1
WHEN DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INTERMESH:
SUBORDINATED PUBLICS’ FACTIONAL SUPPORT WITHIN LAYERED POWER
STRUCTURES
Felicia Pratto, University of Connecticut
Jim Sidanius, Harvard University
Fouad Bou Zeineddine, University of Connecticut
Nour Kteily, Harvard University
Shana Levin, Claremont-McKenna College
In press, 2013, Foreign Policy Analysis
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Abstract
Using social dominance theory and structural balance theory to analyze the political and
psychological perspectives of subordinated peoples, we argue that struggles between dominant
and subordinated polities are embedded in layered power structures. In such contexts, it is
important to examine publics’ political desires and interests in relation to their political elites’
positions or choices of political tactics and allegiances. To illustrate these arguments, we used
random urban samples surveyed in March, 2010 to examine Lebanese and Syrian citizens’
favorability toward their governments and Hezbollah (a quasi-government faction with
significant relations to the governments of Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and the U.S.). As theorized,
citizens’ favorability depended on a) how much they view their government as providing
services for them, b) opposition to general group dominance, c) opposition to U. S. oppression,
and d) their governments’ alignments vis-à-vis the U.S. Implications for political psychology and
international relations theory are discussed.
Authors’ Note. This research was presented at the 2011 annual scientific meeting of the
International Society for Political Psychology, Istanbul. We thank Joseph R. de Rivera, Diala
Hawi, Colin W. Leach, Reem Saab, and Jennifer Sterling-Folker for their comments on previous
drafts of the paper. This research received funding from Harvard University. Correspondence
concerning the article should be directed to Felicia Pratto, Department of Psychology, University
of Connecticut, 406 Babbidge Road, Storrs, CT 06269-1020; felicia.pratto@uconn.edu.
Running Head: Subordinated politics
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WHEN DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INTERMESH:
SUBORDINATED PUBLICS’ FACTIONAL SUPPORT WITHIN LAYERED POWER
STRUCTURES
In a handful of powerful sovereign nations such as the U.K. and the U.S., the political
coalitions that vie for citizens’ support are largely domestic and autonomous. That is, political
parties are indigenous to those nation-states, and may be banned from receiving material or other
support from outside their nations. This situation, however, does not characterize much of the
world, or even much of the history of nations. For example, during the (U.S.) American
Revolution, the opposing sides were provided with financial, materiél, strategic, and ideological
support from France, Britain, the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois Nations) and other Native
Americans, and other colonies. Further, that revolution did not equally serve the elite, non-elite,
and oppressed members of the nascent American society, in large part because of the alliances
between internal political factions and external ones (cf. Zinn 1980). More recently, the U.S.
armament of the Taliban to drive the Soviets from Afghanistan, and U.S. support for the Contras
to defeat the socialist Sandinistas in Nicaragua are two cases in which external political entities
provided significant military, financial, and ideological support to sides engaged in domestic
power struggles (see Pilisuk and Zazzi 2006 for other examples). Liberation movements provide
cross-border intellectual support to one another as well (e.g., Alquwaizani 2011). These
examples problematize the traditional assumptions (Marsh, Jennings, Croft, Wincott, and Buller
1999) that domestic political contests and international relations are separate, that the only
significant power struggles are those among the ‘great powers’ or ‘inter-core’ international
relations (as in Waltz 2010, Ikenberry 2011), and that dominant polities are necessary for the
stability of the world order (e.g., Katzenstein Keohane and Krasner 1998). Rather, many
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contemporary political conflicts must be understood as stemming jointly from the power
struggles between political factions within nations and those factions’ intertwined relations to
external political entities, who may themselves be engaged in a power struggle (e.g., Fakhoury
2011; Hinnebusch 2002; Starr 1994).
In other words, many contemporary political dynamics can have multiple simultaneous
sources of influence at work: a) “domestic” contests between more and less powerful groups or
elites and non-elites within nations or regions, b) “liberation” contests in which client states and
non-state factions struggle for self-determination with superpowers and former colonizers, c)
support of domestic factions from external entities such as other political organizations, other
governments, or corporations, and d) contests between external hegemonic powers. As such, a
number of counter-dominance movements can be viewed simultaneously as a) indigenous
struggles for self-determination and economic betterment of non-elites, b) significantly inspired
by and supported by “foreign” factions, and c) responses to or involvement by proxy in the larger
geo-political hegemony in which developed nations have dominated and fought over “Third
World” nations (e.g., Henley 1995; Suso 2010). Analyses of contemporary politics, especially in
the developing world, must acknowledge that political factions are likely to have multiple
potential roles, goals, and audiences because they are situated in a layered power structure.
To fully understand such political dynamics, the beliefs and attitudes of the people in the
center of such complex power-struggle structures cannot be overlooked, for even the most brutal
dictatorial regime relies on the support of at least some of the populace (Geddes, 2005; Kinne,
2005). Collective (public) motivations, interests, norms, perceptions and beliefs, power, and
engagement are all elements of the popular influence on foreign policy-making (e.g., Entman
2004, 13). Social psychology is well suited for studying these components of public support,
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because it focuses on psychological characteristics that are inherently social and binding for a
group, such as identity, normative frameworks, and shared power environments (e.g., Goldgeier
and Tetlock, 2011). In fact, elite mobilization of constituents and constituents’ participation in
collective action have been shown to depend on the motivations, sense of efficacy, norms, goals,
expected outcomes, and moral narratives that the public holds or is positioned by elites to hold
(Azzi, 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Pruitt and Kim 2004; Chong and Druckman, 2007).
An accounting of popular influence on foreign policy is especially important for nations
under the influence of “core” nations (the so-called “periphery”), because for them, there is no
clear distinction between domestic and international politics. For low power nations, foreign
policy involves dealing with and being dependent on menacing dominant nations (e.g., Goldgeier
and McFaul, 1992), a situation quite distinct from that of “core” actors. This makes foreign
policy-making critical to the everyday citizen and to intra- and non- state factions, more so than
in the politics of highly powerful nations.
