Type of Review: Project Completion Report
Project Title: Transition Assistance for the Local Integration in
Tanzania of the Newly Naturalised Tanzanians from the Old
Settlements
Date started:15 December 2009 Date ended: 30 April 2012
Instructions to help complete this template:
Before commencing the review you should have to hand:
 the Business Case or earlier project documentation.
 the Logframe
 the detailed guidance (How to Note) - Reviewing and Scoring Projects,
 the most recent annual review and other related monitoring reports.
 key data from ARIES, including the risk rating
 the separate project scoring calculation sheet (pending access to ARIES)
Two scores are produced at project completion - one based on achievement of the outputs and
one based on achievement of the outcome. You should assess and rate both the individual
outputs and the overall outcome using the following rating scale and description:
Output Description
Outputs substantially exceeded expectation
Outputs moderately exceeded expectation
Outputs met expectation
Outputs moderately did not meet expectation
Outputs substantially did not meet expectation
Scale
A++
A+
A
B
C
Outcome Description
Outcome substantially exceeded expectation
Outcome moderately exceeded expectation
Outcome met expectation
Outcome moderately did not meet expectation
Outcome substantially did not meet
expectation
Introduction and Context
What support did the UK provide?
DFID provided £3,750,000 to support the transition assistance for the local Integration in
Tanzania of the some 12,300 families/61,500 persons of the Newly Naturalised Tanzanians
(NNTs) living in the Old Settlements (OS) hosting former Burundian Refugees from the 1972
caseload, to end Africa’s most protracted refugee situation. The support was to cover costs for
transport from the settlements in Tabora and Rukwa regions to different destinations in the
country, construction materials and other immediate needs like food as they start new lives. All
165,000 Burundian Refugees from the 1972 caseload in 3 refugees “Old Settlements” of
Katumba, Mishamo and Ulyankulu applied for naturalisation and were granted citizenship. The
rest who did not were assisted to repatriate voluntarily by UNHCR.
What were the expected results?
The expected results were that the group targeted by this funding (12,300 families, some
61,500 individuals) who are newly-naturalised, would receive and use their transition grants to
move out of the Old Settlements and live and make new lives in their new homes
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What was the context in which UK support was provided?
The internal conflict in Burundi in 1972 drove thousands of people out of the country. A great
majority of them fled into Tanzania and were hosted in the agrarian settlements of Ulyankulu
(Tabora region), Katumba and Mishamo (Rukwa region); commonly known as Tanzania’s ‘Old
Settlements’. The international community support to the 1972 Burundian refugees came to
an end in 1985 when the settlements were handed over to the Government of Tanzania. Since
then the refugees have been self-supporting.
In 2007, the GoT decided to resolve this situation and to offer naturalisation for those who
opted to stay in Tanzania. At this time there were 222,000 refugees divided equally between
female and male in the Old Settlements. The Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy
was then developed with three principal components: (i) voluntary repatriation to Burundi for
those who wish to return (53,000 people opted to go back), (ii) naturalisation of refugees who
have expressed a desire to remain in Tanzania (165, 000 refugees-about 32,000 families) and
(iii) local integration support for those granted citizenship.
