Resolution
Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic surveillance.
Resolved: The Federal Government Should
Resolved
Resolved means to express by formal vote
Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary, 1998 (dictionary.com)
Resolved:
5. To express, as an opinion or determination, by resolution and vote; to declare or decide by a formal
vote; -- followed by a clause; as, the house resolved (or, it was resolved by the house) that no money should be apropriated (or, to
appropriate no money).
‘Resolved’ denotes a proposal to be enacted by law
Words and Phrases 64 Permanent Edition
Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by
resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which
is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.
Firm decision
AHD 6 (American Heritage Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)
Resolve TRANSITIVE VERB:1. To make
decide or express by formal vote.
a firm decision about. 2. To cause (a person) to reach a decision. See synonyms at decide. 3. To
Specific course of action
AHD 6 (American Heritage Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)
INTRANSITIVE VERB:1. To reach a decision or make
reduced to constituents. 3. Music To undergo resolution.
a determination: resolve on a course of action . 2. To become separated or
Resolved: – Aff Competition
“Resolved” doesn’t require certainty
Webster’s 9 – Merriam Webster 2009
(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved)
# Main Entry: 1re·solve # Pronunciation: \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\ # Function: verb # Inflected Form(s): re·solved; re·solv·ing 1 : to
become separated into component parts; also : to become reduced by dissolving or analysis 2 : to form a resolution : determine 3 : consult,
deliberate
Or immediacy
PTE 9 – Online Plain Text English Dictionary 2009
(http://www.onelook.com/?other=web1913&w=Resolve)
Resolve: “To form a purpose; to make a decision; especially, to determine after reflection; as, to resolve on a better course of
life.”
Colon
Colon is meaningless --- everything after it is what’s important
Webster’s 00 (Guide to Grammar and Writing, http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm)
Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go
on… If
the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon
represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.
The colon just elaborates on what the community was resolved to debate
Encarta 7 (World Dictionary, “colon”,
http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861 598666)
co·lon (plural co·lons)
noun
Definition:
1. punctuation mark: the punctuation mark (:) used
to divide distinct but related sentence components such as
clauses in which the second elaborates on the first, or to introduce a list, quotation, or speech. A colon is sometimes used in
U.S. business letters after the salutation. Colons are also used between numbers in statements of proportion or time and Biblical or literary
references.
The
“The” is used to denote a specific entity
American Heritage, 00 (Fourth Edition, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/the)
the1
P (th before a vowel; th before a consonant)
def.art.
Used before singular or plural nouns and noun phrases that denote particular, specified persons or
things: the baby; the dress I wore. Used before a noun, and generally stressed, to emphasize one of a
group or type as the most outstanding or prominent: considered Lake Shore Drive to be the
neighborhood to live in these days. Used to indicate uniqueness: the Prince of Wales; the moon. Used
before nouns that designate natural phenomena or points of the compass: the weather; a wind from the
south. Used as the equivalent of a possessive adjective before names of some parts of the body: grab
him by the neck; an infection of the hand. Used before a noun specifying a field of endeavor: the law;
the film industry; the stage. Used before a proper name, as of a monument or ship: the Alamo; the
Titanic. Used before the plural form of a numeral denoting a specific decade of a century or of a life
span: rural life in the Thirties.
The word “the” implies there is only one – as in the USFG
Cambridge Dictionaries Online 7
used to refer to things or people when only one exists at any one time:
‘The’ means all parts.
Merriam-Websters 8 Online Collegiate Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary
4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group
as a whole <the elite>
‘The’ denotes uniqueness – distinguishes the federal government from other
governments
Merriam-Websters 8 Online Collegiate Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary
used as a function word to indicate that a following noun or noun equivalent is a unique or a particular
member of its class <the President> <the Lord>
Federal Government
Federal government is central government
WEBSTER'S 76 NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED, p. 833.
Federal government. Of or relating to the central government of a nation, having the character of a
federation as distinguished from the governments of the constituent unites (as states or provinces).
Federal government is the national government that expresses power
Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, June 1, 2004, pg.716.
Federal government. 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller
political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in
national politics matters – Also termed (in federal states) central government. 2. the U.S. government –
Also termed national government. [Cases: United States -1 C.J.S. United States - - 2-3]
Federal refers to the national government. It’s distinct from state law.
Dictionary of Government and Politics ’98 (Ed. P.H. Collin, p. 116)
federal [‘federal] adjective (a) referring to a system of government in which a group of states are linked
together in a federation; a federal constitution = constitution (such as that in Germany) which provides
for a series of semi-autonomous states joined together in a national federation (b) referring especially to
the federal government of the United States; federal court or federal laws = court or laws of the USA, as
opposed to state courts or state laws.
USFG is the federal government of the USA, based in DC
Dictionary of Government and Politics ’98 (Ed. P.H. Collin, p. 292)
United States of America (USA) [ju:’naitid ‘steits av e’merike] noun independent country, a federation of
states (originally thirteen, now fifty in North America; the United States Code = book containing all the
permanent laws of the USA, arranged in sections according to subject and revised from time to time
COMMENT: the federal government (based in Washington D.C.) is formed of a legislature (the Congress)
with two chambers (the Senate and House of Representatives), an executive (the President) and a
judiciary (the Supreme Court). Each of the fifty states making up the USA has its own legislature and
executive (the Governor) as well as its own legal system and constitution
Should
Should refers to what should be NOT what should have been
OED, Oxford English Dictionary, 1989 (2ed. XIX), pg. 344
Should An utterance of the word should. Also, what ‘should be’.
Should means an obligation or duty
AHD 92 – AHD, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 1992 (4ed); Pg. 1612
Should—1. Used to express obligation or duty: You should send her a note.
Should expresses an expectation of something
AHD 92 – AHD, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 1992 (4ed); Pg. 1612
Should—2. Used to express probability or expectation: They should arrive at noon.
Should expresses conditionality or contingency
AHD 92 – AHD, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 1992 (4ed); Pg. 1612
Should—3. Used to express conditionality or contingency: If she should fall, then so would I.
“Should” expresses duty, obligation, or necessity
Webster’s 61 – Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1961 p. 2104
Used in auxiliary function to express duty, obligation, necessity, propriety, or expediency
Should – Mandatory
“Should” is mandatory
Nieto 9 – Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311
(Colo. Ct. App. 2009)
"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary
2104 (2002). Courts [**15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of
authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense. HN7A number of courts,
confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections
governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a
defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find
the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the
word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud,
257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding
argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d
940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts
interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [**16] have
also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion . In Little v. State, 261
Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction
on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have
been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's
argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction on witness credibility which
used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo.
1958). [*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or
commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49
P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents'
federal tax exemption to be mandatory).
“Should” means must – its mandatory
Foresi 32 (Remo Foresi v. Hudson Coal Co., Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 106 Pa. Super. 307; 161 A.
910; 1932 Pa. Super. LEXIS 239, 7-14, Lexis)
As regards the mandatory character of the rule, the word 'should' is not only an auxiliary verb, it is also the
preterite of the verb, 'shall' and has for one of its meanings as defined in the Century Dictionary: "Obliged or
compelled (to); would have (to); must; ought (to); used with an infinitive (without to) to express obligation,
necessity or duty in connection with some act yet to be carried out." We think it clear that it is in that sense that the
word 'should' is used in this rule, not merely advisory. When the judge in charging the jury tells them that, unless they find from all the
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged, they should acquit,
the word 'should' is not
used in an advisory sense but has the force or meaning of 'must', or 'ought to' and carries [***8] with it
the sense of [*313] obligation and duty equivalent to compulsion. A natural sense of sympathy for a few unfortunate
claimants who have been injured while doing something in direct violation of law must not be so indulged as to fritter away, or nullify,
provisions which have been enacted to safeguard and protect the welfare of thousands who are engaged in the hazardous occupation of
mining.
Should means must
Words & Phrases 6 (Permanent Edition 39, p. 369)
C.D.Cal. 2005.
“Should,” as used in the Social Security Administration’s ruling stating that an ALJ should call on the services of a medical
advisor when onset must be inferred, means “must.”—Herrera v. Barnhart, 379 F.Supp.2d 1103.—Social S 142.5.
Should – Not Mandatory
Should isn’t mandatory
Words & Phrases 6 (Permanent Edition 39, p. 369)
C.A.6 (Tenn.) 2001.
Word “should,” in most contexts, is precatory, not mandatory. –U.S. v. Rogers, 14 Fed.Appx. 303. –Statut 227.
Strong admonition --- not mandatory
Taylor and Howard 5 (Michael, Resources for the Future and Julie, Partnership to Cut Hunger and
Poverty in Africa, “Investing in Africa's future: U.S. Agricultural development assistance for Sub-Saharan
Africa”, 9-12, http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001784/5-US-agric_Sept2005_Chap2.pdf)
Other legislated DA earmarks in the FY2005 appropriations bill are smaller and more targeted: plant biotechnology research and development
($25 million), the American Schools and Hospitals Abroad program ($20 million), women’s leadership capacity ($15 million), the International
Fertilizer Development Center ($2.3 million), and clean water treatment ($2 million). Interestingly, in the wording of the bill, Congress uses the
term shall in connection with only two of these eight earmarks; the others say that USAID should make the prescribed amount available. The
difference between shall and should may have legal significance—one is clearly mandatory while the other is a
strong admonition—but it makes little practical difference in USAID’s need to comply with the congressional directive to the
best of its ability.
Permissive
Words and Phrases 2 (Vol. 39, p. 370)
Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1976.
Term “should,” as used in statutory provision that motion to suppress search warrant should first be heard by
used in regular, persuasive sense, as recommendation, and is thus not mandatory
magistrate who issued warrant, is
but permissive. West’s Ann.Pen Code, § 1538.5(b).---Cuevas v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 238, 58 Cal.App.3d 406 ----Searches 191.
Desirable or recommended
Words and Phrases 2 (Vol. 39, p. 372-373)
Or. 1952. Where safety regulation for sawmill industry providing that a two by two inch guard rail should be installed at extreme outer edge of
walkways adjacent to sorting tables was immediately preceded by other regulations in which word “shall” instead of “should” was used, and
word “should” did not appear to be result of inadvertent use in particular regulation, use of word “should” was intended to convey
idea that particular precaution involved was desirable and recommended, but not mandatory . ORS 654.005 et seq.---Baldassarre v. West Oregon Lumber Co., 239 P.2d 839, 193 Or. 556.---Labor & Emp. 2857
Should – Desirable
“Should” means desirable --- this does not have to be a mandate
AC 99 (Atlas Collaboration, “Use of Shall, Should, May Can,”
http://rd13doc.cern.ch/Atlas/DaqSoft/sde/inspect/shall.html)
shall
'shall' describes something that is mandatory. If a requirement uses 'shall', then that requirement _will_ be satisfied without
fail. Noncompliance is not allowed. Failure to comply with one single 'shall' is sufficient reason to reject the entire product. Indeed, it must be
rejected under these circumstances. Examples: # "Requirements shall make use of the word 'shall' only where compliance is mandatory." This
is a good example. # "C++ code shall have comments every 5th line." This is a bad example. Using 'shall' here is too strong.
should
'should' is weaker. It describes something that might not be satisfied in the final product, but that is
desirable enough that any noncompliance shall be explicitly justified. Any use of 'should' should be examined carefully, as it probably
means that something is not being stated clearly. If a 'should' can be replaced by a 'shall', or can be discarded entirely, so much the better.
Examples: # "C++ code should be ANSI compliant." A good example. It may not be possible to be ANSI compliant on all platforms, but we
should try. # "Code should be tested thoroughly." Bad example. This 'should' shall be replaced with 'shall' if this requirement is to be stated
anywhere (to say nothing of defining what 'thoroughly' means).
“Should” doesn’t require certainty
Black’s Law 79 (Black’s Law Dictionary – Fifth Edition, p. 1237)
Should. The past tense of shall; ordinarily implying duty or obligation; although usually no more than an obligation of propriety or
expediency, or a moral obligation, thereby distinguishing it from “ought.” It is not normally synonymous with “may,” and although often
interchangeable with the word “would,” it does
not ordinarily express certainty as “will” sometimes does.
Should – Immediate
“Should” means “must” and requires immediate legal effect
Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”,
1994 OK 123, 11-8,
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)
¶4 The
legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order connotes
futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must
be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the
critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will
or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered
from the four corners of the entire record.16
[CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE]
13 "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of
meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge
quotation infra note 15. Certain
contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely
indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of
damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory);
Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party
"should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to
include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would
mean the same as "shall" or
"must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). 14 In praesenti means
literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which
in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in
the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).
Should – No Immediate
Should doesn’t mean immediate
Dictionary.com – Copyright © 2010 – http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/should
should
/ʃʊd/ Show Spelled[shood] Show IPA –auxiliary verb 1. pt. of shall. 2. (used to express condition): Were he to arrive, I
should be pleased. 3. must; ought (used to indicate duty, propriety, or expediency): You should not do that. 4. would (used to make a statement
less direct or blunt): I should think you would apologize. Use should in a Sentence See images of should Search should on the Web Origin: ME
sholde, OE sc ( e ) olde; see shall —Can be confused: could, should, would (see usage note at this entry ). —Synonyms 3. See must1 . —
Usage note Rules similar to those for choosing between shall
and will have long been advanced for should and would, but again the rules
have had little effect on usage. In most constructions, would is the auxiliary chosen regardless of the person of the subject: If our allies would
support the move, we would abandon any claim to sovereignty. You would be surprised at the complexity of the directions. Because the main
function of should in modern American English is to express duty, necessity, etc. ( You should get your flu shot before winter comes ), its use
for other purposes, as to form a subjunctive, can produce ambiguity, at least initially: I should get my flu shot if I were you. Furthermore,
should seems an affectation to many Americans when used in certain constructions quite common in British English: Had I been informed, I
should (American would ) have called immediately. I should (American would ) really prefer a different arrangement. As with shall and will,
most educated native speakers of American English do not follow the textbook rule in making a choice between should and would. See
shall.
also
Shall –auxiliary verb, present singular 1st person shall, 2nd shall or ( Archaic ) shalt, 3rd shall, present plural shall; past singular 1st
person should, 2nd should or ( Archaic ) shouldst or should·est, 3rd should, past plural should; imperative, infinitive, and participles lacking. 1.
plan to, intend
to, or expect to: I shall go later.
Substantially
1nc – subsets
Curtail means to limit
MacMillan Dictionary, 15 (‘curtail’, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/american/curtail
curtail
VERB [TRANSITIVE] FORMAL
to reduce or limit something, especially something good
a government attempt to curtail debate
A substantial curtailment must occur across the board – the aff only curtails a single
program
Anderson 5 – Brian Anderson, Becky Collins, Barbara Van Haren & Nissan Bar-Lev, Wisconsin Council
of Administrators of Special Services (WCASS) Committee Members. 2005 WCASS Research / Special
Projects Committee* Report on: A Conceptual Framework for Developing a 504 School District Policy
http://www.specialed.us/issues-504policy/504.htm#committee
The issue “Does it substantially limit the major life activity?” was clarified by the US Supreme Court
decision on January 8th, 2002 , “Toyota v. Williams”. In this labor related case, the Supreme Court noted
that to meet the “substantially limit” definition, the disability must occur across the board in multiple
environments, not only in one environment or one setting. The implications for school related 504
eligibility decisions are clear: The disability in question must be manifested in all facets of the student’s
life, not only in school.
Voting issue – this topic is massive and allows hundreds of minor reform affs – err neg
to create a reasonable expectation of preparedness
Substantially – 2%
“Substantial” must be at least 2%
Words & Phrases 60
'Substantial" means "of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable." Bequest to charitable institution,
making 1/48 of expenditures in state, held exempt from taxation; such expenditures constituting "substantial" part of its
activities. Tax Commission of Ohio v. American Humane Education Soc., 181 N.E. 557, 42 Ohio App. 4.
Substantially – 10%
Less than 10% is insubstantial
Mickels 8 (Alissa, JD Candidate – Hastings College of Law, “Summary of Existing US Law Affecting
Fourth Sector Organizations”, 7-17,
http://www.fourthsector.net/attachments/7/original/Summary_of_US_Law_Affecting_
FS.pdf?1229493187)
Substantial v. insubstantial: Modern courts consider competition with commercial firms as “strong evidence of a substantial
nonexempt purpose.” Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. 710, 713 (1990). Although the tax court has held that the definition of
insubstantial is fact specific, it has found that less than ten percent of a charity’s total efforts is
“insubstantial”, World Family Corp. v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 921 (1982), where as unrelated business activity generating one-third of an
organizations revenue does not qualify for tax-exempt status. Orange County Agric. Soc’y, Inc. v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. 1602, 1604 (1988), aff’d
893 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1990). However, this may be changing after an increasing emphasis on commensurate test.
Substantially – 33%
“Substantially” means 33 percent
Maples 7 (Larry, “Pitfalls in Preserving Net Operating Losses”, The CPA Journal, 3-1, Lexis)
If a new loss corporation has substantial nonbusiness assets, the value of the old loss corporation must be reduced by the amount of the
nonbusiness assets less liabilities attributable to those assets. "Substantial" is defined as one-third of total assets. This is a difficult
provision to interpret. IRC section 382(1)(4) provides that a value reduction in the old loss corporation is required if, just after an ownership
change, the new loss corporation has substantial nonbusiness assets. This language seems odd because the purpose of IRC section 382 is to
prevent loss trafficking, so it would seem that the asset test ought to apply to the old loss corporation.
Substantially – 40%
“Substantially” means 40% --- strict quantification avoids vagueness
Schwartz 4 (Arthur, Lawyer – Schwartz + Goldberg, 2002 U.S. Briefs 1609, Lexis)
a way to avoid vagueness
issues. (Pet. App., at 13-14) Indeed, one of the Amici supporting the City in this case, the American Planning Association, produced
a publication that actually makes a recommendation of a percentage figure that should be adopted by municipalities in
establishing zoning [*37] regulations for adult businesses. n8 The APA's well researched report recommended that the terms
"substantial" and "significant" be quantified at 40 percent for floor space or inventory of a business in the definition of adult
In the opinion below, the Tenth Circuit suggested that a percentage figure would be
business. n9 (Resp. Br. App., at 15-16)
Substantially – 50%
Less than 50% is insubstantial
Brown 94 (Mark R., Professor of Law – Stetson University College of Law, “The Demise of
Constitutional Prospectivity: New Life for Owen?”, Iowa Law Review, January, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 273, Lexis)
n241 I am assuming here that "foreseeable" means "probable," as in "more probable than not." This appears to be a safe assumption given the
proliferance of cases granting immunity to officials who offend the Constitution. If this definition is correct, deterrence only works and liability
should only attach if one's conduct, viewed ex ante, is more likely illegal than legal: the risk of illegality must be more than fifty percent. In
other words, one cannot face deterrence, and liability will not attach, if the risk of illegality is less than fifty percent.
(When viewed in
this fashion, one might perceive a risk of illegality but still not be deterrable because the risk is not substantial, i.e., not
greater than fifty percent.). Lawful conduct, of course, need not be probably lawful. That is what risk is about. Situations might arise
where the objective risk is that conduct is unlawful, but ex post it is lawful. Lest judicial reasoning be completely askew, a fairly strong
correlation exists, however, between action that is ex ante probably lawful and that which is lawful ex post in the courts. If this is not true, then
courts are reaching objectively improbable conclusions, and the whole idea of reliance is illusory.
Legal experts agree
Davignon v. Clemmey 1 (Davignon v. Clemmey, 176 F. Supp. 2d 77, Lexis)
The court begins the lodestar calculation by looking at the contemporaneous billing records for each person who worked on the plaintiff's case.
The absence of detailed contemporaneous time records, except in extraordinary circumstances, will call for a substantial
reduction in any award or, in egregious cases, disallowance. What is a "substantial reduction"? Fifty percent is a favorite
among judges.
Substantially – 90%
“Substantially” means at least 90%
Words & Phrases 5 (40B, p. 329)
N.H. 1949. -The word "substantially" as used in provision of Unemployment Compensation Act that experience rating of an employer may
transferred to' an employing unit which acquires the organization, -trade, or business, or "substantially" all of the assets thereof, is 'an
elastic term which does not include a definite, fixed amount of percentage, and the transfer does not have to be
100 per cent but cannot be less than 90 per cent in the ordinary situation. R.L c. 218, § 6, subd. F, as added by Laws
1945, c. 138, § 16.-Auclair Transp. v. Riley, 69 A.2d 861, 96 N.H. l.-Tax347.1.
Substantial curtailment is 25%
A substantial curtailment is 25%
Senate Hearing, 66 (Possible anticompetitive effects of sale of network TV advertising. Hearings, Eightyninth Congress, second session, pursuant to S. Res. 191, Hein Online)
(f) Substantial curtailment of the normal sales of Brown & Williamson tobacco products due to (1)
prohibition of the manufacture or sale of tobacco products of Brown & Williamson due to governmental
regulations or restrictions; (2) inability to obtain the necessary raw material for the manufacture of
Brown ; Williamson tobacco products due to governmental regulations or restrictions. Substantial
curtailment is defined for the purpose of this subparagraph (f) as a condition where the total sales
volume of Brown & Williamson for any twelve (12) month period has fallen by more than twenty-five
percent (25%) from the preceding twelve (12) months' volume.
Substantially – Considerable
"Substantial" means of real worth or considerable value --- this is the USUAL and
CUSTOMARY meaning of the term
Words and Phrases 2 (Volume 40A, p. 458)
The word “substantial” within Civil Rights Act providing that a place is a public accommodation if a
“substantial” portion of food which is served has moved in commerce must be construed in light of its usual and
customary meaning, that is, something of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable, something
D.S.C. 1966.
worthwhile as distinguished from something without value or merely nominal
“Substantial” means considerable or to a large degree --- this common meaning is
preferable because the word is not a term of art
Arkush 2 (David, JD Candidate – Harvard University, “Preserving "Catalyst" Attorneys' Fees Under the
Freedom of Information Act in the Wake of Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources”, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, Winter,
37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 131)
Plaintiffs should argue that the term "substantially prevail" is not a term of art because if considered a term of art, resort to Black's 7th
produces a definition of "prevail" that could be interpreted adversely to plaintiffs. 99 It is commonly accepted that words that are not
legal
terms of art should be accorded their ordinary, not their legal, meaning , 100 and ordinary-usage dictionaries provide FOIA fee
claimants with helpful arguments. The Supreme Court has already found favorable , temporally relevant definitions of the word
"substantially" in ordinary dictionaries: "Substantially" suggests "considerable" or "specified to a large degree." See
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1976) (defining "substantially" as "in a substantial manner" and "substantial" as
"considerable in amount, value, or worth" and "being that specified to a large degree or in the main"); see also 17 Oxford English Dictionary 6667 (2d ed. 1989) ("substantial": "relating to or proceeding from the essence of a thing; essential"; "of ample or considerable amount, quantity
or dimensions"). 101
Substantial means “of considerable amount” – not some contrived percentage
Prost 4 (Judge – United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, “Committee For Fairly Traded
Venezuelan Cement v. United States”, 6-18,
http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/04opinions/04-1016.html)
The URAA and the SAA neither amend nor refine the language of § 1677(4)(C). In fact, they merely suggest, without disqualifying other
alternatives, a “clearly higher/substantial proportion” approach. Indeed, the SAA specifically mentions that no “precise mathematical formula”
or “‘benchmark’ proportion” is to be used for a dumping concentration analysis. SAA at 860 (citations omitted); see also Venez. Cement, 279 F.
Supp. 2d at 1329-30. Furthermore, as the Court of International Trade noted, the SAA emphasizes that the Commission retains the discretion
to determine concentration of imports on a “case-by-case basis.” SAA at 860. Finally, the definition of the word “substantial”
undercuts the CFTVC’s argument. The word “substantial” generally means “considerable in amount, value or
worth.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1993).
It does not imply a specific number or cut-off. What
may be substantial in one situation may not be in another situation. The very breadth of the term “substantial” undercuts the
CFTVC’s argument that Congress spoke clearly in establishing a standard for the Commission’s regional antidumping and countervailing duty
analyses. It therefore supports the conclusion that the Commission is owed deference in its interpretation of “substantial proportion.” The
Commission clearly embarked on its analysis having been given considerable leeway to interpret a particularly broad term.
Substantially – Real
Substantially means real, not imaginary
Wollman ’93 (Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals – 8th Circuit, Kansas City Power & Light Company, a
Missouri corporation, Appellee, v. Ford Motor Credit Company, a Delaware corporation; McDonnell
Douglas Finance Corporation, a Delaware corporation; HEI Investment Corp., a Hawaii corporation,
Appellants, 995 F.2d 1422; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 13755, L/N)
Instruction No. 10 was not given in isolation, however. The district court's instructions also contained a
definition of "substantial." Instruction No. 11 defined "substantial" as meaning "true, real or likely to
materialize" and as not meaning "imaginary or unlikely to materialize." This instruction properly limited
the potential bases for the jury's decision, which is the essential function of jury instructions. When
combined with the contract and the verdict-directing instructions, [*1432] which tracked the operative
language of the contract, Instruction No. 11 required the jury to find that KCPL had determined a real
risk, not some imaginary hypothetical risk premised solely on a reduction in the DRD. Because the
contract provided only one means of creating a risk of making an indemnity payment--a demand notice
from an Investor--the jury's discretion was properly channelled into deciding whether KCPL had
sufficiently studied and honestly considered the likelihood of receiving such a demand notice. That
determination is all that the contract required.
"Substantial" means actually existing, real, or belonging to substance
Words and Phrases 2 (Volume 40A) p. 460
Ala. 1909. “Substantial”
means “belonging to substance; actually existing; real; *** not seeming or
imaginary; not elusive; real; solid; true; veritable
"Substantial" means having substance or considerable
Ballentine's 95 (Legal Dictionary and Thesaurus, p. 644)
having substance; considerable
Substantially – In the Main
"Substantial" means in the main
Words and Phrases 2 (Volume 40A, p. 469)
Ill.App.2 Dist. 1923 “Substantial” means in substance, in the main, essential, including material or essential parts
Substantially – Without Material Qualification
Substantially is without material qualification
Black’s Law 91 (Dictionary, p. 1024)
Substantially - means essentially; without material qualification.
Substantially – Durable
“Substantial” means durable
Ballantine’s 94 (Thesaurus for Legal Research and Writing, p. 173)
substantial [sub . stan . shel] adj. abundant, consequential, durable, extraordinary, heavyweight, plentiful (“a substantial supply”); actual,
concrete, existent, physical, righteous, sensible, tangible (“substantial problem”); affluent, comfortable, easy, opulent, prosperous, solvent.
Substantially – Not Covert
“Substantially” means not covert
Words & Phrases 64 (40 W&P 759)
The words “outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive,” in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially
the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation,
reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and
imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain; absolute; real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually
existing; true; not including admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.
AT: Arbitrary
‘Substantially’ isn’t precise --- but still must be given meaning. The most objective way
to define it contextually.
Devinsky 2 (Paul, “Is Claim "Substantially" Definite? Ask Person of Skill in the Art”, IP Update, 5(11),
November, http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object_id/c2c73bdb9b1a-42bf-a2b7-075812dc0e2d.cfm)
In reversing a summary judgment of invalidity, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the district court,
by failing to look beyond the intrinsic claim construction evidence to consider what a person of skill in the art would understand in a
"technologic context," erroneously concluded the term "substantially" made a claim fatally indefinite. Verve, LLC v.
Crane Cams, Inc., Case No. 01-1417 (Fed. Cir. November 14, 2002). The patent in suit related to an improved push rod for an internal
combustion engine. The patent claims a hollow push rod whose overall diameter is larger at the middle than at the ends and has
"substantially constant wall thickness" throughout the rod and rounded seats at the tips. The district court found that the expression
"substantially constant wall thickness" was not supported in the specification and prosecution history by a sufficiently clear definition
of "substantially" and was, therefore, indefinite. The district court recognized that the use of the term "substantially" may be definite
in some cases but ruled that in this case it was indefinite because it was not further defined. The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding
that the district court erred in requiring that the meaning of the term "substantially" in a particular "technologic context" be found
solely in intrinsic evidence: "While reference to intrinsic evidence is primary in interpreting claims, the criterion is the meaning of
words as they would be understood by persons in the field of the invention." Thus, the Federal Circuit instructed that
"resolution of any ambiguity arising from the claims and specification may be aided by extrinsic evidence of usage and
meaning of a term in the context of the invention." The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instruction that
"[t]he question is not whether the word 'substantially' has a fixed meaning as applied to 'constant wall thickness,' but
how the phrase would be understood by persons experienced in this field of mechanics, upon reading the patent
documents."
“Substantially” needs to be given a quantitative meaning --- any other interpretation
is more arbitrary
Webster’s 3 (Merriam Webster’s Dictionary, www.m-w.com)
Main Entry: sub.stan.tial
b : considerable in quantity : significantly great <earned a substantial wage>
Make the best determination available. Substantially must be given meaning
Words and Phrases 60 (Vol. 40, State – Subway, p. 762)
“Substantial” is a relative word, which, while it must be used with care and discrimination, must nevertheless
be given effect, and in a claim of patent allowed considerable latitude of meaning where it is applied to such subject as thickness, as by
requiring two parts of a device to be substantially the same thickness, and cannot be held to require them to be of exactly the same thickness.
Todd. V. Sears Roebuck & Co., D.C.N.C., 199 F.Supp. 38, 41.
