How democracy was achieved
A review of Roger Congleton, Perfecting Parliament: Constitutional Reform and the
Origins of Western Democracy, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011, pp. 658
George Tridimas*
University of Ulster, School of Economics
Newtownabbey, Co. Antrim, BT37 0QB, UK
Abstract
In ‘Perfecting Parliament’ Roger Congleton applies the rational choice framework to explain
two attributes of the democratization of the West from the medieval times to the early
twentieth century, first the shift of policy making authority from the king to the parliament
and second the extension of voting rights to previously disenfranchised groups of the
population. This review essay sets out the themes of the book, and relates the book to the
democratization of classical Athens and democratization from the last quarter of the 20th
century.
JEL Classification:
Key words:
D7 N4
Democracy, Democratization, Ancient Athens, Constitutional exchange;
Franchise extension; Democracy and development
*Tel: +44 (0) 28 90368273, fax: + 44(0) 28 0366847, e-mail: G.Tridimas@ulster.ac.uk
How democracy was achieved
You can never have a revolution to establish a democracy. You must
have a democracy in order to have a revolution
(G.K.Chesterton, Tremendous Trifles, 1909)
1.
Introduction
In modern free societies, democracy is the basis of policymaking and law enforcement. In the
current political climate, politicians always profess to act democratically. Even in autocratic
regimes, rulers often feel obliged to make claims that citizens of their countries are not denied
democratic freedoms. However, if we take a long view of history and judge the political lives
of our ancestors by modern standards, autocracy, that is, absence of rule by the people, was
the norm. It has only been in the last two hundred years that people in Western Europe, the
United States, Canada, Australia and Japan, collectively known as “the West”, have come to
live under regimes where those who govern do so after winning competitive elections. Also
political liberalization during the 19th and early 20th centuries coincided with unprecedented
economic growth that vastly improved the well-being of the same people who experienced
democratic politics. However, the advance of democracy has not been smooth; the 20th
century inter-war period witnessed a reverse to authoritarianism, and, despite the progress to
democracy after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, great swathes of humanity
remain ruled by autocrats.
Roger Congleton offers illuminating answers to the question of how liberal democracy arose.
In scholarship that combines economic theory, political science and history, he builds a
theory of constitutional negotiation, which he uses to explain the transformation of king–
dominated medieval government to modern liberal parliamentary democracy as it prevailed
in the early 20th century. He divides the democratization of the West into two fundamental
elements: first, the shift of policy making authority from the king to the parliament; second,
the extension of voting rights to previously disenfranchised groups of the population, so that
the parliament came to represent the citizenry rather than the aristocratic elites. He shows that
the two moves were generated by mechanisms that operated independently of one other and
constructs a systematic account of how the shift to democracy was accomplished.
Such arguments and related hypotheses will surely be discussed at length and will be tested
empirically for a long time to come. In the present essay, after reviewing Congleton’s theory
of how the West democratized (section 2), I shall also investigate how, if at all, the theory fits
1
the introduction of democracy in ancient Athens (section 3) and is consistent with (section 4)
the recent democratic transition, that is, democratization before and after the time period
covered by his book. In section 5 I offer some concluding comments.
2.
Congleton’s theory of the democratic transformation
The book is in three parts, namely, formal economic theory, chapters 2 – 8; a constitutional,
political and economic history account, chapters 9 – 18; and a statistical-evidence part with a
social-science overview, Chapters 19 – 20. The first part weaves together previously
published work of Congleton to present a political-economy explanation of the existence and
architecture of territorial governments.
Chapters 2 – 4 show that such governments are based on the “king and council” template,
remain relative stable over time, and display institutional conservatism. In the king-andcouncil scheme, responsibilities for deciding policies are divided between a single person, the
king (or chief executive) and a committee or council that is the progenitor of the modern
parliament and makes important decisions by voting, and tends to be governed by rules rather
than making arbitrary decisions.
Chapter 5 observes that the authority to make policy is multi-dimensional, because decisions
on different policy issues are separable, and control of policy can be divided between the king
and the originally aristocratic parliament. The initial assignments of policymaking authority
are regarded as “political property rights”. When authority is shifted among policymakers, a
“market for power” is created through which policymaking and procedures for selecting
policy makers can be peacefully and lawfully reformed. Just as trade in ordinary markets
results in mutual benefits for the trading parties, so do constitutional bargains that divide
power over policy making. When technology changes, ideology shifts, external threats
beckon, or genetic shocks occur (a new sovereign with talents and tastes different from those
of his predecessor ascends to the throne), mutually beneficial trades in policymaking
authority between the king and the parliament take place. Using a spatial decision framework,
Chapter 6 develops a model of constitution bargains where the king may trade parliament’s
approval for higher revenue for the royal household in exchange for more parliamentary
authority (veto power to agenda setting) in other policy areas.
