Ethics Cases – Schedule 5 (ENG1181)
Case 20: Teton Dam [Real-World]


Background
o Who/What:
 Bureau of Reclamation
 Dam failure leading to collapse
o Where/When:
 Idaho
 June 5, 1976
Outcome
o Who/What:
 14 deaths
 80% of nearby existing structures damaged.
 Thousands of acres of fertile topsoil washed away.
 Local cutthroat trout population endangered
 Teton Dam was a typical earthfill dam, of which the Bureau of Reclamation had already
built 250.
o How/Why:
 Silt used in the core and trench fills was inadequate leading to erosion and cracking.
 Trenches in the canyon walls were narrow and steep leading to stress and hydraulic
cracking.
 Inadequate provisions for handling leakage & inadequate instrumentation to monitor
conditions in the embankment surrounding canyon walls.
Teton Dam – extracted from Lessons from the Failure of the Teton Dam, Proceedings of the 3rd ASCE
Forensics Congress, October 19 - 21, 2003, San Diego, California, which can be accessed at:
http://www.civil.uwaterloo.ca/maknight/courses/cive554650/lectures/EarthDams/Teton%20Dam%20Failure%2
0Case%20Study.pdf
The failure of the Teton Dam during initial filling of the reservoir on June 5, 1976 killed fourteen people and
caused hundreds of millions of dollars in property damage downstream. A thorough investigation identified the
causes of the failure and suggested improvements for the design and construction of earthen dams.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 5 (ENG1181)
Construction of the dam began in February 1972. When complete, the embankment would have a maximum
height of 93 meters (305 feet) above the riverbed and would form a reservoir of 356 million cubic meters
(288,000 acre-feet) when filled to the top. The dam was closed and began storing water on October 3,
1975, but the river outlet works tunnel and the auxiliary outlet works tunnel were not opened. Due to these
sections being incomplete, the water was rising at a rate of about 1 meter (3 feet) per day, which was higher
than the predetermined goal rate of 0.3 to 0.6 meters (1 to 2 feet) per day for the first year, as set by the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation. However, the increased rate was expected, due to the tunnels being incomplete, and
considered acceptable by the Bureau of Reclamation as long as seepage and the water table downstream of the
dam were measured more frequently.
On June 3, 1976 several small seepages were noticed in the north abutment wall. Pictures were taken and these
leaks were reported to the Bureau of Reclamation. This led to more frequent inspections of the dam. It was now
to be inspected daily, and readings were to be taken twice weekly instead of once a week. On June
4, 1976 wetness was noticed in the right abutment and small springs were beginning to appear.
On June 5, 1976 the first major leak was noticed between 7:30 and 8:00 a.m. The leak was flowing at about 500
to 800 liters per second (20 to 30 cfs) from rock in the right abutment. By 9:00 a.m. the flow had increased to
1,100 to 1,400 liters per second (40 to 50 cfs) and seepage had been observed about 40 meters (130 feet) below
the crest of the dam. At 11:00 a.m. a whirlpool was observed in the reservoir directly upstream from the dam
and four bulldozers were sent to try to push riprap into the sinkhole near the dam crest. Two of the bulldozers
were swallowed up by the rapidly expanding hole, and the operators were pulled to safety by ropes tied around
their waists.
Between 11:15 and 11:30 a.m. a 6 by 6 meter (20-foot by 20-foot) chunk of dam fell into the whirlpool and
within minutes the entire dam collapsed. At 10:30 a.m. dispatchers at the Fremont and Madison County
Sheriffs’ offices were notified that the dam was failing. An estimated 300 million cubic meters of water (80
billion gallons) headed down the Upper Snake River Valley. The towns in its path included Wilford, Sugar City,
Rexburg, and Roberts. More than 200 families were left homeless. The final toll was 14 killed directly or
indirectly and an estimated 400 million to one billion dollars in property damage. At the time of failure the
reservoir elevation was 1,616 meters (5,301.7 feet) and was filling at a rate of 1 meter (3 feet) per day. At full
capacity the water surface elevation would have been 1,621.5 meters (5,320.0 feet).
Following the failure, the Governor of Idaho and the Secretary of the Interior selected an independent panel to
review the cause of the failure. The failure is best overall explained in the Review to the Department of Interior
by the Independent Panel as, “... caused not because some unforeseeable fatal combination existed, but because
(1) the many combinations of unfavorable circumstances inherent in the situation were not visualized, and
because (2) adequate defenses against these circumstances were not included in the design”
The panel summarized its conclusions:
1. The pre-design site and geological studies were “appropriate and extensive.”
2. The design followed well-established USBR practices, but without sufficient attention to the varied and
unusual geological conditions of the site.
3. The volcanic rocks of the site are “highly permeable and moderately to intensely jointed.”
4. The fill soils used, “wind-deposited non-plastic to slightly plastic clayey silts,” are highly erodible. The
soil classification was ML.
5. The construction was carried out properly and conformed to the design except for scheduling.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 5 (ENG1181)
6. The rapid rate of filling of the dam did not contribute to the failure. If the dam had been filled more
slowly, “a similar failure would have occurred at some later date.”
7. Considerable effort was used to construct a grout curtain of high quality, but the rock under the grout
