YSI-SSSUP Economic History Conference
The Nation-State and the World Economy between Two Eras of Globalization, 1913-1975
The development model of the Military Regime and the State of Exception: Brazilian
economic history at the end of the Golden Age1
By Leonardo Dias Nunes2
Abstract
This paper aims to make a synthesis about the characteristics of the development model adopted by the
Military Regime in Brazil and connect then with the end of the Golden Age of capitalism and the beginning of
the Landslide, according to the periodization made by Eric Hobsbawm in his book Age of Extremes. My
hypothesis is that the Brazilian Military Regime, which occurred between 1964 and 1985, made the transition
from the Golden Age to the Landslide. These two periods have different forms of capital reproduction and
society organization and the financialization of capital is the phenomenon that subordinates all these changes.
Therefore, this is a prime historical moment to the historians get to understand how the new period of the
capitalism started to be introduced in Brazil. With this in mind, I split the paper into three sections. In the first
section, I show how the Bretton Woods monetary agreement failed. In the second section, I show the main
characteristics of the development model performed by the Military Regime which, by one side, had to deal
with an economic and a political crises, by the other side, had to reestablish the economic growth to legitimate
themselves. I also show the characteristics of the State of Exception that was built during the Military Regime
which also was an instrument that had become essential to the maintenance of the possibilities of the capital
reproduction in that period. In the third section, I connect the characteristics of the Military development
model and the characteristics of the state of exception through the reflections about the new world time made
by the Brazilian philosopher Paulo Arantes. I conclude that both the Brazilian economic development that
occurred during the Military Regime and the Golden Age were parts of a capitalism period which has finished
and that has few possibilities to be repeated.
Key-words: Golden Age – Military Regime – Brazilian Development Model – State of Exception
1
This paper is a preliminary result of a Ph.D. research. In it, I will construct an argumentation based in consolidated
references concerning the history of capitalism in the twentieth century as well about an interpretation of the development
model performed by the Military Regime in Brazil. For this reason, I will not reconstruct all the debates about the issues
that are in the paper. I will build my arguments from consolidated definitions which will continue to be developed be in
the next stages of this research.
2 Ph.D. Candidate in Economic Development at Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Brazil.
Email: leonardodiasnunes@hotmail.com
Introduction
The Brazilian Military Regime began in 1964 with a Coup d’état and finished in
1985. It is possible to realize that this period of Brazilian history is between the fall of the
Golden Age and the beginning of the Landslide, according to the periodization established
by Eric Hobsbawm in his book Age of Extremes.
Having this relation in mind, this paper aims to relate the changes occurred during
the Golden Age of capitalism and the changes in the economic development model
performed by the Military Regime. Therefore, I seek to answer the following question:
What is the relation between the Golden Age of capitalism and the results of the
development model performed by the Military Regime in Brazil?
Octávio Ianni (2014) presented this relation objectively. He argued that during the
Military Regime it was made a transition between development models in Brazil. Before
1964, the development had national objectives, and after it began to be characterized as
dependent of international capital.
My hypothesis is that the Military Regime made the transition between the Golden
Age and the Landslide by seeking for internalization of the industrialization process in
Brazil, which was funded by the emerging process of the financialization of capital. To
defend this hypothesis, I will split this paper into three sections.
In the first section, From the Golden Age to the Landslide: the financialization of
capital's route, I will present the post-war historical context with the aim of showing the
failure of the Bretton Woods agreement and the consequences of this fact to the peripheral
economies as the Brazilian one. In the second section, The development model performed
by the Military Regime and the State of Exception, I will evidence which were the
2
economic policies that gave consistency to the industrial policy performed by the Military
governments between 1964 and 1979. Furthermore, I will argue that the State of Exception
was a crucial factor to achieve the capital accumulation during the period. In the third
section, The New Time of the World, I will present the Paulo Arantes’ interpretation about
the current history of capitalism, who argues that actually exists a perennial State of
Exception. Lastly, in the Final Remarks, I will resume the main relation between the end of
the Golden Age of the capitalism, the economic development model performed by the
Military Regime, and the State of Exception. With these relations in mind, I will argue that
the Coup d’état occurred in 1964 started a decivilization process in the Brazilian society.
Moreover, I will expose the questions that emerged while I was writing this paper which
will be answered as the research develops.
From the Golden Age to the Landslide: the financialization of capital’s route
The twentieth century was a period of great transformations in the history of
mankind. According to Eric Hobsbawm, this period cannot be compared to any other
because of the wars, revolutions, crises, and technological advancements which have taken
place. The English historian splits the short century into three periods: the Age of
Catastrophe, the Golden Age, and the Landslide. The Age of Catastrophe which occurred
between 1914 and 1945 was a pivotal period for all the citizens that lived in it - mainly for
the European citizens. Those who had born before the start of the twentieth century and
3
were still alive in 1945 would not live again the extreme experiences of war, hunger, and
destruction.3
These events which occurred during the first forty-five years of the twentieth
century have conducted the institutions and practices of the Golden Age of the capitalism, a
period that took place between 1945 and 1989. In fact, this historical period started to be
called this way after its end, as Eric Hobsbawm wrote: “The gold glowed more brightly
against the dull or dark background of the subsequent decades of crisis” (HOBSBAWM,
1995, p. 258).