2
Chapters 7 and 8 examine the extension of the franchise, the second component of
democratization. Suffrage laws for selecting political representatives are remarkably stable
for a simple reason: At any point in time, other things being equal, the median–decisive voter
is satisfied with the existing law defining voting rights, for it allows him to be pivotal in
determining policy. Similarly, those elected to office are reluctant to change the parameters
of a system that has brought them the benefits of office. When the ideological norms held by
the median voter shift in favour of extending the right to vote, widespread expansion of
suffrage follows. Such changes in norms occurred as a result of personal experiences,
inspiration from new ideas, and convictions of those who were already enfranchised.
Furthermore, in practice, the cost of organizing interest groups fell with industrialization and
the increase in urbanization. Campaigns for change were then orchestrated by interest groups
pursuing franchise reform, by political groups expecting to gain the support of newly
enfranchised voters, and industrialists and workers who were under-represented in the
medieval parliaments. In particular, following the industrial revolution, workers could
bargain for voting rights in exchange for industrial peace and a broader tax base.
Chapter 9 – 12 of Part II describe how from the 18th century onwards western European
societies became more secular (even though the population continued to be deeply religious)
and more liberal as a result of discoveries of new lands, technological changes that increased
the efficient scale of production, trade expansion, greater scientific knowledge, and wider
consumer choice. These chapters also document the ascent of liberal ideas about limited
government, tolerance, natural rights, equality before the law, and gradual rejection of the
importance of birth privileges. Taking full advantage of technological progress was possible
after reforming medieval laws and regulations controlling economic and political life.
Economic and political reforms did not occur spontaneously or through revolution but
through formal changes in the law that reflected changes in political and legal theories and
the economic interests of those with the authority to reform long-standing laws. Restrictions
on farmland ownership were liberalised, as were internal and external trade, slavery was
abolished, publicly funded education was introduced, and suffrage was extended. To some
extent, the latter came as a result of economic growth that allowed more citizens to satisfy
wealth and tax payments qualifications; but more importantly it came as the result of
ideological shifts and pragmatic considerations by liberal politicians who expected a larger
number of supporters from newly qualified middle-class voters. Over the course of the 19th
century, policymaking authority gradually shifted away from the aristocratic chamber of
3
parliament towards the elected chamber, as the cumulative result of a series of minor liberal
reforms that reduced the control of the sovereign. At the same time, new debates emerged
regarding qualifications for voting, size of voting districts, voting rules, partisan interests,
weighted voting, and women’s suffrage.
Chapters 12–18 of the historical narrative chart the constitutional histories of three
contemporary constitutional monarchies, the UK, Sweden and the Netherlands, and three
republics Germany, Japan and USA. Despite obvious and significant differences, the
constitutional developments of the six countries share several common trends that fit well the
hypotheses advanced in the first part of the book. In all countries, the fabric of the king-andcouncil template was retained, parliaments gradually acquired more control over policy
making (as a result of opportunistic bargaining between the parliaments and the sovereigns),
and the right to vote was slowly extended from a very small percentage of the population to
what is now known as universal suffrage. In England, starting with the Magna Charta of
1215, the parliament became the dominant institution well before universal suffrage was
obtained. In Germany, on the contrary, suffrage expanded more rapidly than power shifted to
parliament, while with the World War I defeat hereditary monarchy was abolished and a
republic was established, which was subsequently overthrown by the chancellorship of
Adolph Hitler in 1933. Constitutional reform in the Netherlands took the form of moving
from the republic of the provinces (1581) to kingdom (1815) and then gradually to
parliamentary democracy. Japanese political liberalisation started in earnest towards the end
of the 19th century but parliamentary democracy ended in the 1930s after a resurgence of
conservatism and domestic political violence. Industrialization was a catalyst for the
transition to liberal reform in the European countries but not for the USA, where
liberalisation of colonial governments preceded the 1776 war of independence from Britain.
As a corollary, the case studies show that constitutional reform towards parliamentary
democracy was neither an entirely European phenomenon nor irreversible once started.