Using context removes the arbitrariness of assigning a fixed percentage to
“substantial”
Viscasillas 4 – professor at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, (Pilar, “Contracts for the Sale of
Goods to Be Manufactured or Produced and Mixed Contracts (Article 3 CISG)”, CISG Advisory Council
Opinion No. 4, 10-24, http://cisgac.com/default.php?ipkCat=128&ifkCat=146&sid=146)
2.8. Legal writers who follow the economic value criterion have generally quantified the term "substantial part" by comparing Article 3(1) CISG
(substantial) with Article 3(2) CISG (preponderant): substantial being less than preponderant. In this way, legal
writers have used the
following percentages to quantify substantial: 15%,[14] between 40% and 50%,[15] or more generally
50%.[16] At the same time, other authors, although they have not fixed any numbers in regard to the quantification of the term "substantial"
have declared that "preponderant" means "considerably more than 50% of the price" or "clearly in excess of 50%".[17] Thus it seems that for
the latter authors, the quantification of the term "substantial" is placed above the 50% figure. Also, some Courts have followed this
approach.[18]
2.9. To consider a fixed percentage might be arbitrary due to the fact that the particularities of each
case ought to be taken into account; that the scholars are in disagreement; and that the origin of those
figures is not clear.[19]
Therefore, it does not seem to be advisable to quantify the word "substantial" a priori in percentages. A
case-by-case analysis is preferable and thus it should be determined on the basis of an overall
assessment.
Contextual definitions of “substantial” solve arbitrariness
Tarlow 2k – Nationally prominent criminal defense lawyer practicing in Los Angeles, CA. He is a frequent
author and lecturer on criminal law. He was formerly a prosecutor in the United States Attorney's Office
and is a member of The Champion Advisory Board (Barry, The Champion January/February, lexis)
In Victor, the trial court instructed that: "A reasonable doubt is an actual and substantial doubt . . . as distinguished from a doubt
arising from mere [*64] possibility, from bare imagination, or from fanciful conjecture." Victor argued on appeal after receiving the death
penalty that equating a reasonable doubt with a "substantial doubt" overstated the degree of doubt necessary for acquittal. Although
the
court agreed that the instruction was problematic given that "substantial," could be defined as "that
specified to a large degree," it also ruled that any ambiguity was removed by reading the phrase in the
context of the sentence in which it appeared. Finding such an explicit distinction between a substantial doubt and a fanciful
conjecture was not present in the Cage instruction, it held that the context makes clear that "substantial" was used in the sense of existence
rather than in magnitude of the doubt and, therefore, it was not unconstitutional as applied. Id. at 1250.
Even if substantial isn’t precise --- you should still exclude their Aff for being tiny.
Even judges can make a gut check.
Hartmann 7 – Judge, Hong Kong (IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, 8/20,
http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=58463&currpage=T
The word ‘substantial’ is not a technical term nor is it a word that lends itself to a precise
measurement. In an earlier judgment on this issue, that of S. v. S. [2006] 3 HKLRD 251, I said that it is not a word —
To say, for example, that ‘there has been a
substantial increase in expenditure’ does not of itself allow for a calculation in numerative terms of the exact
increase. It is a statement to the effect that it is certainly more than a little but less than great. It
defines, however, a significant increase, one that is weighty or sizeable.”
“… that lends itself to precise definition or from which precise deductions can be drawn.
Context – Obama reforms ‘substantial’
Contextually Obama’s surveillance reforms are ‘substantial’ despite maintaining
robust intelligence
Edgar, 4/13/15 - visiting fellow at the Institute and adjunct professor of law at the Georgetown
University Law Center (Timothy, “The Good News About Spying”
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-04-13/good-news-about-spying
In 2013, Obama called for a national dialogue on surveillance and privacy. Since then, he has made
genuine attempts at reform. The job is far from over, but Washington has already come farther than
many believe. Today, the United States confronts a variety of threats—ranging from the Islamic State, to
Iran’s nuclear program, to cyber intrusions from China, North Korea, and Russia. Each of these threats
requires robust intelligence capabilities. Obama has maintained these capabilities, but at the same time,
has ordered surveillance reforms that are substantial indeed. Privacy and civil liberties advocates have a
friend in the White House, even if they do not realize it. Obama has led, and it is time for others to
follow.
Obama’s reforms are transparency, extending privacy protections to foreign persons,
and creating protections against the use of bulk data
Edgar, 4/13/15 - visiting fellow at the Institute and adjunct professor of law at the Georgetown
University Law Center (Timothy, “The Good News About Spying”
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-04-13/good-news-about-spying
In 2013, at Obama’s direction, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) established a
website for the intelligence community, IC on the Record, where previously secret documents are
posted for all to see. These are not decades-old files about Cold War spying, but recent slides used at
recent NSA training sessions, accounts of illegal wiretapping after the 9/11 attacks, and what had been
highly classified opinions issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court about ongoing
surveillance programs.
Although many assume that all public knowledge of NSA spying programs came from Snowden’s leaks,
many of the revelations in fact came from IC on the Record, including mistakes that led to the
unconstitutional collection of U.S. citizens’ emails. Documents released though this portal total more
than 4,500 pages—surpassing even the 3,710 pages collected and leaked by Snowden. The Obama
administration has instituted other mechanisms, such as an annual surveillance transparency report,
that will continue to provide fodder for journalists, privacy activists, and researchers.
The transparency reforms may seem trivial to some. From the perspective of an intelligence community
steeped in the need to protect sources and methods, however, they are deeply unsettling. At a Brown
University forum, ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Officer Alexander Joel said, “The intelligence
community is not designed and built for transparency. Our culture is around finding our adversaries’
secrets and keeping our own secrets secret.” Accordingly, until only a few years ago, the intelligence
community resisted making even the most basic information public. The number of FISA court opinions
released to the public between 1978 and 2013 can be counted on one hand.
Beyond more transparency, Obama has also changed the rules for surveillance of foreigners. Until last
year, privacy rules applied only to “U.S. persons.” But in January 2014, Obama issued Presidential Policy
Directive 28 (PPD-28), ordering intelligence agencies to write detailed rules assuring that privacy
protections would apply regardless of nationality. These rules, which came out in January 2015, mark
the first set of guidelines for intelligence agencies ordered by a U.S. president—or any world leader—
that explicitly protect foreign citizens’ personal information in the course of intelligence operations.
Under the directive, the NSA can keep personal information in its databases for no more than five years.
It must delete personal information from the intelligence reports it provides its customers unless that
person’s identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence—a basic rule once reserved only for
Americans.
The new rules also include restrictions on bulk collection of signals intelligence worldwide—the practice
critics call “mass surveillance.” The NSA’s bulk collection programs may no longer be used for
uncovering all types of diplomatic secrets, but will now be limited to six specific categories of serious
national security threats. Finally, agencies are no longer allowed simply to “collect it all.” Under PPD-28,
the NSA and other agencies may collect signals intelligence only after weighing the benefits against the
risks to privacy or civil liberties, and they must now consider the privacy of everyone, not just U.S.
citizens. This is the first time any U.S. government official will be able to cite a written presidential
directive to object to an intelligence program on the basis that the intelligence it produces is not worth
the costs to privacy of innocent foreign citizens.
Context – ending bulk data collection
Ending bulk data collection is a ‘substantial curtailment’ of surveillance
Timmons, 6/1/15 – staff for Quartz (Heather, “The US government can no longer spy on every US citizen
at once” Quartz, http://qz.com/416262/the-us-government-can-no-longer-spy-on-every-us-citizen-atonce/
The US government’s ability to collect information on American citizens was substantially curtailed on
midnight Sunday, after an extension of the Patriot Act expired before the US Congress passed a
replacement bill aimed at reforming it.
What’s expiring: The Patriot Act extension, signed into law in 2011. This includes the controversial
Section 215, which, as the ACLU explains it, “allows the [Federal Bureau of Investigation] to force
anyone at all—including doctors, libraries, bookstores, universities, and Internet service providers—to
turn over records on their clients or customers.” Because of this expiration, the National Security Agency
and others can also no longer collect this information, including US citizens’ phone calls, in bulk. In
addition, agencies abilities to conduct roving wiretaps, and spy on so-called “lone wolf” terrorists not
connected to any organization are curbed.
Who is responsible. Republican presidential candidate Rand Paul, a longtime privacy advocate, dug in his
heels and said he would refuse to allow a replacement bill to be adopted in time to replace the nowexpired parts of the Act. In a special Sunday session of the Senate, he appeared to harass his fellow
Republicans while they were speaking.
National security hawks and Senate leader Mitch McConnell “badly underestimated the shift in the
national mood,” which the Democrats and Libertarians understand, The New York Times reported.
What happens next. The replacement bill, named, without apparent irony, the “USA Freedom Act,” is
still expected to pass as early as this week. While it still gives widespread information gathering powers
to US security agencies, it will prohibit them from collecting American citizens’ phone records and other
information in bulk, limiting such collecting to specific searches.
Curtail
Curtail violations
1nc – curtail means decrease size
Curtail means to reduce the extent or quantity of
Oxford Dictionaries, 15 (“curtail”,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/curtail)
Definition of curtail in English:
verb
[WITH OBJECT]
1Reduce in extent or quantity; impose a restriction on: civil liberties were further curtailed
That precludes qualitative modifications – the plan violates by maintaining the
existing scope of surveillance
State v. Knutsen, 3 - 71 P. 3d 1065 - Idaho: Court of Appeals, http://caselaw.findlaw.com/id-court-ofappeals/1320950.html
By its plain language, Rule 35 grants a district court the authority within a limited period of time to
reduce or modify a defendant's sentence after relinquishing jurisdiction. To "reduce" means to
diminish in size, amount, extent or number, or to make smaller, lessen or shrink. WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1905 (1993). To "modify" means to make more temperate and
less extreme, or to lessen the severity of something. Id. at 1452. Thus, under the plain meaning of
its language, Rule 35 authorizes a district court to diminish, lessen the severity of, or make more
temperate a defendant's sentence. An order placing a defendant on probation lessens the severity
of a defendant's sentence and thus falls within the district court's authority granted by Rule 35.
Other state jurisdictions have held likewise in interpreting similar rules for reduction of sentence.
See State v. Knapp, 739 P.2d 1229, 1231-32 (Wy.1987) (similar rule of criminal procedure
authorizes reduction of a sentence of incarceration to probation); People v. Santana, 961 P.2d 498,
499 (Co.Ct.App.1997) (grant of probation is a "reduction" under Colorado Cr. R. 35(b)).
Voting issue –
1. Limits – every existing program can be modified any number of ways, they
create hundreds of new cases
2. Negative ground – all predictable disad links stem from cutting the size of
federal surveillance – qualitative reforms don’t link
1nc – net curtailment
Curtail means to reduce the extent or quantity of
Oxford Dictionaries, 15 (“curtail”,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/curtail)
Definition of curtail in English:
verb
[WITH OBJECT]
1Reduce in extent or quantity; impose a restriction on: civil liberties were further curtailed
It must be a net reduction measured against the status quo baseline – the plan
violates by merely preventing a future increase
Howell, 14 - US District Court Judge (Beryl, HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, et al., Plaintiffs, v.
SALLY JEWELL, Secretary of the Interior, et al.,1 Defendants, v. STATE OF WISCONSIN, et al. IntervenorDefendants. 1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Sally Jewell, Secretary of the Interior, is
automatically substituted for her predecessor in office. Civil Action No. 13-186 (BAH) UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175846 December 19, 2014,
Decided December 19, 2014, Filed
Moreover, by defining "significant portion of a species' range" in the final rule as referring only to a
species' "current range," the FWS explicitly contradicts the conclusions by courts finding that "range"
must include the "historical range" and the ESA's legislative history. LEG. HIST. at 742 (H. Rep. 95-1625,
from Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, regarding ESAA) ("The term 'range' [in the ESA] is
used in the general sense, and refers to the historical range of the species."); Defenders of Wildlife, 258
F.3d at 1145. It also renders meaningless the word "curtailment" in 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A), since it is
impossible [*162] to determine the "present . . . curtailment of [a species'] habitat or range" without
knowing what the species' historical range was prior to being curtailed.
Voting issue to protect negative ground – we can’t get predictable disad links or
counterplans against affirmatives that merely codify status quo actions
--xt – requires a baseline
Curtail requires a measurable baseline
Federal Register, 80 (45 Fed. Reg. 45107 1980, Hein Online)
A number of commenters offered various definitions for the terms “curtailments” and "requirements."
"Curtailment" was generally agreed to be the inability to deliver the volumes of gas demanded or
necessary to meet contract requirements. Commenters explained that the term "curtailment" has long
been used by the gas industry to cover any situation in which an operating gas company by reason of
emergencies, shortages of supply or other factors, cannot make the deliveries of gas to which its
customers are entitled under governing instruments such as curtailment plans, tariffs and service
agreements. Furthermore, the operational definition of "curtailment" may-vary somewhat from pipeline
.to pipeline with regard to the index from which curtailment is to be measured. All of the commenters
agreed that "curtailment" should not be merely a reduction in deliveries from contractual requirements, but rather should continue to be measured relative to actual base period end-use data
for some period of time prior to a shortage and adjusted for specific factors such as weather. Some
commentdrs suggested that ERA not adopt a standardized definition of "'curtailment."
1nc – budget authority
Curtail means reducing the budget authority for a program – the aff is only a
regulatory change
Dembling, 78 – General Counsel, General Accounting Office; (Paul, “OVERSIGHT HEARING ON THE
IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1974” HEARING BEFORE THE TASK FORCE ON BUDGET PROCESS OF
THE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND
SESSION JUNE 29, 1978, Hein Online)
Application of curtailment procedure.-The review procedure is triggered by an executive branch decision
to 'curtail" a program which has been made subject to the bill. The definition of "curtail" (subsection
(a)(3)) requires that the executive branch decision result in a reduction of budget authority applied in
furtherance of the program. As noted above, the level of budget authority for this purpose would be the
amount so specified in an appropriation act. The reduction relates to the use of funds "in furtherance of
the program." Thus, although the full amount of budget authority may be spent in some manner, e.g., to
pay contract termination costs or other liabilities incident to the curtailment, such a use of funds still
involves a reduction in funding for affirmative program purposes which triggers the review provisions.
Curtailment review procedure.-The review procedure would generally be similar to the procedure for
reviewing deferrals of budget authority under the Impoundment Control Act, except that congressional
disapproval would take the form of a concurrent resolution. The President would report a proposed
curtailment decision to Congress, together with appropriate information (subsection (b)), and
supplementary reports would be made for any revisions (subsection (c)(3)). The proposal, and any
supplementary reports, would be printed in the Federal Register (subsection (c)(4)).
Voting issue to protect limits and negative ground. Allowing regulatory changes
explodes the topic by creating many small affs that don’t link to very much – only a
hard budgetary limit forces affirmatives to take large enough actions to ensure
adequate disad links and counterplan competition
--xt budget authority
Curtail means discontinuing a program and reducing budget authority for it
Dembling, 78 – General Counsel, General Accounting Office; (Paul, “OVERSIGHT HEARING ON THE
IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1974” HEARING BEFORE THE TASK FORCE ON BUDGET PROCESS OF
THE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND
SESSION JUNE 29, 1978, Hein Online)
(3) "Curtail" means to discontinue, in whole or in part, the execution of a program, resulting in the
application of less budget authority in furtherance of the program than provided by law.
1nc – third party curtailment
Curtail means cutting away the authority
Merriam-Webster, 15 (‘curtail’, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/curtail
Full Definition of CURTAIL
transitive verb
: to make less by or as if by cutting off or away some part <curtail the power of the executive branch>
<curtail inflation>
That requires a third party restriction – executive self-restraint isn’t topical
8th Circuit Court of Appeals 10
(Public Water Supply Dist. No. 3 v. City of Leb., 605 F.3d 511, Lexis)
HN9 7 U.S.C.S. § 1926(b) provides that a rural district's service shall not be curtailed or limited. In this
context, the verbs "curtail" and "limit" connote something being taken from the current holder, rather
than something being retained by the holder to the exclusion of another. "Curtail" is defined as shorten
in extent or amount; abridge; "limit" is defined as set bounds to; restrict. The available cases and
fragments of legislative history all seem to have in mind curtailment resulting from substitution of some
third party as a water-supplier for the rural district. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote
Voting issue for limits and negative ground. This is the largest topic in memory and
allowing executive self-restraint explodes the number of solvency advocates and takes
away core negative CP ground
--xt – third party curtailment
Curtail is a rule limiting action
Gibbons 99 – PhD in Statistics
(Jean, “Selecting and Ordering Populations: A New Statistical Methodology,” p 178)
In general, curtailment is defined with respect to any rule as terminating the drawing of observations at
a number smaller than n as soon as the final decision is determined; here n is the maximum number of
observations that one is allowed to take. Thus curtailment is an “early stopping rule” and it yields a
saving in the number of observations taken. Therefore we now discuss curtailment with respect to our
sampling rule of looking for the cell with the highest frequency in n observations; we wish lo evaluate
the amount of saving that may result for various values of k and n.
1nc - Curtail not abolish
Curtail means a partial restriction – the aff is a cancelation of a program, not
curtailment
San Fellipo, 92 (John, “OREGON'S TELEPHONE INFORMATION DELIVERY SERVICE LAW: A CONSUMER
PROTECTION STEP TOO FAR” 28 Willamette L. Rev. 455 1991-1992, Hein Online)
131. The author understands "limit" as used in OR. ADMIN. R. 860-21-505(8) (1991) to mean cancel, as
opposed to the word "curtail" used in section (7), meaning only a partial restriction.
Voting issue to create reasonable limits and protect negative ground. They increase
the number and quality of affirmative solvency advocates on a topic that is already
the broadest in memory.
--xt curtail is not abolish
Curtail means reduce – not abolish
Black’s Law Dictionary, 90 (Sixth Edition,
http://archive.org/stream/BlacksLaw6th/Blacks%20Law%206th_djvu.txt
Curtail. To cut off the end or any part of; hence to shorten, abridge, diminish, lessen, or reduce; and
term has no such meaning as abolish. State v. Edwards, 207 La. 506, 21 So.2d 624, 625.
Curtail cannot abolish
Supreme Court of Connecticut 85
(IN RE JUVENILE APPEAL (85-AB), Lexis)
1. In an attempt to suggest that the statutory right to a private hearing under General Statutes § 46b122 is not really nullified by their opinion, the majority points to General Statutes § 46b-124. While
recognizing, as they must, that their position does result in publicity, they nevertheless argue that § 46b124 by prohibiting disclosure of records and proceedings in juvenile matters does "curtail the additional
publicity that a public trial would generate." Two points should be made to counter this "justification."
First, as one court said: "[I]n common parlance, or in law composition, the word `curtail' has no such
meaning as `abolish.'" State v. Edwards, 207 La. 506, 511, 21 So.2d 624 (1945). Rather, it means "`to cut
off the end, or any part, of; hence to shorten; abridge; diminish; lessen; reduce.'" Id. Second, the
statutory right to a private hearing in § 46b-122 does not talk at all in terms of relativity, of something is
to be diminished, lessened or reduced. It confers a right that is not to be diluted, let alone nullified.
Curtail means reduce, not end – prefer definitions in the context of restricting
executive power
Tatro et al, 15 – Director and Asst. General Counsel for Union Electric Company (Wendy, REPLY BRIEF OF
AMEREN MISSOURI, 4/10,
https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov/mpsc/commoncomponents/viewdocument.asp?DocId=935923768
Noranda does describe some options if it should encounter problems. In its brief, Noranda quotes from
its SEC filings on this issue.345 Notably, these filings never say “close,” let alone “will close.” They do,
however, use the term “curtailment.”346 Webster’s defines “curtail” as “to make less by or as if by
cutting off or away some part,” as in “curtail the power of the executive branch.”347 Thus, Noranda
discusses reducing its operations, but not closure. In these same filings, Noranda also uses the terms
“restructuring,” “bankruptcy,” and “divest.”348 Thus, while Noranda argues to this Commission that
closure “will” occur, the fine print in Noranda’s SEC filings list every option but closure. Outside of
illogical and factually unsupported threats, Noranda presents nothing that suggests the smelter’s
mandatory closure.
Curtail is a reduction – distinct from termination
2nd Circuit Court of Appeals 49
(Commission of Dep't of Public Utilities v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 178 F.2d 559, Lexis)
When these provisions are read in the light of the background stated and particularly the rejection of
express provisions for the power now claimed by the New Haven, it is obviously difficult to accept the
New Haven's present view that a complete abandonment of passenger service was not intended. Even
the words used point to the decisive and- under the circumstances- clean-cut step. The word
'discontinue' is defined by Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d Ed. 1939, as meaning ' * * * to put
an end to; to cause to cease; to cease using; to give up'- meanings quite other than the connotations
implicit in the word 'curtail,' which it defines ' * * * to shorten; abridge; diminish; lessen; reduce.' It goes
on to give the meaning of 'discontinue' at law as being 'to abandon or terminate by a discontinuance'an even more direct interpretation of the critical term. An interesting bit of support from the court itself
for this view is found in Art. XI, §. 2(m), of the final Consummation Order and Decree, which reserved
jurisdiction in the District Court: 'To consider and act on any question respecting the 'Critical Figures'
established by the Plan with respect to the termination by the Reorganized Company of passenger
service on the Old Colony Lines.' A 'termination' is quite different from a 'reduction.'∂ In this light the
provision substituting a contractual for a franchise obligation for the maintenance of Old Colony
passenger service assumes understandable significance. A plan approved by the I.C.C. might properly
provide for abandonment of service upon the happening of a stated event; the crucial factors of public
interest have been weighed and evaluated just as they would be on a proposal for immediate
abandonment, and only the final event, conclusively detrimental to the continuance of the road, is
needed for operation of the announced step. Surely, however, no such consideration can properly apply
to the substitution of a contractual undertaking so broad and general in its terms as to permit a railroad
to cease, taper off, continue, or expand its operations at will. Should such a provision appear in even a
fully consummated plan, I should think it still sufficiently unusual and vulnerable that its validity could
not be considered conclusively determined. In this connection reference should be made to the New
Haven's claim of 'option' even when the critical figures of loss are reached. A choice between continuing
or abandoning the service is a much more limited one than the wide authority to operate substantially
at will here asserted. But there is, indeed, little to indicate that even this choice was contemplated in the
plan. About the only thing looking in this direction is the provision as to the option, inserted as an
afterthought on the state's insistence, giving Massachusetts the right to buy the Braintree line at salvage
value in the event the passenger losses exceed the critical figure and as a result the road 'shall elect' to
discontinue the service. Definite interpretation of this might well await the clearer light of fuller
discussion; meanwhile I apprehend that it does not contemplate anything as extensive as a purely
discretionary power in the officers of the road to continue incurring these losses as they choose. The
lines of the device to [569] be rid of the Old Colony had been firmly fixed before this appeared; at most
it should permit the road to operate after the happening of the stated event only with the consent of
the vitally interested parties and the representative of the public so long as losses stayed near the
critical figure. Anything beyond this would again tend to nullify the plan. It was certainly never
contemplated that the passenger service would be continued when the losses incurred were four and a
half times as great as those specified as critical.∂ In reaching their differing conclusion, my brethren rely
upon the circumstance that on a few occasions during this long reorganization the Commission or our
court has spoken of a 'curtailment of service' or of discontinuing passenger service 'in whole or in part.'
Neither by themselves nor in their contexts do these offhand characterizations or references appear to
me to support the inference sought to be drawn from them. Indeed several are only statements of
contentions or arguments presented and without further significance. True, the word 'curtailment' has
occasionally been used; but it must be recalled that in the total picture of Old Colony service, complete
abandonment of passenger trains is only a 'curtailment,' since freight trains are still to run. Thus it is that
discontinuing passenger travel must be authorized by the I.C.C. under the bankruptcy power, rather
than under its normal power over abandonment, since it constitutes only a partial abandonment.
Moreover, no stress can properly be put on the Commission's statement early in the proceedings that
the public was 'alive to the danger that service may be discontinued, in whole or in part.' 244 I.C.C. 239,
264. For this was soon after the time that the New Haven had been seeking a curtailment of Old Colony
passenger service, rather than a discontinuance, in the form of its abortive attempt to close 88
passenger stations. The Commonwealth, various towns, and commuters groups had just finished
fighting to prevent any curtailment of service, and were as aware of that as a danger as they were of
discontinuance as a danger. See Rood, Protecting the User Interest in Railroad Reorganization, 7 Law &
Contemp.Prob. 495, 1940. It is a fact that as early as 1939 the New Haven trustees had tried to
discontinue passenger service on the Boston Group of Old Colony lines, and the efforts of the
reorganization judge were required to induce them to hold off on this move while a satisfactory
compromise was sought. Id. at 502.
Not abolishment
Supreme Court of Louisiana 45
(State v. Edwards, 207 La. 506, Lexis)
Police Jury of Concordia Parish, La., Ordinance No. 202 (April 14, 1943) provided that three open seasons
for the hunting of squirrels were curtailed, but the ordinance did not specify how much the state open
hunting seasons were to be curtailed. La. Gen. Stat. § 2947 (1926) provided that the annual open season
for hunting squirrels was from October 1st to January 15, and defendant was convicted of killing
squirrels on October 1, 1944. The ordinance was purportedly enacted to exercise the discretion given to
parish authorities to curtail the hunting season by La. Gen. Stat. § 2939 (1926), but defendant claimed
that the ordinance was invalid because it was meaningless. The court annulled defendant's conviction,
finding that the ordinance was meaningless because the time frame in which hunting was to be curtailed
was not specified. The state's argument that the parish abolished all hunting for the three seasons was
rejected because the Ordinance's use of the term "curtailed" indicated that there was a reduction of the
hunting season and not its abolishment. Also the court had jurisdiction to review the conviction
because its jurisdiction extended to ordinances that imposed penalties.∂ Outcome∂ The court annulled
the conviction and sentence that had been imposed on defendant, and it ordered that the prosecution
of defendant be dismissed.∂ Hide sectionLexisNexis® Headnotes∂ Civil Procedure > ... > Jurisdiction >
Jurisdictional Sources > Constitutional Sources∂ Civil Procedure > Appeals > Appellate Jurisdiction > State
Court Review∂ Constitutional Law > ... > Jurisdiction > Subject Matter Jurisdiction > Amount in
Controversy∂ Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > General Overview∂ HN1 The Supreme Court of
Louisiana has jurisdiction of the question of constitutionality or legality of an ordinance under La. Const.
art. VII, § 10, which states that it shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases where the legality, or
constitutionality of any fine, forfeiture, or penalty imposed by a parish, municipal corporation, board, or
subdivision of the State shall be in contest, whatever may be the amount thereof. Shepardize - Narrow
by this Headnote∂ Environmental Law > Natural Resources & Public Lands > Topic Summary ReportFish &
Wildlife Protection∂ HN2 La. Gen. Stat. § 2947 (1926 ) provides that the annual open season for hunting
squirrels is from October 1st to January 15th; and, according to La. Gen. Stat. § 2925 (1926), the term
"open season" includes the first and the last of the two days mentioned. Shepardize - Narrow by this
Headnote∂ Counsel: A. B. Parker, of Jena, and C. T. Munholland and Theus, Grisham, Davis & Leigh, all of
Monroe (W. T. McCain and J. W. Ethridge, both of Colfax, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.∂ Fred S.
LeBlanc, Atty. Gen., M. E. Culligan, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jesse C. McGee, Dist. Atty., of Harrisonburg (Jos.
M. Reeves, of Vidalia, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee. ∂ Judges: O'Niell, Chief Justice. ∂ Opinion by:
O'NIELL ∂ Opinion∂ [507] The appellant was convicted of killing squirrels out of season, in violation of a
parish ordinance, and was sentenced to pay a fine of $ 25 and the costs of court or be imprisoned in the
parish jail for 30 days.∂ In a motion to quash the bill of information, and again in a motion for a new trial
and a motion in arrest of judgment, the defendant pleaded that the parish ordinance [508] was
unconstitutional, for several reasons which we find it unnecessary to consider. He pleaded also that in
any event the ordinance was illegal because it was so worded as to have no meaning or effect. The
motions were overruled.∂ HN1 This court has jurisdiction of the question of constitutionality or legality of
the ordinance, under the provision in Section 10 of Article VII of the Constitution that the Supreme Court
shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases "where the legality, or constitutionality of any fine,
forfeiture, or penalty imposed by a parish, municipal corporation, board, or subdivision of the State shall
be in contest, whatever may be the amount thereof."∂ The charge in the bill of information, stated
specifically, is that on the 1st day of October, 1944, the defendant "did unlawfully hunt and take six
squirrels during the closed season, contrary to the provisions of Ordinance 202 of the Police Jury of
Concordia Parish". Under the state law the 1st day of October was within the open season for hunting
squirrels. HN2 In Section 1 of Article III of Act 273 of 1926, being Section 2947 of Dart's General Statutes,
the annual open season for hunting squirrels is from October 1st to January 15th; and, according to
Section 1 of Article I of the act, being Section 2925 of Dart's General Statutes, the term "open season"
includes the first and the last of the two days mentioned. Hence the defendant is not accused of
violating the state law.∂ The ordinance purports to "curtail" the open season for hunting squirrels, or
deer [509] or bear, as fixed by the state law, but does not give the extent of the curtailment, or indicate
whether it shall be cut off from the beginning or from the end of the open season, from October 1st to
January 15th. The first section of the ordinance, adopted on April 14, 1943, reads as follows: "Section 1.
