Barron v. Baltimore (1833)
7-0
Context of the Case: John Barron was co-owner of a profitable wharf in the harbor of
Baltimore. As the city developed and expanded, large amounts of sand accumulated in the
harbor, depriving Barron of the deep waters which had been the key to his successful business.
He sued the city to recover a portion of his financial losses.
Questions before the Court: Does the Fifth Amendment deny the states as well as the national
government the right to take private property for public use without justly compensating the
property's owner?
Court’s Ruling: No. The Court announced its decision in this case without even hearing the
arguments of the City of Baltimore. Writing for the unanimous Court, Chief Justice Marshall
found that the limitations on government articulated in the Fifth Amendment were specifically
intended to limit the powers of the national government. Citing the intent of the framers and the
development of the Bill of Rights as an exclusive check on the government in Washington D.C.,
Marshall argued that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction in this case since the Fifth
Amendment was not applicable to the states.
Amendment and/or Constitutional clause involved: U.S. Constitution 5th Amendment
Implications of the case socially and politically: The social implications of the case was
towards rather the city can freely take property from an individual for the general welfare of the
people with compensation. The plantiff is mad that his property was slowly destroyed by the
city, which caused him to lose business without beign compensated, although it this is said to
only apply to the U.S. Federal Government.
Plaintiff: Barron Defendant: Mayor and City Council of Baltimore Justice: John Marshall
Majority Opinion: The provision in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States declaring that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation
is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of power by the Government of the United
States, and is not applicable to the legislation of the States.
The Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for themselves,
for their own government, and not for the government of individual States.
Miami Herald v. Tornillo (1974)
9-0
Context of the Case: Pat Tornillo was Executive Director of the Classroom Teachers
Association and a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives in Dade County, Florida.
The Miami Herald published two editorials criticizing Tornillo and his candidacy. He demanded
that the Herald publish his responses to the editorials. When the Herald refused, Tornillo sued in
Dade County Circuit Court under Florida Statute Section 104.38, which granted political
candidates criticized by any newspaper the right to have their responses to the criticisms
published. The Herald challenged the statute as a violation of the free press clause of the First
Amendment. The Circuit Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of
Florida reversed this decision.
Questions before the Court: Did Florida Statute Section 104.38, the "right to reply" statute,
violate the free press clause of the First Amendment applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Court’s Ruling: Yes, The statute was an "intrusion into the function of editors," and imposed "a
penalty on the basis of the content." Chief Justice Burger relied on New York Times v. Sullivan in that the
"right to reply" statute "limits the variety of public debate," and was therefore unconstitutional.
Amendment and/or Constitutional clause involved: U.S. Constitution 1st Amendment
Implications of the case socially and politically: The implication of this case was if politicians
could force the media to air responses to criticisms that they published. If this happened then
many political candidates would gain a large amount of power and be capable of violating the
right to a free press.
Plaintiff: Miami Herald Defendant: Pat Tornillo Majority Opinion: Warren Burger
Majority Opinion: The issue in this case is whether a state statute granting a political candidate
a right to equal space to reply to criticism and attacks on his record by a newspaper violates the
guarantees of a free press.
Dred Scott v. Sanford (1856)
7-2
Context of the Case: Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to 1843, he resided in
Illinois (a free state) and in an area of the Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by
the Missouri Compromise of 1820. After returning to Missouri, Scott sued unsuccessfully in the
Missouri courts for his freedom, claiming that his residence in free territory made him a free
man. Scott then brought a new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained that no pureblooded Negro of African descent and the descendant of slaves could be a citizen in the sense of
Article III of the Constitution.
Questions before the Court: Was Dred Scott free or slave?
Court’s Ruling: Dred Scott was a slave. Under Articles III and IV, argued Taney, no one but a
citizen of the United States could be a citizen of a state, and that only Congress could confer
national citizenship. Taney reached the conclusion that no person descended from an American
slave had ever been a citizen for Article III purposes. The Court then held the Missouri
Compromise unconstitutional, hoping to end the slavery question once and for all.
