary Reports and Explanations of Major Variances (continued)
Statement of Changes in Equity
for the period ended 30 June 2015
Retained earnings
Opening balance
Balance carried forward from
previous period
Adjustment1
Adjusted opening balance
Comprehensive income
Surplus/(Deficit) for the
period
Total comprehensive income
Total comprehensive income
attributable to
Australian Government
Transactions with owners
Distributions to owners
Returns of capital
Other - Omnibus Repeal Day
(Autumn 2014) Act 2014
Contributions by owners
Departmental capital budget
Total transactions with
owners
Closing balance as at 30
June
Closing balance attributable
to Australian Government
1
Actual
$’000
Budget
Estimate
Original
(1,450)
Asset revaluation surplus
Variance
Actual
$’000
Budget
Estimate
Original
(24)
(1,426)
1,110
( 1)
(1,451)
(24)
855
(469)
(1)
(1,427)
1,324
855
(469)
855
Contributed equity/capital
Variance
Actual
$’000
Budget
Estimate
Original
1,110
-
2,863
1,110
1,110
-
-
-
1,324
-
-
(469)
1,324
-
-
-
-
-
-
(596)
(596)
Total equity
Variance
Actual
$’000
Budget
Estimate
Original
Variance
3,259
(396)
2,523
4,345
(1,822)
2,863
3,259
(1)
2,522
-
-
(396)
-
-
4,345
(469)
(1)
(1,823)
469
-
-
-
-
-
(469)
469
-
-
-
-
-
-
(469)
469
-
-
-
(1,423)
-
(1,423)
(1,423)
-
(1,423)
-
-
-
-
(1,423)
-
(1,423)
(1,423)
-
(1,423)
(493)
(103)
1,110
1,110
-
1,440
3,259
(1,819)
1,954
3,876
(1,922)
(493)
(103)
1,110
1,110
-
1,440
3,259
(1,819)
1,954
3,876
(1,922)
Adjustments relate to rounding against Retained Earnings.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
162
Note 17: Budgetary Reports and Explanations of Major Variances (continued)
Cash Flow Statement
for the period ended 30 June 2015
Notes
OPERATING ACTIVITIES
Cash received
Appropriations
Sale of goods and rendering of services
Net GST received
Total cash received
Cash used
Employees
Suppliers
Section 74 receipts transferred to OPA
Total cash used
Net cash from/(used by) operating activities
11
INVESTING ACTIVITIES
Cash used
Purchase of property, plant and
equipment
Total cash used
Net cash from/(used by) investing activities
FINANCING ACTIVITIES
Cash received
Contributed equity
Total cash received
Net cash from/(used by) financing activities
Net increase/(decrease) in cash held
Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of
the reporting period
Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the
reporting period
7A
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
Actual
$’000
Budget
Estimate
Original
Variance
8,606
75
204
8,885
9,602
75
9,677
(996)
204
(792)
(4,408)
(4,368)
(75)
(8,851)
34
(5,257)
(4,420)
(9,677)
-
849
52
(75)
826
34
(39)
-
(39)
(39)
(39)
-
(39)
(39)
-
-
-
(5)
67
281
(5)
(214)
62
281
(219)
163
Note 17: Budgetary Reports and Explanations of Major Variances (continued)
Explanations of major variances
Employees
Variance of $0.763m or 15% of budget is primarily due to an actual ASL of 30.6
compared to a Budgeted ASL of 38 (variance in ASL is 19%).
Staffing levels (and variance) is addressed in Chapter 3—Performance Overview
of the Annual Report.
Affected line items (and statement)
Employee benefits expense (Statement of Comprehensive Income)
Employee provisions (Statement of Financial Position)
Other payables (Statement of Financial Position)
Operating cash used - employees (Cash Flow Statement)
Suppliers paid
Variance of $0.632m or 14% of budget is primarily due to lower expenses as a
result of lower than budgeted staffing levels, thereby impacting certain
expenditure categories such as training and travel.
Suppliers expense (Statement of Comprehensive Income)
Suppliers payable (Statement of Financial Position)
Operating cash used - suppliers (Cash Flow Statement)
Depreciation and amortisation
Variance of $0.100m or 21% of budget is primarily due to the purchase of new
assets in the property, plant and equipment (PP&E) assets class, thereby
increasing annual depreciation/amortisation expenses and impact to gross book
value for the PP&E asset base.
Depreciation and amortisation expense (Statement of Comprehensive Income)
Non-Financial Assets, Land & buildings and Property, Plant & Equipment, Intangibles
(Statement of Financial Position)
Investing cash used - Purchase of PP&E (Cash Flow Statement)
Finance costs
Variance of $0.004m relates to the annual cost for unwinding the make-good
provision for leasehold improvements. This budget was captured against
Suppliers paid in 2014–15.
Write-down and impairment of assets
Variance of $0.015m relates to disposal of non-current financial assets such as
information and communications technology equipment no longer in use.
No budget is allocated as disposal of assets is not known a thte time of preparing
the budget.
Other revenue
Variance of $0.048m primarily represents resources received free of charge for
audit services, which have not previously been included in the budget. From
2015–16, a budget has been allocated to recognise the value for audit services
received.
Cash and cash equivalents
Variance of $0.219m or 78% is primarily due to a reduced working cash balance
at the end of each month and will vary depending on forecasted cash payments.
Trade and other receivables
Variance of $2.520m or 48% is primarily due to movements in appropriation
receivable balances. Since 2013–14, approximately $4m of ACLEI's
appropriation receivable has been repealed - refer to the Statement of Changes
in Equity and Note 15C.
This is offset by unspent annual appropriations of $1.9m in 2014–15.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
Finance costs expense (Statement of Comprehensive Income)
Provisions, Other Provisions (Statement of Financial Position)
Write-down and impairment of assets expense (Statement of Comprehensive
Income)
Non-Financial Assets, Land & buildings and Property, Plant & Equipment, Intangibles
(Statement of Financial Position)
Own Source Revenue, other revenue (Statement of Comprehensive Income)
Cash and cash equivalents (Statement of Financial Position)
Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the reporting period (Cash Flow Statement)
Trade and other receivables (Statement of Financial Position)
Other Payables (Statement of Financial Position)
Contributed Equity/Capital (Statement of Changes in Equity)
Operating cash received - Appropriations (Cash Flow Statement)
164
Note 17: Budgetary Reports and Explanations of Major Variances (continued)
Explanations of major variances
Suppliers
Variance of $0.181m or 55% is primarily due to decreased trade creditors and accruals at
the end of the reporting period and unwinding of the lease incentive.
Affected line items (and statement)
Suppliers expense (Statement of Comprehensive Income)
Suppliers payable (Statement of Financial Position)
Operating cash used - suppliers (Cash Flow Statement)
Other payables
Variance of $0.564m or 67% primarily relates to the use of unearned income received
under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 for ACLEI's Surveillance Capability Enhancement
Pilot Project (January 2012 to December 2013).
Actual also includes accrued salary and superannuation that is classified as Employee
Provisions for budgeting.
Employee benefits expense (Statement of Comprehensive Income)
Employee provisions (Statement of Financial Position)
Other Payables (Statement of Financial Position)
Operating cash used - employees (Cash Flow Statement)
Employee provisions
Variance of $0.100m or 9% primarily relates to movement in annual and long service
leave provisions as a result of higher leave taken and/or paid out on cessation and
movement in standard parameters used in the short-hand method.
Budget estimate includes a component of accrued salary and superannuation that are
classified as Other Payables for financial reporting.
Employee benefits expense (Statement of Comprehensive Income)
Employee provisions (Statement of Financial Position)
Other Payables (Statement of Financial Position)
Operating cash used - employees (Cash Flow Statement)
Contributed Equity
Variance of $1.819m or 56% is primarily due to repeal of unspent appropriations, offset by
departmental capital budget funding.
Trade and other receivables (Statement of Financial Position)
Retained surplus / (accumulated deficit)
The effect of movements in the Statement of Financial Position and results in the
Statement of Comprehensive Income contribute to the result recorded against retained
surplus / (accumulated deficit). The budgeted result was an operating deficit of $0.469m,
being the budgeted amount for depreciation and amortisation expenses. Actual result was
a surplus of $0.596m.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
Results and explanations provided in:
- Statement of Comprehensive Income
- Statement of Financial Position
165
PART FIVE—APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1 Papers and presentations
APPENDIX 2 Additional statistics
APPENDIX 3 Changes in ACLEI’s operating environment
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
166
APPENDIX 1—PAPERS AND PRESENTATIONS
The following presentations were made during 2014–15 by the Integrity Commissioner, Mr Michael Griffin AM.