Be it ordained by the Police Jury of the Parish of Concordia, State of Louisiana, in lawful session
convened, that the open seasons for the hunting and taking of wild deer, bear and squirrels within the
boundaries of the Parish of Concordia, State of Louisiana, are hereby curtailed for the open seasons of
1943-1944, the open seasons of 1944-1945, and the open seasons of 1945-1946, it being apparent that
a curtailment of the open seasons so that such game life may restock themselves by natural breeding is
necessary, and written consent having been given by the Conservation Commissioner of the State of
Louisiana to the Police Jury of the Parish of Concordia, to adopt this ordinance."∂ The second section of
the ordinance imposes the penalty, -- a fine not less than $ 25 or more than $ 100, or imprisonment for
a period not exceeding 60 days, or both the fine and imprisonment; the third section repeals all
ordinances in conflict with Ordinance No. 202; and the fourth or last section provides that Ordinance
No. 202 shall become effective after promulgation in the official journal of the parish, once a week for
four consecutive weeks. Such promulgation is required by the third paragraph of Section 15 of Article I
of Act 273 of 1926, Section 2939 of Dart's General [510] Statutes. Ordinance No. 202 was adopted under
authority of that section of the statute, which section reads as follows:∂ "Section 15. The Police Jury of
any parish may apply to the Conservation Commissioner for the right to adopt an ordinance to curtail
the open season in such parish, or any part thereof, when it becomes apparent that the game bird and
game quadruped life are in need of a curtailment of the open seasons so that such game life may
restock themselves by natural breeding.∂ "Upon receipt of such application and if conditions indicate the
need of adding protection for any game bird or game quadruped or all of them, the Commissioner may
give written consent to the police jury of the parish to adopt, in their discretion, an ordinance to curtail
the open season, but for not more than three consecutive years, which curtailment shall apply to
everyone, including the residents of such parish.∂ "Such curtailment shall become effective only after
notice of the adoption of such ordinance shall have been promulgated by the police jury, in the official
parish journal, once a week for four consecutive weeks prior to the regular annual open seasons for
hunting. Annual special parish close seasons on the game birds and game quadrupeds shall commence
on the legal date of the open seasons in each year."∂ The argument for the prosecution is that the
ordinance abolished the three open seasons, namely, the open season from October 1, 1943, to January
15, [511] 1944, and the open season from October 1, 1944, to January 15, 1945, and the open season
from October 1, 1945, to January 15, 1946; and that, in that way, the ordinance suspended altogether
the right to hunt wild deer, bear or squirrels for the period of three years. The ordinance does not read
that way, or convey any such meaning. According to Webster's New International Dictionary, 2 Ed.,
unabridged, the word "curtail" means "to cut off the end, or any part, of; hence to shorten; abridge;
diminish; lessen; reduce." The word "abolish" or the word "suspend" is not given in the dictionaries as
one of the definitions of the word "curtail". In fact, in common parlance, or in law composition, the
word "curtail" has no such meaning as "abolish". The ordinance declares that the three open seasons
which are thereby declared curtailed are the open season of 1943-1944, -- meaning from October 1,
1943, to January 15, 1944; and the open season 1944-1945, -- meaning from October 1, 1944, to January
15, 1945; and the open season 1945-1946, -- meaning from October 1, 1945, to January 15, 1946. To
declare that these three open seasons, 1943-1944, 1944-1945, and 1945-1946, "are hereby curtailed",
without indicating how, or the extent to which, they are "curtailed", means nothing.
It cannot ‘make surveillance impossible’
Baker 7 - author of Capitalism's Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market System
(“Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade,”
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/391/fore/15evbe.htm?comm_id=8&Language=E&Parl=39&Ses=1)
Mr. Baker: I agree with the point that you were making about the World Bank. Many people in the
World Bank are extremely dedicated to curtailing poverty in developing countries. Some others are
looking for the next opportunity in the private sector and may be less aggressive in fighting corruption
and money laundering; perhaps less aggressive in taking on the kinds of problems we are talking about
here.
You are correct when you talk about oil revenues going out into foreign banks. They do not go to other
African banks, but come frequently through the structure I talked about, the illicit financial structure,
but ultimately into Western economies.
Part of what fascinates me is that it is almost entirely a permanent outward transfer; very little turns
around and goes back in at a later date to developing countries. The little bit that turns around and goes
back almost always goes back as foreign direct investment, FDI; that is to say it has gone abroad, has
acquired a foreign nationality as a company, investment fund or trust account, and it comes as FDI with
the intention of going abroad again as dividends, interest on principal payments on loans or as transfer
pricing disguised in inter-company transactions.
You used the words "make it impossible"; I use the word "curtail." I am interested in curtailing the
outflow of illicit money, not trying to stop it entirely. Curtailing it is a matter of political will; stopping it
is draconian. I am not certain I favour that.
General curtail definitions
Reduce
Curtail means to reduce
American Heritage, 15 (‘curtail’, https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=curtail
cur·tail (kər-tāl )
tr.v. cur·tailed, cur·tail·ing, cur·tails
To cut short or reduce: We curtailed our conversation when other people entered the room. See
Synonyms at shorten.
Means to reduce or limit
MacMillan Dictionary, 15 (‘curtail’, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/american/curtail
curtail
VERB [TRANSITIVE] FORMAL
to reduce or limit something, especially something good
a government attempt to curtail debate
Impose a restriction
Curtail means impose a restriction
Oxford Dictionaries, 15 (“curtail”,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/curtail)
Definition of curtail in English:
verb
[WITH OBJECT]
1Reduce in extent or quantity; impose a restriction on: civil liberties were further curtailed
Curtail means place restrictions on
Vocabulary.com, 15 (‘curtail’ http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/curtail
DEFINITIONS OF:
curtail
v place restrictions on
“curtail drinking in school”
Synonyms:
curb, cut back, restrict
Curtail means cutting away authority
Curtail means cutting away some authority
Merriam-Webster, 15 (‘curtail’, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/curtail
Full Definition of CURTAIL
transitive verb
: to make less by or as if by cutting off or away some part <curtail the power of the executive branch>
<curtail inflation>
Curtail means reduce duration
Curtail can apply to duration
OED, 15 (Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd edition, ‘curtail’,
http://www.oed.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/view/Entry/46170?rskey=Xeus0B&result=2#eid
curtail, v.
3. To shorten in duration or extent; to cut down; to abbreviate, abridge, diminish, or reduce, in extent
or amount.
Curtail requires prevention
Curtail requires prevention, not just stopping current actions
Doss, 99 (Julie, “PEER TO PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE IX: A DISCUSSION OF LIABILITY
STANDARDS FROM DOE v. LONDONDERRY” 34 Tulsa L.J. 443 1998-1999, Hein Online)
The court also turned to the OCR policy interpretations for guidance acknowledging that the OCR
requires school districts to "take reasonable steps to curtail peer sexual harassment" and holds those
districts to a "knows or should have known" standard."' 9 The word "curtail" suggests that the districts
are required to prevent as well as stop sexual harassment.
AT: Curtail excludes abolish
Curtailment can discontinue a program in whole or in part
Dembling, 78 – General Counsel, General Accounting Office; (Paul, “OVERSIGHT HEARING ON THE
IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1974” HEARING BEFORE THE TASK FORCE ON BUDGET PROCESS OF
THE COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS SECOND
SESSION JUNE 29, 1978, Hein Online)
(3) "Curtail" means to discontinue, in whole or in part, the execution of a program, resulting in the
application of less budget authority in furtherance of the program than provided by law.
Curtailment includes complete elimination
FASB 85
(Financial Accounting Standards Board, EMPLOYERS' ACCOUNTING FOR SETTLEMENTS AND
CURTAILMENTS OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS AND FOR TERMINATION BENEFITS (ISSUED
12/85))
Statement 87 continues the past practice of delaying the recognition in net periodic pension cost of (a)
gains and losses from experience different from that assumed, (b) the effects of changes in assumptions,
and (c) the cost of retroactive plan amendments. However, this Statement requires immediate
recognition of certain previously unrecognized amounts when certain transactions or events occur. It
prescribes the method for determining the amount to be recognized in earnings when a pension
obligation is settled or a plan is curtailed. Settlement is defined as an irrevocable action that relieves the
employer (or the plan) of primary responsibility for an obligation and eliminates significant risks related
to the obligation and the assets used to effect the settlement. A curtailment is defined as a significant
reduction in, or an elimination of, defined benefit accruals for present employees' future services.
Eliminating part curtails the whole
Chase, 49 – US Circuit Court judge (COMMISSION OF DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES OF
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS v. NEW YORK, N.H. & H.R. CO. No. 40, Docket 21392 UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 178 F.2d 559; 1949 U.S. App. LEXIS 3864
November 10, 1949, Argued December 13, 1949, Decided, lexis)
In reaching their differing conclusion, my brethren rely upon the circumstance that on a few occasions
during this long reorganization the Commission or our court has spoken of a 'curtailment [**32] of
service' or of discontinuing passenger service 'in whole or in part.' Neither by themselves nor in their
contexts do these offhand characterizations or references appear to me to support the inference sought
to be drawn from them. Indeed several are only statements of contentions or arguments presented and
without further significance. True, the word 'curtailment' has occasionally been used; but it must be
recalled that in the total picture of Old Colony service, complete abandonment of passenger trains is
only a 'curtailment,' since freight trains are still to run. Thus it is that discontinuing passenger travel
must be authorized by the I.C.C. under the bankruptcy power, rather than under its normal power over
abandonment, since it constitutes only a partial abandonment. Moreover, no stress can properly be put
on the Commission's statement early in the proceedings that the public was 'alive to the danger that
service may be discontinued, in whole or in part.' 244 I.C.C. 239, 264. For this was soon after the time
that the New Haven had been seeking a curtailment of Old Colony passenger service, rather than a
discontinuance, in the form of its abortive attempt to [**33] close 88 passenger stations. The
Commonwealth, various towns, and commuters groups had just finished fighting to prevent any
curtailment of service, and were as aware of that as a danger as they were of discontinuance as a
danger. See Rood, Protecting the User Interest in Railroad Reorganization, 7 Law & Contemp.Prob. 495,
1940. It is a fact that as early as 1939 the New Haven trustees had tried to discontinue passenger service
on the Boston Group of Old Colony lines, and the efforts of the reorganization judge were required to
induce them to hold off on this move while a satisfactory compromise was sought. Id. at 502.
No limiting function – curtailing to make an agency non-functional has the same effect
as abolition
Hildebrandt, 37 – chair of the Subcommittee of the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads
(“Foreign Air Mail,” HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE POST OFFICE
AND POST ROADS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SEVENTY-FIFTH CONGRESS, Hein Online)
The CHAIRMAN. By the authority to curtail or reduce service you have the right to destroy or to
eliminate the contractor. He cannot render service if you reduce the service, for instance, to one round
trip a month. You have ample authority under the provision you now recommend to destroy a route if
you wish to do so.
Mr. CROWLEY. One could not probably put that construction on the word "curtail." It seems to reduce,
but it would not be held to reduce to such an extent as to destroy the contract itself.
The CHAIRMAN. You could cut the service down so much that a contractor could not operate.
Curtail allows almost elimination
Brooke, 77 – US Senator (9 Housing and Transportation of the Handicapped Laws Histories and
Administrative Documents Bernard D. Jr. ed. 17792 1977-1978, Hein Online
Mr. BROOKE. The Senator said "closing of the base." I think he used the word "curtail," because
sometimes a base may not be closed, but it will be cut back to such an extent that it is almost closed
anyway.
Context – Levi Guidelines
The Levi Guidelines ‘curtailed’ domestic intelligence gathering
Berman, 14 - Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School (Emily Berman, Regulating
Domestic Intelligence Collection, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 3,
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol71/iss1/5
Since the FBI’s inception, there has been tension embedded in its mission. It is charged not only with
solving crimes but also with preventing them.26 While the two goals often complement one another,
they call for very different types of investigative activities. Focus on crime solving argues for a set of
investigative powers enabling inquiries into specific acts, with an eye toward successful prosecution of
the perpetrators.27 Preventive work, by contrast, requires the collection of much broader swaths of
information—information about illicit organizations, their members, their goals, their capacities, and
their sources of funding as well as information about possible targets.28
Over time, both the Bureau’s focus and the rules governing its activities have swung back and forth
along the spectrum between the targeted investigations of crime solving and the broader intelligence
gathering associated with prevention. The Guidelines themselves are the product of the FBI’s early1970s move away from intelligence collection. After the United States Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, commonly known as the Church
Committee for its chair Senator Frank Church (D-ID), revealed that decades of unregulated intelligence
collection by the FBI had resulted in widespread abuses of the government’s investigative powers,29
Congress determined that the FBI should be subject to a legislative charter setting out strict limits on its
intelligence-collection authority.30 In an effort to stave off potentially more restrictive legislative action,
President Gerald Ford’s Attorney General, Edward Levi, issued in 1976 the first set of Attorney General’s
Guidelines—known as the Levi Guidelines.31
The Levi Guidelines strictly curtailed domestic intelligence investigations through a basic regulatory
structure that subsequent versions of the Guidelines have largely retained.32 This structure consists of
multiple investigative levels. For each successive level, a higher threshold of suspicion is necessary to
proceed; the investigative tools agents may use are more intrusive; and procedural safeguards, such as
the need for supervisory approval and limits on the temporal length of investigations, are more
robust.33 The Guidelines continue to function as the primary constraint on the FBI’s operations and
remain a justification for the lack of a statutory charter governing the FBI’s activities, but they have not
remained static.34 Multiple modifications made in the years between 1976 and 2001 eased, though
ultimately retained, restrictions on intelligence collection.35
Its
Its denotes ownership
‘Its’ is a possessive pronoun showing ownership
Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005
(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)
Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to
show possession or ownership.
EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)
US must be the possessor or agent of surveillance
Merriam Webster No date (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/its its AWEY)
Full Definition of ITS¶ : of or relating to it or itself especially as possessor, agent, or object of
kennel> <a child proud of its first drawings> <its final enactment into law>
an action <going to its
“Its” means belonging to it or that thing
Oxford English Dictionary 14 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/its
Its
A. As adj. poss. pron. Of or belonging to it, or that thing (L. ejus); also refl., Of or belonging to itself, its own
(L. suus).
Grammatically, this refers solely to U.S. policy
Manderino 73 (Justice – Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, “Sigal, Appellant, v. Manufacturers Light and
Heat Co”., No. 26, Jan. T., 1972, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 450 Pa. 228; 299 A.2d 646; 1973 Pa.
LEXIS 600; 44 Oil & Gas Rep. 214, Lexis)
On its face, the written instrument granting easement rights in this case is ambiguous. The same sentence which refers to the right to lay a 14
inch pipeline (singular) has a later reference to "said lines" (plural). The use of the plural "lines" makes no sense because the only previous
reference has been to a "line" (singular). The writing is additionally ambiguous because other key words which are "also may change
the size of its pipes" are dangling in that the possessive pronoun "its" before the word "pipes" does not have any subject
preceding, to which the possessive pronoun refers. The dangling phrase is the beginning of a sentence, the first word of which
does not begin with a capital letter as is customary in normal English [***10] usage. Immediately preceding the "sentence" which does not
begin with a capital letter, there appears a dangling [*236] semicolon which makes no sense at the beginning of a sentence and can hardly
relate to the preceding sentence which is already properly punctuated by a closing period.
The above deviations from accepted
grammatical usage make difficult, if not impossible, a clear understanding of the words used or the
intention of the parties. This is particularly true concerning the meaning of a disputed phrase in the instrument which states that the
grantee is to pay damages from ". . . the relaying, maintaining and operating said pipeline. . . ." The instrument is ambiguous as to what the
words ". . . relaying . . . said pipeline . . ." were intended to mean.
Its is possessive and refers to the party preceding its use – the USFG
US District Court 7
(United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. John,
“AGF Marine Aviation & Transp. v. Cassin, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90808,” Lexis)//BB
The Court inadvertently used the word "his" when the Court intended to use the word "its." The
possessive pronoun was intended to refer to the party preceding its use--AGF. Indeed, that reference is
consistent with the undisputed facts in this case, which indicate that Cassin completed an application for
the insurance policy and submitted it to his agent, Theodore Tunick & Company ("Tunick"). Tunick, in
turn, submitted the application to AGF's underwriting agent, TL Dallas. (See Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of
Mot. for Summ. J. 5.)
Grammatically, this refers to the United States Federal Government
Manderino 73 – Justice, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
(“Sigal, Appellant, v. Manufacturers Light and Heat Co., No. 26, Jan. T., 1972, Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, 450 Pa. 228; 299 A.2d 646; 1973 Pa. LEXIS 600; 44 Oil & Gas Rep. 214, Lexis)
On its face, the written instrument granting easement rights in this case is ambiguous. The same
sentence which refers to the right to lay a 14 inch pipeline (singular) has a later reference to "said lines"
(plural). The use of the plural "lines" makes no sense because the only previous reference has been to a
"line" (singular). The writing is additionally ambiguous because other key words which are "also may
change the size of its pipes" are dangling in that the possessive pronoun "its" before the word "pipes"
does not have any subject preceding, to which the possessive pronoun refers. The dangling phrase is the
beginning of a sentence, the first word of which does not begin with a capital letter as is customary in
normal English [***10] usage. Immediately preceding the "sentence" which does not begin with a
capital letter, there appears a dangling [*236] semicolon which makes no sense at the beginning of a
sentence and can hardly relate to the preceding sentence which is already properly punctuated by a
closing period. The above deviations from accepted grammatical usage make difficult, if not impossible,
a clear understanding of the words used or the intention of the parties. This is particularly true
concerning the meaning of a disputed phrase in the instrument which states that the grantee is to pay
damages from ". . . the relaying, maintaining and operating said pipeline. . . ." The instrument is
ambiguous as to what the words ". . . relaying . . . said pipeline . . ." were intended to mean.
Possessive means “owning” – Merriam Webster
(Merriam Webster, 2014 access date, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/possession)//BB
: the condition of having or owning something
: something that is owned or possessed by someone
law : the crime of having something that is illegal (such as a drug or weapon)
That means the USFG must own the surveillance program
Supreme Court of Oklahoma 34
(Swindall v. State Election Board, 168 Okla. 97, Lexis)//BB
However, I view another phase of the act which is not considered in the majority opinion. It is my
opinion that the expression, "its nominees," should have been construed by this court. Had this court so
construed those words, it would have assisted the State Election Board in the furtherance of its
ministerial duties, and would have set to rest the immediate question. It is my theory that the correct
interpretation to place upon those words, "its nominees," is to the effect that those words do not mean
all the nominees of any particular party. The word "its" is the possessive case, or the possessive
adjective of "it", meaning of or belonging to it. Webster's International Dictionary. In other words, the
expression, "its nominees," as applied to the Republican party, means nominees of it (the Republican
party). The words, "nominees" of the "Republican party," do not and necessarily cannot mean all the
nominees of the Republican party. Those words, however, do mean more than one nominee. It seems
reasonable to conclude, in the absence of an expression like "all of its nominees," or words of similar
import, that it was not the intent of the Legislature to make those words, "its nominees," all inclusive. It
seems to me that a fair and reasonable interpretation would be that those words support and embrace
the thought expressed by the New York statute, to wit, that it is the intention of the candidate to
support generally at the next general election the nominees of the party from which he seeks his
nomination, or that it is his intention to support a majority of the candidates of that party.
Its is associated with
Its means associated with
Dictionary.com, 9 (based on Collins English Dictionary, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/its?s=t)
its (ɪts)
— determiner
a. of, belonging to, or associated in some way with it: its left rear wheel
b. ( as pronoun ): each town claims its is the best
Domestic
Domestic violations
1nc - Domestic means within US borders
Domestic surveillance is the collection of information within national borders
Avilez et al, 14 - Ethics, History, and Public Policy Senior Capstone Project at Carnegie Mellon University
(Marie, “Security and Social Dimensions of City Surveillance Policy” 12/10,
http://www.cmu.edu/hss/ehpp/documents/2014-City-Surveillance-Policy.pdf
Domestic surveillance – collection of information about the activities of private individuals/organizations
by a government entity within national borders; this can be carried out by federal, state and/or local
officials
The plan violates – they restrict surveillance on US persons regardless of borders
Voting issue to protect limits and negative ground. They explode the topic by allowing
a wide range of international affirmatives where US nationals are tangentially
involved with foreign terrorism – requiring a geographic limit is more predictable
--xt - Domestic means within the US
Domestic means wholly within the United States
Meyer, 14 – lawyer at Stanford (Jonathan, “Executive Order 12333 on American Soil, and Other Tales
from the FISA Frontier” 12/3, http://webpolicy.org/2014/12/03/eo-12333-on-american-soil/
3. These Aren’t “Domestic” Communications Under FISA and the Wiretap Act
Both the Wiretap Act and FISA include exclusivity provisions. The Wiretap Act text, in 18 U.S.C. §
2511(2)(f), reads:
[Procedures] in [the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and FISA] shall be the exclusive
means by which electronic surveillance, as defined in [FISA], and the interception of domestic wire, oral,
and electronic communications may be conducted.
The similar FISA text, in 50 U.S.C. § 1812, says:
Except as [otherwise expressly authorized by statute,] the procedures of [the Wiretap Act, the Stored
Communications Act, the Pen Register Act, and FISA] shall be the exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance and the interception of domestic wire, oral, or electronic communications may be
conducted.
Once again unpacking the legalese, these parallel provisions establish exclusivity for 1) “electronic
surveillance” and 2) interception of “domestic” communications. As I explained above, intercepting a
two-end foreign wireline communication doesn’t constitute “electronic surveillance.” As for what counts
as a “domestic” communication, the statutes seem to mean a communication wholly within the United
States.7 A two-end foreign communication would plainly flunk that definition.
So, there’s the three-step maneuver. If the NSA intercepts foreign-to-foreign voice or Internet traffic, as
it transits the United States, that isn’t covered by either FISA or the Wiretap Act. All that’s left is
Executive Order 12333.
Domestic surveillance means within the geographic territory of the US
Sladick, 12 – blogger for the Tenth Amendment Center, (Kelly, “Battlefield USA: The Drones are Coming”
http://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2012/12/battlefield-usa-the-drones-are-coming/
In a US leaked document, “Airforce Instruction 14-104”, on domestic surveillance is permitted on US
citizens. It defines domestic surveillance as, “any imagery collected by satellite (national or commercial)
and airborne platforms that cover the land areas of the 50 United States, the District of Columbia, and
the territories and possessions of the US, to a 12 nautical mile seaward limit of these land areas.” In the
leaked document, legal uses include: natural disasters, force protection, counter-terrorism, security
vulnerabilities, environmental studies, navigation, and exercises.
Federal definitions concur
Letters of Credit
(2-6 Letters of Credit § 6.04, Lexis)
The second type of transaction out of which eligible acceptances arise is transactions involving the
domestic shipment of goods.12Link to the text of the note The word “domestic” in this context has been
defined by the Federal Reserve Board to mean “within the United States.”13Link to the text of the note
The requirements of connection between the acceptance and the domestic shipment transaction
parallel those for the import- export transaction: The draft should be drawn by the buyer or seller of the
goods, in an amount reasonably equal to the cost of the transaction, and should finance a current
shipment. Like the import-export transaction, the domestic shipment transaction should be selfliquidating.
--excludes the cloud
The cloud is outside of US borders
Donohue, 15 - Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Laura, “SECTION 702 AND THE
COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND INTERNET CONTENT” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117,
Winter, lexis)
These other types of programs can potentially yield significant amounts of information. The NSA appears
to be collecting email address books for most major webmail companies, and storing the information in
multiple databases. n136 According to the Washington Post, the yield is "hundreds of millions of contact
lists from personal e-mail and instant messaging accounts around the world." n137 On any
representative day, in turn, the NSA appears to collect approximately half a million buddy lists and
inboxes (which frequently include the first part of the messages that have been sent). n138
Another example of collection under Executive Order 12,333 is the interception of content flowing
between data centers overseas. In October 2013, the Washington Post reported that the NSA was
collecting hundreds of millions of records, ranging from metadata to content, transiting fiber optics
cables between Google and Yahoo data centers. n139 The principal tool used to analyze the infor [*153]
mation, MUSCULAR, appears to be operated jointly with the U.K.'s Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ). n140 The collection of information held on the cloud, outside U.S. borders, shifts
the program outside the FISA framework. n141
--includes foreign intelligence
Refers to searches within the United States---this can include relevant information
about foreign sources
Truehart 2 – J.D., Boston University School of Law
(Carrie, “CASE COMMENT:UNITED STATES v. BIN LADEN AND THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE EXCEPTION
TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT FOR SEARCHES OF "UNITED STATES PERSONS" ABROAD,” 82 B.U.L.
Rev. 555)
This Case Comment uses the word "domestic" to refer to searches and investigations conducted within
the United States. The term "domestic foreign intelligence investigations" at first glance seems like an
oxymoron, but it is not. As used in this Case Comment, the term refers to investigations conducted
within the United States to obtain foreign intelligence information - that is, information pertaining to
foreign nationals and their respective governments or international groups - as opposed to
investigations conducted within the United States to obtain domestic intelligence information - that is,
information pertaining to United States persons only. Notice that a United States person residing in the
United States, however, could become the target of a foreign intelligence investigation if the
Government were investigating that individual's relationship with a foreign government or international
terrorist group. In other words, the difference between whether an investigation is a "domestic foreign
intelligence investigation" or a "domestic intelligence investigation" turns on whether the investigation
focuses in part on a foreign government or international group.
The line between "foreign intelligence investigations" and "criminal investigations" is admittedly a blurry
one. This is especially true where the target of the investigation is suspected of involvement in
espionage or terrorism because these activities are crimes as well as national security concerns. See
United States v. Troung Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915-16 (stating that "almost all foreign intelligence
investigations are in part criminal investigations" because, "although espionage prosecutions are rare,
there is always the possibility that the targets of the investigations will be prosecuted for criminal
violations"); Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 278 (stating that "[a] foreign intelligence collection effort that
targets the acts of terrorists is likely to uncover evidence of crime"). For the purpose of this Case
Comment, the term "foreign intelligence investigations" refers to investigations conducted primarily for
the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence. "Criminal investigations" refers to investigations
conducted specifically for the purpose of obtaining information to prosecute crimes.
FISA only applies to domestic surveillance of foreigners on US soil
Donohue, 15 - Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Laura, “SECTION 702 AND THE
COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND INTERNET CONTENT” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117,
Winter, lexis)
C. The Protect America Act
Four months after McConnell's proposal, Congress passed the Protect America Act (PAA), easing
restrictions on the surveillance of foreigners where one (or both) parties were located overseas. n53 In
doing so, it removed such communications from FISA's definition of "electronic surveillance," narrowing
the term to include only domestic communications. The attendant restrictions, such as those related to
probable cause that the target be a foreign power or an agent thereof, or likely to use the facilities to be
placed under surveillance, or specifications related to the facility in question, dropped away.
Includes foreigners on US soil
Adelson 8 – Program Director of the Human Rights and Immigration Law Project, Center for the
Advancement of Human Rights, Florida State University College of Law; BA, Brandeis University; MPhil,
University of Cambridge; JD, University of Miami School of Law
(Wendi, “CHILD PROSTITUTE OR VICTIM OF TRAFFICKING?,” 6 U. St. Thomas L.J. 96)
Although the TVPA was not enacted specifically to prevent the prostitution of U.S. born children, some
of the legislative debates reflect that certain legislators had that goal in mind. For example, the late
Senator Wellstone imagined that Congress designed the TPVA "to help federal law enforcement officials
expand anti-trafficking efforts here and abroad; [and] to expand domestic anti-trafficking and victim
assistance efforts." 30Link to the text of the note His use of the word "domestic" likely refers to efforts
that take place on U.S. soil as well as actions geared toward the aid of "domestic" or U.S. born victims.
[102] As executed, the language of the TVPA is broad enough to extend its protective blanket to foreign
born as well as LPR and U.S. children exploited in this manner.
--US persons definition unlimits
Their interpretation allows affs about data collection anywhere in the world
Tracy, 15 (Sam, “NSA WHISTLEBLOWER JOHN TYE EXPLAINS EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333” 3/18,
http://warrantless.org/2015/03/tye-12333/
It’s been widely reported that the NSA, under the constitutionally suspect authority of Section 215 of
the PATRIOT Act, collects all Americans’ phone metadata. Congress has not yet passed any reforms to
this law, but there have been many proposals for changes and the national debate is still raging. Yet
Americans’ data is also being collected under a different program that’s entirely hidden from public
oversight, and that was authorized under the Reagan-era Executive Order 12333.
That’s the topic of a TEDx-Charlottesville talk by whistleblower John Napier Tye, entitled “Why I spoke
out against the NSA.” Tye objected to NSA surveillance while working in the US State Department. He
explains that EO 12333 governs data collected overseas, as opposed to domestic surveillance which is
authorized by statute. However, because Americans’ emails and other communications are stored in
servers all over the globe, the distinction between domestic and international surveillance is much less
salient than when the order was originally given by President Reagan in 1981.
