Critical Race Theory
Things to know about the argument: The K goes in the same direction as many of the aff’s that decrease racial profiling in surveillance. You can still make a negative argument if the aff approaches surveillance reduction in a colorblind manner, or makes an argument about upholding the constitution or American Democracy. The file is also short on generic legal links, but we hope to augment that section in wave 2. The narrative good alternative cards can be re-appropriated for this purpose if you are looking for more in the meantime. We included a possible 1ac that is a planless, narratives good affirmative. The basis is that racial profiling is based on federal legal whiteness. Inserting narratives of the oppressed into legal discussions blurs objectivity and challenges whiteness. If you’d like to run a plan, there are various avenues that the courts or congress could address racial profiling in surveillance. Some of that solvency evidence is in the file, but would require some more research. Note that the 1ac doesn’t include an impact beyond racism. If you’d like to add an additional systemic claim to racism, you can pull from the impact portion of the K. Education arguments to answer framework are found in the FW section of the K. Contributors to thank include: Carla Ho, Cayla Lee, Taya Smith and Michael Cho

***CRT GOOD***

AFF

We present the following narrative to illustrate the pervasive effect that federal racial profiling law has on legal enforcement
Nelson, 2000 (Jill [Prominent African American Journalist and Novelist], "Police Brutality: An Anthology", 6/28/15, 92-93) // cjh
The gun never moved. When they asked me for my license (they had already discovered John's during the body search), I asked if I could reach down to get it or if they would prefer to get it themselves. I told them I was afraid to reach down. "Why is that, ma'am?" the "officer" responded. The other cop came around and retrieved my purse. He pulled out the wallet. He did not search the bag. The partner returned to the patrol car. The other cop's gun remained ready to fire into John's right temple. And the boy in blue just smiled on. Clearly, we had made his day. About five minutes later, the partner returned. "They do own the car," he mumbled. The gun was placed back in the holster. Then, I received the requisite apology. After all, I was the White woman with the registration and had a medical school ID. The trespass had not been the gun at John's temple, but the ten-minute delay I
suffered as a result of "a police computer error" Clearly, John was still a "nigger," but I was apparently no longer a "nigger lovin' slut." The couple did not file a complaint. More fearful than angry, they saw little value in perpetuating a painful experience. Countless other victims of police abuse must reach a similar conclusion. Under those conditions, pragmatism prevails over courage. Principle is sacrificed to survival. This is America. There is a long history of de facto autho-rization for
police to keep Blacks generally and Black men most specifically in the
subordinate place that society approves and the law condones. Racial rhetoric? Hardly. From the earliest period in our history, a primary role of law enforcement was to keep Blacks under control, quite literally during the slavery era. To curb runaways and prevent the formation of insurrectionary plots, slaveholders developed elabo-rate systems of patrols made up of conscripted local Whites who traveled the roads and checked plantation quarters. Slaves caught without passes were summarily punished with twenty lashes, but the brutality of the patrols resulted in complaints from slaves and mas-ters alike.' The end of slavery in 1863 increased
the danger of the now free Blacks, who posed a greater threat to Whites
determined to keep the former chattels in their subordinate place. As a child in Durham, North Carolina, during the second decade of the twentieth century, Pauli Murray viewed the local police "as heavily armed, invariably mountainous red-faced [men] who to me seemed more a signal of calamity than of protection."' Albon Holsey, growing up in Georgia at the turn of the century, recalled having lived in "mortal fear" of the police, "for they were arch-tormenters and persecutors of Negroes."' The North was no better. Richard R. Wright Jr. remembered, "I was convinced early that policemen were my enemies. I never approached a policeman with a question until I had been in Chicago for nearly a year."' Leon Litwack has written that during the Jim Crow era, the subject of the police often dominated conversations among young Blacks. The stories revolved around chases, harassment, clubbings, illegal arrests, and coerced confessions.' Far worse than what the police did to Blacks is what they failed to do. From

1859 through the early 1960s, at least five thousand Blacks lost their lives by lynching.'
There are few reports that police or other law enforcement officials posed a
serious barrier to lynch mobs. And, of course, few, if any, of the perpetrators were ever brought to justice. According to a scholar of the period, lynchers had "little to fear from those who administered the southern legal sys-tem," and prosecutors often dismissed lynchings as "an expression of the will of the people."' In 1900, for example, there were at least 105 reported lynchings. In New Orleans during that year, -White mobs assaulted Blacks for three days, burning and robbing their homes and stores. Mass murder was not sufficient to save the first of several antilynching measures, this one introduced by G. H. White, a Black congressman from North Carolina, from dying in committee." Despite earnest campaigns by the NAACP, which was founded a decade later, and other groups, the Congress never passed any of the antilynching bills placed before it. Beyond documented lynchings by vigilante mobs, it is simply
impossible to estimate the number of Blacks murdered by individual Whites in cases where the motive was racial antagonism. Only a small number of
those who committed these crimes were tried for them.
The FBI surveillance has historically targeted people of color without ‘cause’
Cyril, 15 (Malkia [Activist and Writer], April issue of The Progressive, "Black America's State of Surveillance", 6/27/15, www.progressive.org/news/2015/03/188074/black americas-state-surveillance) // cjh Ten years ago, on Martin Luther King Jr.’s birthday, my mother, a former Black Panther, died from complications of sickle cell anemia. Weeks before she died, the FBI came knocking at our door, demanding that my mother testify in a secret trial proceeding against other former Panthers or face arrest. My mother, unable to walk, refused. The detectives told my mother as they left that they would be watching her. They didn’t get to do that. My mother died just two weeks later. ¶ My mother was not the only black person to come under the watchful eye of American law enforcement for perceived and actual dissidence. Nor is dissidence always a requirement for being subject to spying.
Files obtained during a break-in at an FBI office
in 1971 revealed that African Americans, J. Edger Hoover’s largest target group, didn’t have to be perceived as dissident to
warrant surveillance. They just had to be black
. As I write this, the same philosophy is driving the increasing adoption and use of surveillance technologies by local law enforcement agencies across the United States. ¶ Today, media reporting on government surveillance is laser-focused on the revelations by Edward Snowden that millions of Americans were being spied on by the NSA. Yet my mother’s visit from the FBI reminds me that
, from the slave pass system to laws that deputized white civilians as enforcers of Jim Crow, black people and other people of color have lived for centuries with surveillance practices aimed at maintaining a racial hierarchy. impoverished underclass.
¶ ¶ It’s time for journalists to tell a new story that does not start the clock when privileged classes learn they are targets of surveillance.
We need to understand that data has historically been overused to repress dissidence, monitor perceived criminality, and perpetually maintain an
In an era of big data, the Internet has increased the speed and secrecy of data collection. Thanks to new surveillance technologies, law enforcement agencies are now able to collect massive amounts of indiscriminate data. Yet legal protections and policies have not caught up to this technological advance. ¶ Concerned advocates see mass surveillance as the problem and protecting privacy as the goal
. Targeted surveillance is an obvious answer—it may be discriminatory, but it helps protect the privacy perceived as an earned privilege of the inherently innocent.
¶
The trouble is, targeted surveillance frequently includes the indiscriminate collection of the private data of people targeted by race but not involved in any crime.
¶ For targeted communities, there is little to no expectation of privacy from government or corporate surveillance. ¶ Instead, we are watched, either as criminals or as consumers.
We do not expect policies to

protect us. Instead, we’ve birthed a complex and coded culture
—from jazz to spoken dialects—
in order to navigate a world in which spying
, from AT&T and Walmart to public benefits programs and beat cops on the block
, is as much a part of our built environment as the streets covered in our blood. This continues today through federal surveillance, grounded in constitutionalism, and used to propagate the myth of ‘black criminality’
Marshall 12 - Assistant Professor — Ph.D., 2002, Government, Harvard University (Stephen, "The Political Life of Fungibility" http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v015/15.3.marshall.html) Presumed guilt constituted Martin’s peculiar vulnerability and this presumption has a political constitution. When Zimmerman saw Martin he saw criminality, understood as the commission of crime, an intension to commit crime, an escape from prior crime, or some combination of the three. Tempting as it may be to look to the War on Drugs during the Reagan era as the seedbed for state practices of racialized surveillance, interdiction, and incarceration, both the Reagan era’s escalation of these practices and the presumption of Martin’s guilt are bound up with the criminalization of blackness that emerges in the context of US slavery. This is a history of racialization in which black agency is figured as criminality . Although
the US Constitution
artfully evades the word slavery and refuses express enumeration of the racial attributes of citizenship, it articulates the figure of black criminality as fundamental law and
affirms practices of racialized surveillance and interdiction as civic virtue
. Answering to lingering Jeffersonian questions about
black humanity engendered by the 3/5 clause
of Article I, Section II, Article IV defines national citizenship by setting it in an antagonistic relation to the crime of black fugitivity
. Opposing the “immunities and privileges” of citizenship to
the culpable derelictions of treason, felony, and escape from slavery, the framers
yoke blackness to crime, legislate the intelligibility of black agency in the figure of the fugitive slave, and inscribe the “immunities and privileges” of citizenship as both a freedom from the presumption of criminal alterity and a duty to interdict the fugitive
. Noting the fragility of constitutions and the indispensable constitutional scaffolding provided by criminal alterity and norms of interdiction, Alexis de Tocqueville writes, “
the genuine sanction of political laws is to be found in the penal laws, and if the sanction is lacking, the law sooner or later loses its force. Therefore, the man who judges the criminal is really the master of society.”6
By expressly granting blacks entitlement to “immunities and privileges” of citizenship, the 14th Amendment (1868) sought to abolish black fugitivity and dissipate the antagonism between it and US citizenship. Grand as was the effort, such a revolution proved impossible. With commercial exchange of black bodies prohibited except as punishment for crime, Historian Kali Gross notes how Northern white newspapers invent the
figure of the “Colored Amazon” to allege the growing menace of black women’s criminality and “supply a new and growing commercial trade in blackness.”7 Concurrently, white southerners rehabilitate black fugitivity in the more menacing figure of the black rapist and re-found the old antagonism upon the violent hatred patriarchal societies cultivate against sexual predators who assail the women it values.
At the turn of the century,
southern intellectual’s leading role in propagating selective census data which

reflected repressive criminalization of southern black life
helped to give birth to modern crime statistics as well as make the case that northern blacks were also unfit for citizenship
national discourse on black inferiority.”
8 When
queen and drug warlord were vibrantly recirculated
. As Kalil Muhammad notes, one of the crucial legacies of “race conscious laws, discriminatory punishments, and new forms of everyday surveillance” is its contribution to a
“statistical rhetoric of black criminality” that operates as “a proxy for a the figures of the welfare
in the 1980s in connection with the southern strategy of the Republican Party, they neither inaugurated the criminalization of blackness nor simply revived a disreputable national tradition of racial animus.
post-civil rights Era.
Recovering constitutional principle that
posits an antagonism between the citizen and the fugitive slave, the party
refashioned black fugitivity in order to restore American citizenship in the
Cyril 2015 (Malkia Amala [under and executive director of the Center for Media Justice (CMJ) and co-founder of the Media Action Grassroots Network]; Black America's State of Surveillance; Mar 30; www.progressive.org/news/2015/03/188074/black-americas state-surveillance; kdf) Today,
media reporting on government surveillance is laser-focused on the revelations by
Edward
Snowde
n that millions of Americans were being spied on by the NSA. Yet my mother’s visit from the FBI reminds me that, from the slave pass system to laws that deputized white civilians as enforcers of Jim Crow,
black people and other people of color have lived for centuries with surveillance practices aimed at maintaining a racial hierarchy.
It’s time for journalists to tell a new story that does not start the clock when privileged classes learn they are targets of surveillance. We need to understand that data has historically been overused to repress dissidence, monitor perceived criminality, and perpetually maintain an impoverished underclass. In an era of big data, the Internet has increased the speed and secrecy of data collection. Thanks to new surveillance technologies, law enforcement agencies are now able to collect massive amounts of indiscriminate data. Yet legal protections and policies have not caught up to this technological advance. Concerned advocates see mass surveillance as the problem and protecting privacy as the goal. Targeted surveillance is an obvious answer—it may be discriminatory, but it helps protect the privacy perceived as an earned privilege of the inherently innocent. The trouble is
, targeted surveillance frequently includes the indiscriminate collection of the private data of people targeted by race but not involved in any crime. For targeted communities, there is little to no expectation of privacy from government or corporate surveillance.
Instead
, we are watched, either as criminals or as consumers
. We do not expect policies to protect us. Instead, we’ve birthed a complex and coded culture—from jazz to spoken dialects—in order to navigate a world in which spying, from AT&T and Walmart to public benefits programs and beat cops on the block, is as much a part of our built environment as the streets covered in our blood. In a recent address, New York City Police Commissioner Bill Bratton made it clear: “2015 will be one of the most significant years in the history of this organization. It will be the year of technology, in which we literally will give to every member of this department technology that would’ve been unheard of even a few years ago.” Predictive policing, also known as “Total Information Awareness,” is described as using advanced technological tools and data analysis to “preempt” crime. It utilizes trends, patterns, sequences, and affinities found in data to make determinations about when and where crimes will occur. This model is deceptive, however, because it presumes data inputs to be neutral. They aren’t. In a racially discriminatory criminal justice system, surveillance technologies reproduce injustice. Instead of reducing discrimination, predictive policing is a face of what author Michelle Alexander calls the “New Jim Crow”—a de facto system of separate and unequal application of laws, police practices, conviction rates, sentencing terms, and conditions of confinement that operate more as a system of social control by racial hierarchy than as crime prevention or punishment. In New York City, the predictive policing approach in use is “Broken Windows.” This approach to policing places an undue focus on quality of life crimes—like selling loose cigarettes, the kind of offense for which Eric Garner was choked to death. Without oversight, accountability, transparency, or rights, predictive policing is just high-tech racial profiling—indiscriminate data collection that drives discriminatory policing practices. As local law enforcement agencies increasingly adopt surveillance technologies, they use them in three primary ways: to listen in on specific conversations on and offline; to observe daily movements of individuals and groups; and to

observe data trends. Police departments like Bratton’s aim to use sophisticated technologies to do all three. They will use technologies like license plate readers, which the Electronic Frontier Foundation found to be disproportionately used in communities of color and communities in the process of being gentrified. They will use facial recognition, biometric scanning software, which the FBI has now rolled out as a national system, to be adopted by local police departments for any criminal justice purpose. They intend to use body and dashboard cameras, which have been touted as an effective step toward accountability based on the results of one study, yet storage and archiving procedures, among many other issues, remain unclear. They will use Stingray cellphone interceptors. According to the ACLU, Stingray technology is an invasive cellphone surveillance device that mimics cellphone towers and sends out signals to trick cellphones in the area into transmitting their locations and identifying information. When used to track a suspect’s cellphone, they also gather information about the phones of countless bystanders who happen to be nearby. The same is true of tear gas. domestic drones, which are in increasing use by U.S. law enforcement to conduct routine aerial surveillance. While drones are currently unarmed, drone manufacturers are considering arming these remote-controlled aircraft with weapons like rubber bullets, tasers, and They will use fusion centers. Originally designed to increase interagency collaboration for the purposes of counterterrorism, these have instead become the local arm of the intelligence community. According to Electronic Frontier Foundation, there are currently seventy-eight on record. They are the clearinghouse for increasingly used “suspicious activity reports”—described as “official documentation of observed behavior reasonably indicative of pre operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity.” These reports and other collected data are often stored in massive databases like e-Verify and Prism. As anybody who’s ever dealt with gang databases knows, it’s almost impossible to get off a federal or state database, even when the data collected is incorrect or no longer true.
Predictive policing doesn’t just lead to racial and religious profiling—it relies on it.
Just as stop and frisk legitimized an initial, unwarranted contact between police and people of color, almost 90 percent of whom turn out to be innocent of any crime,
suspicious activities reporting and the dragnet approach of fusion centers target communities of color
. One review of such reports collected in Los Angeles shows approximately 75 percent were of people of color. This is the future of policing in America, and it should terrify you as much as it terrifies me. Unfortunately, it probably doesn’t, because
my life is at far greater risk than the lives of white Americans
, especially those reporting on the issue in the media or advocating in the halls of power. One of the most terrifying aspects of high-tech surveillance is the invisibility of those it disproportionately impacts.
The NSA and FBI have engaged local law enforcement agencies and electronic surveillance technologies to spy on Muslims living in the United States.
According to FBI training materials uncovered by Wired in 2011, the bureau taught agents to treat “mainstream” Muslims as supporters of terrorism, to view charitable donations by Muslims as “a funding mechanism for combat,” and to view Islam itself as a “Death Star” that must be destroyed if terrorism is to be contained. From New York City to Chicago and beyond, local law enforcement agencies have expanded unlawful and covert racial and religious profiling against Muslims not suspected of any crime. There is no national security reason to profile all Muslims. At the same time, almost 450,000 migrants are in detention facilities throughout the United States, including survivors of torture, asylum seekers, families with small children, and the elderly. Undocumented migrant communities enjoy few legal protections, and are therefore subject to brutal policing practices, including illegal surveillance practices. According to the Sentencing Project, of the more than 2 million people incarcerated in the United States, more than 60 percent are racial and ethnic minorities. But by far, the widest net is cast over black communities. Black people alone represent 40 percent of those incarcerated. More black men are incarcerated than were held in slavery in 1850, on the eve of the Civil War. Lest some misinterpret that statistic as evidence of greater criminality, a 2012 study confirms that black defendants are at least 30 percent more likely to be imprisoned than whites for the same crime. This is not a broken system,
it is a system working perfectly as intended,
to the detriment of all. The NSA could not have spied on millions of cellphones if it were not already spying on black people, Muslims, and migrants. As surveillance technologies are increasingly adopted and integrated by law enforcement agencies today,
racial disparities are being made invisible by a media environment that has failed to tell the story of surveillance in the context of structural racism.
Carbado 3--(Devon W., Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law, Critical Race Theory, and Criminal Adjudication. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 7 (May, 2003), pp. 1757-1828 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3657500 , cayla_)

A fourth payoff from using narrative is that it can function as a rhetorical
strategy to rearticulate the ideological content of various legal regimes to
demonstrate that, as Enrique Carrasco puts it, "law is essentially a story that
reflects and legitimates the (racial) viewpoints and interests of those in
power."'38 Consider Sherene Razack's contribution to A New Critical Race Theory. She employs narrative to uncover the national story behind Canadian immigration law: "Canada is besieged. Every Tom, Dick, and Harry wants to get in. They will stop at nothing. They do not respect us. They will return our generosity with betrayal. We have no choice but to become strict and to monitor more closely who is coming in."'39 Razack demonstrates how this story is employed to give
political and legal traction to a variety of mechanisms (for example, the requirement that border crossers carry certain identity documents) to
police the Canadian border and its national identity. At bottom, narrative is a methodology. It can be done well or poorly, and it is valuable and worth using where it either provides better or previously discounted evidence or more effectively persuades than other methodologies.
Chang 93 – (Robert S. Seattle University Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality “Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space” California Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Oct., 1993), pp. 1241+1243-1323 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3480919 , cayla_) Mainstream
academic legal discourse begins from the premise that objective knowledge exists and is accessible.
I call this the rational/ empirical position. My own theoretical bias tells me that this is a false premise, but I start here to show how the case for personal narrative would appear within the context of mainstream academic discourse.180
Different disempowered groups have developed a similar methodology that tries to reveal bias in supposedly neutral standards.
Feminist legal scholars ask "[t]he woman question." They ask "about the gender implications of a social practice or rule: have women been left out of consideration? If so, in what way; how might that omission be corrected? What difference would it make to do so?"181 Race scholars ask the race question, and so on.
use of the objective voice is one of the social practices that has come under the scrutiny of those asking this type of question. The objective voice is obtained by abstracting from the individual in order to universalize the The perspective of the author so that not only does the author, as an abstracted entity, speak as Everyman, the author also presumes to speak for everyone.
A favorite device is the use of what one commentator calls the "constitutive we."'s2
This "constitutive we" appears in the work of many philosophical and legal theorists.
For example, John Rawls uses "we" in a subtle way that includes "us" as fellow inquirers into the questions he poses."83 But who does he think "we" is?184 Too often,
the individual used as the model for the universal is a man, and more specifically, a white man. Thus, one goal of personal narrative is to discredit this "we."
For example, I might use personal narrative to show that the "we" is a lie because it does not include "me." The stories of outsiders become important because they tell the story from different perspectives, perspectives that may have been excluded when formulating the objective, universal "we." It is important to remember that at this stage
, personal narrative is not being offered to replace what had previously been thought of as objective: to impose my subjectivity

upon everyone else only repeats the sin.
'85 Rather,
personal narrative is being offered to show that objectivity may actually be a disguise for white male subjectivity, which takes away the subjectivity of the disempowered.
86 One attempt to restore these lost subjectivities relies on a version of standpoint epistemology. An objectivist or liberal epistemology takes as the proper standpoint that of the "neutral, disinterested observer, a so-called Archimedean standpoint somewhere outside the reality that is being observed."'87 In contrast,
that others cannot have." standpoint epistemologies identify a certain group as victim and then "privileges that status by claiming that it gives access to understanding about oppression
'88 In the context of feminism, "[t]he feminist standpoint epistemologies argue that because men are in the master's position vis-i-vis women, women's social experience-conceptualized through the lenses of feminist theory--can provide the grounds for a less distorted understanding of the world around us."'189 This same point can and has been made about other oppressed groups.'90 One question that arises is why the viewpoint of the oppressed should be privileged. One theorist argues that the standpoint of the oppressed is epistemologically advantageous for the following reasons: It provides the basis for a view of reality that is more impartial than that of the ruling class and also more comprehensive.
that historical period It is more impartial because it comes closer to representing the interests of society as a whole; whereas the standpoint of the ruling class reflects the interests only of one section of the population, the standpoint of the oppressed represents the interests of the totality in
. Moreover, whereas the condition of the oppressed groups is visible only dimly to the ruling class, the oppressed are able to see more clearly the ruled as well as the rulers and the relation between them. Thus, the standpoint of the oppressed includes and is able to explain the standpoint of the ruling class.191 But the claim that the standpoint of the oppressed is more impartial is unconvincing. It seems that the standpoint of the oppressed would be partial; it would not necessarily provide less distorted views but differently distorted views.
The claim of representing society as a whole also seems problematic because the viewpoints of the oppressed and oppressors are quite distinct and complex.
192 It still might make sense to include the standpoint of the oppressed,
however, not because it has any special access to the truth, but because what is taken as truth is incomplete or distorted without the views of the oppressed.'93
There is the further problem of identifying the standpoint of the oppressed. If oppression or subjugation provides the grounding for having a less distorted view, then it would seem that the prime candidate would be the standpoint of lesbians of color.194 Even if, for the sake of simplicity, we decide that the relevant category is that of women, we are still left with the problem of identifying this standpoint. One commentator warns that we cannot discover this standpoint "directly in women's naive and unreflective world view,""' because this world view, usually labelled as other women the ability to see the truth."196
false consciousness, has been
shaped by the dominant male perspective so that it cannot be trusted. Even with standpoint epistemology, then, not all stories of oppression are created equal. This is problematic "because of the unwillingness, central to feminism, to dismiss some women as simply deluded while granting
Carbado 3--(Devon W., Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law, Critical Race Theory, and Criminal Adjudication. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 7 (May, 2003), pp. 1757-1828 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3657500 , cayla_) First, narrative performs an epistemological function. It provides knowledge
about the nature of discrimination from the perspective of those who
experience it. But why narrative and why not statistical analysis? After all, statistical analysis (assuming a large enough data set) has the benefits of identifying a general phenomenon that is verifiable by third parties.126 And certainly there is nothing about the use of narrative in CRT that precludes critical race theorists from also using

statistics. So why not the epistemology of statistics rather than (or in addition to) the epistemology of narrative? The answer may be that narrative does something that statistical analysis does not: It focuses on the specific and provides detail. Statistical analyses do the reverse. When an outsider is trying to describe an
experience to someone who cannot readily relate to it, an insider, narrative provides the detail that can help the insider empathize and relate to the
experience. To employ the language of Clifford Geertz, "We see the lives of others
through lenses of our own grinding."'27 Narrative helps to situate whites in
the "grinding" of racial subordination. A second payoff from using narrative relates to the idea of truth. Narrative is a means by which one can challenge
"the perfectibility, externality, or objectivity of truth."'3' Through narrative, critical race theorists can demonstrate the contingency and situatedness of
truth. For example, the first two essays in A New Critical Race Theory-Kimberl6 Crenshaw's contributionl32 and the contribution of Sumi Cho and Robert Westley'33-are in dialogue about the "true" genesis of CRT. Of course, Cho and Westley would not say that the history they excavate-which focuses on student activism as a form of social movement that helped to form the "theory"-is true and that the account provided by, among others, Crenshaw (which they argue focuses on the "writings that 'formed the movement""134) is false. Nor are Cho and Westley invested in "proliferate[ing] competing genesis stories."'35 But they do mean to suggest that the truth about
the genesis of CRT is bigger than Crenshaw's "superagency" approach, an
approach that they say "emphasize[s] the agency of individual scholars.""36 The juxtaposition of Crenshaw's essay against Cho and Westley's reminds us that while
most of the controversy about "truth" and CRT arises in the context of contestations between critical race theorists and their detractors, the question of what is true-as well as the question of how truth should be
theorized-is contested (sometimes only implicitly) within CRT as well. A third benefit of narrative is that it can serve as a counterhegemonic device.
Through narrative, people of color can counter the dominant
representations of their identities and their experiences; they can engage in what Margaret Montoya refers to as "discursive subversions."' 37 This is the project in which Henry Richardson engages. He constructs a conversation between an African president and an African American law professor. The exchange constitutes a form
of discursive subversion in that whiteness occupies a background and
marginal space in the discussion. Put differently, the conversation is not mediated by concerns about whiteness or black respectability. The professor and the African president speak about international politics, domestic sovereignty, and tribal conflicts.
The conversation is unconstrained by racial surveillance. They appear to be speaking not as subalterns, but as fully formed (or, at least, not overly
determined) subjects. Presumably, one of the reasons Richardson confers this sense
of freedom on the professor and the president is to raise a question about
power: What happens when black people have it? His answer seems to be that problems of division and social conflict do not necessarily disappear. Michel
Foucault's descriptive claim-that we have an ambivalent relationship to
power-becomes, in Richardson's essay, a normative one.

Hutchinson 2 – (Darren L. Professor of Constitutional Law, Remedies, Race and the Law, and Civil Rights Seminar at the University of Florida Levin College of Law “Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform” 6-2002 scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1399&context=facultypub , cayla_) Political resistance is perhaps the most positive usage of race by persons of color. Persons of color utilize racial identity to respond to racial subjugation. Race serves as an organizational instrument for challenging racial oppression.52 Furthermore, in the context of law and policy, persons of color and
progressive scholars have advocated the implementation of race-conscious
policies that seek to remedy social inequality1 3 Supreme Court opposition to remedial race consciousness has sparked a generous amount of criticism from progressive scholars.54 The arguments of proponents of progressive race
blindness threaten to legitimize this conservative jurisprudence that
neutralizes governmental efforts to combat racial injustice.55 The abolition of race-a position advanced in varying degrees in progressive race blindness scholarship would make it difficult for persons of color to resist oppression and to demand race conscious remedies for racial oppression.56 In an apparent effort to avoid complicating racial justice efforts, some proponents of progressive race blindness have qualified their claims: They have crafted their arguments to accommodate the usage of race as an antisubordination tool. Cunningham, for example, wants to maintain "race as a cause
of action" for racial injustice, while extricating it from notions of individual
identity. 7 Even Appiah, who has been quite vigilant in his deconstruction of and opposition to racial categorization, now recognizes (at least in passing) the political significance of race to persons of color.58 Appiah, nevertheless, qualifies his observation that race can serve as a site of resistance by cautioning advocates of race
consciousness against "let[ting] our racial identities subject us to new tyrannies."5 9 This analytical compromise, which would keep race as a source of political resistance while abandoning or tentatively embracing it as an aspect of identity, obscures the connections between racial identity
and resistance. This blurring of identity and politics occurs because progressive race blindness theorists overlook two important factors related to identity and resistance. First, progressive race blindness theorists disregard the fact that racial resistance strengthens an individual's racial identity or race consciousness. Furthermore, these theorists do not recognize that some level of race consciousness, or racial identity, serves as a prerequisite or catalyst for racial resistance. In sum, the proponents of progressive race blindness do not acknowledge that there is a symbiotic relationship between racial resistance and identity formation; the two processes are mutually reinforcing. [. . .] The progressive race blindness scholarship also blurs the reality that racial consciousness or identity serves as a prerequisite or catalyst for racial resistance. Persons of color have written extensively on how their racial identity-shaped by experiences with subordination-gives them valuable "experiential knowledge" for challenging racial injustice. 6 Similarly, progressive whites have
persuasively argued that white obliviousness to race and racial identity

impedes whites' understanding and appreciation of racial oppression. 63 For whites or persons of color, race consciousness and identity help create the circumstances for meaningful racial resistance. Accordingly, the progressive race blindness compromise, which seeks to maintain political race but to extricate race from identity and culture, presents an unworkable position. Political resistance to racial subordination constructs and reinforces racial identity and consciousness; racial identity and consciousness are prerequisites for racial resistance. By opposing or questioning
racial identity, proponents of progressive race blindness offer a theory that renders racial resistance an extraordinarily difficult or even impossible
proposition.

Davis 92 (James K. author of Assault On the Left: The FBI and the Sixties Antiwar Movement Spying on America: the FBI's domestic counterintelligence program Praeger 1992 Page 111-113, cayla_) Another, far less violent COINTELPRO strategy was to create tension and mistrust within the groups, so as to neutralize their effectiveness from the inside. In several situations, FBI COINTELPRO actions attempted to destroy
group members’ marriages. In Saint Louis, a black-nationalist group
member’s wife—described by friends as an intelligent and respectable woman— received an anonymous bureau letter saying that her husband had “been making It here” with other women in his organization and that “he gives us this jive ‘bout their better in bed than you.” In San Francisco, the wife of a Panther leader received an anonymous letter that accused her husband of having affairs with several teenage girls, and taking some of the girls on trips with him. In another situation in
Saint Louis, a husband who had expressed concern about his wife’s
activities in a biracial group received an anonymous letter that cause him and his wife to separate. The letter said, in part, “Look man. Guess your old lady doesn’t get enough at home or she wouldn’t be shucking and jiving with our Black men in this group.” In Chicago another type of internal discord was created. In March 1969, a
local Panther leader made known his fears that a party faction led by Fred
Hampton and Bobby Rush was “out to get him.” The bureau capitalized on
the situation by sending an anonymous letter to Fred Hampton in an effort to create additional strain in the Panther’s relations with another group—
the Blackstone Rangers—and within the Panther group itself. The letter read, “Brother Hampton: just a word of warning. A Stone friend tells me [name deleted] wants the Panthers and is looking for somebody to get you out of the way. Brother Jeff [leader of the Blackstone Rangers] is supposed to be interested. I’m just a black man looking for blacks working together, not more of this gang banging.” The FBI Key Black
Extremist Program which was incorporated into the COINTELPRO strategy, began in 1970. Key black extremists were defined as “black activists who were particularly agitated, extreme, and vocal in their demands for
terrorism and violence.” Reports on these extremists were to be submitted every ninety days. One of the bureau’s most successful efforts at creating internal
strife within the Black Panthers played on the schism that had developed between the followers of Eldridge Cleaver and those who followed Hue
Newton. This program began in March 1970 while Cleaver was in exile in Algeria and Newton was in prison. An anonymous bureau letter was sent to Cleaver in
Algeria to tell him that certain Panther officials in California were actively
working against him. The letter was a master-piece of deceit. Cleaver responded immediately by expelling three leaders form the party, and a furious exchange of letters between Panther leaders in California and Cleaver soon followed. On August 13, 1970, Huey Newton was released from prison. The Philadelphia Panther office, as well as

the national headquarters, received an anonymous bureau letter questioning Newton’s competence and leadership. FBI wiretaps at Panther headquarters and at other
offices, together with informant reporting, confirmed that the anonymous letters were very unsettling to the party as a whole. In the summer of 1970 Cleaver led a delegation to North Vietnam and North Korea. A letter was sent to Cleaver, criticizing Newton for not having arrange adequate press coverage.
Joseph 06 (Peniel E. PhD founder of Black Power Studies, Professor of History at Tufts University “Black Power’s Powerful Legacy” The Chronicle Review (7/21/06) http://www.penielejoseph.com/legacy.html , cayla_)
**We do not endorse the ableist language
Yet beneath Carmichael's call for "Black Power" lies a more complicated story. His volatile image at the 1966 march marked both black power's first year of public recognition and shifting national priorities of civil-rights activism. Carmichael's increasing calls to oppose the Vietnam War (often punctuated at protests by chants of "Hell no, we won't go") would lead him to become one of the country's most vocal antiwar activists during the next year. His invocation of self-determination would increasingly lead him to embrace a Pan-Africanist vision in hope of restoring Africa as a world power. The pages of FBI files that I received courtesy of the Freedom of Information Act detail Carmichael's interviews with foreign news media when he traveled, transcripts of speeches in America, and agency efforts to prosecute him on charges of sedition for his outspoken antiwar activities. Since only about a quarter of the almost 20,000 pages of Carmichael's files have been released to date, much remains to be discovered — about his role and the movement to which he gave a name. The documents reflect bureau
surveillance of Carmichael through the tumultuous summer of 1967, a year
when major American cities experienced devastating riots. Not as well remembered as 1968 and its infamously cataclysmic and violent events, 1967 might be described as the "Year of Stokely Carmichael" — all the more remarkable given the fact that he spent five months of it abroad, on a whirlwind international tour that
cemented his reputation as the most dangerously charismatic activist of the
black-power era. At the start of 1967, Carmichael found himself trailed by ex-convict-turned-journalist (and future Black Panther) Eldridge Cleaver for a story in Ramparts magazine and mediating disputes among militants in the San Francisco Bay Area eager to be considered the vanguard of California's burgeoning black-power movement. By the spring, Carmichael was one of the featured speakers, along with King and Benjamin Spock, at New York City's massive mobilization against the Vietnam War. Leading groups of marchers waving Vietcong flags, he vowed to fight "LBJ's racist war." In May, after stepping down as chairman of S.N.C.C., Carmichael

vowed to return to grassroots organizing in Washington, D.C., the site of some of his youthful activism as a Howard student. His promise to take over the city "lock,
stock, and barrel" by promoting black rule made the FBI, local authorities,
and political pundits take notice. "Stokely Carmichael says he's coming," warned The Wall Street Journal, "and the nation's capital is in a sweat." Such fears, however, turned out to be premature. By July Carmichael was touring the world, first in London, where he shared the dais with radical intellectuals like Herbert Marcuse and proclaimed that American cities would become "populated by peoples of the third world" who would not tolerate racism; then in Cuba, where he befriended Fidel Castro and held up the Cuban revolution as a daring experiment in freedom. In 1968 he began a short-lived alliance with the Black Panthers before leaving the United States for Conakry, Guinea (his favorite stop on his global tour, and where he lived in between speaking tours in the United States until he died in 1998). The Black Panthers briefly represented the face of the new radicalism. Like surrealist painters, the Panthers imagined a world not yet in existence, but one they could will into being. Made up of reformed troublemakers, college students, and ex-cons, the Panthers brandished guns and law books in an at times quixotic effort to foment revolution from below. The Panthers, whose personal lives and often limited professional opportunities were shaped by the impoverished landscape of Oakland, Calif., set out to organize the black working class. Huey P. Newton, the seventh child of a preacher and a housewife who had been transplanted from Louisiana to Oakland, huddled in the offices of the North Oakland Service Center in October 1966 and dictated the party platform; Bobby Seale, his slightly older, equally driven but more practical friend, wrote it down. The Black Panther Party's 10-point
manifesto, issued in 1966, called for black self-determination, decent housing and education, and the end to police brutality and exploitation in
the ghetto. The revolution the Panthers so confidently predicted did not go off as planned. Financially crippled, physically harassed by federal surveillance,
and burdened by the descent of once-promising leaders into self-destructive behavior and corruption — highlighted by factional splits and Newton's escalating drug abuse — the Panthers had retreated to local organizing in Oakland by the early 1970s. They seemed far removed from their daringly
romantic beginnings. Black power's intellectual and political legacy is often obscured by the cringe-inducing polemics, threats of violence, and galloping sexism of the words of fire issued by activists like Carmichael, Cleaver, and Newton. Removed from the tumultuous historical setting of 1960s America, those words seem little more than the angry rhetoric of a justly forgotten era, of black nationalists blaming whites for the nation's worsening urban crisis and gun-toting Panthers vowing to lead a political revolution with an army of the black underclass. In popular memory, black power
is a tragedy; a wrong turn from King's hopeful dream to hateful polemics. It has become a twisted bit of folklore, a cautionary tale about angry militants
dragging down more promising movements for social justice.

Alexander 10 (Michelle associate professor of law at Ohio State University, a civil rights advocate and a writer “The new Jim Crow: Mass incarceration in the age of colorblindness” New York: The New Press. 2010 http://www.kropfpolisci.com/racial.justice.alexander.pdf , cayla_)
Courts and scholars agree that the Fourth Amendment governs all searches and seizures by the police and that the amendment was adopted in response to the English practice of conducting arbitrary searches under general
warrants to uncover seditious libels. The routine police harassment, arbitrary searches, and widespread police intimidation of those subject to English rule helped to inspire the American Revolution. Not surprisingly, then, preventing arbitrary searches and seizures by the police was deemed by the Founding Fathers an essential element of the U.S. Constitution. Until the War on Drugs, courts had been fairly stringent
about enforcing the Fourth Amendment's requirements. Within a few years after the drug war was declared, however, many legal scholars noted a sharp
turn in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. By the close of the Supreme Court's 1990-91 term, it had become clear that a major shift in the relationship between the citizens of this country and the police was under way. Justice
Stevens noted the trend in a powerful dissent issued in California v. Acevedo, a case upholding the warrantless search of a bag locked in a motorist's trunk: In the years [from 1982 to 1991], the Court has heard argument in 30 Fourth Amendment cases involving narcotics. In all but
one, the government was the petitioner. All save two involved a search or seizure without a warrant or with a defective warrant. And, in all except three, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the search or seizure. In the meantime, the flow of narcotics cases through the courts has steadily and dramatically increased. No impartial observer could criticize this Court for hindering the progress of the war on drugs. On the contrary, decisions like the one the Court makes today will support the conclusion that this Court has become a loyal foot soldier in the Executive's fight against crime.9 The Fourth Amendment is but one example. Virtually all constitutionally protected civil liberties have been undermined by the drug war. The Court has been busy in recent years approving mandatory drug testing of employees and students, upholding random searches and sweeps of public schools and students,
permitting police to obtain search warrants based on an anonymous informant's tip, expanding the government's wiretapping authority, legitimating the use of paid, unidentified informants by police and prosecutors, approving the use of helicopter surveillance of homes without a warrant, and allowing the forfeiture of cash, homes, and other property
based on unproven allegations of illegal drug activity. For our purposes here, we limit our focus to the legal rules crafted by the Supreme Court that grant law enforcement a pecuniary interest in the drug war and make it relatively easy for the

police to seize people virtually anywhere—on public streets and sidewalks, on buses, airplanes and trains, or any other public place—and usher them behind bars. These
new legal rules have ensured that anyone, virtually anywhere, for any
reason, can become a target of drug-law enforcement activity.

ACLU 9 (a nonpartisan, non-profit organization whose stated mission is "to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties guaranteed to every person in this country by the Constitution and laws of the United States." “The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States: A Follow-Up Report to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination” August 2009 https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/humanrights/cerd_finalreport.pdf , cayla_) In paragraph 14 of its Concluding Observations to the U.S., the Committee focused on two particular concerns: the failure to pass federal legislation to stop the
practice of racial profiling, and the failure to end the National Security Entry and Exit Registration System (NSEERS) program, which targets
individuals on the basis of national origin and religion.28 The Committee expressed its concern as follows: The Committee notes with concern that despite the
measures adopted at the federal and state levels to combat racial profiling – including the elaboration by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice of the Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies – such practice continues to be
widespread. In particular, the Committee is deeply concerned about the increase in
racial profiling against Arabs, Muslims and South Asians in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attack, as well as about the development of the National
Entry and Exit Registration System (NEERS) [sic] for nationals of 25 countries, all located in the Middle East, South Asia or North Africa (arts. 2 and 5 (b)). Bearing in mind its general recommendation No. 31 (2005) on the prevention of racial discrimination in the administration and functioning of the criminal justice system, the Committee recommends that the State party strengthen its efforts to combat racial profiling at the federal and state levels, inter alia, by moving expeditiously towards the adoption of the End Racial Profiling Act, or similar federal legislation. The Committee also analysis ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S FOLLOW-UP SUBMISSION TO CERD ON RACIAL PROFILING [D]espite clear evidence that racial profiling
continues to be a problem for federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, the U.S. government has taken little action to investigate, prosecute or combat the practice. The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States 17 draws the attention of the State party to its general recommendation No. 30 (2004) on discrimination against
noncitizens, according to which measures taken in the fight against terrorism must not discriminate, in purpose or effect, on the grounds of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin, and urges the State party, in accordance with article 2, paragraph 1 (c), of the Convention, to put an end to the National Entry and Exit Registration System (NEERS) [sic] and to eliminate other forms of racial profiling against Arabs, Muslims and South Asians.29 The U.S. government’s response acknowledges that no
progress had been made on enacting federal legislation to ban racial profiling.30 The U.S. government’s submission does not explain, however,

that there was little public support from the executive branch for such
legislation.31 While Congress is responsible for passing laws, it is critical that the leaders of the executive branch call for and urge the passage of such important legislation. Sadly, such leadership has been lacking for several years. The U.S. response also acknowledges the widespread criticism of the NSEERS
program and seeks to justify governmental inaction by noting that the judicial branch continues to be available for those whose rights have been
violated by the program. However, the U.S. submission fails to examine the
ongoing ramifications of the program for individuals and families affected
by the registration process.32 Nor is there explanation of why the program is necessary or should be continued. Insufficient Action Taken by Executive Branch Agencies The U.S. response focuses on the actions of the executive branch –
particularly the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – to prevent and respond to incidences of racial
profiling. Though the submission mentions four investigations launched by the Department of Justice since November of 2007, only one (Puerto Rico) involves racial profiling; and the submission includes no information beyond the opening of the investigations. The submission also fails to include any details about or results of the “numerous” investigations opened by DHS’ Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. In
addition, although the submission recognizes the authority of federal agencies to investigate “patterns or practices of violations” of racial profiling, the U.S. government omits any recent examples of racial profiling
investigations leading to settlements.33 The two settlements cited by the U.S. (reached in 1999 with the State of New Jersey and in 2000 with the Los Angeles Police Department) are now several years old, and have failed to effectively combat racial profiling.34
ACLU 9 (a nonpartisan, non-profit organization whose stated mission is "to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties guaranteed to every person in this country by the Constitution and laws of the United States." “The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States: A Follow-Up Report to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination” August 2009 https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/humanrights/cerd_finalreport.pdf , cayla_) The U.S. follow-up submission reiterates the importance of the Justice Department’s 2003 Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, claiming that it is “binding on all federal law enforcement officers.”44 However, it is important to cite the guidance itself, which clearly falls short of ICERD standards, especially with regard to the absolute lack of enforceability: This guidance is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch. It is not intended to, and does not, create any right, benefit, trust, or responsibility, whether substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against

the United States, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities, entities, officers, employees, or agents, or any person, nor does it create any right of review in an administrative, judicial or any other proceeding.45 In addition to failing to establish enforceable standards under which law enforcement agents can be held accountable, the guidance creates a significant loophole that allows for racial
profiling for reasons of “national security,” a term that can be deployed to
justify a wide variety of unjust practices: In investigating or preventing threats to national security or other catastrophic events (including the performance of duties related to air transportation security), or in enforcing laws protecting the integrity of the Nation’s borders, Federal law enforcement officers may not consider race or ethnicity except to the extent permitted by the Constitution and laws of the United States.46
Importantly, the guidance is only for federal law enforcement and is not applicable to state and local law enforcement agencies, where many racial profiling violations occur. The federal government has imposed numerous requirements on state and local law enforcement in exchange for federal funding in many areas, including post- 9/11 law enforcement measures, yet no effort has been made to require compliance with the guidance as a condition of this funding.
Oliver 94 (Mike, Professor of Disability Studies University of Greenwich, London “Politics and Language: Understanding the Disability Discourse” Dept of Psychotherapy, University of Sheffield disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/Oliver-pol-and-lang 94.pdf , cayla_) The discourse of rights, both human and civil, has played a major role in disability politics in recent years and this requires us to broaden our understanding of the issues in fundamental ways. To begin with, our current segregative practices and segregated provision, which continue to dominate the education of disabled children, have to be seen for what they are; the denial of rights to disabled people in just the same way as others are denied their rights in other parts of the world. As I wrote in a review of a recent re-appraisal of special education. "The lessons of history through the segregation of black people in the United States and current struggles to end segregation in South Africa have shown this to be so. To write as if segregation in schools, or from public transport systems or from public spaces or inter-personal interactions in our own society is somehow different, is to depoliticise the whole issue ". (Oliver 1991) What is
both interesting and unfortunate about the integration/segregation discourse in the area of education however, has been its narrowness, both in terms of its failure to see integration as anything other than a technical
debate about the quality of educational provision. Its failure to explicitly
develop any connections with other debates about segregation of, for example, disabled from public transportation systems, of black people in South Africa, of blind people from public information, or of the poor from
major parts of our cities, has been a major omission. An important reason for this is that legislation, as a concept, has been taken over by politicians, policy

makers, professionals and academics, who have discussed and debated it,
divorced from the views of disabled people themselves. Even my own discipline of sociology, which has a justifiable reputation for criticising everything in sight
including itself, has focused little on the exclusion of disabled people from
society and its institutions (Oliver 1990). While it is certainly true that in the early eighties sociologists played a significant role in exposing the humanitarian ideology underpinning the segregation of children with special needs and exposing the various vested interests concerning (Tomlinson 1982. For et al 1982), this was somehow seen in isolation from other exclusionary processes (Oliver 1985). Further, sociologists have
spent less time examining and criticizing the theory and practice of integration except for a questioning of the romanticism of the integration movement (Barton and Tomlinson 1984) and an articulation of its moral
and political basis (Booth 1989). What is at stake in this dispute within the
integration/segregation discourse is nothing less than our view of both the
nature of social reality and the role of politics in society. One view sees integration as a humanitarian response to unintended consequences in our past history which can be changed by the development of paternalistic policies. The alternative view suggests that “Integration is not a thing that can be delivered by politicians, policy makers or educators, but a process of struggle that has to be joined” (Oliver 1989. 143) And in recognition of that, it is perhaps time we changed the name of the discourse to that of inclusion/clusion rather than integration/segregation. The reason for this change is that the discourse of integration has largely been a
static one about location whereas inclusion is a process which “… fundamentally challenges the traditional approach which regards impairment and disabled people as marginal, or an ‘afterthought’, instead of recognizing that impairment and disablement are a common experience of humanity, and should be a central issue in the planning and delivery of a
human service such as education”. (Mason and Rieser 1994.41) 6. Conclusion In this Unit, I have not discussed the issue of language in ways that suggest that what is at stake is merely changing the labels and terminology we use. Instead I have written
about language as a political issue structured by relations of power and have
attempted to locate this within post-modernist social theory. I have argued that language is inextricably linked to both policy and practice and it is
precisely because of these inextricable links that the right wing critics of
political correctness are wrong. We do not use language just to describe the world and name our own experiences of it. Nor does language merely enable us to deconstruct the world and practices we engage in. It can enable us to conceptualise a better world and begin the process of reconstructing it. We can only believe that attempting to do so is ‘mind control’ or ‘linguistic terrorism’ as far as disabled people or those with special needs are concerned, if we believe that everything is fine and the worlds we inhabit do not need deconstructing and reconstructing. If we
believe that we can improve the quality of all our lives through better policy and changed practice, then we have to recognize that language has a central
role to play in this improvement.