Chapter 19 of Part III presents statistical evidence supporting the validity of the theoretical
model of constitutional reform developed in Part I. Although the regression equations are not
structural equations of the models studied, they are motivated and informed by the analytical
framework developed. The chapter first discusses the problems of measuring economic,
institutional, and political variables during the 19th century; it then plots several diagrams
correlating the time profile of real per capita GDP and political variables; finally, it reports
4
Granger-type causality tests. It is found that causality between economic growth and
democratic liberalization is bidirectional as predicted by the theoretical analysis. Congleton
concludes that the political and economic ‘revolutions’ of the 19th century were not
revolutions (in the sense of a single abrupt break from the past), but the consequence of a
series of reforms, and that constitutional and economic liberalisation are jointly determined
rather than causally related.
Chapter 20 compares and contrasts the theory of constitutional bargains developed in the
book with other theories of the rise of western democracy, and in particular, “big-bang”
approaches, in which democratic governance emerges as a result of a violent revolution or
alternatively a peaceful constitutional convention (or some combination of the two), and
evolutionary or reform theories, in which political developments are one of many areas of
change through time. Contrary to popular myths and romantic views of historical episodes, it
was not revolutions that established contemporary democracy and representative government.
Revolutions, which more often than not are accompanied by widespread violence, do not lead
to democratic reforms, since successful revolutionary leaders are more likely to keep control
and continue the revolutionary organization’s hierarchical decision making, secrecy, and
discipline, rather than grant voting rights. Congleton’s analysis differs from other economic
accounts by emphasising the role of both economic interests and liberal ideologies, with
interest groups organized around narrow liberal ideas in education, trade and voting rights
instrumental in a long series of reforms that produced liberal democracies and open economic
systems.
Congleton’s book is a huge intellectual enterprise covering vast territories of research carried
out with rigour and gusto. Drawing on the familiar spatial decision making framework, he
offers an innovative model of the market for power over budgets and public policies to
explain how constitutional reforms are adopted. His modelling of franchise extension stresses
the importance of ideological objectives and the reduction of the cost of organizing political
interest groups that are able to push for the realization of their objectives. His case studies of
comparative constitutional histories along with his empirical results shed light on the debate
surrounding the link between development and democracy. Some further discussion of
Congleton’s hypotheses is warranted.
5
Empirical work has confirmed the casual observation that democracy and development are
positively correlated. Research has investigated how factors such as size of real per capita
income, education, ethnic fractionalization, hierarchical state religions, trade openness,
income inequality, legacy of institutions established by colonial powers, legal origins
(whether dominated by common law or civil law systems), geography (which includes nonhuman factors such as climate, soil fertility, disease and mineral wealth), trust, and
democracy are related. There is, however, controversy about causality. Two opposing views
have been expressed.
The modernization, or democratic transition, theory1 claims that political development in the
long run is a consequence of overall development. Economic development is driven by higher
production volumes, which also generate more complex transactions, and, as income
increases, so does demand for democracy, urbanization, education and other attributes of
modernity such as administrative efficiency, transparency and so on. Neither the economy
nor the society can any longer be run by the edicts of autocratic rulers and democracy is
established.
On the other hand, the primacy of institutions view2 argues that both income and democracy
are determined by political institutions that structure power relations. Countries that choose
different institutions at different “critical junctures” travel along different long-run paths of
economic and political development.3
Like the primacy of institutions view, Congleton treats institutions that divide authority about
policymaking as endogenous, that is, they are chosen by rational actors. In his statistical work
1
This is typically associated with Lipset (1959); for recent discussion and empirical results
see amongst others Barro (1999), Borooah and Paldam (2007), Paldam and Gundlach (2008) and
(2009), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008).
2
The origins of this view can be found in North (1981); for a full formal account and
econometric investigation see Acemoglu et al (2001), Rodrik et al. (2004), Acemoglu et al. (2005),
who also offer a comparative review, and Acemoglu et al. (2008).
3
Przeworski and Limongi (1997) find that the level of economic development does not affect
the probability of transitions to democracy but high income makes democratic regimes more stable.
However, the validity of that conclusion was challenged by Boix and Stokes (2003) who found that
economic development increases the probability that a country will undergo a transition to democracy
More generally, Przeworski (2005) doubts whether existing theoretical models can identify the
mechanisms that give rise to democracy – instead he is concerned with the question of whether
democracies can survive once they are established. See also Cheibub et al (2010) for an insightful
discussion in favour of a minimalist classification of democracy – dictatorship and critique of
measures of democracy used in empirical studies.
