China’s Response to International Humanitarian Intervention
Yu Zhao
Center for East Asian Studies, Stanford University
One of the most significant phenomena of the post-Cold War international
society is the increase of humanitarian crises happening within sovereign states
rather than between sovereign states. In an anarchic international system, how
should states respond to massive and systematic violations of fundamental human
rights occurring in another sovereign state which are even committed by the
authorities of that state? Should states participate in international humanitarian
intervention which by definition is “ the use force in another sovereign state’s
territory to protect the host state’s citizens from gross human rights abuses, mass
atrocities, crimes against humanity, or genocide”?1 While Western countries
enthusiastically espouse the ideas of “humanitarian intervention” and “the
responsibility to protect” (R2P for short), many Asian states have expressed their
reluctance and suspicion based on their different historical experience, weaker
position in the international power hierarchy, and non-Western value system. China,
as the regional power of East Asia, shares many characteristics with other nonWestern Asian states in this regard; however, as an emerging global power, China
has also experienced gradual but significant progressive transformation in its
thinking and policy towards international humanitarian intervention and relevant
peacekeeping operations.
Helen M. Stacy, Human Rights for the 21st Century: Sovereignty, Civil Society, Culture, Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 221
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This article will outline Chinese thinking of human rights and humanitarian
intervention which is believed to have shaped its foreign policy. Also, it will trace
the policy development of China on humanitarian intervention by examining its
policy towards major international humanitarian crises since the early 1990s.
Chinese Rationale
In general, China only gives conditional support to international
humanitarian intervention based on two criteria: 1) the consent of the host
sovereign state and 2) the authorization of the UN Security Council. We should also
keep in mind that China has not experienced a simple, straightforward, and linear
development in its position on humanitarian intervention. After the high point of
opposition in Kosovo, it seems that China adopted a softer, more flexible and
pragmatic stance in East Timor and Darfur, which, however, is followed by a return
of a hard line in dealing with the “Arab Spring” lately. There are several factors that
have been critical in shaping China’s policy on humanitarian intervention: 1) its
upholding of Westphalian notion of absolute state sovereignty reflected by its
insistence on the consent of the host country; 2) its peculiar understanding of
human rights which does not include Western sense of democracy, manifested in its
abhorrence of any attempt of “regime change”; and 3) its rising national power
which can both increase its influence on the host country and enhance its confidence
in making more assertive move to oppose Western initiatives. Among the above,
Chinese understanding of sovereignty is at the core.
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China has a traditional Westphalian understanding of state sovereignty,
which is enshrined in modern international law but is also constantly challenged in
today’s globalization era. The traditional wisdom is that sovereignty constitutes
contemporary international system of nation states originated from the Peace of
Westphalia in 1648. The UN Charter, the most important source of contemporary
international law, states, “The Organization is based on the principle of the
sovereignty equality of all its Members,”2 and the Article 2(3) further states that “All
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”3 Hence,
according to current formal international law, the borders between sovereign states
cannot be transcended, which constitutes the conflict between Westphalian
sovereignty and international humanitarian intervention for protecting universal
human rights.
However, in face of the repeated occurrences of humanitarian crises within a
sovereign state with an incapable government in the post-Cold War period, there
have been many voices calling for a redefinition of state sovereignty. In the opening
address to the 1999 UN General Assembly meeting, former UN Secretary General
Kofi Annan proclaimed a more activist stance towards humanitarian intervention by
redefining state sovereignty and proposed enhancement of “individual sovereignty”
which was defined as “the human rights and fundamental freedoms of each and
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U.N. Charter, art. 2(1)
U.N. Charter, art. 2(3)
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every individual as enshrined in our Charter.”4 But this claim soon encountered
Chinese opposition as Chinese officials argued that “the issue of human rights is the
internal affairs of a given country, and should be addressed mainly by the
Government of that country,” and “sovereign equality, mutual respect for State
Sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of others are the basic
principles governing international relations today.”5
We are glad to witness that Chinese conservative and inflexible stance in the
global trend of redefining sovereignty has changed subtly but significantly in its
response to the new idea of sovereignty as international “responsibility to protect”
(R2P in short), which means that “when a population is suffering serious harm, and
the state in question is unwilling or unable to avert it or is itself the perpetrator, the
principle of nonintervention yields to an international responsibility to protect.”6
Although still with reservation, China included a section of R2P in its Position Paper
on the UN Reforms in 2005, stating, “When a massive humanitarian crisis occurs, it
is the legitimate concern of the international community to ease and defuse the
crisis.”7
The Chinese upholding of Westphalian sovereignty has deep domestic roots.