--AT: Geography definition overlimits
A wide range of genuinely domestic affs exists
Thompson, 13 – Legislative Attorney for the Congressional Research Service (Richard, “Drones in
Domestic Surveillance Operations: Fourth Amendment Implications and Legislative Responses”
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42701.pdf
1 The term “domestic drone surveillance” as used in this report is designed to cover a wide range of
government uses including, but not limited to, investigating and deterring criminal or regulatory
violations; conducting health and safety inspections; performing search and rescue missions; patrolling
the national borders; and conducting environmental investigations.
--AT: ‘originated within’ CI
Physically located within---distinct from originated
Beppu 8 – Senior Articles Editor, Cardozo Law Review. J.D. Candidate (June 2007), Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law
(Daisuke, “WHEN CULTURAL VALUE JUSTIFIES PROTECTIONISM: INTERPRETING THE LANGUAGE OF THE
GATT TO FIND A LIMITED CULTURAL EXCEPTION TO THE NATIONAL TREATMENT PRINCIPLE,” 29 Cardozo
L. Rev. 1765)
Although there is no provision in the Vienna Convention that deals with this contingency, 80Link to the
text of the note and although the Appellate Body has not [1779] expressly formulated a rule that would
help to decide the matter, 81Link to the text of the note it is a sound assumption to make, based on the
fact that the Oxford Dictionary is the one most often cited, that the Appellate Body would defer to the
Oxford Dictionary. 82Link to the text of the note In other words, the Oxford definition prevails when the
Oxford Dictionary offers a definition that differs significantly from that of Webster's Dictionary. 83Link to
the text of the note Relying primarily on the Appellate Body's preference for the Oxford Dictionary, the
result for the purposes of this analysis is that the word "domestic" comes to mean "physically located
within boundaries." Therefore, the Oxford meaning of "domestic" - being physically located within
boundaries - is different from "national origin" - a source of national character.
1nc – domestic means US persons
Domestic surveillance means that it must target US persons – not just be collected
within the US
McCarthy, 6 – former assistant U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York. (Andrew, “It’s Not
“Domestic Spying”; It’s Foreign Intelligence Collection” National Review, 5/15, Read more at:
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/122556/its-not-domestic-spying-its-foreign-intelligencecollection-andrew-c-mccarthy
Eggen also continues the mainstream media’s propagandistic use of the term “domestic surveillance [or
'spying'] program.” In actuality, the electronic surveillance that the NSA is doing — i.e., eavesdropping
on content of conversations — is not “domestic.” A call is not considered “domestic” just because one
party to it happens to be inside the U.S., just as an investigation is not “domestic” just because some of
the subjects of interest happen to reside inside our country. Mohammed Atta was an agent of a foreign
power, al Qaeda. Surveilling him — had we done it — would not have been “domestic spying.” The calls
NSA eavesdrops on are “international,” not “domestic.” If that were not plain enough on its face, the
Supreme Court made it explicit in the Keith case (1972). There, even though it held that judicial
warrants were required for wiretapping purely domestic terror organizations, the Court excluded
investigations of threats posed by foreign organizations and their agents operating both within and
without the U.S. That is, the Court understood what most Americans understand but what the media,
civil libertarians and many members of Congress refuse to acknowledge: if we are investigating the
activities of agents of foreign powers inside the United States, that is not DOMESTIC surveillance. It is
FOREIGN counter-intelligence.
That, in part, is why the statute regulating wiretaps on foreign powers operating within the U.S. — the
one the media has suddenly decided it loves after bad-mouthing it for years as a rubber-stamp — is
called the FOREIGN Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The United States has never needed court
permission to conduct wiretapping outside U.S. territory; the wiretapping it does inside U.S. territory for
national security purposes is FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, not “domestic surveillance.”
Voting issue to protect limits – they explode the topic by expanding ‘domestic’ to
cover immigration and foreign counter-intelligence – which are both big enough to be
separate topics
--Excludes FISA
Domestic surveillance only observes conduct of potential criminal activity – foreign
intelligence gathering is a legally distinct category of federal policy
Fisher, 4 - Associate Professor of Law and Director, Center for Social Justice, Seton Hall Law School
(Linda, “GUILT BY EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION: POLITICAL PROFILING, SURVEILLANCE AND THE PRIVACY
OF GROUPS” ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:621)
There is ample precedent for adopting a reasonable suspicion of criminality standard for political
surveillance. This standard remains as a requirement for police departments accepting federal aid.237
Its substantial equivalent was successfully employed in the FBI’s domestic surveillance guidelines for
over twenty-five years.238 It was also incorporated into the Chicago Red Squad consent decree.239 The
Church Committee endorsed the reasonable suspicion standard as a predicate for terrorism
investigations in 1976.240 Notably, it was recently adopted in the Denver police spying consent
decree.241 And it was enacted in a Seattle ordinance.242 Other political surveillance litigation was not
as successful.243 However, the Dale Court’s affirmation of a robust right of association strengthens and
reinforces those First Amendment arguments previously available.
(footnote 238)
238. See ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES, supra note 13; Lininger, supra note 13. These guidelines
apply to domestic surveillance only; that is, surveillance of conduct that involves potential criminal
activity, rather than foreign intelligence. The guidelines governing foreign intelligence are classified.
Portions of prior foreign intelligence surveillance guidelines from 1995 have been released, but nothing
since that time has been made available to the public. The 1995 guidelines give investigators much
greater leeway to collect intelligence than do the domestic surveillance guidelines. See ATTORNEY
GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR FBI FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND FOREIGN
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS (1995), available at http://www.politrix.org/foia /fbi/fbiguide.htm.
The FISC is exclusively about foreign surveillance, not domestic
Berman, 14 - Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School (Emily Berman, Regulating
Domestic Intelligence Collection, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 3,
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol71/iss1/5
Another barrier to enlisting the FISC in intelligencecollection governance is that the intelligencecollection activities governed by the Guidelines extend beyond the scope of the FISC’s jurisdiction. The
FISC oversees electronic foreign intelligence surveillance and physical searches of premises connected
with foreign powers.322 It has no role in overseeing purely domestic surveillance of Americans absent
probable cause that those Americans are agents of a foreign power.323 The content of the Guidelines
and the activities they regulate—such as physical surveillance of Americans, infiltration of religious or
political groups, the use of informants, requests for internet history— rarely fall within the FISC’s
jurisdiction. Individuals who wish to challenge FBI activity—if they can establish standing—do not have
access to the FISC.324 Thus, it is unclear what role the FISC could play in reviewing many activities in
which the FBI engages.
FISA only governs foreign surveillance even if it operates within the United States
Harper, 14 – JD, University of Chicago (Nick, “FISA’s Fuzzy Line between Domestic and
International Terrorism” The University of Chicago Law Review [81:1123,
https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/81_3/Harper_CMT.pdf
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 1 (FISA) regulates, among other things, the
government’s acquisition of electronic surveillance within the United States for foreign intelligence
purposes. FISA allows a federal officer to seek an order from a judge at a specially designated court
“approving electronic surveillance of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power for the purpose of
obtaining foreign intelligence information.” 2 As long as the requisite foreign nexus can be shown, FISA
warrants are preferable to their possible substitutes because they are easier to obtain and allow for
more secretive and penetrating investigations.3
Consistent with FISA’s foreign focus, the government may use the statute to investigate members of
international terrorist groups within the United States.4 However, the activities of purely domestic
terrorist groups do not fall under FISA and must therefore be investigated using standard criminal
investigative tools.5 Often, terrorists will easily be identified as international; members of designated
“foreign terrorist organizations” operating within the United States are clearly international terrorists.
But the proliferation of modern communication technologies has caused increasing slippage between
the definitions of domestic and international terrorism. For example, many homegrown terrorists are
inspired by international groups to commit attacks in the United States.6 In many cases, the government
seems to classify these actors as international terrorists based on Internet activity that ranges from
viewing and posting jihadist YouTube videos to planning attacks with suspected foreign terrorists in chat
rooms, thus using FISA’s formidable investigatory weapons against them.7 The government is aided in
this task by FISA’s definition of international terrorism, which has an extremely vague and potentially
loose internationality requirement.8 An expansive interpretation of this requirement could be used to
subject what might properly be considered domestic terrorist groups to FISA surveillance.
FISA doesn’t apply to domestic surveillance
Harper, 14 – JD, University of Chicago (Nick, “FISA’s Fuzzy Line between Domestic and
International Terrorism” The University of Chicago Law Review [81:1123,
https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/81_3/Harper_CMT.pdf
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly said that members of international and domestic terrorist
groups should receive differing levels of Fourth Amendment protection,153 there is strong implicit
support for this proposition. The Keith Court, by limiting its decision to domestic organizations, implicitly
acknowledged that the surveillance of international groups would trigger different considerations, even
noting that warrantless surveillance “may be constitutional where foreign powers are involved.” 154
Moreover, Congress unequivocally stated that domestic terrorist groups should not be subject to FISA
surveillance, implying that a different balancing of interests is at stake for the two groups.155
--Excludes section 702
Section 702 is purely targeted towards non-US persons outside of the United States
Donohue, 15 - Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Laura, “SECTION 702 AND THE
COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND INTERNET CONTENT” 38 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 117,
Winter, lexis)
1. Section 702
FISA Section 702 empowers the Attorney General (AG) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
jointly to authorize, for up to one year, "the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information." n64 Five limitations apply.
Acquisition may not intentionally (a) target a person known to be located in the United States; n65 (b)
target an individual reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, if the actual purpose is
to target an individual reasonably believed to be located in domestic bounds; n66 (c) target a U.S.
person reasonably believed to be outside domestic bounds; n67 or (d) obtain wholly domestic
communications. n68 In addition, (e), all acquisition must be conducted consistent with the Fourth
Amendment. n69
PRISM governs foreign intelligence gathering, not domestic surveillance
Margulies, 14 - Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law (“CITIZENSHIP, IMMIGRATION,
AND NATIONAL SECURITY AFTER 9/11: THE NSA IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: SURVEILLANCE, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM” 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2137, April, lexis)
Edward Snowden's disclosures have thus far centered on two NSA programs. One is domestic - the socalled metadata program, operated pursuant to section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, n13 and entailing
the bulk collection of call record information, including phone numbers and times of calls. n14 The other
is foreign - the PRISM program, operated pursuant to section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA). n15 Under section 702, the government may conduct surveillance targeting the contents of
communications of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located abroad when the surveillance
will result in acquiring foreign intelligence information. n16 The FISC must approve any government
request for surveillance under section 702, although these requests can [*2141] describe broad types
of communications without identifying particular individuals. n17
Under section 702, "foreign intelligence information" that the government may acquire includes a
number of grounds related to national security, such as information relating to an "actual or potential
attack" or "other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power." n18 It also
includes information relating to possible sabotage n19 and clandestine foreign "intelligence activities."
n20 Another prong of the definition appears to sweep more broadly, including information relating to
"the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States." n21 Despite the greater breadth of this
provision, President Obama informed a domestic and global audience that U.S. intelligence agencies
seek a narrow range of information centering on the national security and foreign intelligence concerns
described above. n22 While the U.S. intelligence agencies acquire a substantial amount of data that
does not fit under these rubrics, the president's speech confirmed that U.S. analysts do not rummage
through such data randomly or for invidious purposes. n23 A scatter-shot approach of this kind would
be unethical, illegal, and ineffective. Instead, NSA officials query communications using specific
"identifiers" such as phone numbers and email addresses that officials reasonably believe are used by
non-U.S. persons abroad to communicate foreign intelligence information. n24 The government must
also have in place minimization procedures to limit the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of
nonpublic information about U.S. persons. n25 The NSA deletes all irrelevant content, including content
from non-U.S. persons, after five years. n26
In acknowledging the "legitimate privacy interests" of both U.S. and non-U.S. persons, President Obama
affirmed the U.S. commitment to core principles in January 2014. n27 First, he narrowed the operating
definition of [*2142] foreign intelligence information, limiting it to "information relating to the
capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations,
foreign persons, or international terrorists." n28 In addition, he asserted that the NSA would engage in
bulk collection of communications for purposes of "detecting and countering" terrorism, espionage,
nuclear proliferation, threats to U.S. forces, and financial crimes, including evasion of duly enacted
sanctions. n29 Addressing anticipated concerns that these limits still left the NSA with too much
discretion, President Obama declared what the United States would not do. First, it would not collect
communications content "for the purpose of suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent, or for
disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion." n30
Second, it would disseminate and store information regarding any person based on criteria in section 2.3
of Executive Order 12,333 n31: cases involving "foreign intelligence or counterintelligence," public
safety, or ascertainment of a potential intelligence source's credibility. n32
PRISM only governs foreign intelligence information
Greenwald, 13 – Glenn Greenwald is a fomer columnist on civil liberties and US national security issues
for the Guardian. An ex-constitutional lawyer, he was until 2012 a contributing writer at Salon. (Glenn,
“NSA Prism program taps in to user data of Apple, Google and others” The Guardian, 6/7,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
A senior administration official said in a statement: "The Guardian and Washington Post articles refer to
collection of communications pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This
law does not allow the targeting of any US citizen or of any person located within the United States.
"The program is subject to oversight by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the Executive
Branch, and Congress. It involves extensive procedures, specifically approved by the court, to ensure
that only non-US persons outside the US are targeted, and that minimize the acquisition, retention and
dissemination of incidentally acquired information about US persons.
"This program was recently reauthorized by Congress after extensive hearings and debate.
"Information collected under this program is among the most important and valuable intelligence
information we collect, and is used to protect our nation from a wide variety of threats.
"The Government may only use Section 702 to acquire foreign intelligence information, which is
specifically, and narrowly, defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This requirement applies
across the board, regardless of the nationality of the target."
--Excludes XO 12333
XO 12333 only governs exclusively foreign surveillance – curtailing it isn’t topical
Kehl, 14 – Policy Analyst at New America’s Open Technology Institute (Danielle, “Surveillance Costs: The
NSA’s Impact on the Economy, Internet Freedom & Cybersecurity” July,
https://www.newamerica.org/oti/surveillance-costs-the-nsas-impact-on-the-economy-internetfreedom-cybersecurity/
Over the course of the past year, the world has learned that this bulk collection program was just one
small part of the NSA’s massive surveillance apparatus.4 Just a day after the first leak, The Washington
Post ran a story about PRISM, the NSA’s “downstream” collection program authorized under Section 702
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Under the PRISM program, the NSA compels major
tech companies like Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, Facebook, and Twitter to turn over the contents of
communications stored on company servers that have been sent or received by targets that the NSA
reasonably believes are outside of the United States.5 While few details are known about the programs
the NSA operates under Section 702, and several of the details regarding the PRISM program are a
subject of debate,6 a declassified 2011 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court opinion revealed that the
NSA collects more than 250,000,000 Internet communications annually using Section 702 and that “the
vast majority of these communications are obtained from Internet service providers” through the PRISM
program.7 The remainder of those communications comes from Section 702 surveillance that is
conducted “upstream”—that is, surveillance conducted not by obtaining stored communications from
cloud providers’ servers but by tapping directly into the U.S. Internet backbone network that carries
domestic, international, and foreign communications.8
Beyond NSA surveillance inside the United States under Section 215 and Section 702, the NSA engages
in massive surveillance of Internet and telephone communications outside of the country as well.
Unconstrained by statute and subject only to Executive Branch oversight under the Reagan-era
Executive Order 12333,9 this extraterritorial surveillance was revealed in October 2013 to include the
monitoring of key private data links that connect Google and Yahoo data centers around the world—
monitoring that in just 30 days processed 181,280,466 new records that traversed those links.10
Similarly, the NSA is using Executive Order 12333 to authorize the collection of millions of email address
books globally,11 and the recording of vast numbers of international phone calls—sometimes all of the
phone traffic in an entire country.12 Executive Order 12333 is also presumably the authority under
which the NSA is assisting British intelligence agencies in acquiring millions of webcam photos sent by
users of Yahoo,13 and under which the NSA is collecting over five billion cell phone location data points
per day, enabling it to track individuals’ movements and relationships with others.14
--Excludes internet surveillance
Internet surveillance isn’t ‘domestic’ if it’s targeted towards foreign persons
Thompson, 13 - Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer
of Source Associates. Prior to holding my present positions, I was Deputy Director of the Security Studies
Program at Georgetown University (Loren, “Why NSA's PRISM Program Makes Sense” Forbes, 6/7,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2013/06/07/why-nsas-prism-program-makes-sense/
President Obama’s firm defense of the National Security Agency’s “domestic” surveillance program on
Friday should calm some of the more extravagant fears provoked by public disclosure of its existence. I
put the word “domestic” in quotes because the effort to monitor Internet and other communications
traffic isn’t really about listening in on Americans, or even foreign nationals living here, but rather
intercepting suspicious transmissions originating overseas that just happen to be passing through the
United States.
That is an eminently sensible way of keeping up with terrorists, because it is so much easier than
tapping into network conduits in other countries or under the seas (not that we don’t do that). In order
to grasp the logic of the NSA program, which is code-named PRISM, you have to understand how the
Internet evolved. It was a purely American innovation at its inception, with most of the infrastructure
concentrated in a few places like Northern Virginia.
I live a few miles from where the Internet’s first big East Coast access point was located in the parking
garage of an office building near the intersection of Virginia’s Routes 7 and 123, an area that some
people refer to as Internet Alley. Because the Worldwide Web grew so haphazardly in its early days, it
was common until recently for Internet traffic between two European countries to pass through my
neighborhood. There were only a few major nodes in the system, and packet-switching sends messages
through whatever pathway is available.
The Washington Post story on PRISM today has a graphic illustrating my point about how bandwidth
tends to be allocated globally. Like a modern version of ancient Rome’s Appian Way, all digital roads
lead to America. It isn’t hard to see why Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper could say on
Thursday that “information collected under this program is among the most important and valuable
foreign intelligence information we collect.” No kidding: PRISM generated an average of four items per
day for the President’s daily intelligence briefing in 2012.
The key point to recognize, though, is that this really is foreign intelligence. The architecture of the
Internet enables NSA to collect it within U.S. borders, but there is no intention to spy on U.S. citizens. A
few elementary algorithms used in narrowing the analysis of traffic should be sufficient to assure that
the privacy of American citizens is seldom compromised. President Obama stressed in his comments
today that safeguards have been put in place to prevent the scope of NSA surveillance from expanding
beyond its original purpose.
I don’t want to minimize the dangers to civil liberties associated with such a program. It needs to be
monitored closely, which is one reason why Congress has been kept informed about its existence.
However, compared with the threat posed by terrorists bent upon destroying America, PRISM presents
at worst only modest danger to our liberties. Its main purpose is to protect those liberties, not subvert
them.
--xt - Domestic means US persons
Domestic surveillance is the acquisition of nonpublic information about US persons
IT Law Wiki, no date - This wiki is an encyclopedia of the legal issues, cases, statutes, events, policies,
people, organizations and publications that make up the global fields of information law, information
technology law (“domestic surveillance” http://itlaw.wikia.com/wiki/Domestic_surveillance
Domestic surveillance is the acquisition of nonpublic information concerning United States persons.
Domestic refers to citizens of the US
POWELL, 72 – US Supreme Court Justice (UNITED STATES v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN ET AL. (PLAMONDON ET AL., REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST) No. 70-153
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 407 U.S. 297; 92 S. Ct. 2125; 32 L. Ed. 2d 752; 1972 U.S. LEXIS
38
8 Section 2511 (3) refers to "the constitutional power of the President" in two types of situations: (i)
where necessary to protect against attack, other hostile acts or intelligence activities of a "foreign
power"; or (ii) where necessary to protect against the overthrow of the Government or other clear and
present danger to the structure or existence of the Government. Although both of the specified
situations are sometimes referred to as "national security" threats, the term "national security" is used
only in the first sentence of § 2511 (3) with respect to the activities of foreign powers. This case involves
only the second sentence of § 2511 (3), with the threat emanating -- according to the Attorney General's
affidavit -- from "domestic organizations." Although we attempt no precise definition, we use the term
"domestic organization" in this opinion to mean a group or organization (whether formally or informally
constituted) composed of citizens of the United States and which has no significant connection with a
foreign power, its agents or agencies. No doubt there are cases where it will be difficult to distinguish
between "domestic" and "foreign" unlawful activities directed against the Government of the United
States where there is collaboration in varying degrees between domestic groups or organizations and
agents or agencies of foreign powers. But this is not such a case.
--2nc limits
Domestic surveillance is the acquisition of nonpublic information concerning United
States persons – this is already very broad – expanding it further prevents focused
analysis
Small, 8 - United States Air Force Academy (Matthew, “His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic
Surveillance, Civil Liberties and Executive Power during Times of National Crisis”
http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Small.pdf
Before one can make any sort of assessment of domestic surveillance policies, it is first necessary to
narrow the scope of the term “domestic surveillance.” Domestic surveillance is a subset of intelligence
gathering. Intelligence, as it is to be understood in this context, is “information that meets the stated or
understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed and narrowed to meet those
needs” (Lowenthal 2006, 2). In essence, domestic surveillance is a means to an end; the end being
intelligence. The intelligence community best understands domestic surveillance as the acquisition of
nonpublic information concerning United States persons (Executive Order 12333 (3.4) (i)). With this
definition domestic surveillance remains an overly broad concept.
This paper’s analysis, in terms of President Bush’s policies, focuses on electronic surveillance;
specifically, wiretapping phone lines and obtaining caller information from phone companies. Section f
of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 defines electronic surveillance as:
[T]he acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire
or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States person
who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States
person, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant
would be required for law enforcement purposes;
Adhering to the above definition allows for a focused analysis of one part of President Bush’s domestic
surveillance policy as its implementation relates to the executive’s ability to abridge certain civil
liberties. However, since electronic surveillance did not become an issue of public concern until the
1920s, there would seem to be a problem with the proposed analysis.
--AT: Geographic limit best
Geographic interpretation of ‘domestic’ is outdated in the surveillance context
Sanchez, 14 - Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. His work focuses on technology, privacy, and civil
liberties, particularly national security and intelligence surveillance. (Julian, “Snowden: Year One” 6/5,
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2014/06/05/julian-sanchez/snowden-year-one
The second basic fact is that modern communications networks obliterate many of the assumptions
about the importance of geography that had long structured surveillance law. A “domestic” Internet
communication between a user in Manhattan and a server in Palo Alto might, at midday in the United
States, be routed through nocturnal Asia’s less congested pipes, or to a mirror in Ireland, while a
“foreign” e-mail service operated from Egypt may be hosted in San Antonio. “What we really need to do
is all the bad guys need to be on this section of the Internet,” former NSA director Keith Alexander likes
to joke. “And they only operate over here. All good people operate over here. All bad guys over here.”
It’s never been quite that easy—but General Alexander’s dream scenario used to be closer to the truth.
State adversaries communicated primarily over dedicated circuits that could be intercepted wholesale
without much worry about bumping into innocent Americans, whereas a communication entering the
United States could generally be presumed to be with someone in the United States. The traditional
division of intelligence powers by physical geography—particularized warrants on this side of the
border, an interception free-for-all on the other—no longer tracks the reality of global information
flows.
It’s terrible for both teams – it unlimits the topic, but also means no aff could actually
solve, since the internet has made borders a non-factor
Bedan, 7 - J.D. Candidate, Indiana University School of Law (Matt Echelon's Effect: The Obsolescence of
the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Legal Regime," Federal Communications Law Journal: Vol. 59: Iss. 2, Article
7. Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol59/iss2/7
Apart from the issue of private corporations gathering and sharing intelligence, FISA's surveillance
definition is antiquated due to the distinction it makes between data acquired inside or outside of the
U.S. Again, government observation only qualifies as surveillance if the data is acquired inside the U.S. or
if one or more of the parties is a known U.S. person, inside the U.S., who the government is targeting
intentionally. In other words, unrestrained and indiscriminate eavesdropping by the NSA is allowed
under FISA as long as the communication is not physically intercepted within the U.S., and the target is
either: (1) someone known to be a non-U.S. person, (2) someone who is intentionally targeted but
whose identity is unknown, or (3) anyone else in the world who is not intentionally being targeted.
Today, the requirement that the interception of electronic communications takes place outside U.S.
borders is hardly an obstacle to intelligence agencies. The proliferation of the Internet and other global
communication networks has made physical distance and political borders a nonfactor in the realm of
communications. To increase efficiency, Internet traffic is often routed through the least congested
server regardless of the server's physical location.58 For instance, two neighbors in Nebraska chatting
on an instant messenger program might have their communications routed through servers in Hong
Kong and back, despite being only 30 feet apart.
A territorial limit doesn’t reflect the changing nature of technology that renders
territory obsolete
Margulies, 14 - Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law (“CITIZENSHIP, IMMIGRATION,
AND NATIONAL SECURITY AFTER 9/11: THE NSA IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: SURVEILLANCE, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM” 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2137, April, lexis)
[*2151] As I suggest in my forthcoming article, however, the effective control test is inadequate for the
cyber and communications realm. n78 Here, physical control over persons or territory is unnecessary.
n79 The NSA can remotely control much of the communication of a foreign national abroad. It can
eavesdrop on those communications and may be able to filter the communications received by that
individual or alter the content the individual receives. n80 According to press reports, the NSA can break
many forms of encryption used around the world because of "back doors" it has engineered in many
software systems. n81 The NSA apparently also has the capacity to gain control of computers not
directly connected to the internet, because of the implantation of tiny radio transmitters in many
computers manufactured in the United States and elsewhere. n82 Consider as well that the United
States has relationships with internet and telecommunications companies that facilitate surveillance.
Since, at the present time, much of the world's internet traffic is routed through the United States, that
virtual power is unprecedented. Moreover, the United States has the capacity to directly access
undersea cables and other carriers of internet and telephonic communications. n83 The extended
duration and seamlessness of U.S. control [*2152] in the virtual sphere constitutes an ongoing state
presence that is in some ways more pervasive than states' dominance within their physical territory. A
narrow standard requiring physical control does not do justice to the challenge of rapidly evolving
technology in a changing world. n84 The virtual control test supplies a broader standard that meets this
challenge.
General domestic definitions
Patriot Act definition
Patriot Act definition of ‘domestic’ terrorism
Casman, 11 – master’s thesis for Master of Arts Degree in Ethics and Policy Studies Department of
Political Science at UNLV (Betsey, “The Right to Privacy in Light of the Patriot Act and Social Contract
Theory” May, UNLV Theses/ Dissertations/Professional Papers/Capstones. Paper 1086,
http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2087&context=thesesdissertations
These modifications of the First Amendment seem to stem from the provision for the right to free
speech, but the right to assembly has also called into question. Though as noted a person’s exercising of
their First Amendment’s rights is not in and of itself enough to initiate an investigation, but that seems
to be more theory than fact. Rackow writes the legislation of Section 802, “Section 802 of the Patriot Act
amends 18 U.S.C. 2331, which defines international terrorism by instituting a new crime of ‘domestic
terrorism’. The Act broadly defines ‘domestic terrorism’ as activities that:
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or
any State;
(B) appear to be intended –
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States
Upon review of this expansive definition it becomes clear that many acts of political dissent and activism
now will be characterized as ‘domestic terrorism’ (Rackow 2002, 1688). The attitude of “you are either
for us or against” has grown to mean that if you speak against “us” then you are against “us” then you
support terrorism. As was the case with the passing of the Patriot Act, no discourse on the legislation
was allowed or “terrorism” would win. There is a prevailing understanding that United States citizens
have the right to free speech and a right to assemble (among other rights enumerated within the First
Amendment); however, to exercise these rights in light of 9/11, especially to criticize the government,
can lead and has led to accusations of terrorism. This is not talking about sedition or incitement to
violence which are not covered speech under the First Amendment, but the ability to voice dissent in
open in public forums without being the subject of prosecution. The most basic of American rights can
garner attention, followed by investigation. Despite laws stating specifically that the practice of one’s
First Amendment rights shall not lead to investigation, the definitions involved in the expansive
definition of domestic terrorism do not lead to any confidence that that will be the case.
AT: FISA is only international
No bright line exists between foreign and domestic terrorists
Harper, 14 – JD, University of Chicago (Nick, “FISA’s Fuzzy Line between Domestic and
International Terrorism” The University of Chicago Law Review [81:1123,
https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/81_3/Harper_CMT.pdf
Consistent with FISA’s foreign focus, the government may use the statute to investigate members of
international terrorist groups within the United States.4 However, the activities of purely domestic
terrorist groups do not fall under FISA and must therefore be investigated using standard criminal
investigative tools.5 Often, terrorists will easily be identified as international; members of designated
“foreign terrorist organizations” operating within the United States are clearly international terrorists.
But the proliferation of modern communication technologies has caused increasing slippage between
the definitions of domestic and international terrorism. For example, many homegrown terrorists are
inspired by international groups to commit attacks in the United States.6 In many cases, the government
seems to classify these actors as international terrorists based on Internet activity that ranges from
viewing and posting jihadist YouTube videos to planning attacks with suspected foreign terrorists in chat
rooms, thus using FISA’s formidable investigatory weapons against them.7 The government is aided in
this task by FISA’s definition of international terrorism, which has an extremely vague and potentially
loose internationality requirement.8 An expansive interpretation of this requirement could be used to
subject what might properly be considered domestic terrorist groups to FISA surveillance.
FISA’s internationality requirement has been stretched into the domestic sphere
Harper, 14 – JD, University of Chicago (Nick, “FISA’s Fuzzy Line between Domestic and
International Terrorism” The University of Chicago Law Review [81:1123,
https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/81_3/Harper_CMT.pdf
Subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2) together limit the applicability of the provision to activities that are serious
violations of criminal law in the United States and that are intended to serve typical terrorist goals
(intimidating a population, influencing government policy, and so forth).63 Subsection (c)(3), however, is
the focus of this Comment, as its language regarding criminal activities that “transcend national
boundaries” defines the extent of the international nexus that is required to permit FISA surveillance.
