INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Focus Questions, Unit 1: The Causes of Conflict
Why are there no official intl. statistics kept on political violence and its victims as is the case with economic data?
What are some of the ways that social scientists typically measure the presence of conflict and its consequences?
Why is the data on conflict deaths collected by the World Health Organization subject to much debate?
Looking at the data that has been collected to document recent conflict trends, how much more or less war is there
now than was the case two decades ago? What are the major trends with respect to: the number battle deaths in the
typical conflict and overall, civil wars, and conflicts among or involving non-state actors? What about major crises—
situations where one or more countries begin to prepare their people for disputes? What about spending on the
military? What about instances of genocide?
Why are people—and even scholars and policymakers—so unaware of the ongoing changes in the frequency and
deadliness of conflict? Looking at survey data that has been collected on regional perceptions of national security,
how closely do people’s fears for security mirror actual levels of conflict in their region?
What regions have the most conflict in the world today? Which countries have been involved in the most conflicts
since the end of WW2? Which countries have spent the most time involved in conflict? What, if anything, do the most
violent countries have in common?
Why do scholars like Kenneth Waltz think that it is necessary to study the causes of war? Is understanding the causes
of war the same as being able to end it?
What are the core assumptions of each of the three “images” Waltz proposes to best understand why war happens?
His images are not meant to be “theories” of conflict, but rather levels of analysis where theories should be targeted.
What theories does he briefly cover for each level? (More specific questions on these are listed below)
What evidence, if any, is there to suggest that human beings might be innately—that is, biologically or
psychologically—prone to engage in or support violence? Why have social scientists frequently pointed to primate
behavior as a source for understanding human biology and violence? What objections have been raised to studying
chimpanzees as a proxy for what human beings look like once you peel away the impacts of modern socialization?
Based on your partial viewing of Soldiers of Conscience and the various readings we covered on the social
construction of war, what evidence is there to suggest that warriors and war itself are “made” or “invented” rather
than natural? What evidence is there that human beings may physically reject the violence of modern warfare?
What social functions has war historically served, and why does the nearly universal presence of war in written
records not necessarily demonstrate that war is “natural”? What are some other widespread social behaviors that
have been nearly or completely eliminated in a short period of time by modernity?
How might biological differences explain variations between men and women in supporting conflict? How does the
propensity for war appear to change as women gain more political and social power in a society, and how does the
data we reviewed in class (PPTs) support Fukuyama’s argument that the world would be a safer place if it were run by
women? What kind of biological and other evidence does he provide to support this view?
Does patriarchy cause militarism, as suggested by Fukuyama, or is it the other way around? Gwynne Dyer’s
documentary (PPTs include links to the video) contends that the development of state militarism led to rigid
patriarchy and the various institutions that historically justified and perpetuated limitations on women’s freedom
almost everywhere? What evidence does he provide to support his claim? If he is right, how might declining
militarism in some societies lead to a restructuring of these nations’ gender relations?
What are the major arguments of the scholars—many of them women—who believe that it is “folly” to believe the
world would be a lot safer if only it were run by women? Are the differences in support for conflict among men and
women all that different when compared to variations across different societies? What kind of evidence do these give
in support of their arguments?
What are the major approaches to understanding the relationship between ethnicity and violence? Specifically, why
might ethnic attachments and motivations towards group violence be biologically rooted? What evidence is there to
suggest the socialization is better able to overcome individual inclinations towards violence and group-level violence
towards “outsiders,” especially when territory is involved? Why is violence between peoples who see themselves as
belonging to different “peoples” or “nations” so common?
Other thinkers—among them Dr. Seuss—see ethnies as constructed and flexible identities that are broadly open to
manipulation, especially by “nationalists.” What are their arguments? Why does Samuel Huntington think that ethnic
identities—even those at the “civilizational” level—are likely to be major drivers of conflict in the 21st century?
Some scholars (review Waltz’s images reading and Jack Levy) argue that most international conflict is the product of
state/domestic politics and economics. What types of geographical, cultural, and economic settings experience the
most interstate violence?
What types of governments are most prone to conflict? Why might democracies be expected to be less inclined
towards violence against other countries? Although they don’t appear to fight one another, are democracies, in fact,
less frequently involved in wars with other states? Are they less likely to start conflicts? Are they any more likely to
get out of conflict once they are involved? How do variations among the structures of democracies impact the
likelihood that they will start or join conflicts?
Some scholars (review the article by Byman and Pollack) have tried to understand how certain political systems and
societies are more or less likely to select leaders who support conflict. What kind of leaders (or more specifically,
which kind of leader personalities) are most prone to war-making? What kinds of political systems (or at least
political arraignments) are most susceptible to putting conflict-inclined leaders into a position where they cause
wars?
What are the core assumptions of “realism” about the nature of the international system (review the reading from
Waltz at the beginning of the unit and see Mearsheimer’s side of the debate with Zbigniew Brzezinski)? What is
anarchy, and why does it produce security dilemmas and thus conflict?
How do different “balances of power” in the international system impact the propensity for war? Why might it not be
a safer world if there are lots of strong countries rather than just one? When is the international system least prone
to conflict, and when it is least stable? Why does the rise of a new regional power or the decline of a global hegemon
(a single dominant global power) usually lead to conflict no matter who is in control of the involved governments?
John Mearsheimer applies to core assumptions of realism to make the argument that the US can and most likely will
act more like “Godzilla” than “Bambi” in dealing with an ever-more wealthy and powerful China. Why does he, like
many realists, believe that the US and China will likely end up in a military confrontation even if both would prefer to
avoid it?