Just as understanding international relations (IR) by considering only “great powers” and
their elites is inadequate, so too is simply documenting public opinion without understanding
where support for various political factions comes from; that is, what needs, interests, and desires
supporters of particular factions hope to fulfill with their allegiance. This sometimes-forgotten
public’s political factional preferences can be expected to reflect both their domestic concerns,
such as whether their government or local factions provide opportunities, justice, rights, and
security, and how such parties are situated in the international balances of power. For example,
Lebanese and Syrian citizens’ support for their own governments and regional political factions
such as Hezbollah may be influenced proximally by perceptions that the organizations provide
physical and economic security. Support for domestic and regional political factions may also be
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influenced more distally by those factions’ perceived relations with external political actors such
as Russia, Iran, the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Citizens’ support or opposition to such
factions in turn influences geopolitics. Understanding the situated psychology behind the
political factional preferences of people living in countries enmeshed in such international webs
is an important element of both domestic and international politics. In the next section, we
consider the psychological situation of subordinated peoples and what goals they have before
examining our specific case.
Counter-Dominance Desires among Oppressed Peoples
For citizens in this layered power structure, their support of political factions may be
especially informed by their psychological orientation toward group-based dominance. Such
orientations stem from their position in the group hierarchy (e.g., Pratto Sidanius Stallworth and
Malle 1994). As social dominance theory predicts, there is empirical evidence around the world
that people in subordinated group positions, such as oppressed ethnic, racial, or religious groups
and women, reject group hegemony more than people in dominant group positions (Lee Pratto
and Johnson 2011; Pratto Sidanius and Levin, 2006; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Likewise, some
studies show that members of lower economic classes reject group dominance more than
members of middle and upper economic classes (Pratto et al. 1994; Pratto and Stewart 2012).
From the standpoint of the subordinated, we can understand how some oppressed people
adopt a “liberation” psychology resisting not only domestic oppression (e.g., Montiel and
Rodriguez 2009) but also the international power dynamics that produce oppressive environs.
Like other people, subordinated people are aware of their own survival needs (e.g., Braizat 2007;
Davies and Pro Poor Centre 2007). Their experience of struggling to meet those needs in the face
of the exclusionary and discriminatory practices and policies of group dominance systems help
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them to both recognize power inequality and to reject ideologies and frames that would
legitimize it (e.g., Pratto 1999; Sidanius Henry Pratto and Levin 2004; Pratto et al. 2006). Group
dominance systems also tend to segregate dominant and subordinate groups and to emphasize the
differentness and un-deservingness of subordinates (e.g., Pratto and Stewart 2012). This has an
important socio-political consequence that is contrary to group dominance, namely, awareness of
subordinate social identity (e.g., Hartmann Gerteis and Croll 2009) and of the discrimination that
accompanies it (e.g., Operario and Fiske 2001). When subordinated groups recognize their
subordinate identity and its contrast to the reputation and material power position of dominant
groups, they recognize the injustice of the denial of their group’s needs and rights (Major, 1994).
Considering how their group position compares to that of superior groups increases subordinated
people’s identification with and commitment to their own group (Ouwerkerk and Ellemers,
2002) and makes them more likely to reject dominant ideologies that disempower and obfuscate
their groups’ needs (e.g., Lee et al. 2011). In short, group-dominance systems have inherent
structural qualities, including power-linked identities, dominant ideologies, and group inequality,
that provoke psychological processes such as social comparison, identity salience, and rejection
of dominant ideologies among subordinated groups. Such psychological processes can lead
people in subordinated situations to develop liberation or counter-dominant psychologies.
Balance Theory
We draw upon one other general social-psychological theory to understand the attitudes
citizens in multi-layered power structures may hold toward political factions, namely, balance
theory (Heider 1946). Our explication of social dominance theory suggests that citizens of
subordinated (“periphery”) nations may have a mostly negative orientation towards dominant
(“core”) nations. For example, surveys of Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, Indonesia, and
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Pakistan have repeatedly shown near consensual disapproval of U.S. foreign policy toward
Muslim and Arab nations, toward U.S. relations to Israel and Palestine, and of U.S. dominance
over world affairs and lack of attention to Arabs’ and Muslims’ interests (e.g., Kohut 2005; Wike
and Poushter 2010; Pew Global Attitudes Project 2011). When citizens of a subordinated nation
have negative orientations towards a “core” nation, if the “core” nation has a positive
relationship to a given domestic political faction, balance theory implies that citizens will have a
negative orientation towards the faction. Likewise, if citizens have a negative orientation towards
a “core” nation and the domestic political faction also has a negative orientation towards the
“core” nation, balance theory predicts that citizens will have a positive orientation towards the
faction. Should relations between the attitude objects change, citizens’ political orientations and
actions are also likely to change (e.g., Visser 1994). Should a faction have a complex or
ambivalent relationship to a “core” nation, balance theory implies that citizens’ orientations
towards the faction will also be complex or ambivalent (Heider 1946). Such ambivalence may
weaken the strength of attitudes predicted by balance theory. To summarize, for citizens in
subordinated nations who live in layered power structures, we posit that their preferences for
domestic political actors may be informed by their views of how well those actors help them
meet their basic needs, by those actors’ external alliances with hegemonic nations, as well as
citizens’ own tolerance or intolerance of group dominance. To illustrate our theoretical
argument, we compared Lebanese and Syrian citizens’ favorability toward their governments,
because at the time of our study, the governments differed substantially in how opposed they
were perceived to be towards the U.S. We also measured their favorability toward Hezbollah, a
significant political actor which has positioned itself as a defender of Arabs against Israeli and
U.S. hegemony. To understand whether counter-dominance motives influence attitudes towards
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these political actors, we measured citizens’ general orientation toward group dominance and
their concerns about U.S. hegemony.
Lebanese and Syrian Politics
Before explaining our predictions, we summarize the political contexts of Lebanese and
Syrians. Although Syria and Lebanon share a long cultural and political history, their 20th
century treatment by Western colonial powers differs, and indeed this is partly what led to their
division by the West into separate states (Tibawi 1969, 329-337). For over four decades,
Lebanon has been repeatedly interfered with, invaded, and bombed by the U.S. and its ally, Israel
(e.g., Richman 1991). Thus, a significant portion of Lebanese find U.S. influence and/or
interference reprehensible, and any hints of allegiance by their government to the U.S. as
unacceptable (e.g., El-Husseini 2010). This ‘rejectionist’ camp however faces a different sector
of society that has historically viewed themselves as more Western-oriented than other Arabs are
(e.g., Levin Henry Pratto and Sidanius 2003; Sidanius et al. 2004) and have typically derived
political (or military) support from the West, including the U.S. Although in previous decades
these camps have split along sectarian lines, more recently, the ideological divisions do not map
well to religious sects. Where levels of external intervention and domestic fragmentation are
high, the central government of a nation is likely to be lacking in legitimacy and strength
(Schock 1996). This has certainly been the case in Lebanon, as evidenced by the succession of
ephemeral coalition governments since 2005 (see also Failed States Index ratings for Lebanon,
Fund for Peace 2010).