This internationality requirement is FISA’s attempt to draw the line between domestic and
international terrorism.
This Part seeks to understand precisely where FISA draws the line between domestic and international
terrorist groups. It begins in Section A by considering the text and legislative history of FISA’s definition
of international terrorism. Section B then looks to a similar provision in the Antiterrorism Act to divine
how courts might apply the international terrorism provision in FISA. Finally, Section C locates the outer
boundary of FISA’s definition of international terrorism by examining the limited public record of two
modern FISA cases. This analysis finds minimal discernible international connections and therefore
argues that FISA’s definition of international terrorism has been stretched further into the domestic
sphere than was originally intended by Congress.
FISA’s line between domestic and international terrorism is blurry
Harper, 14 – JD, University of Chicago (Nick, “FISA’s Fuzzy Line between Domestic and
International Terrorism” The University of Chicago Law Review [81:1123,
https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/81_3/Harper_CMT.pdf
The House report provides the most thorough explanation of the legislature’s intended scope of the
international terrorism definition generally and the internationality requirement specifically. In fact,
given that courts faced with FISA challenges do not engage in public interpretations of this language,78
the House report may be the only authority that provides meaningful insight into this provision. The
report frames its analysis by noting that activities that transcend national boundaries must have a
“substantial international character.”79 It then proceeds to list several activities of otherwise-domestic
terrorist groups that would or would not meet this standard:
The fact that an airplane is hijacked while flying over Canada between Alaska and Chicago does not by
itself make the activity international terrorism. A domestic terrorist group which explodes a bomb in the
international arrivals area of a U.S. airport does not by this alone become engaged in international
terrorism. However, if a domestic group kidnaps foreign officials in the United States or abroad to affect
the conduct of that foreign government this would constitute international terrorism. If a domestic
group travels abroad and places a bomb in a foreign airplane, this too would be international
terrorism.80
This excerpt is not extraordinarily illuminating, but it does help establish some data points. First, the fact
that a hijacking of a domestic flight over Canadian airspace does not transcend national boundaries
indicates that the standard should not be satisfied by every activity that crosses a US border. At the
other end of the spectrum, travelling to a foreign destination to engage in terrorist activities does meet
the internationality requirement. The examples between these two extremes do not substantially
narrow the focus, although it appears that targeting politically salient international interests within the
United States creates a sufficient international nexus.
Beyond these examples, the House report further notes that a domestic terrorist group has a sufficient
international nexus if it receives “direction or substantial support” from a foreign government or
terrorist group.81 This support must be “material, technical, training, or other substantive support” of
the terrorist activities, rather than mere “moral or vocal support.”82 Finally, and importantly, the report
states that “[a]ctivities parallel to or consistent with the desires of a foreign power do not by themselves
satisfy the requirement that the foreign power is directing the domestic group.”83
Three general conclusions can be drawn from this report. First, it seems clear that the phrase “transcend
national boundaries” was not intended to reach as far as its plain meaning permits. As was noted, the
language could encompass any activities that go beyond US borders,84 but the House report seems to
envision a more substantial international connection. Second, while the examples might be seen as
establishing the outer boundaries of a necessary international nexus, the legislature left plenty of gray
area in which the government can operate. Third, this loose demarcation of the necessary international
nexus becomes more difficult to interpret with each passing year, as the Internet increasingly makes
international connections a part of everyday life.
US person definition
A US person is a citizen, corporation, or lawful permanent resident
Jordan, 6 - LL.M., New York University School of Law (2006); cum laude, Washington and
Lee University School of Law (2003) (David, “Decrypting the Fourth Amendment: Warrantless NSA
Surveillance and the Enhanced Expectation of Privacy Provided by Encrypted Voice Over Protocol” 47
B.C.L. Rev. 505 (2006), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol47/iss3/2
8 FISA's provisions require the government to obtain a FISA warrant when seeking to surveil a "United
States person." A U.S. person is defined as a U.S. citizen, a permanent resident, a corporation
incorporated in the United States, or an unincorporated association consisting of mostly U.S. citizens or
permanent residents. FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(1) (2000).
AT: No brightline – speech
An agent of a foreign power isn’t determined by speech
Bedan, 7 - J.D. Candidate, Indiana University School of Law (Matt Echelon's Effect: The Obsolescence of
the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Legal Regime," Federal Communications Law Journal: Vol. 59: Iss. 2, Article
7. Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol59/iss2/7
In addition to court-ordered surveillance, FISA permits the President to authorize electronic surveillance
without a court order for a period of up to one year, provided the Department of Justice ("DOJ") certifies
that the surveillance is: (1) only for foreign intelligence information; (2) targets only foreign powers or
their agents; and (3) there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the contents of
any communication to which a United States person is a party.29 In each of those cases, the Attorney
General is required to certify compliance with those conditions to the FISC.30 In addition, the Attorney
General is required to provide a semiannual report on the use of surveillance under overall compliance
to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as well as the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence detailing the extent of surveillance being conducted without a court order.31
Under the statute, a U.S. person can be classified as an "agent of a foreign power" upon a finding that he
or she acts for a foreign power, is or may be involved in espionage for a foreign power, or is involved in
international terrorism. An important caveat to this definition is that no U.S. person can be classified as
an agent of a foreign power based solely on his participation in activities protected by the First
Amendment. 33
Surveillance
Surveillance violations
1nc control violation
Surveillance is monitoring with preventive intent
Lemos, 10 - Associate Professor at Faculty of Communication at Federal University of Bahia, Brazil
(Andre, ““Locative Media and Surveillance at the Boundaries of Informational Territories”,
http://www.irma-international.org/viewtitle/48348/
Although they often appear to be synonymous, it is important to distinguish between informational
control, monitoring and surveillance so that the problem can be better understood. We consider control
to be the supervision of activities, or actions normally associated with government and authority over
people, actions and processes. Monitoring can be considered a form of observation to gather
information with a view to making projections or constructing scenarios and historical records, i.e., the
action of following up and evaluating data. Surveillance, however, can be defined as an act intended to
avoid something, as an observation whose purposes are preventive or as behavior that is attentive,
cautious or careful. It is interesting to note that in English and French the two words “vigilant” and
“surveillance”, each of which is spelt the same way and has the same meaning in both languages, are
applied to someone who is particularly watchful and to acts associated with legal action or action by the
police intended to provide protection against crime, respectively. We shall define surveillance as actions
that imply control and monitoring in accordance with Gow, for whom surveillance "implies something
quite specific as the intentional observation of someone's actions or the intentional gathering of
personal information in order to observe actions taken in the past or future" (Gow. 2005. p. 8).
According to this definition, surveillance actions presuppose monitoring and control, but not all forms of
control and/or monitoring can be called surveillance. It could be said that all forms of surveillance
require two elements: intent with a view to avoiding/causing something and identification of
individuals or groups by name. It seems to me to be difficult to say that there is surveillance if there is no
identification of the person under observation (anonymous) and no preventive intent (avoiding
something). To my mind it is an exaggeration to say, for example, that the system run by my cell phone
operator that controls and monitors my calls is keeping me under surveillance. Here there is
identification but no intent. However, it can certainly be used for that purpose. The Federal Police can
request wiretaps and disclosure of telephone records to monitor my telephone calls. The same can be
said about the control and monitoring of users by public transport operators. This is part of the
administrative routine of the companies involved. Once again, however, the system can be used for
surveillance activities (a suspect can be kept under surveillance by the companies' and/or police safety
systems). Note the example further below of the recently implemented "Navigo "card in France. It
seems to me that the social networks, collaborative maps, mobile devices, wireless networks and
countless different databases that make up the information society do indeed control and monitor and
offer a real possibility of surveillance.
Violation – they curtail information gathering, not surveillance
Voting issue – for limits and ground. All information gathering is topical under their
interpretation and the negative loses security based disads and critiques
--2nc limits
Conflating surveillance with information gathering explodes limits and wrecks topic
education
Fuchs, 11 – Professor of Social Media at the University of Westminster's Centre for Social Media
Research (Christian, “New Media, Web 2.0 and Surveillance” Sociology Compass 5/2 (2011): 134–147,
10.1111/j.1751-9020.2010.00354.x, http://fuchs.uti.at/wp-content/uploads/Web20Surveillance.pdf
‘Living in ‘‘surveillance societies’’ may throw up challenges of a fundamental – ontological – kind’ (Lyon
1994, 19). Social theory is a way of clarifying such ontological questions that concern the basic nature
and reality of surveillance. An important ontological question is how to define surveillance. One can
distinguish neutral concepts and negative concepts.
For Max Horkheimer, neutral theories ‘define universal concepts under which all facts in the field in
question are to be subsumed’ (Horkheimer 1937 ⁄ 2002, 224). Neutral surveillance approaches define
surveillance as the systematic collection of data about humans or non-humans. They argue that
surveillance is a characteristic of all societies. An example for a well-known neutral concept of
surveillance is the one of Anthony Giddens. For Giddens, surveillance is ‘the coding of information
relevant to the administration of subject populations, plus their direct supervision by officials and
administrators of all sorts’ (Giddens 1984, 183f). Surveillance means ‘the collation and integration of
information put to administrative purposes’ (Giddens 1985, 46). For Giddens, all forms of organization
are in need of surveillance in order to work. ‘Who says surveillance says organisation’ (Giddens 1981,
xvii). As a consequence of his general surveillance concept, Giddens says that all modern societies are
information societies (Giddens 1987, 27; see also: Lyon 1994, 27).
Basic assumptions of neutral surveillance concepts are:
• There are positive aspects of surveillance.
• Surveillance has two faces, it is enabling and constrainig.
• Surveillance is a fundamental aspect of all societies.
• Surveillance is necessary for organization.
• Any kind of systematic information gathering is surveillance.
Based on a neutral surveillance concept, all forms of online information storage, processing and usage in
organizations are types of Internet surveillance. Examples include: the storage of company information
on a company website, e-mail communication between employees in a governmental department, the
storage of entries on Wikipedia, the online submission and storage of appointments in an e-health
system run by a hospital or a general practitioner’s office. The example shows that based on a neutral
concept of surveillance, the notion of Internet surveillance is fairly broad.
Negative approaches see surveillance as a form of systematic information gathering that is connected to
domination, coercion, the threat of using violence or the actual use of violence in order to attain certain
goals and accumulate power, in many cases against the will of those who are under surveillance. Max
Horkheimer (1947 ⁄ 1974) says that the ‘method of negation’ means ‘the denunciation of everything
that mutilates mankind and impedes its free development’ (Horkheimer 1947 ⁄ 1974, 126). For Herbert
Marcuse, negative concepts ‘are an indictment of the totality of the existing order’ (Marcuse 1941, 258).
The best-known negative concept of surveillance is the one of Michel Foucault. For Foucault,
surveillance is a form of disciplinary power. Disciplines are ‘general formulas of domination’ (Foucault
1977, 137). They enclose, normalize, punish, hierarchize, homogenize, differentiate and exclude
(Foucault 1977, 183f). The ‘means of coercion make those on whom they are applied clearly visible’
(Foucault 1977, 171). A person that is under surveillance ‘is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of
information, never a subject in communication’ (Foucault 1977, 200). The surveillant panopticon is a
‘machine of power’ (Foucault 2007, 93f).
In my opinion, there are important arguments speaking against defining surveillance in a neutral way:
1. Etymology: The French word surveiller means to oversee, to watch over. It implies a hierarchy and is
therefore connected to notions, such as watcher, watchmen, overseer and officer. Surveillance should
therefore be conceived as technique of coercion (Foucault 1977, 222), as ‘power exercised over him [an
individual] through supervision’ (Foucault 1994, 84).
2. Theoretical conflationism: Neutral concepts of surveillance put certain phenomena, such as taking
care of a baby or the electrocardiogram of a myocardial infarction patient, on one analytical level with
very different phenomena, such as preemptive state-surveillance of personal data of citizens for fighting
terrorism or the economic surveillance of private data or online behaviour by Internet companies
(Facebook, Google, etc.) for accumulating capital with the help of targeted advertising. Neutral concepts
might therefore be used for legitimatizing coercive forms of surveillance by arguing that surveillance is
ubiquitous and therefore unproblematic.
3. Difference between information gathering and surveillance: If surveillance is conceived as systematic
information gathering, then no difference can be drawn between surveillance studies and information
society studies and between a surveillance society and an information society. Therefore, given these
circumstances, there are no grounds for claiming the existence of surveillance studies as discipline or
transdiscipline (as argued, for example, by Lyon 2007)
4. The normalization of surveillance: If everything is surveillance, it becomes difficult to criticize coercive
surveillance politically.
Given these drawbacks of neutral surveillance concepts, I prefer to define surveillance as a negative
concept: surveillance is the collection of data on individuals or groups that are used so that control and
discipline of behaviour can be exercised by the threat of being targeted by violence. A negative concept
of surveillance allows drawing a clear distinction of what is and what is not Internet surveillance. Here
are, based on a negative surveillance concept, some examples for Internet surveillance processes
(connected to: harm, coercion, violence, power, control, manipulation, domination, disciplinary power,
involuntary observation):
• Teachers watching private activities of pupils via webcams at Harriton High School, Pennsylvania.
• The scanning of Internet and phone data by secret services with the help of the Echelon system and
the Carnivore software.
• Usage of full body scanners at airports.
• The employment of the DoubleClick advertising system by Internet corporations for collecting data
about users’ online browsing behaviour and providing them with targeted advertising.
• Assessment of personal images and videos of applicants on Facebook by employers prior to a job
interview.
• Watching the watchers: corporate watch systems, filming of the police beating of Rodney King (LA
1992), YouTube video of the police killing of Neda Soltan (Iran 2009).
There are other examples of information gathering that are oriented on care, benefits, solidarity, aid
and co-operation. I term such processes monitoring. Some examples are:
• Consensual online video sex chat of adults.
• Parents observing their sleeping ill baby with a webcam that is connected to their PC in order to be
alarmed when the baby needs their help.
• The voluntary sharing of personal videos and pictures from a trip undertaken with real life friends who
participated in the trip by a user.
• A Skype video chat of two friends, who live in different countries and make use of this communication
technology for staying in touch.
--xt – control violation
Surveillance requires linkage to decisions to use the data coercively to be meaningful –
defining it as data collection alone trivializes surveillance
Bennett, 5 – professor of political science at the University of Victoria (Colin, Global Surveillance and
Policing, edited by Elia Zureik and Mark Slater, p. 132-133)
Have I been the subject of surveillance or, more precisely, 'dataveillance' (Clarke 1989)? Again, the
literature would suggest that any capture of personal information (however benign) constitutes a
surveillance process. Surveillance, Lyon contends, is 'any collection and processing of personal data,
whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing those whose data have been
garnered.' It is simply the outcome of the 'complex ways in which we structure our political and
economic relationships' (2001: 2). Marx (1988) has also argued that there is a 'new surveillance' routine, everyday, invisible and pre-emptive. Linked to this broad definition is the power of classification
and sorting. It is a powerful means of creating and reinforcing social identities and divisions (Gandy
1993; Lyon 2003).
Without dissenting from these judgements, two insights suggest themselves as a result of the case
studies above. First, my personal data (so far as I know) has not been processed for any purpose beyond
that of ensuring that I am a valid passenger on the days and flights reserved. It has not been analysed,
subjected to any investigation, manipulated or used to make any judgement about me. No doubt, a
certain amount of data mining of de-identified information occurs within the industry to analyse general
travel patterns and demands. No doubt, had I not opted out under the Aeroplan privacy policy, my data
might have ended up with a variety of Aeroplan's partners, and I might have received related, and
unrelated, promotional materials.
It seems, however, that there is a fundamental difference between the routine capture, collection and
storage of this kind of personal information, and any subsequent analysis of that information from
which decisions (benign or otherwise) might be made about me. The new process for AP1/PNR analysis
serves to highlight the distinction. As a passenger, when I return to Canada, that information is
automatically transferred ahead of my arrival to the CCRA's Passenger Assessment Unit at the Canadian
airport, and it is systematically analysed. Anybody within a 'high-risk' category is then subject to further
investigation. The crucial process, therefore, is not the capture and transmission of the information,
but the prior procedures, and the assumptions that underpin them, about who is or is not a high-risk
traveller. Surveillance might be 'any collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or
not.' If we are to use such a broad definition, however, we need to find another concept to describe the
active intervention of human agents who then monitor that data to make decisions about individuals.
'Surveillance' conflates a number of distinct processes. To describe what has happened to me as
surveillance perhaps serves to trivialize the real surveillance to which some individuals, perhaps with
'risky' surnames and meal preferences, can be subjected during air travel.
Surveillance is the elimination of privacy with the explicit goal of changing individual
behavior – it’s distinct from ‘watching over’
Huey, 9 – assistant professor of sociology at the University of Western Ontario (Laura, Surveillance:
Power, Problems, and Politics. Hier, Sean P., and Greenberg, Joshua, eds. p. 221-222, ebrary
The past few years have witnessed incredible growth in the field of surveillance studies. Remarkably,
despite this growth, there is no consensus on what forms of human activity are encompassed by the
term “surveillance.” Derived from the French for watching over, surveillance encompasses the basic
activity of watching others. Brian Martin (1993, 115) uses surveillance in this sense when he describes it
as “keeping a close watch on others.” However, this basic definition has been variously expanded upon
and/or challenged. Gary Marx (1998), among others, suggests that there has been a notable shift in
what constitutes surveillance. Marx distinguishes between what he terms traditional surveillance,
involving close observation of a targeted individual (e.g., the police officer who trails a suspect), and the
new surveillance: technologies designed to systematically extract and collect personal data (e.g., the
database that collects, sorts, and creates data profiles of targeted individuals and groups). Whereas
traditional surveillance is an exceptional activity, proliferating technologies have made the new
surveillance a routine, everyday activity that is largely invisible to those people whom it targets. What
these two forms of surveillance share, however, is that each seeks to “eliminate privacy in order to
determine normative compliance or to influence the individual” (Marx 2003, 370).
For Colin Bennett (2005), such an understanding of surveillance is insufficient. Bennett argues that the
use of technology to systematically capture and analyze data must be understood in relation to
institutional, cultural, and political contexts and goals: an action alone does not constitute surveillance;
it does so only in relation to its stated uses and goals. To illustrate this point, Bennett distinguishes
between the mundane collection and use of his personal data when taking a flight to Toronto and the
experience of someone who has been targeted for close observation and special treatment by virtue of
his or her name or meal preferences. According to Bennett, then, understanding surveillance as the
simple act of watching over – the mother over the child, for example – “trivializes” its meanings, its
uses, and the experiences of its targets.
Most predictable - Information collection for control of the population is the only
unifying theme in diverse definitions of surveillance
Gill, 7 – professor of politics and security in the School of Social Science, Liverpool John Moores
University, UK (Peter, Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness,
Bruneau, Thomas C., and Boraz, Steven C., eds, ebrary)
Surveillance is a core concept in explaining modern governance. Though discussed in different ways by
social theorists such as Dandeker, Giddens, and Foucault, 2 there is a core of similarity in their definition
of surveillance, as constituted by two primary components: first, the gathering and storing of
information and, second, the supervision of people’s behavior. In other words, it is concerned with
knowledge and power. In contemporary Western social theory, surveillance is seen as the central aspect
both of the establishment of modern ‘‘sovereign’’ state forms and of the more recent decline of
sovereignty as it is replaced by ‘‘governance’’ (or, for Foucault, ‘‘governmentality’’), 3 including the
concomitant recognition of the significance of private forms of governance. Furthermore, studies of
non-Western societies show that surveillance is similarly central there: its philosophical basis may be
crucially different (for example, the rejection of individualism), but its core goals— understanding and
control— remain. 4 So, not surprisingly, global surveillance is argued by David Lyon to be an intrinsic
part of the general economic restructuring of capitalism that is referred to as globalization, 5 and post9/11 developments have served only to accelerate this already existing trend. 6
Surveillance requires a direct control relationship – otherwise ALL information
gathering is topical
Monahan, 10 - Associate Professor of Communication Studies at The University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill (Torin, Critical Issues in Crime and Society : Surveillance in the Time of Insecurity, p. 8-9
ebrary) ICT = information and communication technologies
Surveillance Infrastructures
Surveillance has become a powerful, if dubious, symbol of national security. However, as with all
technologies, surveillance functions in a polyvalent way to mediate and regulate interactions among
people, organizations, and the built world. To the extent that information and communication
technologies (ICTs) have the capacity to capture and store data for retrieval and analysis, whether at a
later date or on the fly, they possess a modality for surveillance. Broadly defined, surveillance systems
are those that afford control of people through the identification, tracking, monitoring, or analysis of
individuals, data, or systems. The control element is crucial for determining whether surveillance is
occurring because otherwise all interactions with ICTs would constitute a surveillant relationship.
Surveillance is, by definition, about power. That being said, people are subject to surveillance
throughout their everyday lives and are often completely unaware of it. Moreover, one need not wait
until some exercise of control is felt in order to predict what systems have surveillance potential and
under what conditions surveillance might be asserted. Surveillance systems, seen as such, proliferate
throughout society: in urban infrastructures, transportation systems, cell phones, identification
documents, computer programs, frequent shopper cards, medical and consumer products, and much
more. Whether mobilized by the government, industry, employers, or peers, surveillance systems
modulate experiences of the world.
Surveillance requires data collection for a purpose – it must be acted upon – it’s
distinct from observation
Farrall, 9 – PhD dissertation at the University of Pennsylvania (Kenneth, “SUSPECT UNTIL PROVEN
GUILTY, A PROBLEMATIZATION OF STATE DOSSIER SYSTEMS VIA TWO CASE STUDIES: THE UNITED
STATES AND CHINA” Publicly accessible Penn Dissertations. Paper 51,
http://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/51
DEFINING SURVEILLANCE
Surveillance, according to Ball & Webster (2003), involves the “observation, recording and
categorization of information about people, processes, and institutions.” Lyon (2004) offers a definition
of surveillance that is similar to Ball & Webster’s, but with an important addition. According to Lyon,
surveillance involves the “rationalized control of information within modern organizations, and involves
in particular processing personal data for the purposes of influence, management, or control” (p.
135).The key distinction here is that the information is gathered for a purpose and that that purpose
involves some form of action. Data that is simply gathered, but never acted upon or attended to by a
human being, does nothing.
Surveillance differs from the more general form, observation, in its more systematic nature. It is
practiced by institutions, not individuals. Using the language of cybernetics, I define surveillance in
society as the systematic production of informational feedback about people, processes and institutions
which facilitates the internal regulation of a social system. We can break down this feedback into two
branches: 1) the continuous flow of real-time information about the system in question to the regulator
and 2) the matrix of stored historical data about this system (memory) accessible to the regulator. While
the regulators of many simple cybernetic systems may operate without this second channel of feedback
3 , social systems and their institutions of surveillance have become very reliant on them.
--Excludes genetic surveillance
Collection of genetic information isn’t surveillance unless it’s used for a forensic
purpose
Epstein, 9 – Associate Professor of Law at Widener University School of Law (Jules, “"GENETIC
SURVEILLANCE"-THE BOGEYMAN RESPONSE TO FAMILIAL DNA INVESTIGATIONS” 2009 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. &
Pol'y 141 2009, Hein Online)
Beyond Professor Mnookin's stated concerns is the sound-bite derogation of familial DNA investigations,
made by other critics,' 59 as "lifelong genetic surveillance." The term "surveillance" is itself a mis-nomer,
as no one is watching or re-testing the profile once it is collected; rather, it is stored passively, and only
compared against new crime scene profiles uploaded into the database.160 This distinction is not
insignificant, as there is no ongoing examination of the sample to learn more about the individual.
Given the authoritarian, "Big Brother"' 61 connotation of lifelong surveillance, use of the terminology is
ill-advised.
The term is disproportionate for a second reason-the limited number of instances in which familial DNA
"searching" will even occur. Here, the more aggressive British experience is telling. "In 2004, . ..
approximately 20 familial searches had been undertaken. . . The reasons for this limited application
include a recognition of the novelty of the process and also the volume of partial matches it may
provide."' 62 Although the ever-increasing use of DNA database searches cannot be disputed, 163 the
likelihood of substantial familial searching has not been demonstrated. The only validity of the term
"genetic surveillance" is that of the risk of use of the stored DNA information for non-forensic purposes.
This concern, if valid, applies primarily to the individual in the database, and not (for the most part) to
relatives.
1nc – nonpublic information
Violation – the aff curtails the use of federal acquisition of public information – that’s
not surveillance, which requires that an expectation of privacy is violated
Bedan, 7 - J.D. Candidate, Indiana University School of Law (Matt, “Echelon's Effect: The Obsolescence of
the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Legal Regime," Federal Communications Law Journal: Vol. 59: Iss. 2, Article
7. Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol59/iss2/7
The definition of surveillance, in pertinent form, is the acquisition of a communication either sent or
received by a "particular, known United States person who is in the United States," if the
communication was acquired by "intentionally targeting" that person, and if the circumstances are such
that they have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 53 Alternatively, "surveillance" also means the
acquisition of any communication to or from someone located in the United States, if the acquisition
occurs within the United States.54
It is clear from both FISA and Supreme Court precedent that an individual must have a reasonable
expectation of privacy for "surveillance" to occur. In United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that
individuals have no expectation of privacy in information held by a third party.55 Through the use of
National Security Letters, the FBI and the NSA routinely exploit this rule of law to acquire vast amounts
of personal information on U.S. citizens from private corporations, such as phone companies and
Internet service providers. 56 Because FISA's definition of surveillance fails to account for this practice,
the government is not required to get a warrant or make any certification of probable cause.
Considering how much the technological capacity of the private sector for gathering and retaining
personal information has increased in recent years, the privacy implications of government access to
this data are huge.
Voting issue –
1. limits – they explode the topic to cover governmental use of ALL types of
information, like height, weight, your facebook status or twitter accounts – it’s infinite
2. negative ground – ‘privacy bad’ is core ground on a surveillance topic, but their
interpretation completely avoids the link
--xt - nonpublic information
Domestic surveillance means the acquisition of non-public information – it’s distinct
from the broader ‘intelligence gathering’ and requires an expectation to privacy
Small, 8 - United States Air Force Academy (Matthew, “His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic
Surveillance, Civil Liberties and Executive Power during Times of National Crisis”
http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Small.pdf
Before one can make any sort of assessment of domestic surveillance policies, it is first necessary to
narrow the scope of the term “domestic surveillance.” Domestic surveillance is a subset of intelligence
gathering. Intelligence, as it is to be understood in this context, is “information that meets the stated or
understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, processed and narrowed to meet those
needs” (Lowenthal 2006, 2). In essence, domestic surveillance is a means to an end; the end being
intelligence. The intelligence community best understands domestic surveillance as the acquisition of
nonpublic information concerning United States persons (Executive Order 12333 (3.4) (i)). With this
definition domestic surveillance remains an overly broad concept.
This paper’s analysis, in terms of President Bush’s policies, focuses on electronic surveillance;
specifically, wiretapping phone lines and obtaining caller information from phone companies. Section f
of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 defines electronic surveillance as:
[T]he acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire
or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States person
who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States
person, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant
would be required for law enforcement purposes;
Adhering to the above definition allows for a focused analysis of one part of President Bush’s domestic
surveillance policy as its implementation relates to the executive’s ability to abridge certain civil
liberties. However, since electronic surveillance did not become an issue of public concern until the
1920s, there would seem to be a problem with the proposed analysis.
Considering an American citizen’s claim to a right to privacy, the proposed analysis is not limited to
electronic surveillance alone but rather includes those actions that would seek, or at least appear, to
abridge a civil liberty. The previously presented definition of electronic surveillance itself implies an
infringement into a person’s expected right, in this case the right is to privacy. Acknowledging the
intrusion inherent in the definition, the question of how far the president can push this intrusion
becomes even more poignant. As such, President Bush’s policies are not the sole subject of scrutiny, but
rather his supposed power to abridge civil liberties in the interest of national security. The first part of
the analysis, then, turns to a time where the national security of the United States was most at jeopardy,
during its fight for independence.
It requires the elimination of a privacy interest – otherwise they make all trivial uses
of information ‘surveillance’
Huey, 9 – assistant professor of sociology at the University of Western Ontario (Laura, Surveillance:
Power, Problems, and Politics. Hier, Sean P., and Greenberg, Joshua, eds. p. 221-222, ebrary
The past few years have witnessed incredible growth in the field of surveillance studies. Remarkably,
despite this growth, there is no consensus on what forms of human activity are encompassed by the
term “surveillance.” Derived from the French for watching over, surveillance encompasses the basic
activity of watching others. Brian Martin (1993, 115) uses surveillance in this sense when he describes it
as “keeping a close watch on others.” However, this basic definition has been variously expanded upon
and/or challenged. Gary Marx (1998), among others, suggests that there has been a notable shift in
what constitutes surveillance. Marx distinguishes between what he terms traditional surveillance,
involving close observation of a targeted individual (e.g., the police officer who trails a suspect), and the
new surveillance: technologies designed to systematically extract and collect personal data (e.g., the
database that collects, sorts, and creates data profiles of targeted individuals and groups). Whereas
traditional surveillance is an exceptional activity, proliferating technologies have made the new
surveillance a routine, everyday activity that is largely invisible to those people whom it targets. What
these two forms of surveillance share, however, is that each seeks to “eliminate privacy in order to
determine normative compliance or to influence the individual” (Marx 2003, 370).