6
he does not undertake a detailed multiple regression analysis of the kind carried out by the
empirical research. Instead, he runs temporal causality tests for five of the countries
investigated (Japan is left out because of lack of data) with mid-19th to early 20th century data,
and concludes that democracy and income are jointly determined. This finding indicates that
economic and political liberalization are the outcome of other similar variables and is
consistent with his fundamental hypothesis that “both are induced by trends in technology
and ideological developments that produce new constitutional gains from exchange and
compromise” (p.587), an argument further supported by the narrative of each country studied.
Congleton’s argument that political change and liberalization came about as the outcome of
constitutional negotiations, and was gradual and peaceful, goes against that of Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000) that the elites extended suffrage rights to the disenfranchised poor majority
because that was the only credible way to redistribute wealth and hold back the threat of
revolution.4 On this account and despite several differences, Congleton’s focus on negotiation
is closer to the spirit of explanations of franchise extension that call attention to peaceful
political exchanges. Lizzeri and Persico (2004) emphasize trading voting rights for more
public goods and intra-elite divisions. Specifically, an external economic shock causes
divergent interests within the elite and drives part of the enfranchised elite to extend the
franchise voluntarily to previously disenfranchised groups in order to increase the provision
of public goods that will directly increase its welfare.5 Engerman and Sokoloff (2006)
propose yet another explanation for the extension of the franchise in the Americas based on
factor endowments that does not involve revolutionary threats. Territories facing labour
scarcity, typically USA “frontier” states, could attract immigrants by offering them, amongst
other inducements, full political rights including the suffrage. On the other hand, in countries
with soil suitable for production in large plantations or abundant mineral wealth, as in Latin
4
That enfranchisement of the poor diminishes the risk of insurrection is an argument also
pursued by Justman and Gradstein (1999) and Conley and Temini (2001). Bourguigon and Verdier
(2000) study the complex dynamics of growth, inequality, franchise extension and investment in
human capital financed by taxation. In the vein of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Ellis and Fender
(2009) explore a growth model where the capital owning elite introduce democracy to ensure the
credibility of labour market reforms that aim to redistribute to the workers by paying them the
marginal product of labour.
5
For further elaboration of intra-elite division as a cause of franchise extension see Llavador
and Oxby (2005) and Jack and Lagunoff (2006). Munshi (forthcoming) explains franchise extension
without revolutionary threats or redistribution motives but through the presence of elite-pressure,
large rents from office and evenly-balanced partisan competition. Like Congleton, Hoperdahl (2011)
too emphasizes political exchanges and voluntary suffrage expansion.
7
America, small settler elites could more easily exploit the resources and deny political rights
to the large native populations.
3. Democratization in ancient Athens
I turn now to the democracy of ancient Athens, which has had an enduring impact on ideas of
liberty and political equality as well as on ensuing perennial dilemmas involving the latter
and order and social stability. Etymologically, the word democracy comes from the Greek
words ‘demos’, that is, people, and ‘kratos’, that is, rule. The political ideals of equality
among the citizens, liberty, respect for the law, and justice of modern democracy originate
from ancient Greece. However, the modern notion that human beings are individuals with
inviolable rights is not part of the ancient Greek thought. A citizen’s rights and obligations
followed from his capacity of being a member of the citizenry; they were public rights and
duties.6 In this context, the notion of protecting the individual against the might of the state
did not exist in ancient Greece.
Democracy was born in ancient Athens at the end of the sixth century BCE.7 Until then
Athens was ruled by the nine archons, drawn from the aristocratic families that often fought
against each other for supremacy, and the Council of Areopagus consisting of former
archons, that had veto powers, oversaw laws and magistrates, and conducted trials. In 594
BCE a large scale social and economic crisis was resolved by appointing Solon, an aristocrat,
as lawgiver. Solon introduced wide ranging political and economic reforms that included
making access to public office conditional on wealth rather than birth, formal accountability
of magistrates, and granting legal standing rights to all male Athenian citizens. Solon’s
dispensation was broken in 546 BCE when Peisistratus established himself as tyrant (extraconstitutional, one-man authority). The tyranny was overthrown in 510. A struggle for power
that followed was won by Cleisthenes, an aristocrat, who allied himself to the common
people – demos – by proposing constitutional reforms that would provide for wider political
rights. He then introduced a series of fundamental constitutional reforms, determining
citizenship rights and the powers of the assembly of citizens, which led to the foundation of
6
See Held (2006).