ACLU 9 (a nonpartisan, non-profit organization whose stated mission is "to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties guaranteed to every person in this country by the Constitution and laws of the United States." “The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States: A Follow-Up Report to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination” August 2009 https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/humanrights/cerd_finalreport.pdf , cayla_) Inaction on Problematic Federal Bureau of Investigation Guidelines The U.S. follow- up submission acknowledges the serious concerns of many Members of Congress and advocacy groups about new guidelines (adopted in October 2008) regulating the domestic operations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).70 The follow-up submission states: “Although the guidelines maintain the status
quo with respect to the use of race or ethnicity in investigations, they have
been criticized by advocacy groups and members of Congress for not going far enough to eliminate racial profiling, particularly in national security investigations.”71 The Bush administration took no steps to address the concerns raised, and the guidelines are now operational. Recently, in response to concerns about the guidelines raised by Senator Russ Feingold during Attorney General Eric Holder’s Senate confirmation hearings, Attorney General Holder committed to taking a “close look” at the guidelines early in his tenure to consider whether changes need to be made.72 Thus far, the Obama administration has taken no further action.73 It is
imperative that new policies regarding the FBI guidelines and other law enforcement agency regulations be consistent with U.S. treaty obligations
under ICERD and all other human rights commitments. See section 4 for additional information and concerns about the new FBI guidelines. Finally, it is significant to note that in May and June 2008, after the CERD review, the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance visited the United States to conduct a formal country visit. In his report, recently presented to the U.N. Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur focused on racial profiling as one of his priority concerns, and made the following relevant
recommendations: As a matter of urgency, the [U.S.] Government should clarify to law enforcement officials the obligation of equal treatment and, in particular, the prohibition of racial profiling. This process would benefit from the adoption by Congress of the End Racial Profiling Act. State Governments should also adopt comprehensive legislation prohibiting racial profiling. To monitor
trends regarding racial profiling and treatment of minorities by law enforcement, federal, state and local governments should collect and publicize data about police stops and searches as well as instances of police abuse. Independent oversight bodies should be established within police

agencies, with real authority to investigate complaints of human rights violations in general and racism in particular. Adequate resources should
also be provided to train police and other law enforcement officials.74 The U.S. government should act swiftly to implement the Special Rapporteur’s recommendations.

Amster et al 06
political theory - professor at Georgetown University teaches and publishes on subjects including peace/nonviolence, homelessness/poverty, social/environmental movements, and (Amory Starr, Luis Fernandez, Randall Amster, Lesley Wood, “The Impact of Surveillance on the exercise of political rights: an interdisciplinary analysis” , http://www.trabal.org/texts/assembly091707.pdf, p.7)
[Boykoff 2006: 179; Marx 1989].
Mutual police and protester distrust may limit the possibility of police-protester negotiations before demonstrations, thus
, thus,
[Noakes, Klocke, and Gillham 2005; della Porta and Reiter 1998]. Several studies have suggested that covert forms of repression can result in challengers substituting violent behavior for non-violent activity [Lichbach 1987, White 1989].
Movement decline is associated with exhaustion, and a frequent polarization and increasing distrust between militants and moderates. In movement decline, moderates who are most likely to compromise with authorities are more likely to defect from an organization, and militants who seek continued confrontation are more likely to persist. [Tarrow 1998, 147-8]

Lininger 04-
, p.1206- 07) defense attorney and a graduate of Kent State University with a BA in Political Science and graduated from the University of the Pacific's McGeorge School of Law (Tom Lininger “Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious Groups” http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ilr89&div=34&g_sent=1&collection=journals#1216 Published reports indicate that
the F.B.I. has used a variety of investigative techniques to monitor worshippers at mosques." The F.B.I. has Plan to Count Mosques Stirs Protests
, INTER PRESS SERV., Feb. 17, 2003, available at 2003 WL 6914199.
countries." Utilized confidential informants, undercover agents, surveillance cameras, flyovers, and subpoenas for phone records, among other investigative techniques
.17
Federal law enforcement agencies have not only infiltrated mosques in the United States, but also in foreign
8 This Article will consider whether the prior limits on investigations of religious institutions should be reinstated, and if so, by what means. In particular, I will consider the possibility that state bars' ethical codes could be revised to prohibit prosecutors from supervising the surveillance and infiltration of religious organizations absent a specific suspicion of criminal activity by the organization or its members. This issue has not yet attracted the attention of any other commentators.19
Lininger 04-
defense attorney and a graduate of Kent State University with a BA in Political Science and graduated from the University of the Pacific's McGeorge School of Law (Tom Lininger “Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious Groups” http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ilr89&div=34&g_sent=1&collection=journals#1216 , p.1206)
A surveillance camera was installed
on a utility pole
near a mosque in Lackawanna, New York.
The camera was aimed at the entrance of the mosque
. The Lackawanna Police Chief acknowledged the presence of the camera, but said that his department had no involvement in placing it there. Dan Herbeck, Alwan Spoke with Bin Laden, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 25, 2003, at Al, available at 2003 WL 6435470. The camera was installed during the time period when the F.B.I. was investigating a "terrorist sleeper cell" known as the Lackawanna Six, but the F.B.I. declined to comment about whether it had placed the camera on the utility pole. Id. Jim Holstun, a professor of English at S.U.N.Y. Buffalo, has posted a photo of the camera on the Internet on a Web site entitled Lackawanna Mosque-Watch 2003, available at http://www.buffaloreport.com/ 030201holstun.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) (on file with the Iowa Law Review). In another case,
videotape to an F.B.I. agent
Feb. 11, 2004) (on file with the Iowa Law Review).
an F.B.I. informant videotaped a mass wedding at a mosque, and then provided the
. Affidavit in Support of Arrest Warrant at 19-20, United States v. Mohammed Ali Hasan AI-Moayad, M-03-0016 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://news. findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/usalmoayadl0503aff.pdf (last visited
th
Kleinder 10- litigation attorney at U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York and graduated from Tufts University and Boston College Law School (Yevgenia S. Kleiner “Racial Profiling in the Name of

National Security: Protecting Minority Travelers’ Civil Liberties in the Age of Terrorism Note” http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/bctw30&type=Text&id=108 p.106-08) Of all of the federal agencies criticized for abusing their discretion under the PATRIOT Act,
the TSA
has perhaps
suffered the most vehement attacks for violating travelers' civil liberties
.19 Formed
in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
, the TSA is an agency of the Department of Homeland Security and is responsible for screening all airline passengers.20 Now that airlines can no longer use independent contractors to supply their security personnel,
all of the screeners currently employed in U.S. airports are federal employees.
protected rights.
21
In implementing directives aimed at ensuring the nation's security, TSA employees, and thus the federal government, have been accused of dis- criminating against minority travelers in violation of constitutionally
22 As the experiences of the Irfan family and countless others demonstrate, the
TSA's current methods
of ensuring passengers' safety often
result in unnecessary
delays and
examinations prompted by loose directives and unconstitutional prejudices.
The tragic events of
September 11, 2001 introduced a fear of ter- rorism into Americans' daily lives and inspired in many a suspicion of immigrants of Muslims and Middle Eastern descent
.24 Compounding the dangerous environment of racism these fears engender is whatJef- frey Goldberg, an acclaimed Israeli-American journalist, calls American "security theater.'25 Goldberg argues that airport security in America is a sham, entirely incapable of dealing with a myriad of security vulner- abilities, and accuses the security system of being able to catch only the most careless and "stupid" of terrorists.26 If Goldberg is right, his argu- TSA in August 2007 for its role in refusing to let a man wearing a t-shirt that read "We Will Not Be Silent" in English and Arabic board a JetBlue Airways flight.

The belief in democracy and equality is a racist one that obscures and further promotes white privilege
Lopez, 2003 (Gerardo [Professor of Political Science], "The (Racially Neutral) Politics of Education: A Critical Race Theory Perspective", Educational Administration Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 1 (February 2003) 68-94, 6/28, eaq.sagepub.com/content/39/1/68.full.pdf) // cjh Taken holistically, CRT posits that beliefs in neutrality, democracy, objectivity,¶
and equality “are not just unattainable ideals, they are harmful fictions¶ that obscure the normative supremacy of whiteness in American law and¶
society” (Valdes et al., 2002, p. 3). Notwithstanding, White Americans continue¶
to believe in these ideals, because a racial reality is, perhaps, too difficult¶ to
digest. For example, if I were to argue that what we study within the ¶ politics of education is entirely racist, most scholars in the field—conservative ¶ and liberal alike— would be greatly offended, finding such statements perhaps a handful of truly racist individuals whose ¶ preposterous and absurd. Although
some would agree there might be certain¶ institutional practices (such as
power) that limit the political participation of¶ nonmainstream groups, or
base is not largely affected by racism.
¶ ¶ values and beliefs create policies that negatively affect people of color, most¶ of us would believe that our knowledge To the contrary, most of us would tend to believe that what we study actually ¶ highlights the processes by which people of color are marginalized on a ¶ daily basis and how they can challenge and change the political spectrum ¶ through voting, grassroots organizing, mass mobilization, and the election of ¶ minority officials and representatives. In other words, the belief that the politics¶ of
education actively supports a racist agenda does not fit our prevailing¶ and espoused beliefs about the nature of the field.¶ The role of CRT is to
highlight the fact that such beliefs only serve to¶ maintain racism in place— relegating racism to overt/blatant and unmistakable ¶ acts of hatred, as opposed to highlighting the ways in which our beliefs, ¶ practices, knowledge, and apparatuses reproduce a system of racial hierarchy ¶ and social inequality. Rarely do we question
our own values and knowledge¶ base and how those beliefs emerge from— and help sustain—the notion of a¶ racially neutral and democratic social
order that works for all people. In other ¶ words, within the field, we have a tendency to think that social problems ¶ (such as racism) will be resolved if more people get involved in the political ¶ arena and “do something” about it. The belief in democracy
and “justice for¶ all” is protected—as is the belief that the vehicles to ascertain social justice¶ are racially neutral. It is a cheery and simplistic
take on how racism actually¶ functions in society, as well as a naïve understanding how it can be resolved ¶ and remedied.
Beckett and Sasson 2k (Katherine and Theodore, Beckett: Professor of Law, Societies & Justice Program

Department of Sociology, University of Washington/ Sasson: Professor of International and Global Studies at Middlebury College The Politics of Injustice: Crime and Punishment in America pg. 179-181 2000 Sage Publications, Inc., cayla_)
All Americans are experiencing stepped-up surveillance. Suspect populations, however, are kept under far tighter scrutiny. Black men, regardless of their involvement with the justice system, are routinely
subjected to motor vehicle stops for the crime of DWB—Driving While Black.
Members of minority groups are often stopped in airports, bus terminals, and other public places and questioned about drugs, a practice legitimated by typically ambiguous “drug courier profiles,” which open the door for
unlimited police discretion. Since September 11, 2001, racial profiling of
Arabs and people believed to have ties to the Middle East has become
especially widespread. For individuals of all races who have been sentenced by a court, forms of surveillance range from regular probation, which might entail nothing more than a notification requirement concerning change of address, to electronic monitoring, day reporting, halfway house residency, and house arrest. Probationers and parolees suspected of substance abuse problems must submit to regular drug and alcohol testing. Sex offenders must register with local police, who in turn, in may jurisdictions, notify area residents and prospective employers. In the United States, on any given
day, nearly 1 in 3 young black men is under one form or another of criminal
justice supervision. In many U.S. cities, the proportion is even more dramatic. As noted in Chapter 1, in 1997, 50% of black males in Washington, DC, between 18 and 35 years old were in jail or prison, on probation or parole, out on bond, or wanted on an arrest warrant. In neighboring Baltimore, Maryland, in 1991, the comparable statistic was 56%. In high-poverty, racially segregated neighborhoods, the percentage
is still higher. One unsurprising consequence of the expansion and intensification of community surveillance (e.g., probation and parole) is the burgeoning number of people sent to prison for violating the conditions of
community release. In 1980, new court commitments were responsible for 82% of prison admissions; parole and probation violations were responsible for 17%. By 1997, the share of prison admissions from the courts had declined to 60%, and the share stemming from conditional release violations surged to 40%. Many of these violators are detected through drug tests. Although probation and parole were conceived, at
least in part, as mechanisms for reintegrating offenders into community
life, they now help to explain why U.S. prisons are bursting at their seams.
(Abu-Jamal Column Written 9/19/98 http://www.mumia.nl/TCCDMAJ/quietdv.htm) It has often been observed that America is a truly violent nation, as shown by the thousands of cases of social and communal violence that occurs daily in the nation. Every year, some 20,000 people are killed by others, and additional 20,000 folks kill themselves. Add to this the

nonlethal violence that Americans daily inflict on each other, and we begin to see the tracings of a nation immersed in a fever of violence.
But, as remarkable, and harrowing as this level and degree of violence is, it is, by far, not the most violent feature of living in the midst of the American empire. We live , equally immersed, and to a deeper degree ignores wide-ranging "structural" violence, of a kind that destroys human life with a breathtaking ruthlessness.
, in a nation that condones and Former Massachusetts prison official and writer, Dr. James Gilligan observes; "By `structural violence' I mean the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function of the class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society's collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society . These are not acts of God. I am contrasting `structural' with `behavioral violence' by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on." -- (Gilligan, J., MD, Violence: Reflections On a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage, 1996), 192.) This form of violence, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, is invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more insidious . How dangerous is it -- really? Gilligan notes: "[E]very fifteen years every decade, throughout the world.
, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide on the weak and poor every year of " [Gilligan, p. 196] Worse still, in a thoroughly capitalist society, much of that violence became internalized , turned back on the Self, because, in a society based on the priority of wealth, those who own nothing are taught to loathe themselves , as if something is inherently wrong with themselves, instead of the social order that promotes this self-loathing. This intense self-hatred was often manifested in familial violence as when the husband beats the wife, the wife smacks the son, and the kids fight each other. and systematic violence may be called The War on the Poor This vicious, circular, and invisible violence, unacknowledged by the corporate media, uncriticized in substandard educational systems, and un- understood by the very folks who suffer in its grips, feeds on the spectacular and more common forms of violence that the system makes damn sure -- that we can recognize and must react to it. This fatal . It is found in every country, submerged beneath the sands of history, buried, yet ever present, as omnipotent as death. In the struggles over the commons in Europe, when the peasants struggled and lost their battles for their communal lands (a precursor to similar struggles throughout Africa and the Americas), this violence was sanctified, by church and crown, as the "Divine Right of Kings" to the spoils of class battle. Scholars Frances Fox-Piven and Richard A Cloward wrote, in The New Class War (Pantheon, 1982/1985): "They did not lose because landowners were immune to burning and preaching and rioting. They lost because the usurpations of owners were regularly defended by the legal authority and the armed force of the state. It was the state that imposed increased taxes or enforced the payment of increased rents, and evicted or jailed those who could not pay the resulting debts. It was the state that made lawful the appropriation by landowners of the forests, streams, and commons, and imposed terrifying penalties on those who persisted in claiming the old rights to these resources. It was the state that freed serfs or emancipated sharecroppers only to leave them landless." The "Law", then, was a tool of the powerful to protect their interests, then, as now. It was a weapon against the poor and impoverished, then, as now. It punished retail violence, while turning a blind eye to the wholesale violence daily done by their class masters. The law was, and is, a tool of state power, utilized to protect the status quo, no matter how oppressive that status was, or is. harm to people should be allowed to remain Systems are essentially ways of doing things that have concretized into tradition, and custom, without regard to the rightness of those ways. No system that causes this kind of , based solely upon its time in existence. must serve life, or be discarded as a threat and a danger to life. Such systems must pass away, so that their great and terrible violence passes away with them Systems .

Academic legal discourse creates whiteness as objective reality – Reject the affirmative as a colorblind policy that reifies existing legal structures. Our alternative shifts perspective by inserting narratives of oppressed individuals into legal discourse
Chang 93 – (Robert S. Seattle University Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality “Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space” California Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Oct., 1993), pp. 1241+1243-1323 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3480919 , cayla_) Mainstream
academic legal discourse begins from the premise that objective knowledge exists and is accessible.
I call this the rational/ empirical position. My own theoretical bias tells me that this is a false premise, but I start here to show how the case for personal narrative would appear within the context of mainstream academic discourse.180
Different disempowered groups have developed a similar methodology that tries to reveal bias in supposedly neutral standards.
Feminist legal scholars ask "[t]he woman question." They ask "about the gender implications of a social practice or rule: have women been left out of consideration? If so, in what way; how might that omission be corrected? What difference would it make to do so?"181 Race scholars ask the race question, and so on.
use of the objective voice is one of the social practices that has come under the scrutiny of those asking this type of question. The objective voice is obtained by abstracting from the individual in order to universalize the The perspective of the author so that not only does the author, as an abstracted entity, speak as Everyman, the author also presumes to speak for everyone.
A favorite device is the use of what one commentator calls the "constitutive we."'s2
This "constitutive we" appears in the work of many philosophical and legal theorists.
For example, John Rawls uses "we" in a subtle way that includes "us" as fellow inquirers into the questions he poses."83 But who does he think "we" is?184 Too often,
the individual used as the model for the universal is a man, and more specifically, a white man. Thus, one goal of personal narrative is to discredit this "we." For
example, I might use personal narrative to show that the "we" is a lie because it does not include "me." The stories of outsiders become important because they tell the story from different perspectives, perspectives that may have been excluded when formulating the objective, universal "we." It is important to remember that at this stage
, personal narrative is not being offered to replace what had previously been thought of as objective: to impose my subjectivity upon everyone else only repeats the sin.
'85 Rather,
personal narrative is being offered to show that objectivity may actually be a disguise for white male subjectivity, which takes away the subjectivity of the disempowered.
86 One attempt to restore these lost subjectivities relies on a version of standpoint epistemology. An objectivist or liberal epistemology takes as the proper standpoint that of the "neutral, disinterested observer, a so-called Archimedean standpoint somewhere outside the reality that is being observed."'87 In contrast,
that others cannot have." standpoint epistemologies identify a certain group as victim and then "privileges that status by claiming that it gives access to understanding about oppression
'88 In the context of feminism, "[t]he feminist standpoint epistemologies argue that because men are in the master's position vis-i-vis women, women's social experience-conceptualized through the lenses of feminist theory--can provide the grounds for a less distorted understanding of the world around us."'189 This same point can and has been made about other oppressed groups.'90 One question that arises is why the viewpoint of the oppressed should be privileged. One theorist argues that the standpoint of the oppressed is epistemologically advantageous for the following reasons: It provides the basis for a view of reality that is more impartial than that of the ruling class and also more comprehensive.
It is more impartial because it comes closer to representing the interests of society as a whole; whereas the standpoint of

the ruling class reflects the interests only of one section of the population, the standpoint of the oppressed represents the interests of the totality in that historical period
. Moreover, whereas the condition of the oppressed groups is visible only dimly to the ruling class, the oppressed are able to see more clearly the ruled as well as the rulers and the relation between them. Thus, the standpoint of the oppressed includes and is able to explain the standpoint of the ruling class.191 But the claim that the standpoint of the oppressed is more impartial is unconvincing. It seems that the standpoint of the oppressed would be partial; it would not necessarily provide less distorted views but differently distorted views.
The claim of representing society as a whole also seems problematic because the viewpoints of the oppressed and oppressors are quite distinct and complex.
192 It still might make sense to include the standpoint of the oppressed,
however, not because it has any special access to the truth, but because what is taken as truth is incomplete or distorted without the views of the oppressed.'93
There is the further problem of identifying the standpoint of the oppressed. If oppression or subjugation provides the grounding for having a less distorted view, then it would seem that the prime candidate would be the standpoint of lesbians of color.194 Even if, for the sake of simplicity, we decide that the relevant category is that of women, we are still left with the problem of identifying this standpoint. One commentator warns that we cannot discover this standpoint "directly in women's naive and unreflective world view,""' because this world view, usually labelled as
false consciousness, has been shaped by the dominant male perspective so that it cannot be trusted. Even with standpoint epistemology, then, not all stories of oppression are created equal.
This is problematic "because of the unwillingness, central to feminism, to dismiss some women as simply deluded while granting other women the ability to see the truth."196

Delgado 95 -- (Richard, Founder of Critical Race Theory, civil rights and critical race theory at University of Alabama School of Law Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge Philadelphia : Temple University Press, 1995. cayla_)
**We do not endorse the ableist language To use color-blind nonrecognition effectively in the private sphere, we
would have to fail to recognize race in our everyday lives. This is impossible. One cannot literally follow a color-blind standard of conduct in ordinary social life. Moreover, the technique of nonrecognition ultimately supports the supremacy of white interests. In everyday American life, nonrecognition is self-
contradictory because it is impossible not to think about a subject without
having first thought about it at least a little. Nonrecognition differs from nonperception. Compare color-blind nonrecognition with medical color-blindness. A medically color-blind person is someone who cannot see what others can. It is a partial nonperception of what is “really” there. To be racially color-blind, on the other hand, is to ignore what one has already noticed. The medically color-blind individual never perceives color in the first place; the racially color-blind individual perceives race and then ignores it. This is not just a semantic distinction. The characteristics of race that are noticed (before being ignored) are situated within an already existing understanding of race. That is, race carries with it a complex social
meaning. This pre-existing race consciousness makes it impossible for an individual to be truly nonconsious of race. To argue that one did not really consider the race of an African American is to concede that there was an identification of Blackness. Suppressing the recognition of a racial classification in order to act as if a person were not of some cognizable racial class is inherently racially premised. [. . .] From a psychological or psychoanalytic perspective, nonrecognition may be considered a mode of
repression. The claim that race is not recognized is an attempt to deny the reality of internally recognized social conflicts of race. This internal psychological conflict between recognition and repression of racial identity is reflected in legal discourse. More concretely, an individual’s assertion that he “saw but did not consider race,” can be interpreted as a recognition of race and its attendant social implications, followed by suppression of that recognition. The legal mode of racial nonrecognition is, then, the external extension of this psychological mode of denial of race. As explained by Charles Lawrence, “[w[hen an
individual experiences conflict between racist ideas and the societal ethic that condemns those ideas, the mind excludes his racism from consciousness.” The impetus for that conflict may be moral, legal, or both.
But the suppression does take place, and the external world accommodates it by accepting and institutionalizing the repression rather than attempting to expose and alter the conditions of racial exploitation. The inherent self-contradictions of nonrecognition can be summarized in terms of dialectical logic: A subject is defined
by its negation, hence, an assertion of nonconsideration necessarily implies consideration. The stronger and more defined the character of racial

recognition, the clearer and more sharply drawn its dialectical opposite,
racial nonrecognition. The assertion “I noticed but did not consider race” divides
the dialectic into its two components, consideration and nonconsideration. It then focuses exclusively on the nonconsideration by denying the existence
of the consideration component. While this is a complex maneuver surrounded by assertions of moral superiority, the attempt to deny racial consideration is, at its root, an attempt to hide the underlying racial oppression, a reality no amount of hand-waving can.
APA 8 (American Psychological Association—leading scientific and professional organization representing psychology in the United States, Commemorating Brown: the Social Psychology of Racism and Discrimination Washington, DC 2008, page 187-188, cayla_)
On a societal level, the implications of the psychology of invisibility also
extend to the American preference for color blindness (Plaut & Markus, 2007).
The color-blind ideology contends that race is irrelevant to social life and seeks to make invisible all representations, or even acknowledgements, of
different racial and ethnic groups. It espouses the idea that “we are all the
same.” In addition to rendering invisible the value of these different groups,
it also glosses over the experiences and consequences of racism in America. Without accurate representations of these experiences, members of various racial and ethnic groups may find it difficult to create strategies for discussing, recognizing, and remedying racial inequality (Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Forman, 2004). In other words, just as the stereotyping and prejudice literature has focused on alleviating the pernicious effects of negative representations and has, at times, not recognized the impact of the lack of positive or any representations, the color-blind
ideology has focused on dirt polishing racial prejudice and discrimination
by minimizing attention to race. This approach has masked both the negative influences of racial prejudice and discrimination in shaping individual and group outcomes (i.e., any status differences between racial groups caused by racism) and the
positive influences of racial identity as a cognitive resource that can buffer
the negative effects of stereotyping and prejudice. This ideology also appears to have psychological benefits for Whites but negative consequences for minorities. Plaut and Markus (2007) found that when White students were primed with a color- blind ideology, they felt better about themselves (more happy and confident) and allocated fewer resources to minority programs. Color-blind ideologies also leave racial differences open to other explanations—in particular, American ideas about meritocracy, which locate the responsibility for individual success and failure solely in the hands of the individual. That is, a meritocracy focuses on individual
character, ability, and effort and ignores situational or societal influences and considers status differences or disparities between groups natural and
warranted (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In summary, colorblind and meritocracy ideologies allow Whites to ignore racial

differences (and inequality) and interpret their own privileged position as being the result of individual accomplishment and merit. In contrast, these representations leave people from racial and ethnic minority groups with views of
themselves and their low status as products of their own making—that is, as
a lack of individual accomplishment and merit (Hochschild, 1995)—rather than as products of systemic racism. These ideologies obscure the negative impacts of historical and structural racial discrimination on targeted individuals—making them invisible to both the targets and the observers of stereotyping and prejudice. Furthermore, the color-blind ideology fundamentally restricts the devel-
opment or dissemination of varied and positive representations relevant to
different racial groups.

Alexander 10 (Michelle associate professor of law at Ohio State University, a civil rights advocate and a writer “The new Jim Crow: Mass incarceration in the age of colorblindness” New York: The New Press. 2010 http://www.kropfpolisci.com/racial.justice.alexander.pdf , cayla_) But even assuming that our nation achieved as much as a 25 percent reduction in crime overall through mass incarceration, it still means that the overwhelming majority of incarceration—75 percent—has had absolutely no impact on crime, despite costing nearly $200 billion annually. As a crime reduction strategy, mass incarceration is an abysmal failure. It is largely ineffective and extraordinarily expensive. Saying mass incarceration is an abysmal failure makes sense, though, only if one assumes that the criminal justice system is designed to prevent and control crime. But if mass incarceration is understood as a system of social control—specifically, racial control—then the system is a fantastic success.30 In less than two decades, the prison population quadrupled, and
large majorities of poor people of color in urban areas throughout the United States were placed under the control of the criminal justice system
or saddled with criminal records for life. Almost overnight, huge segments
of ghetto communities were permanently relegated to a second-class status, disenfranchised, and subjected to perpetual surveillance and monitoring by law enforcement agencies. One could argue this result is a tragic, unforeseeable mistake, and that the goal was always crime control, not the creation of a racial undercaste. But judging by the political rhetoric and the
legal rules employed in the War on Drugs, this result is no freak accident. In order to make this point, we need to talk about race openly and honestly. We must stop debating crime policy as though it were purely about crime. People must come to understand the racial history and origins of mass incarceration—the
many ways our conscious and unconscious biases have distorted our judgments over the years about what is fair, appropriate, and constructive when responding to drug use and drug crime. We must come to see, too, how our economic insecurities and racial resentments have been exploited for political gain, and how this manipulation has caused suffering for people of all colors. Finally, we must admit, out loud, that it was because of race that we didn't care much what happened to "those people" and imagined the
worst possible things about them. The fact that our lack of care and concern may have been, at times, unintentional or unconscious does not mitigate our crime—if we refuse, when given the chance, to make amends. Admittedly, though, the temptation to ignore race in our advocacy may be overwhelming. Race makes people uncomfortable. One study found that some whites are so loath to talk about race and so fearful of violating racial etiquette that they indicate a preference for avoiding all contact with black people.31 The striking reluctance of whites, in particular, to talk about
or even acknowledge race has led many scholars and advocates to conclude
that we would be better off not talking about race at all. This view is buttressed

by the fact that white liberals, nearly as much as conservatives, seem to have lost patience with debates about racial equity. Barack Obama noted this phenomenon in his book, The Audacity of Hope: "Rightly or wrongly, white guilt has largely
exhausted itself in America; even the most fair-minded of whites, those who would genuinely like to see racial inequality ended and poverty relieved, tend to push back against racial victimization—or race-specific claims based
on the history of race discrimination in this country." Adding to the temptation to avoid race is the fact that opportunities for challenging mass incarceration on purely race-neutral grounds have never been greater. With budgets busting, more than two dozen states have reduced or eliminated harsh mandatory minimum sentences, restored early-release programs, and offered treatment instead of incarceration for some drug offenders.32 The financial crisis engulfing states large and small has led to a conversion among some legislators who once were "get tough" true believers. Declining crime rates, coupled with a decline in public concern about crime, have also helped to create a rare opening for a productive public conversation about the War on Drugs. A promising indicator of the public's receptivity to a change in course is California's Proposition 36, which mandated drug treatment rather than jail for first-time offenders, and was approved by more than 60 percent of the electorate in 2000.33 Some states have decriminalized marijuana, including Massachusetts, where 65 percent of state voters approved the measure.34 Taken together, these factors suggest that, if a major
mobilization got under way, impressive changes in our nation's drug laws and policies would be not only possible, but likely, without ever saying a word about race. This is tempting bait, to put it mildly, but racial justice advocates should not take it. The prevailing caste system cannot be
successfully dismantled with a purely race-neutral approach. To begin with, it is extremely unlikely that a strategy based purely on costs, crime rates, and the wisdom of drug treatment will get us back even to the troubling incarceration rates of the 1970s. As indicated earlier, any effort to downsize dramatically our nation's prisons
would inspire fierce resistance by those faced with losing jobs, investments,
and other benefits provided by the current system. The emotion and high anxiety would likely express itself in the form of a racially charged debate about values, morals, and personal responsibility rather than a debate about the prison economy. Few
would openly argue that we should lock up millions of poor people just so that other people can have jobs or get a good return on their private
investments. Instead, familiar arguments would likely resurface about the need to be "tough" on criminals, not coddle them or give "free passes." The
public debate would inevitably turn to race, even if no one was explicitly
talking about it. As history has shown, the prevalence of powerful (unchallenged)
racial stereotypes, together with widespread apprehension regarding major structural changes, would create a political environment in which implicit
racial appeals could be employed, once again, with great success. Failure to anticipate and preempt such appeals would set the stage for the same divide-and conquer tactics that have reliably preserved racial hierarchy in the United States for centuries. Even if fairly dramatic changes were achieved while ignoring race, the results would be highly contingent and temporary. If and when the economy improves, the justification for a "softer" approach would no longer exist. States would likely gravitate

back to their old ways if a new, more compassionate public consensus about race had not been forged. Similarly, if and when crime rates rise—which seems likely if the nation's economy continues to sour—nothing would deter politicians from making black and brown criminals, once again, their favorite whipping boys. Since the days of slavery,
black men have been depicted and understood as criminals, and their criminal "nature" has been among the justifications for every caste system
to date. The criminalization and demonization of black men is one habit
America seems unlikely to break without addressing head-on the racial
dynamics that have given rise to successive caste systems. Although
colorblind approaches to addressing the problems of poor people of color often seem pragmatic in the short run, in the long run they are counterproductive. Colorblindness, though widely touted as the solution, is actually the problem.
Alexander 10 (Michelle associate professor of law at Ohio State University, a civil rights advocate and a writer “The new Jim Crow: Mass incarceration in the age of colorblindness” New York: The New Press. 2010 http://www.kropfpolisci.com/racial.justice.alexander.pdf , cayla_)
Far from being a worthy goal, however, colorblindness has proved catastrophic for African Americans. It is not an overstatement to say the systematic mass incarceration of people of color in the United States would not have been possible in the post—civil rights era if the nation had not
fallen under the spell of a callous colorblindness. The seemingly innocent phrase, "I don't care if he's black . . ." perfectly captures the perversion of Martin Luther King Jr.'s dream that we may, one day, be able to see beyond race to connect spiritually across racial lines. Saying that one does not care about race is offered as an
exculpatory virtue, when in fact it can be a form of cruelty. It is precisely because we, as a nation, have not cared much about African Americans that we have allowed our criminal justice system to create a new racial
undercaste. The deeply flawed nature of colorblindness, as a governing
principle, is evidenced by the fact that the public consensus supporting
mass incarceration is officially colorblind. It purports to see black and
brown men not as black and brown, but simply as men—raceless men—who have failed miserably to play by the rules the rest of us follow quite naturally. The fact that so many black and brown men are rounded up for
drug crimes that go largely ignored when committed by whites is unseen. Our collective colorblindness prevents us from seeing this basic fact. Our blindness also prevents us from seeing the racial and structural divisions that persist in society: the
segregated, unequal schools, the segregated, jobless ghettos, and the segregated public discourse—a public conversation that excludes the

current pariah caste. Our commitment to colorblindness extends beyond individuals to institutions and social arrangements. We have become blind, not so much to race, but to the existence of racial caste in America. More than forty-five years ago, Martin Luther King Jr. warned of this danger. He insisted that blindness and
indifference to racial groups is actually more important than racial hostility to the creation and maintenance of racialized systems of control. Those who supported slavery and Jim Crow, he argued, typically were not bad or evil
people; they were just blind. Even the Justices who decided the infamous Dred Scott case, which ruled "that the Negro has no rights which the white man is bound to respect," were not wicked men, he said. On the contrary, they were decent and dedicated men. But, he hastened to add, "They were victims of a spiritual and intellectual
blindness. They knew not what they did. The whole system of slavery was largely perpetuated through spiritually ignorant persons." He continued: This tragic blindness is also found in racial segregation, the not-too-distant
cousin of slavery. Some of the most vigorous defenders of segregation are sincere in their beliefs and earnest in their motives. Although some men are segregationists merely for reasons of political expediency and political gain, not all of the resistance to integration is the rear- guard of professional bigots. Some people feel that their attempt to preserve segregation is best for themselves, their children, and their nation. Many are good church people, anchored in the religious faith of their mothers and fathers. . . . What a tragedy! Millions of Negroes have been crucified by conscientious blindness. . . . Jesus was right about those men who crucified him. They knew not what they did. They were inflicted by a terrible blindness.36 Could not the same speech be given about mass incarceration today? Again, African Americans have been "crucified by conscientious blindness." People of good will have been unwilling to see black and brown men, in their humanness, as entitled to the same care, compassion, and concern that would be extended to one's friends, neighbors, or loved ones. King recognized that it was this indifference to the plight of other races that supported the institutions of slavery and Jim Crow. In his words, "One of the great tragedies of man's long trek along the highway of history has been the limiting of neighborly concern to tribe, race, class or nation." The
consequence of this narrow, insular attitude "is that one does not really mind what happens to the people outside his group."37 Racial indifference and blindness—far more than racial hostility—form the sturdy foundation
for all racial caste systems. Abandoning the quest for a colorblind society is easier said than done, of course. Racial justice advocates, if they should choose this
path, will be required to provide uncomfortable answers to commonly asked
questions. For example, advocates are frequently asked, When will we (finally) become a colorblind society? The pursuit of colorblindness makes people impatient. With courage, we should respond: Hopefully never. Or if those words are too difficult to utter, then say: "Not in the foreseeable future." More than a little patience will be needed when explaining the complete about-face. Probably around the same number of people think the Earth is flat as think race consciousness should be the rule in perpetuity, rather than the exception. It would be a mistake, though, to assume that people are
incapable of embracing a permanent commitment to color consciousness. The shift may, in fact, come as something of a relief, as it moves our collective focus away from a wholly unrealistic goal to one that is within
anyone's reach right now. After all, to aspire to colorblindness is to aspire to

a state of being in which you are not capable of seeing racial difference—a
practical impossibility for most of us. The shift also invites a more optimistic view of human capacity. The colorblindness ideal is premised on the notion that we,
as a society, can never be trusted to see race and treat each other fairly or with genuine compassion. A commitment to color consciousness, by contrast, places faith in our capacity as humans to show care and concern for others, even as we are fully cognizant of race and possible racial
differences. If colorblindness is such a bad idea, though, why have people across the political spectrum become so attached to it? For conservatives, the ideal of colorblindness is linked to a commitment to individualism. In their view, society should be concerned with individuals, not groups. Gross racial disparities in health, wealth, education, and opportunity should be of no interest to our government, and racial identity should be a private matter, something best kept to ourselves. For liberals, the ideal of colorblindness is linked to the dream of racial equality. The hope is that one day we will no longer see race because race will lose all of its significance. In this fantasy, eventually race will no longer be a factor in mortality rates, the spread of disease, educational or economic opportunity, or the distribution of wealth. Race will correlate with nothing; it will mean nothing; we won't even notice it anymore. Those who are less idealistic embrace colorblindness simply because they find it difficult to imagine a society in which we see race and racial differences yet consistently act in a positive, constructive way. It is easier to imagine a world in which we tolerate racial differences by being blind to them. The uncomfortable truth, however, is that
racial differences will always exist among us. Even if the legacies of slavery, Jim Crow, and mass incarceration were completely overcome, we would remain a nation of immigrants (and indigenous people) in a larger world
divided by race and ethnicity. It is a world in which there is extraordinary racial and ethnic inequality, and our nation has porous boundaries. For the foreseeable future, racial and ethnic inequality will be a feature of American life. This reality is not cause for despair. The idea that we may never reach a state of perfect racial equality—a
perfect racial equilibrium—is not cause for alarm. What is concerning is the
real possibility that we, as a society, will choose not to care. We will choose to be blind to injustice and the suffering of others. We will look the other way and deny our public agencies the resources, data, and tools they need to solve problems. We will refuse to celebrate what is beautiful about our distinct cultures and histories, even as we blend and evolve. That is cause for despair. Seeing race is not the problem. Refusing to
care for the people we see is the problem. The fact that the meaning of race may evolve over time or lose much of its significance is hardly a reason to be
struck blind. We should hope not for a colorblind society but instead for a world in which we can see each other fully, learn from each other, and do what we can to respond to each other with love. That was King's dream—a society that is capable of seeing each of us, as we are, with love. That is a goal worth fighting for.’

Davis et al 15-
researcher of social justice leadership at University of Texas with the Department of Educational Administration at the University of Texas ( Standards”, Bradley W. Davis , Mark A. Gooden, and Donna J. Micheaux, “Color-Blind Leadership: A Critical Race Theory Analysis of the ISLLC and ELCC http://eaq.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/05/20/0013161X15587092.full.pdf+html, p. 7) Additionally, Delgado and Stefancic (2001) argue that serves important
the system of White supre macy5 purposes
that outline
how race-based outcomes emerge
, often
as an unconscious result of how individuals think about race
. Moreover,
the inherent subtlety
that comes
from
being
ordinary makes White racism harder to detect
, and therefore more difficult to address. Incidentally, the impact of the unearthed White racism is difficult to measure. Thus,
concepts of color blindness
or formal definitions of equality,
which insist on treating all people equally, facilitate hiding White racism in plain sight natural, and fair, as it operates in the background in activities like policy construction
.
equalizing outcomes
. Thus,
White takes on the appearance of
repair of racial opportunity gaps. Thus, like those CRT scholars who argue
being normal, Color blindness s stifles deeper reflections about inequity and precludes interrogations of White privilege or conversations about
. In the case of education, color blindness precludes recognition and
that concepts of neutrality, objectivity, color blindness, and meritocracy must be challenged
,
we
contend that educators
must start to question why these concepts hinder the reduction of systemic inequities
.

Lawrence 95 – (Charles R. Professor of Law at University of Hawai'i at Mānoa Centennial “The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness: Learning to Think and Talk About Race, Again” Boston College Third World Law Journal Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 2 1-1 1995 lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1248&context=twlj , cayla_)
It was not until well after Brown established Justice Harlan's dissent as the law of the land that color-blindness was transformed from a healing
prescription into a carrier of the disease itself.16 If the equal protection clause required the disestablishment of racist meanings, practices and institutions, that disestablishment could not occur without giving affirmative attention to those meanings and practices. This is the meaning of affirmative action. One cannot desegregate a segregated school by ignoring the race of those seeking admission. 17 But affirmative action made it apparent that one could not achieve equal opportunity without some redistribution of opportunity. Of course this redistribution was resisted. The resistance took the form of antiaffirmative action politics and what became known as "reverse discrimination" litigation. 19 The transformation of color-
blindness from prescriptive ideal into a condition of societal denial first appeared in these anti-affirmative action cases and in the politics that
created those cases.20 The transformation is achieved by the assertion that Justice Harlan's ideal has now become real. "Our Constitution is color-blind" becomes
'We are a color-blind society."21 Such an assertion can only be believed if
we engage in massive denial of what we see and hear every day. Thus when the Supreme Court struck down the Richmond Virginia minority set-aside program in Croson,22 the majority opinion found that there was "no direct evidence of race discrimination [against minority contractors] on the part of the city ... or any evidence that the city's prime contractors had discriminated against minority-owned subcontractors."23 The Court's majority blinds itself to Richmond's history of slavery and segregation.24 It refuses to see the city's still segregated neighborhoods and segregated schools. The Justices deny their own life experiences in clubs, communities and jobs where blacks are rarely seen.25 And if these realities are brought to their attention they say, "but this is not evidence,"26 or "this is economics, not race, "27 or "this is protected racist speech, not conduct,"28 or "it is not racism when white contractors hire their friends and all of their friends just happen to be white,"29 or "maybe black folks don't like contracting work. "30 And then they say to
those who seek affirmative remedies for this discrimination, "You must be a
racist if you don't believe we are a color-blind society. "31 These are all forms
of denial. The Justices on the Supreme Court are not its only practitioners.
Denial is a pervasive symptom of contemporary American racism.

The belief in democracy and equality is a racist one that obscures and further promotes white privilege
Lopez, 2003 (Gerardo [Professor of Political Science], "The (Racially Neutral) Politics of Education: A Critical Race Theory Perspective", Educational Administration Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 1 (February 2003) 68-94, 6/28, eaq.sagepub.com/content/39/1/68.full.pdf) // cjh Taken holistically, CRT posits that beliefs in neutrality, democracy, objectivity,¶
and equality “are not just unattainable ideals, they are harmful fictions¶ that obscure the normative supremacy of whiteness in American law and¶
society” (Valdes et al., 2002, p. 3). Notwithstanding, White Americans continue¶
to believe in these ideals, because a racial reality is, perhaps, too difficult¶ to
digest. For example, if I were to argue that what we study within the ¶ politics of education is entirely racist, most scholars in the field—conservative ¶ and liberal alike— would be greatly offended, finding such statements perhaps a handful of truly racist individuals whose ¶ preposterous and absurd. Although
some would agree there might be certain¶ institutional practices (such as
power) that limit the political participation of¶ nonmainstream groups, or
base is not largely affected by racism.
¶ ¶ values and beliefs create policies that negatively affect people of color, most¶ of us would believe that our knowledge To the contrary, most of us would tend to believe that what we study actually ¶ highlights the processes by which people of color are marginalized on a ¶ daily basis and how they can challenge and change the political spectrum ¶ through voting, grassroots organizing, mass mobilization, and the election of ¶ minority officials and representatives. In other words, the belief that the politics¶ of
education actively supports a racist agenda does not fit our prevailing¶ and espoused beliefs about the nature of the field.¶ The role of CRT is to
highlight the fact that such beliefs only serve to¶ maintain racism in place— relegating racism to overt/blatant and unmistakable ¶ acts of hatred, as opposed to highlighting the ways in which our beliefs, ¶ practices, knowledge, and apparatuses reproduce a system of racial hierarchy ¶ and social inequality. Rarely do we question
our own values and knowledge¶ base and how those beliefs emerge from— and help sustain—the notion of a¶ racially neutral and democratic social
order that works for all people. In other ¶ words, within the field, we have a tendency to think that social problems ¶ (such as racism) will be resolved if more people get involved in the political ¶ arena and “do something” about it. The belief in democracy
and “justice for¶ all” is protected—as is the belief that the vehicles to ascertain social justice¶ are racially neutral. It is a cheery and simplistic
take on how racism actually¶ functions in society, as well as a naïve understanding how it can be resolved ¶ and remedied.