For Colin Bennett (2005), such an understanding of surveillance is insufficient. Bennett argues that the
use of technology to systematically capture and analyze data must be understood in relation to
institutional, cultural, and political contexts and goals: an action alone does not constitute surveillance;
it does so only in relation to its stated uses and goals. To illustrate this point, Bennett distinguishes
between the mundane collection and use of his personal data when taking a flight to Toronto and the
experience of someone who has been targeted for close observation and special treatment by virtue of
his or her name or meal preferences. According to Bennett, then, understanding surveillance as the
simple act of watching over – the mother over the child, for example – “trivializes” its meanings, its
uses, and the experiences of its targets.
Even the broadest definition doesn’t include information provided with consent
Pounder 9 – PhD, Director, Amberhawk Training and Amberhawk Associates
(Chris, “NINE PRINCIPLES FOR ASSESSING WHETHER PRIVACY IS PROTECTED IN A SURVEILLANCE
SOCIETY,” Scholar)
This paper uses the term "surveillance" in its widest sense to include data sharing and the revealing of
identity information in the absence of consent of the individual concerned. It argues that the current
debate about the nature of a "surveillance society" needs a new structural framework that allows the
benefits of surveillance and the risks to individual privacy to be properly balanced.
Surveillance is not shared information
Hypponen 14 - computer security expert and columnist
(Mikko, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/m/mikkohyppo633646.html)
Governmental surveillance is not about the government collecting the information you're sharing
publicly and willingly; it's about collecting the information you don't think you're sharing at all, such as
the online searches you do on search engines... or private emails or text messages... or the location of
your mobile phone at any time.
Must be secret
Baker 5 – MA, CPP, CPO
(Brian, “Surveillance: Concepts and Practices for Fraud, Security and Crime Investigation,”
http://www.ifpo.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/surveillance.pdf)
Surveillance is defined as covert observations of places and persons for the purpose of obtaining∂
information (Dempsey, 2003). The term covert infers that the operative conducting the∂ surveillance is
discreet and secretive. Surveillance that maintains a concealed, hidden, undetected∂ nature clearly has
the greatest chance of success because the subject of the surveillance will act∂ or perform naturally.
Remaining undetected during covert surveillance work often involves∂ physical fatigue, mental stress,
and very challenging situations. Physical discomfort is an∂ unfortunate reality for investigators, which
varies from stinging perspiration in summer to hard∂ shivers during the winter.
Must be covert
IJ 98
(Info Justice, OPERATIONS, SURVEILLANCE AND STAKEOUT PART 1,
http://www.infojustice.com/samples/12%20Operations,%20Surveillance%20And%20Stakeout%20Part%
201.html)
Surveillance is defined as the systematic observation of persons, places, or things to obtain information.
Surveillance is carried out without the knowledge of those under surveillance and is concerned primarily
with people.
--third party data not topical
The Third Party Doctrine means individuals don’t have an expectation of privacy if
their data is available to third parties
Turner, 15 - Brad Turner is a graduate of Duke Law School and a practicing attorney in Ohio. (“When Big
Data Meets Big Brother: Why Courts Should Apply United States v. Jones to Protect People's Data” 16
N.C. J.L. & Tech. 377, January, lexis)
"Big Brother is Watching You." n1 Big Data n2 is fast becoming big business. n3 In an effort to target
consumers with advertisements that connect consumers with goods and services that they are likely to
buy, businesses track, collect, store, analyze, and share consumer data. n4 From smartphones n5 to
smart thermostats, n6 from customer loyalty cards n7 to in-store motion detectors, n8 from cookies n9
to web beacons n10 and beyond, n11 [*380] companies obtain people's data from every source
possible in an attempt to transform that data into consumer sales. n12
Of course, Big Data is valuable to more than just the private sector. Governments of all shapes and sizes
are quickly learning the potential value of obtaining and using Big Data. n13 Unlike business, however,
government cannot obtain huge troves of data about its citizens without raising the specter of Orwell's
Big Brother. n14 Recent revelations about the size and scope of the National Security Agency's ("NSA")
data-collection efforts, for example, have sparked a national debate about the propriety of the
government collecting huge quantities of highly-detailed data about its citizens. n15 In a post-9/11 age
when people conduct much of their daily lives online, Americans are understandably concerned about
whether our national security apparatus strikes the proper balance between national security and civil
liberties. n16
Thankfully, unlike the citizens in Orwell's 1984, n17 Americans have a tough, old friend to protect them
from Big Brother: the [*381] Fourth Amendment. n18 The Fourth Amendment's protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures have protected Americans' persons, papers, and effects for
generations. And in an age when people's lives are constantly being tracked, recorded, analyzed, and
shared by third parties, n19 its protections have never been more important.
The problem, exposed by the NSA's continued snooping, is a bit of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
called the "Third-Party Doctrine." n20 Long ago, the Supreme Court said that a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information that person knowingly exposes to others. n21 While such a policy
may have made sense at a time when ubiquitous government surveillance was a practical and political
impossibility, it makes little sense today. Nearly everything people do today becomes data. And nearly
every bit of data is shared, knowingly or unknowingly, voluntarily or involuntarily, with others. The script
has flipped: it is as difficult today for a person to avoid being tracked as it was thirty or forty years ago
for the government to track that same person. Thus, a once small and manageable exception to the
Fourth Amendment, the Third-Party Doctrine, now threatens to swallow whole the privacy guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment.
As the institution that created the Third-Party Doctrine so many years ago, n22 courts have the duty to
ensure that it does not completely destroy privacy in the information age - an era where constant and
pervasive surveillance is the norm. This Article suggests that courts adopt the Klayman v. Obama n23
approach and hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to government [*382] acquisitions of Big Data,
including metadata. More specifically, courts should follow Justice Alito's reasoning in United States v.
Jones n24 to hold that government acquisitions of Big Data are searches subject to the reasonableness
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Surely, if the government's collection of someone's global
positioning system ("GPS") data in Jones was intrusive enough to constitute a search, then so are
government acquisitions of Big Data.
Though such a holding would leave unresolved many challenging questions, such as whether the
collection of bulk data would require a warrant, it would be an important first step that would bring the
Fourth Amendment into the twenty-first century and enable the next generation of Americans to
conduct their lives without fear of unreasonable government searches and seizures of their data.
No data privacy exists whatsoever – companies track every activity consumers make
Turner, 15 - Brad Turner is a graduate of Duke Law School and a practicing attorney in Ohio. (“When Big
Data Meets Big Brother: Why Courts Should Apply United States v. Jones to Protect People's Data” 16
N.C. J.L. & Tech. 377, January, lexis)
II. Big Data and The Illusion of Privacy
Despite whatever Americans may believe or desire about privacy, their activities are far from private.
Every website visit, every hyperlink click, every Facebook message sent, and every YouTube video
watched is being tracked. n25 Even offline activities, like shopping, driving, walking, and exercising are
being tracked. n26 In the words of the Jurassic Park ranger tracked by a pack of velociraptors, n27 "We
are being hunted." n28 Instead of velociraptors hunting Americans for lunch, Americans are being
hunted for the purpose of advertising, or more generally, for the purpose of making money from their
data. Only, unlike the trained Jurassic Park ranger, many Americans do not know they are being hunted.
[*383] One scholar compared this to a two-way mirror: the end-user sees her own activities reflected in
the two-way mirror, and does not realize that on the other side, she is actually being observed by any
number of faceless, non-descript organizations that she probably does not even know exist. n29
A. Tracking Online Activities
Nearly everything a person does online is tracked in some way. Advertisers are looking for valuable ad
space, and companies with that space are eager to cash-in.
1. The Fundamentals of Online Tracking: Cookies, Website Activity Logs, Form Data, and Web Beacons
When a person visits a website, the website will place a "cookie" on the person's computer or electronic
device that tracks the person's activities on the website. n30 These cookies can be set to erase
themselves after the individual leaves the website - or not. n31 Persistent (multi-session) cookies stay
on a person's computer and can stay there until they expire, which can be months or even years. n32
Persistent cookies are the objects of code on a person's computer that enable a website to "remember"
a visitor so that a visitor need not, for example, re-enter her username and password each time she
wishes to log on to her email. n33 Typically, cookies [*384] can be read only by the website generating
the cookie. n34 That, however, is not always the case. Sometimes the cookie can be read by multiple
websites, permitting information-sharing between several different websites visited by the same
person. n35 Thankfully, cookies can be blocked, n36 although often at the cost of severely reduced
functionality. n37 New cookie-like technology dubbed "canvas fingerprinting," however, may be
"virtually impossible to block." n38
Cookies are not the only way an online entity can track a user's activities. Users are tracked in any
number of ways that do not require the ability to store a cookie on a user's computer or electronic
device. For example, websites n39 keep detailed activity logs of every visitor, n40 like an automatically
generated visitor log or guestbook. These logs gather raw user-data, like the accessing-device's IP
address, the access date and time, and cookie data, if it exists. n41 Software then reads and interprets
this raw data to provide the website operator with information about user behavior. n42 Of course, any
data directly entered by visitors into [*385] form fields, like name, contact information, etc., is stored in
the webserver's database. Cookie data, website activity log data, and form data can then be combined
and associated to build a comprehensive snapshot of a particular visitor's activity on the website. n43
Web beacons are another popular, very simple, and very effective way of tracking people's online
whereabouts without using a cookie. Each time someone visits a website embedded with a tracker's
web beacon, the tracker is notified, like a blip on a radar. n44 From the blips, the tracker can
surreptitiously track a visitor's online whereabouts across any website embedded with the beacon.
Embed enough web beacons into enough websites, and a tracker can learn a great deal about a visitor:
everything from the visitor's political ideology to the visitor's sexual preferences.
2. The Incentive to Track and Collect as Much Data as Possible - Big Data's Raison d'Etre
Hosting websites and providing services is not cheap, and it certainly is not free. To the pay the bills,
companies often sell ad space to online advertising agencies eager to reach a broader audience. n45
And when selling ad space pays the bills, information about the company's electronic visitors is very
valuable. The more information that advertising agency has about a particular company's electronic
visitors, the better the ad agency is able to [*386] display ads that influence those visitors. n46 The
more effective the ad, the more money the advertisement agency makes from its clients. n47 The more
money advertising agencies make from advertising on a particular electronic space, the more money the
host-company can charge for that ad space. n48
Such an information and data-driven system encourages ad space hosts, as well as the advertising
agencies that buy ad space, to collect as much personal data as possible from visitors. Though a
particular website may enjoy access to only its visitors' information, an advertising agency has access to
the visitor information of all of the electronic spaces where it displays ads (e.g., websites, smartphone
apps, software, console gaming systems, etc.). n49 The ability to compile data from so many different
sources helps advertising agencies create a three-dimensional, high-detailed image of any particular
visitor. n50 Complex algorithms [*387] then track that visitor's electronic movements and place
advertisements on websites, between songs, and before and during videos that are more likely to
influence the visitor. n51
Facebook and Google have become two of the most pervasive data-aggregating advertising agencies.
Google's AdSense advertisement system dwarfs most other online ad agencies, boasting more than two
million affiliates. n52 Facebook's advertising program is different, but just as massive. Facebook enjoys
access to the data of more than 950 million users. n53 Facebook records more than 2.5 billion status
updates, wall posts, photos, videos, and comments every day. n54 Facebook also collects data about
users visiting any platform that contains a Facebook "Like" button, whether the Facebook user clicks the
"Like" button or not. n55 One company estimates that these "Like" buttons exist on nearly one million
websites. n56 With access to so much high-quality data, it is no wonder why Google and Facebook are
able to target users and visitors with such eerily accurate web ads. n57
B. "Offline" Tracking
Going offline will not stop the hunt; people are tracked even when they think they are offline.
Smartphones, GPS systems, [*388] customer-loyalty cards, video cameras, and even radio frequency
identification ("RFID") devices track the whereabouts, purchasing habits, and seemingly offline activities
of Americans every single day, even though Americans may not realize it or approve.
1nc – technical means
Surveillance requires information collection through the use of technology
Odoemelam, 15 - Chika Ebere Odoemelam is with University of Western Ontario, London,
Ontario, Canada (“Adapting to Surveillance and Privacy Issues in the Era of
Technological and Social Networking” International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, Vol. 5, No. 6,
June 2015, http://www.ijssh.org/papers/520-H140.pdf)
According to an article by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (2009) [3], “Surveillance is the
collection or monitoring of information about a person or persons through the use of technology”. Thus,
from the above definition, one can see that surveillance involves a wide range of technology and
practices aimed at monitoring the activities of people possibly without their knowledge and permission.
For instance, there is audio surveillance which involves phone-tapping and listening devices, visual
surveillance which involves in-car video devices, hidden video surveillance, and closed-circuit television
camera (CCTV), tracking surveillance which includes global positioning systems (GPS) and mobile phones
and data surveillance which involves computer, internet and keystroke monitoring. The majority of the
above devices are constantly used to monitor people without their prior permission.
Furthermore, surveillance according to David Lyon (2007) [4] is “the focused, systematic and routine
attention to personal details for the purposes of influence, management, protection or direction”. The
above definition shows that surveillance is an instrument used by the authorities for the monitoring and
management of the activities of its citizenry. Thus, to achieve this objective, nations use electronic
communication technologies such as wiretapping telephone conversations, tracking people with
biometric data and using infrared cameras. In the same vein, marketing firms sometimes use social
media technologies such as Facebook, Twitter, blogs and instant messaging devices to collect data about
individual users, and in most cases, end up in violating the privacy of the users.
Violation – the aff curtails the use of physical searches, it’s distinct
Voting issue to preserve limits – search and seizure law should be a separate topic –
they explode surveillance into the entire body of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
and make it impossible to predict or prepare for
--xt technical means
Observation from a distance---requires electronic equipment
Aydin 13 – PhD, Associate Professor
(Mehmet, “Perception of Surveillance: An Empirical Study in Turkey, USA, and China,” International
Journal of Business, Humanities and Technology, 3.4)
Information Technology (IT) transformation in government can be seen as a revolution in terms of
quality and∂ cost of public services. However, it is also a reality that governments’ use of IT may pose a
threat to civil rights∂ and liberties. In the last decade, there is an abundance of news in the media
regarding with the continuing assault∂ on citizens’ privacy arising from some Information Technology (IT)
applications. The most critical part of IT use∂ is related to surveillance activities. Surveillance is the
monitoring of the behavior, activities, or information for the∂ purpose of influencing, managing,
directing, or protecting (Lyon, 2007). In fact, surveillance is a highly∂ complicated issue with its positive
and negative sides. It generally involves observation of individuals or groups∂ by government
organizations. The word surveillance generally refers to observation from a distance by means of∂
electronic equipment (such as closed circuit television- CCTV), or interception of electronically
transmitted∂ information (such as Internet traffic or phone calls). These surveillance categories (CCTV,
Internet and telephone)∂ will also be the subject of this study. In the empirical part, attitudes of students
towards those technologies will be∂ analyzed in depth.
Requires distance and technology
KAB 15
(Cutting edge technology solutions, Surveillance System Services,
http://www.kabcomputers.com/Services/Security-and-Surveillance-System-Services.htm)
Surveillance Systems (CCTV)
KAB Computer Services offers several surveillance services. By definition, system surveillance is the
process of monitoring the behavior of people, objects or processes within systems for conformity to
expected or desired norms in trusted systems for security or social control. The word surveillance is
commonly used to describe observation from a distance by means of electronic equipment or other
technological means.
Typical Surveillance System Services:
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)
Surveillance Cameras
Hidden or Covert Cameras
GPS Tracking (Real-Time and Data Loggers)
Surveillance requires the use of technical means
Odoemelam, 15 - Chika Ebere Odoemelam is with University of Western Ontario, London,
Ontario, Canada (“Adapting to Surveillance and Privacy Issues in the Era of
Technological and Social Networking” International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, Vol. 5, No. 6,
June 2015, http://www.ijssh.org/papers/520-H140.pdf)
Still contributing in the definition of surveillance, Gary T. Marx, (2002) [7], adds to the definition of
surveillance by describing it as “The use of technical means to extract or create personal data. This may
be taken from individuals or contexts”. The above definition suggests that those that have the power or
authority, such as police and other members of law enforcement agencies, can carry out surveillance
activities beyond what individuals disclose to them and without their prior notice or permission. Hence,
to carry out such operations in the context, law enforcement agents look at patterns and settings of
relationships while using surveillance technologies, such as data profiling of individuals.
Surveillance is scrutiny through technical means to create or extract personal data –
most predictable because it best reflects current government practice
Marx, 4 – Professor Emeritus from M.I.T. (Gary, “Some Concepts that may be Useful in Understanding
the Myriad Forms and Contexts of Surveillance, Intelligence and National Security,” 19:2, 226-248, DOI:
10.1080/0268452042000302976
WHAT IS SURVEILLANCE?
The dictionary definition of surveillance as it is applied to many contemporary new forms such as video,
computer dossiers, electronic location and work monitoring, drug testing and DNA analysis is woefully
inadequate or worse.7 For example in the Concise Oxford Dictionary surveillance is defined as ‘close
observation, especially of a suspected person’. Yet today many of the new surveillance technologies are
not ‘especially’ applied to ‘a suspected person’. They are commonly applied categorically. In broadening
the range of subjects the term ‘a suspected person’ takes on a different meaning. In a striking
innovation, surveillance is also applied to contexts (geographical places and spaces, particular time
periods, networks, systems and categories of person), not just to a particular person whose identity is
known beforehand.
The dictionary definition also implies a clear distinction between the object of surveillance and the
person carrying it out and a non-co-operative relationship. In an age of servants listening behind closed
doors, binoculars and telegraph interceptions, that separation made sense. It was easy to distinguish the
watcher from the person watched. Yet self-surveillance, cosurveillance and reciprocal surveillance have
emerged as important themes, often blurring the easy distinction between agent and subject of
surveillance. Well-publicised warnings that surveillance might be present seek to create self-restraint. A
general ethos of self-surveillance is also encouraged by the availability of home products such as those
that test for alcohol level, pregnancy, AIDS and other medical conditions.
Nor does the traditional definition capture contemporary cases of ‘cooperative’ parallel or comonitoring, involving the subject and an external agent in which the former voluntarily sends a remote
message (as with location and some implanted physiological monitoring devices). Individuals may agree
to wear badges and have transmitters for toll roads or as anti-theft means installed on their cars. They
may join programmes that invite police to search their vehicles if driven late at night. Many bio-metric
forms involve some degree of co-operation, or at the least, implicit co-operation by the failure to take
steps to block transmission.
The border between the watched and the watcher may also be blurred in that there can be a continuous
transmission link between sender and receiver as with brain waves or scents. The sender and receiver
are in one sense electronically joined. It may be difficult to say where the subject stops and the agent
begins. As with questions of copyright and electronic media, new issues of the ownership and control of
property appear. Such transmissions are ‘personal’ but leave the person’s body and control. The line
between what is public and private is hazy in such settings.
The term ‘close observation’ also fails to capture contemporary practices. Surveillance may be carried
out from afar, as with satellite images or the remote monitoring of communications and work. Nor need
it be ‘close’ as in detailed – much initial surveillance involves superficial scans looking for patterns of
interest to be pursued later in greater detail. It is both farther away and closer than the conventional
definition implies.
The dated nature of the definition is further illustrated in its seeming restriction to visual means as
implied in ‘observation’. The eyes do contain the vast majority of the body’s sense receptors and the
visual is a master metaphor for the other senses (for example, saying ‘I see’ for understanding or being
able to ‘see through people’). Indeed, ‘seeing through’ is a convenient short-hand for the new
surveillance.
To be sure the visual is usually an element of surveillance, even when it is not the primary means of data
collection (for example, written accounts of observations, events and conversations, or the conversion
to text or images of measurements from heat, sound or movement). Yet to ‘observe’ a text or a printout
is in many ways different from a detective or supervisor directly observing behaviour. The eye as the
major means of direct surveillance is increasingly joined or replaced by hearing, touching and smelling.
The use of multiple senses and sources of data is an important characteristic of much of the new
surveillance.
A better definition of contemporary forms of surveillance is needed. The new forms of surveillance
involve scrutiny through the use of technical means to extract or create personal data, whether from
individuals or contexts. The data sought may or may not be known by the subject, who may be willing or
unwilling to have it discovered or revealed. It may involve revealed information for which verification is
sought.
The use of ‘technical means’ to extract and create the information implies the ability to go beyond what
is offered to the unaided senses or voluntarily reported. Many of the examples involve an automated
process and most extend the senses by using material artefacts or software of some kind, but the means
for rooting out can also be sophisticated forms of deception as with undercover operations, ruses and
pretexts. The use of ‘contexts’ along with ‘individuals’ recognises that much modern surveillance also
looks at settings and patterns of relationships. Systems as well as persons are of interest.
This definition excludes the routine, non-technological surveillance that is a part of everyday life such as
looking before crossing the street or seeking the source of a sudden noise or of smoke. An observer on a
nude beach or police interrogating a co-operative suspect would also be excluded, because in these
cases the information is volunteered and the unaided senses are sufficient.
I use the more neutral and broader verb ‘scrutinise’ rather than ‘observe’ (with its tilt toward the visual)
in the definition because the nature of the means (or the senses involved) suggests sub-types and issues
for analysis that ought not to be foreclosed by a definition. For example how do visual, auditory, text
and other forms of surveillance compare with respect to factors such as intrusiveness or validity? In
addition much surveillance is automated and hence ‘observation’ (if that is what it is by a machine, is of
a different sort).
While the above definition captures some common elements among new surveillance means,
contemporary tactics are enormously varied.8 There is need for a conceptual language that brings some
parsimony and unity to the vast array of old and new surveillance activities and which can permit more
systematic comparisons and explanations. The next section suggests dimensions that can be used to
categorise the means aspect of surveillance.
--AT: Physical surveillance is topical
Surveillance requires information gathering from a distance – even if physical
surveillance is part of it, that just means observation not searches
Shahabuddin, 15 - JD, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law (Madiha, ““The More Muslim
You Are, the More Trouble You Can Be”:1 How Government Surveillance of Muslim Americans2 Violates
First Amendment Rights” Chapman Law Review [Vol. 18:2)
Professor Christopher Slobogin defines surveillance as “government efforts to gather information about
people from a distance, usually covertly and without entry into private spaces.”21 Surveillance as a
general phenomenon is then broken down into three categories: 1) communications surveillance, which
is “the real-time interception of communications”; 2) physical surveillance, which is “the real-time
observation of physical activities”; and 3) transaction surveillance, which is the “accessing [of] recorded
information about communications, activities, and other transactions.”22 According to Slobogin, since
9/11, “the United States government has been obsessed, as perhaps it should be, with ferreting out
national security threats,” but “more than occasionally it has also visited significant intrusion on large
numbers of law-abiding citizens—sometimes inadvertently, sometimes not.”23 Within the context of
national security, intelligence gathering24 of pattern occurrences in neighborhoods and communities is
intended to “analyze broad or meaningful trends” as a means of assessing the validity and likelihood of a
national security threat.25
Such intelligence gathering, however, armed with a prejudicial purpose can result in “selective
surveillance” that imposes burdens on Muslim Americans’ First Amendment rights, further alienating
this particular community from the government.26 The surveillance of Muslim Americans operates
along a similar, yet covert, vein of the “Broken Windows”27 theory of policing. Developed by James Q.
Wilson and George L. Kelling, this theory posits that when a community riddled with violence and crime
becomes less tolerant of the minor causes of social disorder, a decrease in violent crime will result.28
Implementation of the Broken Windows theory has resulted in aggressive “zero tolerance policing” in
New York City, with its stated goal being to increase misdemeanor arrests on the streets in an effort to
reduce other, more violent crime.29 While there has been much social science research conducted to
test the Broken Windows theory, “there is no reliable empirical support for the proposition that disorder
causes crime or that broken-windows policing reduces serious crime.”30
--AT: Overlimits
Technological surveillance is broad – multiple examples
Odoemelam, 15 - Chika Ebere Odoemelam is with University of Western Ontario, London,
Ontario, Canada (“Adapting to Surveillance and Privacy Issues in the Era of
Technological and Social Networking” International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, Vol. 5, No. 6,
June 2015, http://www.ijssh.org/papers/520-H140.pdf)
V. TYPES OF SURVEILLANCE
The advent of advanced forms of technology has made our lives more prone to public scrutiny today, in
the 21st century. The concept of a surveillance society whereby our everyday private lives are being
monitored and recorded by the authorities is no longer news. Since the September 2001 terrorists
attack in the United States, the assault on our privacy by security agents using sophisticated surveillance
programs or privacy-invading devices has been a constant presence in the news media. The availability
of wireless communications, computers, cameras, sensors, GPS, biometrics, and other technologies is
growing silently in our midst.
According Christopher Parsons (2011) [10], “When we send messages to one another online, when we
browse web pages and send e-mail, our communications are typically unencrypted, that is, they are in a
form that can be easily read”. Because our communications are unencrypted, everyone who uses online
technology or other forms of communications is vulnerable to surveillance. Our online and offline
communications are constantly being monitored and are under surveillance by the “appropriate”
authorities. As a result, it is possible for our privacy to be violated without our consent because of our
reliance on technology. There is a huge privacy issue in relation to digital and other forms of
communications all over the globe, especially when telecommunications companies install equipment
that could be used for covert surveillance and even modification of our communications.
Moreover, various forms of surveillance abound that could be blamed for bringing our lives out of the
private domain and into the public sphere. These forms of surveillance include.
A. E-mail Surveillance
This is related to the monitoring of both encrypted and unencrypted electronic messages or
communications of individuals by government agencies. The government does this by ordering Internet
Service Providers (ISP) to inspect their user's communications data, both encrypted and unencrypted.
According to the New York Times (June 16, 2009) [11] article, “The National Security Agency is facing
renewed scrutiny over the extent of its domestic surveillance program, with critics in Congress saying its
recent intercepts of the private telephone calls and e-mail messages of Americans are broader than
previously acknowledged, current and former officials said”. The above statement suggests that we are
living in a surveillance society, and that the challenges society will face in adapting it as a way of life are
enormous and potentially overwhelming.
B. Telephone Tracking Surveillance
The recent claims that US intelligence agencies have been monitoring the mobile phone conversations
of German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, as well as those of over seventy million French citizens, is a strong
example of telephone surveillance.
According to an article, Der Spiegel (2013) [12] reporting on information obtained from former NSA
worker Edward Snowden, “Merkel's mobile number had been listed by the NSA's Special Collection
Service (SCS) since 2002 and may have been monitored for more than 10 years”. This information makes
it obvious that the surveillance business observes no boundaries and a respects no individual. In
surveillance, everybody is a suspect irrespective of one's position in the society. Surveillance is
sometimes carried out by tapping the targets' communications with high-tech surveillance equipment,
thus threatening their right to privacy as guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Disclosures of this nature will continue to raise fundamental questions around the world about
how to effectively protect our privacy and our personal data from unauthorized surveillance. For
instance, if companies are handing over customer data or access to their equipment without
authorization, those businesses may well have broken the law by violating the privacy of their
customers.
C. Other Forms of Surveillance
According to Christian Fuschs (2010) [13], other forms of surveillance include:
1) Scanning the fingerprints of visitors entering the United States.
2) The use of speed cameras for identifying speeders which involves state power.
3) Electronic monitoring bracelets for prisoners in an open prison system.
4) Scanning of Internet and phone data by secret services.
5) Usage of full body scanners at airports.
6) Biometric passports containing digital fingerprints.
7) CCTV cameras in public places for the prevention of crime and terrorism.
8) Assessment of customer shopping behaviour with the help of loyalty cards.
9) Data collection in marketing research.
10) Assessment of personal images and videos of applicants
on Facebook by employers prior to a job interview.
11) Passenger Name Record (PNR) data transfer in the aviation industry.
12) Corporations spying on employees, or union members.
1nc – people not places violation
Surveillance is the focused, systematic and routine collection of personal details – it
excludes surveillance of places
Keiber, 14 – PhD dissertation for the Graduate Program in Political Science at Ohio State (Jason, “The
Surveillance of Individuals in International Politics”
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=osu1397573412&disposition=inline
The study of surveillance has its own discipline, yet it is relatively new. The field of Surveillance Studies
“covers a huge range of activities and processes, but what they have in common is that, for whatever
reason, people and populations are under scrutiny.”65 A representative definition of “surveillance” is:
“the focused, systematic and routine” collection and analysis of “personal details for purposes of
influence, management, protection or direction.66
Various elements of the definition deserve attention. First, surveillance is focused and routine. This
suggest it is, at the very least, purposive, and incidental acquisition of data would not count as
surveillance proper. Second, it includes both collection and analysis. Note also that collection entails the
activity of gathering information as well as the storage of it. Storage, for example of data in a database,
is an important component of surveillance because it enables those conducting surveillance to keep
track of information over time and recall that information when needed. Analysis is included because
often the collected data does not speak for itself. For example most information is classified (sorted) as
it gets stored, and classification is itself a form of analysis. Moreover, technology increasingly enables
automated data analysis and data mining to discover patterns and novel information. Third, according to
the definition above different actors can conduct surveillance—governments, corporations, civic
organizations, parents, etc. For my purposes the focus will be on governmental forms of surveillance.