Historians have pieced together the fragmentary written and archeological evidence to
provide a coherent and detailed account of the emergence of the Athenian democracy and its
structures. For a recent account see amongst others Ober (2008) and Cartledge (2009); see also the
volume edited by Raaflaub et al. (2007) for a debate about the start and completion of the Athenian
democratic transformation.
7
8
democracy. The assembly of citizens, requiring a quorum of six thousand participants,
became the sovereign political body deciding on all important issues of public interest. All
Athenian men from the age of twenty years could participate, while those aged thirty and
above could be appointed to executive or judicial office. After listening to the speakers,
voting in the assembly took place by show of hands and decisions were taken by simple
majority. From 501 BCE, the assembly elected annually by show of hands the ten generals,
the commanders of the army and the navy, who along with a few treasury and religious
commissionaires were the only elected officials. From 487 BCE the nine archons were
selected by lot, while in 462 BCE the Areopagus lost its checking powers. A fully democratic
constitution was then functioning.8 In addition to its direct nature, it had several other
prominent characteristics. There were no political parties in the sense of organizations to
represent economic and social cleavages and espouse distinct ideological positions. The
courts played a significant political role in the sense of controlling the other organs of the
state. Perhaps more strikingly, a large number of public offices were filled by lot including
five hundred councilors responsible for the day-to-day administration and the preparation of
the assembly business, six thousand judges and another six hundred magistrates. Being a
direct democracy, it also defied modern classifications on the parliamentary – presidential
scale. Recent research has revealed that the Athenian democratization was associated with
growing economic prosperity, urbanization was high, and wealth was distributed relatively
equitably.9
In sum, the ancient Athenian democracy differs from the modern western variant in that it
was direct and not representative, made decisions by simple majority, had no political parties,
and delegated responsibilities to officials appointed by sortition. In Tridimas (2011a), I
explain how the above institutions worked in tandem, forming an internally consistent
framework such that it may not have been possible for any one of them to have functioned
without the existence of the rest. Contrasting the parliamentarian and the Athenian
democracy, Manin (1997) points out that the former is predicated on citizens having an equal
right to consent to government, while the Athenian democracy not only recognized the latter
but also promoted equality of the right to occupy office. Coercive government is legitimized
8
By the mid-5th century, pay for those serving in public office had been introduced. In
comparison, the British equivalent evolution was considerably slower as property qualifications for
the British MPs were scrapped in 1858 and pay was introduced in 1912.
9
See Morris (2004) and Ober (2010).
9
when citizens agree to be bound by the rules imposed by those in office. Equal voting rights
(irrespective of one’s birth, income, education, or gender) in elections to choose government
manifests equality of citizens to give their consent and therefore confer legitimacy to those
elected to office.10 The 19th and 20th century conflicts for suffrage extension analyzed by
Congleton and the literature he surveys describe fights for achieving such political equality.
A similar fight took place in ancient Athens. Franchise extension took place gradually
throughout the sixth century when aristocratic rule by birthright was replaced with rule by the
wealthy (Solon’s reforms), and eventually with rule by the people irrespective of wealth
(Cleisthenes’ democracy).11 However, the Athenians restricted voting rights to men only; but
they went one step further than equality of voting rights for men by instituting equality of
opportunity to occupy office for all citizens, as manifested in the practice of sortition,12 which
lacks a modern equivalent.
The above description shows that despite the ideological and practical differences, there is a
remarkable similarity between the emergence of the Athenian democracy and the
parliamentary democracies described by Congleton. A form of king-and-council architecture
was present in ancient Athens and Congleton’s thesis on the gradual extension of the
franchise is applicable too. The democratic transformation of Athens, the political
emancipation of the demos and its eventual control over policymaking was accomplished in a
number of steps over a long period of time (594 – 462 BCE), with each reform building on
previous ones and with support by substantial parts of the earlier aristocracy, and despite the
occasional violence was peaceful. Nor was calling the assembly a revolutionary institutional
innovation: assemblies of warriors were held from the Archaic times (700 – 500 BCE) as
described in the Homeric poems. The new element was the transfer of decision making power
to the assembly (and the courts); that too took a while to be completed and was the product of
negotiations between the ruling aristocrats and the emerging demos, who provided the
hoplites for land defence, and the rowers for powering the navy, classes excluded from
10
However, in practice the interplay of the usual electoral laws based on plurality or
proportional representation formulas applied to constituencies of different size, may invalidate the
principle of vote equality.