First, Chinese semi-colonial modern history during which time China repeatedly
suffered invasions and humiliation of foreign powers makes Chinese people believe
that the absolute concept of state sovereignty is a useful tool in protecting national
Kofi Annan, “Balance State Sovereignty with Individual Sovereignty”, speech at the General
Assembly of the United Nations, Sep. 20, 1999. See http://dwfed.org/pp_annan_on_sov.html
5 U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 8th plen. mtg. U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.8, Sep. 22, 1999
6 See ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Report 69, 2011
7 Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms, Jun. 7, 2005.
http://www.china-un.org/eng/xw/t199101.htm
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interest of China; it helps Chinese people control the destiny of its own nation, and
enables China to “demonstrate equal standing in the family of nations in terms of
equality and the respect it is due.”8 “The century of humiliation” refers to this period
of modern history is reinforced in the Chinese Communist Party’s historiography,
and this reinforces the importance of “sovereignty and territorial integrity” to
Chinese nation. In fact, the modern history of subjugation, the notion of sovereignty,
and the suspicion of Western powers are major forces in today’s Chinese
nationalism. Secondly, national unification, territorial integrity, and political
stability are fundamental policy goals of the Chinese Communist Party who has been
consistently troubled by the independence movements in Taiwan, the secessionist
forces of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet, and the call for more independence
and freedom by people in Hong Kong. Therefore, Chinese government has always
been very sensitive and emotional in the cases that foreign forces intervene a
country in humanitarian crisis that is caused by civil war, the uprising of minority
ethnic groups, or independence movements, such as the situation in Kosovo. Finally,
Chinese official foreign policy guideline, the “Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence,” includes the clauses of mutual respect for each other country’s
territorial integrity and sovereignty, and mutual noninterference in each other’s
internal affairs; and these rules are codified in Chinese Constitution thus become
Chinese domestic laws.
A different understanding of the concept of human rights is another
important factor that has shaped Chinese policy on humanitarian intervention. It is
Jia Qingguo, “China”, in Watanabe Koji (ed.), Humanitarian Intervention: The Evolving Asian Debate,
Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2003, p. 27
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noteworthy that China did not incorporate the exact words of “human rights” into
its Constitution until the latest amendment got approved in 2004. To fight against
Western criticism of its human rights record, China in return identifies itself as a
defender of a different, non-Western version of human rights. Like many other
developing non-Western countries, it emphasizes economic, social and cultural
rights over civil and political rights. China is among very few countries which have
not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Against this
background, China never considers Western style democracy as a fundamental
human right, and it opposes the West’s attempt to achieve the goal of regime change
or enforcement of democracy through humanitarian intervention, such as in the
cases of Haiti, Iraq and “Arab Spring”.
Finally, we should not miss the point that China’s rising power and increasing
global influence has been changing its attitudes and policy towards humanitarian
intervention, represented by China’s more flexible, pragmatic and constructive role
in East Timor, Darfur, and Libya. Some scholars hold that as China’s global interests
have grown along its rising power and increasing need for markets and resources,
so too has Beijing’s awareness of the importance of preventing catastrophic
breakdowns of order in the developing world; more Chinese policymakers have
realized the long-term political health of China’s developing country partners are
crucial to its peaceful and favorable external environment.9 And an active role in UN
peacekeeping operations and certain humanitarian intervention operations can be
used as a means to protect China’s increasing global interests, including natural
Robert Weiss and Steven Hill, “China as Peacekeeper: Implications for the Law and Politics of
Humanitarian Intervention”, Yale Journal of International Affairs, Spring/Summer 2011, pp. 138-139
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resources, overseas citizens, investment, and political influence, which explains
China’s policy on Sudan. However, if China’s positive move on humanitarian
intervention has been mainly driven by its strategic concerns of national interest
rather than by purely altruistic humanitarian motivations, it is hard to say that
whether China will return to a tougher and more assertive line once it gains more
power to do so, such as in the recent case of Syria.