Amendment and/or Constitutional clause involved: 5th Amendment; Missouri Compromise
Implications of the case socially and politically: The social implication was towards slaves
having the chance to become free under the U.S. Constitution.
Plaintiff: Dred Scott Defendant: Sanford
Majority Opinion: A free negro of the African race, whose ancestors were brought to
this country and sold as slaves, is not a "citizen" within the meaning of the Constitution
of the United States.
: Chief Justice Taney
Minority Opinion: First. That the free native-born citizens of each State are citizens of the
United States.
Second. That, as free colored persons born within some of the States are citizens of those States,
such persons are also citizens of the United States.
Third. That every such citizen, residing in any State, has the right to sue and is liable to be sued
in the Federal courts, as a citizen of that State in which he resides.
Fourth. That, as the plea to the jurisdiction in this case shows no facts, except that the plaintiff
was of African descent, and his ancestors were sold as slaves, and as these facts are not
inconsistent with his citizenship of the United States and his residence in the State of Missouri,
the plea to the jurisdiction was bad, and the judgment of the Circuit Court overruling it was
correct.
I dissent, therefore, from that part of the opinion of the majority of the court in which it is held
that a person of African descent cannot be a citizen of the United States, and I regret I must go
further and dissent both from what I deem their assumption of authority to examine the
constitutionality of the act of Congress commonly called the Missouri Compromise.
: Justice Curtis
New York Times v. Sullivan (1963)
9-0
Context of the Case: Decided together with Abernathy v. Sullivan, this case concerns a fullpage ad in the New York Times which alleged that the arrest of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.
for perjury in Alabama was part of a campaign to destroy King's efforts to integrate public
facilities and encourage blacks to vote. L. B. Sullivan, the Montgomery city commissioner, filed
a libel action against the newspaper and four black ministers who were listed as endorsers of the
ad, claiming that the allegations against the Montgomery police defamed him personally. Under
Alabama law, Sullivan did not have to prove that he had been harmed; and a defense claiming
that the ad was truthful was unavailable since the ad contained factual errors. Sullivan won a
$500,000 judgment.
Questions before the Court: Did Alabama's libel law, by not requiring Sullivan to prove that an
advertisement personally harmed him and dismissing the same as untruthful due to factual errors,
unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of press
protections?
Court’s Ruling: The Court held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all
statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are
made with actual malice (with knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of their truth
or falsity). Under this new standard, Sullivan's case collapsed.
Amendment and/or Constitutional clause involved: 1st Amendment
Implications of the case socially and politically: Implications were about Sullivan being
defaced by false information reported by the New York Times.
Plaintiff:
New York Times
Defendant: Sullivan
Majority Opinion: Factual error, content defamatory of official reputation, or both, are
insufficient to warrant an award of damages for false statements unless "actual malice" -knowledge that statements are false or in reckless disregard of the truth -- is alleged and proved.
Justice William Brennan
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Fed. Communications Commission (1968)
7-0
Context of the Case: The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) fairness doctrine
requires radio and television broadcasters to present a balanced and fair discussion of public
issues on the airwaves. The doctrine is composed of two primary requirements concerning
personal attacks in the context of public issue debates and political editorializing. The FCC
conditioned its renewal of broadcast licenses on compliance with its regulations. Red Lion
Broadcasting challenged the application of the fairness doctrine with respect to a particular
broadcast. In a companion case (United States v. Radio Television News Directors Association
(RTNDA)), the fairness doctrine's requirements concerning any broadcast were challenged.
Questions before the Court: Do the FCC's fairness doctrine regulations, concerning personal
attacks made in the context of public issue debates and political editorializing, violate the First
Amendment's freedom of speech guarantees?
Court’s Ruling: In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the fairness doctrine was
consistent with the First Amendment. Writing for the Court, Justice White argued that spectrum
scarcity made it "idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable
to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish."