At the time of our study in March, 2010, the Lebanese government was divided between
the “March 14” and “March 8” coalitions, with a parallel divide in the populace reflecting each
camps’ stance towards the U.S. and its influence (see top panel of Figure 1). Applying balance
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theory to each of the agents, each small triad is balanced (e.g., March 14 and March 8 camps
oppose one another, with March 14 tolerating the U.S. and March 8 rejecting the U.S.), but all of
the larger triads (e.g., March 14 coalition’s governing faction, March 14 supporters, and March 8
supporters) contain ambivalence, as shown on the diagonals in Figure 1 (top). Thus, the only
balanced, and therefore, stable, relationships are predicated on Lebanese internal divisions. By
implication, U.S. political influence in the region contributes to divisions within Lebanon, and
such divisions in turn hamper the legitimacy and effectiveness of Lebanese governments in the
eyes of Lebanese citizens.
During the past four decades, Syria was often allied with enemies of the U.S., including
U.S.S.R. and Iran, and has opposed U.S. influence in the region far more than Lebanese
governments have (e.g., Colombo, 2011; Samii 2008). The strong Syrian government depends on
the control of the military and internal security and intelligence agencies, which police citizens’
speech and enforce displays of approval of the government (e.g., Wedeen 1999). As the Syrian
government positions itself as rejecting the U.S. (El-Husseini 2010), which we expect is
compatible with citizens’ views of the U.S., Syrians can approve of their government’s policies
regarding U.S. influence (see bottom panel of Figure 1). Further, the compatible stance that the
Syrian government and Hezbollah take toward the U.S. and toward each other, enables Syrian
citizens’ rejection of the U.S. to lend favorability to both their government and Hezbollah (see
bottom panel of Figure 1).
Given these Lebanese and Syrian relations with the U.S., especially prior to the 2011
Syrian rebellion when the present data were collected, one would expect Syrians to mistrust the
U.S. and its influence more than Lebanese on average. However, citizens in both nations could
be expected to dislike their own governments to the extent these governments were perceived to
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endorse and appease the U.S. In this sense, citizens’ favorability towards their domestic
government is also an international issue. Using balance theory structurally to consider citizens,
domestic factions, regional factions, and “core” powers can identify likely political divisions and
instability across all levels.
Hezbollah is a significant, if complex, political actor in the Levant. One could argue that
Hezbollah was born of a kind of reactive nationalism (Henley, 1995) – a regional nationalism in
response to colonialism, and a response to social and economic inequality between Shi’a and
other Muslims within the Arab subordinate relation to Israel and the U.S. (Salamey and Pearson,
2007). Hezbollah’s support thus also connects inextricably to both the domestic and international
domains.
Hezbollah can be factually characterized in multiple ways (Arsan 2006; El-Husseini
2010; Norton, 2000). Hezbollah is simultaneously a large non-governmental provider of social
and religious services within Lebanon, a para-military organization, and a significant party bloc
within Lebanon’s democratically elected parliament (e.g., Early 2006). Hezbollah’s social
services include providing education, health clinics, support for war veterans and financial
assistance to the destitute in southern Lebanon (e.g., Flanigan and Abdel-Sadr 2009), and city
planning and neighborhood reconstruction in Beirut following the 2006 war with Israel (Fawaz
2009). The U.S. State Department classifies Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, and in part
because of Syria’s support of Hezbollah, also classifies Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism (U.S.
State Department 2008). Among numerous other anti-U.S. or anti-Israeli violent actions, as part
of the “July War” between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006, Hezbollah rocket-bombed northern
Israel and killed and captured Israeli soldiers. This war garnered considerable international and
regional attention for Hezbollah. Moreover, many Arabs viewed Hezbollah’s efficacy at getting
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Israel to abandon its occupation of southern Lebanon in 2000 as a significant means of restoring
Arab pride and respect (e.g., Norton 2000). Given Hezbollah’s military capabilities and control
of some areas of Lebanon (e.g., Burkholder 2006), the national Lebanese government does not
monopolize control of violence or territory. Although other sects also maintain militias and
function semi-autonomously from the government, Hezbollah is widely seen as having
substantial influence (e.g., Saad-Ghorayeb 2002). In fact, some view Hezbollah as functioning
as a quasi-government in that it has de facto control over territory, and provides infrastructure
(e.g., urban planning and reconstruction) and civic organization as well as social services and
security (e.g., Early 2006; Fawaz 2009). Hezbollah also enjoys popular support in the electorate.
At the time of our data collection, Hezbollah or its close allies held 11 of 30 Cabinet ministries,
enough to collapse the government by withdrawing, as it did in January, 2011.
Hezbollah’s anti-Israeli and anti-U.S. rhetoric and behavior may, at first glance, seem to
indicate a desire to harm dominants. The broader geo-political context, however, problematizes
such simplistic interpretations. This kind of speech and action is inherently connected to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Arabs’ perception of the U.S. bias toward Israel, and the U.S.maintained imbalance of power perceived between Israel and the Arab world (e.g., El-Husseini
2010). A different goal that is widely understood by Arab scholars is one of returning things to
balance, of providing Palestinians, and by extension, Arabs, with a viable face-saving sovereign
territory to re-establish the shattered Palestinian nation and ease the humiliation and oppression
of invasion and occupation (e.g., Early 2006; El-Husseini 2010). These motives are more
consistent with egalitarian resistance goals. Other rhetoric and political positioning, especially
coming out of Syria in recent decades, speaks of autonomy striving – accepting isolation,
sanctions, and marginalization rather than submitting to the dominant West (Hinnebusch 2005).
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Thus, to some segments of the Lebanese and Syrian publics, Hezbollah may be viewed as a
promoter of Arab pride and respect, a developer of Arab societies, and as an attenuator of
international hegemony.