Presentations marked with an asterix were made on the Integrity Commissioner’s behalf by the Executive Directors
or other ACLEI staff members.
In December 2014, the Acting Integrity Commissioner, Mr Robert Cornall AO, issued a limited-circulation paper, as
indicated.
PUBLIC PRESENTATIONS
Corruption investigators: the integrity imperative
14 November 2014*
10th National Investigations Symposium, Sydney
(available at www.nsw.ipaa.org.au/10-nis-speaker-bios)
INTERNATIONAL AUDIENCES
Building a corruption resistant system
4 February 2015
Border Five Integrity Dialogue, hosted by the ACBPS
(available on ACLEI’s website: www.aclei.gov.au)
Combatting corruption enabled border crime—the ACLEI experience
21 May 2015*
Workshop for law enforcement and border agencies from Australia, Canada
and the United States, hosted by the AFP at the Embassy of Australia,
Washington, DC
SPECIAL INTEREST AUDIENCES
Lessons from Operation Heritage/Marca
15 June 2015*
Interagency Integrity Program, hosted by the AFP
Law enforcement integrity
18 June 2015
Interagency Integrity Program, hosted by the AFP (panel)
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT AUDIENCES
Corruption enabled border crime workshop
26 March 2015*
Facilitated discussion about current and emerging corruption vulnerabilities
in the border environment for senior officers from the ACBPS, ACC, ACLEI,
AFP, AUSTRAC, the Department of Agriculture and the Department of
Immigration and Border Protection
Emerging integrity risks for public servants
2 occasions*
Australian Public Service Ethics Contact Officer Network
Fraud and corruption control—the asset protection model
20 November 2014*
Commonwealth Fraud Liaison Forum
PAPERS BY THE INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER
Occasional Paper Corruption risk in the Public Service—lessons from law
enforcement corruption investigations
December 2014
Issued by Acting Integrity Commissioner, Mr Robert Cornall AO, to
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
167
Australian Public Service agency heads.
This paper has not been made public.
PRESENTATIONS TO LEIC ACT AGENCIES
THE AUSTRALIAN CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION SERVICE
The role of the Network and how corruption prevention works
Two occasions*
Integrity Support and Referral Network
THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLICE
Role of ACLEI
Two occasions*
Professional Standards Induction Program
Corruption risk-awareness on deployment
Five occasions*
International Deployment Group
Integrity Debate
Four occasions*
Recruit and transition training
Role of ACLEI and Managing corruption risk
Two occasions*
Confidant Network training
Integrity in law enforcement
9 February 2015
AFP Senior Officer Muster
(available on ACLEI’s website: www.aclei.gov.au)
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Integrity Leadership
13 May 2015
Senior Executive Conference
(available on ACLEI’s website: www.aclei.gov.au)
Corruption risks and treatments
10 June 2015
Department of Agriculture Audit Committee
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
168
APPENDIX 2—ADDITIONAL STATISTICS
The Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Regulations 2006 set out the particulars that are
required to be included in the Annual Report. The relevant statistics are presented in the following
pages.
Notes to the additional statistics
The statistics presented here represent corruption issues. Just because corruption issues have been
brought to the Integrity Commissioner’s notice, it should not be inferred that each one will have
substance.
The definition of the ACC in the following tables includes members and former members of the ACC
who may also have been members of the former NCA.
Numbers appearing in (brackets) are for the previous reporting period, 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014.
Data reported in Chapter 5—Assessments and investigations has been adjusted to disregard duplicate
notifications or referrals relating to the same corruption issue. To satisfy the requirements of the
Regulations, the statistics presented in Appendix 2 have not been amended in this way.
Regulation 17
Prescribed particulars relating to corruption issues notified to the Integrity Commissioner by heads of
law enforcement agencies under section 19, during 2014–15.
Regulation 17(a), (b) and (c)
Type and number of corruption issues received during 2014–15, by corruption class, as assessed
upon receipt
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
TOTAL
31 (27)
3 (1)
23 (28)
0 (5)
2 (2)
1 (0)
60 (63)
Pervert the course of justice
[s 6(1)(b)]
1 (0)
0 (0)
4 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
5 (0)
Corruption of any other kind
[s 6(1)(c)]
1 (1)
0 (0)
5 (5)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
6 (6)
33 (28)
3 (1)
32 (33)
0 (5)
2 (2)
1 (0)
71 (69)
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
TOTAL
Issue not identified as
‘significant’ under s 20:
Integrity Commissioner
satisfied that ACLEI
involvement not warranted
[s 22(1)]
4 (1)
0 (0)
0 (8)
0 (2)
0 (0)
0 (0)
4 (11)
Integrity Commissioner
arranged for State integrity
agency to investigate
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Abuse of office [s 6(1)(a)]
Total
Regulation 17(d) and (e)
Reasons for taking no further action
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
169
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
TOTAL
Integrity Commissioner
satisfied that another
agency should investigate
[s 31(4)(a)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
Referral of allegation or
information is frivolous or
vexatious [s 31(4)(b)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Conduct to which the issue
relates has been, is or will
be subject of proceedings
before a court [s 31(4)(d)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Investigation not warranted
in all the circumstances
[s 31(4)(e)]
7 (5)
0 (1)
4 (3)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
11 (9)
After further assessment,
did not raise a corruption
issue within the meaning of
the LEIC Act
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (2)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (2)
Total
11 (6)
0 (1)
5 (13)
0 (2)
0 (0)
0 (0)
16 (22)
[s 29(6)(b)]
Regulation 17(f)
Investigations managed by Integrity Commissioner
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
TOTAL
Managed investigations
[s 26(1)(b)(i) or 26(1)(d)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Investigations undertaken
by the AFP and managed
by ACLEI [s 26(1)(c)(i)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
N/A
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Total
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
CrimTrac
TOTAL
Regulation 17(g)
Investigations overseen by Integrity Commissioner
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
Investigations overseen
[s 26(1)(b)(ii) or 26(1)(e)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Investigations undertaken
by the AFP and overseen
by ACLEI [s 26(1)(c)(ii)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
N/A
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
1 (0)
Total
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
1 (0)
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
170
Other ways by which section 19 notifications were dealt with
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
TOTAL
ACLEI investigation
[s 26(1)(a)]
2 (4)
0 (0)
3 (1)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
5 (5)
Joint investigation
[s 26(2)]
10 (3)
1 (0)
1 (7)
0 (2)
1 (0)
0 (0)
13 (12)
Unsupervised
investigation
conducted by
referring agency
[s 26(1)(b)(iii)]
11 (3)
1 (0)
14 (6)
0 (1)
1 (0)
0 (0)
27 (10)
Unsupervised
investigation
conducted by the
AFP
[s 26(1)(c)(iii)]
0 (1)
0 (0)
N/A
0 (0)
0 (1)
0 (0)
0 (2)
Direction to notifying
agency to investigate
[s 22(2a)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Referrals to other
government agencies
(see Regulation 21)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Under assessment at
close
of reporting period
3 (11)
1 (0)
5 (6)
0 (0)
0 (1)
0 (0)
9 (18)
Total
26 (22)
3 (0)
23 (20)
0 (3)
2 (2)
0 (0)
54 (47)
Regulation 18
Prescribed particulars relating to corruption issues raised by allegations or information referred to the
Integrity Commissioner under section 18 (by the Minister) and section 23 (by other people) during
2014–15.