cap was not adequately sealed. The curtain was nevertheless subject to piping – “too much was expected
of the grout curtain, and ... the design should have provided measures to render the inevitable leakage
harmless.”
8. The dam’s geometry caused arching that reduces stresses in some areas and increased them in others and
“favored the development of cracks that would open channels through the erodible fill.”
9. Finite element calculations suggested that hydraulic fracturing was possible.
10. There was no evidence of differential foundation settlement contributing to the failure.
11. Seismicity was not a factor.
12. There were not enough instruments in the dam to provide adequate information about changing
conditions of the embankment and abutments.
13. The Panel had quickly identified piping as the most probable cause of the failure, then focused its efforts
on determining how the piping started. Two mechanisms were possible. The first was the flow of water
under highly erodible and unprotected fill, through joints in unsealed rock beneath the grout cap, and
development of an erosion tunnel. The second was “cracking caused by differential strains or hydraulic
fracturing of the core material.” The Panel was unable to determine whether one or the other mechanism
occurred, or a combination.
14. “The fundamental cause of failure may be regarded as a combination of geological factors and design
decisions that, taken together, permitted the failure to develop.”
The Panel further described the geological factors as numerous open joints in the abutment joints and scarcity of
better fill material than the highly erodible soil. the design decisions were “complete dependence for seepage
control on a combination of deep key trenches filled with windblown soils and a grout curtain,” a geometry of
the key trench that “encouraged arching, cracking, and hydraulic fracturing” in the backfill, using compaction of
the fill as the only protection against piping and erosion, and failure to provide for the inevitable seepage.
Another factor was the poor compaction of the aeolian silt fill material. It was compacted at less than the
optimum moisture content. The “material, as compacted in the dam, permitted continuous erosion channels
(pipes) to be formed in the core without any evidence of their existence becoming visible.”
Ethics Cases – Schedule 5 (ENG1181)
Case 22: A Troubled Engineer [Hypothetical]
 Background
o Who/What:
 Brutus Buckeye works at Scarlet & Gray Co.
 Currently part of a team trying to secure a tender on a project that will reverse the dire
fortunes of the firm.
 Outcome
o Who/What:
 Brutus learns from his boss that his good friend, O.H. Bucks, who is also a crucial
member of the team, might be let go after the transaction due to restructuring of the firm.
o How/Why:
 O.H. Bucks had been offered an excellent position with a rival company only to turn it
down so as to not let his team and his firm down at an important juncture.
 O.H. Bucks is the only person in the firm who possesses the necessary knowledge and
skills to secure the tender on time.
 Brutus Buckeye in dilemma over his loyalty to his friend, O.H. Bucks and his loyalty to
his firm regarding the information about the restructuring move that was given to him in
the strictest confidence.
A Troubled Engineer - extracted and based on a case study from the St. James Ethics Centre, which can be
accessed at: http://www.ethics.org.au/content/troubled-engineer
Brutus Buckeye is employed at Scarlet & Gray Co., an engineering firm and is currently part of a team working
on a tender for a major infrastructure project. The firm has been experiencing some financial vulnerability and
securing this project is essential to the restoration of the firm’s fortunes. The tender deadline is three weeks
away and Brutus’ team is working long hours to get the work done on time.
Now Brutus Buckeye’s boss has called him in to let you know that, even if they win the tender, a restructure of
the firm will be necessary. To avoid disruption until after Brutus’ team’s important job is completed, this
information is given to Brutus in strict confidence.
Brutus suspects, from your conversation with the boss, that one of his colleagues will lose his job in the coming
restructure. Brutus and O.H. Bucks, this colleague—a good friend—have been with the firm for ten years. O.H.
Bucks has told Brutus that he has just been offered an excellent position in a rival company. Having thought
long and hard about accepting the offer, O.H. Bucks has decided against it because he doesn’t want to let down
the team and the firm at this important time.
O.H. Bucks is a crucial member of the team preparing the tender—there is no one else in the firm with the
knowledge and skills to complete the job within the tight timeframe. He will never know that you had the
information about the restructure, and Brutus does not know with absolute certainty that his position is in
danger.
What ought Brutus Buckeye do in this difficult situation? Brutus certainly does not want to see O.H. Bucks pass
up this opportunity only to lose his current job in a month’s time.
Brutus’ loyalty to his friend urges him to alert O.H. Bucks to the possibility that his current job is in danger.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 5 (ENG1181)
But Brutus knows how important he is to the team in the next few weeks, and how important it is that the firm
wins this tender. Brutus received this information in strictest confidence, and his loyalty to his employer seems
to demand that he respect this confidence.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 5 (ENG1181)
CASE 24: THE CASE OF THE KILLER ROBOT [Real-World]
http://faculty.berea.edu/pearcej/CSC126/bottasks/KillerRobot-1.pdf