Testing Counter-Dominance Motives in Citizens’ Favorability toward Political Factions in
Lebanon and Syria
Starting from the viewpoint of people in subordinated situations, we theorized that their
preferences for certain political factions would depend on how well they perceive the power
exercised by those factions as enabling citizens to meet their needs, and on the factions’ external
alliances as fulfilling their goals regarding counter-dominance. These goals inform people’s
sensitivity to and relative acceptance or rejection of both domestic and international hegemony.
In our historical context (data were collected in March, 2010), Syrians and Lebanese lived in
functioning nation-states in which citizens expected their governments to provide important
things to their societies, including security, economic opportunity, and justice. To the extent that
citizens viewed their governments as fulfilling this domestic contract, we expected them to
support their governments.
However, we also expected the external political alliances of Lebanon vs. Syria to
produce different attitudes in their publics regarding the factions in relation to their counterdominance motives. In March, 2010 the Syrian government and its public posture could be said
to be decidedly anti-U.S., so we expected Syrians concerned about American oppression to
support their government. We predicted that— due to ‘international concerns’ related to the
hegemony of the United States over Lebanon and Syria— people who oppose group-based
dominance in general, that is, are low on social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994),
would support the anti-U.S. Syrian government, but would weakly oppose the Lebanese
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government, which was split in terms of its stance toward the U.S. In other words, we expected
different net effects of being counter-dominance oriented on favorability toward the Syrian
versus the Lebanese governments.
In both Syria and Lebanon, given Hezbollah’s antagonistic history with both the U.S. and
its ally, Israel, we expected those most concerned about U.S. dominance to favor Hezbollah
most. Further, because people low on social dominance orientation should oppose the global
hierarchy in which Arabs are subordinated (e.g., Sidanius et al., 2004), and because Hezbollah,
in both words and deeds, has positioned itself as a defender of oppressed Arabs against the U.S.
and its allies, we expect them to support Hezbollah, but this should happen mainly through
concerns over U.S. oppression. These patterns can be shown in correlations among our measures.
Hypotheses. Our theorizing leads us to hypothesize that the Syrian and Lebanese publics’
favorability toward various political factions will be influenced by those factions’ relations to
one another. We tested whether participants’ attitudes towards the U.S. government, their own
national government, and Hezbollah correlated in a way compatible with relationships among
those factions. According to balance theory, the product of the signs of these three correlations
should be positive if the relationships are stable. Further, we hypothesized that citizens’
favorability towards domestic factions will be underlain by their orientation towards intergroup
dominance, mediated through concerns about American hegemony. However, we also predicted
that the national government’s relation to the U.S. would moderate this effect. Participants
should be more favorable towards the Syrian government the more opposed to group dominance
in general and the more concerned over American oppression they were. On the other hand, we
expected Lebanese people low on social dominance orientation to have concerns about U.S.
oppression, but given Lebanon’s impotent security apparatus and divided government, we
15
expected a weaker and negative relationship between concerns over U.S. oppression and
favorability of government in contrast to the positive relationship in the Syrian sample. This sign
change between the Syrian and Lebanese samples should be apparent in the structural equation
models we tested.
In both Lebanon and Syria, we expected a pathway from low social dominance
orientation to opposition to U.S. oppression to favorability toward Hezbollah. Omitting a direct
path between favorability of government and favorability of Hezbollah in both models lets us test
whether their expected positive (Syria) and negative (Lebanon) correlations are accounted for by
concerns over U.S. oppression.
Further, our models included a means of testing whether citizens’ attitudes towards their
government depends on their orientation toward the domestic contract. In both samples we
expected citizens’ perceived provision of government services to predict favorability towards the
government. However, given the corrupt, laissez-faire government of Lebanon, which serves
Lebanese elites more than others (Zaazaa 2010), and its majority appeasing the U.S., we
expected that social dominance orientation would be positively related to favorability towards
the government. People higher on social dominance orientation in Lebanon should view the
government as providing better services, which in turn should predict favorability of the
government.
METHOD
Procedure and Participants
Under our instructions, Zogby International interviewed 158 residents of Beirut, 17
residents of Tripoli, 12 residents of Tyre, and 11 residents of Aley, Lebanon (N = 198 Lebanese
citizens) and 200 residents of Damascus, Syria in March, 2010. Participants were selected
16
randomly from strata designed to guarantee religious and gender diversity in the samples; one
participant in each household was randomly selected using a Kish grid (next-birthday method).
Among the Lebanese participants were 100 men and 98 women; they identified their religious
sects as Sunni (n = 61), Shi’a (n = 29), Druze (n = 13), non-specified Muslim (n = 11), Maronite
Christian (n = 61), Roman Catholic (n = 9), or Orthodox Christian (n = 14). Among Syrian
participants were 100 men and 100 women. They identified their religious sects as Sunni (n =
118), Shi’a (n = 6), Druze (n = 3), non-specified Muslim (n = 35), Roman Catholic (n = 26),
Orthodox Christian (n = 11), or other (n = 1). Interviews were conducted in Arabic by a samegender interviewer; the translation from English was provided by Zogby and checked by us.
Interviews lasted approximately one hour. Only those measures relevant to the present
hypotheses are explained here.
Measures
Favorability toward own government, the U.S. government, and Hezbollah. Participants
indicated how they felt about “the government in this country,” “the American government,” and
“Hezbollah” as very unfavorable (1), unfavorable (2), neutral (3), favorable (4) or very favorable
(5). Favorability towards own government and Hezbollah served as our main outcome measures
in our models. Participants from Lebanon (M = 3.60, SD = 1.43) and from Syria (M = 3.70, SD =
1.35) did not differ reliably in their favorability toward Hezbollah, F < 1. However, Damascenes
favored their government (M = 4.22, SD = 0.99) more than Lebanese favored theirs (M = 3.26,
SD =1.19), F (1, 395) = 75.5, p < .001, 2 = .16. Both samples had unfavorable ratings of the
U.S. government, though the Lebanese less so (M = 1.74, SD = 1.05) than the Damascenes (M =
1.56, SD = 0.87), F (1, 398) = 3.96, p < .05, 2 = .01.
17
Perceived government services. Participants rated how much they agreed or disagreed
with two statements, “People like you are treated unjustly by the government,” (reverse-coded)
and “The government provides the things you and your family need” as strongly disagree (1),
disagree (2) are neutral (3), agree (4) or strongly agree (5; α = .75 in Lebanon, α = .80 in Syria).