Regulation 18(a), (b) and (c)
Type and number of corruption issues received during 2014–15, by corruption class, as assessed
upon receipt
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
17 (10)
3 (0)
7 (7)
1 (2)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
28 (19)
Pervert the course of
justice [s 6(1)(b)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
Corruption of any
other kind [s 6(1)(c)]
1 (1)
0 (0)
0 (1)
0 (1)
0 (1)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (4)
18 (11)
3 (0)
8 (8)
1 (3)
0 (1)
0 (0)
0 (0)
30 (23)
Abuse of office
[s 6(1)(a)]
Total
CrimTrac Former NCA
TOTAL
Regulation 18(d) and (e)
Reasons for taking no further action
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
171
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
Former
NCA
TOTAL
Integrity
Commissioner
satisfied that another
agency should
investigate [s 31(4)(a)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Referral of allegation
or information is
frivolous or vexatious
[s 31(4)(b)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Conduct to which the
issue relates has
been, is or will be
subject of
proceedings before
a court [s 31(4)(d)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0(0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Investigation not
warranted in all the
circumstances
[s 31(4)(e)]
5 (5)
0 (0)
3 (4)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
8 (9)
After further
assessment, did not
raise a corruption issue
within the meaning of
the LEIC Act
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (2)
0 (1)
0 (1)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (4)
Total
5 (5)
0 (0)
4 (6)
0 (1)
0 (1)
0 (0)
0 (0)
9 (13)
Other ways that section 18 and 23 referrals were dealt with
Investigations managed by Integrity Commissioner
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
Former
NCA
TOTAL
Managed investigations
[s 26(1)(b)(i) or
26(1)(d)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Investigations
undertaken by AFP
and managed by
ACLEI [s 26(1)(c)(i)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
N/A
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Total
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
172
Investigations overseen by Integrity Commissioner
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
Former
NCA
TOTAL
Investigations
overseen
[s 26(1)(b)(ii) or
26(1)(e)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Investigations
undertaken by AFP
and overseen by
ACLEI [s 26(1)(c)(ii)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
N/A
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Total
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
Former
NCA
TOTAL
ACLEI investigation
[s 26(1)(a)]
1 (1)
1 (0)
2 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
4 (1)
Joint investigation
[s 26(2)]
5 (0)
2 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
8 (0)
Unsupervised
investigation
conducted by agency
subject of referral
[s 26(1)(b)(iii)]
5 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
6 (0)
Unsupervised
investigation
conducted by the AFP
[s 26(1)(c)(iii)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
N/A
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Referrals to other
government agencies
[see Regulation 21]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Under assessment at
close of reporting
period
2 (5)
0 (0)
1 (2)
0 (2)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
3 (9)
Total
13 (6)
3 (0)
4 (2)
1 (2)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
21 (10)
Other methods of handling
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
173
Regulation 19
Own initiative investigations [s 38] carried forward to 2014–15
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
Former
NCA
TOTAL
Abuse of office
[s 6(1)(a)]
2 (2)
0 (0)
2 (3)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
4 (5)
Corruption of any
other kind [s 6(1)(c)]
0 (0)
1 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (0)
Total
2 (2)
1 (0)
2 (3)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
5 (5)
Own initiative investigations [s 38] commenced in 2014–15
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
Former
NCA
TOTAL
Abuse of office
[s 6(1)(a)]
1 (0)
0 (1)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (1)
Total
1 (0)
0 (1)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
1 (1)
Regulation 20
Corruption issues investigated by the Integrity Commissioner under section 26(1)(a), including joint
investigations. Any details required under Regulation 20(e) are reported in Chapter 6—Reports to the
Minister.
Regulation 20(a), (c) and (d)
Type and number of corruption issues investigated during 2014–15 (including joint investigations and
investigations carried forward from previous years)
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC CrimTrac
Former
TOTAL
NCA
INVESTIGATIONS COMMENCED DURING 2014–15
Abuse of office
[s 6(1)(a)]
22
4
10
3
1
0
0
40
Pervert the course
of justice [s
6(1)(b)]
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
2
Corruption of any
other kind [s
6(1)(c)]
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Subtotal
24
4
11
3
1
0
0
43
INVESTIGATIONS COMMENCED DURING 2013–14 AND ACTIVE IN 2014–15
Abuse of office
[s 6(1)(a)]
7
0
6
2
0
0
0
15
Corruption of any
other kind [s
6(1)(c)]
1
1
2
0
0
0
0
4
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
174
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
8
1
8
2
Subtotal
AUSTRAC CrimTrac
0
0
Former
TOTAL
NCA
0
19
INVESTIGATIONS COMMENCED DURING 2012–13 AND ACTIVE IN 2014–15
Abuse of office
[s 6(1)(a)]
5
0
6
N/A
N/A
N/A
0
11
Subtotal
5
0
6
N/A
N/A
N/A
0
11
INVESTIGATIONS COMMENCED DURING 2011–12 AND ACTIVE IN 2014–15
Abuse of office
[s 6(1)(a)]
0
0
2
N/A
N/A
N/A
0
2
Corruption of any
other kind [s
6(1)(c)]
0
1
0
N/A
N/A
N/A
0
1
Subtotal
0
1
2
N/A
N/A
N/A
0
3
Total
investigations
active in 2014–15
37
6
27
5
1
0
0
76
Regulation 20(b)
Investigations concluded during 2014–15
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
Former
NCA
TOTAL
Investigations
completed by the
Integrity Commissioner
(reports to the
Minister)
2 (6*)
1 (0)
1 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
4 (6*)
Investigations
discontinued after
reconsideration [s 42]
2 (6)
1 (1)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
3 (7)
Total
4 (12)
2 (1)
1 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
7 (13)
*Investigation Report 01/2014 relates to two corruption issues. Investigation Report 02/2014 relates to four corruption issues.
Regulation 21
Corruption issues referred to government agencies for investigation (other than LEIC Act agencies)
Regulation 21(a), (e) and (f)
Referrals made to other government agencies during 2014–15
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
Former
NCA
TOTAL
Referral to ‘home
agency’ [s 29(6)(a)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Referral to State or
Territory integrity
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
175
agency [s 29(6)(b)]
Total
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Regulation 21(c) and (d)
Type and number of corruption issues that were referred to a government agency for investigation
during 2014–15
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
Former
NCA
TOTAL
Abuse of office
[s 6(1)(a)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Pervert the course of
justice [s 6(1)(b)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Corruption of any other
kind [s 6(1)(c)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Total
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Regulation 21(b)
Number of government agency investigations completed during 2014–15
ACBPS
ACC
AFP
Ag
AUSTRAC
CrimTrac
Former
NCA
TOTAL
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Completed
investigations
Regulation 22
Part 12 of the LEIC Act includes provisions for dealing with allegations or information raising
corruption issues that relate to ACLEI staff, known as ACLEI corruption issues.
Regulation 22(a), (c) and (d)
Type and number of ACLEI corruption issues concluded during 2014–15
INVESTIGATED BY:
TOTAL
INTEGRITY
COMMISSIONER
SPECIAL
INVESTIGATOR
Abuse of office [s 6(3)(a)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Pervert the course of justice
[s 6(3)(b)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Corruption of any other kind
[s 6(3)(c)]
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
Total
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
176
Regulation 22(b)
Investigations of ACLEI corruption issues completed during 2014–15
TOTAL
Investigations completed during 2014–15 (reports to the Minister)
0 (0)
Regulation 23 – Section 149 certificates
Section 149 certificates may be issued by the Attorney-General on the grounds that, if the
information were disclosed, it would prejudice the security, defence or international relations of the
Commonwealth, prejudice the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies, the proper performance of
the ACC, an investigation, fair trial, a person’s life or physical safety or disclose the identity of a
confidential source, amongst other reasons (section 149, LEIC Act).
TOTAL
Section 149 certificates issued by the Attorney-General in 2014–15
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
0 (0)
177
APPENDIX 3—CHANGES IN ACLEI’S OPERATING
ENVIRONMENT
ACLEI monitors developments in government policy, legislation, case law and
administrative review that may affect the operating environment or agency practices
and procedures. These matters are reported here.
Developments in the integrity framework
Developments in State, national and international integrity arrangements can affect the framework
within which ACLEI operates—for instance, increased community awareness about corruption and
new ways in which to report suspicious conduct can have positive multiplier effects across
jurisdictions. Similarly, new opportunities to share information and intelligence between jurisdictions
can be created. Other developments can be aimed at strengthening specific areas of the national
integrity framework.