UNHCR launched a special appeal in February 2008 to raise funds for the initial two years of
the programme. By March 2008, the first repatriation convoy was sent off by the High
Commissioner for refugees from Katumba settlements. However, during 2008, changes in the
Tanzanian political situation had implications for naturalisation and local integration activities,
which increased the time and cost for each. The GoT wished to have the process of
naturalisation and integration fast tracked. Other changes related to a change of intention of
nine thousand refugees from naturalisation to voluntary repatriation and unforeseen increases
in fuel, truck and rail transport charges had a significant implication on the overall budget. As a
result, the 2009 Supplementary Programme Budget was revised up from USD $ 12.7 million to
USD 22.2 million. Other development partners who are supported the UNHCR 2009
supplementary programme covering both Tanzania and Burundi is as shown below:
Total revised Appeal budget Tanzania 2009 in
USD
Carry over 2008
EC regional protection programme
United States of America
ECHO
EC- European Development Fund (2nd part)
Japan
Belgium
Germany
Ireland
Total received
Funding gap
22, 237,108
2, 595, 361
2,861230
2, 840,000
2, 414, 698
1, 589, 572
1, 000,000
1,406, 470
2, 054, 852
351, 617
16, 113, 800
6, 123, 308
This resulted in a funding gap of USD $6,123,308 million of which UNHCR requested DFID to
support. DFID support would address the local integration needs of the 12,300 out of 32,000
families who will be naturalised- representing 40% of the naturalised citizens. The funding was
to be allocated as follows:
Local integration
12,300 families/61,500 people
Sector
Transition Assistance (cash
grant)
2
USD
4,612, 500
Supporting activities of
UNHCR(such as establishment
of relocation centres, mass
information campaign)
Programme support and
delivery
967, 500
Indirect costs: HQ support 7%
420,000
6,000,000
Total
It was expected that some 32,000 newly naturalized Tanzanian families will move out of the
settlements over a period of two years. These individuals will be the primary beneficiaries of
the final local integration programme. A similar number of the natural Tanzanian families in the
hosting communities in the areas final destinations shall also benefit from a set of targeted
interventions.
By July 2010 however, a number of very significant national administrative and political
changes had significantly altered the operating environment. These changes included the
establishment of a Local Integration unit in PMORALG (Prime Minister’s Office, Regional
Administrative and Local Government), November 2010 elections and the formulation of the
National Strategy for Community Integration Programme (NaSCIP). PMORALGin collaboration
with the Ministry of Home Affairs was assigned to oversee, facilitate and coordinate the
movement of NNTs to the designated regions. These changes and consultations resulted in
an unavoidable low implementation rate. Following UNHCR’s request, DFID in a letter dated
10 January 2011 extended the implementation timeline to 30 April 2011 including a revision in
the number of beneficiaries from 61,500 to 33,000 due to an increase in the cash grant per
person. The cash grant increment was a result of further discussions with PMORALG.
In mid-2011 the Local Integration (LI) operation was officially put on hold by the Government
of Tanzania pending further consultations and final decision on mode of implementation and
legal status to be accorded to the former refugees. Due to the continued delay in government
approval of commencement of the operation, DFID granted UNHCR another extension to 30
December 2012 approved on 28 September 2011.
The UNHCR summary expenditures to date vis-a-vis the total funds received from DFID are as
follows;
Local
integration
12,300
families/61,500
people
Supporting
activities of
UNHCR (such as
establishment of
relocation
centres, mass
information
campaign)
Total
Sector
Transition
Assistance (cash
grant)
Programme
support and
delivery
Planned
USD
Actual
Variance
4,612, 500
75,606
98%
967, 500
967, 500
0%
420,000
0%
Indirect costs: HQ 420,000
support 7%
6,000,000
3
1,463,106
The local integration programme remains on hold.. The previous high-level decision to
naturalise and disperse the 1972 contingent has, de facto, been reversed as a result of a
domestic political considerations. As a result, it looks extremely unlikely that there will be any
relocation out of the Old Settlements and therefore the cash grants allocated to the 33,000
beneficiaries will not be required. Even if naturalisation is not formally reversed, it is likely that
the remaining contingent will be allowed to stay in their current locations.
DFID had, with UNHCR, been monitoring closely the changes in the operating environment.
Maintaining a funding allocation for the proposed naturalisation/relocation was important to
evidence the international commitment to the process sought by GoT and to address
legitimate GoT concerns about the funding the process. With the change in GoT policy, and
with the aim of applying resources in a timely and most efficient way, DFID then engaged the
UN system in discussions about how the resources could be returned or reallocated.
UNHCR has submitted a proposal requesting DFID to consider a re-allocation of the cash
grant balance of USD 4,536,894 to other associated refugee support programmes. , DFID has
decided to close this project and relocate the balance of the programme funds to other
humanitarian needs in Tanzania. The new UNHCR’s reallocated support will run under a
different project until 30th April 2013.