On average Syrians felt their government provided more services to them (M = 3.93, SD = 1.11)
than Lebanese (M = 2.72, SD = 1.05), F (1, 398) = 123.51, p < .001, 2 = .24.
Concerns about U.S. oppression. Using the same response scale, all participants rated
their agreement with the following two statements: “I oppose American dominance in the
world,” and “Arabs deserve more respect from the American government” (reversed; α = .66 in
Lebanon, α = .74 in Syria). Participants from both Lebanon (M = 4.25, SD = 0.82) and Syria (M
= 4.32, SD = 0.86) agreed with these statements on average, and samples did not differ, F < 1.
Social dominance orientation. Social dominance orientation was measured using 6 of the
16 items from the social dominance orientation scale (Pratto et al. 1994) assessed on the same 5point agree-disagree response scale as previous items. The three con-trait items, which were
reversed-coded, were, “Group equality should be our ideal,” “We should increase social
equality,” and “It would be good if all groups could be equal.” The three pro-trait items were
“Superior groups should dominate inferior groups,” “Inferior groups should stay in their place,”
and “It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the
bottom.” The scale was internally reliable in Lebanon (α = .90) and in Syria (α = .84). These
items were administered after unrelated personality and religious identification measures, and
before the measures concerning the U.S., own government, or Hezbollah, to avoid
priming/framing effects. As the means were low (M = 1.75, SD = 0.83 in Lebanon, M = 1.73, SD
= 0.75 in Syria), this measure can be considered to assess counter-dominance motivations.
18
Participants were also asked to name their religious sect and favorite political party. A
majority of the Syrian sample and 20% of the Lebanese sample did not name a party, so we were
unable to use this measure in our analyses. Given the frequencies of religious sects, we were
unable to test for sectarian differences in Syria. In Lebanon, contrasts between each major sect
(Shi’a, Sunni, and Maronite) and the others showed that while there were predictable mean
differences between sects in terms of concern over U.S. oppression and support for Hezbollah
(with larger means among the Shi’a), there were no moderating effects of sect on the
relationships modeled.
RESULTS
Balanced attitudes regarding “core” and regional political factions. Many of our
hypotheses are predicated on the assumption that our participants hold the U.S. government in
negative regard. In fact, the mean scores of favorability toward the American government show
that participants were decidedly unfavorable. One simple means of testing whether balance
theory applies to citizens’ orientations towards political factions is to correlate attitudes towards
the U.S., own national government, and Hezbollah. Figure 2 shows correlations for the Lebanese
and Syrian samples. As we anticipated, there was a weak but positive correlation between
favorability toward the Lebanese and U.S. governments, and a negative correlation between
favorability toward the Syrian and U.S. governments. For both samples, the sets of relationships
are balanced, but in different configurations. Although both Syrian and Lebanese participants
were more supportive of Hezbollah the less they supported the U.S. government, the relationship
between Hezbollah attitudes and own government attitudes was positive for Syria and negative
for Lebanon. All three sets of parallel correlations were reliably different between the Lebanese
versus Syrian samples, Zs > 4.44, ps < .001.
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A weakness of our study is that we did not separately measure citizens’ support of the
domestic and the foreign policy stances of different domestic factions. However, we did measure
participants’ orientations towards dominance, both in terms of social dominance orientation and
in terms of concerns over U.S. oppression, and their perception of how well their governments
provide services to them. Our structural equation models employ these variables to predict
support for one faction (Hezbollah) in comparison to support for national governments.
Counter-dominance and attitudes towards political factions. Correlations among the
variables in our model (see Table 1) confirm our predictions. In both samples, as expected,
people more opposed to group-based dominance in general also were more concerned about U.S.
oppression of Arabs. In Syria, social dominance orientation correlated negatively with
favorability toward government and toward Hezbollah. In Lebanon, social dominance orientation
correlated positively with favorability toward government and negatively with favorability
towards Hezbollah. Further, in Syria, the more participants were concerned about U.S.
oppression, the more they liked both their government and Hezbollah. In contrast and as
expected, in Lebanon, the more participants were concerned about U.S. oppression, the more
they favored Hezbollah and slightly disfavored the Lebanese government.
Our theoretical analysis suggested a slightly different model for Syria than for Lebanon.
Both, however, included social dominance orientation as the most fundamental variable, and
attitudes toward Hezbollah and towards government as the final measures, mediated by
perceived government services and concerns over U.S. oppression. For comparability, the
measurement models used the same measured variables for the latent constructs of government
services (2 items), social dominance orientation (6 items), and concerns over U.S. dominance (2
items) as described above (see Table 2) for both samples. We correlated the errors of the pro-trait
20
items for social dominance orientation to account for method variance as recommended by Xin
and Chi (2010). We used maximum likelihood estimation in Amos 18.0 to test the fit of the
structural equation models separately in the Lebanese and Syrian samples.
Our model for the Syrian sample positioned social dominance orientation as exogenous,
which predicted both perceived government services and concerns over U.S. oppression. Both
these mediators were allowed to predict favorability of government, and concerns over U.S.
oppression were allowed to predict favorability of Hezbollah. The path from social dominance
orientation to perceived government services was unreliable, p > .10, so we removed it from the
final model. The final model described the data adequately; the ratio of 2 /df was under 2.0, and
several other fit indicators were within generally accepted ranges (see Figure 3). The path
coefficients shown in Figure 3 show that people who were more counter-dominance oriented
were more concerned about U.S. oppression, and this was a strong positive predictor of
favorability of government and favorability of Hezbollah. Perceived government services also
predicted favorability toward government. These results show that concerns over U.S. oppression
were sufficient to account for the covariance between favorability toward each faction. Further,
adding direct paths from SDO to favorability of either the government, Hezbollah, or both only
did not change the RMSEA more than .008. (Further the high collinearity between SDO and
concerns over U.S. oppression make the mediated model most parsimonious in the Syrian
sample.) In other words, as predicted, concerns over U.S. oppression fully mediated the influence
of SDO on favorability of both factions.