Amendment and/or Constitutional clause involved: 1st Amendment
Implications of the case socially and politically: The implication is of if the federal
government can control what broadcasting companies can actually put on their own
programming.
Plaintiff: Red Lion Broadcasting Co. Defendant: FCC
Majority Opinion: Byron White
T he history of the fairness doctrine and of related
legislation shows that the FCC's action in the Red Lion case did not exceed its authority, and
that, in adopting the new regulations, the FCC was implementing congressional policy.
School Dist. Of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp (1962)
8-1
Context of the Case: The Abington case concerns Bible-reading in Pennsylvania public schools.
At the beginning of the school day, students who attended public schools in the state of
Pennsylvania were required to read at least ten verses from the Bible. After completing these
readings, school authorities required all Abington Township students to recite the Lord's Prayer.
Students could be excluded from these exercises by a written note from their parents to the
school. In a related case -- Murray v. Curlett -- a Baltimore statute required Bible-reading or the
recitation of the Lord's Prayer at open exercises in public schools. Murray and his mother,
professed atheists -- challenged the prayer requirement.
Questions before the Court: Did the Pennsylvania law and Abington's policy, requiring public
school students to participate in classroom religious exercises, violate the religious freedom of
students as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Court’s Ruling: The Court found such a violation. The required activities encroached on both
the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment since the
readings and recitations were essentially religious ceremonies and were "intended by the State to
be so."
Amendment and/or Constitutional clause involved: Establishment of Religion (1st and 14th
Amendment)
Implications of the case socially and politically: The social question was rather if the state
government had the power to force children to do religious practices within school, although not
everyone may be of the same religion.
Plaintiff: Schempp Defendant: Pennsylvania
Majority Opinion:
Justice Clark: Because of the prohibition of the First Amendment
against the enactment by Congress of any law "respecting an establishment of religion," which is
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, no state law or school board may
require that passages from the Bible be read or that the Lord's Prayer be recited in the public
schools of a State at the beginning of each school day -- even if individual students may be
excused from attending or participating in such exercises upon written request of their parents.
Minority Opinion:
Justice Stewart: I think the records in the two cases before us are
so fundamentally deficient as to make impossible an informed or responsible determination of
the constitutional issues presented. Specifically, I cannot agree that, on these records, we can say
that the Establishment Clause has necessarily been violated. [Footnote 4/1] But I think there exist
serious questions under both that provision and the Free Exercise Clause -- insofar as each is
imbedded in the Fourteenth Amendment -- which require the remand of these cases for the
taking of additional evidence.
Gregg v. Georgia (1975)
7-2
Context of the Case: A jury found Gregg guilty of armed robbery and murder and sentenced
him to death. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except as to its
imposition for the robbery conviction. Gregg challenged his remaining death sentence for
murder, claiming that his capital sentence was a "cruel and unusual" punishment that violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Questions before the Court: Is the imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments as "cruel and unusual" punishment, and if it should be allowed to
make others fear capital punishment.
Court’s Ruling: No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that a punishment of death did not
violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances. In extreme criminal
cases, such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately killing another, the careful
and judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed.
Amendment and/or Constitutional clause involved: 8th Amendment: Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
Implications of the case socially and politically: The Social implication is if the death penalty
is justifiable in the U.S. under cruel and unusual punishment.
Plaintiff: Gregg Defendant: Georgia
Majority Opinion:
Justice Stewart: The punishment of death for the crime of murder
does not, under all circumstances, violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 428 U. S.
168-187.
(a) The Eighth Amendment, which has been interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner to
accord with evolving standards of decency, forbids the use of punishment that is "excessive"
either because it involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or because it is grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime.
Minority Opinion:
Justice Brennan: The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”The opinions of MR. JUSTICE STEWART, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS today hold that "evolving standards of decency" require focus not on
the essence of the death penalty itself, but primarily upon the procedures employed by the State
to single out persons to suffer the penalty of death.