Policy Development—A Chronological Review
A chronological examination of Chinese governmental attitudes towards
major humanitarian crises since the beginning of 1990s shows that China still holds
many reservations about intervening in human rights violations in other states
especially when it involves use of force or threats of use of force; however, greater
pragmatism and flexibility are also manifested in recent China’s positions and
actions in humanitarian intervention in the 21st century.
In December 1992, the UN Security Council historically adopted the
Resolution 794 authorizing a US-led humanitarian intervention in Somalia, a
country in dire humanitarian situations, which marked both the first Security
Council Chapter VII authorization of the use of force without the consent of the host
state and the first Security Council authorization of the use of force based on purely
humanitarian concerns. China voted in favor of the draft resolution, but expressed
its reservation that military actions led by certain countries might affect the
collective role of the UN, and claimed that military operation in Somalia was an
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“exceptional action” because of the “unique situation” of the country, i.e. the absence
of a functioning Somali government.10
In the following Haiti and Rwanda crises in 1994, China chose to abstain from
voting on UN Security Council resolutions that legally authorized multinational
intervention led by a certain member state. China’s decisions rested in its aversion
to using humanitarian intervention to restore democracy (in Haiti case) and its
emphasis on consent from the parties concerned in the crisis (in Rwanda case). The
NATO’s 1999 unilateral and later regarded by the UN as “illegal but legitimate”
intervention in Kosovo “marked the high point of China’s opposition” to the idea of
humanitarian intervention.11 China took a much more assertive stance or even a
leading role in defending sovereignty of Yugoslavia and the legal norm of
nonintervention. China unprecedentedly abstained on all the main UN Security
Council resolutions regarding the Kosovo issue in 1998-1999, and in several
occasions, China was bold enough to be the only member of the Security Council to
abstain.12 The Chinese government claimed that NATO’s unilateral intervention
without UN authorization seriously violated the UN Charter and international law.
In sharp contrast, shortly after Kosovo crisis, China supported the UNauthorized Australian-led intervention in East Timor for the continuing violence and
resulting humanitarian crisis after gaining consent of Indonesian government. It
even sent its first batch of peacekeepers there in January 2000, its first participation
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/PV. 3145, Dec. 3, 1992
Jonathan E. Davis, “From Ideology to Pragmatism: China’s Position on Humanitarian Intervention
in the Post-Cold War Era”, Venderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 44, no.2 (Mar. 2011), p. 245
12 Those resolutions include Resolution 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999), and
1244 (1999). On Resolution 1160, 1199, and 1244, China was the only member that abstained.