11
Fleck and Hannsen (2004) offer a formal model of the extension of voting rights in ancient
Athens. Bitros and Karayiannis (2010) show how institutions and the moral norms of Athens were
instrumental in her economic success, while Pitsoulis (2011) discusses of the origin and adoption of
the majority rule.
12
For a review of the literature on sortition and the question of why a self-interested citizen
may appoint government officials by lot rather than elections, see Tridimas (2012).
10
decision making in earlier political dispensations. Equally, even though absence of
quantitative information does not permit an empirical investigation, historians affirm a link
between political liberalization and economic growth which is also manifested through the
famed architectural and cultural achievements of the Athenians. On this account, democracy
led to a revolution in living standards and attitudes. However, the analogies stop here. The
direct-democracy nature of ancient Athens implies that there is no strict analogue between the
gradual transfer of power from the king to the parliament analyzed by Congleton and ancient
Athens. Direct democracy meant that enfranchisement simultaneously shifted policymaking
authority from the aristocracy to the demos. We may then infer that Congleton’s theory of
constitutional bargaining and enfranchisement produces multiple institutional equilibria, the
Athenian democracy being one and the Western democracy being a different one.
How the Athenian democracy fell is a question still awaiting a satisfactory political-economy
explanation. The rise of Alexander’s Macedon in the fourth quarter of the 3rd century and the
military defeat of Athens in 322 BCE ended the democratic constitution, while it also gave
rise to theoretical writings favouring monarchy. (The reverse of) Congleton’s intuition may
be of use here: the Athenian democracy was not concurrent with major technological
breakthroughs or large scale industrialization. After Athens and before the imperial period,
the ancient Roman republic operated a number of democratic arrangements but never adopted
the notion of one-man one-vote, while it also had in place a variety of restrictions on political
participation based on wealth. Ideas in favour of democracy and against absolute rule
reappear with the Enlightenment and it is with scholars from that era that Congleton’s inquiry
starts.
4. Democratization after World War II
The constitutional evolution analyzed in ‘Perfecting Parliament’ ends in the 1930s. Further
democratization took place after the end of WWII when Germany, Italy and modern Greece
resumed democratic politics (but Central and East Europe turned communist) and in the
aftermath of decolonization from European powers. However, democratization stalled and
was even in reverse by the early 1960s. Indeed, consistent with Congleton’s injunction, and
despite the rhetoric, nationalist revolutionary leaders were more likely to fashion and preside
over despotic regimes rather than democracies. Democratic order took root only in India
(1947) and Israel (1948). A “third” wave of democratization swept Europe in the midseventies with, Portugal (1974), Greece (1974) and Spain (1976) shaking off military
11
dictatorships and adopting the parliamentary democracies analyzed by Congleton.
Interestingly, Portugal and Greece opted for a republican form of state 13, while Spain
established a constitutional monarchy. Political liberalization in Argentina (1983), Brazil
(1985), South Korea (1987) and Chile (1988) preceded the surge of democratization that
followed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of Communism. As a broad
generalization, Central and Eastern European countries made the transition to parliamentary
democracy rather rapidly and smoothly (Yugoslavia being an obvious exception). In the
nineties democracy seemed to be on an unstoppable advance in Latin America, Africa and
several parts of Asia. In the first decade of the 21st century, with the exceptions of autocracies
in the Middle East, communists in East Asia, and some African states, countries hold
elections and many countries ruled by illiberal governments only twenty years before are now
classified as democracies. Several countries previously torn by strife and civil war have
power-sharing arrangements based on proportional representation and respect for
minorities.14 The ‘Arab spring’ of 2011 that sees countries of the Maghreb getting rid of long
dictatorships raises expectations that democracy will prevail there too.
However, the ongoing wave of democratization differs from the democratization of the West
analyzed by Congleton. I discuss three key issues, namely, winning the argument against an
autocratic alternative, achieving democracy out of dictatorship rather than 18th century
hereditary monarchy, and finally establishing a functioning democracy.