ACLU 9 (a nonpartisan, non-profit organization whose stated mission is "to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties guaranteed to every person in this country by the Constitution and laws of the United States." “The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States: A Follow-Up Report to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination” August 2009 https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/humanrights/cerd_finalreport.pdf , cayla_)
FBI Investigations of Muslims As part of the “war on terror,” the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) has continued to undertake problematic inquiries and investigations of members of Muslim communities, Muslim
religious organizations (including mosques), and even Muslim charities.137 Targeted individuals have been investigated at their places of employment, their homes, and their schools and universities, and have had their families, friends, classmates, and co-workers questioned and harassed.138 These investigations have had a chilling
effect on the civic participation of Arab, Muslim and South Asian individuals and communities, since many are afraid to attend their local
mosques or get involved with Islamic organizations and events.139 Updates 32 The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States Rarely do these investigations result in terrorismrelated charges. Most cases have resulted in no
charges being filed at all or with the filing of lesser charges such as
immigration-related offenses, tax evasion or document fraud. As discussed elsewhere in this document, the creation of a “suspect community” seems to have been codified in the new FBI guidelines, allowing agents to consider race and religion when starting investigations. For example, in February 2009, it was reported that the FBI had infiltrated several mosques in California, using cameras and other surveillance equipment to record hours of conversations in those mosques, as well as in restaurants and homes.140 Local residents report that the surveillance has caused them to avoid the mosques and pray at home, avoid making charitable contributions – a fundamental tenet of the Muslim faith – and refrain from having conversations about political issues such as U.S. foreign policy.141 Use of Informants and Agent Provocateurs
Since 9/11, the FBI has increasingly used informants to infiltrate mosques
and other places where Muslims gather.142 A number of these informants have been paid large sums of money to elicit information about potential criminal or terrorist activity, which has led to charges of entrapment.143 Some feel that the financial
incentives cause these agents to exaggerate claims or instigate plots in order to show success. The FBI has used several questionable and coercive tactics
to recruit Muslims to serve as informants. These attempts have occurred directly through FBI agents or through questioning by other law enforcement
agencies like Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs
and Border Patrol (CBP).148 Attempts have also been made to recruit individuals who report suspicious activity to law enforcement.149 Anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals who refused to cooperate were threatened or retaliated against. Updates The

Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States 33 The stories below tell the experiences of two individuals who were subject to such recruitment and retaliation: FBI Guidelines In October 2008, former Attorney General Michael Mukasey and the Department of Justice under the Bush Administration released The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations. 152 While a small number of NGOs, including the ACLU, were invited by the Department of Justice to review and comment on the Guidelines during the drafting process, the final version lacks the changes requested by the ACLU and others, including members of Congress.153 The new Guidelines went into effect on December 1, 2008. The new Guidelines have several significant
problems. Most notably, they open the door to abuse of power and racial profiling by allowing the FBI to open “assessments” without any factual
predicate.154 By calling their investigations “assessments,” FBI agents can
investigate any person they choose, provided it is done with the goal of preventing crime, protecting national security, or collecting foreign
intelligence.155 There is no requirement of a factual connection between
the agent’s authorizing purpose and the actual conduct of the individuals
who are being investigated.156 FBI agents can initiate “assessments” without any supervisory approval and without reporting to FBI headquarters or to the Department of Justice.157 Moreover, the new Guidelines do not require the FBI to keep records regarding when “assessments” are opened or closed, and “assessments” have no time limitation.158 The FBI can even initiate an “assessment” if the agent determines that the person might make a good FBI informant.159 Innocence does not protect people
from being subjected to a wide range of intrusive investigative techniques including: the collection of information from online sources, including
commercial Updates 34 The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States databases; the recruitment of informants who are then tasked to gather information about individuals under “assessment”; the use of FBI agents to surreptitiously gather information from friends and neighbors without revealing their true identity or true purpose for asking these questions; and the use of FBI agents to follow individuals under “assessment” day and night for as long as the agents deem necessary.160 Perhaps most troubling is that the new Guidelines will significantly increase racial profiling. Former Attorney General Mukasey stated that the Guidelines “will not alter the previous Department rules that forbid predicating an investigation simply based on somebody’s race, religion, or exercise of First Amendment rights.”161 But, rather than eliminating racial profiling, the
Guidelines actually encourage the profiling of people of color through the
national security exceptions. Because the exceptions do not require legal proof of criminal suspicion, the U.S. has disproportionately targeted and will continue to target Arabs, Muslims and South Asians.162 Despite the statements of Attorney General Holder, who said that ending racial profiling was a “priority” for the Obama administration and that profiling was “simply not good law enforcement,”163 the Obama administration has not repealed these guidelines.

APA 8 (American Psychological Association—leading scientific and professional organization representing psychology in the United States, Commemorating Brown: the Social Psychology of Racism and Discrimination Washington, DC 2008, page 84-85, cayla_) This institutional perspective was pioneered by DuBois (1920/2003) and Cox (1948), but their view was not influential in White social science circles until the late 1960s. At that
time, Black activist scholars,
particularly Stokely Carmichael [later known as Kwame Ture] and Charles Hamilton (see Carmichael & Hamilton, 1967),
brought the concept of institutional
racism to the center of conceptual and research attention in their writings. The 1960s civil rights movements had pressed mainstream social science to consider an institutional perspective on racism, and by the 1970s a few White scholars (see, e.g., Blauner, 1972) were questioning the institutionally racist character of U.S.
society. Even major government reports on the racial protests of the 1960s could now include analyses of a societal problem explicitly termed White
racism. Since the 1960s, a growing body of empirical research clearly has indicated that contemporary racism is deeply imbedded in the foundation of U.S. society (see Feagin, 2000, 2006). Racism is far more than a matter of some scattered bigots, or even of an influential racist ideology, but rather is thoroughly institutionalized and systemic. By systemic racism, I mean the White attitudes, emotions,
practices, and institutions that are integral to the long-term exploitation and domination of African Americans and other Americans of color in U.S.
society. At systemic racism’s heart are the practices of Whites that deny
Americans of color the dignity, opportunities, and privileges generally
available to Whites. This system of racism was initially created by European Americans in the enslavement of African Americans and the genocidal taking of Native American lands in the 17th to the 19th centuries. For many generations, descendants of European immigrants have greatly benefited from the intergenerational transmission of this enrichment. Systemic racism was intentionally built into the U.S.
Constitution and other political documents by the “founding fathers,” many of whom were slaveholders or benefited as merchants, lawyers, or bankers
from a slavery-centered economy (Feagin, 2000, 2006). After the slavery provisions were voided by the Civil War constitutional amendments, White leaders
created not only a system of legal segregation in southern and border
states—a form of near-slavery that lasted until recently, the late 1960s—but also de facto segregation in the North, a form of racial oppression often only modestly less onerous than legal segregation. Today, Whites—most centrally, White men— remain critical to the perpetuation of a still pervasively racist system. They maintain it through the reinforcement of racist ideology and through large-scale discrimination in employment, education, housing, politics, and public accommodations.
A majority of Whites still work aggressively to maintain their White privileges and the unjust enrichment garnered from past oppression by
ancestors (see Feagin 2000, 2006; Feagin & McKinney, 2003; Picca & Feagin, 2007).

Too often social scientists, especially social psychologists, pussyfoot [circumvent] around on racial matters and prefer to study them in their less controversial forms of individual “prejudice” or “bias” and not in terms of
institutionalized racial discrimi- nation and systemic racism. Let us examine briefly two leading current textbooks. In one social psychology textbook, Aronson, Wilson, and Akert (2002) provided one major chapter dealing with racial and ethnic issues. They offered insightful discussions of affective and cognitive aspects of prejudice and stereotyping as well as of how people use social categories, make attributions, and develop interracial contacts that might reduce prejudice. There is also a brief discussion of how conformity to norms might be involved in prejudice and stereotyping.
Apart from a cursory data-less paragraph describing institutional racism,
racism is viewed only in terms of individual stereotyping and prejudice. There is no significant treatment of racial discrimination. Also missing is a serious discussion of the history of racial oppression and of contemporary institutionalized racism. Discussions of racism are mainly framed in terms of individual
differences, and there is no serious coverage of the history or social struc ture that undergirds and generates racist stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. Thus, there is little sense that individuals are heavily shaped by the vested (e.g., material) interests of the socioracial groups to
which they belong. An introductory sociology textbook by John Macionis (2003) also focuses substantially on theories of prejudice and stereotyping, but this textbook does have a substantial discussion of U.S. immigration and of the demographic characteristics of racial and ethnic groups. It also provides short histories of Black, Latino, and
Asian Americans with brief references to the discrimination they have historically faced. There is a brief paragraph on racism, which is interpreted
solely in terms of individual attitudes. There is one page that briefly explores the relationship between prejudice and discrimination and briefly notes the idea of institutional discrimination developed by Carmichael and Hamilton (1967)—with the major example of institutional racism being in the past (legal segregation). As with the social psychology text, there is no sustained discussion of institutional or systemic racism today. Although there is more attention to the racialized history of
U.S. racial groups than in the social psychology text, there is no significant discussion of the contemporary discrimination faced by Americans of color
demonstrated in numerous field research studies (see Feagin, 2000; Feagin & Sikes, 1994). Both textbooks emphasize ideas and topics long characteristic of research on racial-ethnic issues: prejudice, stereotyping, assimilation, and sometimes individualized discrimination. Yet, they contain relatively little discussion of
research on discrimination that is systematically webbed across
mainstream institutions. The result is a mild analysis of U.S. racism that
accents issues of individual prejudice or matters of assimilation rather than
challenging readers about the systematically racist nature of U.S. society.
Given that collective phenomena are considered the domain of sociology and much social psychology, the relative lack of attention to institutional
and systemic racism by these social scientists is noteworthy and troubling. Why have they seemingly abdicated their concern with larger collectivities when researching racial matters? With regard to social psychologists, one might initially argue that this is less of a problem, for today most take as their mandate studying individual prejudice and stereotyping. However, the problem with this is that one cannot
understand the full meaning of individual prejudices and stereotypes

without examining the impact of the larger context of systemic racism on
individual subjectivity. (Indeed, as the editors of this volume note in their opening and closing chapters, this neglect of social contexts is a general problem for much social psychology today.) Individuals pick up prejudices and stereotypes from the social networks in which they live, and these are still highly segregated and racialized (see Feagin & O’Brien, 2003). In the case of White Americans, these social networks
maintain what I have termed a broad White racial framing of society, one that includes a strong racist ideology that was originally created in the 17th
and 18th centuries (Feagin, 2006; see also chap. 3, this volume). Today, as in the
past, this White racial frame encompasses an extensive array of racialized
prejudices, stereotypes, images, emotions, and inclinations. It is largely within White-dominated networks and institutions that Whites learn, hone, test, and sometimes reject racial understandings and proclivities to discriminate. Researchers
cannot understand racial prejudices and individual acts of discrimination
well without examining closely their interactive and contextual settings.

Sabo et. al. (Samantha, Susan Shaw, Maia Ingram, Nicolette Teurel-Shone, Scott Carvajal, Jill Guernsey de Zapien, Cecilia Rosales, Flor Redondo, Gina Garcia, Raquel Rubio-Goldsmith Director of Transborder Initiatives University of Arizona, Mel and Enid Zuckerman College of Public Health, Arizona Prevention Research Center, United States “Everyday violence, structural racism and mistreatment at the US-Mexico border” azprc.arizona.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/Everyday%20Violence%20-%20Sabo_0.pdf , cayla_) This study aimed to document the prevalence of and ways in which US citizen and permanent residents of Mexican descent experience immigration policy and militarization of the Arizona border region. The concept of everyday violence, or
violence that is normalized by marginalized groups, is situated at the ‘capillary level’ and focuses on the daily micro-level interactions that directly and indirectly impose violence on individuals (Scheper-Hughes, 2004, p. 276). Such violence can render structural racism, defined by Krieger et al. (1993, p. 938) as ‘the exploitive and oppressive social relationships that simultaneously define racial/ethnic groups and cause a system of inequalities that become embodied as racial/ ethnic health
inequities,’ invisible to its victims (Bourgois, 2009; Quesada et al., 2011). In essence, everyday violence on the USe Mexico border is the observable and violent manifestation ofstructural racism and is the space where the arm of the state directly confronts the oppressed. Specifically, we are concerned with how militarized zones of
the Arizona border are experienced and normalized by US citizen and
permanent residents of Mexican descent. We define militarization as the saturation of and pervasive encounters with immigration officials including local police enacting immigration and border enforcement policy with military style tactics and weapons (Dunn, 1996). Within militarized zones, encounters with officials can
occur in public and private spaces in the form of formal and informal checkpoints, discretionary identity inspection, and arbitrary abuse and
detention (Duschinski, 2009; Goldsmith et al., 2009). Research has shown that
militarization of communities contributes to a collective experience of
being under siege (Bourgois, 2004; Dunn, 2009; Duschinski, 2009) in which targeted groups endure contestation of their own identity and citizenship (Romero and Serag, 2004; Russell-Brown, 2004; Weitzer and Tuch, 2002). Such ‘identity encounters’ and the associated arbitrary consequences serve to compound targeted groups’ suspicion and distrust of state institutions and authority (Duschinski, 2009; Warner, 2006). Targeted groups often strategically use silence and
minimization of victimization as coping strategies for self-preservation
(Green, 1994). Chronic suppression of traumatic events may be internalized
and manifest as stress, anxiety and increased risk for debilitating mental
and physical health conditions (G.C. Gee et al., 2012; Thoits, 2010). Fear of

reprisal, criminalization, and lack of pathways for resistance to human
rights violations have also been shown to be detrimental to health (Green, 1994; Vargas, 2001; Warner, 2006). While the everyday violence of structural
racism inherent in many immigration and border enforcement policies have
historically plagued Mexican origin residents of the borderlands (Orrenius, 2004), their felt effects may have been particularly palpable during the time of this research, 2006e2008. Between these years, Arizona enacted restrictive immigration law related to education, employment, identification, law enforcement, and language (Green, 2011; Goldsmith and Romero, 2008). Simultaneous increases in capital and
human resources to the Office of Homeland Security in form of US border patrol agents and National Guard, border fencing and technology transformed Arizona border communities into highly militarized
environments (Goldsmith and Romero, 2008). Locally, anti-immigrant militia groups were also present in most rural Arizona border communities, while the pressure for local law enforcement to assume federal immigration law enforcement responsibilities was also mounting (Goldsmith and Romero, 2008). Thus, during the time of this study, residents were operating within a particularly anti-immigrant political landscape, one that was highly focused on restricting access to public services
paralleled by an unprecedented accumulation of state and federal resources
for ArizonaeMexico border security (McNicoll, 2012; Rodriguez and Padilla, 2010; E.A. Viruell-Fuentes et al., 2012). Emerging evidence has demonstrated an inverse relationship between restrictive or punitive immigration policies and major social determinants of health, specifically in access to health and social services, education opportunities, and adequate employment remuneration (Acevedo-Garcia et al., 2012; Hacker et al., 2011; Edna A. Viruell-Fuentes, 2011). Immigration health scholars have also begun to examine how an anti-immigrant climate has the potential to increase levels of discrimination, fear, stress, and illness among immigrant populations (Carvajal et al., 2012; Gilbert C. Gee, 2011; Hardy et al., 2012; E. A. Viruell-Fuentes, 2007). Most recently, anti-immigrant policies have been argued to produce the conflation
of ethnicity and immigration status at both interpersonal and institutional levels, thus creating a hostile environment for entire ethnic groups,
regardless of immigration status (Viruell-Fuentes et al., 2012). According to Viruell-Fuentes et al. (2012) ‘.all Latinos [in the US] are perceived as Mexican, all Mexicans are seen as immigrants, and they in turn are all cast as undocumented’.
Mexican origin immigrants and their non-immigrant co-ethnics of the Arizona borderlands experience day-to-day ethnic and immigration related discrimination, stress, limited mobility, and fear of accessing health and
social services (Acevedo-Garcia et al., 2012; Carvajal et al., 2012; Dreby, 2010). Specifically, institutionalized ethno-racial profiling in immigration and local
law enforcement, or the sanctioned use of ‘Mexicanness’ or ‘Mexican appearance’ as probable cause for citizen inspection, has been documented
among Mexican US citizen and permanent residents since 1994 (Goldsmith et al., 2009; R. Koulish et al., 1994). As immigration reform emerges as a highly salient political issue for both political parties, and border security remains at the core of
immigration reform debates, it is imperative that scholars advance the understanding of the public health impact of such enforcement policies on

the daily lives of Mexican-origin US permanent residents, and their
nonimmigrant US citizen co-ethnics.

Calderon 6—(Dolores, University of Utah assistant professor in the Department of Education, Culture, and Society and the Ethnic Studies Program “One-Dimensionality and Whiteness” USA Policy Futures in Education, Volume 4, Number 1, 2006 http://pfe.sagepub.com/content/4/1/73.full.pdf+html , cayla_) The development of this possessive investment in whiteness is linked to the origin
of property rights in the United States where ‘race and property ... played a crucial role in establishing and maintaining racial and economic
subordination’ (Harris, 1995, p. 277). Identification in the United States of the individual with his/her society, as Marcuse (1991) identifies, in this case the
possessive investment in whiteness, has been concretely accomplished both
historically and currently via the construction of citizenship.[3] In the United States, the ‘legal definition of whiteness took shape in the context of
immigration law, as courts decided who was to have the privilege of living in
the United States’ (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001, p. 77). Who had and has access to citizenship is a one-dimensional construction in which citizenship requires a type of ‘false consciousness’ that constructs citizenship as a proxy for whiteness.[4] Historically [5], citizenship in the United States was defined by an explicit socially and culturally homogeneous view (Torres, 1998, p. 170). For example, ‘judges defined the white race in opposition to blackness or some other form of otherness. Whiteness,
thus, was defined in opposition to nonwhite, an opposition that also marked
a boundary between privilege and its opposite’ (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001, p. 77).
Therefore, because inclusion in the benefits of citizenship is measured by whiteness, disenfranchised non-white communities can only access these
benefits if they attempt to assimilate to the totality of whiteness. For example, the concept of ‘passing’, or becoming white, which is ‘well known among black people in the United States’ is a ‘feature of race subordination in all societies structured on white supremacy’ (Harris, 1995, p. 277). Passing, in the context of the black experience in the United States ‘is related to the historical and continuing pattern of white racial domination and economic exploitation, which has invested passing with a certain economic logic’ (1995, p. 277). This assimilation, however, is also obfuscated for
non-whites because the concept of whiteness irrationally maintains the
non-white citizen at a distance from the core of whiteness. This manifestation of whiteness reflects how the ‘“cunning of Reason” works, as it so often did, in the interest of the powers that be’ (Marcuse, 1991, pp. 15-16). Simply identifying whiteness as the measure of citizenship is not enough. If the analysis were to stop at this point, it would preclude an analysis of the racism of whiteness. Maria de los Angeles Torres (1998) explains that because citizenship assumes loyalty to a state, ‘the identities
of many immigrants are too complex to allow’ for a singular oath of allegiance to the United States (Torres, 1998, p. 170). This oath is emblematic of the normative and universalizing discourse whiteness has
upon institutions. This is problematic for non-white communities as: [d]iaspora
communities often reside in multiple states or have traveled through them.

Restricting loyalty to one state flattens immigrants’ experiences and limits
their political options, particularly when they are affected by the decisions of many states. (1998, p. 170) One-Dimensionality and Whiteness 77 The construction of citizenship thus reflects the full ideological manifestations of whiteness. Thus,
ideology has very real and concrete manifestations that serve to promote
advanced industrial society. [. . .] Interestingly, the plight of immigrants in the
United States is framed from an ideological position that claims that only through achieving the legal status of citizenship can individuals truly attain
the American Dream. Furthermore, in contemporary society, the: absorption of ideology into reality does not, however signify the ‘end of ideology.’ On the contrary, in a specific sense advanced industrial culture is more ideological than its predecessor, inasmuch as today the ideology is in the process of production itself ... It is a good way of life – much better than before – and as a good way of life, it militates against qualitative change. Thus emerges a pattern of one-dimensional thought and behavior in
which ideas, aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or
reduced to terms of this universe. (1991, pp. 11-12) For this reason it is important to understand how whiteness has historically manifested and transformed itself, for it is
in the contemporary moment that whiteness is most transparent and
difficult to lay a finger on. This transparency is not an accident of history; it is the
living legacy of whiteness, which locates its heritage in the devastation inflicted on the colonized by the European colonizer. In order to extract whiteness from its invisibility, it is important to note, ‘[e]very colonized
people – in other words, every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality – finds itself face to
face with the language of the civilizing nation’ (Fanon, 1967, p. 18). Thus, in the language of citizenship one can find the language or reproduction of whiteness.
Gonzalez 15 - J.D., University of California, Berkeley (Marc-Tizoc "Afterword: Habeas data: Comparative constitutional interventions from latin america against neolibral states of insecurity and surveillance" http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4077&context=cklawrevi ew)
By such means, among others
(e.g., truth and reconciliation processes and other extraordinary constitutional writs like amparo and similar writs of protection),5
century.6
diverse Latin American peoples sought to recover their societies from those, often military officers and members of the traditional landed elite, who had disappeared, killed, tortured, and terrorized their citizenry with impunity in the final decades of the twentieth
Simultaneously, these third generation human rights were designed to safeguard the precious new democracies so that the terror of the dictatorships would never more recur.7 Why does it feel critical to remember these histories and to understand the constitutional remedies developed by those who reconstructed democracies in the aftermath of these regimes?
revelations about the technology, scale, and coordination of contemporary corporate
and state surveillance
Recent throughout and beyond the United States have

opened new opportunities to contextualize
historically and to chart spatially
our neoliberal states of insecurity and surveillance.
8 While distinctive,
the rights protected by habeas data are not unique to Latin America. United States Constitution
Indeed, many countries and international unions, such as Germany, the United States, and the European Union, have developed a complex array of legal protections for data.9
Nevertheless, the terrible twentieth century histories of Latin America constitute compelling sociolegal reasons for evolving the venerable writ of habeas corpus into the information-focused right of habeas data and for embedding habeas data into a foundational source of national law like the Afterword
. Without habeas data rights being recognized as fundamental by the highest court of a jurisdiction, people may well lack effective means to learn what information their governments have collected about them.10
Moreover, failing to constitutionalize rights like the writ of habeas data may contribute to “a dialogic default—a failure to contest economic [and other forms of] injustice within constitutional and political discourse.”1 In this
, I offer a critical intervention into the existing discourse of Anglophone legal scholars regarding bulk metadata collection and related programs.12 While I claim neither expertise in national security law, nor in Internet privacy law, my conversations regarding habeas data with legal scholars based in the United States over the past decade have impressed on me that
many scholars may be completely ignorant of this critical evolution in constitutional protections In light of the recent reportage of massive surveillance
ACLU 9 (a nonpartisan, non-profit organization whose stated mission is "to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties guaranteed to every person in this country by the Constitution and laws of the United States." “The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States: A Follow-Up Report to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination” August 2009 https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/humanrights/cerd_finalreport.pdf , cayla_) As of May 2009 a total of sixty-six 287(g) MOAs have been signed in twenty-three states,83 and approximately eighty applications to join the program are pending approval.84 ICE’s budget for the program has increased tenfold in the last two years, from $5.4 million in 2007 to $54.1 million in 2009.85 Enforcement of federal
immigration law by local law enforcement is inherently problematic and
tied to practices of racial profiling, as noted recently in ACLU testimony before Congress: Because a person is not visibly identifiable as being undocumented, the basic problem with local police enforcing immigration law is that police officers who are often not adequately trained, and in some cases not trained at all, in federal immigration
enforcement will improperly rely on race or ethnicity as a proxy for
undocumented status. In 287(g) jurisdictions, for example, state or local police with minimal training in immigration law are put on the street with a mandate to arrest “illegal aliens.” The predictable and inevitable result is that any person who looks or sounds “foreign” is more likely to be stopped by police, and more likely to be arrested (rather than warned or cited or simply let go) when stopped. . . . The problem of racial profiling, however, is not limited to 287(g) field models . . . the federal
government uses an array of other agreements to encourage local police to enforce immigration law. Racial profiling concerns therefore are equally

present under jail-model MOUs or other jail-screening programs. Officers,
for example, may selectively screen in the jails only those arrestees who
appear to be Latino or have Spanish surnames. Police officers may also be motivated to target Latinos for selective or pretextual arrests in order to run them through the booking process and attempt to identify undocumented immigrants among them.86 As such, immigration enforcement by local police raises grave concerns about racial profiling of Latinos and other racial minorities, and of both U.S. citizens and non citizen immigrants. Although the overwhelming majority of Latinos in the United States are U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents87 (and Latinos are expected to constitute more than twenty-five percent of the U.S.
population by 2050),88 Latinos have frequently been singled out for
immigration stops and inquiries by local law enforcement. Such race and
ethnic-based immigration enforcement imposes injustices on racial and ethnic minorities, specifically reinforcing the harmful perception that Latinos—U.S. citizens and non-citizens alike—are presumptively “illegal immigrants” and therefore not entitled to full and equal citizenship unless
and until proven “legal.”89 Low-wage Latino immigrant workers are particularly threatened as are low-wage South Asian workers, who face an intersection of anti immigrant hostility, employment abuse, and post-9/11-related discrimination.90 In addition to exacerbating pre-existing racial profiling in local communities, local police enforcement of the immigration laws under the 287(g) program and other related ICE
ACCESS programs undermines the trust between the police and the
communities that they serve. When local police function as immigration agents, the message is sent that some citizens do not deserve equal protection under the law. Fear, as opposed to trust, is created in Latino and other immigrant communities, and Latino U.S. citizen children with parents, who are either immigrants or citizens, may avoid coming in contact with police or any public officials (including school officials) out of concern that they, their parents or family members will be targeted by local enforcement because of their actual or perceived immigration status.91 Latina and other immigrant women who are victims of domestic violence may fear interacting with the police because of their immigration status, or the status of their families, or even their abusers, and the consequences of that fear can leave them in dangerous and violent situations.92
Respect and trust between law enforcement and communities of color are essential to successful police work.93 It is for this reason that many police executives and police organizations have expressed concern that local police enforcement of the immigration laws has a “negative overall impact on public safety.”94 Despite the significant problems associated with local police enforcement of immigration laws, ICE has not responded to, or monitored, complaints about the 287(g) program or other ICE ACCESS programs. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently reported that ICE lacks key internal controls for the implementation of the287(g) program, even though the program has been in operation for
approximately seven years.95 The GAO report conclusively found that 287(g) program objectives have not been documented in any program-related materials; guidance on how and when to use program authority is inconsistent; guidance on how

ICE officials are to supervise officers from participating agencies has not been created; data that participating agencies use to track and report to ICE has not been defined; and
performance measures valuating progress toward program objectives have
not been developed.
Romero 6 – (Mary, professor and faculty head of Justice and Social Inquiry at Arizona State University and an affiliated faculty member with Women and Gender Studies, Asian Pacific American Studies and African and African American Studies “Racial Profiling and Immigration Law Enforcement: Rounding Up of Usual Suspects in the Latino Community” Critical Sociology, Volume 32, Issue 2–3 2006 nclc203muir.pbworks.com/f/Crit%20Sociol-2006-Romero-447-73.pdf , cayla_) Daniel Georges-Abeyie’s (2001:x) theoretical paradigm of grand and petit
apartheid links current practices of racial profiling with other “negative social factors and discretional decision-making by both criminal justice
agents and criminal justice agencies.” Georges-Abeyie’s theoretical work outlines a continuum of petit apartheid discriminatory practices ranging from the covert and informal to the overt and formal. Petit apartheid has been used to explain racial profiling in the war against drugs (Campbell 2001; Covington 2001), regulating and policing public space (Bass 2001; Ferrell 2001b), under-representation of persons of color interested in law enforcement (Ross 2001) and the use of racial derogation in prosecutors’ closing arguments ( Johnson 2001). Petit apartheid relates to concerns about struggles over access to urban public space, freedom of movement, the processes of capital investment, political decision-making, and policing first theorized by Henri Lefebvre (1996 [1968]) and others (see Caldeira 2000; Ferrell 2001a; Harvey 1973, 1996; Holston 1999; Mitchell 2003). Images and perceptions of public space are used to encourage, discourage, or prohibit use and movement. Exclusionary models of public life are most noted for privileging middle-class consumers. Surveillance, stops, and searches maintain a landscape of
suspicion and reinforce white, middle-class citizens’ suspicions of racial
minorities and protect their access to public space. When citizenship is racially embodied through law-enforcement practices that target Mexican-American neighborhoods and business areas, then Henri Lefebvre’s (1996 [1968]:174) statement about urban space is actualized: “The right of the city manifests itself as a superior form of rights: right to freedom, to individualization in socialization, to habitat and to inhabit.” Immigration law enforcement assists such exclusionary use of urban public spaces and limits freedom of movement. However, the INS is in the position of having to negotiate an adequate flow of undocumented labor to meet urban capitalist needs while maintaining the appearance of controlling immigration. Consequently, immigration law enforcement in US cities is not structured around

systematic or random checking of identification but rather a pattern of citizenship inspection that maintains the landscape of suspicion. Given the class and racial
segregation perpetuated by exclusive residential zoning, the INS targets ethnic cultural spaces marked by Mexican-owned businesses, agencies offering bilingual services, and neighborhoods with the highest
concentration of poor and working-class Latinos. Within these areas, INS agents engage in “typing” suspected aliens (Heyman 1995; Weissinger 1996) that embodies a “figurative border” (Chang 1999). In the process of typing Mexicans as suspects, Americans are “whitened.” The 1975 Supreme Court decision that “Mexican appearance” “constitutes a legitimate consideration under the Fourth Amendment for making an immigration stop” ( Johnson 2000:676) legalized micro- and macro aggressions inflicted upon Mexican Americans. Micro- and macroaggressions, as well as petit apartheid, are experienced by Mexican Americans when they are caught within a racially profiled dragnet in which INS agents operate with unchecked discretion. Harms of reductions and repression occur when Latinos are subjected to racially motivated (and frequently class-based) stops and searches and race-related INS abuse (Arriola 1996–97; Benitez 1994; Lazos 2002; Vargas 2001). Micro-aggressions are racial affronts on
a personal level, experienced when an individual Mexican American is stopped and asked to prove citizenship status; macro-aggressions are group
affronts because they are directed towards “Mexicanness” in general. Macro aggressions target dark complexions and physical characteristics characterized as “Mexican” or “Latino;” speaking Spanish, listening to Spanish music, shopping at Mexican-owned businesses, or any other cultural practices bring on racially motivated stops.
Romero 6 – (Mary, professor and faculty head of Justice and Social Inquiry at Arizona State University and an affiliated faculty member with Women and Gender Studies, Asian Pacific American Studies and African and African American Studies “Racial Profiling and Immigration Law Enforcement: Rounding Up of Usual Suspects in the Latino Community” Critical Sociology, Volume 32, Issue 2–3 2006 nclc203muir.pbworks.com/f/Crit%20Sociol-2006-Romero-447-73.pdf , cayla_)
While legal scholars, civil rights advocates, and the general public denounced federal law enforcement practices towards Muslims and persons of Middle-Eastern descent under the Patriot Act, racialized immigration stops and searches, abuse, and harassment are ongoing processes honed
over a century of citizenship inspections of Mexicans. Immigration policing is based on determining that citizenship is visibly inscribed on bodies in specific urban spaces rather than “probable cause.” In the Chandler Roundup, official investigations found no evidence that stops and searches were based on probable cause of criminal activity. The conclusion drawn by the Attorney General’s investigation underscores the harms of micro- and macro-aggressions and the use of petit apartheid: . . . there were no other warrants, charges, or holds for these individuals that in any way indicated other

criminal activity or that required extraordinary security or physical force. The issue raised by this type of treatment is not whether the arrest and deportation is legal, but whether human beings are entitled to some measure of dignity and safety even when they are suspected of being in the United States illegally. (1997:28–9) The Chandler
Roundup fits into a larger pattern of immigration law enforcement practices that produce harms of reduction and repression and place Mexican Americans at risk before the law and designate them as second-class citizens
with inferior rights. Latino residents in Chandler experienced racial affronts
targeted at their “Mexicanness” indicated by skin color, bilingual speaking
abilities, or shopping in neighborhoods highly populated by Latinos. During immigration inspections, individuals stopped were demeaned, humiliated, and embarrassed. Stops and searches conducted without cause were
intimidating and frightening, particularly when conducted with
discretionary use of power and force by law enforcement agents. [. . .]
Racialized immigration stops establish, maintain, and reinforce second class citizenship and limit civil, political, economic, and cultural rights and
opportunities. In urban barrios, the costly enterprise of selected stops and searches, race-related police abuse, and harassment results in deterring political participation, in identifying urban space racially, in classifying immigrants as deserving and undeserving by nationalities, and serves to drive a wedge dividing Latino neighborhoods on the basis of citizenship status.

Romero 6 – (Mary, professor and faculty head of Justice and Social Inquiry at Arizona State University and an affiliated faculty member with Women and Gender Studies, Asian Pacific American Studies and African and African American Studies “Racial Profiling and Immigration Law Enforcement: Rounding Up of Usual Suspects in the Latino Community” Critical Sociology, Volume 32, Issue 2–3 2006 nclc203muir.pbworks.com/f/Crit%20Sociol-2006-Romero-447-73.pdf , cayla_)
Conquest of the Southwest subliminally grafted Mexicans to “the American
psyche as a ‘foreigner,’ even though the land had once belonged to Mexico” (Romero 2001:1091). Following the Mexican-American War, special law-
enforcement agencies were established to patrol the newly formed border
and to police Mexicans who remained in occupied territory, as well as later migrants across the border. The most distinct form of social control and domination used by the US in this occupation was the creation of the Texas and Arizona Rangers. Maintaining the interests of cattle barons in Texas, the Texas Rangers treated Mexicans living along the border as cattle thieves and bandits when they attempted to reclaim stolen property from cattle barons. Similarly, the Arizona
Rangers protected capitalist interests by protecting strikebreakers against
Mexican miners. Following a parallel pattern, the INS rarely raided the fields during harvest time and scheduled massive immigration roundups during periods of economic recession and union activity (Acuña 2000). Remembering the policing functions
of the Texas and Arizona Rangers and the Border Patrol (including the current militarization at the border) is crucial in recognizing the social functions accomplished by racialized immigrant raids, sweeps, and
citizenship inspections (Acuña 2000; Andreas 2000; Dunn 1996; Nevins 2002). Under Operation Wetback, for example, only persons of Mexican descent were included in the campaign and thus were the only group to bear the burden of proving citizenship (Garcia 1980). Militarized sweeps of Mexicans maintained the community in “a state of permanent insecurity” in the 1950s; in response a petition was submitted to the United Nations charging the USA with violating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Acuña 2000:306). A number of recent studies unveil the hypocrisy of US border
policies that manage to allow enough undocumented immigrant labor in to meet employers’ demands while at the same time increasing INS and Border
Patrol budgets (Andreas 2000; Massey et al. 2002; Nevins 2002). Longitudinal studies comparing INS efficiency and increased budget prior to the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) to late-1990s immigration law reforms suggest
that the cost of detaining unauthorized border crossers has increased
(Massey et al. 2002). Immigration researchers (Chavez 2001; Massey et al. 2002) claim that we are paying for the illusion of controlled borders while politicians make a political spectacle, pandering to alarmist public discourse about a Mexican immigrant invasion, the breakdown of the US-Mexico border, and increased crime resulting from immigration (Chavez 2001). Operation Blockade and Operation Gatekeeper failed to deter extralegal immigration from Mexico. US employers continue to

have access to a vulnerable, cheap labor force created by assigning workers an “illegal” status. The worst cost of these failed policies are the increasing loss of
human lives as migrants are forced to cross the border in the most desolate
areas of the desert (Cornelius 2001; Eschbach et al. 1999)

ACLU 9 (a nonpartisan, non-profit organization whose stated mission is "to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties guaranteed to every person in this country by the Constitution and laws of the United States." “The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States: A Follow-Up Report to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination” August 2009 https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/humanrights/cerd_finalreport.pdf , cayla_) As noted in the December 2007 ACLU and the January 2008 RWG shadow reports to the CERD Committee, since the tragic events of 9/11, the United States government has subjected hundreds of men from (or appearing to be from) Muslim, Arab,
or South Asian countries to racial profiling, unfair treatment and punishment, and arbitrary detention and investigation.105 Without specific or material verification, individuals have been scrutinized based upon assumptions of their potential connection to alleged “terrorist activities.”106 Almost none of these men have been found to have any connection to terrorism and the law enforcement agencies who categorized the men as having “special interest” appear to have based many of these
decisions on racial, ethnic, and religious profiling.107 While in custody for months on end, some of the men were physically and psychologically
brutalized and mistreated, and even still, after having been found to be innocent of the terrorist activity that they were suspected of, many of these
men were deported.108 We would respectfully refer the Committee to two ACLU reports that document the destructive impact that these human rights violations have had upon the individual families and broader communities that these men belonged to, as well as to a 2004 decision of the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.109 NSEERS (“Special Registration”) In the wake of 9/11, the U.S. government has
used immigration enforcement as a justification to target members of Muslim, Arab and South Asian communities for investigation, interrogation
and sometimes deportation.110 Though this tactic has been used in various ways, the most notorious is the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS).111 The NSEERS program required certain non-immigrants from
predominantly Muslim countries to register themselves at ports of entry and local immigration offices, and to be fingerprinted, photographed and
questioned at length based on their countries of origin.112 The U.S. government took the position that NSEERS did not constitute religious profiling, since it was based on national origin and eventually was to be expanded to all countries.113 In reality, the program was never expanded past the original list and, although some parts of the program were suspended, other parts are still in place.114 After considering the report of the U.S. government and after listening to testimony of U.S. officials during the constructive dialogue, the Committee issued a recommendation to the U.S. government

expressing concern over the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS). The recommendation states in relevant part: The Committee also draws
the attention of the State party to its general recommendation no. 30 (2004) on discrimination against non-citizens, according to which measures taken in the fight against terrorism must not discriminate, in purpose or effect, on
the grounds of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin, and urges the Updates 30 The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States State party, in accordance with article 2, paragraph 1 (c), of the Convention, to put an end to the National Entry and Exit Registration System (NEERS) [sic] and to eliminate other forms of racial profiling against Arabs, Muslims and South Asians.115 The CERD Committee recommendation was most appropriate. Unfortunately, victims who challenged the constitutionality of the NSEERS program have failed to win redress. In September 2008, in Rajah et al. v. Mukasey, four people placed in removal proceedings with orders of removal had their claims rejected by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.116 The court found, in relevant part, that the Immigration and
Nationality Act provides statutory authorization for the NSEERS program, that the NSEERS program does not violate the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution and that petitioners had not endured 4th or 5th
Amendment violations.117

ACLU 9 (a nonpartisan, non-profit organization whose stated mission is "to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties guaranteed to every person in this country by the Constitution and laws of the United States." “The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States: A Follow-Up Report to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination” August 2009 https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/humanrights/cerd_finalreport.pdf , cayla_)
Lastly, the federal government has failed to assess or address the impacts of the NSEERS program on transgender women who are citizens of affected
countries and are present in the United States. Although such individuals may have completely transitioned to a female gender identity and live their lives entirely as women, it is unclear whether they are required to register under NSEERS in light of the fact that they were assigned a male identity at birth.126 Moreover, some of their
identity documents may still indicate that they are male as a result of obstacles to changing identity documents to reflect individuals’ gender identity and expression in both the U.S. and overseas. This places transgender women from targeted countries at risk of either being found to be noncompliant with the program and deported, or of having to disclose
their transgender status in order to comply with the program. Both options
can have profoundly adverse consequences for their safety.127
“Operation Front Line” Despite the U.S. government’s acknowledged obligation to provide relevant information to the Committee and its stated position that it has done so,
there are significant examples of racial profiling at the federal level that have not been disclosed either as part of the U.S. government’s 2007 report128 or as part of the follow-up information provided to the Committee
in January 2009.129 A significant example is “Operation Front Line,” a program
whose existence was revealed by a recent Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit by the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee and
Yale Law School’s National Litigation Project.130 By its official description,
Operation Front Line was designed to “detect, deter and disrupt terror operations” among immigrants during the months leading up to the
presidential election in November 2004.131 However, the documents
obtained though the suit contained “damning evidence against the use of
ethnic racial and religious profiling in counterterror operations.”132 Evidence suggests that the list of people who registered under NSEERS was used to identify people who were called in for interviews with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).133 An analysis of the data obtained from the Department of
Homeland Security reveals that an astounding seventy-nine percent of the targets investigated were immigrants from Muslim majority countries.134
Moreover, foreign nationals from Muslim-majority countries were 1,280 times more likely to be targeted than similarly situated individuals from other countries.135 Incredibly, not even one terrorism-related conviction resulted from the interviews

conducted under this program. What did result, however, was an intense chilling
effect on the free speech and association rights of the Muslim, Arab and
South Asian communities targeted in advance of an already contentious presidential election.136 The Committee should request that the U.S. government explain why this information was not disclosed previously, that it reveal information
on any similar racial profiling programs operated under the Bush administration, and that it highlight any steps taken by the Obama
administration with respect to Operation Front Line.
ACLU 9 (a nonpartisan, non-profit organization whose stated mission is "to defend and preserve the individual rights and liberties guaranteed to every person in this country by the Constitution and laws of the United States." “The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States: A Follow-Up Report to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination” August 2009 https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/humanrights/cerd_finalreport.pdf , cayla_) Profiling at Airports and Border Crossings For Muslim, Arab and South Asian people who enter the United States, entry can come at a high cost for both citizens and non citizens alike.164 Muslims, Arabs and South Asians, including those assumed
to be Muslim based on their appearance, are frequently pulled aside by Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and questioned about their faith, friends,
family, and even political opinions.165 Travelers have reported their cell phones, computers, personal papers, business cards and books being taken and, many believe, copied by the CBP agents.166 Even U.S. citizens have been threatened with referral to ICE.167 This unjust treatment is caused, in part, by a problematic CBP guidance. Released in July 2008, the CBP guidance on border searches of information contained in papers and electronic devices states, in part, that “[i]n the course of a border
search, and absent individualized suspicion, officers can review and analyze the information transported by any individual attempting to enter, reenter,
depart, pass through, or reside in the United States . . . ”.168 The guidance followed on the heels of the 2007 CBP decision to lower the basis for copying documents from a “probable cause” standard to a “reasonable suspicion” standard.169 This overly
broad guidance gives agents at the border latitude to single out travelers based on their apparent or actual religion or ethnicity, and creates a higher bar for re-entry for U.S. citizens from Muslim, Arab and South Asian
countries. Often, in order to travel abroad for business, pleasure or to see family, Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians are forced to submit to lengthy and humiliating searches and have their families, business contacts and personal papers subject to governmental scrutiny.170 As a result, business travelers have reduced their trips abroad and individuals have left personal papers, cell phones, and laptops at home to avoid the intensive and unwarranted searches by CBP. Many Muslim, Arab, and South Asian
travelers have been told that their names are on government lists and

cannot be cleared. Far from being mere inconveniences, these stops are intrusive and humiliating and interfere with citizens’ rights to privacy and
re-entry.171 The following stories illustrate the impact of these unfair practices on individuals and families: Religious Head Coverings and Air Travel In August 2007, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) released a series of new guidelines intended to serve as standard operating procedures for security screening at airports around the U.S.176 These new screening procedures singled out Sikh turbans
and Muslim head coverings to be screened with higher scrutiny, even though no evidence existed that these objects were being used to hide harmful or dangerous items.177 The new procedures led to widespread profiling and abuse of Sikhs at airports where they were required to remove their turbans, have their turbans roughly patted down by Transportation
Security Officers (TSO), and face additional screening procedures.178 After continuous negotiations with three Sikh organizations to combat the unclear, inconsistent, and unfair application of TSA operating procedures, a new set of options for screening Sikhs and their turbans was negotiated and issued by the TSA in October 2007.179 Per these new guidelines, after being selected for screening at the discretion of a TSO, a Sikh was to be provided three options for screening his turban: (1) a
private screening area or a puffer machine, if available; (2) a self patdown of the turban followed by a swabbing of the fingers of the individual
for chemical residue; or (3) a TSO pat-down of the turban.180 This policy, absent from the U.S. government’s follow-up submission to the Committee, has been implemented with questionable success.181 Sikhs have reported that wide-scale differences and inconsistencies exist between airports, that all three options are rarely given, and that the discretionary nature of screening procedures coupled with a lack of training has led to a failure to curtail abuses and profiling of Sikhs at airports.182 The stories of three individuals impacted by these TSA procedures are as follows: Muslim
women have faced similar profiling and discrimination. Because the federal government has not adequately publicized the existence of or trained TSA agents in its policy on “religious and cultural sensitivity,” women who wear Muslim religious attire (including the hijab and other head coverings) have experienced profiling, harassment, and inappropriate and invasive
searches.186 In 2006, the Council on American-Islamic Relations received eighty complaints of racial discrimination in the airport.187

Link – ‘Integrationist’ thinking “Intergration” forces people of color to assimilate to an oppressive culture where race is a taboo but they are still judged for it
Peller, 2011 (Gary [Professor at Georgetown Law], "History, Identity, and Alienation", CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW VOLUME 43 JULY 2011 NUMBER 5, 6/28, 1481 – 1501, uconn.lawreviewnetwork.com/files/documents/Peller.pdf) // cjh Integrationism within the African American community has had two¶ main, and divergent, meanings. Rather than signify the opening of¶ American institutions
neutrally to all, as it has historically for virtually all¶ white liberals and progressives, many African Americans have historically¶ understood racial integration as more problematic because it also signified¶ cultural
assimilation rather than liberal neutrality.14 As Professor Cruse, a ¶ nationalist, argued, integration means assimilation, because it means¶ integrating into white cultural practices,15 or “the Negro . . . transform[ing] ¶ himself into a white black-man,” as Robert Browne, another nationalist ¶ intellectual, put it.16
¶ Primarily among middle-class Blacks there has traditionally existed ¶ another strand of integrationist ideology, articulated along the lines of the ¶ Frederick Douglas/NAACP tradition that did not see integration as cultural ¶ assimilation.17 Like its counterpart among whites, this integrationism ¶ consisted of a liberal, rights-oriented conception of the triumph of ¶ rationality and equality over prejudice and discrimination, reflected in ¶ terms of encompassing African Americans as full citizens in liberal ¶ American democracy. The words of Martin Luther King, Jr. evoke the ¶ idea of a day where men “will not be judged by the color of their skin but ¶ by the content of their character.”18 ¶ As Cruse describes its class dimensions, Black integrationism is ¶ associated with the Black middle class because that class is the only Black ¶ group for whom such integration could seem attainable: ¶ [T]he Negro working class has been roped in and tied to the ¶ chariot of racial integration driven by the Negro middle class.
hangs up “our” drive for¶ integration.19 ¶ ¶
In this drive for integration the Negro working class is being¶ told in a thousand ways that it must give up its ethnicity and become human, universal, full-fledged American. Within the¶ context of this forced alliance of class aims there is no room¶ for Negro art . . . or Negro art institutions . . . because all of¶ this is self-segregation which
The integrationist philosophy sees Negro ghettoes as ¶ products of racial segregation that should not even exist.
¶ Hence, nothing in the traditions of ghettoes are [sic] worth ¶ preserving even when ghettoes do exist in actuality. This is ¶ typical integrationist logic on all things social.20
Americans as a distinct social group.21 “In contrast to ¶ ¶ Black nationalism, on the other hand, involves the centering of race¶ consciousness to identify a
Black community, based on the idea that race¶ constitutes African
the integrationist premise that blacks and whites are essentially the same,
in the sense of coming from different
¶ ¶
the idea of race as the organizing basis for group-consciousness asserts that¶ blacks and whites are different,
[social histories and dissimilar conditions of life].”22