Section A: Detailed Output Scoring
Output 1: Newly naturalised Tanzanians are financially supported to move away from the Old
Settlements
Output 1: final score and performance description: C
In later 2010/early 2011, it became clear that no newly naturalised citizens would be able to
move out of the settlement by the end of the project date. This followed the government
decision to postpone the local integration process until further notice. The issuance of the
remaining 161,200 citizen certificates was also put on hold and it is unclear when the process
will be completed, if at all. Cash grants allocated to some 33,000 beneficiaries are no longer
likely as informal indications from the Government of Tanzania are that, in any event the newly
naturalised Tanzanians (NNTs) will be allowed to stay in their current location in the Old
Settlements.
Final results:
The first notifications to the naturalised Tanzanians were officially posted in April 2010 by the
MHA and UNHCR High Commissioner. 162,256 persons were naturalised and were
commonly referred to as Newly Naturalised Tanzanians (NNTs). Citizenship certificate
issuance started on a small scale in Da es Salaam with a ceremony at the Ministry of Home
Affairs (Citizenship Processing Unit)/ Centre for the Study of Forced Migration (CSFM)
Certificate Issuance Centre. To date only 749 individuals living in Dar es Salaam region
received their certificates of which 704 turned-up for cash grants prior to the government’s
‘temporary’ hold on the LI programme.
Indicator
Number of newlynaturalised
Tanzanians in
possession of
Baseline
Baseline:no-one with
transition grant
Actual Progress
Only 770 certificates and
transition grants have been
issued to Newly Naturalised
Tanzanians (NNTs) as of
Target:All of the group
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Score
C
“transition grants”
amounting to
TShs 100,000
(USD 75)
targeted by this funding
(12,300 families, some
61,500 individuals) have
received and used their
transition grants to move out
of the Old Settlements
today, all of whom are based
in Dar es Salaam.
Other newly naturalised
citizens have not received
their cash grants or moved out
of the settlements.
The government instructed
UNHCR to delay moving
people out of the settlement
until after the 2010 general
elections. Until now, no new
instructions have been issued.
Impact Weighting (%): 100%
Revised since last Annual Review? N
Risk: High
Revised since last Annual Review? N
Considerations for future support:
UNHCR has approached DFID for reallocation of £2,023,448.38 remaining unutilised balance
to support the voluntary repatriation of the 1993 Burundian refugees in Mtabila camp in 2012.
If the project involved more than 4 Outputs please copy the box above and paste below.
Section B: Results and Value for Money.
1. Achievement and Results
1.1 Has the logframe been changed since the last review? N
The log frame was not changed as the Government of Tanzania did not formally abandon its
agreed position of naturalising the 1972 refugees’ caseload and relocating them from the Old
Settlements. Logframe assumptions therefore did not formally change. Further DFID
discussed and reviewed this matter with UNHCR and decided that since the Government of
Tanzania had not changed its position and has indicated lack of money as one of the
impediments for relocation, the risk of removing the relocation cash grants from UNHCR,
thereby potentially seemingly undermining the process, was high. A no-cost extension was
therefore agreed allowing additional time for the GoT policy position to be clarified. It was not
unreasonable to assume that the Government of Tanzania would maintain its original highlevel decision to naturalise and relocate the 1972 Burundian refugees. In recent months
though the de facto position has been increasingly evidence, requiring DFID and UNHCR to
take more definitive action regarding the programme.
1.2 Final Output score and description: C
Only 770 citizenship certificates were provided against a target of 61,500. Although the
programmes’ ultimate aim of bringing to and end the Africa’s most protracted refugee situation
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may well be solved in part by programmatic decision to allow the group to remain in situ. The
logframe indicator of “number of newly-naturalised citizens who have moved away from the
Old Settlements and are recorded as settled on land at multiple destinations across Tanzania”
was not met.
1.3 Direct feedback from beneficiaries
Direct feedback was secured through various meetings between NNTs, UNHCR and Ministry
of Home Affairs. UNHCR worked closely with the ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Regional
Administration and Local Governments, Prime Minister's office and NGO partners in
developing the strategy for naturalisation and smooth integration of the newly naturalised
citizens
1.4 Overall Outcome score and description: C
The government who is the main partner in this programme has pursued alternative policies
that have changed the dates and numbers of refugees who were initially to receive DFID cash
grant. This has subsequently affected the use of funds.