International guideline for compliance management systems
In December 2014, the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) published
ISO 19600:2014—Compliance management systems–Guidelines. The new management standard is
a welcome addition to the existing range of global risk and compliance guidance, and can be
expected to be influential in the approach that the private and public sectors will take to developing
and maintaining their anti-corruption frameworks. While geared to address a wide range of
compliance risks, the framework established by the standard will help to ensure that organisations
have adequate and effective measures in place to detect and prevent corrupt conduct—particularly in
an entity’s highest risk areas of operation.
The international standard was adopted for use in Australia in August 2015, and is referred to
as AS/ISO 19600:2015.
Developments in the law enforcement operating environment
Changes in the law enforcement operating environment may affect corruption risk, for example by
increasing or reducing incentives or opportunities for criminal compromise to occur. Strengthened
regulatory controls in programmes or geographic areas may also cause a displacement effect,
whereby criminal groups may look for vulnerabilities in less protected areas. Accordingly, ACLEI
maintains an interest in changes that affect the operating environment of the agencies in the LEIC
Act jurisdiction.
National Organised Crime Response Plan 2015–2018
In May 2015, the Law Crime and Community Safety Council—a standing council of the Council
of Australian Governments—endorsed a new plan to continue to promote a coordinated national
approach to combating serious and organised crime.
The National Organised Crime Response Plan 2015–2018 articulates Australia’s national response
to the threat posed by serious and organised crime to the Australian economy and society. It depicts
the cooperative and evolving nature of Australia’s response to serious and organised crime and will
serve as a platform to guide future developments in this area.
In particular, the Plan outlines how the Commonwealth, States and Territories will work together over
the next three years to address a number of key threats from serious and organised crime, including
the increasing prevalence of drugs such as ‘ice’.
ACLEI will continue to monitor the ways that collegiate efforts across jurisdiction may affect the
prospect of there being ‘vertical collusion’ between corrupt officers.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
178
Organised Crime in Australia 2015
The Organised Crime in Australia 2015 report (available at www.crimecommission.gov.au) is an
unclassified version of the ACC’s Organised Crime Threat Assessment. The report describes the
context in which organised crime operates in Australia and gives an overview of each of the key illicit
markets and the activities which enable serious and organised crime.
The ACC report identifies corruption as one of the six key enablers for organised crime and observes
that corruption can be used to facilitate or hide the use of other enablers, such as money-laundering
or identity crime. In relation to identity crime, the report predicts that, as identity document security
features continue to improve, organised crime groups will be more likely to attempt to corrupt officials
in order to access information and documents or to obtain genuine identity documents fraudulently.
ACLEI will continue to target awareness-raising and discovery efforts to mitigate this risk.
Developments in ACLEI’s operating environment
Developments in legislation and government policy can have a direct impact on ACLEI. Relevant
changes are set out in this section.
Australian Border Force Act 2015 and Customs and Other Legislation Amendment
(Australian Border Force) Act 2015
These two enactments received Royal Assent on 20 May 2015. In combination, they established the
Australian Border Force (ABF) within the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP)
from 1 July 2015.
The ABF Act establishes the statutory office, role and powers of the ABF Commissioner and
employees. Importantly, it provides for a number of integrity measures for the integrated DIBP,
including the ability to issue binding written directions in relation to the administration and control of
the ABF and DIBP, the ability to require DIBP workers to undergo alcohol and prohibited drug
screening tests, secrecy and disclosure provisions, and the ability to manage serious employee
misconduct (including targeted integrity testing).
The Customs and Other Legislation Amendment (ABF) Act abolishes the Australian Customs and
Border Protection Service. It also brings the integrated DIBP into the Integrity Commissioner’s
jurisdiction on a whole-of-agency basis from 1 July 2015, and extends the integrity testing regime to
DIBP staff members.
Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment (Powers) Act 2015
The Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment (Powers) Act received Royal Assent on 30 June 2015.
It amends the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 and the LEIC Act to clarify the uses to which
information obtained through coercive means may be put. The amendments also authorise the use of
derivative material, and specify the circumstances in which coercively-obtained material may be
provided to a prosecutor.
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015
Receiving Royal Assent on 13 April 2015, this enactment puts into effect recommendations of the
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security to ensure that telecommunications data
remains available for law enforcement—and
anti-corruption—investigations.
The Data Retention Act introduces a mandatory data retention scheme, requiring
telecommunications service providers to retain and to secure for two years telecommunications data
and to protect retained data from unauthorised interference and access. In addition, the Act specifies
which agencies may have access to telecommunications data and stored communications. The
mandatory data retention scheme will be reviewed within three years after it is implemented.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
179
Relevant decisions of courts and administrative tribunals
Case law informs the interpretation of legislation. Accordingly, ACLEI monitors relevant decisions of
courts and tribunals to guide its administration of the LEIC Act and the use of powers. These
decisions, and their effect, are summarised in the table below.
Citation
Relevance to ACLEI
Commissioner of the Australian
Federal Police v Zhao [2015] HCA 5.
This case concerns the circumstances in which evidence
may be admissible in applications under the Proceeds of
Crime Act 2002.
The AFP had appealed a decision of the Victorian Court of
Appeal to stay retention and forfeiture action. The action
had been stayed because the application was made on
substantially the same basis as criminal charges against
one of the parties subject to the application, and responding
to it would compromise his right to silence in relation to
those charges.
The High Court unanimously dismissed the AFP’s appeal.
Their Honours considered the risk to a fair trial was plain,
given that the criminal charges and the Proceeds of Crime
application covered substantially the same ground. To
require the accused, in seeking to have the application
stayed, to identify the specific risk to the fairness of his
pending trial would expose him to that same risk. The High
Court agreed with the Victorian Court of Appeal that orders
protecting the accused’s position would not remove the risk.
The decision is of relevance to ACLEI, as an agency
whose work can lead to applications under the Proceeds of
Crime Act.
Independent Commission Against
Corruption v Cunneen [2015] HCA 14
In this case, the High Court dismissed the NSW ICAC’s
appeal against a decision of the NSW Court of Appeal
that found that the conduct allegedly engaged in by
Ms Cunneen did not fall within the class described in
ICAC’s enabling Act.
The High Court read “corrupt conduct” in ICAC’s Act as
including offences which could actually affect the integrity of
public administration and excluding those which could not.
Thus, conduct that adversely affects the probity of the
exercise of an official function by a public official is included
in the definition and conduct that may adversely affect the
efficacy of the exercise of another person’s official function
is not included.
Although the ICAC and LEIC Acts differ in fundamental
ways, the decision may inform decisions relating to
investigations under the LEIC Act.
Sage v ZZ [2015] FCA 450
Under the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002, a person
is in contempt of the ACC if he or she refuses to answer
truthfully when required by an ACC examiner. The
examiner may apply for the contempt to be dealt with by the
Federal Court or Supreme Court as if it were a contempt of
that Court. ZZ had been brought before the Federal Court
of Australia under this provision.
In the Federal Court, on 8 May 2015, noting that there was
no proper alternative, Justice Rares directed that ZZ be
held in custody until 23 October 2015, although it would be
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
180
Citation
Relevance to ACLEI
possible for ZZ at any time, to cooperate and to be
released. His Honour observed that ZZ “must be punished
for your continued deliberate defiance of your legal
obligations to answer questions in the examination truthfully
and, secondly, there is a fundamental need to deter others
from doing what you are doing”.
ZZ was released on 5 June 2015, after purging his
contempt.
ACLEI has contempt provisions similar to those of the ACC,
and this decision demonstrates the efficacy of
these arrangements.
R v Seller, R v McCarthy [2015]
NSWCCA 76
This case concerns whether a person who has had access
to transcripts of coercively-obtained evidence should be
excluded as a witness in a related trial.
The defendants in this case had each been compulsorily
examined by the ACC, and subsequently faced criminal
charges. They had applied for a permanent stay, for the
relevant witness to be excluded and for the prosecution to
be replaced by people who could be shown not to have had
access to the ACC transcripts.
At first instance, the NSW Supreme Court refused the stay
and the change to the prosecution team, but decided the
witness should not give evidence. The defendants and the
Crown each appealed against aspects of the decision.
The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the appeals, giving
considerable weight to the High Court decisions in
Lee v R [2014] HCA 20 and X7 v Australian Crime
Commission [2013] HCA 29. The Court indicated that,
whether the witness, or anyone else who had read the
transcript, should give evidence could depend on the
evidence that he or she was to give; however, it would be
difficult for the defence to cross-examine without touching
on the examinations. The Court of Criminal Appeal decided
not to grant a permanent stay—notwithstanding the past
dissemination of information from the examinations—as
there was no-one in the prosecution team who had been
exposed to that material.
