New Media: A Tool of Civil Society, Not Revolution
In a span of less than three years, the international community witnessed two jolting
upheavals. In 2009, Iran saw the largest demonstrations since its 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Hundreds of thousands of protestors took to the streets to decry electoral fraud in their June 13th
presidential elections. Protest endured for two months, even in the face of the Basij militia’s
brutality. Still, the “Green Revolution” failed to achieve its desired result, the rightful installation
of Mir Hussein Moussavi in place of incumbent Mahamoud Ahmadinejad.i About one-and-a-half
years later, millions of Egyptians demonstrated to demand that their leader of thirty years, Hosni
Mubarak, step down. The airing of long-time economic, political, and social grievances was met
with violent retaliation by regime. Yet in February 2011, he ceded to the pressure and abdicated.ii
Both conflicts utilized new media tools heavily, but with different end results. These contrasting
examples reveal that the use of new media does not guarantee a movement’s success. New media
can have but a limited effect as an instrument of political revolution; instead, it is best used to
build peace as part of a climate of political discourse that leads to just government.
Resistance to the Iranian regime was bolstered through new media. New media tools
made mobilization easier. Word of protests, gatherings, and news spread faster on the internet
than by word of mouth. As a result, large, informal groups could take on collective action
previously reserved for organized campaigns.iii Given the protestors’ lack of formal organization,
new media helped direct individuals to opportunities for engagement. New media also offered
every protestor the tools to bear witness to the Revolution. Along these lines, one tweet read,
“We have no national press coverage in Iran, everyone should help spread Moussavi’s message.
One Person = One Broadcaster. #IranElection.” In addition to promoting individual
responsibility, new media fostered solidarity among protestors. The Mousavi campaign was
successful in creating text-message viral chains, in which people would forward political slogans
and anti-Ahmadinejad jokes to one another. Similarly, the Mousavi Facebook page had an
additional 50,000 fans only three days after the election. Yet online activity was but a symptom
of underlying unrest, unrest which would have exploded in the streets with or without the
internet. Citizens were infuriated, screaming “death to the dictator” during protest.iv The internet
is not so powerful that it can evoke this kind of fury, or that it can compel thousands to risk their
lives protesting. As the citizen’s cries demonstrate, yearning for just government is what
motivated Iranian citizens. Thereby, the Revolution would have taken place with or without new
media. New media was not indispensible.
New media has been associated with successful and failed attempts at political reform,
revealing that its use does not guarantee a movement’s success. In the deposition of Hosni
Mubarak in Egypt, new media had the same internal effects as in Iran; it was used to discuss,
mobilize, and unify.v Similarly, new media allowed the world a window into what was going on
inside Egypt. Yet Mubarak abdicated, while Ahmadinejad did not. Why? The use of new media
does not have a preordained effect. Rather, other national circumstances have a bigger impact
upon the success of political movements. Despite many Iranian politicians’ denouncement of the
electoral results, the regime’s authority was deeply rooted.vi Contrastingly, the Egyptian regime
was internally fractured— to this end, Mubarak quickly lost the loyalty of the military when
protests began. Millions rather than thousands of people demanded change in Egypt. Egyptian
protests rode the unrest of the region, whereas protests in Iran were an isolated event. As the
contrasting examples of Iran and Egypt demonstrate, the extent to which new media can foster
political change is constrained by many other factors.
Yet another factor that affected the success of the protest movements was the extent of
political discourse before the revolutions. If there is insufficient discourse before a revolution,
not enough of the populous will be convinced of the need for change within the government. As
a result, fewer citizens will be involved in protest. As Egypt shows, new media can be part of a
dialogue that leads to just governance. Voices of dissent have been rising since the 2005
elections.vii There are thirty to sixty Islamist groups in Egypt, successful in channeling
widespread discontent into popular support. New media tools were utilized by opposition groups
such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Kefaya, Hizb el Ghad, and the April 6 Movement prior to the
revolution. Aided by the fact that a large percent of the population— 24.5%—viii had internet
access, opposition groups used new media to win sympathizers, fuel discontent, and organize
resistance on the ground.ix Conversely, Iranians had fewer opportunities for political
organization. There were no prominent groups similar to the Islamist groups that were
channeling discontent prior to the Green Revolution. There was also far fewer avenues to express
discontent. Internet access was far more limited— only 10.5% of the population was online—x
and was subjected to some of the most restrictive filtering in the world.xi Similarly, the media
was nearly entirely state-run.xii Thereby, the differences in the strength of Iranian and Egyptian
civil societies affected the nations’ predispositions for political change. Had civil society been
stronger in Iran, perhaps the Green Revolution would have had sufficient momentum to shake
the regime.
Aside from the ability of new media to bolster a political revolution, it can be especially
important in nurturing fledgling democracies. Since Mubarak’s fall, Egypt has been making a
rocky transition to representative government. For example, Egyptian security forces drew
international condemnation after storming the offices of six non-governmental organizations in
December 2011. The military-led government claimed this was a part of an investigation into
foreign influence in the outbreak of protests. NGO workers were able to detail and post photos of
the raid on Twitter, holding the powerful military accountable during the shift to democracy.