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in UN peacekeeping operation since 1992. Darfur is another milestone in the
evolution of Chinese position on humanitarian intervention and it represents the
first occasion upon which “China became heavily involved in an international
humanitarian crisis”.13 The West criticizes that China’s political support to
Khartoum was the major obstacle to halting the brutal human disaster in Darfur,
and many condemned that China established close economic and even military
relationship with Khartoum simply in return of oil. Being very sensitive to those
Western criticisms and threatened by an international human rights backlash
against the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Chinese government rethought its static position
on humanitarian intervention. It began to use its newly gained economic power and
diplomatic influence to pressure Khartoum to make compromise according to the
request of the international society, marked by President Hu Jingtao’s visit to
Khartoum in February 2007. However, it did not give up the precondition for a
legitimate intervention, namely the consent of the host country. Finally, after
Khartoum changed attitudes toward UN peacekeepers, China voted for UN
Resolution 1769 in July 2007 authorizing the deployment of a 25,000 UN-AU troop
to Darfur with the majority of them from Africa.14
The arrival of “the Arab Spring” and subsequent governments’ violation of
human rights of their citizens have become the most recent test bed for China’s
foreign policy on human rights issues. So far, China has adopted a case-by-case
strategy in responding humanitarian crises in different countries, and there is still
Chengqiu Wu, “Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Responsibility: Changes in China’s Response to
International Humanitarian Crises”, Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2010), p. 8
14 S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/RES1769, Jul. 31, 2007
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no consensus on the motivations behind different Chinese positions on
humanitarian intervention in different countries. For instance, China eventually
abstained from voting on UN Security Council’s Resolution 1973 which approved
“non-fly zone” over Libya, authorizing “all necessary measures” to protect civilians,
and was instrumental in authorizing the largely European-led intervention in
Libya.15 In contrast to its position on Libya, China has shown its uncompromising
upholding of state sovereignty and nonintervention principle in its position on Syria,
reportedly in support of Russia. China, together with Russia, used its veto power on
a Security Council draft resolution that would have demanded that all parties in
Syria stop all violence and protect its population, guarantee the political rights of its
citizens.16 The use of veto power was very rare in the voting record of China in post
Cold-War period and it was previously only used on Taiwan-related issues. Some
Chinese policy analysts believe that the veto “shows China’s confidence in foreign
affairs”, especially after the lesson learnt from Libya in which “NATO misused the
rights given by the UN resolution about setting up the no-fly zone, which was then
turned into ‘regime change’.”17
After the case analysis of China’s position on post Cold-War humanitarian
interventions, it is also meaningful to have a broad picture about China’s changing
role in UN peacekeeping operations many of which have engaged in humanitarian
relief efforts in post-conflict countries, with or without consent from the involved
S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973, Mar. 17, 2011
U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6711th mtg., Doc. S/PV. 6711, Feb. 4, 2012
17 Jaime A. FlorCruz, “Why China Didn’t Back UN Plan for Syria?”, CNN, Feb. 9, 2012 See
http://articles.cnn.com/2012-02-09/asia/world_asia_syria-china-florcruz_1_xi-jinping-global-timescui-tiankai?_s=PM:ASIA
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parties. Those operations are called as the “second generation” and “third
generation” UN peacekeeping operations. Several recent studies show that China
has quietly but steadily increased its participation in UN peacekeeping operations
over the past two decades.18 Since its first time to send military observers to the UN
Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East in 1990, China has deployed
more than 12,000 persons to UN peacekeeping missions in the world, made
personnel, financial, political and troop contributions in modern peace operations
which sometimes include enforcement missions that proceed without consent of the
host country.19 In 2001, China became the largest troop contributor among the P5.20
To conclude, the above analysis shows that China has been experiencing
complex and substantial changes in its position on humanitarian intervention, yet a
clear policy line on this matter has not emerged. During the process of
transformation and adjustment, the Chinese case sometimes presents inconsistency
and even contradictory. On the one hand, the statistics shows China’s great
expansion and progress in participating UN peacekeeping operations; however, on
the other, the case by case analysis of Chinese positions on the post-Cold War
humanitarian crises reveals that it is hard to say China has been moving towards a
more activist and interventionist direction or not. But it is no doubt that “the
consent of the host sovereign state” and “the authorization of the UN Security
See Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, “China’s Expanding Peacekeeping Role: Its Significance and the
Policy Implications”, SIPRI Policy Brief, Feb. 2009; International Crisis Group, “China’s Growing Role
in UN Peacekeeping”, Apr. 2009
19 Robert Weiss and Steven Hill, “China as Peacekeeper: Implications for the Law and Politics of
Humanitarian Intervention”, Yale Journal of International Affairs, Spring/Summer 2011, p. 137
20 Ibid.
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Council” are the two preconditions set by China in judging the legitimacy of the
intervention, which indicates that China has not given up its traditional Westphalian
understanding of sovereignty and its explicit preference to the UN institutional
agenda. Also, as an authoritarian regime, China is still very sensitive to promotion of
democracy and regime change. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the greater
pragmatism and flexibility manifested in China’s position and actions on
humanitarian intervention today.
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