This case may inform ACLEI’s practice in managing
evidence obtained through coercive means.
Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions v Afiouny [2014]
NSWCCA 176
The NSW Court of Criminal Appeal unanimously upheld an
appeal by the Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions in relation to sentences for two offences of
bribing a Commonwealth Customs officer, in relation to the
importation of contraband tobacco.
Justice Finnane in the District Court had sentenced the
defendant to concurrent terms of three years and three
months imprisonment, with a single non-parole period of
one year and eight months.
The Court of Criminal Appeal noted that the offences were
sufficiently distinct from each other that the sentences
should not have been concurrent, and considered that the
defendant had been given an excessive “discount” for his
plea of guilty and cooperation with authorities. The court
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
181
Citation
Relevance to ACLEI
found the sentence imposed was manifestly inadequate
and did not reflect the defendant’s criminality, referring to
the repeated, deliberate and serious sequence of actions
that made up the offences. The Court resentenced the
defendant to four years imprisonment on each charge, with
individual non-parole periods of two years and six months
and a combined non-parole period of three years and six
months.
On 8 April 2015, the High Court refused the defendant
special leave to appeal.
These decisions indicate the gravity with which corruption
offences are considered by the courts.
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
182
PART SIX—INDEX
Compliance index
Alphabetical index
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
183
COMPLIANCE INDEX
This guide relates to the Report’s compliance with the Requirements for Annual
Reports as provided by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (June
2015) and the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act and Regulations.
Requirements for Annual Reports
PAGE
Letter of transmittal
iii
Table of contents
ix
Index
Glossary
194
vii
Contact officer(s)
ii
Internet home page address and Internet address for Report
ii
INTEGRITY COMMISSIONER’S REVIEW
PAGE
Summary of significant issues and developments
2–3, 5–10, 24
Overview of performance and financial results
2–3, 5–10,
25–27, 43–46
Outlook for following year
Significant issues and developments—portfolio
7,9
Not applicable
AGENCY OVERVIEW
PAGE
Role and functions
11–19
Organisational structure
Outcome and programme structure
19
22–23
Changes from PBS
Not applicable
Portfolio structure (for portfolio departments)
Not applicable
REPORT ON PERFORMANCE
PAGE
Review of performance during the year in relation to
programmes and contribution to outcomes
25–27
Actual performance in relation to deliverables and KPIs set
out in the PBS
28–42
Where performance targets differ from the PBS
Not applicable
Narrative discussion and analysis of performance
25–27, 28–42
Trend information
3, 43–46, 62–79
Significant changes in nature of principal functions/ services
2, 7, 9, 11, 24
Performance of purchaser/ provider arrangements
Not applicable
Factors, events or trends influencing performance
6–9, 24, 183–
188
Contribution of risk management in achieving objectives
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
99–101
184
Performance against service charter
Discussion and analysis of financial performance
Significant changes in financial results from the prior year,
from budget or anticipated to have a significant impact on
future operations
Not applicable
43–46
24, 43–46
Agency resource statement and summary resource tables by
outcomes
44, 45
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PAGE
Actions in dealing with fraud, certification
iii, 100–101
Corporate governance practices
95–101
Names and responsibilities of the senior executive
94, 103
Senior management committees and their roles
Corporate and operational planning
Internal audit, and financial and operational risk management
Ethical standards policy and practices
SES remuneration
EXTERNAL SCRUTINY
Significant developments in external scrutiny
95, 112–113
99
30–31, 95–100,
117–118
119–122
103
PAGE
95, 112–117,
122
Judicial decisions and decisions of administrative tribunals
and the Australian Information Commissioner
Not applicable
Reports by the Auditor-General
Not applicable
Reports by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on ACLEI
113
Reports by the Commonwealth Ombudsman
116
Agency capability reviews
MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES
Effectiveness in managing and developing human resources
Workforce planning, staff retention and turnover
Not applicable
PAGE
97, 101–106
27, 102
Features of employment arrangements
101–105
Training and development
104–105
Work health and safety performance
Productivity gains
105
101–102
Statistics on staffing
103
Statistics on employees who identify as Indigenous
102
Employment agreements
104
Performance pay
OTHER MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
Not applicable
PAGE
185
Assets management
Not applicable
Purchasing policies and principles
107
Consultancy services
107
Absence of provisions in contracts allowing access by the
Auditor-General
108
Contracts exempted from publication in AusTender
108
Procurement initiatives to support small business
108
Financial Statements
123
Work health and safety (Schedule 2, Part 4, WHS Act)
106
Advertising and Market Research
Environmental performance
Not applicable
110
Compliance with the Carer Recognition Act 2010
Not applicable
Grant programmes
Not applicable
Disability reporting
111
Information Publication Scheme statement
117
Material errors in previous Annual Report
Agency Resource Statements and Resources for outcomes
List of Requirements
3
44, 45
190–193
LEIC Act requirements
PAGE
Statistics pursuant to LEIC Regulations [s 201(2)(a)]
Significant issues in law enforcement affecting integrity
[s 201(2)(b)]
Patterns and trends in corruption [s 201(2)(c)]
Recommendations for changes to laws of the Commonwealth [s
201(2)(d)(i)]
Recommendations for changes to administrative practices of
Commonwealth Government agencies [s 201(2)(d)(ii)]
Prosecutions [s 201(2)(e)]
174–182
85–91, 183–188
85–91
None
50–52, 83
78–79
Confiscation proceedings [s 201(2)(f)]
80
AD(JR) Act applications [s 201(2)(g)(i)]
115
Other court proceedings involving the Integrity Commissioner
[s 201(2)(g)(ii)]
Summary of investigation outcomes [reg 20(e)]
ACLEI corruption issues [reg 22(e)]
Special reports to the Minister, made under section 204 of the
LEIC Act
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
80
81–83
122
None
186
ALPHABETICAL INDEX
TOPIC
PAGE
2014–15 highlights
2-3
A
Abuse of office
68, 78, 79, 175, 177, 179-182
Accountability
94-122
ACLEI
Accountable Authority
27, 94, 95
approach and role
11-13
Asset Protection Model
capabilities
54, 172
2, 6-8, 25, 27, 85, 86, 87-88, 100, 102, 104-105, 185
confidence in
2, 7-8, 10, 24, 41-42, 97-98, 100-101, 119-122
contact details
ii, iv
corporate plan
9, 24, 32, 95, 99
dealing with corruption in
97-98, 122, 182
fraud, managing risks and incidents, certification
iii
integrity framework
119-121
internet presence
ii, 39-40, 52-53, 81, 111
intranet
102, 109, 121
investigations
3, 9, 13-14, 61-77
leadership
2, 10, 24, 27, 103
overview
11-19
pamphlet
39-40, 52
Professional Standards Officer
41, 100, 119-121
resources available to
strategic focus
3, 7, 24, 43-45, 127-169
6-9, 12-13, 24-27, 32-33, 35, 37, 56, 59, 99, 119, 185
Strategic Risk Management Policy and Framework
strengthening integrity arrangements in
workflow management
99-100
95-101, 119-121
8-9, 30-31
values
5, 10, 97-98, 105, 119-121
Acronyms
vi
Acting Integrity Commissioner
Advertising and market research