As was the case for our Damascene sample, we expected Lebanese who were counterdominance oriented to be concerned about U.S. oppression, which in turn should predict
favorability towards Hezbollah. Unlike in Syria, we expected concerns over U.S. oppression to
21
be negatively but weakly related to favorability towards the (divided) government. As in Syria,
we expected perceived government services among Lebanese to predict favorability towards the
government, although in Lebanon we expected people higher rather than lower on social
dominance orientation to perceive that the government provides for them. The results shown in
Figure 4 confirm these predictions. The model described the data adequately (see fit indicators in
Figure 4). Further, when we added direct paths from SDO to favorability of either or both
factions, the direct paths were unreliable, ps > .09, and models did not fit substantially better than
the mediated model, ps > .05. Therefore, as with the Damascene sample, the influence of SDO
on favorability toward Hezbollah and the government were fully mediated.
People who sympathize with Hezbollah might be more likely to adopt its rejectionist
ideology (El-Husseini 2010). Therefore, we also tested alternative models in which favorability
toward Hezbollah drove concerns over U.S. oppression and favorability toward the government,
keeping other aspects of these models the same. Results showed that model fits in both samples
were inadequate (e.g., RMSEAs > .08; pcloses < .008).
DISCUSSION
Given that sub-state political factions have changed the foreign policy of great powers
(e.g., the U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon following the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in
Beirut), it should be non-controversial to assert that international relations must incorporate not
only nations of the “periphery,” but regional, sub-state, and popular political desires (see also
Starr 1994). The question theoretically is how to frame these relations. We asserted that
understanding the layered power structure and the dynamic potential of actors at all levels, the
ways those power structures afford or thwart the meeting of human needs and desires, as well as
the psychological motivations of the public, can help account for the cross-level links between
22
domestic and international politics. Drawing on balance theory, we argued that citizens’ stances
towards different political factions would be mutually compatible, but would depend on the
perceived quality of the relationship between the factions. This is why we predicted that results
in the Syrian and Lebanese samples would differ due to their governments’ different relations
with the U.S. We also argued that people in oppressive contexts may be especially sensitive to
group-based dominance, and that such an orientation, combined with people’s view of the
various factions’ alliances in the domestic, regional, or global political hegemony would also
influence what factions they favor. In discussing the case examined in the present study, we
illustrate how attending to the sources of publics’ support for factions, as well as to their
ideological and strategic allegiances, is essential to understanding political dynamics.
Support for Government
Most simply, citizens in functioning states should support their government to the extent
they perceive it as providing for their needs. We found that both Lebanese and Syrian samples
showed a strong relation from the perception that the government provides services for its
citizens to favorability toward that government. Governments differ in how broadly or narrowly
they serve publics or domestic elites, and this posture appeals to different leanings in the public.
The correlations in Table 1 showed that Syrians favored their socialist government more if they
were low on social dominance orientation, whereas Lebanese participants favored their laissezfaire government more to the extent they were high on social dominance orientation. These
results replicate studies in other countries showing that social dominance orientation correlates
positively with attitudes towards political parties or governments who favor elites versus
subordinates domestically (see Pratto et al., 2006 for a review).
23
Support for Regional Factions in International Power Context
Further, we argued that citizens in the “periphery” must be concerned with the
international power structure that also influences them. Two sets of analyses followed from this
assertion. First, we used balance theory to reason that citizens’ attitudes towards their
government and Hezbollah would depend in part on the relationship between those factions and
the U.S. In fact, both samples showed balanced triadic correlations of attitudes, but each sample
had a different configuration that reflected the degree of enmity between its government and the
U.S. The correlations between attitudes towards the U.S. and own government were mildly
positive in Lebanon and distinctly negative in Syria, reflecting the degree of enmity between
these governments. Likewise, there was a strong positive correlation in the Syrian sample
between attitudes towards Hezbollah and one’s government, but a weaker and negative
correlation in the Lebanese sample. These attitudinal associations reflect the stated stances of the
governments and Hezbollah toward each other. The signs of correlations among them show
which are psychologically compatible as well as politically compatible.
Second, employing social dominance theory, we predicted that citizens’ preferences for
political factions would also depend on whether factions’ perceived alliances with “core” powers
reflects citizens’ own preferences regarding dominance. The correlations and net effects
confirmed that those lower on social dominance orientation favored the anti-U.S. Syrian
government and disfavored the more pro-U.S. Lebanese government. They also had more
concerns over U.S. oppression in both countries. More pointedly, concerns over U.S. oppression
was an equally strong positive predictor of favorability toward Hezbollah in both samples,
whereas such concerns were strongly positively predictive of favorability of the Syrian
government and weakly negatively predictive of favorability of the Lebanese government. In
24
both samples, this variable reliably mediated the influence of SDO on both factions. Together,
both sets of results fit our theorizing about how citizens of subordinated nations’ attitudes’
towards local political factions may be partly based in how they perceive those factions in
relation to “core” powers and in their orientations towards group dominance.
Hezbollah
For those with sympathy for Hezbollah’s victims or for those who suffered at the hands
of Hezbollah’s enemies, Hezbollah’s violent actions and rhetoric are understandably likely to
garner the most attention and to frame their understanding of Hezbollah. An important finding of
this study is that support for Hezbollah was found outside the Shi’a community and apparently
driven by opposition to American oppression of Arabs. People may sympathize with Hezbollah
for other reasons, such as its provision of social services and defense not provided by other
governments (Early 2006; Norton 2000, 2007; El-Husseini 2010). It is plausible that people who
sympathize with Hezbollah then adopt Hezbollah’s anti-Western ideology, but the results of our
alternative models showed no support for the notion that support for Hezbollah drives concerns
over U.S. oppression.
Concerns over American Oppression
Arab concerns over American oppression must be understood in the context of Arab
subordination in the world, especially by the U.S. The litany of Arab complaints of disrespect
from the U.S. is long and polyphonic, going back to the broken promises of Arab independence
after World War I and coming from multiple nations and competing political parties. The U.S.
has supported Muslim ruling elites who have suppressed Shi’a and other sects in several nations
(e.g., Saudi Arabia, Bahrain) and no government protected southern Lebanon from the U.S.backed Israeli violence over the past 60 years, particularly during and after the 1975-1990
25
Lebanese civil war. The nature of Arab-U.S. relations is inextricably connected to the U.S.’s proIsraeli intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict (e.g., Fakoury 2011), as well as to the echoes of
the Soviet-era struggle over Lebanon and Syria between the U.S. and Russia (through allies such
as Saudi Arabia and Iran; e.g., Lasensky and Yacoubian 2006). Moreover, the “doublestandards” that the U.S. and other Western entities are perceived to apply when considering
violations of humanitarian law and political aspirations provide a sore contrast point for many
Arabs (e.g., Richman 1991; Kohut 2005; Saad-Ghorayeb 2002; El-Husseini 2010; Salamey and
Pearson 2007). Indeed, we found that in both samples, opposition to U.S. oppression was a direct
predictor of participants’ favorability toward Hezbollah. This finding highlights the importance
of understanding regional and domestic faction preferences as nested within the global
hegemony, but also of studying ordinary citizens’ opinions, values, and understandings of their
political situations and choices.