1.5 Impact and Sustainability
Impact
The overall purpose of the project was geared towards “normalising the migration situation
and reducing refugees’ caseload in Tanzania and thus accelerate the East African regional
integration as it will allow for properly regulated movement in the region- which is an essential
milestone for the EAC. In order for the integrated labour market to work, it will be necessary to
reduce concerns about the status of asylum seekers.
Sustainability
The problem of 1972 refugees’ caseload has been solved in part although the formal legal
status is clear and the Government of Tanzania have suggested that naturalisation may be
translated into another, yet to be defined category of residence. A total of 162,000 have been
naturalised although only 770 have their certificates. They do not require additional
humanitarian assistance as they pursue self-sustaining livelihoods
.
2. Costs and timescale
2.1 Was the project completed within budget / expected costs: N
The programme has been brought to an end well within the budget. Although the cash transfer
to NNTs which formed major component of the support was not done, the administrative and
programme support costs were reasonably spent. UNHCR has requested DFID to relocate
some of this fund for use for voluntary repatriation of the Burundian refugees and the
remaining amount has been passed on to WFP following a request to support Protracted
Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) for Assistance to Refugees in Camps in NorthWestern Tanzania
2.2 Key cost drivers
The key cost drivers included Cash Grant (to the small group that already received citizenship
certificates); Programme support /delivery (establishment of POMRALG LI Unit, LI Support
Officers, MHA citizenship certificates, implementing partner support) and Headquarters’
overhead cost (7% of total amount)
2.3 Was the project completed within the expected timescale: N
Two no cost extensions were requested and provided. These were due to circumstances
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beyond the control of DFID and UNHCR – see above.
Some of the main reasons for delayed project implementation were:
- The Tanzania’s 2010 General elections
- Domestic politicians questioning the procedures followed in the naturalisation process
particularly with respect to whether Parliament was duly consulted.
- Land allocation issue in the regions/districts where the NNTs are to be relocated to
remained a challenge. Some of the regions/districts resisted supposed to receive the
NNTs on the grounds that they did not have sufficient land in their regions/districts.
3. Evidence and Evaluation
3.1 Assess any changes in evidence and what this meant for the project.
3.2 Set out what plans are in place for an evaluation.
An independent final evaluation was planned but could not be carried out because the actual
cash transfer and resettlement did not happen. However, Annual Reviews were carried out in
2010 and half year Progress reports were submitted to DFID by UNHCR. A team of DFID staff
comprised of Social Policy Advisor and Governance Team Leader visited the project site
ahead of the extensions. All key stakeholders were consulted during the process.
4. Risk
4.1 Risk Rating (overall project risk): Low
Did the Risk Rating change over the life of the project?
No
4.2 Risk funds not used for purposes intended
The balance of funds have been re-allocated (DFID reclaimed the money and reapplied it for
other pressing humanitarian need;i.e., £2,023,448.38 for voluntary repatriation of the 1993
Burundian refugees in Mtabila camp in 2012; and the other £ 848,001.62 for amending the
broken food pipeline for feeding refugees from Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) in Nyarugusu and Mtabila Camps.
4.3 Climate and Environment Impact
There was no direct environmental impact and specific risk anticipated as a result of DFID’s
support to the relocation of NNTs. The movements were to be as natural and organic as
possible.
5. Value for Money
5.1 Performance on VfM measures
This programme responded to a chronic rather than acute issue whose basic economic case
is simple to describe. The core of the project was a cash transfer which would “pays for itself”
in terms of costs and benefits, i.e. a transfer to people who are poorer than average and below
the poverty line (72% are below the international poverty line in Tanzania). Support to
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normalising the migration situation and reducing refugees’ caseload was also seen to be
important for East African regional integration as it would allow for properly regulated
movement in the region- which is an essential milestone for the EAC.
Because of the need to end the programme because of external reasons, it is not possible to
conclude that the programme has delivered VfM. The theoretical benefits of bulk cash
transfers were not achieved. In practice only a small proportion were actually delivered and
there is no evidence on the benefits yielded from those delivered. The argument that cash
transfers to poor people are good VfM therefore is not sufficiently justified.