Agency integrity initiatives
Agency investigation
Agency policy advices
Aggregation of corruption risks
Agriculture, Department of
awareness-raising presentations to
commencement in jurisdiction
integrity framework developments
24, 38, 53, 103, 173
111
54-55
15
95, 100, 116, 119-121
88
iv, 7, 91
53, 173
28
29, 48, 50, 54-55
notification requirements
64
prosecutions relating to staff members of
79
Allegations, nature of
American Bar Association
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
68, 175, 177, 179-182
60
187
Anti-corruption
arrangements
54-55
community, contact with
58
cooperation
19
framework, Australia
12, 37-38, 51-52
frameworks, law enforcement agencies
18, 27, 32-34, 47-58, 90-91
measures
15, 38, 56, 87-91
measures, in ACLEI
2, 27, 104, 119-121
safeguards, adding to
50-52
Anti-Corruption Agency Forum
59
Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission, Republic of Korea
59
Assessments
8-9, 25, 30-31, 61, 62, 67, 76, 77
Asset Protection Model
Attorney-General’s Department
54, 174
13, 34, 48, 51, 53, 57-60, 98, 101, 108-109, 122
Audit Committee
Auditor-General
Australia Awards Scholarship, recipients
Australian Anti-corruption Commissions Forum
Australian Border Force
establishment
integrity framework
95-98
96, 117
59
57
iv, 7, 11
7, 11, 24, 37, 43, 185
2, 27, 51, 55, 72, 83, 185
see also Immigration and Border Protection, Department of
Australian Capital Territory Policing
Australian Crime Commission
drug testing in
iv
iv, 2, 7, 11, 55, 59
82, 83
Gangs Intelligence Coordination Centre
86
Illicit Drug Data Report 2013–14
85
integrity framework
integrity testing
National Criminal Fusion Capability
Organised Crime in Australia 2015, report
Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2015
physical surveillance capability, hosted by
54, 83
72
18, 28, 29, 48, 68
29, 49, 184
2, 26, 37, 49, 184
69
reports relating to
82, 83
review relating to
83
Australian Crime Commission Act 2002
Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
awareness-raising presentations to
Border Five Group Integrity Dialogue
innovative corruption detection mechanisms
integration into DIBP
integrity testing
internal investigations under the LEIC Act
National Border Strategic Assessment
prosecutions relating to staff members of
83, 185, 187
iv, 11, 28, 40, 43, 49, 59, 188
173
2, 60
55, 68
7, 24, 27, 43, 51, 185
50, 72
35-36
2, 26, 48
79
reports relating to
82, 83
Taskforce Pharos
55, 68, 86
Australian Defence Force
96
Australian Federal Police
iv, 11, 40, 49, 53, 59, 186
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
188
awareness-raising presentations to
cooperation with
173
2, 8, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 33, 48, 49, 58, 59
integrity testing
Interagency Integrity Investigators Program
international Deployment Group
internal investigations under the LEIC Act
72
53, 54, 172
173
35-36
Joint Taskforce with, see Joint Taskforce (Sydney)
Professional Standards unit
36
reports relating to
82
Australian Government Solicitor
Australian Information Commissioner
Australian National Audit Office
Australian Public Sector Anti-Corruption Conference
56
117
96, 101, 107, 108, 117, 124-XX
53, 91
Australian Public Service Code of Conduct
121
Australian Public Service, corruption risk in
2, 53, 173
Australian Public Service Values
Australian Public Service Commission
Ethics Contact Officer Network
Australian Taxation Office
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre
105, 121
56, 58, 106, 111
53, 172
56
iv, 11, 43, 49
commencement in jurisdiction
28
cooperation with
56
integrity framework
Australia’s international anti-corruption engagement
Awareness-raising presentations
48, 54
59-60
2, 39-40, 53, 172-173
B
Back office corruption risk
Beazley AC, His Excellency the Hon Kim
2, 48, 49, 50, 83, 87, 90, 98
48
Border
see Australian Border Force
see corruption enabled border crime
Border Five Group Integrity Dialogue
Border Management Group
Box, Mr Darren
Bribery or bribes
Business continuity arrangements
Business planning
11, 89, 204, 205
4, 10, 204
2, 60, 172
37, 58
96
49, 78-79, 85, 86, 87, 89, 188
100
99
C
Case law relevant to ACLEI
Chief Executive’s Instructions
Civil actions
Cocaine
Coercive information-gathering powers, use of
Coles, Mr Anthony
Collusion
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP)
Commonwealth Fraud Control Policy
Commonwealth Ombudsman
Commonwealth Procurement Rules
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
186-188
95
16, 81
6, 85
3, 7, 12, 14, 70-71, 118, 185
96
viii, 15, 78, 86, 184
34, 188
100
115-116
107
189
Community of Practice for Corruption Prevention
18, 27, 36, 40, 48, 50, 56, 91
Compliance Management Systems Guidelines (international)
183
Compromise, corruption risk
17, 49, 54, 78, 83, 86, 88, 90, 184
Concertina model of staffing
69, 102
Concluded issues
3, 75-76, 175, 177, 181, 182
Confiscation proceedings
80
Conflicts of interest, ACLEI arrangements
104, 120-121
Conflicts of interest, risks arising from
12, 56, 83, 100
Consultancies
107
Contact reporting obligations
120, 121
Controlled operations
3, 14, 71, 115, 116
Convictions
3, 26, 34, 79
Cooperation
anti-corruption
19, 50
importance of
8, 18, 60, 184
international
59-60, 87-88
to fight organised crime
184
with law enforcement agencies
8, 17-18, 29, 50, 88
with other integrity agencies
57-58
Corcoran, Ms Joann
96
Cornall AO, Mr Robert
2, 10, 24, 27, 38, 53, 103, 173
Corrupt conduct
viii
indicators of
2, 28-29, 39, 52, 55, 87
evidence of
6, 15, 30-31, 47, 70, 78, 82, 87, 97
opportunities for
37-38, 72, 82, 86, 89
Corrupt networks
viii, 8, 78, 97
Corruption
control (ACLEI)
detection
2, 41, 50, 97-98, 100-101
2, 6, 8, 16-18, 24, 26, 28-29, 47-49, 50, 51, 55, 58, 68, 87
deterrence
12, 18, 27, 28-29, 37-38, 50, 58, 86
disruption
12, 26, 58, 70
handshake
vii, 17-18, 78
hotline
ii, iv
issue, meaning of
viii
notification system
28-29, 47
offences
3, 10, 78-79, 188
partnerships against
8, 56-58
prevention
2, 9, 18-19, 24, 37-38, 40, 47-60, 89-91
protection of key commodities
90
resistance to
28-29, 37-38, 47-60, 86
serious, definition of
vulnerabilities
9
2, 16, 28-29, 37, 47-49, 50, 54-55, 86, 89-91
Corruption and Crime Commission (WA)
Corruption enabled border crime
ACLEI/ACC delegation to North America about
ACLEI/AFP joint investigations into
57
2, 6, 17, 24, 59-60, 85-89
2, 6, 26, 48, 49, 56, 87-89, 172
2, 7, 8, 48, 48
assessment of
2, 26, 48
incentives for (benefits to organised crime)
6, 85-86
LEIC Act agency workshop on
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
49, 53, 172
190
lessons from overseas partners
2, 6, 26, 48, 60, 87-89
strategies for dealing with
2, 28, 51, 58, 86-87, 90
vulnerabilities to and indicators of
2, 26, 28-29, 48, 49, 89, 91
Corruption enabled crime
vii, 17
Corruption risk
agency initiatives to deal with
54-55
at the border see corruption enabled border crime
assessing
2, 18, 50
awareness
47-49, 50, 52-53, 90
back-office staff
2, 48, 49, 50, 83, 87, 90, 98
dispersed workforces
89
displacement
viii, 49
indicators
16, 88
infiltration
17, 51, 85, 88, 99
in managing organisational change
90-91
in the Australian Public Service
2, 53, 173
private use of illicit drugs
12, 37, 54, 56, 83
protecting key commodities
90
undeclared relationships with criminals
83
Corruption risks, aggregation of
88
Corruption enabled crime at the border see Corruption enabled border crime
Counter-surveillance
6, 105
Court proceedings
3, 78-80
Covert information-gathering powers and methods
3, 6, 14, 71, 114-116, 118
Crime and Corruption Commission (Qld)
53, 57
Crimes Act 1914
71, 114, 115, 116
Criminal Code
16, 79
CrimTrac (The CrimTrac Agency)
iv, 11, 43, 91
commencement in jurisdiction
28
integrity framework
29, 40, 53, 55
Crown jewel strategy
Culture, workplace
vii, 86, 90, 98
28, 39, 50, 52, 54-55, 86, 89, 90-91, 97-98, 101, 119-121
