Syllabus of the course.
Instructor Professor B.Kashnikov
Analytic Ethics
This is a compulsory course offered to the 4th year students in Philosophy. The pre-requisites of
the course include the knowledge of the standard course of History of Philosophy, Ethics and
Logic for HSE Philosophy students, who have already passed through 3 years of study. The
students are also supposed to be well trained in English, at the level not lower than that of an
excellent mark in terms of the standard program at HSE.
The course provides an account of the development of the analytic ethics from G.E.
Moore (1873-1958) and includes both meta-ethics and normative ethics. The emergence of
analytic tradition was related to a remarkable turn from metaphysical and psychological theories
in ethics to the theories based of logic and language. Moore famously claimed in 1903 that Good
cannot be defined, since it is a matter of empirical intuition of special kind. Anyone who comes
out with the naturalistic definition of the Good commits a naturalistic fallacy. H. A. Prichard
(1871-1947) continued the same line of thought. He claimed that the realm of ethics presupposes
its own reasoning and it is impossible to find an answer to the question “Why should I do moral
action?”. W. D. Ross (1877-1971) attacks the notion that when we think ethically we always
think in terms of consequences. He notes that some of our ethical thinking is backward rather
than forward oriented. Here he argues that no single principle can tell us the whole story about
ethics. In the process he introduces the concept of prima facie duty. The situation in analytic
ethics was modified under the influence of Logical Positivism, which started to inflict its
influence on Anglo-American philosophy in early 1930th. J. Ayer (1910-1989) is generally
regarded as a founding father of emotive theory of ethics, which was presupposed to eliminate
the contradiction between objectivism (non naturalism) and relativism (naturalism). Moral
statements are non verifiable and non cognitive. They have no truth value. C. L. Stevenson
(1908-1979) made significant contribution to this mode of thinking. The definition of the good is
possible since moral statements are not total rubbish. They contain certain magnetism, which is
not verifiable by scientific methods. There may be some disagreements on the nature of Good,
but people can usually understand each other. The language may be used in two different ways:
Descriptive and Dynamic (magnetic, persuasive). R. M. Hare (1919-2002) in his “The
Language of Morals” developed a new line of thought in analytic ethics called “universal
prescriptivism”. He makes an important distinction between two kinds of thinking: Critical
thinking and Non-critical thinking. We apply to critical thinking whenever we are in a moral
conflict between two principles. Allan Gibbard follows the line of Hare in his prescriptivism
and non-cognitivism. He attends the norms that we can endorse. Typically we reason in order to
facilitate coordination with others. If a judgment is moral it overrides non-moral judgments. We
have a pair of constraints. They are guilt and remorse. Evolution has a big role to play. It gave
us prescriptivity. It also gave us the dual-control systems of guilt and resentment. According to
Tom Beauchamp, what justifies the norms of the common morality is that they are the norms
best suited to achieve the objectives of morality and the objectives are human flourishing.
Justification is a pragmatic ongoing process. Starting in the 1960s and 1970s several new trends
developed, all of them united by the general idea of normative ethics: Revival of contract theory
(Rawls and Scanlon here); Revival of naturalist position (Boyd and Railton among others)
Revival of virtue theory (GEM Anscombe, Phillipa Foote, Rosalind Hursthouse, Michael Slote,
Charles Taylor), the emergence of analytical deontology (Christine Karsgaard), further
development of analytical utilitarianism (Bernard Williams). At the same time anti theoretical
trend in analytic ethics emerged (Alasdair MacIntyre).
The objective of the course is twofold: to get the thorough knowledge of the
contemporary analytic ethics and to learn how to make sophisticated ethical judgments. The
course will be studied according to the following plan:
1. The emergence of the analytic tradition in Ethics (Moore, Prichard, Ross )
2. The influence of logical positivism (Ayer, Stevenson).
3. The turn to universal prescriptivism (Hare, Gibbard, Beauchamp, Habermas)
4. The return of moral objectivism and the new trends of development since 1970th. (Rawl,
Boyd, Anscombe, Williams, Karsgaard)
5. Theory vs anty-theory debate in contemporary analytic ethics and the crisis of the ethical
theory.
Reading List
a. Required.
Alexander Miller. An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003.
Moral Discourse and Practice. Some Philosophical Approaches. Edited by S.Darwall,
A.Gibbard and P.Railton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Stephen P.Schwartz. A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy. From Russel to Rawls. Malden,
MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012.
b. Optional
H.J. McCloskey. Meta-ethics and Normative Ethics. The Hague: Martnis Nijhoff, 1969.
Peter Baron. Meta-ethics: Ethics Study Guide. Somerset BA: PushMe Press, 2014.
Louis P. Pojman, James Fieser. Ethics. Discovering Right and Wrong. Boston, MA: Wadsworth,
2012.
We will use the following means of evaluation: homework assignments, quizzes, the
written midterm test, the final exam. The intermediate grade is computed at the end of the first
module taking into consideration the average homework grade and the midterm grade.
The final grade is computed at the end of the term taking into consideration the cumulated grade,
intermediate grade and final exam grade.
Methods of instruction will be based on lectures, seminars and home assignments.