Finally, surveillance is about people. Students of international politics may pause here—what about
surveillance of material things like missile sites and nuclear enrichment facilities. Surveillance Studies,
which has roots in sociology and human geography, is primarily interested in surveillance as a social and
political phenomenon. That being said, sometimes surveillance of objects can provide a lot of
information about what certain people are doing. This is well within the purview of surveillance studies.
For an IR example, IAEA monitoring of gas centrifuges is similar to workplace monitoring intended to
check whether or not employees are doing their job. On the other hand there is some material-focused
surveillance which Surveillance Studies doesn’t address. For example satellites and seismic and
atmospheric monitoring constantly operate to detect nuclear detonations, but this is activity that
Surveillance Studies is not too interested in.
Voting issue to ensure predictable limits. Surveillance already covers a huge range of
activities – including surveillance of places explodes the topic and skirts the core
controversies of surveillance studies
--xt people violation
Surveillance is defined as ‘social sorting’---the deliberate collection of personal
information for the purpose of management, protection or detection
Tucker and Wang 14 – *PhD, Professor of Computer Science, **PhD, Professor @ U Portsmouth
(Victoria and John, “On the Role of Identity in Surveillance,” http://arxiv.org/pdf/1408.3438.pdf)
David Lyon has emphasised a general conception of surveillance, which he has characterised∂ as “the
focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence,∂ management,
protection or detection” (2007a: 14). Furthermore, “this attention to personal∂ details is not random,
occasional or spontaneous; it is deliberate and depends on certain∂ protocol and techniques” (ibid.).
Lyon (2003, 2007b) has emphasised the significance of∂ considering contemporary surveillance as social
sorting. He defined the term to mean the∂ “focus on the social and economic categories and the
computer codes by which personal data∂ is organized with a view to influencing and managing people
and populations” (Lyon, 2003:∂ 2). Social sorting has become the main purpose of surveillance, since
surveillance today is∂ overwhelmingly about personal data.∂ The rise of surveillance leads to an
emphasis on monitoring the behaviours from selected∂ individuals, through groups of people, to the
entire population. The growth and effectiveness∂ of the monitoring are made possible by all sorts of new
technologies, especially software∂ technologies. However, surveillance as social sorting is becoming
increasingly significant,∂ not merely because of the abundance and availabilities of new technological
devices. Rather,∂ these devices are required because of the increasing number of perceived and actual
risks,∂ and consequently, the desire to monitor the behaviour of the entire population (cf. Lyon,∂ 2003).
Systematic observation and identification of particular attributes of individuals
Tucker and Wang 14 – *PhD, Professor of Computer Science, **PhD, Professor @ U Portsmouth
(Victoria and John, “On the Role of Identity in Surveillance,” http://arxiv.org/pdf/1408.3438.pdf)
Indeed, surveillance is about data and essential to contemporary surveillance practices are∂ software
technologies and hardware devices that collect, store and process data. Currently,∂ the growth and
effectiveness of surveillance are made possible by all sorts of new∂ technologies, especially software
technologies. They are increasingly becoming a natural∂ component of our everyday life as various forms
of surveillance practices are routinely built∂ into our physical and virtual environments. Surveillance is a
process of data gathering that∂ involves the systematic observation of behaviours and individuals, and
the identification of∂ the ones that are deemed to have specific attributes (see: Figure 1).
Systematic observation of persons
Wang 11 – PhD, Vice President for Information Services and Chief Information Officer for the RF
(Hao, “Protecting Privacy in China,” p. 27)
Surveillance is defined as the systematic investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of
one or more persons. Traditionally, surveillance has been undertaken by physical means, such as
guarding prisons. In recent decades, it has been enhanced through image amplification devices such as
high-resolution satel¬lite cameras.6"1 Most of them are readily available in China today. However, some
of them are also privacy invasive. They render current Chinese legal protections seriously inadequate.
These devices may include: (I) microphones or listening devices that can be concealed; (2) miniature
tape recorders; (3) hidden cameras such as cell phone cameras; (4) hidden monitors that operated by
remote control; (5) infrared devices enabling photographs to be taken at night; (6) miniature
transmitters; and so on.
People
Nawawi 15 – PhD, Lecturer of Future Public Health Professionals
(Wan, “Surveillance Methods of Reducing Pilferage Problems in Foodservice Operation,” J. Basic. Appl.
Sci. Res., 5(1)91-94, 2015)
Nowadays, pilferage becomes one of the issues that are affecting the foodservice establishment. One of
the∂ methods that can help to reduce pilferage problem is through surveillance. According to Advanced
English∂ Dictionary, surveillance is defined as “a close watch keeps on a person, especially someone
suspected of∂ criminal activities”. This means, surveillance is the continuous monitoring of an individual
under supervision. In∂ the food service industry, the employee theft frequently occurred and it gives bad
effect to this industry [8]. So,∂ the surveillance is very important in order to reduce employee theft and it
can be done using the technology or by∂ humans.
General surveillance definitions
Limits good - surveillance
Narrow definitions are preferable---otherwise ‘surveillance’ is completely unlimited
Walby 5 – PhD, Associate Professor, University of Winnipeg, Department of Criminal Justice
(Kevin, “Institutional Ethnography and Surveillance Studies: An Outline for Inquiry,” Surveillance &
Society 3(2/3): 158-172)
The emerging transdisciplinary field of surveillance studies suffers from an overabundance of
speculative theorizing and a dearth of rigorous empirical research. Of course, many monographs,
articles, and reports tangentially related to the study of surveillance are based on social scientific
practice, and many of the classic works that constitute surveillance studies itself are not purely
speculative but engage through research with the social world they investigate (see, for instance, Rule,
1973; Braverman, 1974; Marx, 1988). Researching surveillance involves “watching” and needs to be
accompanied by an ethics of honesty, sympathy and respect as it regards researchers and their
respondents. Still, there is no overarching method in this area of study. Nor should there be only one
overarching method. When we use the word “surveillance” we often forget how amazingly diverse the
forms, linkages, and processes captured by the word are. That surveillance is a signifier referring to faceto-face supervision, camera monitoring, TV watching, paparazzi stalking, GPS tailing, cardiac
telemonitoring, the tracking of commercial/internet transactions, the tracing of tagged plants and
animals, etc., points to an impossible and always receding signified. Nevertheless, we need to refer to
these processes, and at present time surveillance is the term. We also need ways of inquiring into these
processes. The search is on for the methods of inquiry needed to give surveillance studies continuity and
legitimacy in the sport de combat of social science.
Reject broad definitions of surveillance – they prevent rigorously analyzing the topic
Jobard, 8 – Center of Sociological Research on Penal Institutions (Fabien, Law and Deviance, Volume 10 :
Surveillance and Governance. Deflem, Mathieu, ed, p. 77 ebrary)
The term surveillance raises a lexical difficulty which complicates its theoretical implications as well as
its empirical specification. Narrowly understood, it refers to the set of processes and measures through
which the State is informed of the activities of a person or of a group of persons while avoiding
repressive action, either because no offence has actually been identified or because the government
prefers, for one reason or another, to be discrete (Fijnaut & Marx, 1995; Sharpe, 2000). Yet, Michel
Foucault’s seminal work Surveiller et punir was translated into English under the title Discipline and
Punish (Foucault, 1977). In this latter disciplinary understanding, the notion of surveillance has to do
with a much broader field (Deleuze, 1988). It ceases to be a mere policing tool among many others in
the State’s policing arsenal, and instead becomes a regime of ‘‘governmentality’’ combining and
articulating different technologies, strategies, and governmental rationalities (Rose & Miller, 1992).
Accordingly, surveillance becomes a notion to describe a specific way through which human behavior is
apprehended, and hence ensure predictability, calculability, and ‘‘governability’’ (Gandy, 1993; Lyon,
1994; Wood, 2003). Here, of course, we find ourselves following a path opened by Foucault (1988) and
followed by many others since (for instance Rose, 2000).
However, whether one understands the notion of surveillance in its narrow sense, as a mere set of
disparate means within a governmental apparatus, or, on the contrary, as the basis for the constitution
of a governmentality regime which relies on spotting, identification, and control, using number of
techniques, devices, and processes, in both cases, the risk is that surveillance becomes an ‘‘all-terrain’’
notion which has less and less to do with the ground realities of its implementation. As David Garland
(1997) strongly underlines, the notion of surveillance could then lead directly to a variant of
reductionism: applicable to too many situations, it would, at the same time, suppress the empirical
specificities of each one. This inclination is all the more detrimental that, in polishing the ruggedness of
reality, it contributes to neglecting the uniqueness of the organizational methods and the institutional
layouts, the various types of intervention, and of the stocks of knowledge precisely meant to define the
‘‘surveillance society.’’ Yet, if there were one systematic observation to report, it would be the
multiplicity and variability of the devices of surveillance. Each of these devices adapts to specific
constellations, which have characteristic social, spatial, and temporal indicators, and are defined by the
nature of the threats and the risks that operate inside of them. The differences from one constellation
to another are what deserve particular attention.
Federal surveillance laws
Surveillance laws refer to FISA, the NSA, the Right to Financial Privacy Act, and the Fair
Credit Reporting Act
Congressional Record, 13 (Text of S.1599, a bill to amend the Patriot Act, 10/29, p. S7630)
(2) SURVEILLANCE LAW.—The term ‘‘surveillance law’’ means any provision of any of the following:
(A) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
(B) Section 802(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 436(a)).
(C) Section 2709 of title 18, United States Code.
(D) Section 1114 of the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(5)(A)).
(E) Subsection (a) or (b) of section 626 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u(a), 1681u(b)).
(F) Section 627(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681v(a)) (as in effect on the day before the
date of the enactment of this Act).
AT: Lyon definition
Topical exceptions exist to general standards for surveillance
Lyon, 7 – David Lyon directs the Surveillance Studies Centre, is a Professor of Sociology, holds a Queen’s
Research Chair and is cross-appointed as a Professor in the Faculty of Law at Queen's University in
Kingston, Ontario (SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW, p. 13-16)
Defining surveillance
Before going any further, I should make clear what is meant by surveillance. Although the word
'surveillance' often has connotations of surreptitious cloak-and-dagger or undercover investigations into
individual activities, it also has some fairly straightforward meanings that refer to routine and everyday
activity. Rooted in the French verb surveiller, literally to 'watch over', surveillance refers to processes in
which special note is taken of certain human behaviours that go well beyond idle curiosity. You can
'watch over' (or, more clumsily, 'surveill') others because you are concerned for their safety; lifeguards
at the edge of the swimming pool might be an example. Or you can watch over those whose activities
are in some way dubious or suspect; police officers watching someone loitering in a parking lot would be
an example of this kind of surveillance.
Surveillance always has some ambiguity, and that is one of the things that make it both intriguing and
highly sensitive. For example, parental concern and care for children may lead to the adoption of some
surveillance technologies in order to express this. But at what point does this become an unacceptable
form of control? Does the answer depend on whether or not the offspring in question are aware that
they are being tracked, or is the practice itself unethical by some standards? At the same time, putting
the question this way assumes that people in general are wary, if not positively spooked, when they
learn that others may be noting their movements, listening to their conversations or profiling their
purchase patterns. But this assumption is not always sound. Many seem content to be surveilled, for
example by street cameras, and some appear so to relish being watched that they will put on a display
for the overhead lenses, or dis- close the most intimate details about themselves in blogs or on
webcams.
So what is surveillance? For the sake of argument, we may start by saying that it is the focused,
systematic and routine attention to per- sonal details for purposes of influence, management,
protection or direction. Surveillance directs its attention in the end to individuals (even though
aggregate data, such as those available in the public domain, may be used to build up a background
picture). It is focused. By systematic, I mean that this attention to personal details is not random,
occasional or spontaneous; it is deliberate and depends on certain protocols and techniques. Beyond
this, surveillance is routine; it occurs as a 'normal' part of everyday life in all societies that depend on
bureaucratic administration and some kinds of information technology. Everyday surveillance is endemic
to modern societies. It is one of those major social processes that actually constitute modernity as such
(Giddens 1985).
Having said that, there are exceptions. Anyone who tries to present an 'overview' has to admit that
particular circumstances make a difference. The big picture may seem over-simplified but, equally, the
tiny details can easily lose a sense of significance. For example, not all surveillance is necessarily focused.
Some police surveillance, for instance, may be quite general - a 'dragnet' - in an attempt somehow to
narrow down a search for some likely suspects. And by the same token, such surveillance may be fairly
random. Again, surveillance may occur in relation to non-human phenomena that have only a secondary
relevance to 'personal details'. Satellite images may be used to seek signs of mass graves where
genocide is suspected or birds may be tagged to discover how avian flu is spread. Such exceptions are
important, and add nuance to our understanding of the big picture. By looking at various sites of
surveillance, and exploring surveillance in both 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' ways, I hope to illustrate
how such variations make a difference to how surveillance is understood in different contexts.
The above definition makes reference to 'information technology', but digital devices only increase the
capacities of surveillance or, sometimes, help to foster particular kinds of surveillance or help to alter its
character. Surveillance also occurs in down-to-earth, face-to- face ways. Such human surveillance draws
on time-honoured practices of direct supervision, or of looking out for unusual people or behaviours,
which might be seen in the factory overseer or in neighbourhood watch schemes. Indeed, to accompany
the most high-tech systems invented, the US Department of Homeland Security still conscripts ordinary
people to be the 'eyes and ears' of government, and some non-professional citizen-observers in Durban,
South Africa have been described by a security manager (without irony) as 'living cameras' (Hentschel
2006).
But to return to the definition: it is crucial to remember that surveillance is always hinged to some
specific purposes. The marketer wishes to influence the consumer, the high school seeks efficient ways
of managing diverse students and the security company wishes to insert certain control mechanisms such as PIN (personal identification number) entry into buildings or sectors. So each will garner and
manipulate data for those purposes. At the same time, it should not be imagined that the influence,
management or control is necessarily malign or unsocial, despite the frequently negative connotations
of the word 'surveillance'. It may involve incentives or reminders about legal requirements; the
management may exist to ensure that certain entitlements - to benefits or services - are correctly
honoured and the control may limit harmful occurrences.
On the one hand, then, surveillance is a set of practices, while, on the other, it connects with purposes.
It usually involves relations of power in which watchers are privileged. But surveillance often involves
participation in which the watched play a role. It is about vision, but not one-sidedly so; surveillance is
also about visibility. Contexts and cultures are important, too. For instance, infra-red technologies that
reveal what is otherwise shrouded in darkness help to alter power relations. But the willing selfexposure of blog-writers also helps to change the contours of visibility. To use infra-red devices to see
into blog- writers' rooms at night would infringe personal rights and invade private spaces. But for blogwriters to describe their nocturnal activities online may be seen as an unexceptional right to free
expression.
Lyon’s definition has so many exceptions it’s not useful
Sparrow, 13 - LEAP Encryption Access Project (Elijah, “Digital Surveillance”, chapter in Global
Information Society Watch 2014,
giswatch.org/sites/default/files/gisw2014_communications_surveillance.pdf
It is no easy task to pinpoint what we mean when we say “surveillance”. As a first approximation, David
Lyon defines surveillance as “the focused, systematic, and routine attention to personal details for
purposes of influence, management, protection, or direction.” This definition tries to convey the way in
which surveillance has historically functioned as a necessary aspect of maintaining modern society,1 for
example, in sorting citizens from non-citizens, the sick from the healthy, the credit worthy from the
credit risks. He then immediately goes on to note that surveillance is often not focused, systematic or
routine at all – for example, in the case of dragnet surveillance that captures information from the
digital communication of everyone without any evidence of its efficacy. What are we to make of
surveillance in a digital age, where the capture and processing of personal information by powerful
actors is not just routine but ubiquitous? Increasingly, surveillance does not seem an activity undertaken
for simple “influence, management, protection or direction”, but instead seems to be much more,
constituting the core security strategy of many nation-states and the core business model for the largest
internet firms, credit card companies, and advertisers.
Most historians of surveillance likely agree with Lyon’s assertion that “digital devices only increase the
capacities of surveillance or, sometimes, help to foster particular kinds of surveillance or help to alter its
character.”2 It is worthwhile, however, to ask what precisely is different about “digital”, and how this
transformation of surveillance scale and character might represent something substantially new.
AT: Dictionary definition of surveillance
Dictionary definitions don’t reflect the actual federal practice of surveillance
Marx, 4 – Professor Emeritus from M.I.T. (Gary, “Some Concepts that may be Useful in Understanding
the Myriad Forms and Contexts of Surveillance, Intelligence and National Security,” 19:2, 226-248, DOI:
10.1080/0268452042000302976
WHAT IS SURVEILLANCE?
The dictionary definition of surveillance as it is applied to many contemporary new forms such as video,
computer dossiers, electronic location and work monitoring, drug testing and DNA analysis is woefully
inadequate or worse.7 For example in the Concise Oxford Dictionary surveillance is defined as ‘close
observation, especially of a suspected person’. Yet today many of the new surveillance technologies are
not ‘especially’ applied to ‘a suspected person’. They are commonly applied categorically. In broadening
the range of subjects the term ‘a suspected person’ takes on a different meaning. In a striking
innovation, surveillance is also applied to contexts (geographical places and spaces, particular time
periods, networks, systems and categories of person), not just to a particular person whose identity is
known beforehand.
The dictionary definition also implies a clear distinction between the object of surveillance and the
person carrying it out and a non-co-operative relationship. In an age of servants listening behind closed
doors, binoculars and telegraph interceptions, that separation made sense. It was easy to distinguish the
watcher from the person watched. Yet self-surveillance, cosurveillance and reciprocal surveillance have
emerged as important themes, often blurring the easy distinction between agent and subject of
surveillance. Well-publicised warnings that surveillance might be present seek to create self-restraint. A
general ethos of self-surveillance is also encouraged by the availability of home products such as those
that test for alcohol level, pregnancy, AIDS and other medical conditions.
Nor does the traditional definition capture contemporary cases of ‘cooperative’ parallel or comonitoring, involving the subject and an external agent in which the former voluntarily sends a remote
message (as with location and some implanted physiological monitoring devices). Individuals may agree
to wear badges and have transmitters for toll roads or as anti-theft means installed on their cars. They
may join programmes that invite police to search their vehicles if driven late at night. Many bio-metric
forms involve some degree of co-operation, or at the least, implicit co-operation by the failure to take
steps to block transmission.
The border between the watched and the watcher may also be blurred in that there can be a continuous
transmission link between sender and receiver as with brain waves or scents. The sender and receiver
are in one sense electronically joined. It may be difficult to say where the subject stops and the agent
begins. As with questions of copyright and electronic media, new issues of the ownership and control of
property appear. Such transmissions are ‘personal’ but leave the person’s body and control. The line
between what is public and private is hazy in such settings.
The term ‘close observation’ also fails to capture contemporary practices. Surveillance may be carried
out from afar, as with satellite images or the remote monitoring of communications and work. Nor need
it be ‘close’ as in detailed – much initial surveillance involves superficial scans looking for patterns of
interest to be pursued later in greater detail. It is both farther away and closer than the conventional
definition implies.
The dated nature of the definition is further illustrated in its seeming restriction to visual means as
implied in ‘observation’. The eyes do contain the vast majority of the body’s sense receptors and the
visual is a master metaphor for the other senses (for example, saying ‘I see’ for understanding or being
able to ‘see through people’). Indeed, ‘seeing through’ is a convenient short-hand for the new
surveillance.
To be sure the visual is usually an element of surveillance, even when it is not the primary means of data
collection (for example, written accounts of observations, events and conversations, or the conversion
to text or images of measurements from heat, sound or movement). Yet to ‘observe’ a text or a printout
is in many ways different from a detective or supervisor directly observing behaviour. The eye as the
major means of direct surveillance is increasingly joined or replaced by hearing, touching and smelling.
The use of multiple senses and sources of data is an important characteristic of much of the new
surveillance.
A better definition of contemporary forms of surveillance is needed. The new forms of surveillance
involve scrutiny through the use of technical means to extract or create personal data, whether from
individuals or contexts. The data sought may or may not be known by the subject, who may be willing or
unwilling to have it discovered or revealed. It may involve revealed information for which verification is
sought.
The use of ‘technical means’ to extract and create the information implies the ability to go beyond what
is offered to the unaided senses or voluntarily reported. Many of the examples involve an automated
process and most extend the senses by using material artefacts or software of some kind, but the means
for rooting out can also be sophisticated forms of deception as with undercover operations, ruses and
pretexts. The use of ‘contexts’ along with ‘individuals’ recognises that much modern surveillance also
looks at settings and patterns of relationships. Systems as well as persons are of interest.
This definition excludes the routine, non-technological surveillance that is a part of everyday life such as
looking before crossing the street or seeking the source of a sudden noise or of smoke. An observer on a
nude beach or police interrogating a co-operative suspect would also be excluded, because in these
cases the information is volunteered and the unaided senses are sufficient.
I use the more neutral and broader verb ‘scrutinise’ rather than ‘observe’ (with its tilt toward the visual)
in the definition because the nature of the means (or the senses involved) suggests sub-types and issues
for analysis that ought not to be foreclosed by a definition. For example how do visual, auditory, text
and other forms of surveillance compare with respect to factors such as intrusiveness or validity? In
addition much surveillance is automated and hence ‘observation’ (if that is what it is by a machine, is of
a different sort).
While the above definition captures some common elements among new surveillance means,
contemporary tactics are enormously varied.8 There is need for a conceptual language that brings some
parsimony and unity to the vast array of old and new surveillance activities and which can permit more
systematic comparisons and explanations. The next section suggests dimensions that can be used to
categorise the means aspect of surveillance.
Surveillance is intentional, systematic, individual focused
Surveillance is intentional, systematic, and focused on individuals
Richards, 13 - Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law (Neil, “THE DANGERS OF
SURVEILLANCE” HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 126:1934, SSRN)
What, then, is surveillance? Scholars working throughout the English-speaking academy have produced
a thick descriptive literature examining the nature, causes, and implications of the age of surveillance. 6
Working under the umbrella term of “surveillance studies,” these scholars represent both the social
sciences and humanities, with sociologists making many of the most significant contributions.7
Reviewing the vast surveillance studies literature, Professor David Lyon concludes that surveillance is
primarily about power, but it is also about personhood.8 Lyon offers a definition of surveillance as “the
focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management,
protection or direction.”9 Four aspects of this definition are noteworthy, as they expand our
understanding of what surveillance is and what its purposes are. First, it is focused on learning
information about individuals. Second, surveillance is systematic; it is intentional rather than random or
arbitrary. Third, surveillance is routine — a part of the ordinary administrative apparatus that
characterizes modern societies.10 Fourth, surveillance can have a wide variety of purposes — rarely
totalitarian domination, but more typically subtler forms of influence or control.11
Surveillance is data collection
Surveillance is the collection of data for administrative purposes
Allmer, 12 - Lecturer in Social Justice at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland (Thomas, Towards a
Critical Theory of Surveillance in Informational Capitalism, p. 24-25, ebrary)
Anthony Giddens (1985, 172-197; 1995, 169-181) defines surveillance as “symbolic material that can be
stored by an agency or collectivity” and as “the supervision of the activities of subordinates” (Giddens
1995, 169). He primarily sees surveillance as a phenomenon of the nation-state: “Surveillance as the
mobilizing of administrative power – through the storage and control of information – is the primary
means of the concentration of authoritative resources involved in the formation of the nation-state.”
(Giddens 1985, 181) While Foucault’s negative and powerful understanding of surveillance is criticized, a
neutral notion of surveillance is discussed. Surveillance is seen as documentary activities of the state, as
information gathering and processing, as collection, collation and coding of information, and as records,
reports and routine data collection for administrative and bureaucratic purposes of organizations. The
nation-state began to keep these official statistics from its beginning and to “include the centralized
collation of materials registering births, marriages and deaths; statistics pertaining to residence ethnic
background and occupation; and … ‘moral statistics’, relating to suicide, delinquency, divorce and so
on.” (Giddens 1985, 180)
Surveillance is data collection for population management
Allmer, 12 - Lecturer in Social Justice at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland (Thomas, Towards a
Critical Theory of Surveillance in Informational Capitalism, p. 25, ebrary)
Similar to Giddens, Christopher Dandeker (1990) describes surveillance as form of information gathering
and administrative organization of modernity. “The term surveillance is not used in the narrow sense of
‘spying’ on people but, more broadly, to refer to the gathering of information about and the supervision
of subject populations in organizations.” (Dandeker 1990, vii)
Surveillance is purely data collection about individuals or groups
Allmer, 12 - Lecturer in Social Justice at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland (Thomas, Towards a
Critical Theory of Surveillance in Informational Capitalism, p. 26, ebrary)
Computer scientist Roger Clarke (1988, 498-499; 505f.) defines surveillance as “the systematic
investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more persons. Its primary
purpose is generally to collect information about them, their activities, or their associates. There may be
a secondary intention to deter a whole population from undertaking some kinds of activity.” (Clarke
1988, 499) For Clarke, surveillance and dataveillance are neither negative nor positive as it depends on
the situation. “I explicitly reject the notion that surveillance is, of itself, evil or undesirable; its nature
must be understood, and society must decide the circumstances in which it should be used”. (Clarke,
1988, 498f.) Although many dangers and disadvantages of surveillance in general and dataveillance in
particular are mentioned, benefits like physical security of people and financial opportunities in both
public (social welfare and tax) and private (insurance and finance) sector are listed as well.
Surveillance doesn’t require control
Allmer, 12 - Lecturer in Social Justice at the University of Edinburgh, Scotland (Thomas, Towards a
Critical Theory of Surveillance in Informational Capitalism, p. 26, ebrary)
Based on Baudrillard, William Bogard (1996, 1ff.) focuses on the simulation of hypersurveillant control in
telematic societies. He defines bureaucratic surveillance as “information gathering and storage systems
(accounting, recording, and filing mechanisms) and the various devices for encoding and decoding that
information (impersonal, standardized rules governing its access, use, and dissemination).” (Bogard
1996, 1f.) He argues that surveillance ranges between absolute control in disciplined societies and the
absence of control in non-disciplined societies. Bogard (2006, 97-101) understands surveillance as
decentralized networks, where monopolized power and control of information become more
impossible. Surveillance is both a mode of oppressed capture and a mode of lines flight of “escape,
deterritorialization, indetermination and resistance” (Bogard 2006, 101).
Surveillance is the administration and control of information – includes birth, marriage
and death certificates
Odoemelam, 15 - Chika Ebere Odoemelam is with University of Western Ontario, London,
Ontario, Canada (“Adapting to Surveillance and Privacy Issues in the Era of
Technological and Social Networking” International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, Vol. 5, No. 6,
June 2015, http://www.ijssh.org/papers/520-H140.pdf)
Anthony Giddens (1984) [8], provided a definition of surveillance based on administration, explaining
that “surveillance as the mobilising of administrative power-through the storage of and control of
information-is the primary means of the concentration of authoritative resources involved in the
formation of nation-state”. Through the above definition, Giddens explains that the modern state uses
surveillance and information gathering mechanisms such as those related to births, marriages, deaths
and other demographic figures, as a means of exerting its authority, power and influence on the society
as the only instrument of enforcing control on its citizens. As a result, surveillance has become a
universal phenomenon that exists in every sphere of all human endeavours.
Includes retrospective surveillance
Surveillance includes retrospective surveillance
Gibson, 14 – UK barrister (Bryan, Criminal Justice : A Beginner’s Guide, p. 71, ebrary)
In its expanded meaning, the term surveillance is now regularly applied to forms of retrospective
surveillance, as where the records of a bank, supermarket or internet provider are accessed under legal
powers or must be disclosed following a ‘suspicious activity report’ (SAR). In modern times extensive
duties have been placed on banks, lawyers, accountants and others with access to the monetary
dealings of others to make SARs, particularly concerning potential money laundering, which has
significant connections to organized crime, illegal drugs, the sex industry, tax evasion and trafficking of
all kinds.
Includes political surveillance
Political surveillance is government recording of groups engaged in First Amendment
expression
Fisher, 4 - Associate Professor of Law and Director, Center for Social Justice, Seton Hall Law School
(Linda, “GUILT BY EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION: POLITICAL PROFILING, SURVEILLANCE AND THE PRIVACY
OF GROUPS” ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:621)
This Section examines the governmental and associational interests implicated in surveillance of First
Amendment activity, employing the Supreme Court’s decisions on associational rights beginning with
NAACP and culminating with Dale. Although surveillance issues are generally analyzed solely under the
Fourth Amendment, political surveillance should be analyzed primarily under the stricter standards of
the First Amendment because it is directed at political and religious speech. At the point of convergence
of the First and Fourth Amendments, the reasonableness restrictions of the latter inform analysis, but
the compelling state interest standard of the First Amendment should govern; otherwise, expressive
activity is not adequately and consistently protected.152 To be consistent, First Amendment standards
should govern across the board, regardless of whether a search or seizure might occur.
Moreover, the Fourth Amendment does not cover much of the investigative activity involved in political
surveillance, either because no potential search or seizure is involved, or because individuals in a group
setting do not have the requisite “reasonable expectation of privacy.”153 Even so, the First Amendment
protects these individuals and groups from unjustified investigations that intrude upon their lawful
expressive activity.154
Political surveillance is defined as an array of techniques employed by government agents to investigate
and record the political and religious beliefs and activities of those engaged in First Amendment
expression, ranging from infiltrating and disrupting organizational leadership to observing and recording
public events.155 Note that the definition does not include terrorism investigations that are not based
on First Amendment expression.