D
Databases—access to, governance of
32, 41-42, 109, 119
Data retention, under Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979
Dealing with corruption issues relating to ACLEI
Declaration of Private Interests
6, 37, 51, 57, 185
122, 182
104, 120-121
Delegations to ACLEI
59
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
59
Department of Human Services
96
Detection challenge
6, 24, 51
Detection, avoiding
8, 14, 49
Developments in ACLEI’s operating environment
Digital transition strategy
Disability reporting
Disciplinary actions and proceedings
Displacement of corruption risk
Disseminations of information by ACLEI
Drugs, illicit, risks arising from
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
185
101, 102, 109
111
9, 15, 16, 26, 34, 81
viii, 49, 184
7, 17, 26, 31, 33, 34, 41, 118
6, 56, 82, 83, 85-87
191
Duplicate sources of information
61
E
Edith Cowan University
50
Effectiveness paradox
87
E-learning training packages , ACLEI contribution to
53
Electronic records management
102, 108-109
Employee assistance program
103, 106
Employment screening
58, 97
Enduring lie, the
51
Enforcement orders
80
Engaging with staff (on corruption risk)
54, 55, 88, 100, 105, 120-121
Enterprise Agreement 2012–2014
101, 104
Enterprise Risk Register
96, 99-100
Environmental performance
110
Ethics Contact Officer Network (APSC)
53, 172
Evidence, false or misleading
3, 70, 78-79
Exhibits
42, 97
Expenses for Outcome One
46
External accountability, use of powers
114-116
External workload, management of
72-75
F
Facilities, for corruption investigation
41, 109-110
Federal Court of Australia
80, 187
Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997
95
Financial processes, management of
107-108
Financial statements
43, 95, 96, 107, 124-169
Financial summary
43-46
Fraud and Corruption Control (ACLEI)
iii, 41, 95, 96, 99, 100-101, 121
Fraud Control Policy, Commonwealth
100
Fraud control in ACLEI
managing risks and incidents, certification
Fraud Liaison Forum, Commonwealth
Fraud policy, contribution to
Fraud Rule, PGPA Act
Freedom of information
41, 95, 100-101
iii
53, 172
2, 37, 38, 51
53, 100
117
Freedom of Information Act 1982
51, 108, 117
Freedom of information statistics
117
G
Gaynor CSC, Brigadier James
96
Gifts and Benefits obligations
120
Glossary
Governance framework (ACLEI)
Griffin AM, Mr Michael
Grooming
vii-viii
27, 95
iii, 2, 5-10, 24, 27
49
H
Hamburger PSM, Mr Peter
Hard-to-detect corruption
9, 43
6, 24, 51
Heads of Commonwealth Integrity Agencies Forum
58
Heads of Commonwealth Operational Law Enforcement Agencies (HOCOLEA)
58
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
192
Hearing guidelines
33, 118
Hearings
3, 7, 12, 14, 15, 70-71, 118
Hearings, offences arising from
3, 14, 16, 70, 78-79
Hong Kong Complaints Against Police Office
59
Hotspots
56, 98, 121
Human resources, in ACLEI
101-106
I
Ice (crystalline methamphetamine)
85, 184
Identity crime
184
Illicit conduct, corruption risk
12, 37, 56, 83
Illicit Drug Data Report 2013–14 (ACC)
85
Illicit drugs
6, 12, 82, 83, 85
Illicit rewards
6, 85-87, 188
Immigration and Border Protection (Department of)
iv, 7, 24, 30, 37, 49, 51, 58, 59, 89, 118
commencement in jurisdiction
7, 11
formation of the Australian Border Force
2, 7, 24, 185
integration of the ACBPS
7, 24, 185
integrity framework
2, 27, 48, 51, 55, 72, 83, 185
Importations, illicit
6, 58, 85-87, 188
Independence, of the Integrity Commissioner
13
Independent Commission Against Corruption (NSW)
52, 57, 91, 186
Independent review of ACLEI’s resources (Peter Hamburger review)
9, 43, 102
Independent review of ACLEI’s staffing structure (Scheetz review)
102
Indian Police Service Mid Career Training Program
59
Indicators of corrupt conduct
2, 28-29, 39, 52, 55, 87
Indicators of corruption risk
16, 88
Individual Flexibility Arrangements
104
Indonesian Directorate General of Customs and Excise
59
Infiltration
17, 51, 85, 88, 99
Informants
viii, 17, 41
Information
about corruption
17, 26, 28-29, 31, 34, 63-65
access and handling audits
41-42, 119
and communications technology
98, 108-109
and intelligence sharing
47, 88
guidelines
41, 118
holdings
41, 42, 97, 119
management of
41-42, 119
unauthorised disclosure of
54, 90
value to organised crime
gathering powers
6, 41, 86-87, 90, 184
3, 6, 7, 12, 14, 70-71, 114-116, 118, 185
Information technology staff, risks arising from
2, 48, 50, 83, 90
Inquiry into ACLEI’s jurisdiction
Inquiry into the Border Force Bill 2015 and the Customs and
Other Legislation Amendment (ABF) Bill 2015
Inquiry into the integrity of Australia’s border arrangements
113
52
52, 113
Inquiry into the Law Enforcement Legislation Amendment (Powers) Bill 2015
51
Inquiry into prosecutions arising from Independent Commission Against Corruption investigations
52
Inquiry into the TIA Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2014
52
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
193
Insights, corruption prevention
13, 18, 27, 37-38, 53-58, 89-91
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security
116
Integrity
assurance measures (ACLEI)
41-42, 119-121
cultures, building
56-60, 91, 120
frameworks, design of
12, 18, 50, 51, 54-55, 58, 90, 120
initiatives
54-55
partnership
10, 12, 60
system, adding value to
32-34, 47-60
system, effectiveness of
28-29
Integrity Agencies Group
58
Integrity agencies in Australia, cooperation with
8, 57-58
Integrity agencies in other countries, links with
59-60, 87-89
Integrity Commissioner, appointment
2, 13, 24, 103
Integrity Commissioner, term
2, 13, 24, 103
Integrity Commission of Tasmania
57
Integrity Policy (ACLEI)
119-121
Integrity Risk Reporting and Management policy
120
Integrity testing
14, 55, 72, 115
Intelligence
collection
6, 18, 28, 48, 68, 69, 109
criminal
6, 18, 34, 47, 88
holdings, picture
6, 36, 64, 73, 76, 88
sharing
2, 17, 18, 29, 34, 47, 48, 88
use of
117
Inter-Departmental Committee on Anti-Corruption
60
Internal audit
95-98
controls to prevent internal corruption
2, 41, 50, 97-98, 121
data loss prevention
98
exhibit management
42, 97
pre-employment recruitment practices
97
International engagement
2, 59-60, 87-89
International Law Enforcement Academy (Bangkok)
60
Intrusive information-gathering powers see Covert information-gathering powers and methods
Investigations
addressing corruption risk
37-38
by ACLEI
by other agencies under the LEIC Act
3, 66-70, 176, 179
3, 15, 35-36, 66-67, 72-75, 176, 178, 179
commenced
3, 35-36, 68, 70, 180
discontinued
33, 34, 35-36, 67, 70, 74, 181
independence of
13, 14
joint
33, 66, 68-70, 118
management of
32-34, 117-119
outcomes
2, 3, 32-33, 67, 78-79, 81-83
own initiative
63, 179
reconsidered
33, 34, 67, 73
reports, by the Integrity Commissioner
2-3, 15-16, 32, 34, 38, 50, 67, 70, 81-84
workload 2014–15
62, 65-67
J
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
194
Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit
iii, 190
Joint Taskforce (Sydney) (ACLEI/AFP)
arrangements for
24
8, 26, 33, 41, 43, 58, 68, 69, 94, 102, 109, 118
cooperation with other agencies
focus
Jones, Ms Katherine
Judicial review
Jurisdiction
extension of
review of implementation of extended
Parliamentary Joint Committee inquiry into ACLEI’s
29, 57, 58, 118
2, 8, 26, 27, 29, 48, 58, 118
57
115
11
7, 9, 11, 24, 37
9, 43, 102
113
K
Keenan, The Hon Michael MP
Key Performance Indicators, performance against
iii, 10, 24
28-42
L
Law enforcement agencies, definition
Law enforcement corruption risks, trends in
Law enforcement databases, access to
Law enforcement information
Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Act 2006 (LEIC Act)
amendments to
offences against
specific requirements and provisions
Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Regulations 2006
Law enforcement operating environment, developments in
Law reform, contribution to