The first obstacle to democratic convergence relates to the appeal of current nondemocratic
alternatives. Western liberal democracy as a system of governance is not unchallenged. The
Chinese model of economic growth, including amongst others components one-party rule,
emphasis of the paramount interests of the nation over the individual, selective use of
markets, a significant role for state enterprises and the importance of government in guiding
the economy, may be considered as an alluring option. From the mid-nineties, that system
delivered fast growing prosperity to the rising middle class of city-dwellers, and increased
China’s status as a global power. Further, the banking crisis, output contraction and sovereign
debt crisis that have befallen on the West since 2008 have sparked talk about the failure of
13
See Tridimas (2010) for a political economy examination of the 1974 Greek referendum
that abolished the monarchy.
14
Examples of varying success are amongst others Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon and Northern
Ireland. Tridimas (2011b) offers a public choice analysis of power-sharing arrangements based on
election outcome under proportional representation.
12
capitalism and boosted support for an expansive role of the state. The argument about the
superiority of non-democratic regimes in delivering high economic growth, drawn from the
conflictual and often fractious nature of democratic politics, is related to the debate on the
modernization vs institutions controversy mentioned above. However, the emphasis here is
on the comparative advantages of democracy and dictatorship for economic growth, that is,
how political institutions affect the rate of change of income rather than its level.15 It is first
important to recognize that there are several contemporary counterexamples of autocracies
from Africa, Asia and Latin America with meagre and indeed declining economic
performance. Arguably then, it may be more accurate to talk about “Chinese exceptionalism”.
Democrats would of course remain undeterred by such arguments not least because of the
value placed on democracy, that is, democracy and the associated freedoms are desirable per
se over and above their economic implications.16 However, if the authoritarian
exceptionalism secures long-lasting economic gains, it is legitimate to ask whether there is a
trade-off between democracy and economic growth. Congleton’s reply is reassuring for
democracy. He points out that during the 19th century there was no trade-off between liberal
politics and economic growth. Rather, the two complemented one another. 17
Establishing democracy from 20th century dictatorship differs from achieving democracy out
of 18th century hereditary monarchy. Traditional European monarchical rule was based on
government by birth right and deference to the ruling aristocratic class. Military dictatorship
relies on the backing of the armed forces while civilian dictatorship relies on the support of a
mass party, and both types operate repressive security apparatus. Succession in monarchies is
based on familial ties, a simple rule whose operation avoids costly contests for power. On the
contrary, dictatorships lack clear rules of succession. Rival claims may then be settled after
15
A large volume of work has developed debating the issue and often reporting conflicting
estimates; see Olson (1993), Przeworski and Limongi (1993), Perotti (1996), Wintrobe (1998),
Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) and Collier and Hoeffler (2009).
16
Furthermore, Bjørnskov et al. (2010) report that both economic and democratic political
institutions have a positive effect on happiness, where the latter effect is more pronounced in richer
countries.
17
Hillman (2007) argues that autocrats do not have an “encompassing interest” in economic
growth because their priority is the survival of their rule and security of office rents. The emergence
of a middle class associated with economic development will lead to demand for accountability and
honesty in government and political competition that would end autocratic rule. For the same reason
autocrats do not have the incentive to provide quality education or health care. On the contrary, they
encourage corruption because it redistributes income to public officials that are then expected to
support the regime.
13
violent and otherwise damaging conflicts. To avoid such problems the dictator may appoint a
successor. However, in doing so he faces the “successor’s dilemma”18: The sitting dictator
may be threatened by a designated successor who builds enough independent support to
ensure his succession against his rivals. However, if the designated successor fails to build a
power base, his rule will be at risk and so will the legacy of the sitting dictator. A further
complicating issue relates to the types of compromises struck to unseat a dictator.
Inducements like immunity from prosecution and safe passage away from the country may
hasten his exit but may violate notions of justice particularly for the victims of repression.