Carbado 3--(Devon W., Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law, Critical Race Theory, and Criminal Adjudication. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 7 (May, 2003), pp. 1757-1828 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3657500 , cayla_) Robert Chang observes that the articulation of race as a social construction is "a mantra"'49 in CRT. "[F]or fun," Professor Chang sometimes has his "students say it out loud .... Nothing happens. They are not enlightened, and the world has not changed .... So why the mantra?"50 CRT's answer is that the conceptualization of race as a social construction helps to explain not only the intelligibility and currency of race as a social category (that is, the existence of race) but also the negative and positive social meanings associated with specific racial identities (that is, the existence of racial hierarchy). Several of the essays in A New Critical Race Theory illustrate this point. Consider Robert Hayman and Nancy Levit's contribution to the volume."5 Their essay performs a periodizational analysis of the social construction of race to advance the claim that race
was never simply "out there" to be identified and discovered. Rather, they
argue, race was invented "in a quite literal sense."52 Their analysis begins in the seventeenth century, between 1619 and 1662. They argue that, during this period, the idea of race had not yet crystallized. While European colonists were mindful of
bodily differences between themselves and Africans, those differences were
not a basis for the establishment of a social hierarchy. Instead, "whatever 'race' ism may have characterized the early colonies was vague, incomplete, and far from universal."'3 We are somewhat skeptical of the claim that the colonists saw bodily differences between themselves and the Africans as differences without social or hierarchical significance. At the very least, Europeans perceived Africans to be primitive.54 Nor are we convinced that the concept of race did not exist before this period. One can argue that many of the clashes between ethnically different
groups in China, Egypt, and India-among other regions-were informed by
what we would today articulate as racial discourses." Still, the general point that Hayman and Levit make-that race evolved and that that evolution was a function of societal needs, politics, and economics-is well-taken.56 According to Hayman and Levit, between 1662 and 1776, the idea of race-an idea that developed to require both racial categorization and racial hierarchy-was instantiated. During this period, a variety of discourses articulated the African/European differences as differences in worth and entitlement. It is in this context that "[r]ace emerged ... as a
determinant of legal status .... [T]he 'negro' was a slave and the 'white'
person was free."57 Between 1776 and 1835, the material realities of race were further entrenched by political rationalization. Hayman and Levit reason that this rationalization was needed "to resolve the contradiction between the ideology of the revolutionary generation and the fact of chattel slavery."'58 The final period Hayman and Levit identify is "1835-?", presumably suggesting that we are still in this period. Here, politicians, academics, and scientists enlisted the rhetoric of science, and the results of "scientific studies," to prove the "truths" about race.59 Hayman and Levit's essay demonstrates that race does not exist a priori, but is instead
produced by discourses. These discourses-in politics, law, and science-

create, give meaning to, and organize race.60 And this process of racial
formation is unstable. The definition of race has changed, the list of racial categories has changed, and the social meaning of specific racial identities has changed. Race thus is, and historically has been, mutable61--or, to put the point in slightly different terms,
race did not have to exist,62 and it certainly did not have to exist in the
forms it has throughout American history.
Chang 93 – (Robert S. Seattle University Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality “Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space” California Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Oct., 1993), pp. 1241+1243-1323 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3480919 , cayla_)
The Critical Legal Studies movement emerged in order to examine the ways in which the law reinforces hierarchical social relations.
Critical Legal Scholars draw from several political and intellectual movements, including Marxism, Legal Realism, poststructuralism, and postmodemism. Critical Legal Scholars contend that
inevitable.
legal doctrine is indeterminate, contradictory, and partial to privileged classes.
Far from being a site of abstract and neutral reasoning, law, Critical Legal Scholars contend, is ideological and political. Critical Legal Scholars also argue that the
law invokes imposing images and technical language in order to mystify its audiences and to convince them that legal arrangements are natural and
Critical Legal Scholars often target legal rights in their critiques. Critical Legal Scholars believe that
rights are malleable and that they alienate individuals from one another and induce a false consciousness among oppressed people who, believing they are truly protected by rights, do not actively resist their oppression.
Several, though not all, Critical Legal Scholars trash rights and argue that progressives should stress informality over the structure of rights; rights simply reify law and nurture the illusion of law's naturalness. Postmodemism leads Critical Legal Scholars to question reliance upon law as a vehicle for achieving justice. Critical Legal Scholars conclude that
neutrality.
rights are part of an oppressive social regime and that progressive scholars should forcefully deconstruct their seemingly natural status. 85 Critical Race Theorists share Critical Legal Scholars' skepticism toward law's purported
They accept Critical Legal Scholars' indeterminacy thesis, believe that the law reinforces hierarchical social relations,
and concur with the notion that the law is a
limited, perhaps even
improper, instrument for pursuing equality.
Yet, Critical Race Theorists do not share the Critical Legal Scholars' desire to move beyond a rights structure. Although they concede that rights are malleable and socially constructed, they are also aware of the importance of rights in the struggle for racial justice. Several Critical Race Theorists contributed to a symposium in the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 6 in which they criticized Critical Legal Scholars for failing to recognize the importance of rights for communities of color. Although they acknowledge the limitations of rights talk, Critical Race Theorists also believe that rights play a vital role in antiracism. Patricia Williams, for example, eloquently conveys the simultaneous mistrust of and reliance upon rights by blacks: To say that blacks never fully believed in rights is true; yet it is also true that blacks believed in them so much and so hard that we gave them life where there was none before. We held onto them, put the hope of them into our wombs, and mothered them-not just the notion of them. We nurtured rights and gave rights life. And this was not the dry process of reification, from which life is drained and reality fades as the cement of conceptual determinism hardens roundbut its opposite. This was the resurrection of life from 400-year-old ashes; the parthenogenesis of unfertilized hope.87 Critical Race Theorists, therefore, embrace both a postmodernist skepticism toward the efficacy, neutrality, and inevitability of law and a concomitant modernist reliance upon law and enlightened reasoning as sources of antiracist resistance. 88 In a thoughtful account of the divide between Critical Race Theory and Critical Legal Studies, Angela Harris argues that the task for
C
ritical
R
ace
T
heorists
is to "live in the conflict between modernism and

postmodernism."' 9 Harris offers a healthy resolution to the apparent internal contradiction of Critical Race Theory. Critical Race Theorists cannot completely reject postmodernism, because "the old optimistic faith in reason, truth, blind justice, and neutrality, have not brought us to racial justice, but have rather left us 'stirring the ashes."'
90 Nevertheless, a wholesale commitment to postmodernism (and complete rejection of modernist principles) is undesirable because "faith in reason and truth and belief in the essential freedom of rational subjects have enabled people of color to survive and resist subordination."91 Both postmodernism and modernism offer strategic advantages for antiracist theory. Rather than seeking to resolve its internal conflict, Critical Race Theory should seek to "inhabit that very tension."92

APA 8 (American Psychological Association—leading scientific and professional organization representing psychology in the United States, Commemorating Brown: the Social Psychology of Racism and Discrimination Washington, DC 2008, page 46, cayla_) These processes highlight the ways in which social representations define the “right” answers to the “who am I” and “who are we” questions. Social repre-
sentations are seen and understood through the eyes of the groups to which people belong. As a result, people in groups calibrate or attune their thoughts about their identities through social discourse, not individual
contemplation (Wagner, 1997). Cultural practices and institutions, like career days and schools, provide discourses for imagining possible selves, and these discourses vary depending on the individual’s social identities. Moreover, the quantity and quality of social representations available to various groups are not arbitrary. The group that
defines who is seen and what is good is often the group in power. In the
United States, this group is what Spindler and Spindler (1990) called the referent ethniclass. Its members have control over institutions like the media and the legal system, and subsequently they have control over the quantity and quality
of available representations of various groups. As a result, the group in power is often associated with what is good, whereas the less powerful
groups are associated with what is less good or are rendered invisible. When these groups develop possible selves, the good is seen as “not me,” and the “me” is left either to vie for the remaining identities (Oyserman, Fryberg, & Yoder, 2006) or with no identities at all—they are invisible. Being invisible in a given domain poses
threats to a sense of belonging and to opportunities for elaborating possible
selves. Although numerous identities exist in the world- and although we may prefer to see young boys like Mark, Matt, and Michael as having abundant identity choices—self-
relevant information is qualified by the number and the meaning of social
representations that are available for each boy’s particular social identity. These representations, deemed relevant through social identity filters, prescribe the boys’ likely life paths in ways that are clear both to themselves and to others in their environments. A social representational approach highlights the ways in
which the available representations of social identities support or limit future possible selves. Although individuals must contend with the representations that both are and are not associated with their groups, the focus here is on how the “not me” is communicated.

Alexander 10 (Michelle associate professor of law at Ohio State University, a civil rights advocate and a writer “The new Jim Crow: Mass incarceration in the age of colorblindness” New York: The New Press. 2010 http://www.kropfpolisci.com/racial.justice.alexander.pdf , cayla_)
Even in small towns, such as those in Dodge County, Wisconsin, SWAT teams treat routine searches for narcotics as a major battlefront in the drug
war. In Dodge County, police raided the mobile home of Scott Bryant in April 1995, after finding traces of marijuana in his garbage. Moments after busting into the mobile home, police shot Bryant—who was unarmed— killing him. Bryant's eight-year-old son was asleep in the next room and watched his father die while waiting for an ambulance. The district attorney theorized that the shooter's hand had clenched in "sympathetic physical reaction" as his other hand reached for handcuffs. A spokesman for the Beretta company called this unlikely because the gun's double-action trigger was designed to prevent unintentional firing. The Dodge County sheriff compared the shooting to a hunting accident.45 SWAT raids have not been limited to homes, apartment
buildings, or public housing projects. Public high schools have been invaded by SWAT teams in search of drugs. In November 2003, for example, police raided Stratford High School in Goose Creek, South Carolina. The raid was
recorded by the school's surveillance cameras as well as a police camera. The tapes show students as young as fourteen forced to the ground in handcuffs as officers in SWAT team uniforms and bulletproof vests aim guns at their heads and lead a drugsniffing dog to tear through their book bags. The raid was initiated by the school's principal, who was suspicious that a single student might be dealing marijuana. No
drugs or weapons were found during the raid and no charges were filed.
Nearly all of the students searched and seized were students of color. The
transformation from "community policing" to "military policing," began in 1981, when President Reagan persuaded Congress to pass the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act, which encouraged the military to give local, state, and federal police access to military bases, intelligence,
research, weaponry, and other equipment for drug interdiction. That legislation carved a huge exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, the Civil War—era law prohibiting the use of the military for civilian policing. It was followed by Reagan's
National Security Decision Directive, which declared drugs a threat to U.S. national security, and provided for yet more cooperation between local,
state, and federal law enforcement. In the years that followed, Presidents George
Bush and Bill Clinton enthusiastically embraced the drug war and increased the transfer of military equipment, technology, and training to local law enforcement, contingent, of course, on the willingness of agencies to prioritize drug-law enforcement and concentrate resources on arrests for
illegal drugs. The incentives program worked. Drug arrests skyrocketed, as SWAT

teams swept through urban housing projects, highway patrol agencies organized drug interdiction units on the freeways, and stop-and-frisk
programs were set loose on the streets. Generally, the financial incentives offered to local law enforcement to pump up their drug arrests have not been well publicized, leading the average person to conclude reasonably (but mistakenly) that when their local police departments report that drug arrests have doubled or tripled in a short period of time, the arrests reflect a surge in illegal drug activity, rather than an infusion of money and an intensified enforcement effort.

Calderon 6—(Dolores, University of Utah assistant professor in the Department of Education, Culture, and Society and the Ethnic Studies Program “One-Dimensionality and Whiteness” USA Policy Futures in Education, Volume 4, Number 1, 2006 http://pfe.sagepub.com/content/4/1/73.full.pdf+html , cayla_) Whiteness represents what I call a flat epistemology [2] in which the
organization of knowledge is hierarchical, unidirectional, and reductive. A flattened epistemology is totalizing, assuming a singular way of knowing that precludes critical interventions and it is not derived from an organic
community. Rather, a flattened epistemology is one-dimensional because it is predetermined and disseminated in order to reproduce whiteness. Marcuse’s (1991) analysis in One-Dimensional Man provides a framework with which to further define this flat epistemology. The flat epistemic nature of whiteness is attributed
to the unidirectional mode of capitalist relations, which always progress towards the reproduction of capital and disallow critical engagement of the
system. Marcuse (1991) explains that modern society’s technological rationalism operates as an apparatus that ‘imposes its economic and political requirements for defense and expansion on the labor time and free time, on the material and intellectual culture. By virtue of the way it has organized its technological base, contemporary industrial society tends to be totalitarian’ (1991, pp. 2-3). These increasing economic and political requirements demand a flattened culture which flows singularly from the Establishment. In essence, the totalitarian or flattened rationalism is ideologically produced in the onedimensional epistemology of whiteness. Individuals come to understand themselves, for the most part, only in relation to the universal or totalitarian notion of whiteness. Whiteness appears to be commonsensical, universal and value-neutral. George Lipsizt (1998) points out that ‘whiteness is everywhere in U.S. culture, but it is very hard to see’ (Lipsitz, 1998, p. 1). Whiteness represents the normative practices and discourses upon
which everything is measured, but this measurement is not an explicit act.
Rather, it remains an unseen, or invisible measure. ‘As the unmarked category against which difference is constructed, whiteness never has to speak its name, never has to acknowledge its role as an organizing principle in social and cultural relations’ (1998, p. 1). Whiteness silently pervades all sectors of life, both public and private.
Refusing to acknowledge race as a defining factor in society protects the white supremacy – Silence is a ‘link’
Lopez, 2003 (Gerardo [Professor of Political Science], "The (Racially Neutral) Politics of Education: A Critical Race Theory Perspective", Educational Administration Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 1 (February 2003) 68-94, 6/28, eaq.sagepub.com/content/39/1/68.full.pdf) // cjh Our understanding of events, as told by Schattschneider and others, suggests ¶ that the incident was not in any way a race riot. Such negation not only ¶
suggests the riot had nothing to do with racism but altogether disregards the¶ pent-up frustration

and rage of the African American community. The reason ¶ for this mislabeling, in my opinion, has to do with a constricted understanding ¶ of what constitutes a race riot. For Schattschneider (1960), the event in ¶ question failed to meet this definition because “most of the shops looted and ¶ 80 Educational Administration Quarterly ¶ Downloaded from eaq.sagepub.com at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on June 26, 2015 ¶ the property destroyed by the Negro mob belonged to Negroes” (p. 2). For ¶ Mayor La Guardia and Congressman Powell, the event was not a race riot ¶ because there was no “physical violence between Blacks and Whites” ¶ (Capeci, 1977). In essence, a race riot,
according to these definitions, can¶ only occur if there are objective facts or discernable evidence of violence¶ between two groups. Anything short of direct contact or aggression fails to be¶ included in this definition.¶ By refusing to label the 1943 incident a race riot, individuals not only strip¶ the event of its racial underpinnings but render its social and political
significance¶ meaningless. The riot becomes a mere conflict, where chaos and ¶ destruction ruled for a short period of time. In effect, such reasoning leads us ¶ to believe that the public boiling-over of African Americans had little to do ¶ with racism or the reality of being Black in a White society. Instead, it ¶ becomes an unfortunate and isolated incident that simply got out of hand.
¶ Moreover, because individuals failed to
identify racism as a key element¶ of the riot, White power and privilege were protected and reified. Because¶ Blacks were not “rioting” against a White power structure, there was no need¶ to fundamentally change the social and living conditions for African Americans
¶ in Harlem. Although the riots did open the possibility for increased ¶ political representation for Black Americans,
there was little fundamental¶ change in social and economic power
relations between Blacks and Whites.¶ As such, the overall event and public protest did little to substantially alter the ¶ gross social and economic inequities in New York City during this particular ¶ period in history.
¶ How could Schattschneider—along with other key political figures, ¶ researchers, and scholars—not see racism as an underlying cause of this riot?
¶
Why was this incident not labeled a race riot, despite the fact that the collective¶ anger of African Americans was targeted mainly at symbols of White¶ power such as the New York Police
Department? How could Schattschneider ¶ use an example that describes blatant racial conflict without highlighting ¶ issues of White supremacy and social power? Answers to these questions ¶ rest, in part, on the fact that racism and its effects are rarely discussed or ¶ acknowledged in society (Omi & Winant, 1986; Tatum, 1997; West, 1993a).
¶
There is
a problematic silence that surrounds issues of racism—a silence that ¶ is difficult to broach. In fact, most people would rather not discuss racism ¶ whatsoever because the topic itself is uncomfortable and unpleasant ¶ (Anzaldúa, 1990; Tatum, 1997; West, 1993a, 1993b).
¶ As a result of this disquieting silence, most individuals fail to identify
its¶ magnitude and breadth and limit its scope to superficial manifestations
like¶ prejudice, discrimination, and blatant intolerance (Delgado & Stefancic,
hate crimes, and so forth—while ignoring the deeper, often invisible,¶ and
more insidious forms of racism that occur on a daily basis (Parker, 1998; ¶ ¶ 1995, 2001; Matsuda, 1996; Tatum, 1997). In fact, most people view racism¶ as the
enactment of overt racial acts—for example, name calling, burning¶ crosses,
Scheurich & Young, 1997; Tyson, 1998).
¶ In addition, when discussions of racism do occur, people

overwhelmingly ¶ focus on explicit acts, believing that racism is perpetrated by “bad people” ¶ who dislike others because of something as arbitrary and innocuous as their not penetrate our institutions, organizations, or ways of thinking (Bell, 1995b; Delgado, 1995a; Omi & Winant, 1986; Parker, Deyhle, & Villenas, Scheurich & Young, 1997; Tatum, 1997; Williams, 1995a, 1995b).
¶ perspective, therefore, only protects White privilege by highlighting ¶ ¶ 1999; This limited ¶ ¶ skin color. Although this type of blatant racism certainly does occur, such a¶
belief incorrectly assumes that it is only found at this surface level and does¶
racism’s blatant and conspicuous aspects, while ignoring or ¶ downplaying its hidden and structural facets (Harris, 1995; Scheurich & ¶ Young, 1997; Tyson, 1998).
¶ Needless to say, most
individuals do not discuss the topic of racism at all¶
(Fine, Powell, Weis, & Mun Wong, 1997; Frankenberg, 1993; Sleeter, 1996).
¶
They ignore it because they believe
the topic is too unpleasant (Anzaldúa, ¶ 1990), because they feel that racism is a thing of the past (Bell, 1995b), ¶ because they do not see themselves as “raced” individuals (Fine et al., 1997; ¶ Frankenberg, 1993; Haney López, 1995a, 1995b), or because they feel that ¶ the race problem is not theirs to solve (Tatum, 1997). Others feel that because ¶ they, as individuals, do not hold racist beliefs, then the topic is somewhat ¶ external and impertinent in their daily lives (Frankenberg, 1993). In all of
role of race and racism in the larger social order
¶ these cases, such beliefs—individually and collectively—domesticate and¶ minimize the
The law serves to protect and benefit white privilege while ignoring racial difference
Lopez, 2003 (Gerardo [Professor of Political Science], "The (Racially Neutral) Politics of Education: A Critical Race Theory Perspective", Educational Administration Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 1 (February 2003) 68-94, 6/28, eaq.sagepub.com/content/39/1/68.full.pdf) // cjh Unfortunately, racism is as powerful today as it was in the past; it has¶ merely assumed a normality, and thus an invisibility, in our daily lives. In ¶ other words, “Time has made past racial practices and assumptions invisible¶ to modern eyes” (Lazos Vargas, in press). We often fail to recognize racism ¶ because we do not see it beyond its most blatant manifestations (Delgado & ¶ Stefancic, 2001). By necessitating tangible documentation of its existence, ¶
legal and juridical apparatuses have, in effect, dealt with racism’s most obvious¶ forms but have perpetuated its existence at deeper and more invisible¶
levels.
¶ In addition, racism has now been turned on its head, as allegations of ¶ reverse racism and calls for equal protection are increasingly used by Whites ¶ to prove discrimination or racial harm against them (Delgado & Stefancic, ¶ 2001). This is particularly true in affirmative action cases (Hopwood v. Texas, ¶ 1996; Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 1978), where Whites ¶ have sued their organizations using the same legal statutes designed to protect ¶ African Americans and other marginalized groups (Parker, in press; Taylor, ¶ 1999). Indeed, racism has taken on a new twist, as
Whites reclaim their¶ positionality and power in society by using the courts
as their vehicle. The ¶ staying power of case law only institutionalizes the current

power relationships ¶ between Whites and non-Whites while protecting the material and ¶ symbolic property interest of White individuals (Harris, 1995).
¶ In response to these growing concerns, a new area of legal scholarship ¶ known as CRT has emerged to analyze the pervasiveness of racism in society ¶ (Crenshaw et al., 1995; Delgado, 1995a; Delgado & Stefancic, 2001; ¶ Matsuda, 1996; Matsuda et al., 1993; Valdes et al., 2002; Williams, 1995b).
¶ As an outgrowth of the Civil Rights movement and the Critical Legal Studies ¶ movement, CRT’s premise is to critically interrogate how the law
reproduces,¶ reifies, and normalizes racism in society. Rather than subscribe to the belief¶ that racism is an abnormal or unusual concept, critical race theorists begin¶ with the premise that racism is a normal and
endemic component of our¶ social fabric (see also Banks, 1993; Collins, 1991; Gordon, 1990; LadsonBillings ¶ & Tate, 1995; Scheurich & Young, 1997; Tatum, 1997; Tyson, ¶ 1998). CRT scholars suggest that the reason why society fails to see racism is ¶ because it is such a common/everyday experience that it is often taken for ¶ granted. In other words, racism is part of our everyday reality. It is part of our¶ social
fabric and embedded in our organizations, practices, and structures
¶ (Scheurich & Young, 1997; Tyson, 1998)—it is the usual way “society does ¶ business” (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001, p. 7).

Kleiner 10 (Yevgenia S. associate chair of the Firm’s Women’s Affinity Group and representative of Stroock's Pro Bono Project “Racial Profiling in the Name of National Security: Protecting Minority Travlers' Civil Liberties in the Age of Terrorism” Boston College Third World Law Journal Volume 30 Issue 1 Article 5 11-1-2010 lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=twlj , cayla_) Striking a Balance: The Government’s Post-9/11 War on Terror and its Efforts to Protect Civil Liberties The United States has a dark history pertaining to the treatment of racial and ethnic minorities in times of war and domestic conflict.61 As Wisconsin Democratic Senator Russell Feingold stated in his 2001 Congressional address criticizing the contents of the USA PATRIOT Act: There have been periods
in our nation's history when civil liberties have taken a back seat to what
appeared at the time to be the legitimate exigencies of war. Our national consciousness still bears the stain and the scars of those events: The Alien and
Sedition Acts, the suspension of habeas corpus during the Civil War, the internment of Japanese-Americans, German-Americans, and Italian Americans during World War II, the blacklisting of supposed Communist sympathizers during the McCarthy era, and the surveillance and harassment of anti-war protesters, including Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.,
during the Vietnam War.62 One explanation for these stains in our nation’s history is that in times of mass hysteria, the legislature and the courts tend to subordinate civil rights in their effort to keep the peace.63 Many scholars have argued that the federal government and TSA would do well to learn from the
Korematsu decision and particularly Fred Korematsu’s petition for a writ of
coram nobis.64 In his petition, Mr. Korematsu contended that the government knowingly concealed contradictory evidence as to its claim of military necessity for the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans.65 The U.S. District Court, relying largely on the finding by the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Citizens that “a grave injustice was done to American citizens and resident
aliens of Japanese ancestry who, without individual review or any probative evidence against them, were excluded, removed and detained by the United
States during World War II,” granted Mr. Korematsu’s petition despite acknowledging that it would be impossible to predict whether the concealed evidence may have led the Supreme Court to have reached a different outcome in 1942.66 The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 attracted serious criticism even before it was enacted into law.67 Some scholars argued against the adoption of the Act because of its double
standard of ensuring due process for citizens but not for legal immigrants, a violation of equal protection principles embodied in the United States
Constitution.68 Others, such as Senator Feingold, warned that the PATRIOT Act fell “short of meeting even basic constitutional standards of due process and fairness [because it] continues to allow the Attorney General to detain persons based on mere suspicion.”69 The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act signaled the beginning of an

era of reduced judicial oversight of surveillance by the federal
government.70 Although the Fourth Amendment protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures and normally requires probable cause for government interference, no convenient provision exists to explicitly define the way the Amendment should be read in light of a potential
terrorist threat.71 As a result, the USA PATRIOT Act granted the government wide sweeping investigative powers by permitting it to obtain warrants without a demonstration of the truthfulness of its allegations.72 Furthermore, provisions under Section 505 of the USA PATRIOT Act granted the Department of Justice the freedom to use administrative subpoenas called National Security Letters to obtain records of individuals’ electronic communications without judicial oversight.73 This provision essentially means that National Security Letters enable federal officials to
obtain information on anyone, because the Act does not require officials to demonstrate probable cause or a compelling need for access to the
information.74 It was not until 2003 that Attorney General John Ashcroft finally admitted in a statement before the House Judiciary Committee that the USA PATRIOT
Act had lowered the standard of proof for a warrant to something “lower than probable cause,” and that it had enabled federal officials to investigate
citizens who were neither spies nor terrorists.75 Unfortunately, this admission did not lessen the burden on wrongfully targeted minorities who wish to assert their constitutional rights: in addition to proving a violation of their Fourth Amendment Due Process rights, individuals alleging a racial profiling claim against the
government are required to show that the relevant government agency violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
complying with a “purposefully discriminatory policy.”

Alexander 10 (Michelle associate professor of law at Ohio State University, a civil rights advocate and a writer “The new Jim Crow: Mass incarceration in the age of colorblindness” New York: The New Press. 2010 http://www.kropfpolisci.com/racial.justice.alexander.pdf , cayla_) According to a Bureau of Justice Statistics study, about 30 percent of released prisoners in its sample were rearrested within six months of release.90 Within three years, nearly 68 percent were rearrested at least once for a new offense.91 Only a small minority are rearrested for violent crimes; the vast majority are rearrested for property offenses, drug offenses, and offenses against the public order.92 For those released on probation
or parole, the risks are especially high. They are subject to regular surveillance and monitoring by the police and may be stopped and searched (with or without their consent) for any reason or no reason at all. As a result, they are far more likely to be arrested (again) than those whose
behavior is not subject to constant scrutiny by law enforcement. Probationers and parolees are at increased risk of arrest because their lives are governed by additional rules that do not apply to everyone else. Myriad restrictions on their travel and behavior (such as a prohibition on associating with other felons), as well as various requirements of probation and parole (such as paying fines and meeting with probation officers), create opportunities for arrest. Violation of these special rules can land someone right back in prison. In fact, that is what happens a good deal of the time. The
extraordinary increase in prison admissions due to parole and probation
violations is due almost entirely to the War on Drugs. With respect to parole, in 1980, only 1 percent of all prison admissions were parole violators. Twenty years later, more than one third (35 percent) of prison admissions resulted from parole violations.93 To put the matter more starkly: About as many people were returned to prison for parole violations in 2000 as were admitted to prison in 1980 for all reasons.94 Of all parole violators returned to prison in 2000, only one-third were returned for a new conviction; two-thirds were returned for a technical violation such as missing appointments with a parole officer, failing to maintain employment, or failing a drug test.95 In this system
of control, failing to cope well with one's exile status is treated like a crime. If you fail, after being released from prison with a criminal record—your
personal badge of inferiority—to remain drug free, or if you fail to get a job against all the odds, or if you get depressed and miss an appointment with your parole officer (or if you cannot afford the bus fare to take you there), you can be sent right back to prison— where society apparently thinks millions of Americans belong. This disturbing
phenomenon of people cycling in and out of prison, trapped by their secondclass status, has been described by Loic Wacquant as a "closed circuit of perpetual marginality."96 Hundreds of thousands of people are released from prison every year, only to find themselves locked out of the mainstream society and economy. Most ultimately return to prison,
sometimes for the rest of their lives. Others are released again, only to find themselves in precisely the circumstances they occupied before, unable to cope with the stigma of the prison label and their permanent pariah status. Reducing the amount of

time people spend behind bars—by eliminating harsh mandatory minimums—will alleviate some of the unnecessary suffering caused by this system, but it will not disturb the closed circuit. Those labeled felons will continue to cycle in and out of prison, subject to perpetual surveillance by the police, and unable to integrate into the mainstream society and economy. Unless the number of people who are labeled felons is
dramatically reduced, and unless the laws and policies that keep ex offenders marginalized from the mainstream society and economy are eliminated, the system will continue to create and maintain an enormous
undercaste.

Chang 93 – (Robert S. Seattle University Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality “Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space” California Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Oct., 1993), pp. 1241+1243-1323 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3480919 , cayla_)
When the legal academy was made up exclusively of white males, a legal scholar did not have to reveal the context from which he spoke because everyone occupied the same context. This shared context fostered a false sense of acontextuality, where one could pretend to be aperspectival
because only one perspective was represented.142 With the entry of women and persons of color into the legal academy and with their use of personal narratives in scholarship, whether perspective matters has become a contested issue. Other disciplines recognize the importance of perspective.'43 Even science, once the model for the
study of law,'" has recognized that the perspective of the observer
matters.'45 For example, there was a longstanding dispute among physicists about whether light was a wave or a particle.'46 Adherents of the wave theory, limited by their perspective, were unable to see that light sometimes behaved like a particle. Likewise, adherents of the particle theory were unable to see that light sometimes behaved like a wave. Each group was unable to see what the other group saw; the groups were unable to see that light could be both wave and particle. 147 Just as science has learned that the perspective of the observer cannot only affect, but can also determine, what is observed, law must also recognize the importance of perspective. Professor Laurence Tribe reminds us, "[d]ifficult as it is to view the world from someone else's perspective, not to make the effort is to ignore what science learned long ago."148 The lesson from science for the legal academy is simple: Listen.
Delgado 95 -- (Richard, Founder of Critical Race Theory, civil rights and critical race theory at University of Alabama School of Law Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge Philadelphia : Temple University Press, 1995. cayla_) In an article published with them, Williams describes her exclusion from a New York Store as follows: [. . .] [When editing her account,] “the editors initially deleted all
references to [William’s racial identity informing her that references to physiognomy [sic] were irrelevant . . . . [But] if the racial identity of the
speaker is not included, the point of the story is unintelligible.” Had the editors prevailed, Williams would have appeared irrational for being so angry at a store clerk over a minor incident. The editors sought to suppress the existence of race
from a narrative in which race was the center of the incident. Their

attempted use of nonrecognition would have produced a misleading “nonracial” narrative.

Beckett and Sasson 2k (Katherine and Theodore, Beckett: Professor of Law, Societies & Justice Program Department of Sociology, University of Washington/ Sasson: Professor of International and Global Studies at Middlebury College The Politics of Injustice: Crime and Punishment in America pg. 179-181 2000 Sage Publications, Inc., cayla_)
All Americans are experiencing stepped-up surveillance. Suspect populations, however, are kept under far tighter scrutiny. Black men, regardless of their involvement with the justice system, are routinely
subjected to motor vehicle stops for the crime of DWB—Driving While Black.
Members of minority groups are often stopped in airports, bus terminals, and other public places and questioned about drugs, a practice legitimated by typically ambiguous “drug courier profiles,” which open the door for
unlimited police discretion. Since September 11, 2001, racial profiling of
Arabs and people believed to have ties to the Middle East has become
especially widespread. For individuals of all races who have been sentenced by a court, forms of surveillance range from regular probation, which might entail nothing more than a notification requirement concerning change of address, to electronic monitoring, day reporting, halfway house residency, and house arrest. Probationers and parolees suspected of substance abuse problems must submit to regular drug and alcohol testing. Sex offenders must register with local police, who in turn, in may jurisdictions, notify area residents and prospective employers. In the United States, on any given
day, nearly 1 in 3 young black men is under one form or another of criminal
justice supervision. In many U.S. cities, the proportion is even more dramatic. As noted in Chapter 1, in 1997, 50% of black males in Washington, DC, between 18 and 35 years old were in jail or prison, on probation or parole, out on bond, or wanted on an arrest warrant. In neighboring Baltimore, Maryland, in 1991, the comparable statistic was 56%. In high-poverty, racially segregated neighborhoods, the percentage
is still higher. One unsurprising consequence of the expansion and intensification of community surveillance (e.g., probation and parole) is the burgeoning number of people sent to prison for violating the conditions of
community release. In 1980, new court commitments were responsible for 82% of prison admissions; parole and probation violations were responsible for 17%. By 1997, the share of prison admissions from the courts had declined to 60%, and the share stemming from conditional release violations surged to 40%. Many of these violators are detected through drug tests. Although probation and parole were conceived, at
least in part, as mechanisms for reintegrating offenders into community
life, they now help to explain why U.S. prisons are bursting at their seams.

Bor No Date (Becca member of the Chicago Teachers Union, a union delegate and a member of the Caucus of Rank and File Educators, the Socialist Workers Party (Ireland), People Before Profit, and the Derry Alliance for Choice “Race and Class in Obama’s U.S.” http://irishmarxistreview.net/index.php/imr/article/viewFile/150/151 , cayla_) The sharpest edge of racism in the U.S. is mass incarceration and what Michelle Alexander termed ‘The New Jim Crow.’ Mass incarceration has been fuelled by
the War on Drugs and the US has the highest incarceration rate in the world
with 2.3 million people in prison today. At the time of the passing of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 1986, which marked the beginning of the War on Drugs, the prison population was 300,000. Over the course of the last 30 years, there has been
major militarisation of the police, expansion of the prison complexes, increase of surveillance and harassment of people engaged, and perceived to be engaged, in petty crime, increased sentences and no tolerance policies that led to greater imprisonment for lesser crimes, and massive racial
profiling of Black and brown people. Out of this craze, came the three strikes policy in California that mandated maximum sentences for anyone on their third conviction, regardless of the crime; the Rockefeller Drug laws, which increased sentencing for crack cocaine often found in poor ghettos, but not the cocaine found in wealthy penthouses and elite college campuses; the expansion of the death penalty and incarceration under the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996; and the policy of Broken Windows policing, in which police officers arrest people for petty crimes, such as jumping a turnstile in the Subway or loitering on a corner6 , just to name a few. These policies have led to unprecedented levels of arrests and incarcerations. Multiple studies show that white Americans are more likely to use drugs, however Blacks are three times as likely to be arrested than whites, and 45 percent of convicted drug offenders are Black.7 The Stop and Frisk policy in New York and other cities used the pretext of the War on Drugs to drum up its support. 87 percent of the people
stopped in these searches were Black or Latino, even though Blacks and Latinos only make up 52 percent of the population of New York.
Additionally, police found nothing on 86 percent of the searches. This policy was only defeated after massive protests, organising and a class-action lawsuit against NYC forced the city to admit that Stop and Frisk was unconstitutional.8 In this
atmosphere of criminalising Black people, it is no wonder that one in three Black Americans will go through the criminal justice system at some point in their lives. According to a New York Times study, there are more Black Americans in jail, on probation or parole than there were enslaved in 1850
before the Civil War. Today, the sharpest, most naked form of the criminal justice system is the brutal police violence, which has recently come to the fore. Between 2007 2012 police killed at least two black men a week. In fact, the number of police murders today is larger than the number of lynchings in the five years before the anti-lynching legislation was passed in 1922.9

Alexander 10 (Michelle associate professor of law at Ohio State University, a civil rights advocate and a writer “The new Jim Crow: Mass incarceration in the age of colorblindness” New York: The New Press. 2010 http://www.kropfpolisci.com/racial.justice.alexander.pdf , cayla_)
Racially biased police discretion is key to understanding how the overwhelming majority of people who get swept into the criminal justice system in the War on Drugs turn out to be black or brown, even though the
police adamantly deny that they engage in racial profiling. In the drug war, police have discretion regarding whom to target (which individuals), as well as where to target (which neighborhoods or communities). As noted earlier, at least 10 percent of Americans violate drug laws every year, and people of all races engage in illegal drug activity at similar rates. With such an extraordinarily large population of offenders to choose from, decisions must be made regarding who should be targeted and where the drug war should be waged. From the outset, the drug war could have been waged primarily in overwhelmingly white suburbs or on college campuses. SWAT teams
could have rappelled from helicopters in gated suburban communities and raided the homes of high school lacrosse players known for hosting coke
and ecstasy parties after their games. The police could have seized televisions, furniture, and cash from fraternity houses based on an anonymous tip that a few joints or a stash of cocaine could be found hidden in someone's dresser drawer. Suburban homemakers could have been placed under surveillance and subjected to undercover operations designed to catch them violating laws regulating the use and sale of prescription "uppers." All of this could have happened as a matter of routine in
white communities, but it did not. Instead, when police go looking for drugs, they look in the 'hood. Tactics that would be political suicide in an upscale white suburb are not even newsworthy in poor black and brown
communities. So long as mass drug arrests are concentrated in impoverished urban areas, police chiefs have little reason to fear a political backlash, no matter how aggressive and warlike the efforts may be. And so long as the number of drug arrests increases or at least remains high, federal dollars continue to flow in and fill the department's coffers. As one former prosecutor put it, "It's a lot easier to go out
to the 'hood, so to speak, and pick somebody than to put your resources in an undercover [operation in a] community where there are potentially
politically powerful people."85 The hypersegregation of the black poor in
ghetto communities has made the roundup easy. Confined to ghetto areas
and lacking political power, the black poor are convenient targets. Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton's book, American Apartheid, documents how racially segregated ghettos were deliberately created by federal policy, not impersonal market forces or private housing choices.86 The enduring racial isolation of the ghetto
poor has made them uniquely vulnerable in the War on Drugs. What

happens to them does not directly affect—and is scarcely noticed by—the
privileged beyond the ghetto's invisible walls. Thus it is here, in the poverty stricken, racially segregated ghettos, where the War on Poverty has been abandoned and factories have disappeared, that the drug war has been waged with the greatest ferocity.
SWAT teams are deployed here; buy-and-bust operations are concentrated
here; drug raids of apartment buildings occur here; stop-and-frisk operations occur on the streets here. Black and brown youth are the primary targets. It is not uncommon for a young black teenager living in a ghetto community to be stopped, interrogated, and frisked numerous times in the course of a month, or even a single week, often by paramilitary units. Studies of racial profiling typically report the total number of people stopped and searched, disaggregated by race. These studies have led some policing experts to conclude that racial profiling is actually "worse" in white communities, because the racial disparities in stop and search rates are much greater there. What these studies do not reveal, however, is the frequency with which any given individual is likely to be stopped in specific, racially defined neighborhoods. The militarized nature of law enforcement in ghetto
communities has inspired rap artists and black youth to refer to the police
presence in black communities as "The Occupation." In these occupied territories, many black youth automatically "assume the position" when a patrol car pulls up, knowing full well that they will be detained and frisked no matter what. This
dynamic often comes as a surprise to those who have spent little time in
ghettos. Craig Futterman, a law professor at the University of Chicago, reports that his students frequently express shock and dismay when they venture into those communities for the first time and witness the distance between abstract legal principles and actual practice. One student reported, following her ridealong with Chicago police: "Each time we drove into a public housing project and stopped the car, every young black man in the area would almost reflexively place his hands up against the car and spread his legs to be searched. And the officers would search them. The officers would then get back in the car and stop in another project, and this would happen again. This repeated itself throughout the entire day. I couldn't believe it. This was nothing like we
learned in law school. But it just seemed so normal—for the police and the young men." Numerous scholars (and many law enforcement officials) attempt to justify the concentration of drug law enforcement resources in ghetto communities on the grounds that it is easier for the police to combat
illegal drug activity there. The theory is that black and Latino drug users are more likely than white users to obtain illegal drugs in public spaces that are visible to the police, and therefore it is more efficient and convenient for the police to concentrate their efforts on open-air drug markets in ghetto communities. Sociologists have been
major proponents of this line of reasoning, pointing out that differential access to private space influences the likelihood that criminal behavior will be detected. Because poor people lack access to private space (often sharing small apartments with numerous family members or relatives), their
criminal activity is more likely to be conducted outdoors. Concentrating law enforcement efforts in locations where drug activity will be more easily detected is viewed as a race-neutral organizational necessity. This argument is often buttressed by claims that most citizen complaints about illegal drug activity come from ghetto areas,

and that the violence associated with the drug trade occurs in inner cities. These facts,
drug war defenders claim, make the decision to wage the drug war almost
exclusively in poor communities of color an easy and logical choice. This line of reasoning is weaker than it initially appears. Many law enforcement officials acknowledge that the demand for illegal drugs is so great—and the lack of alternative sources of income so few in ghetto communities—that "if you take one dealer off the street, he'll be replaced within an hour." Many also admit that a predictable consequence of breaking up one drug ring is a slew of violence as others fight for control of the previously stabilized market.87 These realities suggest—if the past two decades of endless war somehow did not—that the drug war is doomed to fail. They also call into
question the legitimacy of "convenience" as an excuse for the mass
imprisonment of black and brown men in ghetto communities. Even putting aside such concerns, though, recent research indicates that the basic assumptions upon which drug war defenses typically rest are simply wrong. The conventional
wisdom—that "get tough" tactics are a regrettable necessity in poor communities of color and that efficiency requires the drug war to be waged in the most vulnerable neighborhoods—turns out to be, as many have long
suspected, nothing more than wartime propaganda, not sound policy.

Impact -Colorblindness Bad Colorblindness only reifies the white power and silences racism
Lopez, 2003 (Gerardo [Professor of Political Science], "The (Racially Neutral) Politics of Education: A Critical Race Theory Perspective", Educational Administration Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 1 (February 2003) 68-94, 6/28, eaq.sagepub.com/content/39/1/68.full.pdf) // cjh
Racism, in other words, has been reduced to broad generalizations about¶ another group based on the color of their skin. It has become an individual¶
construction as opposed to a social and/or civilizational construct (Scheurich & ¶ Young, 1997; Young & Laible, 2000). In this regard, racism is not necessarily ¶ connected to the larger “distribution of jobs, power, prestige, and wealth” ¶ (Crenshaw et al., 1995, p. xiv) but is viewed as deviant behaviors and/or attitudes ¶ in an otherwise neutral world. The belief that colorblindness will eliminate¶ racism is not only
shortsighted but reinforces the notion that racism is a¶ personal—as
opposed to systemic—issue (Matsuda, 1996; McCarthy & ¶ Crichlow, 1993; Scheurich & Young, 1997; Tatum, 1997; Valdes, Culp, & ¶ Harris, 2002; Williams, 1995b).
¶ By ignoring this broader sociological web of power in which racism functions, ¶ individuals can readily equate White racism with Black nationalism.
¶ This slippage only serves to protect the idea of a neutral social order by moving ¶ the focus away from the barriers and inequities that exist in society and ¶ refocusing it on the “ignorant” individual(s). As a
result, the collective frustrations¶ of people of color and/or Black
nationalist groups are simply seen as¶ irrational—their struggle and plight to end racism are, in effect, reduced to a ¶ deviant form of “reverse” racism (see also Solorzano & Yosso, 2001; racism has shifted ¶ ¶ Villalpando, in press). This slippage only maintains
racism firmly in place by¶ ignoring or downplaying the role of White racism in the larger social order.¶ To be certain, racism has never waned in society;
it has merely been manifested¶ in different forms. However, the discourse on through time, such that overt and/or blatant acts of hate (e.g., name calling, ¶ López / CRITICAL RACE THEORY 69 ¶ Downloaded from eaq.sagepub.com at UNIV CALIFORNIA BERKELEY LIB on June 26, 2015 ¶ lynching, hate crimes, etc.) have only been identified as being racist ¶ (Crenshaw, 2002; Hayman & Levit, 2002). This
focus on explicit acts has¶ ignored the subtle, hidden, and often insidious forms of racism that operate at¶ a deeper, more systemic level. When racism becomes “invisible,” individuals¶ begin to think that it is merely a
thing of the past and/or only connected to the¶ specific act. Rarely is racism seen as something that is always present in society ¶ and in our daily lives (Crenshaw et al., 1995; Delgado, 1995a; Delgado & ¶ Stefancic, 2001; Valdes et al., 2002).

Katheryn
, Professor of Law, 19
, "The Clonal Child: Procreative Liberty and Asexual Reproduction," Lexis-Nexis
It is undeniable that throughout human history dominant and oppressive groups have committed unspeakable wrongs against those viewed as inferior. Once a person (or a people) has been characterized as sub-human, there appears to have been no limit to the cruelty that was or will be visited upon him. For example, in almost all wars, hatred towards the enemy was inspired to justify the killing and wounding by separating the enemy from the human race, by casting them as unworthy of human status. This same rationalization has supported: genocide, chattel slavery, racial segregation, economic exploitation, caste and class systems, coerced sterilization of social misfits and undesirables, unprincipled medical experimentation, the subjugation of women, and the social Darwinists' theory justifying indifference to the poverty and misery of others.

(Joseph, Co-director, Crossroads, Dismantling Racism p. 155-156) The limitations imposed on people of color by poverty, subservience, and powerlessness are cruel, inhuman, and unjust: the effects of uncontrolled power privilege, and greed, which are the marks of our white prison, will inevitably destroy us. But we have also seen that the walls of racism can be dismantled. We are not condemned to an inexorable fate, but are offered the vision and the possibility of freedom. Brick by brick, stone by stone, the prison of individual, institutional, and cultural racism can be destroyed. You and I are urgently called to join the efforts of those who know it is time to tear down, once and for all, the walls of racism. The danger point of self-destruction seems to be drawing even more near . The results of centuries of national and worldwide conquest and colonialism, of military buildups and violent aggression, of overconsumption and environmental destruction, may be reaching a point of no return. A small and predominately white minority of the global population derives its power and privilege from the suffering of the vast majority of peoples of color. For the sake of the world and ourselves, we dare not allow it to continue.

1499, SL) (Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh, Thomas, Georgetown Law Journal, “The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness,” 79 Geo. L.J. Poor people are different from us. Most of them are morally weak and undeserving. And, in any event, we are helpless to solve the complex and daunting problem of poverty. This is the rhetoric of poverty. The United States Supreme Court has addressed the constitutional claims of poor people in a range of contemporary cases. 1 The rhetoric of poverty runs through these opinions. Poor people, it is said or implied, are unwilling to work and especially likely to commit fraud or child abuse, or to violate other legal and moral norms. They have bad attitudes and are the cause of their own poverty. At the same time, the problem of poverty is, in the Court's rhetoric, a problem of daunting complexity that is virtually beyond solution. Hard choices, suffering, even "Kafkaesque" results are simply unavoidable.The purposes of this article are to reveal the presence of these rhetorical themes in the Supreme Court's opinions and to argue that the Court's choices are disturbing. These themes, seen in the context of the individual cases, are either shamefully inapt or, at the very least, problematic. When we see that the Court's decisions are shored up by this rhetorical structure, we have good reason to question those decisions. The first rhetorical step, the creation of the abstraction the "poor," is an easily overlooked yet powerful part of the rhetoric of poverty. We are so used to speaking of the poor as a distinct class that we overlook the rhetorical significance of speaking this way. By focusing on the single variable of economic wealth and then drawing a line on the wealth continuum, we create a class of people who are them, not us. Creating this abstraction is, in one sense, merely a way of speaking. We do this because to speak of the world in sensible ways we must resort to categories and abstractions. There are meaningful differences between the circumstances of people below the poverty line and the circumstances of middle class people, and to ignore these real differences can lead to injustice. 2 Thus, to speak of the "poor" is a sensible way to [*1500] talk. In the rhetorical context, however, it is also much more.
1499, SL) (Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh, Thomas, Georgetown Law Journal, “The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness,” 79 Geo. L.J. The creation of the category of the "poor", also makes possible the assertion of their moral weakness. To assert their moral weakness, "they" must exist as a conceptually distinct group. There is a long history of speaking of the poor as morally weak, or even degenerate. 3 Thus, when we hear legal rhetoric about the poor, we often hear an underlying message of deviance: we are normal, they are

deviant. Our feelings about their deviance range [*1501] from empathy to violent hatred. Still, even in the most benevolent view, they are not normal. Their deviance is a product of a single aspect of their lives, their relative wealth position. All other aspects of their lives are either distorted by the label of deviance or ignored. By creating this class of people, we are able at once to distinguish us from them and to appropriate normalcy to our lives and circumstances. The rhetorical assertion of judicial helplessness is also connected to widely shared and long-standing cultural assumptions about the nature of poverty. This rhetoric depends on the assumption that poverty is somehow built into the basic structure of our society and system of law. We assume that the eradication of poverty, even if possible in theory, would require the radical transformation of our society. The causes of poverty, we assume, are a product of a complex set of factors tied to politics, culture, history, psychology, and philosophy. Thus, only in a radically different world might poverty cease to exist. And, whatever the extent of the powers of the Court, radically remaking the world is not one of them. 4 The dual themes of moral deviance and judicial helplessness at first seem to be inconsistent. The premise of moral weakness suggests that the problem is really quite simple. If poor people simply chose to "straighten up and fly right," all would be well. If they would accept and commit to the moral norms of those of us not in poverty, they would cease to be poor, albeit only after a long time and much hard work. In this vision of poverty, the problem is uni-dimensional and is intractable only to the extent that poor people resist the personal, individual reform of their moral lives.