Although the internal social-political and external relations of each Arab state differ,
there is consistent historical and contemporary evidence that Arabs desire an end to U.S.
dominance in their region and greater respect. Indeed, large random surveys conducted in late
June- mid-July, 2010 in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Lebanon, and
Morocco show that 70-97% of those publics said that the U.S. could improve relations with the
Arab world by better understanding Arabs and respecting Arab values or by changing their
policies toward the region (Zogby and Zogby 2010). Aside from certain political elites, Arab
people in many nations consensually favor greater respect for Arabs from the U.S. and less U.S.
dominance of Arabs. This motive is an important influence in what factions and policies they are
likely to support.
26
This is not to say that Arabs place all the blame for their problems externally; public
opinion polls show that they are disturbed by corruption, political scandals, and mis-steps by
their politicians and political parties too (e.g., Arab Barometer Lebanon Report 2007; Pew
Research Center 2010). We would argue that it is precisely because domestic political factions
are coerced— or can choose— to serve external interests that the political choices of citizens in
these layered power structures are complex and frequently experienced as problematic.
Oppression, repression, and instability
Our results illustrate the difficult political choices the people of Lebanon have. If they
reject the dominance that characterizes their domestic, regional, and global political situation,
they view neither their government nor the U.S. as concerned about them, and tend to favor
Hezbollah, which may provoke more enmity from the U.S. If they tolerate group dominance,
they may indeed benefit more from the government (as they perceive it). But they must also
tolerate disrespect and dominance in the international political context from U.S. foreign policy,
and that has not protected Lebanon from violent attacks, occupation, or domination by Syria or
Israel.
Syrian choices have a different complexity. For several decades, Syria positioned itself as
the sole national defender of Arabs against U.S.-Israeli repression. In situations of external
threat, politicians can build up their legitimacy and tolerance for internal repression by invoking
the people’s fears (Campbell 1965). Thus by invoking Syrians’ concerns over U.S. interference,
the Syrian government maintained a fragile balance between dissent over their repressive internal
practices and admiration for the strong rejectionist stance (e.g., El-Husseini 2010). This situation
makes the government’s position as a trustee of the social contract with its people also very
fragile (see also Wedeen 1999, 152). For example, economic engagement with the West on the
27
one hand provides development that the public desires, and on the other, compromises the
principle of rejectionism and opens it to external interference (e.g., Hinnebusch 2005). Thus,
Syria, like Lebanon, has faced choices both internally and externally, which in terms of balance
theory cannot be stable.
Neither domestic nor international concerns, then, are more influential for understanding
the political dynamics of the “periphery.” Rather, unstable international situations are precisely
what call up the various psychologies of dominance and counter-dominance, which are likely to
produce political schisms within the public, nation, and region, and then feed-back as increased
international tensions. Social-psychological research demonstrates that lack of respect for
another group facilitates aggression against that other (Pruitt and Kim 2004), and when a group’s
desires for respect are suppressed by the experience of oppression, they are unlikely to be able to
reconcile with oppressing groups (Janoff-Bulman and Werther 2008). The implication is that
respect of publics’ needs, rather than dominance or control dynamics enacted by elite policy,
may lead to more stable and less conflictual relations among groups. As we have argued,
subordinated people in contested power situations, with the most need, are actually those most
opposed to hegemony.
Structural Balance Theory
Empirical studies on structural balance theory (Cartwright and Harary 1956) confirm that
the most common and stable triadic relationships are “balanced,” and that from balanced
networks of triads emerge large-scale camps of allies who are enemies of other camps (Szell
Lambiotte and Turner 2010). However, there tends to be more structural/strategic instability and
imbalance (and consequently conflict) in dyads and triads containing major powers, due partly to
opportunism and “core” nations’ status/reputation and balance of power concerns (Maoz Terris
28
Kuperman and Talmud 2007). Thus, in contrast to hegemonic stability theory, our theoretical
analysis and results, psychological research on intergroup conflict, and structural balance theory
all imply that the layered power hierarchies that characterize “periphery” subordination by
“core” powers can all too easily become de-stabilizing and conflict-inducing at both domestic
and international levels (see also Gurr and Lichbach 1986; Ikenberry 2011; Jenkins and Schock,
1992).
Applying structural balance theory to the parties discussed in this paper – the U.S., Syria,
Israel, Lebanon, and Hezbollah – demonstrates the inherent instability of the region’s political
relationships. For example, if a Lebanese government developed a positive relationship with its
neighbor Israel, it could also have a positive relationship with the U.S. and that triad would be
balanced. However, following Syria and Israel’s negative relationship, this would imply that a
Lebanese government could not maintain a positive relationship to its other neighbor, Syria, nor
with Hezbollah. If Lebanon has a negative relation with its neighbor Israel, then it could enjoy a
positive relation with its neighbor Syria and with Hezbollah, but this would require a negative
relation with the U.S., a difficult situation for small nations without more powerful allies. This
example demonstrates that the current set of relationships is highly unstable, and of course, this
analysis could be extended to include other important actors (e.g., Iran, Russia). Thus,
considering the international context, and that ordinary citizens as well as elites can try to
respond to it with their own agendas, it is not surprising that Lebanon has been embroiled in a
long civil war, continual political upheavals, and has difficulty in maintaining both a cohesive,
functioning government and its own sovereignty (see Fakhoury 2011), or that the relationship
between the Al-Asad dynasty and Lebanon has been so troubled for decades (see also Samii
2008). The external structural situation cannot help but divide Lebanese political opinion and
29
produce ambivalence in its people. With Syria, however, internal instability stems from the
tension between government repression and protection of the public, whereas instability in
foreign relations stems from the fact that the government has reason to want both positive and
negative relations with the same “core” powers. Further, maintaining external enmities may
legitimize the government, but only insofar as such enmities do not hamper the government’s
ability to provide desired services or to protect the people. In Syria as in Lebanon, then, domestic
and international relations are inherently connected and yet mutually de-stabilizing.