Includes library records
The Patriot Act provision allowing monitoring of library records is ‘domestic
surveillance’
Small, 8 - United States Air Force Academy (Matthew, “His Eyes are Watching You: Domestic
Surveillance, Civil Liberties and Executive Power during Times of National Crisis”
http://cspc.nonprofitsoapbox.com/storage/documents/Fellows2008/Small.pdf
The USA Patriot Act provided much of the latitude under which President Bush operated. Section 203 of
the act allowed the government to intercept oral, wire and electronic communications related to
terrorism. The act failed to detail what exactly “communications related to terrorism” are, giving the
executive a large umbrella of protection. Section 212 amends section 2702 of Title 18-Crimes and
Criminal Procedure allowing government entities to require communications companies to release
customer information. This section superseded Title II of the ECPA. The Act also expanded the scope of
the FBI’s domestic surveillance by allowing the Bureau to monitor library checkout lists and internet use.
More importantly, the American public favored the act.15 Even today support still remains for the act.16
As such, the president did not act outside the public mandate but merely did what he saw fit to ensure
national security.
Includes physical searches
Surveillance includes physical searches
Byrd, 6 – U.S. Senator (S.2362, Senate bill introduced to establish the National Commission on
Surveillance Activities and the Rights of Americans, 3/2, gpo.gov)
(6) the term ‘‘surveillance’’ means any electronic surveillance, physical search, use of a pen register or
trap and trace device, order for the production of any tangible item, or surveillance activity for which a
Federal or State government agent is required to obtain a warrant, before or after engaging in the
activity; and
(7) the term ‘‘warrantless surveillance program’’ means a program of warrantless surveillance
conducted inside the United States by any Federal or State agency.
Includes prisons / detention centers
Includes prisons or detention centers
Torpey, 7 - CUNY Graduate Center (John, “Through Thick and Thin: Surveillance after 9/11”
Contemporary Sociology, volume 36, n 2,
https://www.academia.edu/2796689/A_Symposium_on_Surveillance_Studies
What is “surveillance”? The term evokes suspicion and opprobrium because it suggests a violation of our
autonomy, our freedom to move about and to do as we wish, and this indeed it does—in the putative
interests of public order, commercial transparency, and personal security. Students of surveillance often
make a distinction between visible and invisible forms—the possibility that my keystrokes are being
recorded as I write this, for example, as opposed to the readily identifiable security cameras that have
become increasingly ubiquitous features of everyday life, at least in the richer parts of the world.
One might, however, make a further distinction between “thin” and “thick” forms of surveillance. Thin
surveillance monitors our movements, our business transactions, and our interactions with government,
but generally without constraining our mobility per se. Thick surveillance, on the other hand, involves
confinement to delineated and often fortified spaces, in which observation is enhanced by a limitation
of the range of mobility of those observed. There tend to be significant differences in the social groups
supervised by the two forms of surveillance. Although today everyone is subjected to thin surveillance
to some degree, it disproportionately affects the non-poor, whose actions and transactions must be
facilitated as well as regulated. Access to certain spaces may be limited by thin means that require the
wherewithal or the proper identity, to be sure, but departure from those spaces is normally voluntary
and at the pleasure of the person in question.
In contrast, thick surveillance disproportionately affects the poor, because it is they who are
disproportionately institutionalized; the element of free movement characteristic of thin surveillance is
sharply reduced, if not eliminated altogether. Thick surveillance occurs in prisons, military brigs, POW
and refugee camps, and similar environments. Probation, parole, surveillance via electronic tracking
devices, children’s welfare agencies, boarding schools and the like comprise thin variants of thick
surveillance. They do not necessarily restrict movement, but they may do so, and in any case they
involve a more evident narrowing of freedom than thin surveillance does. While those subjected to thick
surveillance are also subject to the thin variety, they are less likely to be exposed to thin surveillance
than the non-poor because their means—and hence their actions and transactions— tend to be more
limited. In short, supervision and confinement by the state tend to be much more immediate realities
for these groups than they are for the non-poor, whose actions and transactions tend more routinely to
be outside the purview of the state—but under that of commercial surveillance schemes.
Includes disease surveillance
US code includes disease surveillance as surveillance
Murray, 9 – J.D. Candidate, Georgetown University Law Center (Craig, “Implementing the New
International Health Regulations: The Role of the WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement”
Georgetown Journal of International Law, questia)
Another U.S. sanitary measure partly based on the need for surveillance is APHIS's list of requirements
for "approval to export ... [an] animal" to the United States. (206) Requestors must provide a great deal
of information about their country, including the "infrastructure of the veterinary services," (207) the
disease status of the region, (208) its laboratory capability, (209) and the "type and extent of disease
surveillance in the region," including whether the region has an active or passive surveillance system.
(210) Title 9 of the Code of Federal Regulations defines "surveillance" as "[s]ystems to find, monitor, and
confirm the existence or absence of a restricted disease agent or agents in livestock, poultry and other
animals." (211) a An "active" surveillance system relies on systemic affirmative collection and testing of
samples. (212) "Passive" surveillance consists of mandatory reporting of public health events, but the
regulatory agency does not actively "seek out and monitor a restricted disease agent." (213) This APHIS
regulation is a sanitary measure, within the meaning of the SPS Agreement, since it is meant to protect
the health of humans and animals in the U.S. from animal-based diseases. Evidently, the exporting
country's surveillance and regulatory infrastructure are significant to APHIS's determination of whether
or not to allow importation of food from that country.
Disease detection and response are both ‘surveillance’
Leahy, 2k – US Senator (16344 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE July 26, 2000, gpo.gov)
By way of background, the term ‘‘surveillance’’ covers four types of activities: detecting and reporting
diseases; analyzing and confirming reports; responding to epidemics; and reassessing longer-term
policies and programs. I will touch on these categories in a bit more detail, as they illustrate the need for
reform.
In the detection and reporting phase, local health care providers diagnose diseases and then report the
existence of pre-determined ‘‘notifiable’’ diseases to national or regional authorities. The accurate
diagnosis of patients is obviously crucial, but it can be very difficult as many diseases share symptoms. It
is even more difficult in developing countries, where public health professionals have less access to the
newest information on diseases.
In the next stage of surveillance, disease patterns are analyzed and reported diseases are confirmed.
This process occurs at a regional or national level, and usually involves lab work to confirm a doctor’s
diagnosis. From the resulting data, a response plan is devised. Officials must determine a number of
other factors as well, such as the capability of a doctor to make an accurate diagnosis. Unfortunately, in
many developing countries this process can take weeks, while the disease continues to spread.
When an epidemic is identified, various organizations must determine how to contain the disease, how
to treat the infected persons, and how to inform the public about the problem without causing panic.
Forty-nine percent of internationally significant epidemics occur in complex emergency situations, such
as overcrowded refugee camps. Challenges in responding to epidemics are mainly logistical—getting the
necessary treatment to those in need.
Finally, in assessing the longer-term health policies and programs, surveillance teams can provide
information on disease patterns, health care priorities, and the allocation of resources. However,
information from developing countries is often unreliable.
Disease surveillance applies to individuals
Federal Register, 12 (Federal Register /Vol. 77, No. 247 /Wednesday, December 26, 2012 / Proposed
Rules, gpo.gov)
Surveillance. Under this NPRM, HHS/ CDC is proposing to define ‘‘surveillance’’ as the temporary
supervision by a public health official (or designee) of an individual or group, who may have been
exposed to a quarantinable communicable disease, to determine the risk of disease spread. We are
proposing to update the term ‘‘surveillance’’ to more accurately reflect current practice and to clarify
that, just as with quarantine and isolation, this public health measure is applicable to individuals and
groups of individuals.
Includes health surveillance
Domestic surveillance includes public health surveillance
Brennan, 2 - American Medical Informatics Association (Patricia,“AMIA Recommendations for National
Health Threat Surveillance and Response” Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 3/1,
DOI: http://dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1136/jamia.2002.0090204 204-206
Throughout this news report the term surveillance is defined as “the ongoing systematic collection,
analysis, and interpretation of outcome-specific data for use in the planning, implementation and
evaluation of public health practice.”1
Members of the AMIA National Health Threats Task Force have attended many important meetings over
the past few months with key government, state, and local officials to discuss the needs of the U.S.
Health care system, especially in the development and implementation of stronger information
technology solutions. AMIA representatives at these meetings included J. Marc Overhage, MD, PhD; W.
Edward Hammond, PhD; Michael Wagner, MD, PhD; Luis G. Kun, PhD; William A. Yasnoff, MD, PhD;
AMIA Executive Director, Dennis Reynolds; and others.
The Task Force has assisted AMIA in the development of bioterrorism information resources for the
AMIA Web site. These resources include:
▪ Daily updates to articles in the news related to current activity in the areas of information technology
implementation, bioterrorism, and governmental policy discussion and implementation
▪ Links to pertinent government, state, local, association/society, and other sites that provide the latest
information
▪ Posting of scientific articles and recent reports related to information technology in bioterrorism
defense
▪ Congressional activity and testimony
The Primary Care Informatics Working Group of AMIA addressed information technology requirements
for effective primary care surveillance and rapid response throughout the United States. In special
sessions held at the AMIA 2001 Annual Symposium, presentations were made on bioterrorism and the
requirements for primary care physicians in the United States to provide essential surveillance. The
following key points were derived from the presentations:
▪ Primary care providers are the U.S. “frontline forces” for bioterrorism surveillance, detection, and
immediate care.
▪ Hospitals and emergency departments in the United States are often filled to capacity under normal
traffic and do not have the current ability to assume the task of evaluating, in the general population,
flu-like syndromes for anthrax exposure or other conditions that may first present as abnormal
epidemics of common symptoms.
▪ Effective bioterrorism surveillance is a complex task to which there are multiple approaches, including
mechanistic, laboratory, and sentinel surveillance.
▪ Voluntary reporting of surveillance data is problematic, especially if a condition does not appear or if
the reporting process involves significant time and resources outside the normal practices of a physician.
Based on the key points, the following recommendations were made by members of the PCIWG:
Every primary care physician in the United States should be provided now with information on
bioterrorism surveillance and detection using our current resources, especially in anticipation of the flu
season, both to provide appropriate care and to avoid enormous unnecessary panic and health care
expense.
Every primary care physician in the United States should have and use a fully functional electronic
medical record (EMR) with standardized clinical data for current and future domestic surveillance
against biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons on civilian populations.
▪ The EMRs must “fit” the primary care environment to be effective
▪ The data obtained must be available for epidemiologic surveillance regionally and nationally while
protecting patient confidentiality.
▪ Relevant expert knowledge and decision support at the point of care must be linked to the EMR.
▪ Development of such EMRs requires a national commitment to defining standards to which industry
can respond.
▪ Primary care acquisition and implementation of such EMRs requires funding mechanisms.
The Primary Care Informatics Working Group offers its expertise to work with all health care
organizations, public health officials, the Department of Defense, other agencies, vendors, payers, and
the public (patients) to assist in the development of a comprehensive and integrated plan.
The collection and dissemination of health data is surveillance
Pascrell, 14 – US Congressional Representative (H. R. 4251, House bill introduced to direct the Secretary
of Health and Human Services, acting through the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, to establish a surveillance system regarding traumatic brain injury, and for other purposes,
gpo.gov)
(5) SURVEILLANCE.—The term ‘‘surveillance’’ means the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis,
interpretation, and dissemination of data (other than personally identifiable information) regarding a
health-related event for use in public health action to reduce morbidity and mortality and to improve
health.
Surveillance is the collection and analysis of public health data
GAO, 2k – US General Accounting Office (“WEST NILE VIRUS OUTBREAK Lessons for Public Health
Preparedness GAO/HEHS-“ September, gpo.gov
Rapid and accurate diagnosis of disease outbreaks is essential for many reasons. It can help contain an
outbreak quickly by allowing health officials to implement appropriate control or prevention measures
and provide the most effective treatment for those who are affected. Rapid and accurate diagnosis is
essential not only for the public at large, but also for health care workers and others who work with
patients and laboratory samples. Accurate diagnosis is also important in providing information that
could help determine whether the outbreak could have been deliberate—an act of bioterrorism. Public
health officials use the term “surveillance” to denote the ongoing effort to collect, analyze, and interpret
health-related data so that public health actions can be planned, implemented, and evaluated.
Includes quarantines
Rothstein, 8 – University of Maryland (William, The American Historical Review, Vol. 113, No. 4 (October
2008), Book review of Searching Eyes: Privacy, the State, and Disease Surveillance in America, JSTOR
Surveillance is defined as “the ongoing, name-based reporting of cases of disease to state and local
health departments” (p. xvii). The uses of surveillance include investigation and tracking of cases of
disease, contact tracing, quarantine, treatment, program development and evaluation, epidemiological
studies of disease patterns, and sanitary inspections. Each use has raised privacy concerns.
--health surveillance distinct from monitoring
Surveillance is continuous---that’s distinct from monitoring
Hiremath 11 – MD, Dentistry
(SS, “Textbook of Preventive and Community Dentistry,” p. 18)
Monitoring is "the performance and analysis of routine measurements aimed at detecting changes in
the environment or health status of population" such as monitoring air pollution, water quality; growth
and nutritional status, etc. Surveillance is defined as "continuous scrutiny of the factors that determine
the occurrence and distribution of disease and other conditions of ill-health", such as epidemiological
surveillance, demographic surveillance, nutritional surveillance, etc. Surveillance provides information
about new and changing trends in the health status of a population, feedback which may be expected to
modify the policy and the system itself and lead to redefinition of objectives, and timely warning of
public health disasters so that interventions can be mobilized.
‘Ongoing’
Mohr 98 – MD, Professor of Medicine, Biometry and Epidemiology and Director of the Environmental
Biosciences Program
(Lawrence, “Biomarkers: Medical and Workplace Applications,” p. 389)
[this is the beginning of the google view]
vcillance" exams, the exam is also a medical "screening" exam. The distinction is more than semantics.
Surveillance is defined by Last (1983) as:
"... ongoing scrutiny, generally using methods distinguished by their practicability, uniformity, and
frequently their rapidity, rather than by complete accuracy. Its main purpose is to detect changes in
trend or distribution in order to initiate investigative- or control measures."
Must be continuous---anything else dilutes the core meaning of the term
John 13 – PhD, MBBS
(T Jacob, “Textbook of Pediatric Infectious Diseases,” p. 12)
True public health surveillance has two characteristics— continuity in time and coverage in space. If
there are gaps, infectious agents may cause sporadic cases or even outbreaks undetected by the
designated stair. Collection of data on the incidence or prevalence of non-infectious diseases is through
other methods—such as case registries, surveys of population samples, cumulating hospital statistics,
etc. However, many use the term surveillance, inexactly, for other forms of data collection on health
conditions, risk factors, etc. or for discontinuous collection of data on infectious diseases. In other
words, the term surveillance is often loosely used for various methods of collection of data, diluting its
definitional meaning. Therefore, it will be difficult now to restrict its usage strictly according to
definition. In each context it is necessary to redefine surveillance or at least understand that the term is
not used according to the precise definition.
--not health research
It’s distinct from research
Chamberland 1 – MD, MPH
(Mary, “Blood Safety and Surveillance,” p. 424)
Surveillance is defined as "the ongoing systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of health data,
closely integrated with the timely dissemination of these data both to those providing the data and to
those who can apply the data to control and prevention programs" (4). While surveillance is distinct
from epidemiological research, the two are often complementary (5). Epidemiological research studies
usually start with a specific hypothesis to be tested, are conducted in a well-defined population, and are
often time-limited; in addition, the data are complete. In contrast, surveillance data are often used to
identify or describe a problem, identify cases for epidemiological research, monitor temporal trends, or
estimate the magnitude of a problem. Surveillance usually encompasses many more individuals than
might be enrolled in a research studs. As a consequence, data collected by surveillance, which can either
be active or passive, are usually less complete, less detailed, and more open-ended than research data.
Importantly, surveillance programs provide an infrastructure or network, such that in the event i I Lin
unusual case report or an acute problem, even if not related to the surveillance program, an established
methodology is in place for communicating information directly to public health authorities.
Includes nutritional surveillance
Surveillance includes collecting data about nutrition
Kelly, 81 – Trinity College, Dublin (A. “A FOOD AND NUTRITIONAL SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM FOR IRELAND”
Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, Vol. XXIV, Part III, 1980/81, pp. 135-170,
proquest)
Strategies to detect, control and prevent problems of human nutrition require accurate, reliable and upto-date information on a wide range of causal and contributing factors. Hence, an operational definition
of surveillance (proposed by Nichman and Lane, 1977) entails — " . . . the continuous collection,
analysis, dissemination, and utilization of data relating to the nutrition and health status of population
groups, the availability and consumption of food to these groups, and the status of variables which may
have direct or indirect effects on both nutrition status and food consumption". Thus, the specific
objectives of the surveillance system may be summarised in the following three points:—
(i) To identify and characterise those variables which provide information on past, contemporary and
future nutrition conditions:
(ii) To assess the nutritional status of the population, in particular those sectors of it who are identified
as being at risk:
(iii) To provide a basis from which decisions on policy, regarding preventive and promotive aspects of
nutrition, can be made, and possibly to enable inferences about interrelationships between production,
consumption and utilisation to be empirically tested.
Includes occupational health and safety
Surveillance includes occupational hazards and health surveillance
Koh, 3 - D Koh, Head, Dept of Community, Occupational and Family Medicine, Medical Faculty, National
University of Singapore (“Surveillance in occupational health” Occupational and Environmental
Medicine60.9 (Sep 2003): 705-10, 633., proquest)
A definition of surveillance is as follows: "surveillance (ser-va'lens) noun. 1. Close observation of a
person or group, especially one under suspicion. 2. The act of observing or the condition of being
observed" (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 3rd edition, Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1992).
The term "surveillance" is derived from the French word meaning "to watch over". In public health,
surveillance was originally developed as part of efforts to control infectious diseases, but the principles
of surveillance can potentially be applied to other problems such as chronic diseases (loi example,
cancer and coronary heart disease), social problems (for example, drug addiction), and the threat of
bioterrorism.1
Surveillance is a core activity in the practice of occupational health. Two broad groups of surveillance arc
commonly performed-hazard surveillance and health surveillance. While the focus of the former is
hazards at the workplace, the latter type of surveillance pertains to the health of a person of group of
workers. Both have important roles in occupational health practice and arc complementary.
The focus of this paper will be on chemical and biological exposures and related diseases. In many
countries, occupational health concerns include psychosocial and ergonomic issues in the work
environment and related problems and adverse health outcomes. These issues will not be addressed in
detail in this paper, but surveillance programmes for such concerns have been developed, for instance,
in Nordic countries.
HAZARD SURVEILLANCE
Hazard surveillance has been defined as "the process of assessing the distribution of, and the secular
trends in, use and exposure levels of hazards responsible for disease and injury".2 For this type of
surveillance to be considered, a clear "exposure-health outcome" relation must already have been
established. The surveillance of hazards should result in action to reduce exposure in work- places
where indicated. This will eventually reduce the disease burden arising from hazardous exposures.
Hazard surveillance can be incorporated into part of an existing national or regional system used for
other purposes, for example, registries of usage of toxic substances or discharges of hazardous
materials, or information collected by regulatory agencies to check for compliance. One example of this
is the carcinogen registry in Finland.3 Regulatory authorities in many other countries have registries of
factories or work processes.4 Another approach is to have exposure surveys or inspections. In some
countries such as the USA, periodic national occupational exposure surveys arc conducted.1 This is often
based on a representative sample of defined workplaces or processes. Another method of hazard
surveillance is the recording of hazardous occurrences in specific occupational groups, such as
needlestick or sharps injuries among health care workers.5 At the individual workplace, computer
software packages containing exposure databases, can be used to assist in hazard surveillance.
There are several advantages and benefits of hazard surveillance. Firstly, the surveillance of hazards
eliminates the need to wait for disease to occur before taking steps for prevention. This is a
considerable advantage, as many occupational illnesses take time to develop.
Secondly, the activity of identifying single hazards is generally easier than the detection of disease.
Diseases, which have long latent periods, may also have multifactorial aetiologies-thus diagnosis can be
complex. The focus on hazards ensures a direct attention to preventable causes of the disease.
However, while monitoring of individual hazards is easier to implement, integrated exposure databases
and surveillance systems for combined exposures potentially offer a greater promise for improving
health and safety at work.6 As not every exposure results in disease, hazardous situations would be
expected to have a higher frequency of occurrence. This allows an opportunity to monitor trends or
observe emerging patterns in exposure to workplace hazards. The information can be used to predict or
project future disease burdens where prevention is not adequate.
Confidentiality of health information may pose a threat to public health surveillance.7 But unlike health
surveillance, in hazard surveillance confidentiality of records that infringe on individual privacy is not an
issue. However, there could be a practical difficulty with hazard surveillance in dealing with
confidentiality of trade secrets and propriety information on the amount and composition of chemicals
used in different industrial processes.
HEALTH SURVEILLANCE
Health surveillance can either take the form of periodic clinical and/or physiological assessment of
individual workers, or the public health review of the health status of groups of workers. For the
individual, the rationale is to detect adverse health effects resulting from occupational exposures at as
early a stage as possible, so that appropriate preventive measures can be instituted promptly. This is a
form of secondary prevention. The findings from health surveillance can be used to indicate the absence
of a significant hazard, the adequacy of control measures, individuals at increased risk, baseline medical
data, benchmarks for preventive action, and opportunities to provide health education. Another
function is to quantify the incidence and prevalence of occupational and work related disease.
The criteria for health surveillance are:
(1) If it is not possible in practice to further reduce exposure to a known hazard-for example, in
situations where the presence of the hazard is essential or inherent to the work process, and no other
feasible alternatives are available. There may be an ethical dilemma involved in considering what
constitutes an essential part of an industrial process versus the extent of acceptable risk to those who
have to be exposed in the course of their work.
(2) If the relation between the extent of exposure required to produce a health effect is not well
defined, as in exposure to sensitiscrs and carcinogens. For sensitisers, a level of exposure may be
required to sensitise an individual, but the triggering dose necessary to elicit an effect in those already
sensitised may be very small and much lower than the sensitising dose. For carcinogens, it is uncertain
what long term effects may ensue at the cellular level from exposure to small amounts of a known
carcinogen. The body's defence mechanisms may be able to eliminate cellular effects from exposure to
low doses of carcinogens, but the dose which results in a change that initiates the carcinogenic process
irreversibly is often not well determined.
Includes monitoring employees
Surveillance is a way to monitor and control employees
Odoemelam, 15 - Chika Ebere Odoemelam is with University of Western Ontario, London,
Ontario, Canada (“Adapting to Surveillance and Privacy Issues in the Era of
Technological and Social Networking” International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, Vol. 5, No. 6,
June 2015, http://www.ijssh.org/papers/520-H140.pdf)
Also surveillance according to Ogura Toshimaru (2006) [9], “surveillance refers to an activity which
enables the nation state, or capitalist formations like corporations, to manage a population”. The above
definition entails a way of monitoring employee performance by employers of labour for their own
selfish purposes and maximum benefit. It is a form of control imposed by the owners of the means of
production as a way of further enslaving their employees for their own benefit and profit.
Includes places
Surveillance of territory is still surveillance of people
Keiber, 14 – PhD dissertation for the Graduate Program in Political Science at Ohio State (Jason, “The
Surveillance of Individuals in International Politics”
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=osu1397573412&disposition=inline
Under the understanding that “[s]urveillance directs its attention in the end to individuals”67 there is a
lacuna in the Surveillance Studies literature that an IR focus helps bring to light. Because Surveillance
Studies is primarily interested in domestic activity it takes one important thing for granted—territory. A
domestic bias in the literature treats the state’s access to people as a fait accompli. There are however
cases in which the state cannot penetrate its own territory (or, in the international context, the territory
of other states) effectively enough to closely monitor individuals. That is, sometimes the state is not
present enough to even know where individuals are to monitor them. As a result states may monitor
territory as a means by which to understand people. U.S. aerial surveillance along the Mexican border is
an example of this. The surveillance of territory is still surveillance that “directs its attention in the end
to individuals.”
Surveillance includes land and virtual spaces
Keiber, 14 – PhD dissertation for the Graduate Program in Political Science at Ohio State (Jason, “The
Surveillance of Individuals in International Politics”
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=osu1397573412&disposition=inline
The discussion of territory can be generalized in a useful way. IR’s sensitivity to states’ desire for security
and certainty suggests that the state should focus on any domain in which individuals may be conspiring
to harm the state. Surveillance can be applied to any environment in which individuals operate. This
includes land and virtual spaces. Scholars of Surveillance Studies would not object to this. I am merely
highlighting a point that doesn’t get emphasized in the literature. This leads me to the following
definition of ‘surveillance’:
State-led surveillance involves the collection, analysis and storage of information about people, their
activity, and their environments for the purposes of influence and intervention.
Persons places and things
IJ 98
(Info Justice, OPERATIONS, SURVEILLANCE AND STAKEOUT PART 1,
http://www.infojustice.com/samples/12%20Operations,%20Surveillance%20And%20Stakeout%20Part%
201.html)
Surveillance is defined as the systematic observation of persons, places, or things to obtain information.
Surveillance is carried out without the knowledge of those under surveillance and is concerned primarily
with people. Surveillance is further divided into mobile or stationary. Mobile surveillance can be either
by foot or from a moving vehicle. A stationary surveillance is often called a “stakeout”. Foot
surveillance, vehicular surveillance and stationary surveillance all have the same objective. That is to
obtain the necessary objective, which may differ in each type of surveillance. For example information,
a person, a place or piece of land, or a thing such as a plane, a building, nuclear or chemical weapons
held by a felon who would destroy the world.
Includes National ID
Real ID
Milberg 12 – JD Candidate
(Debra, “The National Identification Debate: “REAL ID” and Voter Identification,” I/S: A JOURNAL OF
LAW AND POLICY FOR THE INFORMATION SOCIETY)
A. LACK OF REAL BENEFITS TO NATIONAL SECURITY
Advocates of a more open immigration system are especially concerned about REAL ID. The focus of
many immigration advocacy groups is to build support for public policies that are fair and supportive to
immigrants and refugees entering the United States.29 These groups feel that the Act will prevent
people fleeing persecution from obtaining relief, deny immigrants their day in court when the
government makes a mistake, and actually undermine American security more than it would help.30
In response to the argument that REAL ID is necessary for national security, immigration and privacy
proponents claim that it will actually hinder the American security process.31 By setting federal
eligibility requirements for driver licenses, REAL ID will undermine national security by pushing
immigrants deeper into the shadows and forcing many to drive without licenses. Thus, this bill limits,
rather than expands, government data about individuals in this country.
Many privacy advocates also argue that REAL ID does little to improve national security. Privacy
proponent Jim Harper argues that a national ID represents a transfer of power from individuals to
institutions, and that such a transfer threatens liberty, enables identity fraud, and subjects people to
unwanted surveillance.32 Instead of a uniform, government-controlled identification system, Harper
calls for a competitive, responsive identification and credentialing industry that meets the mix of
consumer demands for privacy, security, anonymity, and accountability.33 Identification should be a
risk-reducing strategy in a social system, Harper concludes, not a rivet to pin humans to governmental or
economic machinery.34
National ID
Tucker and Wang 14 – *PhD, Professor of Computer Science, **PhD, Professor @ U Portsmouth
(Victoria and John, “On the Role of Identity in Surveillance,” http://arxiv.org/pdf/1408.3438.pdf)
Besides these technologies deliberately created for surveillance purposes, surveillance is often
intentionally included in various everyday technologies, such as couriers who deliver packages,
inspectors who collect data and operators in call centres. Individuals who work with ICT systems have
long been aware that the systems that they use in their work are also intended to be a source of data
about their performance – complete recordings of the transactions are made.
In social media sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube, various forms of technologies
are used to gather personal data. For example, geotagging is one of the latest forms of tagging that
allows real-time surveillance. Often, geotagging is used in (i) searching social media postings on sites by
location and finding individuals; and then (ii) exploring their profiles to find out their private information
(e.g., home address and phone number) (Smyser and Holt, 2012). In the Android world, an app called
eBlaster Mobile can be used to watch over phone usage of children or employees by (i) monitoring text
messaging, voice, and Web surfing activity on the Android device; and (ii) logging the physical location of
the smartphone (Bradley, 2011).
In more extreme cases, social rules and norms can be approximated by algorithmic formulae to search
for deviance automatically, and even render deviance from the roles and norms impossible. For
example, various cybercommunities are places where ‘dataveillance’ (van der Ploeg, 2003: 71) is
endemic – every word typed and every movement made can be observed, recorded, stored in digital
files, and replayed and examined in the future. Actually, in theory, it is perfectly possible to turn the
world of the Internet into a digital panopticon, where surveillance can reach perfection, at least in
principle (Wang et al., 2011).
Identity is a core part of existing and developing surveillance practices. The Identity Card Act 2006 is a
very good example. The core of this act is the National Identity Register (NIR) of which identity cards are
a physical manifestation. The Act’s definition of ‘identity’ refers to ‘full name, other names by which an
individual might previously have been known, gender, date and place of birth and external
characteristics of his that are capable of being used for identifying him’ (UK Government, 2006: 2). It
introduces a major restructuring of the way identification functions in the UK – identity becomes
associated with a singular centralised authoritative documentary source.