June 2006 - How far was GB foreign policy to blame for the outbreak of war in 1939?
The reasons for the outbreak of war in 1939 has been the subject of considerable debate since 1945. The extent to
which British foreign policy in the 1920’s and 1930’s was responsible is contentious. Certainly the likes of Churchill
and Cato (Michael Foot), in his work ‘The Guilty Men’, place tremendous emphasis on Chamberlain and the policy of
Appeasement. However this view does not take into account the ambition and plans of Hitler or indeed the ability of
Britain to follow a different course. It also places little emphasis on the significance and legacy of the Paris peace
settlements in ‘sowing the seeds’ of the second world war. Ultimately, the most important cause of WWII was not the
men who tried to appease Hitler but Hitler himself who had set goals that would inevitably bring him into conflict
with other countries. His gambles of the late 1930’s had finally failed when he invaded Poland and Britain and France
declared war on Germany on Sept 3rd 1939.
British foreign policy in the inter war years was, and had to be, focused on avoiding getting embroiled in another
major conflict whilst at the same time safeguarding Britain’s economic and imperial interests. British politicians had
realised immediately after the Great War, Britain could not police Europe and manage its Empire. The policy of
Appeasement was well established in British foreign policy long before Chamberlain became PM. Britain’s economic
limitations and the general public opinion meant that getting involved in a conflict to defend whatever principles, was
a non starter thus negotiation and diplomacy was the only alternative. This manifested itself in the work at Locarno in
1925 in which Austen Chamberlain had been a key architect.
The onset of the depression, and the challenges it presented, meant that GB even more so, was looking to keep itself
out of any conflict. Disarmament was also an economic necessity and whatever military resources GB had, was to be
used to police the Empire. When Hitler came to power in January 1933, withdrew Germany from the disarmament
conference and the League of Nations in 1933, introduced rearmament and conscription by 1935, GB could have done
nothing to stop him. There wasn’t the political will in GB, France or anywhere else in Europe nor was there the
popular will, economic or military capability to stop Hitler. It is also worth mentioning that the issues that Hitler was
challenging were seen by many in GB as legitimate grievances. How could it possibly be justified to try and stop him?
Many critics of British foreign policy in the interwar period have the benefit of hindsight. The fact that war did break
out and that GB was unable to stop it, is often used as a stick to beat Chamberlain and his policy of appeasement with.
What the critics fail to explain is the lack of an alternative. When Churchill criticised the govt for not stopping Hitler
when he rearmed or entered the Rhineland in 1936 he failed to appreciate that GB could not do anything. Churchill’s
call to arms was denounced by the vast majority of the Commons and GB media as ‘sabre rattling’. The voices of
dissent were few and far between until as late as March 1939, when Germany invaded Czechoslovakia after which
point GB was already rearming and giving military assurances to Poland along with several other European countries.
The French followed suit.
The most important reason for war breaking out in 1939 was not a failed GB foreign policy of appeasement or weak
and spineless politicians as depicted by David Low in his political cartoons. It was Hitler and other aggressive
nationalists, both in Europe and further afield. The cooperation between democratic countries in the 1920’s was
replaced by a more confrontational policy where disputes were settled by force and not negotiation. Key to this change
was the impact of the Great Depression. Countries were more introspective, protective of own interests and unwilling
to support the concept of collective security upon which the League of Nations depended. When it came to long
standing disputes arising out of the Peace settlements, it was easier to turn a blind eye or to accept the situation. After
all, even contemporaries of 1919 could see that the issues arising from the peace settlement contained the ingredients
for future conflict.
Hitler came to power vowing to avenge Versailles and to make Germany great again. His speeches and propaganda
talked incessantly about creating Lebensraum in the east, creating a racially pure volk by reuniting all ethnic Germans
under a Greater German Reich. These ambitions were bound to bring him into conflict, according to Hugh Trevor
Roper, at some time in the future. It is unfair, however, to say that GB should have stopped him. Up until Oct 1938,
every step Hitler had taken was to challenge the unjust terms of Versailles including the Anschluss with Austria. The
‘betrayal’ of Czechoslovakia at the Munich Conference may be cited as the time when GB foreign policy should have
made a stand against Germany but the reality is, GB would have lost that war in 1938. The decision to concede the
Sudetenland whilst getting assurances’ from Hitler made absolute sense. Chamberlain could hope for peace but now
had time to prepare for war. With the collapse of the League of Nations, pressure on the British Empire in Asia and
economic considerations, what else could Chamberlain have done? The claim that an alliance with the USSR was an
option is wishful thinking and does not take into account both the strong anti soviet sentiment in GB and the lack of
trust between the 2 countries. Stalin’s actions in recent years had done little to convince Chamberlain he could trust
him any more than he could trust Hitler. At least Chamberlain had personal experience of Hitler.
The war in 1939 was not a result of the failed policy of appeasement; in fact appeasement had delayed war until a time
where GB could better defend itself. War in 1939 was a consequence of Hitler’s long term ambitions and aims
coupled with short term strategy and decisions made. Hitler needed to expand for economic reasons. He had put
tremendous pressure on the economy rearming and now needed raw materials that came from conquest to maintain
rearmament and sustain a reasonable standard of living in Germany. He gambled on GB and France not standing by
Poland after he signed the Nazi Soviet pact and got it wrong. It was Stalin’s decision to sign this agreement that made
war in Europe in 1939 more likely because it emboldened Hitler to go further.
From the outset in 1933, Hitler made it his goal to go to war. The failure of the Paris peace settlements gave him his
long term cause and justification and made it incredibly difficult for the Western powers to follow any other policy
than appeasement. Whether it was series of short ‘blitzkrieg wars’ or not, is irrelevant. Hitler was the aggressor who
pushed and pushed and ultimately his gambles did not pay off.
Hitler may not have had a master plan and he may have been an opportunist but that does not mean that the appeasers
and British foreign policy in general, was responsible for the outbreak of war. Churchill’s analysis that this was the
easiest war in history to have been prevented without a single bullet being fired and that the appeasers were spineless
cowards is only possible with hindsight. It was not a view upheld pre 1939 and fails to take into account the
limitations and restrictions on GB and the ambitions and plans Hitler had.
Appeasement hoped for the best but prepared for the worst. It was the only viable policy available to Chamberlain
both in political and economic terms. The peace settlements had left them in a very difficult position, a situation
compounded by the impact of the great depression.