J.M.
(Prof. of Ethics, writer on religious fundamentalism and human rights, Advisor to the U.N. Human Rights Council, “Racism, xenophobia, and Human Rights,” The Ecumenical Review Although these three causes of racism can be logically distinguished, they are mostly inter-related. Ideology can be the basis of fear, and greed can be justified by ideology and even fear. One of the major manifestations of racism is structural violence. State-organized genocide was a well- known phenomenon in the centuries of colonialism.
Several nations disappeared altogether, or were reduced to tiny minorities, during the 19th century by the United States and by European powers in Africa, Latin America, Australia and New Zealand. (16) Nowadays the international community witnesses state organized "ethnic" cleansing in Central Africa and Eastern Europe. (17) This "ethnic cleansing" includes methods such as deportation, terror and so-called "legal forms" of exclusion from the state concerned. However, structural violence based on racism can have a more subtle form than state-organized terror and genocide. The philosophy of liberation proved in the 1960s that systems--even democratic systems- can become inherently violent . (18) In the maintenance of law and order, and sometimes even under the guise of human rights, a political and economic structure can exert violence to its subjects or a group of them . This usually happens when the system is one-dimensional, that is, when the system controls all spheres of life. The South African system in the period 1948-94 is a good example of a one-dimensional state. All spheres of life (even morality, sexuality and marital life) were controlled by the state. This provides the authorities with the means to discriminate in a "legitimate" way by introducing social stratification. This concept, and the usual pattern of its development, require further reflection. Social stratification is a system of legitimated, structured social inequality in which groups receive disproportionate amounts of the society's wealth, power and prestige and are socially ranked accordingly.
(19) Social stratification flows from the supposition that society consists of irreconcilable groups and the premise that a unitary government with a general franchise cannot govern these groups. The maintenance of division is, according to this view, necessary for good and orderly government. The viewpoint in South Africa since colonization in the 17th century was that whites and blacks should be kept "apart" in order to have peace and prosperity for all. In this case the dividing principle was along racial lines, but it can also, in other cases and regions, be along ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious lines. This premise denies the fact that pluralism can be maintained in a unitary state (in South Africa a unitary state was seen as a danger for white and indigenous futures), and is based on the conviction that nation-states are the only way to deal with pluralism. The dialectical principle must lead to the "us-them" social attitude and structure, with (as has been proven historically) total division and conflict developing according to a particular pattern.
history. (20) In the "us-zone" the uniqueness of the own group is idolized, and maintenance of one's own uniqueness is then of absolute importance. To stimulate the "we feeling" and maintain a strong sense of solidarity, a community will start with a reconstruction of its own
(Abu-Jamal Column Written 9/19/98 http://www.mumia.nl/TCCDMAJ/quietdv.htm) It has often been observed that America is a truly violent nation, as shown by the thousands of cases of social and communal violence that occurs daily in the nation. Every year, some 20,000 people are killed by others, and additional 20,000 folks kill themselves. Add to this the nonlethal violence that Americans daily inflict on each other, and we begin to see the tracings of a nation immersed in a fever of violence.
But, as remarkable, and harrowing as this level and degree of violence is, it is, by far, not the most violent feature of living in the midst of the American

empire. We live , equally immersed, and to a deeper degree ignores wide-ranging "structural" violence, of a kind that destroys human life with a breathtaking ruthlessness.
, in a nation that condones and Former Massachusetts prison official and writer, Dr. James Gilligan observes; "By `structural violence' I mean the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function of the class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society's collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society . These are not acts of God. I am contrasting `structural' with `behavioral violence' by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on." -- (Gilligan, J., MD, Violence: Reflections On a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage, 1996), 192.) This form of violence, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, is invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more insidious . How dangerous is it -- really? Gilligan notes: "[E]very fifteen years every decade, throughout the world.
, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war, or genocide on the weak and poor every year of " [Gilligan, p. 196] Worse still, in a thoroughly capitalist society, much of that violence became internalized , turned back on the Self, because, in a society based on the priority of wealth, those who own nothing are taught to loathe themselves , as if something is inherently wrong with themselves, instead of the social order that promotes this self-loathing. This intense self-hatred was often manifested in familial violence as when the husband beats the wife, the wife smacks the son, and the kids fight each other. and systematic violence may be called The War on the Poor This vicious, circular, and invisible violence, unacknowledged by the corporate media, uncriticized in substandard educational systems, and un- understood by the very folks who suffer in its grips, feeds on the spectacular and more common forms of violence that the system makes damn sure -- that we can recognize and must react to it. This fatal . It is found in every country, submerged beneath the sands of history, buried, yet ever present, as omnipotent as death. In the struggles over the commons in Europe, when the peasants struggled and lost their battles for their communal lands (a precursor to similar struggles throughout Africa and the Americas), this violence was sanctified, by church and crown, as the "Divine Right of Kings" to the spoils of class battle. Scholars Frances Fox-Piven and Richard A Cloward wrote, in The New Class War (Pantheon, 1982/1985): "They did not lose because landowners were immune to burning and preaching and rioting. They lost because the usurpations of owners were regularly defended by the legal authority and the armed force of the state. It was the state that imposed increased taxes or enforced the payment of increased rents, and evicted or jailed those who could not pay the resulting debts. It was the state that made lawful the appropriation by landowners of the forests, streams, and commons, and imposed terrifying penalties on those who persisted in claiming the old rights to these resources. It was the state that freed serfs or emancipated sharecroppers only to leave them landless." The "Law", then, was a tool of the powerful to protect their interests, then, as now. It was a weapon against the poor and impoverished, then, as now. It punished retail violence, while turning a blind eye to the wholesale violence daily done by their class masters. The law was, and is, a tool of state power, utilized to protect the status quo, no matter how oppressive that status was, or is. harm to people should be allowed to remain Systems are essentially ways of doing things that have concretized into tradition, and custom, without regard to the rightness of those ways. No system that causes this kind of , based solely upon its time in existence. must serve life, or be discarded as a threat and a danger to life. Such systems must pass away, so that their great and terrible violence passes away with them Systems .

(Brij, Professor at LSU, Eclipse of Freedom: The World of Oppression, Praeger Publishers p. 3-4) Metaphors of existence symbolize variegated aspects of the human reality. However, words can be apocalyptic . " There are words ," de Beauvoir writes, " as murderous as gas chambers " (1968: 30). Expressions can be unifying and explosive ; they portray explicit messages and implicit agendas in human affairs and social configurations. Manifestly the Cold War is over. But when its social institutions become counterproductive impact the day-to-day operations if the common people. The fear of crime, the world is not without nuclear terror. Ethnic strife and political instabilities in the New World Order -- following the dissolution of the Soviet Union -- have generated fears of nuclear terrorism and blackmail in view of the widening circle of nuclear powers. Despite encouraging trends in nuclear disarmament, unsettling questions, power, and fear of terrorism continue to characterize the crisis of the new age which is stumbling at the threshold of the twenty-first century. The ordeal of existence transcends the thermonuclear fever because the latter does not directly accidents, loss of job, and health care on one hand; and the sources of racism, sexism, and ageism on the other hand have created a counterculture of denial and disbelief that has shattered the façade of civility. Civilization loses its significance . It is this aspect of the mega-crisis that we are concerned about

Kleiner 10 (Yevgenia S. associate chair of the Firm’s Women’s Affinity Group and representative of Stroock's Pro Bono Project “Racial Profiling in the Name of National Security: Protecting Minority Travlers' Civil Liberties in the Age of Terrorism” Boston College Third World Law Journal Volume 30 Issue 1 Article 5 11-1-2010 lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=twlj , cayla_) White supremacy ideology suffused law enforcement from the colonial period onward.
White supremacists have been and continue to be embedded in law
enforcement. A. Colonial to Post-Civil War Periods White supremacy and law enforcement have a long, intertwined history. As early as 1671, South Carolina
established a watch consisting of regular constables and rotating citizens to guard Charles Town against potential problems including slave
gatherings.14 In the 1700s, South Carolina established slave patrols, i.e., slave police, to control and police slaves.15 By 1785, South Carolina incorporated the slave patrols into the Charleston Guard and Watch, the first modern police department because this force was authorized by Charleston to use force, had enforcement responsibilities, was the primary law enforcement agency for Charleston, and had a chain of command consisting of a captain and subordinates.16 Throughout the pre-
Civil War period, the slave patrols and police’s primary task was to control slaves.17 States passed laws allowing local officials to create slave patrols to control the slave population and suppress slave insurrections.18 As one slave patroller recounted, they were directed to search “the negro cabins, &
take every thing which we found in them, which bore a hostile aspect,” especially firearm material.19 They were also instructed to “apprehend every negro
who we found from his home” and capture or shoot any who resisted.20 Slaveholders justified white supremacy over blacks based on “racial
ideologies” derived from laws of nature or laws of God.21 “Racism was
literally postulated as a belief system to justify slavery,” explains Randall
Robinson, founder of the advocacy group TransAfrica.22 The Civil War ended de jure slavery, but white anxieties about losing racial control remained.23 Southern city and county police forces continued to harass and threaten blacks.24 In the post-slavery
South, the Ku Klux Klan’s strategy of white dominance included Klan members serving on police forces.25 Southern white police officers helped reassert white control by enforcing the pass system requiring blacks to carry
a pass and present it on demand.26 As explained by one white officer who arrested a black stablekeeper, “[A]ll ni[ ][ ]ers that did not have a paper from their master, showing that they were employees, must be taken to jail and hired out for 5 dollars per month.”27 The police often participated in or led white mobs to attack black individuals or assemblies.28 For example, in 1866 in New Orleans, the police led an attack
against a convention of black Union loyalists.29 White police officers fired
into the group of black delegates.30 When blacks fired back, a massacre ensued.31 White attackers clubbed and shot the black delegates.32 The police led white

vigilantes around the city beating blacks and shooting blacks who fled.33 A Congressional committee later concluded the massacre had been planned by white police members and assisted by police Sergeant Lucien Adams and Sheriff Harry T. Hays.34 B. Twentieth-Century Period White supremacy and law enforcement remained intertwined in the twentieth century. In the period between World War I and World War II,
right-wing groups, like the Ku Klux Klan, formed the primary domestic threat because they adhered to principles of racial supremacy, or embraced antigovernment and antiregulatory beliefs in favor of individual
freedoms.35 William J. Simmons, an Imperial Wizard of the Klan, stated that “there is never a stand taken unless an officer of the law supervise[s]” Klan violence.36 Rooting out Klan influence by prosecuting those who engaged in Klan violence was difficult for officials because Klan members penetrated all levels of local governments including police departments.37 For example, in one North Carolina town in the 1960s, it was widely known in the community that Pittsboro police officials were Klan members.38 In 1965, one North Carolina State Highway Patrol officer admitted, while chuckling and motioning toward a Klan rally, “Hell, I’m on their side.”39 In 1979, police officer William Rayfield, a Klan member, was indicted by a federal grand jury for firing shots into black leaders’ homes.40 Additional instances of racism in law enforcement included
the Birmingham police chief, Theophilus Eugene “Bull” Connor, turning fire hoses and police dogs on black schoolchildren and other peaceful protesters
during a Civil Rights march in 1963.41 In the 1970s, a San Diego police chief
provided the following answer when queried about running for mayor:
“Can’t do it. I don’t like the ni[ ][ ]ers and the Mexicans don’t like me.”42 Additionally, the “Southeast Investigation” of the San Diego Police Department in 1976 by then-Police Captain Norm Stamper revealed rampant racism.43 Thirty of the thirty one San Diego police officers interviewed, including a lieutenant and two sergeants, admitted using racial slurs.44 African Americans were called ni_ _ers, boys,
splibs toads, coons garboons, groids (derived from “negroid”), Sambos, Buckwheats, Rastuses, Remuses, jigaboos, jungle bunnies, and spooks. Latinos were called greasers, wets, wetbacks, beans, beaners, bean bandits, chickenos, and spics.45 Most officers said they used racial slurs among
themselves and less often with the public.46 In public, however, the officers explained they used racial slurs “only jokingly,” to “defuse a tense situation,” or because they were “really pissed” at someone.47 The police officers dehumanized citizens
of color in other ways. For example, white officers who encountered blacks
would say, during radio calls, “No humans involved” and “just an 11-13—ni[ ][ ]er” (11-13 being code for an animal followed by an identification of the animal).48 Before police officers improperly stopped black suspects for DWB (“driving while black”), officers improperly stopped blacks for BBN (“busy being a ni[ ][ ]er”). A San Diego police officer interviewed in the 1976 Southeast Investigation admitted that he witnessed and made busts based on the racist BBN profile.49 Also, during the
Southeast Investigation’s examination of racial discrimination in the San Diego police force, seventy-one percent of the San Diego police officers
admitted using or witnessing excessive force.50 In the 1980s in Richmond, California, some white police officers who called themselves the “Cowboys” were convicted by a federal court jury of civil rights violations including beating African Americans.51 Also in the 1980s, a Klan police officer in Jefferson County, Kentucky, had

a post office box in the name of the Confederate Officers Patriotic Squad (“COPS”) to receive Klan material. 52 He admitted having a list of approximately forty Klan members with probably more than half being law enforcement officers.53 In 1989, a part-time police officer in Newfields, New Hampshire, was terminated for being a recruiter for the Klan.54 In 1990, the Tarrant County Sheriff’s Department discharged a reserve deputy because of his Klan connections.55 He was the chief recruiter (Kleagle) for the Klan in Texas.56 Shortly thereafter, he began working as a police officer in Century, Florida. 57 The Century Police Department also discharged the officer after learning of his previous membership in the Klan.58 In a 1991 case, a federal district court judge found a group of deputies known as the “Vikings” in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department to be a “neo-Nazi, white supremacist gang.”59 Decades later in 2013, two deputies filed
suit against the L.A. County Sheriff’s Department alleging the Vikings group still exists and that an “inappropriate relationship exists between certain LASD [Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department] personnel and various inmate jail gangs, especially white supremacists.”60
Chin 13 (William Y. Professor of Lawyering at Lewis and Clark Law School and member of the Executive Committee for the Minority Groups Section of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) and the Award Committee for the AALS Section on Legal Writing, Reasoning, and Research “Law and Order and White Power: White Supremacist Infiltration of Law Enforcement and the Need to Eliminate Racism in the Ranks” LSD Journal Vol. 6, 2013 www.lsd-journal.net/archives/Volume6/WhiteSupremacists.pdf , cayla_)
White supremacy and law enforcement remain intertwined at the advent of
the twenty-first century. White supremacists admit they seek employment in law enforcement.61 One white supremacist website explained that although
government police forces are “evil institutions,” instead, individual police officers who are “sympathetic to the pro-White cause” and are “the best of
our Race” are good.62 Former California grand dragon of the Knights of the Klu Klux Klan and founder of White Aryan Resistance (“WAR”), Tom Metzger, gave a 2004 speech to skinheads exhorting them to advance the white cause through infiltration: “We have
to infiltrate! Infiltrate the military! Infiltrate your local governments!
Infiltrate your school board! Infiltrate law enforcement!”63 Also in 2004, the Deputy Chief of Police for the Los Angeles Police Department, Michael Berkow, warned of internal threats stating: “Right-wing extremists and members of militia
movements and supremacist groups and their sympathizers have infiltrated
some local police departments.”64 In 2006, The FBI issued an intelligence
assessment, titled “White Supremacist Infiltration of Law Enforcement,” that explained how “white supremacist groups have historically engaged in strategic efforts to infiltrate and recruit from law enforcement
communities.”65 The election of Barack Obama as President in 2008 did not signify the end of white supremacist threats. Rather, the election of the first African American

president created opportunities for white supremacists to recruit disaffected whites and reinvigorate white supremacists’ cause.66 In 2009, a police officer in Fruitland Park, Florida, James Elkins, resigned while under investigation by the Fruitland Park Police Department for being a Klan official who had distributed fliers promoting the Klan.67 Photos showed the officer dressed in Klan gowns and hoods.68 A letter also named the officer as a recruiter for the National Aryan Knights of the Ku Klux Klan.69 According to a 2010 report by the National Gang Intelligence Center, “White supremacist groups
. . . have successfully infiltrated and have made numerous attempts to infiltrate law enforcement . . . agencies and recruit law enforcement personnel . . . .”70 The report mentioned a former police officer with suspected Klan ties being charged with civil rights violations involving death
threats against blacks.71 The report also noted that the National Alliance, a white supremacist organization, engaged in recruiting efforts, including recruiting law enforcement officers.72 A later 2011 National Gang Intelligence Center report on various gangs, including white supremacist gangs, states: “Gangs encourage members, associates, and relatives to obtain law enforcement . . . employment in order to gather information on rival gangs and law enforcement operations.”73 According to the 2011 report, “gang members in at least 57 jurisdictions, including California, Florida, Tennessee, and Virginia, have applied for or gained employment within judicial, police, or correctional agencies.”74 In a 2013 civil rights case involving an African American tow company owner filing suit against the town after being denied a place on the town’s tow list, witnesses recounted the town’s Chief of Police’s racist statements, including: “I’m not letting that goddam ni[ ][ ]ger tow for us” and “I’m not going to put that fucking ni[ ][ ]er on the tow list.”75 The Chief of Police conceded making some of these statements and using the term “ni[ ][ ]er.”76 Another witness testified that the Chief used
other racial slurs to describe Black, Latino, and Arab residents.77 Although the Seventh Circuit ruled against the Black tow company owner, the court
noted that the Chief’s racist language showed enduring racial bias.78 According to the court, We would have liked to believe that this kind of behavior faded into the darker recesses of our country’s history many years ago. When the chief law-
enforcement officer of a Wisconsin town regularly uses language like “fucking ni[ ][ ]er” in casual conversation, however, it is obvious that there is still work to be done.79 The one part of the work that still needs to be done includes understanding the threat of white supremacist infiltration of the police force, so that racism in this social institution can be effectively
addressed by law enforcement employers.

***Alternatives***

Chang 93 – (Robert S. Seattle University Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality “Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space” California Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Oct., 1993), pp. 1241+1243-1323 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3480919 , cayla_) We see, then, that though there is power in affirming the category Asian
American, the category is also limiting, especially because it remains
defined in terms of the dominant group.414 As long as our identity is defined oppositionally or in contradistinction to others, we are still enslaved to a degree. That the term "Asian American" can be an oppressive categorization is the starting point of the
third branch of Asian American Legal Scholarship-post-structuralism-which deconstructs the category "Asian American," emancipating us from its
limits. Only when we are free of it can we be free to give ourselves our own identity.415
Only in this way can we be free to embrace our identity rather than having
our identity thrust upon us from the outside.416 The question becomes whether Asian American Legal Scholarship can survive this post-structural deconstruction of the category "Asian American."417 If a full post-structural critique deconstructs all categories, including race, then once the category "Asian American" is
deconstructed, so the question goes, how can it any longer serve as a useful
category? This critique misunderstands deconstruction. Part of the problem lies in the word "deconstruction" which implies a breaking down or breaking apart.418 Deconstruction does no such thing. It reveals things to be historically situated and socially constructed, but this realization in no way changes the current construction of the category except to remove any foundational claims.419 Deconstruction simply
reveals the potential for change; a category could be constructed differently in the future, or perhaps our present could be reconstructed differently by
revising or reinterpreting our past.420 To reiterate, in no way does deconstructing the category "Asian American" change the fact that I am an Asian American. My context has constructed me as Asian American. This understanding of contextual
situatedness enables Post-structural Asian American Legal Scholarship to use multiple consciousness as a method to understand and participate in
Stages One, Two, and Three without inconsistency.421 It is able to do this because it understands law as a contextual practice that has certain rules. Even while it criticizes and tries to undermine those rules, it can engage in civil rights struggles because it understands that removal of oppression is beneficial, even if it must come in stages. Mari Matsuda's article, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 422 is an example of multiple consciousness at work. She says at the end of her article, "I have written to persuade readers of good will to adopt legal rules and ethical positions that promote linguistic pluralism. I have used existing legal doctrine, traditional liberal theory, and new critical theories in this

effort."423 She recognizes the inherent contradictions, the internal inconsistencies of doing all three, yet she is able to do it because an Asian American Legal
Scholarship has a pragmatic face. It has a multiple consciousness that can assume various guises. It assumes these guises with a final goal in mind:
liberation. Tremendous diversity exists within the category "Asian American." And
tremendous diversity exists among the disempowered. We must remember, though, that it is only through solidarity that we will one day be free to
express our diversity.

Alt – Unmask racism We must interrogate and end white privilege in order to truly progress in society
Lopez, 2003 (Gerardo [Professor of Political Science], "The (Racially Neutral) Politics of Education: A Critical Race Theory Perspective", Educational Administration Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 1 (February 2003) 68-94, 6/28, eaq.sagepub.com/content/39/1/68.full.pdf) // cjh Because it is so ordinary, we often fail to see how it functions and shapes ¶ our institutions, relationships, and ways of thinking. By unmasking the hidden¶ faces
of racism, CRT aims to expose and unveil White privilege “in its¶ various
permutations” (Ladson-Billings, 1999, p. 12) and reveal a social¶ order that is highly stratified and segmented along racial lines. It is hoped that ¶ such an unveiling will reveal the simple fact that racism is a permanent fixture¶ in the American political, legal, and social spectrum (Bell, 1995b; Crenshaw ¶ et al., 1995; Delgado, 1995a; Delgado & Stefancic, 2001).
¶
A second tenet of CRT is
“Interest Convergence” (Bell, 1995a), or the¶ belief that Whites will tolerate
and advance the interests of people of color¶ only when they promote the
self-interests of Whites. Consider, for example,¶ the landmark Brown v. Board of Education (1954) decision. Derrick Bell ¶ (1995a) suggested that the
Supreme Court decided in favor of desegregation,¶ not because of the historical plight and social conditions of people of color,¶ but because the United States needed to soften its stance on racism to politically¶ appease its
ally countries in the third world during the cold war. In addition, ¶ Bell documented how the courts were especially sympathetic to White ¶ people’s fear of yet another potential uprising by African Americans. Bell’s ¶ research suggests that something dramatic needed to be done on a large scale ¶ to prevent the possible boiling-over of African Americans in the United ¶ States and the potential damage such an uprising could cause for White individuals.
¶ In effect, Brown v. Board of Education was passed simply because ¶ the material interests of Whites converged with the civil rights interests of ¶ African Americans at this particular point in time (Bell, 1995a; see also Harris, ¶ 1995).
Such a convergence not only ensures that racism always remains¶ firmly in place but that social progress advances at the pace that White people¶
determine is reasonable and judicious (Bell, 1995a).

Chang 93 – (Robert S. Seattle University Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality “Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space” California Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Oct., 1993), pp. 1241+1243-1323 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3480919 , cayla_) Mainstream
academic legal discourse begins from the premise that objective knowledge exists and is accessible.
I call this the rational/ empirical position. My own theoretical bias tells me that this is a false premise, but I start here to show how the case for personal narrative would appear within the context of mainstream academic discourse.180
Different disempowered groups have developed a similar methodology that tries to reveal bias in supposedly neutral standards.
Feminist legal scholars ask "[t]he woman question." They ask "about the gender implications of a social practice or rule: have women been left out of consideration? If so, in what way; how might that omission be corrected? What difference would it make to do so?"181 Race scholars ask the race question, and so on.
use of the objective voice is one of the social practices that has come under the scrutiny of those asking this type of question. The objective voice is obtained by abstracting from the individual in order to universalize the The perspective of the author so that not only does the author, as an abstracted entity, speak as Everyman, the author also presumes to speak for everyone.
A favorite device is the use of what one commentator calls the "constitutive we."'s2
This "constitutive we" appears in the work of many philosophical and legal theorists.
For example, John Rawls uses "we" in a subtle way that includes "us" as fellow inquirers into the questions he poses."83 But who does he think "we" is?184 Too often,
the individual used as the model for the universal is a man, and more specifically, a white man. Thus, one goal of personal narrative is to discredit this "we." For
example, I might use personal narrative to show that the "we" is a lie because it does not include "me." The stories of outsiders become important because they tell the story from different perspectives, perspectives that may have been excluded when formulating the objective, universal "we." It is important to remember that at this stage
, personal narrative is not being offered to replace what had previously been thought of as objective: to impose my subjectivity upon everyone else only repeats the sin.
'85 Rather,
personal narrative is being offered to show that objectivity may actually be a disguise for white male subjectivity, which takes away the subjectivity of the disempowered.
86 One attempt to restore these lost subjectivities relies on a version of standpoint epistemology. An objectivist or liberal epistemology takes as the proper standpoint that of the "neutral, disinterested observer, a so-called Archimedean standpoint somewhere outside the reality that is being observed."'87 In contrast,
that others cannot have." standpoint epistemologies identify a certain group as victim and then "privileges that status by claiming that it gives access to understanding about oppression
'88 In the context of feminism, "[t]he feminist standpoint epistemologies argue that because men are in the master's position vis-i-vis women, women's social experience-conceptualized through the lenses of feminist theory--can provide the grounds for a less distorted understanding of the world around us."'189 This same point can and has been made about other oppressed groups.'90 One question that arises is why the viewpoint of the oppressed should be privileged. One theorist argues that the standpoint of the oppressed is epistemologically advantageous for the following reasons: It provides the basis for a view of reality that is more impartial than that of the ruling class and also more comprehensive.
It is more impartial because it comes closer to representing the interests of society as a whole; whereas the standpoint of the ruling class reflects the interests only of one section of the population,

the standpoint of the oppressed represents the interests of the totality in that historical period
. Moreover, whereas the condition of the oppressed groups is visible only dimly to the ruling class, the oppressed are able to see more clearly the ruled as well as the rulers and the relation between them. Thus, the standpoint of the oppressed includes and is able to explain the standpoint of the ruling class.191 But the claim that the standpoint of the oppressed is more impartial is unconvincing. It seems that the standpoint of the oppressed would be partial; it would not necessarily provide less distorted views but differently distorted views.
The claim of representing society as a whole also seems problematic because the viewpoints of the oppressed and oppressors are quite distinct and complex.
192 It still might make sense to include the standpoint of the oppressed,
however, not because it has any special access to the truth, but because what is taken as truth is incomplete or distorted without the views of the oppressed.'93
There is the further problem of identifying the standpoint of the oppressed. If oppression or subjugation provides the grounding for having a less distorted view, then it would seem that the prime candidate would be the standpoint of lesbians of color.194 Even if, for the sake of simplicity, we decide that the relevant category is that of women, we are still left with the problem of identifying this standpoint. One commentator warns that we cannot discover this standpoint "directly in women's naive and unreflective world view,""' because this world view, usually labelled as
false consciousness, has been shaped by the dominant male perspective so that it cannot be trusted. Even with standpoint epistemology, then, not all stories of oppression are created equal.
This is problematic "because of the unwillingness, central to feminism, to dismiss some women as simply deluded while granting other women the ability to see the truth."196
Carbado 3--(Devon W., Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law, Critical Race Theory, and Criminal Adjudication. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 7 (May, 2003), pp. 1757-1828 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3657500 , cayla_) First, narrative performs an epistemological function. It provides knowledge
about the nature of discrimination from the perspective of those who
experience it. But why narrative and why not statistical analysis? After all, statistical analysis (assuming a large enough data set) has the benefits of identifying a general phenomenon that is verifiable by third parties.126 And certainly there is nothing about the use of narrative in CRT that precludes critical race theorists from also using statistics. So why not the epistemology of statistics rather than (or in addition to) the epistemology of narrative? The answer may be that narrative does something that statistical analysis does not: It focuses on the specific and provides detail. Statistical analyses do the reverse. When an outsider is trying to describe an
experience to someone who cannot readily relate to it, an insider, narrative provides the detail that can help the insider empathize and relate to the
experience. To employ the language of Clifford Geertz, "We see the lives of others
through lenses of our own grinding."'27 Narrative helps to situate whites in
the "grinding" of racial subordination. A second payoff from using narrative relates to the idea of truth. Narrative is a means by which one can challenge
"the perfectibility, externality, or objectivity of truth."'3' Through narrative,

critical race theorists can demonstrate the contingency and situatedness of
truth. For example, the first two essays in A New Critical Race Theory-Kimberl6 Crenshaw's contributionl32 and the contribution of Sumi Cho and Robert Westley'33-are in dialogue about the "true" genesis of CRT. Of course, Cho and Westley would not say that the history they excavate-which focuses on student activism as a form of social movement that helped to form the "theory"-is true and that the account provided by, among others, Crenshaw (which they argue focuses on the "writings that 'formed the movement""134) is false. Nor are Cho and Westley invested in "proliferate[ing] competing genesis stories."'35 But they do mean to suggest that the truth about
the genesis of CRT is bigger than Crenshaw's "superagency" approach, an
approach that they say "emphasize[s] the agency of individual scholars.""36 The juxtaposition of Crenshaw's essay against Cho and Westley's reminds us that while
most of the controversy about "truth" and CRT arises in the context of contestations between critical race theorists and their detractors, the question of what is true-as well as the question of how truth should be
theorized-is contested (sometimes only implicitly) within CRT as well. A third benefit of narrative is that it can serve as a counterhegemonic device.
Through narrative, people of color can counter the dominant
representations of their identities and their experiences; they can engage in what Margaret Montoya refers to as "discursive subversions."' 37 This is the project in which Henry Richardson engages. He constructs a conversation between an African president and an African American law professor. The exchange constitutes a form
of discursive subversion in that whiteness occupies a background and
marginal space in the discussion. Put differently, the conversation is not mediated by concerns about whiteness or black respectability. The professor and the African president speak about international politics, domestic sovereignty, and tribal conflicts.
The conversation is unconstrained by racial surveillance. They appear to be speaking not as subalterns, but as fully formed (or, at least, not overly
determined) subjects. Presumably, one of the reasons Richardson confers this sense
of freedom on the professor and the president is to raise a question about
power: What happens when black people have it? His answer seems to be that problems of division and social conflict do not necessarily disappear. Michel
Foucault's descriptive claim-that we have an ambivalent relationship to
power-becomes, in Richardson's essay, a normative one.
Chang 93 – (Robert S. Seattle University Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality “Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space” California Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Oct., 1993), pp. 1241+1243-1323 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3480919 , cayla_)

Stage Two recognizes that formal equality cannot give us what it
promises;398 thus, rather than deny difference, Stage Two accepts and affirms it. In this stage, the disempowered group takes and reconstitutes the term "Asian American."399 The oppressive label becomes a positive identity, a tool for empowerment. As such, a facet of Stage Two is its anti-assimilationist attitude.4"
Assimilation is seen as undesirable because it "resembles the attempt to run away from ourselves, with success coming only through the negation of self,
history, culture, and community.""' In opposition to assimilation is pluralistic integration, which is based on an appreciation of American society's culturally pluralistic nature.403 The characteristics of Stage Two are evident in Cultural Asian American Legal Scholarship, which emphasizes cultural differences as a method to
criticize legal principles and legal institutions that fail to take into account
these differences. An example of work in this area is Questioning the Cultural and Gender-Based Assumptions of the Adversary System: Voices of Asian American Law Students, " written by Carolyn Jin-Myung Oh. In her article, Oh examines the cultural backgrounds of some Asian American law students and their perceptions of the adversary system. She contrasts Western notions of individuality and self-
sufficiency with the greater emphasis on family in most Asian and Pacific
American cultures."5 She hypothesizes about the effects of Confucian principles "which emphasize specific roles and proper harmonious relationships among people in family and society. Because harmonious interpersonal relationships are so
highly valued, direct confrontation is avoided whenever possible. Being indirect or talking around the point is a significant part of the
communication style of Asian groups."406 While the scope of her article is limited to responses of Asian American and Caucasian law students to the potentially alienating legal system and their perceived roles within it,"7 her focus on cultural explanations is a good example of the Cultural Asian American Legal Scholarship embodied in Stage Two.408 We can use differences between Asian cultures and Western
cultures to question the assumptions of Stage One's liberal political theory,
which celebrates the notion of an individuated autonomous self. As mentioned earlier, many Asian philosophies have at their center the concept of noself.49
Without a metaphysical "self" as a locus for rights, liberalism and rights
talk lack coherence. Nevertheless, Stage Two of Asian American Legal Scholarship recognizes that formal equality cannot be denied to Asian Americans. Thus, Stage Two
may also employ the raceneutral and race-conscious methods of Stage One without sharing its commitment to liberal political philosophy. Cultural Asian American Legal Scholarship must avoid the pitfall of essentialism
present in cultural feminist theory.410 We must not generalize the cultural differences of certain Asian American groups or individuals in a way that excludes those who do not fit those characteristics.411 Thus, for example, when authors write about Confucian principles, they should be careful to note that for many Asian American groups, such as Filipinos, South Asians and many Southeast Asians, Confucian principles may not be a significant part of their culture. In addition to the essentialist critique,
there is a further danger in accepting difference, because difference, once recognized, can serve as the basis for discrimination. This is, after all,
exactly what discrimination is-differential treatment based on difference.

Radical Asian American Legal Scholarship operates at this juncture by focusing on differences in power, particularly on how inequality in power has constructed and legitimated racial subordination. Its focus thus contrasts with traditional Asian
American civil rights work, which treats difference as an illusion or something to get beyond,412 and with Cultural Asian American Legal
Scholarship, which celebrates difference.4
Chang 93 – (Robert S. Seattle University Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality “Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space” California Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Oct., 1993), pp. 1241+1243-1323 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3480919 , cayla_) The fear is that if we go down the post-modern road, we will no longer be able
to practice social criticism in a compelling way, because without objectivity, Asian Americans and other disempowered groups cannot claim that our emergence from subordination "is less artificial and constructed than that
which [we] have cast off."212 This conclusion seems to be the ultimate logic of the post-structuralist critique. However, this conclusion is not as devastating as it first might seem. It does not render political action impossible; if anything, it does the opposite, in the sense that political action is all that will be left. The post structuralist critique changes the present game, which involves the search for legitimation, by eliminating the possibility of any appeal to an external standard for legitimation. It becomes, as if it were ever anything but, a question of power, where no one can claim a superior legitimacy nor deny the legitimacy
of another's viewpoint or story.213 Narratives, then, cannot be discounted because in this game of power there is no "objective" standard for
disqualification; one "wins" by being more persuasive. Narratives, especially
narratives about personal oppression, are particularly well-suited for persuasive purposes because they can provide compelling accounts of how
things are in society.214 These stories will carry considerable persuasive
power because in our present political-legal climate, which is dominated by
liberal political philosophy, oppression is undesirable.215 This is the space within which Asian American Legal Scholarship will use narrative.
Chang 93 – (Robert S. Seattle University Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality “Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space” California

Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Oct., 1993), pp. 1241+1243-1323 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3480919 , cayla_) There seem to be two ways to argue the case for personal narrative.'74 The first takes place within the rational/empirical mode.'75 In this mode, an argument will be
convincing if it meets certain standards of "impartiality, objectivity, evidential confirmation, comprehensiveness or completeness, and explanatory power.""' Personal narrative would be offered to challenge the
current formulation of objectivity, but not the notion of objectivity itself."'77 In this sense, personal narrative reveals bias in supposed objectivity and then reconstructs it to include previously excluded perspectives. Some strands of feminist theory and critical race theory have this as their goal and rely to some extent on a version of standpoint epistemology to legitimize the use of stories of oppression. I will examine these arguments in Part II.C.1. The second, more radical approach challenges the rational/empirical mode by challenging the very notion of objectivity and the accessibility of knowledge. This more radical critique is often characterized as post-modern or post-structural.'78 In challenging the rational/empirical mode, this more radical critique also challenges the standpoint epistemologies that might support the use of personal narrative. Since all standpoints are equally
validated (or invalidated), there is no longer any compelling reason to
privilege any viewpoint. To state it differently, my personal narrative is as relevant as your personal narrative, and since both of them are equally relevant, they are
equally irrelevant.
Chang 93 – (Robert S. Seattle University Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality “Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space” California Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Oct., 1993), pp. 1241+1243-1323 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3480919 , cayla_) No discourse takes place in a vacuum; each situates itself, or is situated, within a certain space.124 A new discourse must create a space within which to operate.'25 Asian American Legal Scholarship, as a new discourse, is no exception-it too must create a space, showing its relation to other discourses. Some of this work has already been done. In the previous Part, I showed that Asian American Legal Scholarship is, to an extent, a response to the inadequacy of the current discourse on race and the law. It fills the gap created by the problems of coverage and theory in traditional civil rights work and the problem of coverage in critical race scholarship to date. Asian American Legal Scholarship creates its space out of this gap. Asian American Legal Scholarship contends that personal narrative126 is an important tool in
addressing the oppression of Asian Americans. Narrative occupies a similar
role in both feminist legal theory and critical race theory.127 However, the use of narrative has been and continues to be debated in the context of those two disciplines.'28 Thus, Asian American Legal Scholarship cannot use narrative effectively

without first clearing space for its use. This lack of space can partly be attributed
to the way the discourse on the use of narrative in outsider legal scholarship
has been captured by a focus on the existence of a different voice. This preoccupation with "voice" sparked the rather acrimonious Racial Critiques Debate.129 Professor Alex Johnson attempts to put an end to this debate by positing that every scholar of color speaks in the voice of color.130 That this attempt at closure was unsuccessful is evidenced by a recent article by Professors Farber and Sherry who criticize the use of narrative by feminist legal and critical race scholars because these scholars have not yet proved by empirical evidence the existence of a different voice.13
Narratives are key to revealing the truth about the racist society
Lopez, 2003 (Gerardo [Professor of Political Science], "The (Racially Neutral) Politics of Education: A Critical Race Theory Perspective", Educational Administration Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 1 (February 2003) 68-94, 6/28, eaq.sagepub.com/content/39/1/68.full.pdf) // cjh
The third aspect of CRT is the privileging of stories and counterstories
¶ (Delgado, 1995b, 1995c)—particularly the stories that are told by people of¶
color. CRT scholars believe there are two differing accounts of reality : the¶
dominant reality that “looks ordinary and natural” (Delgado, 1995a, p. xiv) to ¶ most individuals, and a racial reality (Bell, 1995b) that has been filtered out,¶ suppressed, and censored. The counterstories of people of color—such as the ¶ counterstory of the Harlem riots—are those stories that are not told, stories ¶ that are consciously and/or unconsciously ignored or downplayed because ¶ they do not fit socially acceptable notions of truth. By highlighting these subjugated¶ accounts,
CRT hopes to demystify the notion of a racially neutral¶ society and tell
another story of a highly racialized social order: a story where ¶ social institutions and practices serve the interest of White individuals

(Albert, , Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Paris, Racism, University of Minnesota Press, translated by Steve Martinot, p. 163) The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved. Yet for this very reason, it is a struggle
to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism; one must not even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people,
which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which [person] man is not [themself] himself an outsider relative to someone else?). Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated; that is, it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge.

The call for objective education that silences a critical race perspective furthers white privilege
Lopez, 2003 (Gerardo [Professor of Political Science], "The (Racially Neutral) Politics of Education: A Critical Race Theory Perspective", Educational Administration Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 1 (February 2003) 68-94, 6/28, eaq.sagepub.com/content/39/1/68.full.pdf) // cjh Taken holistically, CRT posits that beliefs in neutrality, democracy, objectivity,¶ and
equality “are not just unattainable ideals, they are harmful fictions¶ that obscure the normative supremacy of whiteness in American law and¶
society” (Valdes et al., 2002, p. 3). Notwithstanding, White Americans continue¶
to believe in these ideals, because a racial reality is, perhaps, too difficult¶ to
digest. For example, if I were to argue that what we study within the ¶ politics of education is entirely racist, most scholars in the field—conservative ¶ and liberal alike— would be greatly offended, finding such statements perhaps a handful of truly racist individuals whose ¶ preposterous and absurd. Although
some would agree there might be certain¶ institutional practices (such as
power) that limit the political participation of¶ nonmainstream groups, or
base is not largely affected by racism.
¶ ¶ values and beliefs create policies that negatively affect people of color, most¶ of us would believe that our knowledge To the contrary, most of us would tend to believe that what we study actually ¶ highlights the processes by which people of color are marginalized on a ¶ daily basis and how they can challenge and change the political spectrum ¶ through voting, grassroots organizing, mass mobilization, and the election of ¶ minority officials and representatives. In other words, the belief that the politics¶ of
education actively supports a racist agenda does not fit our prevailing¶ and espoused beliefs about the nature of the field.¶ The role of CRT is to
highlight the fact that such beliefs only serve to¶ maintain racism in place— relegating racism to overt/blatant and unmistakable ¶ acts of hatred, as opposed to highlighting the ways in which our beliefs, ¶ practices, knowledge, and apparatuses reproduce a system of racial hierarchy ¶ and social inequality. Rarely do we question
our own values and knowledge¶ base and how those beliefs emerge from— and help sustain—the notion of a¶ racially neutral and democratic social
order that works for all people. In other ¶ words, within the field, we have a tendency to think that social problems ¶ (such as racism) will be resolved if more people get involved in the political ¶ arena and “do something” about it. The belief in democracy
and “justice for¶ all” is protected—as is the belief that the vehicles to ascertain social justice¶ are racially neutral. It is a cheery and simplistic
take on how racism actually¶ functions in society, as well as a naïve understanding how it can be resolved ¶ and remedied.

Calderon 6—(Dolores, University of Utah assistant professor in the Department of Education, Culture, and Society and the Ethnic Studies Program “One-Dimensionality and Whiteness” USA Policy Futures in Education, Volume 4, Number 1, 2006 http://pfe.sagepub.com/content/4/1/73.full.pdf+html , cayla_) In the context of education, elaborating upon the work of critical pedagogues, one must focus on the one-dimensional nature of schooling and how it serves to maintain the needs of advanced industrial society. Breaking from critical pedagogy, though, I argue that this one-dimensional character, the standardization movement, is a reproduction of the normative ideology of whiteness. The reproduction of
whiteness in structures serves to oppress raced, gendered, and classed individuals and communities who deviate from the norms established by the
ideology of whiteness. Thus, in the context of education, I argue that the crucial theoretical tools we have to challenge onedimensional education and refuse whiteness are critical race theory and critical multicultural education. By pairing the work of Herbert Marcuse ([1964] 1991, 1969) with the work of critical race theorists I also hope
to bring to the fore how whiteness is overlooked by contemporary critical
scholars of education in their works on education, which traditionally center class-based analyses, and instead follow in the footsteps of those scholars who bring race and racism to the forefront of their work ( Ladson-Billings, 1997; Yosso, 2002; Sleeter & Bernal, 2003; Allen, 2004). Sleeter & Bernal (2003) argue that ‘most of the literature
in critical pedagogy does not directly address race, ethnicity, or gender, and
as such has a white bias’ (2003, p. 2). Moreover, this centering of class has detrimental effects upon analyses of race and ethnicity, and has ‘the effect of elevating the power of largely White radical theorists over theorists of color’ (2003, p. 2). Even if unintended, the power white critical theorists have to name and theorize sites
of oppression produces ‘silences’ upon the epistemological validity of the
experiences of oppressed communities (2003, p. 3). Thus, critical race theory in education is an important tool to pierce the silence of singularly class-based analyses of schooling (Yosso, 2002). Furthermore, it is through the lens of critical race theory that the important insights of Marcuse can be rescued from silencing discourses which attempt to find the moments of liberation in spaces that are one-dimensional. This pairing of Marcuse’s work and critical race theory answers Devon W. Carbado’s (2002) call that ‘a robust notion of race-centricity would, in the context of
discussions about education, make clear that educational discourses and
institutions both reflect particular conceptions of, and produce, race’

Critical Race Theory is a prerequisite for good political science education and trains future political leaders
Lopez, 2003 (Gerardo [Professor of Political Science], "The (Racially Neutral) Politics of Education: A Critical Race Theory Perspective", Educational Administration Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 1 (February 2003) 68-94, 6/28, eaq.sagepub.com/content/39/1/68.full.pdf) // cjh In recent years, CRT has played an important role in both legal and educational ¶ circles and has expanded well beyond its origins in the legal arena (see ¶ also Delgado Bernal, 2002; Duncan, 2002; Fernández, 2002; Ladson-Billings, ¶ 1999; Ladson-Billings & Tate, 1995; Lewis, 2001; Parker & Lynn, 2002; ¶ Parker et al., 1999; Smith-Maddox & Solorzano, 2002; Solorzano, 1997; ¶ Solorzano & Delgado Bernal, 2001; Solorzano & Yosso, 2001, 2002; Tate, ¶ 1997; Taylor, 1999; Villalpando, in press; Villalpando & Delgado-Bernal, ¶ 2002). Despite this proliferation,
CRT has yet to make significant inroads
¶
into
other important areas of study such as educational administration,
politics
¶
of education, policy studies, and political science.
As a result,
important
¶
discussions surrounding the permanence of racism remain largely
¶
absent in these particular fields
. This absence is particularly crucial because ¶ these areas collectively argue that social and racial progress cannot only be ¶ advanced but can be overcome and remedied through collective good will, ¶ reform-oriented visions, and strategic policies.
CRT introduces the fact that
¶
racial progress cannot be made by politics or policy alone—because racism
¶
cannot be remedied without substantially recognizing and altering White
¶
privilege.
¶ Earlier in this discussion, I made reference to a story of conflict and how ¶ Schattschneider failed to think about race, racism, and the historical treatment ¶ of people of color in his analysis. I believe Schattschneider’s work is, in ¶ many ways, representative of the field as a whole. Many times, we miss ¶ opportunities to identify and name racism, largely because we do not see it in ¶ the work we do and/or because our respective lenses are not attuned to recognizing ¶ it in our daily lives.
CRT provides us with a healthy reminder that racism
¶
is alive and well in this country and functions at a level that is often invisible
¶
to most individuals.
It reminds us that the only way we will make ¶ advances in dealing with the problem of racism is if we take the time to see ¶ and understand how it operates, recognize it within ourselves, highlight it ¶ within our field, and take brave steps to do something about it. Indeed, it ¶ reminds us that we have a long way to go to address the intractable problem of ¶ race in this society.
¶
As scholars who prepare future educational leaders, we cannot continue to
¶
marginalize and/or trivialize issues of race and racism within the larger discourse
¶
of educational leadership and policy
(Larson, 1997; Parker & Shapiro, ¶ 1992; Young & Laible, 2000).
Issues of race, class, gender, sexual orientation,
¶
and other areas of difference—including their intersections— must take
¶
a central role in our knowledge base and practices
,
so that
the “important ¶ stuff” in
education
al leadership
is not solely rooted in technical knowledge of
¶
leadership and organizational theory
but rests in the nuances of creating ¶ schools that truly work for all children, families, and members of the school ¶ community. Perhaps
the time has come to
take the lessons of CRT to heart and ¶
begin
the process of naming and
dismantling racism within our ranks as well
as in the work we do.