Leadership, of ACLEI
Learning and Development Strategy
Legal proceedings
Legal services expenditure
viii
85-91
41-42, 109, 119
32, 43, 54, 86, 90
iii, 11-19, 193
7, 9, 24, 62, 185
14, 16, 78-79
25, 68, 70, 72, 78, 85, 193
25, 61, 81, 174-182, 193
184
37-38
2, 10, 24, 27, 103
104-105
78-80
108
M
McMillan AO, Prof. John
10
Management structure
94
Mandatory training programme (ACLEI)
Measures, design of anti-corruption
Minister for Justice
41-42, 96, 104-105, 119-121
50-52, 119-121
iii, 9, 10, 13, 24, 43
Minister, reports to the
3, 34, 81-84
Misleading evidence
3, 16, 78, 79
Misplaced loyalties
54, 89
Monitoring of agency investigation outcomes
35-36
Morison, Ms Jenny
Moss, Mr Philip
96
2, 10, 24, 27, 103
N
National Border Strategic Assessment (ACBPS)
2, 26, 37, 48
National Investigations Symposium
53, 172
National Organised Crime Response Plan 2015-2018
29, 184
Nepal, Commission for the Investigation of the Abuse of Authority
33, 118
New South Wales Crime Commission
58
New South Wales Police Force
58
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
195
New Zealand Independent Police Conduct Authority
59
Non-disclosure directions
15
Notice guidelines
33, 118
Notices to Produce
3, 70-71, 118
Notifications, of corruption issues
viii, 3, 28-29, 63-64, 175-176
O
Offences arising from hearings
3, 78-79
Offences relating to the LEIC Act
14, 16, 70, 78-79
Operating environment, changes in
183-188
Operation Barden, report to the Minister
82
Operation Helix
90
report to the Minister
82, 83
Operation Heritage (ACLEI)/Operation Marca (AFP)
53, 78, 172
Operational accountability
117-119
Operational procedures
117-118
Operations Branch
19, 94
Organisational structure
19, 94
Organised crime
vii, 6, 12, 17-18, 29, 38, 41, 48, 49, 50, 59-60, 78, 85-88, 90, 184
Organised Crime in Australia 2015 (ACC)
29, 49, 184
Organised Crime Threat Assessment (ACC)
2, 26, 37, 49, 184
Out of jurisdiction information, treatment of
62
Outcome
22-23, 46
Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs
6
Own initiative identifications of corruption issues
3, 63
Own initiative investigations
13, 62, 179
P
Parliamentary Joint Committee on ACLEI
7, 10, 35, 48, 72, 112-113, 116
examination of Annual Report
113
inquiry into ACLEI’s jurisdiction
113
inquiry into the integrity of Australia’s border arrangements
52, 113
membership
113
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security
51, 52, 185
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement
48
Partnerships against corruption, building
8, 56-60
Patterns and trends
85-91
Performance, factors influencing
24
Personal information, handling of
41-42
Police Integrity Commission (NSW)
8, 57, 58
Policy development, contribution to
2-3, 18, 27, 37-38, 51
Portfolio Budget Statements
22-23, 25, 32, 43-46, 99
Powers
14
accountability in use of
114-116
management of
118
see also coercive information-gathering powers, use of
see also covert information-gathering powers and methods
Presentations
2, 3, 27, 37, 39, 40, 53, 60, 91, 172-173
Prevention functions
2, 3, 13, 18, 23, 37-38, 53, 56, 91
Priorities, strategic
12
Prioritisation model
12, 30-31, 68, 77
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
196
Privacy Act 1988
17
Privacy management
41-42, 71, 119
Private illicit conduct, corruption risk
12, 56, 83
Private Interest declarations
104, 120-121
Proceeds of crime
16, 86
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002
16, 80, 114, 186
Productivity
101-102
Professional standards
as an integrity measure
28, 52
in ACLEI
100-101, 119-121
Profit from illicit drugs
6, 85-87
Program for Personal Performance
99, 101, 105, 120
Programme objective and deliverables
Prosecutions
22-23
3, 9, 10, 16, 18, 26, 34, 52, 78-79, 80, 97
Protective Security Policy Framework
42, 96, 110
Protective security reforms, ACLEI contribution to
2, 38, 51
Providing information to ACLEI
iv, 17
Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013
22, 27, 95, 107
Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014
53, 95, 100, 107
Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013
116
ACLEI arrangements
116, 120
Public Service Act 1999
121
Public Service Commission of South Africa
59
Purchasing policies
107
Q
Queensland Crime and Corruption Commission
53, 57
R
Recommendations, previous
83
Recording practice, notes on
61-62
Records management
105, 108-109
Recruitment in ACLEI
8, 27, 43, 97, 102
Recruitment, corruption risk
17, 51, 85, 97, 99
Referrals of corruption issues
viii, 3, 28-29, 63, 65, 177-179
Relationships with state-based partner agencies
8, 19, 38, 57-58
Relevant decisions of courts and administrative tribunals
186-188
Reporting
by other agencies under the LEIC Act
3, 15, 35-36, 70, 73-74
of corruption issues
to the Minister
iv, 17, 28-29, 52-53
3, 15, 27, 32-34, 38, 50, 70, 75, 81-84, 181
Requirements for Annual Reports
iii, 190-192
Resource Statement
45
Review of Police Oversight in New South Wales
51
Risk management in ACLEI
Ruddock, The Hon Philip MP
95-101
10
S
Search warrants
Secondary employment obligations (ACLEI)
Secondary employment obligations (LEIC Act agencies)
14, 71, 114
120, 121
50, 55
Secondments
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
197
from ACLEI
to ACLEI
treatment under the LEIC Act
8, 36
8, 32, 36, 43, 102, 120, 121
viii, 14, 72, 75
Secretariat Branch
19, 94
Section 66 reports
3, 73-74
Security requirements
Self-incrimination, privilege against
Self-managing risk
Sellenger Centre for Research in Law, Justice and Social Change
Senate Estimates
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs
Senior Executive Service
Small business support
Social media, corruption risk
Sources of information about corruption issues
Special Reports under s204 of the LEIC Act
41-42, 104
16, 37, 51, 187
121
50
114
51, 52, 114
103, 104
108
50, 121
63-65
84
Staff
casual
concertina model
establishment
non-salary benefits
43, 102, 120
69, 102
3
103
performance and development
104-105
profile and remuneration
102-103
recruitment
security requirements
Staff members of law enforcement agencies, definition
State integrity agencies, links with
State of the Service Report
8, 27, 43, 97, 102
42, 104
viii
38, 57-58
27, 106, 111
Strategic focus
12-13
Strategic objective
18, 50
Strengthening integrity
Submissions to Inquiries
Summons
Surveillance Devices Act 2004, use of powers under
18-19, 47-60
3, 37-38, 51-52
14, 70-71, 118
3, 14, 32, 71, 114, 115, 116, 118
Sydney Joint Taskforce see Joint Taskforce (Sydney)
T
Taiwan, Agency Against Corruption, Ministry of Justice
Taskforce arrangements, for corruption investigations
(see also Joint Taskforce (Sydney))
Taskforce Pharos (ACBPS)
59
69, 70, 102, 109, 119
55, 68, 86
Technical capabilities
19
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979
17
changes relating to data retention
use of powers under
Themes identified from investigations
6, 37, 51, 52, 57, 185
14, 71, 114, 115, 116, 118
89-91
Tink AM, Mr Andrew
51
Transparency International Australia
58
Treaties, international
60
Trends
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
85-91
198
Triggers
88
Trusted insiders
6, 54
U
Unauthorised access to restricted data
78
Unauthorised disclosure of information
54, 90
Undeclared associations
83, 90
United Nations Convention Against Corruption
60
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
85
V
Values, misalignment of
51, 91
Vertical collusion
viii, 184
Vulnerabilities
2, 16, 28-29, 37, 47-49, 50, 54-55, 86, 89-91
W
Whistleblowers
15, 17, 51
Winder PSM, Mr Oliver
96
Witnesses, guidance for
118
Work Health and Safety Act 2011 and arrangements
106
Workplace agreements
104
Workplace culture
28, 39, 50, 52, 54-55, 86, 89, 90-91, 97-98, 101, 119-121
ACLEI Annual Report of the Integrity Commissioner 2014–15
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