Congleton’s book attests that establishing democracy out of medieval aristocratic parliaments
was a long and slow process unfolding over several generations. On the other hand, transition
to democracy at the end of the 20th century was faster. In the first instance, unlike the 19th
century norm, the overthrow of a post 1974 dictatorship was followed by immediately
granting of universal suffrage rather than extending it gradually. Second, in comparison to the
gradual ascent of the power of the parliament at the expense of the king, the shift of policy
making authority from the dictator to the elected representatives took place in rapid steps
(although not necessarily on a single date). As with any catching-up, new comers to the
democratization process have the advantage that they can learn from the constitutional
experience of “early starters”, observe what political arrangements have worked in the past,
and adapt them to their own circumstances. Another significant difference is that the current
wave of democratization includes attempts to establish democracy by an external power, as in
the cases of the USA-led efforts to impose democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nevertheless,
their ambiguous outcomes are in accordance with Congleton’s implicit corollary that
democracy is the negotiated outcome of the actions of domestic players.19
The third challenge relates to adopting the rituals and trappings of democracy rather than
asserting its essence.20
That is, holding elections does not provide a guarantee of a
functioning democracy. Elections that are neither free nor fair, vote buying, refusal of
defeated incumbents to leave office, ethnic tensions, civil wars, and revolving plundering
governments make a mockery of the electoral process. Liberal democracy is concerned not
only with the representatives of the majority winning office, but with limiting abuses of
18
See Zhang (2011) for a detailed discussion with an application to communist China.
The post WWII democratization of Japan was also imposed by the USA, but it differs from
current attempts in that Japan is a homogeneous nation, had pre-war democratic experience and built
on pre-existing structures.
20
See also Lipset (1994) for a detailed survey of this and related points.
19
14
power by those in office. The latter requires the operation of checks and balances so that no
single state organ monopolizes power, and freedoms and rights are protected. Prominent
among those arrangements are separation of powers, bicameral legislatures, federal
structures, and independent judiciaries with the power to review the acts of other government
bodies. A number of empirical studies have shown that income and education correlate
significantly with democratization, while democratization is less likely to emerge in Muslim
countries as well as in oil producing countries.21 Such findings go a long way to explaining
why Central and Eastern European countries as well as Latin American countries were more
successful in their transition to democracy. In addition, having set full membership of the
European Union as the final destination of their transition, Central and Eastern European
countries had a clear objective of the political and economic transformation required and the
standards to be achieved. On the other hand, countries lacking such objectives may be less
fervent supporters of democratic reform. It is then advisable to be cautious about the speed
and depth of the current transitions of Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. The democratic
transformation may take some time to complete as the various actors learn to negotiate and
compromise.
5. Conclusions
In answering the question of how the western democracy arose out of aristocratic oligarchy,
Roger Congleton has served an intellectual feast. He augments the standard spatial decision
framework to present an innovative model of constitutional bargaining between the king and
the parliament that is then used to explain how political authority shifts. He highlights the
role of ideological objectives and the decreasing costs of organizing interest groups to explain
franchise extension. He subsequently embarks on a commanding historical narrative of
comparative constitutional developments. He finally contributes to the empirical literature on
the nexus between economic development and democratization. To recap, his propositions
are that democratic governance in the West came about gradually through a series of
parliamentary and electoral reforms that were the result of negotiations, and that the
economic and constitutional liberalization of the 19th century were interdependent,
determined by the same variables, although through different processes. The shift to liberal
21
See amongst others Borooah and Paldam (2007), Persson and Tabellini (2007),
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) and Gundlach and Paldam (2009). The opposing effects of
natural resource abundance on regime stability are studied by Bjorvatn and Naghavi (2011): A
dictator in a country rich in natural resources may be challenged by rival rent-seekers destabilizing the
regime, but may also have enough revenue to buy out opposition groups increasing stability.
15
democracy consisted of a long series of small, largely peaceful, steps that unfolded together
with important economic and ideological changes, and took a long time to complete. The
book challenges conventionally held views of the emergence of western democracy:
“Sudden radical breaks with the past are not necessary for democracy to emerge from
medieval parliamentary regimes, nor are class consciousness or civil wars necessary
preconditions for liberal reform. Institutional flexibility, bargaining, and liberal
interests are sufficient. The models suggest that peaceful lawful constitutional reforms
are possible, and parliamentary democracy can emerge gradually as a series of
constitutional reforms are adopted.” (p. 182)
Amongst other issues, one expects that several more studies will be published in the years to
come to analyze some of the traditional Western democracies left out of the book, with
France being an obvious candidate. In the meantime, taking stock from Congleton’s analysis,
I have gone back to the birth of democracy to relate Congleton’s analysis and intuition to
aspects of the emergence of the Athenian democracy, the predecessor and intellectual
ancestor of modern democracy, and highlighted some stark differences from the period and
institutions that motivated Congleton’s ideas. Congleton’s framework also offers insightful
pointers for reflection on the expansion of democracy beyond the West.
Acknowledgments
I wish to thank Arye Hillman for conversations that helped shape my thoughts on the issues discussed
in this paper.
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