Vehmas and Watson 13—Disability Studies at the Universities of Helsinki and Glasgow respectively (Simo and Nick, “Moral wrongs, disadvantages, and disability: a critique of critical disability studies”, Disability & Society (2013), dml) CDS does not engage with ethical issues to do with the role of impairment and disability in people’s well-being and the pragmatic and mundane issues of day-today living. Imagine, for example, a pregnant woman who has agreed, possibly with very little thought, to the routine of prenatal diagnostics, and who has been informed that the foetus she is carrying has Tay-Sachs disease. She now has to make the decision over whether to terminate the pregnancy or carry it to term. The value judgements that surround Tay-Sachs include the fact that it will cause pain and suffering to the child and he or she will probably die before the age of four. These are morally relevant considerations to the mother. Whilst CDS would probably guide her to confront
ableist assumptions and challenge her beliefs about the condition, considerations having to do with pain and suffering are nevertheless morally significant. The way people see things, and the language that is used to describe certain conditions, can affect how they react to them, but freeing oneself from ableist assumptions may not in some cases be enough. There may be insurmountable realities attached to some impairments where parents feel that their personal and social circumstances would not enable
them to provide the child or themselves with a satisfactory life (Vehmas 2003). Impairment sometimes produces practical, difficult ethical choices and we need more concrete viewpoints than the ideas provided through ableism, which offers very little practical moral guidance. It is questionable whether the notion of ableism would help the parents in deciding whether to have a child who has a degenerative condition that results in early death. Campbell (2009a, 39, 149 and 159), for example, discusses
arguments about impairments as harmful conditions, the ethics of external bodily transplants as well as wrongful birth and life court cases (whether life with an impairment is preferable to non-existence), and how ableism
impacts on discourse around these issues. Whilst her analysis of such
ableist discourses suggests ethical judgements, she provides no arguments or conclusions as to whether, for example, external bodily transplants are ethically wrong or whether impairment may or may not constitute a moral
harm. Under the anti-dualistic stance adopted by CDS, even the well-being/ill-being dualism becomes an arbitrary and nonsensical construct. Under ableism it can be
constructed as merely maintaining the dominance of those seemingly faring well (supposedly, ‘non-disabled’ people), and labels those faring less well as having lesser value. There may not be a clear answer to what constitutes human well-being or flourishing, but in general we can and we need to

agree about some necessary elements required for well-being. Also, as moral agents we have an obligation to make judgements about people’s
well-being and act in ways that their well-being is enhanced (Eshleman 2009). This is why we have, for example, coronary heart disease prevention programmes because the possible death or associated health problems are seen as harms. Possibly
these policies are based on ableist perspective, but if that is the case then the normative use of ableism is null; eradicating supposedly ableist enterprises such as coronary heart disease prevention would be an example of reductio ad absurdum. Denying some aspects of well-being are so clear
that their denial would be absurd, and simply morally wrong. CDS raises ethical issues and insinuates normative judgements but does not provide supporting ethical arguments. This is a way of shirking from intellectual and ethical
responsibility to provide sound arguments and conceptual tools for ethical
decision-making that would benefit disabled people. If we are to describe disability, disablism, and oppression properly, we have to explicate the moral and political wrong related to these phenomena. Whilst CDS has produced useful analyses, for example, of the cultural reproduction of disability, it needs to engage more closely with the evaluative issues inherently related to disability. As Sayer has argued (against Foucault): while one could hardly disagree that we should seek to uncover the hidden and unconsidered ideas on which practices are based, I would argue that critique is
indeed exactly about identifying what things ‘are not right as they are’, and
why. (Sayer 2011, 244) By settling almost exclusively to analyses of ableism without engaging properly with the ethical issues involved, CDS analyses are deficient. The
moral wrongs related to disablism or ableism are matters of great concern to disabled people, and CDS should in its own part take the responsibility of remedying current wrongs disabled people suffer from.

Carbado 3--(Devon W., Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law, Critical Race Theory, and Criminal Adjudication. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 7 (May, 2003), pp. 1757-1828 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3657500 , cayla_) A concrete application of the concept of race as a social construct is the idea of race as a performative identity. The claim is that the social meaning of, for example, a black person's racial identity is a function of the way in which that person performs (presents) her blackness.63 At the core of this conception is the notion that race is not just a structural or macro dynamic. It is a micro and interpersonal dynamic as well; racial identities are formed in, and produced by, social
encounters. In the context of everyday interactions, people construct-that
is, they project and interpret particular images of-race. This means that the intelligibility of a black person's racial identity derives at least in part from (1) the "picture" of blackness she projects and (2) how that racial projection is seen. This
implies that there is more than one way to be, and be interpreted as, black.
Blackness, in other words, is not monolithic. On one side of the spectrum are "conventional" black people. They are black prototypes-that is, people who are perceived to be stereotypically black. Their performance of blackness is consistent with society's understanding of who black people really are. On the other side are "unconventional"
black people--people who are not stereotypically black. Their performance of blackness is outside of what society perceives to be conventional black
behavior. A black person's vulnerability to discrimination is shaped in part by her racial position on this spectrum. The less stereotypically black she is, the more palatable her identity is. The more palatable her identity is, the less vulnerable she is to discrimination. The relationship among black unconventionality, racial
palatability, and vulnerability to discrimination creates an incentive for black people to signal-through identity performances-that they are
unconventionally black.64 These signals convey the idea that the sender is black in a phenotypic but not a social sense. Put another way, the signals function as a marketing device. They brand the black person so as to make clear that she is not a black prototype.65 The concept of race as performative suggests that people of color are not simply acted on. They have some agency to structure the terms upon which they are experienced.66 For example, how a law firm treats a black woman may depend on whether her hair is straightened, "natural" and short, Afroed, or dreaded. In other words, the choices a black woman makes about how to groom her hair will inform how their employers racialize her. But how? "Hair seems to be such a little thing."67 Paulette Caldwell has provided a wonderful articulation of the racializing potential of black women's hair.68 Her article on the subject begins this way:

The Alternative fails -- Economic inequality is perpetuated because of whiteness – It gives lower socio-economic whites a reason to feel superior
Durr, 2002 (Marlese [Professor of Sociology], "The New Politics of Race: From Du Bois to the 21st Century", 6/28, 178-180) // cjh Social reformers worked for years to gain no-fault divorce laws. Now at least according to some studies, those laws are working to disadvantage divorced women more than the old laws did. Unable to overturn death penalty statutes, civil liberties lawyers have evolved an endless series of appeal procedures that serve to maintain condemned persons on death row for ten to twenty years - sometimes against their will. One wonders whether such edge - of - death living is not as "cruel and inhuman" as the death penalty itself. Doing good in this racially charged, economically disparate environment is not simply difficult, it may not be possible. As my black laborer Jake's experience teachers, intended confrontations involving race are risky and always fraught with potential disaster . . . evert when individuals are willing to make personal sacrifices in order to do good. Is it any wonder that so many racial and other social reform efforts fail? Civil rights organizations are now floundering in part because they refuse to acknowledge that opposition to their racial equality goals is not the fault of a group of bad white people whose discriminatory propen-sities can be controlled by well-written civil rights laws, vigorously en-forced. Even those experienced a measure of success become part of the problem rather than a slice of the solution.
blacks who through hard work and good fortune have Our dilemma is expressed by a working-class black character in my book, one named for Langston Hughes's Semple. I had read him a passage from a book (The Alchemy of Race and Rights) by a former student, Patricia Williams. Semple was impressed: "Maybe she can get beyond so many of our bourgeoisie black folks with all their degrees and fancy titles who still don't understand what we ordinary black folks have known for a very long time." "Which is?" I asked rather defensively_ "Which is that the law works for the Man most of the time, and only works for us in the short run as a way of working for him in the long run." I had to laugh in spite of myself. Semple was a marvel. "You will be happy to know," I told him, "that some middle-class black professionals agree with you. Plus, Mr. Sem-ple," I admonished, "you are too hard on those of us who managed to get degrees and what you call a bourgeois life style. I have to tell you that neither offers real protection from racial discrimination. We are both black—and, for precisely that reason, we are in the same boat." "Not really, brother," Semple said. "I mean no offense, but the fact is you upper-income black folks hurt us everyday blacks simply by being successfuL The white folks see you doing your thing, making money in the high five figures_ latching on to all kinds of fancy titles, some of which even have a little authority behind the name, and generally moving on up. They conclude right off that discrimination is over, and that if the rest of us got up off our dead asces dropped the welfare tit, stopped having illegitimate babies, and found jobs, we would all be just like you. It's not fair, brother, but it's the living truth. You may be committed to black people but, believe me, you have to work very had to do as much good for black people as you do harm simply by being good at whatever you do for a living!" ¶ Even Solomon with all his wisdom would be hard pressed to resolve the racial challenges facing our society. Deep down, most of us working in civil rights know that there is no real salvation in the racial field. Wish more faith in the law than in the lessons of our past experience, we continue to plan our civil right programs to conform to our romantic ideals about an integrated America. And, as with romance, we do so with a wild disregard for either logic or history. It is not that we civil rights advocates do not concede that racism is an enormous obstacle to our efforts to achieve racial justice. We know it exists and assert on every public occasion that no social fact in America is more salient than racial difference
connection between the economic subordination of blacks and the social and political stability of whites
.
We
. But
we underestimate the
underestimate when we do not
entirely ignore the fact that there is a deeply held belief in white superiority
important that serves as a key, regulative force in an otherwise fragile and dangerously divided society. Indeed, it is difficult to think of another characteristic of societal functioning that has retained its viability and its value to social stability from the very beginning of the American experience down to the present day.
Slavery and segregation are gone, but most whites continue to expect society to recognize an unspoken but no less vested
property right in their "white-ness." This right is recognized and upheld by courts and society like all property rights under a government created and sustained primarily for that purpose. The result is that it is easy for opponents of social reforms needed by all, white as well as blacks, to build opposition to those re-forms by painting them as somehow giving unfair advantage to blacks. Several years ago, some young white men in Dayton, Ohio, were arrested before they could carry out their plan to blow up the local museum. The men were outraged because the museum had presented an exhibit hon-oring the life of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. These young men, likely poor with even poorer

prospects for a good life, had plenty of reason for outrage. But not at a museum honoring King's life. They should have looked at what the redistribution of the wealth up-ward will mean to their life chances. Statistics show that U.S. wealth concentration in 1989 was more extreme than that of any time since 1929. Between 1983 and 1989, the share of the wealth held by the top half of one percent of the richest families increased by an almost un-precedented 4.6 percentage points. In dollar terms, of the 2.6 trillion dollars of increase in family wealth in that period, 55 percent accrued to the top half of one percent of families. During the same period, 1983 to 1989, the lower-middle and bottom wealth class collectively (i.e., the bottom 40%) lost 256 billion dollars of wealth. And yet these young men viewed a museum honoring King as the enemy, not the local banks or the corporate headquarters in their area. Why don't whites wake up and see the real source of their disadvantage? Professor Kimberle Crenshaw suggests that:
To bring a fundlinental challenge to the way things are, whites would have to question not just their own subordinate status, but also both the economic and the racial myths that
justify the status quo. Racism, combined with equal op-portunity mythology, provides a rationalization for racial oppression, making it difficult for whites to see the Black situation as illegitimate or unnecessary. If whites believe that Blacks, because they are unambitious or inferior, get what they deserve, it becomes that much harder to convince whites that something is wrong with the entire system. Similarly, a
challenge to the legitimacy of con-tinued racial inequality would force whites to confront myths about equality of opportunity that justify for them whatever measure of economic success they may have attained.'
which most hold no real power, but only their privileged racial identity ¶ Race consciousness makes it difficult—at least for whites—to imagine the world differently. It also creates the desire for identification with privileged elites. By focusing on a distinct, subordinate "other," whites include themselves in the dominant circle—an arena in . Consider the case of a dirt-poor, Southern white shown participating in a Ku Klux Klan rally in the movie Resurgence, who declared: "Every morning, I wake up and thank God I'm white." For this person, and for others like him. race consciousness—manifested by his refusal even to associate with blacks—provides a powerful explanation of why he fails to challenge the current social order.2 Novelist Toni Morrison provides a more earthy but hardly less accu-rate assessment of how the presence of blacks enables a bonding by whites that occurs across vast socioeconomic divides. Thus, when in a Time magazine interview Ms. Morrison was asked why blacks and whites can't bridge the abyss in race relations, she replied: I feel personally sorrowful about black-white relations a lot of the time becaus black people have always been used as a buffer in this country between power= to prevent class war, to prevent other kinds of real conflagrations.3 If there were no black people here in this country, it would have been Balkanized. The immigrants would have torn each other's throats am as they have done everywhere else. But in becoming an American, from Europe, what one has in common with that other immigrant is contour for me—it's nothing else but color. the± would stand together. They could all say, "I am not that." So in dam sense, becoming an American is based on an attitude: an exclusion of ¶ me. It wasn't negative to them—it was unifying. Wherever they were from,

Chang 93 – (Robert S. Seattle University Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality “Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space” California Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Oct., 1993), pp. 1241+1243-1323 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3480919 , cayla_)
The first stage is characterized by a denial of difference and, usually, faith in
traditional civil rights work. This faith is premised on notions grounded in liberal political philosophy. The methods employed may be race-neutral or race- conscious.388 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, which held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause applied to Chinese and other immigrants,390 represents an example of a successful race-neutral effort under Stage One. A consent decree that set forth goals and timetables for the San Francisco Police Department to hire
persons bilingual in Chinese is an example of a successful race-conscious
effort under Stage One.39' Another successful race-conscious effort is the Voting Rights Language Assistance Act of 1992. As these victories indicate, legal scholarship in Stage One focuses on formal equality and pursues remedial measures in order to obtain equal rights. The denial of difference in Stage One is often accompanied by a preference for assimilation as a solution to discrimination. For example, one
Japanese American newspaper in 1929 urged the Nisei-second generation Japanese Americans-to become "one hundred percent Americans" in order
to avoid discrimination.393 Failure to assimilate fully, we are warned, leads to the imposition of certain penalties.394 Problems arise, though, when some people realize the contradictions of assimilation: "I wanted to be an American... I wondered why God had not made me an American. If I couldn't be an American, then what was I? A Japanese? No. But not an American either. My life background is American.... [But] my looks made me Japanese."395 Such a realization may either
lead someone to try even harder to be "American,"396 or to reject full
assimilation and accept being different. Proponents of Stage Two start from this premise.397
Carbado 3--(Devon W., Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law, Critical Race Theory, and Criminal Adjudication. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 7 (May, 2003), pp. 1757-1828 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3657500 , cayla_) Our third caveat is that, although the literature on the effectiveness of
homogeneity is broad, the subset that focuses specifically on racial
dynamics is small. Generalization from studies addressing invisible demographic variables, such as education and background, to visible attributes, such as race and

gender, is necessarily controversial.'58 And finally, our treatment of this literature is preliminary, inexpert, and incomplete. The literature is vast, and the scholars who have produced it might take issue with some of what we say. Our sense, however, is that the basic idea we employ this literature to support-that there is an
incentive for employers to pursue homogeneity-is uncontroversial within
the literature. We hope that our analysis will invite other legal scholars, particularly critical race theorists, who are interested in both workplace discrimination and racial diversity management to engage this largely unexplored body of work. Social identity
theory suggests that people have an affinity for those they perceive to be
part of their in-group."59 In concrete terms, people are more likely to
demonstrate TFL (which, again, is shorthand for trust, fairness, and loyalty) to those they perceive to be members of their ingroup.160
Conversely, they are more likely to discriminate against those they perceive to be members of an out-group.1"' Race, being both socially salient and facially visible, is one of the primary categories along which people make initial in- group and out-group categorizations.'62 One explanation is that people assume that those of a similar race are likely to share similar values and to have had similar experiences. As a result, racial outsiders are vulnerable to discrimination from their racial insider colleagues.•"3 To avoid this distrust and dislike (which will likely undermine workplace efficiency by increasing transaction costs), employers will want to hire people who are similar to insiders. The similarity-attraction theory is largely analogous. It posits that people are attracted to those who are similar.'64 The theory is that race is one of the primary categories used to determine similarity and that this similarity, in turn, translates into attraction. Once again, as with social identity
theory, those who appear facially similar are assumed to share the same values and norms of communication.'65 Under this paradigm, racial minorities are presumptively dissimilar and unattractive,'"

Hutchinson 2 – (Darren L. Professor of Constitutional Law, Remedies, Race and the Law, and Civil Rights Seminar at the University of Florida Levin College of Law “Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform” 6-2002 scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1399&context=facultypub , cayla_) Another weakness in progressive race blindness scholarship is that it fails to explain how to end race consciousness. Ending "race as we know it" is a tall order in a society that has been rigidly defined and marked by race. 67 Despite the
implementation of legal provisions guaranteeing formal equality, racial inequality, white supremacy, institutional racism, and the subjugation of persons of color are enduring features of American economic, legal,
political, and social life. 68 Furthermore, the protracted efforts of progressive elements to rid society of inequality have lessened, but not eradicated, the problem. 69 Undoubtedly, the persistence and ubiquity of racism has led the progressive race blindness scholars to advance the abolition of race. 70 But the proven durability of
racism counsels against the advancement of a raceblind agenda without any
programmatic detail. This is not to say that every piece of scholarship that offers a new vision should provide a literal road map for implementing its concerns. The centrality of race in American life, however, means that the radical deconstruction
that the progressive race blindness theorists advocate will require
innovative, if not invasive, efforts. Nevertheless, there is very little in progressive race blindness scholarship that explains how we might accomplish their provocative ideas. Perhaps such detail is lacking because the task they have assumed is an impossible one.

Lawrence 95 – (Charles R. Professor of Law at University of Hawai'i at Mānoa Centennial “The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness: Learning to Think and Talk About Race, Again” Boston College Third World Law Journal Volume 15 | Issue 1 Article 2 1-1 1995 lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1248&context=twlj , cayla_) All of us must condemn outbreaks of anti-semitism. We must oppose the neo-Nazi
voices of Khalid Muhammad and David Duke. Blacks must be particularly vigilant and outspoken when anti-semitism raises its head in our communities, even as Jews must be in the vanguard of the anti-racist
struggle when members of the Jewish community are complicit in the American racial caste system. But I am concerned that the persistent intensity of the call for black leaders to condemn Farrakhan may be indicative of our need to think about anti-semitism in the same false way that the law thinks about racism. This false way of thinking is seductive because it seems to offer a simple solution. If we can isolate and condemn the self-professed anti-semite, if we can impose a condemnation litmus test on black leaders, we can be done with it. Anti-semitism, like racism, is placed outside of ourselves and located in the "guilty other guy." We tell ourselves that most good Americans are not anti-semitic, that there is no internalized, self-inflicted anti-semitism among Jews. "If some of my best friends are Jews," we say, "how can you accuse me of anti-semitism?" Again, I am not saying we should not condemn the self professed bigot and hold him responsible for his actions. I am saying it is not enough.
The persistent calls for condemnation may also be examples of my new lesson at work. They may be a mechanism by which we deny the continued
existence of widespread anti-semitism in the black community. They may be
a way of avoiding the harder conversations about the complex connections between white racism and black anti-semitism. This may be a symptom of color-blindness- acting as if we could talk about anti-semitism in this
country without talking about white racism. When I am asked about Farrakhan and people can hear nothing but the required condemnation, I feel the taboo against honest talk of racism at work. It is also a taboo against honest talk of anti-semitism.

AT -- Link of Omission Refusal to discuss race forces assimilation erasing black identity and characterizing race talk as irrational
Peller, 2011 (Gary [Professor at Georgetown Law], "History, Identity, and Alienation", CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW VOLUME 43 JULY 2011 NUMBER 5, 6/28, 1481 – 1501, uconn.lawreviewnetwork.com/files/documents/Peller.pdf) // cjh The integrationist ideology that whites historically have embraced is¶
rationalistic, legalistic, and liberal. It takes race consciousness—thinking¶
about people in terms of their race—to be the central evil of racism.9
¶
Race¶
consciousness is therefore to be avoided (except, perhaps, in order to help ¶ remedy past racism, one of the issues that distinguishes conservative and ¶ liberal integrationists).
In this mindset, thinking in terms of race reflects a¶ stereotype or bias, a distortion of rationality. Being rational means being¶ colorblind in the sense of not making anything turn on the arbitrary fact of¶ skin color. Racial “discrimination” in social practices such as school¶ admissions and job selection should be replaced with “equal treatment¶ regardless of race,” that is, by selection according to individual “merit.”¶ “Segregation” should be replaced with “integration.”10 Integrationism, in¶ short, imagines an ideal
set of social practices and institutional cultures that¶ are neutral to race.11
¶ In what I am calling “liberal” integrationist approaches to race, the¶ problem of
racism is characterized as a form of irrational discrimination¶ that deviates from the ideals of neutrality and objectivity—the liberal¶ commitment that social power should be exercised according to a neutral¶ and unbiased rule of law and that social goods should be distributed¶ according to objective merit rather than through subjective favoritism. In
¶ the self-image of this ideology, liberal societies like ours are on a ¶ teleological path eventually to purge racism and other distortions from the ¶ terms upon which wealth is distributed and power is exercised. Racial ¶ justice means achieving neutrality with respect to race, freeing racial ¶ minorities from the pre-liberal caste systems of segregation and apartheid, ¶ just as other reform efforts are aimed at transcending other forms of ¶ prejudice and irrational social discrimination. Once “biases” such as racial ¶ prejudice are removed, selection criteria for employment or education ¶ would be based on an objective, apolitical, or at least aracial “merit.”12 ¶ Among Blacks, thinking about race has followed a different structural ¶ trajectory. As Harold Cruse has stated, “American Negro history is ¶ basically a history of the conflict between integrationist and nationalist ¶ forces in politics, economics, and culture, no matter what leaders are ¶ involved and what slogans are used.”13
Carbado 3--(Devon W., Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law, Critical Race Theory, and Criminal Adjudication. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 7 (May, 2003), pp. 1757-1828 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3657500 , cayla_)
Many white people challenge the idea that they are privileged because they
are white. They might agree that discrimination is not a thing of the past, but would not go so far as to conclude that the existence of discrimination renders them privileged.

But CRT's claim about identity privilege is nothing more than a claim about the existence of discrimination. The notion is this: To the extent that race discrimination is a
current social problem, there will be victims and beneficiaries of this
discrimination. The former are disadvantaged; the latter are privileged. Supporting this claim is the idea that "[t]here is no disadvantage without a corresponding
advantage, no marginalized group without the powerfully elite, no subordinate identity without a dominant identity. Power and privilege are
relational; so, too, are our identities."88 Yet the concept of relational privilege has had little political traction. As Thomas Ross's contribution to A New Critical Race
Theory argues, even "right-thinking" white people are unlikely to see
themselves as benefited by their whiteness.89 Ross attributes this to the fact that
many whites accept the narrative of white victimology, a narrative that constructs white people as innocent victims of affirmative action and
political correctness.90 He reasons that the difference between "right-thinking [w]hites" and other whites is that the former "are likely to accept their [white] burden as an appropriate self-sacrifice,"9' in effect as the new White Man's Burden. The concept of white privilege helps us understand contemporary discrimination in the workplace. Part of the privilege of whiteness is its foundational status. Whiteness functions as the
identity against which all other identities are measured.92 When combined
with male privilege and heterosexual privilege (the latter of which we explore more fully below), the point can be articulated this way: "He (the white heterosexual
man) is the norm. The baseline. He is our reference. We are all defined with
Him in mind. We are all the same as or different from him."93 In the context of workplaces that are structured around cooperative work, whites do not have to, in terms of race, think about being the same. They have a limited need to strategize about how and when to signal an integrational capacity to work within teams without causing grit. Whiteness is presumptively grease.'4 Racial minorities, even if they
are allowed into the workplace, still have to perform their race in ways that negate the presumptions that their race will engender discomfort and cause disruptions. The privilege of whiteness lies in not having to do the work to
negate these, and other, racial presumptions.9

Carbado 3--(Devon W., Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law, Critical Race Theory, and Criminal Adjudication. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 7 (May, 2003), pp. 1757-1828 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3657500 , cayla_) A fundamental tenet of CRT is that racism is a multiracial phenomenon.'05
This is not to say that each minority racial group experiences discrimination in the same way or to the same extent. The point is that the effects of racism
transcend any single racial group. In this respect, it might be more accurate to say that American society is characterized not simply by racism but by multiracialism.1"oo In CRT, the dominant expression of the idea is the critique of the black/white paradigm. Informing this critique is the notion that, for the most part, legal and political
discussions about racism focus on black and white experiences, ignoring or
marginalizing the experiences of nonblack people of color.107 Kevin Johnson's contribution to A New Critical Race Theory articulates a version of this argument. According to Johnson, CRT's failure to address the relationship between race and immigration, or the racialization of immigration law, derives "in part from the longstanding assumption that race relations in the United States exclusively concern African Americans and whites."'08 Johnson's argument is not simply that the black/white paradigm elides nonblack racial subordination: It is also that "[s]uch a
binary perspective... obscures the relationship between the subordination of various minority groups."'09 His thinking is that one cannot "appreciate fully the treatment of any particular racial group without understanding the
interrelated and intertwined oppression of all racial minorities.""0 Johnson employs the concepts of "transference" and "displacement" to explain the multiracial way in which racial subordination is interconnected. Both transference and displacement are sociopolitical processes: The former occurs when racial antipathy towards one
group is redirected onto another; the latter operates as "a defense mechanism" that results in the shifting of negative racial attention from one group to a substitute group based on the idea that the substitute group "is
psychologically more available.""' One example of transference is Justice Harlan's famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson. Here, Johnson notes, Justice Harlan argues vociferously against black racial segregation and simultaneously legitimizes racial discrimination against people of Chinese ancestry, people of "a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United States."")2 According to Johnson, Harlan's dissent evidences transference in the sense that "[1]egal punishment of the Chinese replaced that previously reserved for African Americans.""3 Paying attention to multiracialism is relevant to understanding workplace discrimination. Different minority groups exist as outsiders visa-vis a predominantly white workplace culture for different reasons. Blacks are
vulnerable to employment discrimination in part because of stereotypes about race, crime, intellectual capacity, and work ethic. Asian American are vulnerable to discrimination in part because of stereotypes about race,

loyalty, and national identity. Put differently, blacks have to manage the racial impression that they are criminally inclined, intellectually challenged, and lazy; Asian Americans have to manage the racial impression that they are untrustworthy and foreign. This means that nonwhite employees face race-specific pressures to
show a willingness and capacity to fit within predominantly white workplace
cultures. From an employer's perspective, then, racial fit varies across race. While these ideas are consistent with Johnson's critique of the black/white paradigm, they suggest
that the discourse about the paradigm should not only open up space within antidiscrimination theorizing for nonwhite experiences, but also that the discourse should open up the category of race itself to include an understanding of the performative ways in which nonwhites racialize or (re)present themselves to manage the fact that they are "different" and to diminish their vulnerability to negative stereotype attribution.
Chang 93 – (Robert S. Seattle University Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality “Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space” California Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Oct., 1993), pp. 1241+1243-1323 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3480919 , cayla_) The argument I put forth is not unique to Asian American Legal Scholarship,135 but I make the argument here because space must be created for Asian American
Legal Scholarship's use of narrative. I begin by showing that perspective
matters. I then briefly describe resistance to outsider stories. In the face of this
institutional disapproval, outsiders can either conform to the dominant
objective mode of discourse or continue telling their stories. One problem with the former is that many people find this dominant objective voice to be foreign.136 In addition to being foreign, the dominant voice may not adequately capture the
power and intensity of dealing with racism as effectively as a narrative-
based legal scholarship can.137 In order to pursue the latter course, however, the case must be made for narrative.13" I describe two strategies for validating narrative. The first, and as I will argue, ultimately unsuccessful, stategy takes place within the rational/empirical mode."13 The second strategy takes place within post-modern or post-structural theory.'4 By placing the use of narrative squarely on post-
structural theory, I hope to dispel the notion expressed by one commentator that "postmodern 'theory' can be perceived as the discourse of privileged members of society who claim to explain and justify different voice scholarship and, in so doing, attempt to colonize the writing of minorities and outgroup members." 141

Hutchinson 2 – (Darren L. Professor of Constitutional Law, Remedies, Race and the Law, and Civil Rights Seminar at the University of Florida Levin College of Law “Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform” 6-2002 scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1399&context=facultypub , cayla_)
The progressive race blindness scholarship suffers because it tends to essentialize race as an inherently negative-or almost always negative-
construct. The fact that race is socially constructed does not mean that society should have any interest in abandoning it as a concept of identity. In order to justify the abolition of race, progressive race blindness scholars emphasize the negative history of racial oppression. 47 Race and race consciousness, however, need not foster subordination. If race is truly socially constructed-as the advocates of progressive race blindness forcefully argue, then we can evaluate race
consciousness in the context of its usage, rather than believing the
metanarrative that race is bad. 48 If social forces fabricate racial understanding, then critical theorists can assess the value of race by examining the social circumstances and purposes surrounding its deployment.49 Jayne Chong Soon Lee has written cogently on the dangers of essentialism in progressive race blindness arguments. Responding to the work of Appiah, Lee offers a more contextualized assessment of race that challenges Appiah's grand narrative concerning the pitfalls and dangers of race consciousness: The most important weakness of Appiah's dismissal of race is that in declaring biological and essential conceptions of race
useless and dangerous, he fails to recognize that race is defined not by its
inherent content, but by the social relations that construct it. If race is always dangerous, regardless of its meaning within a specific historical and social context, the result is an abstract and unitary conception of race. Basically, Appiah's conception of race fails to acknowledge that meanings change dramatically with social context. For Appiah, once a conception of race is constructed, the possibility of contesting, redefining, and reappropriating it is limited. 50 Progressive race blindness thus suffers from its inability to imagine positive usages of race. The essentializing of
race by advocates of progressive race blindness contradicts their treatment of race as a social construct; it is, in fact, the social-as opposed to biological-
nature of race that gives race a malleable quality.sl Thus, the social constructivist theory of race does not compel the radical deconstruction of race consciousness embraced by some advocates of progressive race blindness. Instead, social
construction theory implies a host of possibilities for the positive deployment of race. Critical scholars can assess the worth of race consciousness by examining the surrounding facts associated with its usage.

Hutchinson 2 – (Darren L. Professor of Constitutional Law, Remedies, Race and the Law, and Civil Rights Seminar at the University of Florida Levin College of Law “Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform” 6-2002 scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1399&context=facultypub , cayla_) Critical Race Theorists recognize that race is socially constructed, 93 that racial mythology has caused a great deal of suffering in communities of color,94 and that racial categorization risks essentialism. 95 Critical Race Theory, however, blends this postmodern skepticism of race with an appreciation of the material reality of race and its role in antiracist reform. Race has a tangible and real quality in that it
distributes social resources, constitutes identity, organizes communities of
color politically, and can serve as a structure for remedying inequality.96 This modernist vision, which treats race as an inevitable structure, co-exists with critical race deconstruction of racial categorization. The duality of Critical Race Theory
can help redirect the content of progressive race blindness theory in order
to move that work beyond its theoretical limitations. Progressive race blindness theorists, in varying degrees, disregard the material impact of race, the reality of structural racism, the positive usages of race as a tool of resistance, and the multidimensionality of identity97 Given the socially constructed but material
nature of race, proponents of progressive race blindness should reexamine
their staunch commitment to extreme postmodern accounts of identity. If they balance their skepticism of race with an understanding of the social significance of racial identity and race consciousness, progressive race blindness theorists can offer an analysis of race that does not dismiss the importance of race to antiracism and to the psyche of persons of color. Only a nuanced theory of race that acknowledges
both its constructed and material dimensions can lead to a realistic account of racial injustice and, potentially, to the articulation of workable
antisubordination theories. The dual consciousness of Critical Race Theory can help bridge the competing realities of race as fictional but real. Critical Race Theory
blends skepticism toward legal abstraction with a passionate commitment to utilizing legal structures to revitalize conditions in oppressed
communities. Advocates of progressive race blindness can learn from the work of Critical Race Scholars who challenged the radical deconstruction of the Critical Legal Studies movement. Skepticism toward race need not lead to a wholesale rejection of its utility for social justice movements. Instead, a sophisticated
approach to race that blends modernist and postmodern narratives can offer a richer account of racial justice that preserves available (and limited)
instruments for resisting domination. The political importance of race to all oppressed communities and progressive movements counsels against the efforts of the progressive race blindness movement to move beyond race. Ultimately, critical
scholars must continue to articulate theories that reconstruct and unveil,
rather than submerge and obscure, the meanings of race.

Hutchinson 2 – (Darren L. Professor of Constitutional Law, Remedies, Race and the Law, and Civil Rights Seminar at the University of Florida Levin College of Law “Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform” 6-2002 scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1399&context=facultypub , cayla_) One of the more striking aspects of progressive race blindness is its unitary focus on race as an identity for disposal. Although many forms of identity are socially
constructed and are grounded in histories of oppression and marginalization, the advocates of progressive race blindness single out race
for deconstruction. Their arguments imply that race, in particular, warrants discarding. They do not even consider what we should do with other forms of
identity, and they do not suggest a comprehensive abolition of identity
categories. Furthermore, many of the arguments of progressive race blindness theorists are directed toward persons of color, as if persons of color are the only
individuals invested in race consciousness or that race consciousness
among persons of color is especially problematic. The most troubling aspect of race centrality in progressive race blindness theories is that it implies a separability of identity categories and systems of oppression. When progressive race blindness theorists advocate the termination of racial identity without commenting on the persistence of gender, sexuality, class, and other identities, they suggest that their racial deconstruction does not implicate other forms of social identity. Yet, as a rich body of scholarship has demonstrated, identity categories do not exist in isolation from one another.64 Instead, identity is multidimensional: The various identity categories interact to shape our individual and collective identities and experiences. 65 The progressive race blindness critique falsely implies a separability of identity categories, because this scholarship advocates the abolition of race but not other identity categories. The progressive race blindness critique fragments identity. Critical scholars have cautioned against efforts to analyze identity categories as unrelated and separate phenomena. For example, Audre Lorde, a black lesbian theorist, has criticized the fragmentation of identity in social justice movements: As a Black lesbian feminist comfortable with the many different ingredients of my identity, and a woman committed to racial and sexual freedom from oppression, I find I am constantly being encouraged
to pluck out some one aspect of myself and present this as the meaning- ful whole, eclipsing or denying the other parts of self. But this is a destructive
and fragmenting way to live.66 The progressive race blindness critique implicates Lorde's complaint. Proponents of progressive race blindness imply a severability of identity in their arguments which seek the abolition of racial but not other forms of identity. Their arguments fragment identity and betray efforts to foster a more multidimensional understanding of identity and subordination.

APA 8 (American Psychological Association—leading scientific and professional organization representing psychology in the United States, Commemorating Brown: the Social Psychology of Racism and Discrimination Washington, DC 2008, page 46, cayla_) They showed that White racial attitudes have shifted markedly since 1954, yet the present pattern is complex. For example, there is far more White willingness to interact with Blacks than a half century ago, but this willingness rapidly dissipates for situations in which Whites are the minority. Principles of equal treatment in such major realms as jobs, schools, residential choice, and public accommodations are now widely accepted, but implementing these principles is often resisted. Hence, although desegregated schools receive wide support, the busing necessary to achieve them is resisted (see also chap. 8, this volume). The most problematic White racial belief today involves
causal attributions for inequality. To account for Black disadvantage, the popular White explanation is that Blacks simply lack what it takes to
achieve. The dominant White perception is that racial discrimination of the past has largely been eliminated. A national survey conducted in 2000 showed that a majority of White Americans believe this fiction. Thirty-four percent believe racial equality has been achieved already; another 18% believe that it will soon he achieved (Bobo, Dawson, & Johnson, 2001). Note, too, how America in 2004 “celebrated” Brown while ignoring the failure to implement the historic decision. Consequently, African
Americans themselves are held to be responsible for ending the inequalities that persist—a current form of “blaming the victim” (Ryan, 1976). This gross misperception underlies other negative racial attitudes that many Whites
hold. Living with the inequality and discrimination, African Americans understandably strongly disagree. Only 6% believe the nation has attained racial equality, and 59% believe they will never see it in their lifetimes (Bobo et al., 2001). Black Americans
also regard present-day discrimination as the primary reason for
continuing racial inequalities. Eighty-one percent of African American respondents agreed with the survey question, “Do you think [the fact that] Blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing is mainly due to discrimination?” (Schuman et al., 1997, p. 275).
They experience discrimination regularly and hesitate to tell White friends
about it for fear of being viewed as “too sensitive”—a common put-down (Feagin & Sikes, 1994). This attribution of discrimination is not a phenomenon
limited to the poorest segments of the Black population. Surveys have shown repeatedly that it is well-educated African Americans who focus on discrimination, feel civil rights change has been too slow, and think White Americans “don’t care about Blacks” (Schuman et al., 1997). Black American interaction with White Americans shapes this phenomenon.

Hutchinson 2 – (Darren L. Professor of Constitutional Law, Remedies, Race and the Law, and Civil Rights Seminar at the University of Florida Levin College of Law “Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform” 6-2002 scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1399&context=facultypub , cayla_) Robinson, however, rejects the qualitative and quantitative findings of this scholarship, asserting that the scholarship evades the question of individual responsibility.78 Robinson's arguments attempt to repackage the conservative culture-of-poverty theory as a progressive postmodernist critique. Although Robinson's work is undeniably provocative, it fails in many respects. First, Robinson's analysis does
not effectively respond to the large body of literature that has refuted many
of the claims made by culture-of poverty theorists. 79 Instead, Robinson simply faults this literature for not taking personal behavior-rather than white supremacy-into account. Despite the empirical research that demonstrates how structural racial inequality constructs poverty, Robinson, wedded to the notions of free will and agency, concludes that the unwise choices of persons of color play the central role in their poverty. Because poor persons of color, according to Robinson, are in fact
free agents, they must have chosen poverty; wealth was a viable, but unelected, option for them. According to Robinson, poor persons of color are not victims of structural and material inequality. Instead, they are
trapped by their own racialized thinking: They accept a script of black inferiority and live their lives accordingly. I do not wish to document the impact of structural racism and economic dislocation on the material conditions for poor persons of color; a host of literature has already demonstrated the operation of racism and economic dislocation on the maintenance and structuring of poverty. 0 Instead, I wish to unveil the most serious and dangerous failing of Robinson's work: his unfounded dismissal of
the existence of structural racism. In his zeal to portray race as a social
construct, Robinson denies the existence of racism. As such, racism, like race itself, assumes a fictional quality.81 Robinson's argument takes social construction theory to an illogical and unrealistic place. The fact that race is socially
constructed does not negate its tangible and lived quality.82 Historical, political, legal, and economic forces involved in the production of race (for example, slavery, segregation, oppressive violence, and employment and educational discrimination) have skewed (and continue to skew) the
distribution of life-sustaining resources in favor of whites. 83 The social quality of race does not alter this white supremacist resource allocation. Nor does it mean that a mere transformation in the consciousness among persons of color can eradicate racism's harmful and pervasive effects. In fact, the race blindness that
Robinson advocates would preclude persons of color from effectively
describing and countering their oppression. Robinson does very little to prove his thesis that rampant internalized racism in communities of color explains racialized economic inequality.84 Instead, Robinson's "psychoanalytic" arguments concerning poor persons of color leave the impression that he holds stereotypical and essentialist views of the very group he purports to defend.

Hutchinson 2 – (Darren L. Professor of Constitutional Law, Remedies, Race and the Law, and Civil Rights Seminar at the University of Florida Levin College of Law “Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform” 6-2002 scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1399&context=facultypub , cayla_) Although the advocates of progressive race blindness are united in their suspicion of race consciousness and racial identity, there are some important differences in their approaches that warrant discussion. My review of the budding literature on progressive race blindness shows that the authors disagree as to how much they wish to deconstruct the concept of race. The authors also disagree as to whether race
consciousness among persons of color contributes to their inequality. [. . .] Legal scholarship on progressive race blindness also differs in the degree to
which the authors attribute racial inequality to race consciousness. Again, Robinson's views are the most extreme on this matter. Robinson argues that race
consciousness among persons of color-rather than institutionalized and
structural racism-sustains racial inequality. In a recent article, for example, Robinson questions popular sociological literature that links "concentrated poverty" with racial injustice. 43 Applying what he calls "New Age Philosophy," Robinson attributes poverty in communities of color to the "choices" and activities of poor individuals. He argues that poor persons of color have the agency to choose poverty or wealth but instead "co-create" poverty through their race consciousness: Despite the manner in which race consciousness ... socializes us to co-create poverty, wealth, or residential segregation, our essential Self can still choose differently. We have absolute freedom. With this absolute freedom, we can focus on a self-empowering philosophy like New Age or a victim centered race consciousness .... [Bly adopting a self-empowering philosophy, one
can deliberately choose to experience poverty or wealth. In so doing, she does not blame anyone else for the manner in which she experienced her
creations. 44 Thus, for Robinson, the effects of race consciousness are deleterious:
Race consciousness imprisons poor persons of color in poverty, and the generational transmission of the "disease" of race consciousness
perpetuates racialized class inequity. I have found no other writing in which an advocate of progressive race blindness has attempted to link poverty with race consciousness among poor persons of color: Robinson remains alone in this position among the works that I have reviewed. In fact, Cunningham and Ford have argued that racial justice claims should persist-even under their deconstructed visions of identity politics. 45 These authors believe that the structure of white supremacy
impacts the material reality of persons of color. Hence, they favor the maintenance of race for the purpose of challenging and responding to
inequality.46

Massa 14
- speaking of Frank Wilderson “Implications of Wilderson’s Afro-Pessimism” http://thehistoricalnerds.com/2014/12/16/implications-of-wildersons-afro-pessimism/#comments The parasitism that takes place here is that
in the first place. In order for one to assure themselves that they are in the state of “always becoming”, that they have the capacity to engage in this process,
. Legal reform falls into the same reasoning for Wilderson. He critiques these forms of coalitional politics as “feigning ontological capacity regardless of the fact that Blackness is incapacity in its pure and unadulterated form.”. (Wilderson, Red, White and Black, pg. 38). By
.
, Wilderson
Thus, in a world where we continue to placate the Black Body with the false hope of legal reform,
.
For Wilderson ,
Regarding the reconceptualization that is necessary,

Wilderson writes, “The Slave needs freedom not from wage relation, nor sexism, homophobia, and patriarchy, nor freedom in in the form of land restoration.
, which itself is the product of accumulation’s and fungibility’s gratuitous violence. There are no feelings powerful enough to alter to the structural relation between the living and the dead. But one can imagine feelings powerful enough to bring the living to death.”(Wilderson, Red, White and Black, pg. 141-142).
production that Wilderson advocates to bring
Massa 14
- speaking of Frank Wilderson “Implications of Wilderson’s Afro-Pessimism” http://thehistoricalnerds.com/2014/12/16/implications-of-wildersons-afro-pessimism/#comments While Spivak’s criticism is targeted to a school of thought that it radically different from Wilderson’s, my argument here is that the way in which
. In building upon Spivak’s work, Linda
when she writes, “There may appear to be a conflation between the issue of speaking for others and the issue of speaking about others. This conflation was intentional on my part. There is an ambiguity in the two phrases: when one is speaking for others one may be describing their situation and thus also speaking about them. In fact,

Similarly,
.
, or simply trying to describe their situation or some aspect of it, One may be speaking about others as an advocate or a messenger if the persons cannot speak for themselves. Thus I would maintain that if the practice of speaking for others is problematic, so too must be the practice of speaking about others, since it is difficult to distinguish speaking about from speaking for in all cases. Moreover, i
. If “speaking about” is also involved here, however, the entire edifice of the “crisis of representation” must be connected as well. In both the practice of speaking for as well as the practice of speaking about others, I am engaging in the act of representing the other’s needs, goals, situation, and in fact, who they are. I am representing them as such and such, or in post-structuralist terms, I am participating in the construction of their subject-positions. Even if someone never hears the discursive self I present of them they may be affected by the decisions.” (Alcoff, The Problem of Speaking for Others, pg. 5-32). Wilderson has spoken for behalf of others. His
The same way that Wilderson believes the capacity of Whiteness to imagine new possibilities is parasitic upon the Black incapacity to do so, Wilderson’s critique is also parasitic upon the construction of social death upon the Black Body so that he can continue to speak on behalf of the Black Body and present himself as their savior by imagining the end of the world. Spivak brilliantly articulates just how
when she writes, “For the “true” subaltern group, whose identity is its difference,

Massa 14
- speaking of Frank Wilderson “Implications of Wilderson’s Afro-Pessimism” http://thehistoricalnerds.com/2014/12/16/implications-of-wildersons-afro-pessimism/#comments To put in bluntly ,
, a culture, that, for Brown, still grew and developed in its own way even during the atrocities of slavery.
. Furthermore , because
A study by the Journal of Blacks in Higher education shows that
,
during the same period . yet the progress made in graduation rates show that the Black Body still has some agency and capacity to shape their own futures.
.
Massa 14
- speaking of Frank Wilderson “Implications of Wilderson’s Afro-Pessimism” http://thehistoricalnerds.com/2014/12/16/implications-of-wildersons-afro-pessimism/#comments

By
because of the violence of the Middle Passage
. For Wilderson, coalitional politics are just attempts to feign the ontological capacity of Blacks to shape their own future. He refers to white people and colored immigrants specifically who try to engage in coalitional politics with the Black Body as “the junior and senior partners of civil society” who pretend as if the Black is coherent and human. (Wilderson, Red, White and Black, pg. 39). It is this kind of ontological absolutism that Wilderson adheres to that David Marriott criticizes when he writes, “Wilderson is prepared to say that black suffering is not only beyond analogy, it also refigures the whole of being. It is not hard when reading such sentences to suspect a kind of absolutism at work here, and one that manages to be peculiarly and dispiritingly dogmatic: throughout Red, White, and Black, despite variations in tone and emphasis, there is always the desire to have black lived experience named as the worst, and the politics of such a desire inevitably collapses into a kind of sentimental moralism: for the claim that ‘Blackness is incapacity in its most pure and unadulterated form’ means merely that the black has to embody this abjection without reserve (p. 38). This logic—and the denial of any kind of ‘ontological integrity’ to the Black/Slave due to its endless traversal by force does seem to reduce ontology to logic, namely, a logic of non-recuperability.” (Mariott, Black Cultural Studies, pg. 37-66).
Furthermore, as Mariott points out,
When
To put it in Lehman’s term,
as Ian Haney Lopez points out in his book White By Law when he writes, “law is implicated in the construction of the

contingent social systems of meaning that attach in our society to morphology and ancestry, the meaning system we commonly refer to as race. The legal system influences what we look like, the meanings ascribed to our looks, and the material reality that confirms the meanings of our appearances. Law constructs race.” (Lopez, White By Law, pg. 16). If the precedent set by court cases, as Lopez points out, were responsible for creating the precedents that shaped how we see race as a social construction, then the need to challenge racism through legal reform becomes more apparent. Wilderson’s ontological absolutism destroys the possibility to form the kind of coalitions that are necessary to engaging with the legal systems that use the law to shape our social perceptions of race.
Wilderson’s Afro-pessimism must be firmly rejected to usher in a politics of hope that is necessary to mobilize coalitions against dominant power structures.
then
Massa 14
- speaking of Frank Wilderson and Bell Hooks “Implications of Wilderson’s Afro-Pessimism” http://thehistoricalnerds.com/2014/12/16/implications-of-wildersons-afro-pessimism/#comments Bell Hooks avoids falling into the colonial trap of Wilderson by speaking for herself and her own experiences. By
. Unlike Wilderson who universalizes the Black experience, Bell

in the first place. Furthermore ,
, because, as pointed out by Bell Hooks,
.
For Bell Hooks,
In the wake of recent events, embracing a politics of hope and solidarity is more important than ever as racism begins to become more apparent. Hope offers the crucial first step towards encouraging the first steps towards resistance, a step that Wilderson’s extreme negativity prevents from ever been taken.
Instead of imagining the end of the world, we must imagine a world with a better future.