This documentation drew much attention, even ending up in the New York Times. As in this
example, old media and new media formed a symbiotic relationship. Old media may collect
information from new media sources and amplify it, as was the case with the NGO raids. Yet the
relationship between old and new can work the other way around. In a February 2011 study,
Hewlett-Packard’s Social Computing Research Group published a paper “Trends in Social
Media: Persistence and Decay.” The report found that old media, including organizations like
The New York Times, CNN and BBC, act as “feeders” for new media, drawing attention to news
that social networks then relay and discuss.xiii Thus, new media is but one component of a
climate of political dialogue.
Given its role in a strong civil society, diplomats should include new media as part of
their calls for global free speech and press. Alternatively, diplomats must not seek to utilize new
media for specific policy aims. When the Green Revolution was underway, U.S. Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton asked Twitter to delay scheduled maintenance that would have disrupted
the site. Iranian officials were furious, demanding that the U.S. “stop meddling.” By advocating
for new media freedom during a specific conflict, Clinton had two effects. Firstly, she
exacerbated already-poor relations between the U.S. and Iran. Secondly, she gave the regime the
impression that the opposition movement was in collusion with foreign governments, further
delegitimizing the resistance in the eyes of the regime.xiv Instead, states should adopt a platform
of regime-neutral support for free speech and press. This platform would include support for new
and old media alike because, as aforementioned, the two complement each other well.
Instead of guarding new media in specific countries and inflaming specific regimes,
diplomats must broadly protect new media. The first way in which this can be achieved is by
prohibiting private entities from selling censorship technologies to foreign governments. Nokia
Siemens Networks, a joint venture of the Finnish cell phone maker and the German technology
giant provided the web filtering systems used in Iran. Furthermore, censorship tools are
sometimes sold to a middleman and then resold to a regime.xv States must require that companies
assure their products are not resold. A second way in which states can achieve this end is by
supporting tools of information, such as independent print media, Wikipedia, and Google— as
much as tools of conversation. Some states seeking to advocate internet freedom have focused
only on tools of information— to use the U.S. as an example again, Clinton announced U.S.
funding for tools designed to prevent censorship of several sites of information.xvi What this
policy fails to acknowledge is that it is when citizens assemble (in person or online) that ideas
are exchanged, opinions formulated, and a sense of community found.xvii Collective
consciousness inspires demands for political change.
In conclusion, it is clear that as a tool of political protest, the effects of new media are
constrained by many other variables. Instead, new media is an integrated part of a strong civil
society. With a robust political dialogue, a nation can come to consensus and be ripe for
progressive governmental change. Only when the people are satisfied with their government
structure will a society truly know peace.
i
"Iran News - Breaking World Iran News," The New York Times, January 26, 2012,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iran/index.html.
ii
"Egypt News - Revolution and Aftermath," The New York Times, January 30, 2012,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/egypt/index.html.
iii
Clay Shirky, "The Political Power of Social Media," editorial, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011, January
30, 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67038/clay-shirky/the-political-power-of-social-media.
iv
Roger Cohen, "Life and Death in Tehran," The New York Times, June 22, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/opinion/23cohenweb.html?ref=iran.
v
http://www.arabmediasociety.com/index.php?article=769&p=10
vi
Said Amir. Arjomand, "Conclusion," in After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009), 210-211.
vii
The Middle East, Tenth ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000), 238.
viii
"CIA - The World Factbook Egypt," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed January 30, 2012,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html.
ix
Sahar Khamis and Katherine Vaughn, "Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution: How Civic Engagement and
Citizen Journalism Tilted the Balance," Arab Media & Society, Summer 2011,
http://www.arabmediasociety.com/index.php?article=769&p=0.
x
"CIA - The World Factbook Iran," Central Intelligence Agency, accessed January 30, 2012,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html.
xi
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2009/06/23/world/23censor.grafic.ready.html
Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations, 8th ed., s.v. "Iran."
xiii
Nick Bilton, "Mainstream Media Still Drive Majority of Twitter Trends," The New York Times (web log),
February 15, 2011, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/mainstream-media-still-drives-majority-of-twittertrends/?ref=egypt.
xiv
Mark Landler, "Washington Taps Into a Potent New Force in Diplomacy," The New York Times, June 16, 2009,
New York ed., World sec., http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/world/middleeast/17media.html?ref=twitter.
xv
NPR, "The Technology Helping Repressive Regimes Spy," December 14, 2011,
http://www.npr.org/2011/12/14/143639670/the-technology-helping-repressive-regimes-spy.
xvi
Mark Lander, "U.S. Policy to Address Internet Freedom," The New York Times, February 14, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/world/15clinton.html?scp=6&sq=clinton%20internet&st=cse.
xvii
Clay Shirky, "The Political Power of Social Media," editorial, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2011, January
30, 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67038/clay-shirky/the-political-power-of-social-media.
xii