Background
 Who:


Randey Samuels (programmer at the Silicon Techtronic's Inc.)
What:
 The death of Bart Matthews killed by an assembly –line robot.
Where/When:
 Cybernetics Inc., in Silicon Heights February 16, 2006.
Outcome
 Who:
 Death of Bart Matthews
 How/Why:
 Matthews was crushed to death when the robot he was operating malfunctioned and
started to wave its hands violently. The Robot arm struck Matthews, throwing him
against a wall and crushing his skull.


Jane McMurdock, prosecuting attorney for the city of Silicon Valley, announced today the indictment of
Randey Samuels on charges of manslaughter. Samuels employed as a programmer at the Silicon Techtronic's
Inc. The charge involves the death of Bart Matthews, who was killed last May by an assembly –line robot.
Matthews worked as robot operator at Cybernetics Inc., in Silicon Heights. He was crushed to death when the
robot he was operating malfunctioned and started to wave its hands violently. The Robot arm struck Matthews,
throwing him against a wall and crushing his skull. Matthews died almost instantly. According to the
indictment, Samuels wrote the particular piece of computer program responsible for the robot malfunction.
“There’s a smoking gun!” McMurdock announced triumphantly at a press conference held in the hall of
Justice." We have the hand written formula, provided by the project physicist, which Samuels was supposed to
program. But he negligently misinterpreted the formula leading to this huge gruesome death. Society must
protect itself against programmers who make careless mistakes. The Sentinel – observer has obtained a copy of
the handwritten formula in question. There are actually three similar formulas, scrawled on piece of yellow
legal pad paper. Each formula describes the motion of the robot in one direction: east-west, North-south and up
–down. The Sentinel-Observer showed the formulas to Bill Park a professor of physics at Silicon Valley
University. He confirmed that these equations could be used to describe the motion of a robot arm. The Sentinel
– Observer then showed Park the program code written by the accused in the programming language. We asked
Park who is fluent in C and several other languages, whether the program code was correct for the given robot –
arm formulas. Parks response was immediate. He exclaimed, “By Jove! It looks like he misinterpreted the
formula. He's guilty as hell, if you ask me”. The Sentinel – Observer was unable to contact Samuels for
comment. “He is deeply depressed about all this,” his girl friend told us over the phone," but Randy believes he
will be acquitted when he gets a chance to tell his side of the story.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 5 (ENG1181)
CASE 26: WHISTLE BLOWING [Real-World]
Engineering Ethics 4th Edition