Paur 05 - Ph.D., Ethnic Studies - designated emphasis in women, gender, and sexuality, University of California - Berkeley (Jasbir K. "Queer Times, Queer Assemblages" http://socialtext.dukejournals.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/23/3-4_84 85/121.full.pdf+html?sid=11c229a1-d2ac-4819-bac2-90de9f229b4e)
These are queer times indeed. The war on terror is an assemblage hooked Jasbir K. Puar into an array of enduring modernist paradigms
(civilizing teleologies, orientalisms, xenophobia, militarization, border anxieties)
and postmodernist eruptions
(suicide bombers, biometric surveillance strategies, emergent corporealities, counterterrorism gone overboard). With its
say emphases on bodies, desires, pleasures, tactility, rhythms, echoes, textures, deaths, morbidity, torture, pain, sensation, and punishment, our necropolitical present-future deems it imperative to rearticulate what queer theory and studies of sexuality have to
about the metatheories and the “realpolitiks” of Empire, often understood, as Joan Scott observes, as “the real business of politics.”1
Queer times require even queerer modalities of thought
, analysis, creativity, and expression in order to elaborate on nationalist, patriotic, and terrorist formations
and their intertwined forms of racialized perverse sexualities and gender dysphorias
. What about
the war on terrorism, and its attendant assemblages of racism
, nationalism, patriotism, and terrorism,
is already profoundly queer?
Through an examination of queerness in various terrorist corporealities, I contend that queernesses proliferate even, or especially, as they remain denied or unacknowledged. I take up these types of inquiries not only to argue
that discourses of counterterrorism are intrinsically gendered, raced, sexualized, and nationalized but also to demonstrate the production of normative patriot bodies that cohere against
and through queer
terrorist corporealities.
In the speculative, exploratory endeavor that follows,
I foreground three manifestations of this imbrication exceptionalisms
. One, I examine
discourses of queerness where problematic conceptualizations of queer corporealities, especially via Muslim sexualities, are reproduced in the service of discourses of U.S.
. Two, I rearticulate a terrorist body, in this case the suicide bomber,
as a queer assemblage that resists queerness-as-sexual-identity (or anti-identity)—in other words, intersectional and identitarian paradigms—in favor of spatial, temporal, and corporeal convergences, implosions, and rearrangements.
Queerness as an assemblage moves away from excavation work, deprivileges a binary opposition between queer and not-queer subjects, and, instead of retaining queerness exclusively as dissenting, resistant
, and alternative (all of which queerness importantly is and does), it underscores contingency and complicity with dominant formations.
argue that a focus on queerness as assemblage enables attention to ontology in tandem with epistemology, affect in conjunction with representational economies, within which bodies,
Finally,
I
such as the turbaned Sikh terrorist, interpenetrate, swirl together, and transmit affects to each other.
Through affect and ontology, the turbaned Sikh terrorist in particular, I argue, as a queer assemblage, is reshaping the terrain of South Asian queer diasporas.

***CRT BAD***

Pyle 99- a trial lawyer specializing in First Amendment and media law. He has represented clients in state and federal court in a wide variety of civil cases, including libel claims, civil rights cases, and commercial disputes (“Race, Equality, and the Rule of Law: Critical Race Theory’s Attack on the Promises of Liberalism” http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2124&context=bclr&sei redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3 Dcritical%20race%20theory%20randall%20kennedy%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D1%26ved %3D0CCgQFjAA%26url%3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Flawdigitalcommons.bc.edu%2Fcgi%2Fviewconte nt.cgi%3Farticle%3D2124%26context%3Dbclr%26ei%3D6M1cT7eoB4jhiAKQqbnXCw%26usg %3DAFQjCNHAmA_oZsiBOwhxDrE1cbvNYRw8Sg%26sig2%3D594KFFfIaVHaU4RonqMT_Q#se arch=%22critical%20race%20theory%20randall%20kennedy%22 , p.4-5) This Note criticizes CRT as au unprincipled, divisive and ultimately unhelpful attack on the liberal tradition ill America." First,
.'• Rather
, not theorists who might offer better alternatives. 20 Second,
within the liberal system. Their wholesale
, while
.2 ' In the process, the race-crits' racialist, blame-game rhetoric does much to alienate potentially helpful whites. 22 .
Pyle 99- a trial lawyer specializing in First Amendment and media law. He has represented clients in state and federal court in a wide variety of civil cases, including libel claims, civil rights cases, and commercial disputes (“Race, Equality, and the Rule of Law: Critical Race Theory’s Attack on the Promises of Liberalism” http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2124&context=bclr&sei redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3 Dcritical%20race%20theory%20randall%20kennedy%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D1%26ved

%3D0CCgQFjAA%26url%3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Flawdigitalcommons.bc.edu%2Fcgi%2Fviewconte nt.cgi%3Farticle%3D2124%26context%3Dbclr%26ei%3D6M1cT7eoB4jhiAKQqbnXCw%26usg %3DAFQjCNHAmA_oZsiBOwhxDrE1cbvNYRw8Sg%26sig2%3D594KFFfIaVHaU4RonqMT_Q#se arch=%22critical%20race%20theory%20randall%20kennedy%22 , p. 9-10) Because
,
.°' Postmodern subjectivism allows race-crits to dismiss inconvenient facts as suspect if they appear to support the "dominant" perspective. 62 Thus, Derrick
" He encourages race-crits, when criticized, to "consider the source. As to a response, a sad smile of sympathy may suffice."'"'Black scholars like Randall Kennedy, who dare dispute CRT's assertions, arc tarred with an academic version of the "Uncle Tom" epithet." For example, Paul Butter dismissed criticism of his call for race-based jury nullification with the insulting allegation that his critic (Kennedy) simply wanted to be an "honorary white
." Public discourse, to race-crits, is just a clash of different "stories:" Indeed, "'rationalism' is itself, just a particular kind of story"" which can be contradicted with non-rational "counterstories."7"
,
72

Pyle 99- a trial lawyer specializing in First Amendment and media law. He has represented clients in state and federal court in a wide variety of civil cases, including libel claims, civil rights cases, and commercial disputes (“Race, Equality, and the Rule of Law: Critical Race Theory’s Attack on the Promises of Liberalism” http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2124&context=bclr&sei redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3 Dcritical%20race%20theory%20randall%20kennedy%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D1%26ved %3D0CCgQFjAA%26url%3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Flawdigitalcommons.bc.edu%2Fcgi%2Fviewconte nt.cgi%3Farticle%3D2124%26context%3Dbclr%26ei%3D6M1cT7eoB4jhiAKQqbnXCw%26usg %3DAFQjCNHAmA_oZsiBOwhxDrE1cbvNYRw8Sg%26sig2%3D594KFFfIaVHaU4RonqMT_Q#se arch=%22critical%20race%20theory%20randall%20kennedy%22 , p After asserting the ubiquity of racial "subordination" in American society,
."
.m. Neither laws nor judicial decisions can rest, as Herbert Wechsler said they must, "on reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved,"" because white lawmakers cannot transcend their subconscious racism."' To the race-crits, the hard-won protections of civil rights law, so dear to integrationists like Thurgood Marshall," serve primarily to deflect calls for more radical change, thereby preserving the racial status quo. 88
." 89 Race-crits sometimes refer to this as a "realist" interpretation of law, in the tradition of American legal realism." The legal realism movement, prominent in law schools between the late 1920s and early 1950s, attacked the formalistic notion that legal rules, if applied faith fully, would produce predictable outcomes in most situations. 91
links to this body of scholarship, however,
.92 Unlike race-crits, the legal realists did not "deconstruct" law and leave nothing in the void. Some used empirical research about social conditions to inform legal rules,93 while others focused their efforts on making legal scholarship more reflective of legal reality. 94

Pyle 99- a trial lawyer specializing in First Amendment and media law. He has represented clients in state and federal court in a wide variety of civil cases, including libel claims, civil rights cases, and commercial disputes (“Race, Equality, and the Rule of Law: Critical Race Theory’s Attack on the Promises of Liberalism” http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2124&context=bclr&sei redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3 Dcritical%20race%20theory%20randall%20kennedy%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D1%26ved %3D0CCgQFjAA%26url%3Dhttp%3A%2F%2Flawdigitalcommons.bc.edu%2Fcgi%2Fviewconte nt.cgi%3Farticle%3D2124%26context%3Dbclr%26ei%3D6M1cT7eoB4jhiAKQqbnXCw%26usg %3DAFQjCNHAmA_oZsiBOwhxDrE1cbvNYRw8Sg%26sig2%3D594KFFfIaVHaU4RonqMT_Q#se arch=%22critical%20race%20theory%20randall%20kennedy%22 , p.27-29) To Derrick Bell, in contrast, the coffers of justice in America have always been empty. To him, the promises of liberalism are just "bogus freedom checks" which "the Man" will never honor.24 '
242
. 2'3 No common principles exist which might persuade whites to he more inclusive. 241
like other class theorists,
(although Far from satisfitctory)
"'
, like Marxism before it, clings to group "domination" as the single cause of disadvantage.2' 7 It
.248

Gross and Livingston 02 (Samuel R. and Debra/ Gross: Thomas and Mabel Long Professor of Law at the University of Michigan/ Livingston: federal judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit “Racial Profiling under Attack” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 102, No. 5 (Jun., 2002), Columbia Law Review Association, Inc. pp. 1413-1438, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1123676, cayla_) We had just reached a consensus on racial profiling. By September 10, 2001, virtually everyone, from Jesse Jackson to Al Gore to George W. Bush to John Ashcroft, agreed that racial profiling was very bad. We also knew what racial profiling was: Police
officers would stop, question, and search African American and Hispanic citizens disproportionately, because of their race or ethnicity, in order to try
to catch common criminals. All this has changed in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Now racial profiling is more
likely to mean security checks or federal investigations that target Muslim
men from Middle Eastern countries, in order to try to catch terrorists. And now lots of people are for it. In the fall of 1999, 81% of respondents in a national poll said they disapproved of "racial profiling," which was defined as the practice by
some police officers of stopping "motorists of certain racial or ethnic groups because the officers believe that these groups are more likely than others to
commit certain types of crimes."' Two years later, 58% said they favored
"requiring Arabs, including those who are U.S. citizens, to undergo special,
more intensive security checks before boarding airplanes in the U.S."2 This new attitude has emerged across the political spectrum.3 Even as stalwart a civil libertarian as Floyd Abrams, the celebrated First Amendment lawyer, has said that under the circumstances we now face, "it seems entirely appropriate to look harder at such people. Remember, Justice [Robert] Jackson said 'the Constitution is not a suicide pact.'"4 Needless to say, racial profiling has not become a national fad. Most
newfound supporters are reluctant and ambivalent, and most public officials continue to say they oppose the practice. There is certainly no new
national consensus in favor of racial profiling. Quite the opposite: The
antiterrorist investigations that followed September 11 have generated a
fresh set of controversies over the issue. But the nature of the debate has changed. Before September 11, the disputes appeared to be factual. Critics would argue that the police acted on the basis of race, and the police would deny it. Now the differences are more likely to be definitional or frankly normative: Does it constitute racial profiling to do what the Department of Justice says it is doing? And if so, are the Department's actions nevertheless justified? To our minds, neither the pre- nor the post-September 11 debates have been very illuminating. The problem may be that before September 11 there was too much agreement on the issue, at least on the surface. Racial profiling continued to occur, as it does today, but
since no public official would defend it, the game turned entirely on

labeling. If a practice was successfully tagged as racial profiling, the cops lost; if not, they won. Since September 11, the debate has shifted but not deepened-at least not appreciably. The division now is between those who say
that we can no longer afford to reject racial profiling out of hand, and those
who insist that this is a principle that must not be compromised. In both
settings, before September 11 and after, no one has stopped to analyze what racial profiling is, and what makes it stand out as a special law enforcement problem. We do not expect to change people's minds or to resolve differences of opinion about the appropriateness of programs that have
been called racial profiling. We do not entirely agree with each other. Nor do we present a general normative theory of racial profiling or a detailed legal analysis. Our goal is more limited: to shed some light on the underlying issues by examining racial profiling in the context of other police practices that take race or ethnicity into account. Some of these practices are among the worst expressions of racism in modern America, while others are perfectly justified. To locate a police practice along this range we need to know in concrete detail not just who the authorities target, and why, but what they do to these people and why they do it. The label "racial profiling," however carefully applied, is not very informative.
Davis 92 (James K. author of Assault On the Left: The FBI and the Sixties Antiwar Movement Spying on America: the FBI's domestic counterintelligence program Praeger 1992 Page 117-119, cayla_)
The FBI made a number of additional attempts to stop sources from funding
targeted black nationalist organizations. The New York office learned from an undercover informant that the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee was attempting to obtain about $35,000 in fund’s from the Episcopal Church. The money
would finance SNCC’s planned liberation school.” The FBI used a series of well-placed anonymous derogatory letters alleging that SNCC was really
planning to use the money for a “fraudulent scheme.” The SNCC also anticipated funding from the Inter-religious Foundation for Community Organization to finance various social reform plans. Again the bureau took action. In this
situation, an anonymous letter to the potential funding organization suggested that the fund would really be used by SNCC in an “illegal kickback
scheme.” In Pittsburgh a black nationalist group known as Unity, Incorporated, was working to obtain a $150,000 grant from the Mellon Foundation. Unity operated a
black power center in Pittsburgh and planned, among other things, to build
a target range in their headquarters basement. The FBI, alerted to this situation, developed a contact inside the Mellon organization. The bureau apprised the
organization of the true nature of Unity, Incorporated. The funding was
quickly blocked. A COINTELPROL memo dated August 28, 1968, from the Pittsburgh field office advised headquarters that “it can be stated with certainty that Unity, Inc.

did not receive a grant from the Mellon Foundation because of this
counterintelligence operation.” In twenty-six separate COINTELPRO
actions, the bureau made information “available to friendly media representatives for the purpose of using such material in a newspaper, magazine, or radio or television program to expose and make public the objectives and activities of the Black Panther Party” and other black
nationalist hate groups. In all cases, this information was supplied to the media on the basis that the source would never be revealed. The bureau’s use of news information, which was administered by the Crime Records Division, was handled in two different ways: first by placing negative information or propaganda about the
Panthers and other black organizations with the news media and, second, by leaking derogatory information intended to discredit particular individuals within black organizations. Internal memoranda that dealt specifically with using the media for COINTELPRO operations were labeled
within the bureau as part of the Mass Media Program. The Crime Records Division disseminated media information at the request of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Hutchinson 2 – (Darren L. Professor of Constitutional Law, Remedies, Race and the Law, and Civil Rights Seminar at the University of Florida Levin College of Law “Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform” 6-2002 scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1399&context=facultypub , cayla_) Despite the general opposition to colorblindness among liberal scholars and Critical Race Theorists, several left-identified commentators have recently begun to challenge this conventional thinking concerning race.' 2 These progressive theorists contend
that society should abandon the concept of race and that people of color
should lead this effort.13 These scholars claim that the negative history of race renders it a peculiar location for people of color to center their identities."4 Specifically, the authors maintain that by clinging to race as an aspect of individual and group identity, people of color allow a construct rooted in domination to define their existence and fail to reconstruct their lives in a way that transcends the language of the dominant culture.' 5 These scholars' stated political and intellectual
commitments stand in contrast to those of conservative scholars and jurists whose embrace of colorblindness has greatly restricted legislative efforts to
combat the effects of racial subordination. Nevertheless, these left-identified scholars have faced criticism that their arguments ignore race's positive value-its utility as a tool for resisting racism. In response to such critiques, some of these scholars have qualified their claims. They now argue that people of color should discard race as
an aspect of individual identity or group culture but should continue to
recognize and to respond to racial subordination in the larger society.16 This Article responds to the advocates of "progressive race blindness" with several critiques of their central claims. [. . .] Although the proponents of progressive
race blindness can overcome some of the limitations of their work, this Article ultimately argues that people of color should continue to "see" race as a dimension of both their individual and group identities
Hutchinson 2 – (Darren L. Professor of Constitutional Law, Remedies, Race and the Law, and Civil Rights Seminar at the University of Florida Levin College of Law “Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform” 6-2002 scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1399&context=facultypub , cayla_) Because they subscribe to constructivist theories of race, advocates of progressive
race blindness contend that race does not have an inevitable existence. On
the contrary, race is a concept that society can discard. Robinson challenges the normalization of racial identity. He contends that race consciousness provides life support for the racial category. Robinson argues that "[i]f we do not constantly and
consciously meditate on it, race cannot exist. Unfortunately, we fuel this
social construct with our mental kindling and intellectual logs."2° Christi
Cunningham urges persons of color to "mourn" racial subjugation by setting

aside race as a component of their personal identities.2" She contends that persons of color can and should "let die our malignant proxies for [community]," such as racial identity, and recreate identity on nonartificial grounds.22 Richard Ford makes a similar claim as Cunningham's-that race should be disaggregated from identity and culture. He argues that [olne can consistently support group consciousness for
the sake of antisubordination politics while remaining skeptical of the coherence of group culture or culture-as-traditions and ambivalent or even hostile to traditionalism and the idea that the norms and practices of any
group should be preserved from pressure to change. 23 Paul Gilroy exhibits a strong faith in the ability of society to transcend race. His excitement stems from the scientific discrediting of the naturalness of race. Gilroy argues that the term race linguistically implies a natural differentiation among individuals that masks a deepening crisis in racial categorization brought about by constructivist understandings of identity:
[Race] stands outside of, and in opposition to, most attempts to render it secondary to the overwhelming sameness that overdetermines social relationships between people and continually betrays the tragic
predicaments of their common species life. The undervalued power of this crushingly obvious, almost banal human sameness, so close and basically invariant that it regularly passes unremarked upon, also confirms that the crisis of raciological
reasoning presents an important opportunity where it points toward the possibility of leaving "race" behind, of setting aside its disabling use as we
move out of the time in which it could have been expected to make sense. 24 The import of social construction theories for the proponents of progressive race blindness is clear: Because human interaction and agency, rather than biology,
create and re-create race, humans can dismantle and set aside their usage of racial categorization.
Hutchinson 2 – (Darren L. Professor of Constitutional Law, Remedies, Race and the Law, and Civil Rights Seminar at the University of Florida Levin College of Law “Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform” 6-2002 scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1399&context=facultypub , cayla_) Advocates of progressive race blindness point to the injurious history of racial
classifications as a justification for radically deconstructing race consciousness. Racial categories, they argue, have historically served as a site of violent subjugation; because these categories are artificial, chosen,
and oppressive, we should endeavor to destroy them. The progressive race blindness theorists contend that by clinging to racial classification, we embrace an identity rooted in subordination and domination. Cunningham, for example, argues that
"[tihe process of racing is a malignancy that infects our identities, like those who raped our ancestors and thus became our ancestors and ourselves. This trauma is evidenced by self-identification that rages against racism yet
clings to concepts of race that make it possible in defining who we are."'25 Robinson takes an equally-if not more-morbid view of racial identification. To Robinson, race consciousness buys into a flawed structure in which "we internalize race's

limitations-self hatred, alienation, and segregation. '26 The implications of
living within the "limitations" of race are especially troubling for persons of
color. According to Robinson, race consciousness breeds a culture of inferiority, victimization, and helplessness among persons of color. 27 If Robinson's claims are true, then progressive movements like antiracism should not fight for the legal
and political recognition of such a psychologically destructive construct as
race.
Hutchinson 2 – (Darren L. Professor of Constitutional Law, Remedies, Race and the Law, and Civil Rights Seminar at the University of Florida Levin College of Law “Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform” 6-2002 scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1399&context=facultypub , cayla_)
Proponents of progressive race blindness also argue against race consciousness on the grounds that race essentializes groups of individuals
by falsely implying that they experience life at a unitary location. Ford, for example, eschews linking race and culture because he fears that this will pose problems of cultural authenticity. Framing claims of cultural oppression in racial terms
risks litigating the messy question of what forms of cultural expression are
legitimate. 28 Cunningham considers race a "malignant proxy" for community, 29 and Robinson contends that racial categorization oppresses and limits the
behaviors and choices of blacks by rigidly defining those activities that are
"authentically" black. 30 Some progressive race blindness theorists have also argued that race consciousness breeds alienation-on both an individual and a community level.
Race consciousness alienates the individual from his or her "true" self, a self unmarred by the myth of racial subjectivity. 3 ' Race consciousness also separates all of us from one another by imposing artificial divisions among the populace. 32
Norton et al 06-
Professor of Business Administration in the Marketing Unit at the Harvard Business School (Michael I Norton, Samuel R. Sommers, Evan P. Aplfelbaum, Natassia Pura, Dan Ariely, “Color Blindness and Interracial Interaction: Playing the Political Correctness Game”, http://pss.sagepub.com/content/17/11/949.full
) Why would simply mentioning someone's race serve as evidence of bias?
There is
, after all,
nothing inherently racist about noticing race
.
But
in a culture
where motivations to avoid appearing prejudiced are increasingly pervasive
( Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986 ; Plant & Devine, 1998 ) and few labels are as aversive as that of “racist” ( Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002 ; Sommers & Norton, 2006 ), color blindness can serve as a useful stratagem:
noticing race is a necessary precursor to racism, but we propose that noticing race can be perceived as a sufficient indication of racism: People who do not notice race are not racist, whereas those who do notice race probably are.
If I do not notice race, then I cannot be a racist.
Certainly, Indeed, noticing race does lead to the activation of stereotypic associations ( Devine, 1989 ; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995 ), which can in turn lead to prejudicial behavior ( Correll, Park, Judd, &

Wittenbrink, 2002 ; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002 effortlessly and rapidly ( Ito & Urland, 2003 ; ). Thus, one mechanism for decreasing bias could be simply not to notice someone's race, thereby forestalling the associations that result in prejudicial behavior. In most cases, however, perceivers do encode the race of other people relatively Montepare & Opeyo, 2002 ; see Cosmides, Tooby, & Kurzban, 2003 ), and such information does affect judgments, though decision makers are reluctant to acknowledge this influence ( Norton, Vandello, & Darley, 2004 ; Sommers & Norton, in press ). We propose that the incongruity between
trying to appear color-blind while automatically noticing color complicates strategic efforts to appear unbiased, creating an inevitable tension between efforts to achieve color blindness and actual success at doing so.

Hutchinson 2 – (Darren L. Professor of Constitutional Law, Remedies, Race and the Law, and Civil Rights Seminar at the University of Florida Levin College of Law “Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform” 6-2002 scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1399&context=facultypub , cayla_) A final problem with progressive race blindness theory is that some of the authors fail to appreciate the magnitude and complexity of racial hierarchy. The work of Ford and Robinson illustrate this point. Ford argues that racial justice claims should be divorced from claims of cultural oppression.7' Ford's primary ground for
skepticism is his belief that the blending of race and culture will harm
persons of color by essentializing cultural identity and group membership and that the litigation of "race-as-culture" discrimination claims will empower courts to define "authentic" and "inauthentic" cultural participation. 7 Ford's analysis fails to comprehend the variety of forms in which racism exists. In particular, Ford does not appreciate the cultural forms of racism and their detrimental effects upon persons of color. In the context of employment discrimination, for example, employers have discriminated on the basis of a battery of workplace rules, such as language ("English-only"), dress, and grooming codes, that operate negatively upon persons of color; these regulations penalize employees for wearing clothing, speaking languages, or wearing hairstyles that are racially identifiable. 73 As several scholars have recognized, the failure of courts to protect race-as-culture results from a
narrow view that race has a fixed, static, and even biological quality; race,
however, is active, practiced, and expressive.74 The courts' separation of
race and culture allows employers and other discriminators to force "Others" to assimilate white, heterosexual, and male norms, while purporting to regulate "neutral" behaviors such as dress, language, and
hairstyle. 75

Carbado 3--(Devon W., Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law, Critical Race Theory, and Criminal Adjudication. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 7 (May, 2003), pp. 1757-1828 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3657500 , cayla_) A second deficiency is that CRT articulates its conception of race as a social
construction at the macro level, focusing primarily on legal and
sociopolitical processes.' It has not paid attention to the interpersonal ways in which race is produced." That is, CRT often ignores the racial productivity
of the "choices" people of color make about how to present theinseles as
racialized persons.7 As a general matter, CRT's race-as-asocial-construction thesis does not include an analysis of the race-producing practices reflected in the daily negotiations people of color perform in an attempt to shape how (especially white) people interpret their nonwhite identities." For example, a Latina may decide not to speak Spanish at work, she may decide to "hold her tongue," or she may refrain from socializing with other Latina workers." These are all race-constructing choices:
How a Latina exercises them will inform how her employer and fellow
employees experience her as a Latina. A CRT/L&E engagement helps to cure some of the deficiencies in both fields. For example, CRT's notion of race as a social
construction can help L&E scholars move to a dynamic conception of race, and L&E's focus on the incentive effects of legal and institutional (norm based) constraints can help CRT scholars analyze the ways in which the
pressures and constraints of the workplace shape both employer and employee behavior. In short, a CRT/L&E joint venture could advance our thinking about how, in the shadow of law, workplace structures and norms affect racial identity-and vice versa. The argument for a collaboration between economics and CRT (and feminist theory and gay and lesbian legal studies) was made with force in a 1996 essay by Ed Rubin.lo Rubin argued that the common critical approach to institutional analysis shared by L&E and
CRT-both fields reject claims about the neutrality and objectivity of legal rules, albeit for different reasons-would, if combined, produce not only an exciting new methodology for legal inquiry, but one with potential to succeed the Legal Process school as a unifying discourse in legal academia.
In the six years since the piece was published, however, there has been little collaborative work between CRT and L&E." If anything, there has been increased antagonism.'2

Chang 93 – (Robert S. Seattle University Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality “Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space” California Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Oct., 1993), pp. 1241+1243-1323 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3480919 , cayla_) This concern about the anecdotal nature of personal narrative manifests itself in resistance and doubt from audiences when they hear stories from critical race scholars. For example, when Professor Patricia Williams tells her now infamous Benetton story,151 the audience forces her to answer such questions as the following: Am I not
privileging a racial perspective, by considering only the black point of view?
Don't I have an obligation to include the "salesman'side" of the story? How can I be sure I'm right? What makes my experience the real black one anyway? Isn't it possible that another black person would disagree with my experience? If so, doesn't that render my story too unempirical and subjective to pay any attention to?052 These questions are similar to the questions I face when I tell my stories. I usually keep
these stories to myself because when I tell them to people, I often hear doubt
in their voices and their questions. How do you know it was racism? How do you know that the same thing would not have happened to anyone else? They question the details. Did you really see the border guard smirk? How do you know that the service station was not out of gas? But I am ready for their questions. I have prepared answers.
The car before me at the service station got gas, and the white man in the car in front of me at the border crossing did not have a problem with his driver's
license. Yes, I could see that far away; I have good vision. As the questions keep coming,
I realize that people do not want to believe me. They do not want to see racism because it is ugly. They have learned or convinced themselves that such ugliness does not exist, at least not in such blatant forms, and not to
Asian Americans.153 From their perspective, since Asian Americans do not suffer from discrimination, I must be mistaken, deluded,154 or lying. And even if they believe my stories, they discount them as isolated incidents.155 Although these questions that Patricia Williams and I face represent common concerns when we use stories in a discourse on law, there are important differences. While people
usually concede that African Americans suffer from discrimination, they
often question the extent or pervasiveness of it.'56 For Asian Americans,
however, people do not even reach the question of extent because the majority of Americans do not believe that Asian Americans suffer from
discrimination. 57 Nor is this false belief in the Asian American model minority myth confined to the general public-it has infected government officials and members of the judiciary."58 This creates different problems for legal storytellers when they speak about Asian American problems. [. . .] When the real question about objectivity is asked, further questions are revealed. What counts as knowledge? What counts as evidence? One use of outsider stories is to demonstrate the inequities of the present situation. The disempowered find ourselves in a peculiar position in that the

evidence we would use to prove our oppression consists of the very stories that are now disbelieved or excluded because they are only stories. In this way, rules of evidence
silence us. In order to get our stories into evidence, we need to broaden or
change the very meaning of evidence.'73 In order to make the case for narrative, I turn now to epistemology because our theory of knowledge largely determines what counts as knowledge and what counts as evidence.
Chang 93 – (Robert S. Seattle University Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality “Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space” California Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Oct., 1993), pp. 1241+1243-1323 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3480919 , cayla_) This story illustrates the danger of the model minority myth: it renders the oppression of Asian Americans invisible. This invisibility has harmful consequences,
especially when those in positions of power cannot see: To be out of sight is
also to be without social services. Thinking Asian Americans have succeeded,
government officials have sometimes denied funding for social service programs designed to help Asian Americans learn English and find
employment. Failing to realize that there are poor Asian families, college administrators have sometimes excluded Asian-American students from Educational Opportunity Programs (EOP), which are intended for all students from low-income families.81 In this way, the model minority myth diverts much-needed
attention from the problems of many segments of the Asian American
community, particularly the Laotians, Hmong, Cambodians, and Vietnamese who have poverty rates of 67.2%, 65.5%, 46.9%, and 33.5%, respectively. These poverty rates compare with a national poverty rate of 9.6%.83 In addition to government officials, this distorted view of the current status of Asian Americans has infected at least one very influential member of the judiciary and legal academy. At a recent conference of the Association of American Law Schools, Judge Posner asked two rhetorical questions: "Are Asians an oppressed group in the United States today? Are they worse off for lacking sizable representation on the faculties of American law schools?"84 His questions are rhetorical because he already has answers, with figures to back them up: "In 1980, JapaneseAmericans had incomes more than 32% above the national average income, and Chinese-Americans had incomes more than 12% above the national average; Anglo-Saxons and Irish exceeded the average by 5% and 2%, respectively."85 He also points out that "in 1980, 17.8% of the white population aged 25 and over had completed four or more years of college, compared to 32.9% of the Asian-American population." [. . .] This blame and its consequences create resentment against Asian Americans among African Americans, Latinos, and poor whites.'03 This resentment, fueled by poor
economic conditions, can flare into anger and violence. Asian Americans, the "model minority," serve as convenient scapegoats, as Korean Americans in Los Angeles discovered during the 1992 riots." Many Korean Americans "now view themselves as 'human shields' in a complicated racial hierarchy,"

caught between "the racism of the white majority and the anger of the black
minority."'05 The model minority myth plays a key role in establishing a racial hierarchy which denies the oppression of Asian Americans while simultaneously legitimizing the oppression of other racial minorities and poor whites.
Carbado 3--(Devon W., Professor of Law at the UCLA School of Law, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law, Critical Race Theory, and Criminal Adjudication. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, No. 7 (May, 2003), pp. 1757-1828 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3657500 , cayla_) The essay in A New Critical Race Theory that tackles racial presentation and performance is Anthony Farley's discussion of the objectification of the black body by white society.71 Although Farley only once employs the language of performance, his argument is about the choices people make about how to be raced. His thesis is this:
"Race is a form of pleasure. For whites, it is a sadistic pleasure in decorating black bodies with disdain. For blacks-in today's non-revolutionary situation-
it has become a masochistic pleasure in being so decorated."72 Fundamental to Farley's claim, then, is that while whites and blacks are not similarly situated with respect to the color line,73 both groups derive pleasure from the sociopolitical
processes that constitute it. Farley spends considerable time explaining why whites would be invested in employing the black body as a "fetish object,"
but little explaining why blacks would make themselves available for, and derive pleasure from, racial objectification. One might posit that the answer is constraint-black agency is so constrained as to make participation inexorable. Farley's answer seems to be seduction-the seduction of a colorblind future or of a depoliticized
understanding of Martin Luther King's dream.74 Farley is critical of this seduction and conceptualizes it as a performance that acquiesces in,
reproduces, and legitimizes racial hierarchy. He writes: The black body is a vast writing project. It is a twice-haunted, twice-scripted body. The good Negro and the bad Negro are animating spirits that emerge, like the Madonna and the Whore, depending on the performance desired. White pre-Civil Rights Movement desire for abject
black bodies required, at times, the good Negro of minstrelsy and, at other
times, the bad Negro of lynchings. Pity and contempt were the twin emotions that accompanied the race pleasure rituals ....75 Farley's suggestion seems to be that the racial quality of black identity performances (the good negro versus the bad negro) makes the color line more or less a pleasurable thing for whites-and for blacks. The concept of race as performative provides a vehicle for thinking about how race figures in employment decisions that are not driven by explicit racial animus.

Moran and Carbado 8 (Rachel F. and Devon W., Moran: Dean of UCLA School of Law, and Michael J. Connell Distinguished Professor of Law/Carbado: Law Professor at UCLA—expert in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law, Critical Race Theory, and Criminal Adjudication Race Law Stories New York, NY : Foundation Press 2008 page 527-528, cayla_) A competing vision of equal protection views the constitutional harm as systemic rather than atomistic. Instead of focusing on individual victims and perpetrators, this
view emphasizes the eradication of inequalities among groups, with respect to such social goods as higher education, access to public contracts, and
political power. A systemic approach places a premium on examining how
historical practices have served to create material inequalities among racial groups, so as to necessitate group-based remedial action. In the early days of VRA enforcement, neither Congress nor the Court had to choose between these two visions because both counseled in favor of dismantling barriers to
African Americans’ participation. After the elimination of blatantly discriminatory practices like the literacy test, however, the systemic perspective counseled in
favor of race-conscious redistricting to promote minority representation,
while the atomistic perspective suggested a race-blind approach. The Justice Department selected the systemic path, refusing to pre-clear plans without sufficient majority-minority districts, and Congress signaled approval of this vision through the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. In Shaw I, the Court suggested that
this path is inconsistent with equal protection because righting individual
wrongs is all that matters. The Court’s commitment to the atomistic theory of equal protection is epitomized by a change that Justice O’Connor made to the Shaw v. Reno opinion at the request of Chief Justice Rehnquist. The first two drafts of her opinion observed that: “Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may
balkanize us into competing racial factions and carry us further from the goal of a fully integrated society that the Fourteenth Amendment
embodies....” An internal memorandum from the Chief Justice objected to this language, stating: “The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits discrimination; it does not require integration, and I think it is a mistake to intimate that it does even as a ‘goal.’
”170 Put another way, government does wrong when it distinguishes between individuals based on race; consequently, government has no affirmative obligation to promote integration or, more broadly, substantive
racial equality in politics or any other sphere.

APA 8 (American Psychological Association—leading scientific and professional organization representing psychology in the United States, Commemorating Brown: the Social Psychology of Racism and Discrimination Washington, DC 2008, page 57-58, cayla_) Here disciplinary needs and the desire to contribute to a nonracist society converge. Social psychology is the most individually and situationally focused of all the social sciences (C. W. Stephan, Stephan, & Pettigrew, 1991). However, broad social
problems such as racism sweep across all levels of analysis from the
individual to the macroinstitutional. Future advances in the discipline require closer links with macroinstitutional levels—from the economic to the political and cultural. Insights of the other social sciences can inform social psychology,
and in turn, social psychological insights can inform the other social sci-
ences. Moreover, the relevance of social psychology for contributing to the resolution of major social problems of many types requires such links (see chap. 5, this volume). Intergroup contact illustrates the point. I noted earlier that contact reduces prejudice over a broader spectrum of conditions than Allport (1954) had originally envisaged with his theory. To be sure, negative experiences in outgroup contact can heighten prejudice—especially when realistic and symbolic threats are involved (W. G. Stephan et al., 2002; W. G. Stephan & Stephan, 2000). However, the full meta-analysis of contact and prejudice studies involving 250,000 subjects revealed that contact
typically diminishes prejudice over an extensive range of situations and
target groups (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Thus, intergroup contact theory has
emerged as one of social psychology’s strongest methods for combating intergroup prejudice. Intergroup contact occurs within the context of institutional structures. Thus, this disciplinary insight runs straight into the
wall of racial segregation. The review in this chapter has shown the massive degree of residential and educational segregation that remains in America—and to some degree this situation is actually worsening. Social psychology must fashion contact
theory to the particular institutional settings—neighborhoods, schools, and
workplaces— where Black and White Americans actually meet. This need suggests more field and longitudinal research on intergroup contact with an eye on the policy relevance of the findings. It also suggests that social psychologists must become more involved in the racial realities of the wider society.
AFSC et. al 13 (American Friends Service Committee, a Religious Society of Friends (Quaker) founded organization working for peace and social justice in the United States and around the world (Committee on Women, Population, and the Environment, Population and Development Program, Hampshire College) “Militarized Zones: Gender, Race, Immigration, Environment” A Special Issue of Political Environments (PE No.10) November 2013 www.cwpe.org/files/militarized-zones.pdf , cayla_)

Regardless of one’s position on the war, a cloud hangs over us all—a cloud of growing
repression, surveillance of domestic civic and religious organizations against whom there is no evidence of wrong doing, and invasive information-gathering programs used by the Pentagon and other government agencies to strengthen the war machine. The USA Patriot Act, the Homeland Security Act, the Total Information Awareness program, and other repressive measures trample rights and erode constitutional
principles. The Patriot Act, for example, is vague and diffuse enough to paint LGBT
people speaking out against the war, or even marching in a gay rights
parade, as “terrorists” working to overthrow the government. The LGBT movement in the United States thrives in no small measure because the legal framework of civil rights and constitutional rights, and reasonable government checks and balances, however imperfectly realized, support us in our struggle for justice. Today, however, those checks and balances are weakened, and the legal framework of rights is corroded.
LGBT people have never fared well in politically charged climates when governments say that it is necessary to sacrifice rights in order to achieve
safety. The question LGBT communities must confront is this: Whose safety will be
increased by erosion of rights? Whose safety will be further jeopardized? Finally, war on Iraq and “the War on Terror” will not protect the human
rights of LGBT people in war-torn countries. The International Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) says, “The U.S. policies of military aggression have
served to render those who deviate from sexual and gender norms and people living with HIV/AIDS especially vulnerable to state-sanctioned
violence and discrimination.” As citizens and residents of the United States, we feel a special responsibility to join with many others worldwide to speak out when we feel that this country’s actions are immoral, unjust, and dangerous. We believe we are morally obligated to resist when particular policies lead neither to justice nor peace, but only to a widening spiral of human suffering and ecological catastrophe. We oppose
the “War on Terror” today so that tomorrow the United States could use its status as a leading world power to strengthen, rather than undermine, the values of international law, international cooperation, multilateralism,
human rights, and economic security for all peoples. Impacts on LGBT Communities Racial Profiling & The War on Immigrant Communities As a direct
result of the racial profiling of all immigrants, LGBT immigrants are in
jeopardy. Al-Fatiha Foundation (LGBTQI Muslims and friends), South Asian Lesbian and Gay Alliance (SALGA), and many other LGBT organizations serving Arab,
Muslim, South and Central Asian, and Latino communities are being
deluged by immigration and deportation issues and concerns. Many are reporting increased problems with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Community based LGBT organizations serving immigrant constituencies generally operate with small budgets, and with the escalation of the “War on Terror,” resources are being stretched beyond capacity. Few immigrant and refugee rights
organizations have developed a systemic capacity to help LGBT immigrants.
LGBT activists of Arab and South or Central Asian descent face special obstacles and risks in traveling. Some choose not to travel outside the United States, even for

religious pilgrimage, for fear of not being permitted back into the country. Some are taking refuge in Canada. The “special registration” program of the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) is spreading fear and confusion in immigrant communities and heightening war fever throughout the U.S. by stigmatizing
immigrants as a threat to national security. By institutionalizing the racist presumption that immigrants are terrorists, it reinforces the drive for war. Mass
roundups of immigrants, secret detentions, detention without charges, and
denial of legal counsel to detainees, are now “acceptable” practices. Many people have been detained or face deportation orders because of confusion, backlog, and hopelessly complex and poorly understood procedures within the INS itself. Those
who fall in the net of immigration authorities may be deported and barred from the United States for life. The policing of the already heavily militarized U.S.-Mexico border has intensified, placing severe strains and hardship on border crossers and border communities. Human rights abuses are commonplace.