There is also no firm evidence that the 7% administrative cost that UNHCR charged achieved
value for money. This is primarily because UNHCR’s management costs for the entire
programme were, according to existing centrally-driven agreements, recovered up front and
not applied as the process of relocation took place.
5.2 Commercial Improvement and Value for Money
Standard and proactive UNHCR procurement and administrative procedures were used.
5.3 Role of project partners
The main implementing partner UNHCR worked closely with other collaborating partners in
Logistics (GIZ-IS), Mass Information Campaign (JRS-Radio Kwizera), Health (TRCS), Camp
Management (IRC) and (CARE, TWESA, TRCS). Since the most of the planned activities
were not carried out, there is no evidence that the programme team demonstrated a good
understanding of value for money.
Procurement for goods and services used was done the UNHCR system. It was competitive
and done through the bidding process based on quality and cost and on previous agreements
with UNHCR experience in the area.
Other Development Partners tracked the programme through period assessment visits to the
camps; e.g. the Friends of the UN in Tanzania,EC regional protection programme, United
States of America, ECHO, EC- European Development Fund, Japan, Belgium, Germany and
Ireland had interest in the naturalization and relocation. They continued to monitor progress
and received reports thus enhanced scrutiny in the programme delivery and hence value for
money.
5.4 Did the project represent Value for Money : N
No –there is no clear evidence to suggest that the project has delivered VfM. The log-frame
targets have not been met and only a small proportion of funding was actually utilised. Of that
small proportion (£1,463,106, £75,606 (8%) was used for direct cash transfers whilst 925% of
the amount was used for overhead costs for programme support at UNHCR locally and the
Ministry of Home Affairs (£967,500 and at UNHCR headquarters (£420,000) ). Had the
programme proceeded as planned, these overhead costs would have applied across the
delivery of the entire cash transfer and relocation components. On the small number of cash
transfers made, there is also no firm evidence on benefits yielded.
The programme’s inability to progress and consequent failure to deliver VfM is largely due to
unanticipated political reasons.
5.5. VfM lessons learnt
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This is an isolated and a specific programme which had a unique political context from which
lessons may therefore not be easily applied to other non-humanitarian programmes. The
lessons learned are that;

When designing programmes where the government’s decision is a major determinant,
close monitoring of the policy context is important. Shifts in policy may require
termination or radical change in programme delivery but potential programme changes
must factor in the risks of undermining a process and thus itself becoming a factor in
the external environment

DFID shall seek central dialogue with UNHCR about improved vfm and fees if no full
implementation has happened, i.e., ‘pro-rata’ administration fees arrangement might be
pursued. Currently the fees are charged upfront regardless whether the project is
implemented or not
6. Conditionality
6.1 Update on specific conditions
No conditionality
7. Conclusions and Actions
The government has put the issuance of the remainder of certificates on hold Cash transfer
and resettlement elsewhere outside the Old Settlement may not happen at all because the
government has changed its position. They newly naturalised Tanzanians are now likely to
remain where they are.
The programme did not achieve its purpose: “to facilitate the movement of the first, selfmotivated groups of refugees from the old settlements, and ensure a smooth start to local
integration as they become newly-naturalised Tanzanians”.
The following are main actions:
 DFID decided to close the programme after two consecutive no cost extensions
 DFID has reallocated most of the remaining funds (£2,023,448.38) to support the voluntary
repatriation of the 1993 Burundian refugees in Mtabila camp back to Burundi following a
request by UNHCR
 The remaining unused balance of £ 848,001.62 has been reapplied to help WFP’s
Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation for Assistance to Refugees in Camps in NorthWestern Tanzania following their request.
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8. Review Process
The review was carried out by DFID Governance Advisor and was informed by a significant
number of programme reports:
 The Project Concept Note (a Business Case);
 The Submissions - No cost extension to UNHCR 2010 and 2011
 The Support to UNHCR Annual Review 2010
 the Logframe
 The Six Months performance Report 2009, 2010 and 2011
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