Background
 Who:


Carl Houston; welding supervisor
What:




Improper welding procedures
Use of wrong materials
Welders were not trained properly.
 Where/When:
 Stone & Weber’s nuclear power facility, Virginia, 1970.
Outcome
 Who:
 Stone & Weber’s Management
 What:
 Atomic Energy Commission to investigate, which confirmed Houston’s allegations.
 How/Why:
 Houston reported to Stone & Weber’s Manager, who ignored him.
Definition: Whistle blowing is alerting relevant persons to some moral or legal corruption, where “Relevant
persons” are those in a position to act in response.
No topic in engineering ethics is more controversial than whistle – blowing. Carl Houston was a welding
supervisor for a nuclear power facility in Virginia (1970) for Stone & Weber
He saw:
 Improper welding procedures
 Use of wrong materials
 Welders were not trained properly
The Situation was dangerous. He reported to Stone & Weber’s Manager, who ignored him. He threatened to
write to Stone & Weber’s Headquarters. Shortly thereafter he was fired on trumped –up charges. Finally he
wrote to Senators Howard's Baker and Albert Gore. The Senators prompted the Atomic Energy Commission to
investigate, which confirmed his allegations.
Ethics Cases – Schedule 5 (ENG1181)
CASE 30: THE THESIS [Hypothetical]
Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases 1995

Background
 Who:


What:


Nelson Nice engineering faculty at State University and Jason Smart undergraduate
teaching assistant.
As time passed by Jason grew impatient with lab work and write-ups and left the project
before it was done and Nice did most of the work.
Outcome
 How/Why:
 One year later Jason, then a grad student at another university, wrote to Nice and asked
him if he would send him a copy of the final report of the work they have done together.
Should Nice send the report to Smart?
Nelson Nice is on the engineering faculty at State University. Three years ago he headed a research project that
involved an undergraduate research assistant. At first Jason Smart was enthusiastic about the project, and he
certainly felt honor that Professor Nice selected him as his undergraduate assistant. However, as time passed
Jason grew impatient with the laboratory work and write-ups. Nelson Nice found out that he had to do more and
more of the work himself. Eventually Jason Smart left the project-before the work was completed.
One year later Jason, then a graduate student at another university wrote to Nelson Nice and asked him if he
would send him a copy of the final report of the work they had done together. Jason explained that he had
matured considerably since his undergraduate days and was now working in a related area. “Now”, he said, “I
think I’m ready for more serious work. It would help me a lot if I could see how things finally worked out in the
project.”
Should Nelson Nice send the report to Jason Smart?
Ethics Cases – Schedule 5 (ENG1181)
CASE 32: USAWAY [Hypothetical]
Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases 1995

Background
 Who:




John Budinski, quality control engineer at Clarke Engineering.
What:
Clarke contracted with USAWAY to supply a product subject to the requirement that all
parts are made in the United States. Although the original design clearly specifies that all
parts must satisfy this requirement, one of Clarke’s suppliers failed to note that one of the
components has two special bolts that are made only in another country.
Outcome
 How/Why:
 There is no time to design a new bolt if the terms of the contract are to be met. USAWAY
is a major customer, and John fears that not meeting the deadline can result in unfortunate
consequences for Clarke.
John Budinski, quality control engineer at Clarke Engineering, has a problem. Clarke contracted with
USAWAY to supply a product subject to the requirement that all parts are made in the United States. Although
the original design clearly specifies that all parts must satisfy this requirement, one of Clarke’s suppliers failed
to note that one of the components has two special bolts that are made only in another country. There is no time
to design a new bolt if the terms of the contract are to be met. USAWAY is a major customer, and John fears
that not meeting the deadline can result in unfortunate consequences for Clarke.
John realizes that the chances of USAWAY discovering the problem on its own are slim. The bolts in question
are not visible on the surface of the product. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that those who work on repairs
will notice that the bolts are foreign made. In any case, Clarke is under contract to do any needed repairs.
Meanwhile, it can work on a bolt design so that it will be ready with US bolts when, and if, replacements are
needed.