Chang 93 – (Robert S. Seattle University Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality “Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space” California Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Oct., 1993), pp. 1241+1243-1323 http://www.jstor.org/stable/3480919 , cayla_) As a result, critical race scholarship tends to focus on the black-white racial paradigm, excluding Asian Americans and other racial minorities. For example, in a recent Colloquy entitled Racism in the Wake of the Los Angeles
Riots, •"8 the Korean American African American conflict was not
addressed, with the exception of two footnotes in one article"9 and a discussion of the actions taken by the Korean government to try to protect Korean citizens and immigrants in another article.'20 Nor were the perspectives of Korean Americans represented. These are serious omissions.'21 The result is that the Colloquy, and more generally, the discourse on race and the law, is not as rich or complete as it might or should be. These omissions foreclosed the possibility of reaching a greater understanding of why the racial tensions exist, how they have
been fostered by legal decisions, and what might be done to bridge the
differences. To focus on the black-white racial paradigm is to misunderstand the complicated racial situation in the United States. It ignores such things as
nativistic racism. It ignores the complexity of a racial hierarchy that has
more than just a top and a bottom. Asian American Legal Scholarship has a vested interest in helping to flesh out the racial paradigm. Asian American Legal Scholarship is needed to address the coverage problem in both traditional civil rights work and in critical race scholarship.'22 Perceptions fostered by the model minority myth contribute to the lack of coverage. Thus, one of the tasks of Asian American Legal Scholarship is to break the silence that surrounds our oppression. An important tool
in breaking this silence is the use of personal narrative. Narrative will allow us to speak our oppression into existence, for it must first be represented before it can be erased.'23

Wilderson 10 (Frank B. American writer, dramatist, filmmaker, critic and professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine Red White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms Duke University Press Durham & London 2010 page 1-5, cayla_) WHEN I WAS a young student at Columbia University in New York there was a Black
woman who used to stand outside the gate and yell at Whites, Latinos, and East and South Asian students, staff, and faculty as they entered the
university She accused them of having stolen her sofa and of selling her into slavery She always winked at the Blacks, though we didn't wink back. Some of us
thought her outbursts bigoted and out of step with the burgeoning ethos of
multicultural-ism and "rainbow coalitions." But others did not wink back because
we were too fearful of the possibility that her isolation would become our
isolation, and we had come to Columbia for the precise, though largely assumed and unspoken, purpose of foreclosing on that peril. Besides, people said she was crazy. Later, when I attended the University of California at Berkeley, I saw a Native American man sitting on the sidewalk of Telegraph Avenue. On the ground in front of him was an upside-down hat and a sign informing pedestrians that here they could
settle the "Land Lease Accounts" that they had neglected to settle all of their
lives. He, too, was "crazy. Leaving aside for the moment their state of mind, it would seem that the structure, that is to say the rebar, or better still the grammar of
their demands—and, by extension, the grammar of their suffering—was
indeed an ethical grammar. Perhaps it is the only ethical grammar available
to modern politics and modernity writ large, for it draws our attention not to how space and time are used and abused by enfranchised and violently powerful interests, but to the violence that underwrites the modern world's
capacity to think, act, and exist spatially and temporally. The violence that robbed her of her body and him of his land provided the stage on which other violent and consensual dramas could be enacted. Thus, they would have to be crazy, crazy enough to call not merely the actions of the world but the world itself to account, and to account for them no less! The woman at Columbia was not demanding to be a participant
in an unethical network of distribution: she was not demanding a place
within capital, a piece of the pie (the demand for her sofa notwithstanding). Rather,
she was articulating a triangulation between two things. On the one hand was the loss of her body, the very dereliction of her corporeal integrity, what Hortense Spillers charts as the transition from being a being to
becoming a "being for the captor,"1 the drama of value (the stage on which surplus

value is extracted from labor power through commodity production and sale). On the
other was the corporeal integrity that, once ripped from her body, fortified and extended the corporeal integrity of everyone else on the street. She gave
birth to the commodity and to the Human, yet she had neither subjectivity nor a sofa to show for it. In her eyes, the world—not its myriad discriminatory practices, but the world itself—was unethical. And yet, the world passes by her without the slightest inclination to stop and disabuse her of her claim. Instead, it calls her "crazy." And to what does the world attribute the Native American mans insanity? "He's crazy if he thinks he's getting any money out of us"? Surely, that doesn't make him crazy. Rather it is simply an indication that he does not have a big enough gun. What are we to make of a world that responds to the most lucid enunciation of ethics with violence? What are the foundational questions of the ethico political? Why are these questions so scandalous that they are rarely posed
politically, intellectually, and cinematically—unless they are posed obliquely
and unconsciously, as if by accident? Give Turtle Island back to the "Savage." Give life itself back to the Slave. Two simple sentences, fourteen simple words, and the structure of U.S. (and perhaps global) antagonisms would be dismantled.
An "ethical modernity" would no longer sound like an oxymoron. From there we could busy ourselves with important conflicts that have been promoted to the level of antagonisms, such as class struggle, gender conflict,
and immigrants' rights. One cannot but wonder why questions that go to the heart of the ethico-political, questions of political ontology, are so unspeakable in intellectual meditations, political broadsides, and even socially and politically engaged feature films. Clearly they can be spoken, even a child could speak those lines, so they would pose no problem for a scholar, an activist, or a filmmaker. And yet, what is also clear—if the filmographies of socially and politically engaged directors, the archive of progressive scholars, and the plethora of left-wing broadsides are anything to go by—is that what can so easily be spoken is now (500 years and 250 million Settlers/Masters on) so ubiquitously unspoken that these two simple sentences,
these fourteen words not only render their speaker "crazy" but become
themselves impossible to imagine. Soon it will be forty years since radical politics, left-leaning scholarship, and socially engaged feature films began to speak the unspeakable.2 In the 1960s and early 1970s the questions asked by radical politics and scholarship were not Should the United States be overthrown? or even Would it be overthrown? but when and how—and, for some, what would come in its wake. Those steadfast in their conviction that there remained a discernable quantum of ethics in the United States writ large (and here I am speaking of everyone from Martin Luther King Jr. prior to his 1968 shift, to the Tom Hayden wing of Students for Democratic Society, to the Julian Bond and Marion Barry faction of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, to Bobby Kennedy Democrats) were accountable, in their
rhetorical machinations, to the paradigmatic Zeitgeist of the Black
Panthers, the American Indian Movement, and the Weather Underground.
Radicals and progressives could deride, reject, or chastise armed struggle mercilessly and cavalierly with respect to tactics and the possibility of "success," but they could not dismiss revolution-as-ethic because they could
not make a convincing case—by way of a paradigmatic analysis—that the United

States was an ethical formation and still hope to maintain credibility as
radicals and progressives. Even Bobby Kennedy (as a U.S. attorney general) mused that the law and its enforcers had no ethical standing in the presence of Blacks.3 One could (and many did) acknowledge America's strength and power. This seldom rose to the level of an ethical assessment, however, remaining instead an assessment of the "balance of forces." The political discourse of Blacks, and to a lesser extent Indians, circulated too widely to wed the United States and ethics credibly.
The raw force of COINTELPRO put an end to this trajectory toward a possible hegemony of ethical accountability. Consequently, the power of Blackness and Redness to pose the question—and the power to pose the question is the greatest power of all—retreated as did White radicals and
progressives who "retired" from the struggle. The question lies buried in the graves of young Black Panthers, AIM warriors, and Black Liberation Army soldiers, or in prison cells where so many of them have been rotting (some in solitary confinement) for ten, twenty, or thirty years, and at the gates of the academy where the "crazies" shout at passersby. Gone are not only the young and vibrant voices that effected a
seismic shift on the political landscape, but also the intellectual protocols of inquiry, and with them a spate of feature films that became authorized, if not by an unabashed revolutionary polemic, then certainly by a revolutionary Zeitgeist. Is it still possible for a dream of unfettered ethics, a dream of the Settlement and the Slave estate's4 destruction, to manifest itself at the ethical core of cinematic discourse when this dream is no longer a constituent element of political discourse in the streets or of intellectual
discourse in the academy? The answer is "no" in the sense that, as history has shown, what cannot be articulated as political discourse in the streets is doubly foreclosed on in screenplays and in scholarly prose, but "yes" in the sense that in even the most taciturn historical moments, such as ours, the grammar of Black and Red suffering breaks in on this foreclosure, albeit like the somatic compliance of hysterical symptoms—it registers in both cinema and scholarship as a symptom of awareness of the structural antagonisms. The election of President Barack Obama does not mitigate the claim that this is a taciturn historical moment. Neoliberalism with a Black face is neither the index of a revolutionary advance nor the end of anti-Blackness as a constituent element of U.S. antagonisms. If anything, the election of Obama enables a plethora of shaming discourses in response to revolutionary politics and "legitimates" widespread disavowal of any notion that the United States itself, and not merely its policies and practices, is unethical. Between 1967 and 1980, we could think cinematically and intellectually of Blackness and Redness as having the coherence of full-blown discourses. From 1980 to the present, however, Blackness and Redness manifest only in the rebar of cinematic and intellectual (political) discourse, that is, as unspoken grammars. This grammar can be discerned in the cinematic strategies (lighting, camera angles, image composition, and acoustic design), even when the script labors for the spectator to imagine social turmoil through the rubric of conflict (i.e., a rubric of problems that can be posed and conceptually solved) as opposed to the rubric of antagonism (an irreconcilable struggle between entities, or positions, the resolution of which is not dialectical but entails the obliteration of one of the positions). In other words, even when films narrate a story in which Blacks or Indians are beleaguered with problems that the

script insists are conceptually coherent (usually having to do with poverty or the absence of "family values"), the nonnarrative, or cinematic, strategies of the film often disrupt this coherence by posing the irreconcilable questions of Red and Black political ontology—or nonontology. The grammar of antagonism breaks in on the mendacity of conflict. Semiotics and linguistics teach us that when we speak, our grammar goes unspoken. Our grammar is assumed. It is the structure through which the labor of speech is possible.5 Likewise, the grammar of political ethics— the grammar of
assumptions regarding the ontology of suffering—which underwrites film
theory and political discourse (in this book, discourse elaborated in direct relation to radical action), and which underwrites cinematic speech (in this book, Red, White, and Black films from the mid-1960s to the present) is also unspoken. This
notwithstanding, film theory, political discourse, and cinema assume an ontological grammar, a structure of suffering. And this structure of suffering crowds out others, regardless of the sentiment of the film or the
spirit of unity mobilized by the political discourse in question. To put a finer point on it, structures of ontological suffering stand in antagonistic, rather then
conflictual, relation to one another (despite the fact that antagonists themselves may not be aware of the ontological position from which they
speak).
Wilderson 10 (Frank B. American writer, dramatist, filmmaker, critic and professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine Red White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms Duke University Press Durham & London 2010 page 55-57, cayla_) IN THE INTRODUCTION and chapter 1, we saw how the aporia between Black
being and political ontology has existed since Arab and European enslavement of Africans. The crafting of questions through which one might arrive at an unflinching paradigmatic analysis of political ontology, a language that could express the structural and performative violence of Slave-making, is repeatedly thwarted. Humanist discourse, whose epistemological machinations provide our conceptual frameworks for
thinking political ontology, is diverse and contrary. But for all its diversity and contrariness it is sutured by an implicit rhetorical consensus that violence
accrues to the Human body as a result of transgressions, whether real or
imagined, within the symbolic order. That is to say, Humanist discourse can
only think a subject's relation to violence as a contingency and not as a

matrix that positions the subject. Put another way, Humanism has no theory of the Slave because it imagines a subject who has been either alienated in language
or alienated from his or her cartographic and temporal capacities.1 It cannot imagine an object who has been positioned by gratuitous violence and who has no cartographic and temporal capacities to lose—a sentient being for whom recognition and incorporation is impossible. In short,
political ontology, as imagined through Humanism, can only produce discourse
that has as its foundation alienation and exploitation as a grammar of suffering, when what is needed (for the Black, who is always already a Slave) is an ensemble of ontological questions that has as its foundation
accumulation and fungibility as a grammar of suffering.2 The violence of the Middle Passage and the Slave estate,3 technologies of accumulation and fungibility, recompose and reenact their horrors on each succeeding generation of Blacks. This
violence is both gratuitous (not contingent on transgressions against the hegemony of civil society) and structural (positioning Blacks onto logically
outside of Humanity and civil society). Simultaneously, it renders the ontological status of Humanity (life itself) wholly dependent on civil society's repetition
compulsion: the frenzied and fragmented machinations through which civil
society reenacts gratuitous violence on the Black—that civil society might know itself as the domain of Humans—generation after generation. Again, we need a new language of abstraction to explain this horror. The explanatory power of Humanist discourse is bankrupt in the face of the Black. It is inadequate and inessential to, as well as parasitic on, the ensemble of questions which the dead but sentient thing, the Black, struggles to articulate in a world of living subjects. My work on film, cultural theory, and political ontology is my attempt to contribute to this often fragmented and constantly assaulted quest to forge a language of
abstraction with explanatory powers emphatic enough to embrace the Black, an accumulated and fungible object, in a Human world of exploited
and alienated subjects. The imposition of Humanism's assumptive logic has encumbered Black film studies to the extent that it is underwritten by the assumptive logic of White or non-Black film studies. This is a problem of cultural studies writ large. In this chapter, I want to illustrate briefly how we might break the theoretical impasse between, on the one hand, the assumptive logic of cultural studies and, on the other, the theoretical aphasia to which cultural studies is reduced when it encounters the (non)ontological status of the Black. I will do so not by launching a frontal attack against White film theory, in particular, or even cultural studies broadly speaking, but by interrogating Jacques Lacan—because Lacanian psychoanalysis is one of the twin pillars buttressing film theory and cultural studies.4 Unfortunately, cultural studies that theorizes the interface between Blacks and Humans is hobbled in its attempts to (a) expose power relationships and (b) examine how relations of power influence and shape cultural practice. Cultural studies insists on a grammar of suffering which
assumes that we are all positioned essentially by way of the symbolic order, what Lacan calls the wall of language—and as such our potential for stasis or change (our capacity for being oppressed or free) is overdeter-mined by our
"universal" ability or inability to seize and wield discursive weapons. This idea corrupts the explanatory power of most socially engaged films and even the most

radical line of political action because it produces a cinema and a politics that cannot account for the grammar of suffering of the Black—the Slave. To put it bluntly, the
imaginative labor of cinema, political action, and cultural studies are all afflicted with the same theoretical aphasia. They are speechless in the face
of gratuitous violence. This theoretical aphasia is symptomatic of a debilitated ensemble of questions regarding political ontology. At its heart are two registers of imaginative labor. The first register is that of description, the rhetorical labor
aimed at explaining the way relations of power are named, categorized, and explored. The second register can be characterized as prescription, the rhetorical labor predicated on the notion that everyone can be emancipated through some form of discursive, or symbolic, intervention.
Wilderson 10 (Frank B. American writer, dramatist, filmmaker, critic and professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine Red White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms Duke University Press Durham & London 2010 page 19-23, cayla_) Again, what is important for us to glean from these historians is that the pre-Columbian period, the late Middle Ages, reveals no archive of debate on these three questions as they might be related to that massive group of black-skinned people south of the Sahara. Eltis suggests that there was indeed massive debate which ultimately led to Britain taking the lead in the abolition of slavery, but he reminds us that that debate did not have its roots in the late Middle Ages, the post-Columbian period of the 1500s or the Virginia colony period of the 1600s. It was, he asserts, an outgrowth of the mid- to late eighteenth-century emancipatory thrust— intra-Human disputes such as the French and American revolutions— that swept through Europe. But Eltis does not take his analysis further than this. Therefore, it is important that we not be swayed by his optimism about the Enlightenment and its subsequent abolitionist discourses. It is highly conceivable that the discourse that elaborates the justification for freeing the slave is not the product of the Human being having suddenly and miraculously recognized the slave. Rather, as Saidiya Hartman argues, emancipatory discourses present themselves to us as further evidence of the Slave's fungibility: "The figurative capacities of blackness enable white flights of fancy while increasing the likelihood of the captive's disappearance."27 First,

the questions of Humanism were elaborated in contradistinction to the human void, to the African qua chattel (the 1200s to the end of the 1600s). Second, as the presence of Black chattel in the midst of exploited and unexploited Humans (workers and bosses, respectively) became a fact of the world, exploited Humans (in the throes of class conflict with unexploited Humans) seized the image of the Slave as an enabling vehicle that animated the evolving discourses of their own emancipation, just as unexploited Humans had seized the flesh of the Slave to increase their profits. Without this gratuitous violence, a violence that marks everyone ex-perientially until the late Middle Ages when it starts to mark the Black onto logically, the so-called great emancipatory discourses of modernity— Marxism, feminism, postcolonialism, sexual liberation, and the ecology movement—political discourses predicated on grammars of suffering and whose constituent elements are exploitation and alienation, might not have developed.28 Chattel slavery did not simply reterritorialize the ontology of the African. It also created the Human out of culturally disparate entities from Europe to the East. I am not suggesting that across the globe Humanism developed in the same way regardless of region or culture; what I am saying is that the late Middle Ages gave rise to an ontological category—an ensemble of common existential concerns—which made and continues to make possible both war and peace, conflict and resolution, between the disparate members of the human race, East and West. Senator Thomas Hart Benton intuited this notion of the existential commons when he wrote that though the "Yellow race" and its culture had been "torpid and stationary for thousands of years . . . [Whites and Asians] must talk together, and trade together, and marry together. Commerce is a great civilizer—social intercourse as great—and marriage greater."29 Eltis points out that as late as the seventeenth century, "prisoners taken in the course of European military action... could expect death if they were leaders, or banishment if they were deemed followers, but never enslavement.... Detention followed by prisoner exchanges or ransoming was common." "By the seventeenth century, enslavement of fellow Europeans was beyond the limits" of Humanism's existential commons, even in times of war.30 Slave status "was reserved for non-Christians. Even the latter group however . . . had some prospect of release in exchange for Christians held by rulers of Algiers, Tunis, and other Mediterranean Muslim powers."31 But though the practice of enslaving the vanquished was beyond the limit of wars among Western peoples and only practiced provisionally in East-West conflicts, the baseness of the option was not debated when it came to the African. The race of Humanism (White, Asian, South Asian, and Arab) could not have produced itself without the simultaneous production of that walking destruction which became known as the Black. Put another way, through chattel slavery the world gave birth and coherence to both its joys of domesticity and to its struggles of political discontent; and with these joys and struggles the Human was born, but not before it murdered the Black, forging a symbiosis between the political ontology of Humanity and the social death of Blacks. In his essay "To 'Corroborate Our Claims': Public Positioning and the Slavery Metaphor in Revolutionary America," Peter Dorsey (in his concurrence with the cultural historians F. Nwabueze Okoye and Patricia

Bradley) suggests that in mid- to late eighteenth-century America Blackness was such a fungible commodity that it was traded as freely between the exploited (workers who did not "own" slaves) as it was between the unexploited (planters who did). This was due to the effective uses to which Whites could put the Slave as both flesh and metaphor. For the revolutionaries, "slavery represented a nightmare' that white Americans were trying to avoid."32 Dorsey's claim is provocative, but not unsupported: he maintains that had Blacks-as-Slaves not been in the White field of vision on a daily basis that it would have been virtually impossible for Whites to transform themselves from colonial subjects into revolutionaries: Especially prominent in the rhetoric and reality of the [revolutionary] era, the concepts of freedom and slavery were applied to a wide variety of events and values and were constantly being defined and redefined. ... Early understandings of American freedom were in many ways dependent on the existence of chattel slavery. . . . [We should] see slavery in revolutionary discourse, not merely as a hyperbolic rhetorical device but as a crucial and fluid [fungible] concept that had a major impact on the way early Americans thought about their political future. . . . The slavery metaphor destabilized previously accepted categories of thought about politics, race, and the early republic.33 Though the idea of "taxation without representation" may have spoken concretely to the idiom of power that marked the British/American relation as being structurally unethical, it did not provide metaphors powerful and fungible enough for Whites to meditate and move on when resisting the structure of their own subordination at the hands of "unchecked political power."34 The most salient feature of Dorsey's findings is not his understanding of the way Blackness, as a crucial and fungible conceptual possession of civil society, impacts and destabilizes previously accepted categories of intra-White thought. Most important, instead, is his contribution to the evidence that, even when Blackness is deployed to stretch the elasticity of civil society to the point of civil war, that expansion is never elastic enough to embrace the very Black who catalyzed the expansion. In fact, Dorsey, building on Bradley's historical research, asserts that just the opposite is true. The more the political imagination of civil society is enabled by the fungibility of the slave metaphor, the less legible the condition of the slave becomes: "Focusing primarily on colonial newspapers . . . Bradley finds that the slavery metaphor 'served to distance the patriot agenda from the antislavery movement.' If anything, Bradley states, widespread use of the metaphor 'gave first evidence that the issue of real slavery was not to have a part in the revolutionary messages.'"35 And Eltis believes that this philosophical incongruity between the image of the Slave and freedom for the Slave begins in Europe and predates the American Revolution by at least one hundred years: "The [European] countries least likely to enslave their own had the harshest and most sophisticated system of exploiting enslaved non-Europeans. Overall, the English and Dutch conception of the role of the individual in metropolitan society ensured the accelerated development of African chattel slavery in the Americas ... because their own subjects could not become chattel slaves or even convicts for life."36 Furthermore, the circulation of Blackness as metaphor and image at the most politically volatile and progressive moments in history (e.g., the French, English, and American

revolutions) produces dreams of liberation which are more inessential to and more parasitic on the Black, and more emphatic in their guarantee of Black suffering, than any dream of human liberation in any era heretofore. Black slavery is foundational to modern Humanism's ontics because "freedom" is the hub of Humanism's infinite conceptual trajectories. But these trajectories only appear to be infinite. They are finite in the sense that they are predicated on the idea of freedom from some contingency that can be named, or at least conceptualized. The contingent rider could be freedom from patriarchy, freedom from economic exploitation, freedom from political tyranny (e.g., taxation without representation), freedom from heteronormativity, and so on. What I am suggesting is that first political discourse recognizes freedom as a structuring ontologic and then it works to disavow this recognition by imagining freedom not through political ontology—where it rightfully began—but through political experience (and practice); whereupon it immediately loses its ontological foundations. Why would anyone do this? Why would anyone start off with, quite literally, an earth-shattering ontologic and, in the process of meditating on it and acting through it, reduce it to an earth-reforming experience? Why do Humans take such pride in self-adjustment, in diminishing, rather than intensifying, the project of liberation (how did we get from 1968 to the present)? Because, I contend, in allowing the notion of freedom to attain the ethical purity of its ontological status, one would have to lose one's Human coordinates and become Black. Which is to say one would have to die. For the Black, freedom is an ontological, rather than experiential, question. There is no philosophically credible way to attach an experiential, a contingent, rider onto the notion of freedom when one considers the Black—such as freedom from gender or economic oppression, the kind of contingent riders rightfully placed on the non-Black when thinking freedom. Rather, the riders that one could place on Black freedom would be hyperbolic—though no less true— and ultimately untenable: freedom from the world, freedom from Humanity, freedom from everyone (including one's Black self). Given the reigning episteme, what are the chances of elaborating a comprehensive, much less translatable and communicable, political project out of the necessity of freedom as an absolute? Gratuitous freedom has never been a trajectory of Humanist thought, which is why the infinite trajectories of freedom that emanate from Humanism's hub are anything but infinite—for they have no line of flight leading to the Slave.
Wilderson 10 (Frank B. American writer, dramatist, filmmaker, critic and professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine Red White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms Duke University Press Durham & London 2010 page 10-11, cayla_)

Regarding the Black position, some might ask why, after claims successfully made on the state by the Civil Rights Movement, do I insist on positing an operational analytic for cinema, film studies, and political theory that appears to be a dichotomous and essentialist pairing of Masters and Slaves? In other words, why should we think of today's Blacks in the United States as Slaves and everyone else (with the exception of Indians) as Masters? One could answer these questions by demonstrating how nothing remotely approaching claims successfully made on the state has come to pass. In other words, the election of a Black president aside, police brutality, mass incarceration, segregated and substandard schools and housing, astronomical rates of HIV infection, and the threat of being turned away en masse at the polls still constitute the lived experience of Black life. But such empirically based rejoinders would lead us in the wrong direction; we would find ourselves on "solid" ground, which would only mystify, rather than clarify, the question. We would be forced to appeal to "facts," the "historical record," and empirical markers of stasis and change, all of which could be turned on their head with more of the same. Underlying such a downward spiral into sociology, political science, history, and public policy debates would be the very rubric that I am calling into question: the grammar of suffering known as exploitation and alienation, the assumptive logic whereby subjective dispossession is arrived at in the calculations between those who sell labor power and those who acquire it. The Black qua the worker. Orlando Patterson has already dispelled this faulty ontological grammar in Slavery and Social Death, where he demonstrates how and why work, or forced labor, is not a constituent element of slavery. Once the "solid" plank of "work" is removed from slavery, then the conceptually coherent notion of "claims against the state"—the proposition that the state and civil society are elastic enough to even contemplate the possibility of an emancipatory project for the Black position—disintegrates into thin air. The imaginary of the state and civil society is parasitic on the Middle Passage. Put another way, No slave, no world. And, in addition, as Patterson argues, no slave is in the world. If, as an ontological position, that is, as a grammar of suffering, the Slave is not a laborer but an anti-Human, a position against which Humanity establishes, maintains, and renews its coherence, its corporeal integrity; if the Slave is, to borrow from Patterson, generally dishonored, perpetually open to gratuitous violence, and void of kinship structure, that is, having no relations that need be recognized, a being outside of relationality, then our analysis cannot be approached through the rubric of gains or reversals in struggles with the state and civil society, not unless and until the interlocutor first explains how the Slave is of the world. The onus is not on one who posits the Master/Slave dichotomy but on the one who argues there is a distinction between Slaveness and Blackness. How, when, and where did such a split occur? The woman at the gates of Columbia University awaits an answer. In "The Black Boy Looks at the White Boy," James Baldwin wrote about "the terrible gap between [Norman Mailer's] life and my own." It is a painful essay in which Baldwin explains how he experienced, through beginning and ending his "friendship" with Mailer, those moments when Blackness inspires White emancipatory dreams and how it feels to suddenly realize the impossibility of the inverse: "The really

ghastly thing about trying to convey to a white man the reality of the Negro experience has nothing whatever to do with the fact of color, but has to do with this mans relationship to his own life. He will face in your life only what he is willing to face in his." His long Paris nights with Mailer bore fruit only to the extent that Mailer was able to say, "Me, too." Beyond that was the void which Baldwin carried with him into and, subsequently, out of the "friendship." Baldwins condemnation of discourses that utilize exploitation and alienations grammar of suffering is unflinching: "I am afraid that most of the white people I have ever known impressed me as being in the grip of a weird nostalgia, dreaming of a vanished state of security and order, against which dream, unfailingly and unconsciously, they tested and very often lost their lives."10 He is writing about the encounters between Blacks and Whites in Paris and New York in the 1950s, but he may as well be writing about the eighteenth-century encounters between Slaves and the rhetoric of new republics like revolutionary France and America.11
No conciliation is possible. Their methodology can’t access anti-Blackness: social movements use the language of the hegemon, ultimately accommodating civil society.
Wilderson 03 (Frank B. American writer, dramatist, filmmaker, critic and professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine “The Prison Slave as Hegemony’s (Silent) Scandal Social Justice, Vol. 30, No. 2 (92), War, Dissent, and Justice: A Dialogue, Social Justice/Global Options 2003 pp. 18-27 http://www.jstor.org/stable/29768181 , cayla_) There is something organic to black positionality that makes it essential to the destruction of civil society. There is nothing willful or speculative in this statement, for one could just as well state the claim the other way around: There is something organic to civil society that makes it essential to the destruction of the Black body. Blackness is a positionality of "absolute dereliction" (Fanon), abandonment, in the face of civil society, and therefore cannot establish itself, or be established, through hegemonic interventions. Blackness cannot become one of civil society's many junior partners: Black citizenship, or Black civic obligation, are oxymorons. In light of this, coalitions and social movements, even radical social movements like the Prison Abolition Movement, bound up in the solicitation of hegemony, so as to fortify and extend the interlocutory life of civil society, ultimately accommodate only the satiable demands and finite antagonisms of civil society's junior partners (i.e., immigrants, white women, and the working class), but foreclose upon the insatiable demands and endless antagonisms of the prison slave and the prison-slave-in-waiting. In short, whereas such coalitions and social movements cannot be called the outright handmaidens of white supremacy, their rhetorical structures and political desire are underwritten by a supplemental anti Blackness. In her autobiography, Assata Shakur's comments vacillate between being interesting and insightful to painfully programmatic and "responsible." The expository method of conveyance accounts for this air of responsibility. However, toward the end of

the book, she accounts for coalition work by way of extended narrative as opposed to exposition. We accompany her on one of Zayd Shakur's many Panther projects with outside groups, work "dealing with white support groups who were involved in raising bail for the Panther 21 members in jail" (Shakur, 1987: 224). With no more than three words, her recollection becomes matter of fact and unfiltered. She writes, "I hated it." At the time, i felt that anything below 110th street was another country. All my activities were centered in Harlem and i almost never left it. Doing defense committee work was definitely not up my alley.... i hated standing around while all these white people asked me to explain myself, my existence, i became a master of the one-liner (Shakur, 1987: 224). Her hatred of this work is bound up in her anticipation, fully realized, of all the zonal violations to come when a white woman asks her if Zayd is her "panther.. .you know, is he your black cat?" and then runs her fingers through Assata's hair to cop a kinky feel. Her narrative anticipates these violations-to-come at the level of the street, as well as at the level of the body. Here is the moment in her life as a prison-slave-in waiting, which is to say, a moment as an ordinary Black person, when she finds herself among "friends" abolitionists, at least partners in purpose, and yet she feels it necessary to adopt the same muscular constriction, the same coiled anticipation, the same combative "one-liners" that she will need to adopt just one year later to steel herself against the encroachment of prison guards. The verisimilitude between Assata's well known police encounters, and her experiences in civil society's most nurturing nook, the radical coalition, raises disturbing questions about political desire, Black positionality, and hegemony as a modality of struggle. In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon makes two moves with respect to civil society. First, he locates its genuine manifestation in Europe, the motherland. Then, with respect to the colony, he locates it only in the zone of the settler. This second move is vital for our understanding of Black positionality in America and for understanding the, at best, limitations of radical social movements in America. For if we are to follow Fanon's analysis, and the gestures toward this understanding in some of the work of imprisoned intellectuals, then we have to come to grips with the fact that, for Black people, civil society itself, rather than its abuses or shortcomings, is a state of emergency. For Fanon, civil society is predicated on the Manicheasm of divided zones, opposed to each other "but not in service of a higher unity" (Fanon, 1968:38-39). This is the basis of his later assertion that the two zones produce two different "species," between which "no conciliation is possible" {Ibid.). The phrase "not in service of a higher unity" dismisses any kind of dialectical optimism for a future synthesis. In "The Avant-Garde of White Supremacy," Martinot and Sexton assert the primacy of Fanon's Manichean zones (without the promise of higher unity), even in the face of American integration facticity. Fanon's specific colonial context does not share Martinot and Sexton's historical or national context. Common to both texts, however, is the settler/native dynamic, the differential zoning, and the gratuity (as opposed to the contingency) of violence that accrues to the blackened position. The dichotomy between white ethics [the discourse of civil society] and its irrelevance to the

violence of police profiling is not dialectical; the two are incommensurable whenever one attempts to speak about the paradigm of policing, one is forced back into a discussion of particular events ? high-profile homicides and their related courtroom battles, for in? stance (Martinot and Sexton, 2002: 6; emphasis added). It makes no difference that in the U.S. the "casbah" and the "European" zone are laid one on top of the other. What is being asserted here is an isomorphic schematic relation, the schematic interchangeability, between Fanon's settler society and Martinot and Sexton's policing paradigm. For Fanon, it is the policeman and soldier (not the discursive, or hegemonic, agents) of colonialism that make one town white and the other Black. For Martinot and Sexton, this Manichean delirium manifests itself by way of the U.S. paradigm of policing that (re)produces, repetitively, the inside/outside, the civil society/Black world, by virtue of the difference between those bodies that do not magnetize bullets and those that do. "Police impunity serves to distinguish between the racial itself and the elsewhere that mandates it...the distinction between those whose human being is put permanently in question and those for whom it goes without saying" (Ibid.: 8). In such a paradigm, white people are, ipso facto, deputized in the face of Black people, whether they know it (consciously) or not. Whiteness, then, and by extension civil society, cannot be solely "represented" as some monumentalized coherence of phallic signifiers, but must first be understood as a social formation of contemporaries who do not magnetize bullets. This is the essence of their construction through a signifying absence; their signifying presence is manifested by the fact that they are, if only by default, deputized against those who do magnetize bullets. In short, white people are not simply "protected" by the police, they are, in their very corporeality, the police. This ipso facto deputization of white people in the face of Black people accounts for Fanon's materiality, and Martinot and Sexton's Manichean delirium in America. What remains to be addressed, however, is the way in which the political contestation between civil society's junior partners (i.e., workers, white women, and immigrants), on the one hand, and white supremacist institutionality, on the other hand, is produced by, and reproductive of, a supplemental anti Blackness. Put another way: How is the production and accumulation of junior partner social capital dependent upon on an anti-Black rhetorical structure and a decomposed Black body? Any serious musing on the question of antagonistic identity formation a formation, the mass mobilization of which can precipitate a crisis in the institutions and assumptive logic that undergird the United State of America must come to grips with the contradictions between the political demands of radical social movements, such as the large prison abolition movement, which seeks to abolish the prison-industrial complex, and the ideological structure that under writes its political desire. I contend that the positionality of Black subjectivity is at the heart of those contradictions and that this unspoken desire is bound up with the political limitations of several naturalized and uncritically accepted categories that have their genesis mainly in the works of Antonio Gramsci, namely, work or labor, the wage, exploitation, hegemony, and civil society. I wish to theorize the symptoms of rage and resignation I hear in the words of George Jackson, when he boils reform down to a single word, "fascism," or in

Assata's brief declaration, "i hated it," as well as in the Manichean delirium of Fanon, Martinot, and Sexton. Today, the failure of radical social movements to embrace symptoms of all three gestures is tantamount to the reproduction of an anti-Black politics that nonetheless represents itself as being in the service of the emancipation of the Black prison slave. By examining the strategy and structure of the Black subject's absence in, and incommensurability with, the key categories of Gramscian theory, we come face to face with three unsettling consequences: (1) The Black American subject imposes a radical incoherence upon the assumptive logic of Gramscian discourse and on today's coalition politics. In other words, s/he implies a scandal. (2) The Black subject reveals the inability of social movements grounded in Gramscian discourse to think of white supremacy (rather than capitalism) as the base and thereby calls into question their claim to elaborate a comprehensive and decisive antagonism. Stated another way, Gramscian discourse and coalition politics are indeed able to imagine the subject that transforms itself into a mass of antagonistic identity formations, formations that can precipitate a crisis in wage slavery, exploitation, and hegemony, but they are asleep at the wheel when asked to provide enabling antagonisms toward unwaged slavery, despotism, and terror. (3) We begin to see how Marxism suffers from a kind of conceptual anxiety. There is a desire for socialism on the other side of crisis, a society that does away not with the category of worker, but with the imposition workers suffer under the approach of variable capital. In other words, the mark of its conceptual anxiety is in its desire to democratize work and thus help to keep in place and insure the coherence of Reformation and Enlightenment foundational values of productivity and progress. This scenario crowds out other postrevolutionary possibilities, i.e., idleness. The scandal, with which the Black subject position "threatens" Gramscian and coalition discourse, is manifest in the Black subject's incommensurability with, or disarticulation of, Gramscian categories: work, progress, production, exploitation, hegemony, and historical self-awareness. Through what strategies does the Black subject destabilize emerge as the unthought, and thus the scandal of, historical materialism, How does the Black subject function within the "American desiring machine" differently than the quintessential Gramscian subaltern, the worker?
Voting for the alternative is an act of burning down the civil society that produces violence against the slave. Their calls for freedom will never leave the plantations and colorlines of society. We must reject their call for equality to abandon the white-over-black system.
Farley 05 (Anthony P. specialist in Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure and Legal Theory and a tenured member of the Boston College Law School faculty “Perfecting Slavery” Boston College Law School Faculty Papers 1-27-2005, http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=lsfp , cayla_)

What is to be done? Two hundred years ago, when the slaves in Haiti rose up, they, of necessity, burned everything: They burned San Domingo flat so that at the end of the war it was a charred desert. Why do you burn everything? asked a French officer of a prisoner. We have a right to burn what we cultivate because a man has a right to dispose of his own labour, was the reply of this unknown anarchist.48 The slaves burned everything because everything was against them. Everything was against the slaves, the entire order that it was their lot to follow, the entire order in which they were positioned as worse than senseless things, every plantation, everything.49 “Leave nothing white behind you,” said Toussaint to those dedicated to the end of white-overblack.50 “God gave Noah the rainbow sign. No more water, the fire next time.”51 The slaves burned everything, yes, but, unfortunately, they only burned everything in Haiti.52 Theirs was the greatest and most successful revolution in the history of the world but the failure of their fire to cross the waters was the great tragedy of the nineteenth century.53 At the dawn of the twentieth century, W.E.B. Du Bois wrote, “The colorline belts the world.”54 Du Bois said that the problem of the twentieth century was the problem of the colorline.55 The problem, now, at the dawn of the twenty-first century is the problem of the colorline. The colorline continues to belt the world. Indeed, the slave power that is the United States now threatens an entire world with the death that it has become and so the slaves of yesterday, today, and tomorrow, those with nothing but their chains to lose, must, if they would be free, if they would escape slavery, win the entire world. We begin as children. We are called and we become our response to the call. Slaves are not called. What becomes of them? What becomes of the broken-hearted? The slaves are divided souls, they are brokenhearted, the slaves are split asunder by what they are called upon to become. The slaves are called upon to become objects but objecthood is not a calling. The slave, then, during its loneliest loneliness, is divided from itself. This is schizophrenia. The slaves are not called, or, rather, the slaves are called to not be. The slaves are called unfree but this the living can never be and so the slaves burst apart and die. The slaves begin as death, not as children, and death is not a beginning but an end. There is no progress and no exit from the undiscovered country of the slave, or so it seems. We are trained to think through a progress narrative, a grand narrative, the grandest narrative, that takes us up from slavery. There is no up from slavery. The progress from slavery to the end of history is the progress from white-over-black to white-over-black to white-over-black. The progress of slavery runs in the opposite direction of the past-present-future timeline. The slave only becomes the perfect slave at the end of the timeline, only under conditions of total juridical freedom. It is only under conditions of freedom, of bourgeois legality, that the slave can perfect itself as a slave by freely choosing to bow down before its master. The slave perfects itself as a slave by offering a prayer for equal rights. The system of marks is a plantation. The system of property is a plantation. The system of law is a plantation. These plantations, all part of the same system, hierarchy, produce white-overblack, white-over-black only, and that continually. The slave perfects itself as a slave through its prayers for equal rights. The plantation system will not commit suicide and the slave, as stated above, has knowing

non-knowledge of this fact. The slave finds its way back from the undiscovered country only by burning down every plantation. When the slave prays for equal rights it makes the free choice to be dead, and it makes the free choice to not be. Education is the call. We are called to be and then we become something. We become that which we make of ourselves. We follow the call, we pursue a calling. Freedom is the only calling—it alone contains all possible directions, all of the choices that may later blossom into the fullness of our lives. We can only be free. Slavery is death. How do slaves die? Slaves are not born, they are made. The slave must be trained to be that which the living cannot be. The only thing that the living are not free to be is dead. The slave must be trained to follow the call that is not a call. The slave must be trained to pursue the calling that is not a calling. The slave must be trained to objecthood. The slave must become death. Slavery is white-over-black. White-over-black is death. White-over-black, death, then, is what the slave must become to pursue its calling that is not a calling. We can be trained in many things. White-over-black requires training. It is with education that we begin. Judge Waring of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina, Charleston Division, penned an instructive dissenting opinion in which he referred to expert witness testimony regarding training and whiteover-black and training in white-over-black: These witnesses testified as to their study and researches and their actual tests with children of varying ages and showed that the humiliation and disgrace of being set aside and segregated as unfit to associate with others of a different color had an evil and ineradicable effect upon the mental processes of our young which would remain with them and deform their view of life until and throughout their maturity . . . And from their testimony as well as from common experience and knowledge and from our own reasoning, we must unavoidably come to the conclusion that racial prejudice is something that is acquired and that acquiring is in early childhood.56 The case, Briggs v. Elliot, was one of four cases consolidated and decided by the United States Supreme Court under the heading Brown v. Board of Education. 57 Judge Waring, over half a century ago, asked and answered a question that vexes us still: When do we get our first ideas of religion, nationality and other basic ideologies? The vast number of individuals follow religious and political groups because of their childhood training. . . . Let the little child’s mind be poisoned by prejudice of this kind and it is practically impossible to ever remove these impressions however many years he may have of teaching by philosophers, religious leaders or patriotic citizens.58 We can be trained in many things, even death, or so it seems. We can be trained because we have a capacity for pleasure, because we have a faculty of desire, because we can imagine our pleasures and orient ourselves by our desires in ways that close the gaps, resolve the conflicts, and clarify the ambiguities of life. The slave can be trained in its calling that is not a calling. The slave becomes a slave when it chooses to pursue its calling that is not a calling.

Wilderson 11 (Frank B., American writer, dramatist, filmmaker, critic and professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine “The Vengeance of Vertigo: Aphasia and Abjection in the Political Trials of Black Insurgents” [De]Fatalizing the Object and Creating Radica Alternatives Issue 5.0 2011, cayla_) The guerilla war that the Black Liberation Army waged against the United States in the late 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s was part of a multifaceted struggle to redress Black dispossession which has been waged since the first Africans landed in the “New” World. ii But the political trials of BLA soldiers marked an unprecedented moment in the history of that struggle; a moment when it became de rigueur for revolutionaries to refuse the role of defendant and assume (while still in custody and often handcuffed) the role of prosecutor and judge—with the public gallery as jury. This shift comprised an unparalleled inversion of jurisprudential casting in which the court itself (and by extension the U.S. government) became defendants. Assata Shakur recalls how brothers and sisters came to her trial every day to “watch the circus.” Her narrative paints a vibrant picture of an intra-mural conversation between Black folks from all walks of life, for whom the court and the trials functioned much like backwoods churches did during slavery. A courtroom of people who joined the defendants in their refusal to rise when the judge came in; folks giving each other the Black Power salute in full view of the U.S. Marshals; Black Muslim men and women spreading their prayer rugs in the corridors of the court and praying to Allah; Black parents explaining the underlying racism of the American legal system to their children. As the judge entered the courtroom, one such well-educated child looked up and said, “Mommy, is that the fascist pig?” to the laughter and applause of the gallery (Assata 212). [2] With only small arms and crude explosives at their disposal, with little of nothing in the way of logistical support,iii with no liberated zone to claim or reclaim, and with no more than a vague knowledge that there were a few hundred other insurgents scattered throughout the U.S. operating in largely uncoordinated and decentralized units,iv the BLA launched 66 operations against the largest police state in the world. Vertigo must have seized them each time they clashed with agents of a nuclear-weapons regime with three million troops in uniform, a regime that could put 150,000 new police on the streets in any given year, and whose ordinary White citizens frequently deputize themselves in the name of law and order. Subjective vertigo, no doubt: a dizzying sense that one is moving or spinning in an otherwise stationary world, a vertigo brought on by a clash of grossly asymmetrical forces. There are suitable analogies, for this kind of vertigo must have also seized Native Americans who launched the AIM’s occupation of Wounded Knee, and FALN insurgents who battled the FBI. [3] Subjective vertigo is vertigo of the event. But the sensation that one is not simply spinning in an otherwise stable environment, that one’s environment is perpetually unhinged stems from a relationship to violence that cannot be analogized.

This is called objective vertigo, a life constituted by disorientation rather than a life interrupted by disorientation. This is structural as opposed to performative violence. Black subjectivity is a crossroads where vertigoes meet, the intersection of performative and structural violence. [4] Elsewhere I have argued that the Black is a sentient being though not a Human being. The Black’s and the Human’s disparate relationship to violence is at the heart of this failure of incorporation and analogy. The Human suffers contingent violence, violence that kicks in when s/he resists (or is perceived to resist) the disciplinary discourse of capital and/or Oedipus. But Black peoples’ subsumption by violence is a paradigmatic necessity, not just a performative contingency. To be constituted by and disciplined by violence, to be gripped simultaneously by subjective and objective vertigo, is indicative of a political ontology which is radically different from the political ontology of a sentient being who is constituted by discourse and disciplined by violence when s/he breaks with the ruling discursive codes.vi When we begin to assess revolutionary armed struggle in this comparative context, we find that Human revolutionaries (workers, women, gays and lesbians, post-colonial subjects) suffer subjective vertigo when they meet the state’s disciplinary violence with the revolutionary violence of the subaltern; but they are spared objective vertigo. This is because the most disorienting aspects of their lives are induced by the struggles that arise from intra-Human conflicts over competing conceptual frameworks and disputed cognitive maps, such as the American Indian Movement’s demand for the return of Turtle Island vs. the U.S.’s desire to maintain territorial integrity, or the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional’s (FALN) demand for Puerto Rican independence vs. the U.S.’s desire to maintain Puerto Rico as a territory. But for the Black, as for the slave, there are no cognitive maps, no conceptual frameworks of suffering and dispossession which are analogic with the myriad maps and frameworks which explain the dispossession of Human subalterns. [5] The structural, or paradigmatic, violence that subsumes Black insurgents’ cognitive maps and conceptual frameworks, subsumes my scholarly efforts as well. As a Black scholar, I am tasked with making sense of this violence without being overwhelmed and disoriented by it. In other words, the writing must somehow be indexical of that which exceeds narration, while being ever mindful of the incomprehension the writing would foster, the failure, that is, of interpretation were the indices to actually escape the narrative. The stakes of this dilemma are almost as high for the Black scholar facing his/her reader as they are for the Black insurgent facing the police and the courts. For the scholarly act of embracing members of the Black Liberation Army as beings worthy of empathic critique is terrifying. One’s writing proceeds with fits and starts which have little to do with the problems of building the thesis or finding the methodology to make the case. As I write, I am more aware of the rage and anger of my reader-ideal (an angry mob as readers) than I am of my own interventions and strategies for assembling my argument. Vertigo seizes me with a rash of condemnations that emanate from within me and swirl around me. I am speaking to me but not through me, yet there seems to be no other way to speak. I am speaking through the voice and gaze of a mob of, let’s just say it, White Americans; and my efforts

to marshal a mob of Black people, to conjure the Black Liberation Army smack of compensatory gestures. It is not that the BLA doesn’t come to my aid, that they don’t push back, but neither I nor my insurgent allies can make the case that we are worthy of our suffering and justified in our actions and not terrorists and apologists for terror who should be locked away forever. How can we be worthy of our suffering without being worthy of ourselves? I press on, even though the vertigo that seizes me is so overwhelming that its precise nature—subjective, stemming from within me, or objective, catalyzed by my context, the raging throng—cannot be determined. I have no reference points apart from the mob that gives no quarter. If I write “freedom fighter,” from within my ear they scream “terrorist”! If I say “prisoner of war,” they chant “cop killer”! Their denunciations are sustained only by assertion, but they ring truer than my painstaking exegesis. No firewall protects me from them; no liberated psychic zone offers me sanctuary. I want to stop and turn myself in.

Davis Professor of Economic Innovation at Trinity College (Dec. 31, Edward P., Anarchy and the Law, http://fullchan4jtta4sx.onion.city/ancap/src/1428172519929.pdf)//DWB -
The state has worked for years attempting to indoctrinate people of the necessity
¶
of government law enforcement
. The chapters in this volume suggest that
this
¶
government wisdom is wrong.
Just because monopolization of law was a convenient way ¶ for government to enhance revenue and exert control
does not mean that government law
¶
is necessary.
The articles in this volume are important from two perspectives. From an ¶ academic perspective they show that
anarchism might be a useful lens to help us analyze
¶
the world
. Do people only cooperate because of the threat of government law? Perhaps ¶ the answer is no. By taking a more realistic perspective, the
anarchists have the potential
¶
to shed light on many situations that others cannot explain.
The articles in this book, ¶ especially in the case study section, represent the tip of the iceberg of possible articles ¶ about anarchy. Like the farmers and ranchers in Shasta County,
self-governance is all
¶
around us
, and this presents a tremendous opportunity for academic research.
¶ From a normative perspective
private-property anarchism may be important for
¶
promoting liberty in both the short and long run
. For those interested in marginal change ¶ in the short run,
private-property anarchism has practical policy implications today.
For ¶ example, should individuals be able to opt for arbitration (if all parties agree), or should ¶ government regulate and overturn arbitration decisions as it does today? Likewise, should ¶ landowners be allowed to create gated communities with private security, or should ¶ government make their streets open to the public and patrol them with government ¶ police? Private-property anarchism sheds light in on these issues.
¶
Private-property anarchism is also important for the long-run prospects for liberty
.
¶ Markets have been a blessing wherever they have been implemented and
government has
¶
been a calamity wherever it has been implemented
. Instead of advocating a system that ¶ we know does not work, why not advocate a system that might?
Limited government
¶
appears to be inherently unstable and anarchism might offer the libertarian the only
¶
alternative
. In the past 250 years the world has successfully thrown off the yoke of ¶ monarchism and in the past twenty-five years the world has successfully thrown off the ¶ yoke of communism.
Why not continue and throw off the bonds of all government?

Lininger 04-
defense attorney and a graduate of Kent State University with a BA in Political Science and graduated from the University of the Pacific's McGeorge School of Law (Tom Lininger “Sects, Lies, and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious Groups” http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ilr89&div=34&g_sent=1&collection=journals#1216 , p.1204) Predictably,
mosques have occupied most of the F.B.I.'s attention since Ashcroft eased the restrictions on investigations of religious organizations
. In January 2003,
branch offices to count the number of mosques within their jurisdictional boundaries.
F.B.I
7 An Iowa Law Review). . Director Robert Mueller
ordered all fifty-six of the F.B.I.'s F.B.I. spokesman initially told Congress that
General made these remarks at a press conference on May 30, 2002, and the Department ofJustice has posted a copy of the Attorney General's statement on its Web site. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Remarks at Press Conference Announcing the Adoption of New Investigative Guidelines (May 30, 2002) [hereinafter Ashcroft Press Conference], http:// www.fas.org/irp/news/2002/05/ag053002.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) (on file with the
this inventory of mosques was
useful as 4. The Attorney
a starting point for proactive investigations of potential terrorists
.8
After civil libertarians raised concerns about the burdens on religious freedom, the F.B.I. offered an entirely different rationale, claiming in public statements that mosque counting was necessary to protect Muslims from hate crimes
.9 This explanation did not put the critics at ease. When Mueller attended the A.C.L.U.'s annual conference in June 2003 to answer questions about investigations of mosques and other subjects, he drew strident rebukes-although he also drew laughter when he joked that "I think you really do owe me" for the recent increase in the A.C.L.U.'s membership.