As our theorizing and results show, to fully understand the international relations in the
region, one must also consider the role that regional and domestic factions and also citizens play,
for nations do not act as exogenous and monolithic entities. Likewise, and as recent events from
the Arab uprisings and elsewhere (e.g., Chile, Peru, Greece) show, states are not independent of
these influences. This highlights the need for international relations and foreign policy analysis
to incorporate the agency and goals of non-state actors and citizens in their own right (Smith,
2000).
A second important implication is that the prediction of foreign interventions’
effectiveness in “periphery” nations, and the definition of success in such maneuvers, must be
evaluated with the presence of layered power structures in mind, as well as the feedback
processes that exist between levels of analysis in such structures. Nationalists and conservatives
in the West sometimes claim that power centralization and projection, or outside control of
“peripheries,” is necessary to maintain stability (e.g., Braithwaite 2004, Rathbun 2008). Liberals
make similar claims under the assumption that imposition of Western political and
socioeconomic developmental paths would lead to progressive liberalization, democratization,
and/or cooperation under the international order (Kayaoglu, 2010; see Ayoob 2005, Ikenberry
30
2011). Both sides assume that hegemony is the most stable form of open international
organization in a unipolar system (e.g., Katzenstein et al. 1998). But, as others have argued from
various perspectives (e.g. Kayaoglu 2010; Ravenal 1973; Richman 1991; Snidal 1985; Tickner,
2003), hegemonic stability as envisioned theoretically may not be enacted or perceived as such,
especially in nations of the “periphery” (e.g., Hinnebusch 2005). The policies used to enact
hegemonic stability have not manifested the theoretical ideal because they tend to ignore translevel effects, non-state actors, and indulge in counter-productive exploitation of power
asymmetries. Whereas these complexities may play a more minor role in inter-“core” foreign
policy, they play a major role in “core”-“periphery” relations given the layered power structure
that so distinctively influences “periphery” nations. Our results and theoretical analysis strongly
imply that hegemonic power projection and interventionism, if taken unilaterally, with
unbalanced motives or goals, or without consideration of trans-level consequences and feedback,
is likely to be destabilizing, not stabilizing.
It is precisely the imposition of unbalanced and insensitive outside control that may lead
to extremes of helplessness or hostility among people, and further to divisions, radicalization,
and/or conflict between factions and between nations. In our specific context, it is not difficult to
conclude that if ‘great power’ and regional/proxy actors’ foreign policy regarding the Levant
remains the same, the chronic frustration of popular needs and desires by elites in the Levant and
their foreign ‘sponsors’ will maintain a continually volatile and potentially escalating situation
there.
31
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Table 1
Correlations among variables in models separately for Syrian and Lebanese samples.
Syrian sample
SDO
Concerns about
Perceived
Favorability
Favorability
U.S. oppression
gov’t services
of gov’t
of Hezbollah
-.57***
-.48***
-.55***
-.34***
.59***
.67***
.47***
.72***
.64**
Concerns about
U.S. oppression
Perceived
government services
Lebanese sample
SDO
Concerns about
Perceived
Favorability
Favorability
U.S. oppression
gov’t services
of gov’t
of Hezbollah
-.50***
.37***
.32***
-.41***
Concerns about
U.S. oppression
-.01
-.10
.54***
Perceived
government services
.59**
-.03
Note. SDO stands for Social Dominance Orientation (see text for all items). The lower the SDO
score, the more opposed one is to group-based dominance. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
41
Table 2
Measurement Models for Syrian and Lebanese samples
Item Number, Items for each Latent Variable (underlined)
Loading
Loading
in Syria
in Lebanon
57. Group equality should be our ideal (R)
.85
.79
58. We should increase social equality (R)
.18
.80
59. It would be good if all groups could be equal (R)
.79
.79
60. Superior groups should dominate inferior groups
.65
.72
61. Inferior groups should stay in their place
.63
.71
62. It's probably a good thing that certain groups
.67
.68
108. Arabs deserve more respect from the American government
.81
.51
110. I oppose American dominance in the world.
.75
.94
147. People like you are treated unjustly by the government (R)
.90
.81
148. The government provides the things you and your family need
.90
.75
Social Dominance Orientation
are at the top and other groups are at the bottom
Concerns about U.S. Oppression
Perceived Government Provisioning
Note. (R) indicates item was reversed coded. We allowed error terms of pro-trait SDO items 6062 to covary. Model fits improved in both samples by allowing errors between Item 62 and
Concerns about U.S. Oppression to correlate.
42
FIGURE CAPTIONS
1. Balance theory diagram of relationships between citizens and political factions in
Lebanon (top panel) and Syria (bottom panel).
2. Correlations among favorability toward the American government, own national
government, and Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria samples (all p < .01).
3. Model of attitudes towards government and Hezbollah in Syria.
4. Model of attitudes towards government and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
43
Lebanon
Citizenry
Government
+
March 14 supporters
March 14 coalition
+
+
U.S.
-
-
March 8 supporters
March 8 coalition
+
Syria
+
Hezbollah
Syrian
Government
-
+
+
-
Syrian
Citizens
U.S.
-
Government
44
Syria
U.S. Government
-.39
Own national
Government
-.30
.58
Hezbollah
Lebanon
U.S. Government
.15
Own national
Government
-.64
-.15
Hezbollah
45
Favorability
.35
Perceived
Governme
of
nt
Government
Social
.54
Dominance
Orientation
-.82
Concerns
Syria
Over
N = 200, df = 47
U.S.
2/df = 1.84
Oppression
RMSEA = .065
CFI = .97
NFI = .94
TFI = .96
PCLOSE = .12
* p < .05, ** p < .001.
Favorability
of Hezbollah
.61
46
Favorability
Perceived
.66
Governme
Government
nt
.45
of
Social
-.17
Dominance
Orientation
-.46
Concerns
Lebanon
Over
N = 198, df = 47
U.S.
2/df = 1.85
Oppression
RMSEA = .066
CFI = .97
NFI = .93
TFI = .95
PCLOSE = .12
* p < .05, ** p < .001
Favorability
of Hezbollah
.61