In an objective way, this period is called by Golden Age of capitalism because, in
the developed countries, has happened economic growth, income distribution, full
employment policies, mass consumption generalization, large investments in social areas
made by governments. In other words, it was built the Welfare State. In a different way, in
peripheral regions of capitalism were executed some successful industrialization
experiences.
Eric Hobsbawm wrote about the factors that had underlain the Golden Age and
argues that on the one hand, during this period there was a dispute between two ways of life
that was expressed in a tension between the United States and the Unions of Soviet
Socialist Republics. On the other hand, the international monetary system that was created
to instrumentalize the economic growth in the post-war period also has to be observed.
Hence, the Bretton Woods Agreement should be understood.
According to Luiz Gonzaga de Mello Belluzzo, new relations concerning to
commerce, production, technology, and finance has emerged from the Bretton Woods
3
Bertrand Russel, Nelson Mandela, and Darcy Ribeiro are men who have written their autobiographies during this period,
and when we read these books it is possible to perceive in other sources the intensity of the second half of the twentieth
century.
4
Monetary Agreement which had the United States as a leadership. During the North
American hegemony, Europe and Japan have reconstructed their national economies and
new industrialization experiences were funded in Latin America and socialist countries
(BELLUZZO, 1995, p. 14).
However, in the mid-1960s, two factors have destabilized the Bretton Woods
Agreement's foundations. First, the economies from Europe and Japan began to compete
with the American economy after their recuperation. Second, North American balance of
payments deficit was creating a high liquidity. Consequently, the dollar's was passing by
deterioration.
At this moment, the Central Banks could not control all the operations of loans and
deposits that were happening in the international monetary system. Furthermore, due to the
First Oil Shock of 1973, there was an enormous amount of dollars to be negotiated in the
world economy.
During this period, other States were questioning the legitimacy of the dollar as the
international reserve currency. However, these critics stopped to happen when the United
States increased their interest rates in 1979 (BELLUZZO, 1995, p. 16).
These factors that I reported caused disorganization in the institutions created by the
Bretton Woods Agreement, and also have finished with the possibilities of economic
growth and social organization that it permitted. The consequence of the end of this
institutional arrangement which was made by the Bretton Woods Agreement was another
institutional arrangement. However, this one was more unstable, decentralized and
deregulated. This is the main characteristics of the international monetary system postBretton Woods. According to Belluzzo:
5
... the evolution of the international credit system crisis and the actions that the
United States took due to the dollar crisis created the conditions to the
development of new forms of financial intermediation and to the globalization's
second stage. These transformations process in the financial sphere can be
understood as the generalization and the supremacy of the capital markets which
is replacing the previous supremacy of the credit system led by the banks
(BELLUZZO, 1995, p. 16, translated by the author).4
This is the historical context of the financialization of the capital which is the same
period when the Military Regime has funded the industrialization process with foreign
capital. Therefore, the end of the Golden Age of the capitalism and the collapse of Bretton
Woods have had severe implications to the Brazilian economy whose consequences will be
analyzed in the next section.
The development model performed by the Military Regime and the State of Exception
The second section is split into two parts. In the first part, I will define the different
periods of the development model performed by the Military Regime between 1964 e 1979.
I also will present the main economic policy instruments which were used to execute the
industrial policy. In the second part, I will define the role of the State of Exception in that
development model.
First period (1964-1967): institutional reforms
The beginning of the 1960 decade is characterized as a period of economic and
political crises in Brazil. The economic crisis could be observed in the inflation levels5 and
the political crisis was in the opposition that the Presidente João Goulart was receiving
In Portuguese: “... a evolução da crise do sistema de crédito internacionalizado e as respostas dos Estados Unidos ao
enfraquecimento do papel do dólar criaram as condições para o desenvolvimento de novas formas de intermediação
financeira e para uma segunda etapa da globalização. Esse processo de transformações na esfera financeira pode ser
entendido como a generalização e a supremacia dos mercados de capitais em substituição à dominância anterior do
sistema de crédito comandado pelos bancos”(BELLUZZO, 1995, p. 16).
5 Inflation Rate (Annual variation in %): 1960= 30,47%; 1961= 47,78%; 1962=51,60%; 1963= 79,92%; 1964= 94,12%.
Source: IPEA-DATA.
4
6
from considerable sectors of the Brazilian society. These problems were not resolved in a
democratic way, and in 1964 was triggered a Coup d'etat which dismissed João Goulart
from the presidency.
After the Coup d’état, the first president of the Military Regime was Humberto
Castello Branco, and to deal with these economic problems was created the Government's
Economic Action Plan (PAEG) which objectives were: achieve an economic growth of 6%
for the next two years, control the balance of payments deficit, and control the high levels
of inflation.
Other important reform which helped the Military Regime to reach its objectives
was the banking reform. The objectives of this reform were the modernization and
concentration of the National Financial System and part of these results can be observed in
Table 1.
Table 1: National Financial System: evolution and dimension
Year
Number of Commercial
banks
Number of Bank branches
Private*
Public** Total Private*
Public**
Total
1964
312
24
336
5.741
578
6.319
1966
287
26
313
6.436
640
7.076
1968
196
28
224
5.810
2.081
7.891
1970
150
28
178
5.658
2.203
7.861
1972
100
28
128
5.640
2.263
7.903
1974
81
28
109
5.529
2.791
8.320
Source: Relatório do Banco Central do Brasil (several numbers) (apud PAULA, 1998)
OBS : (*) It includes national and foreign private banks.
(**) It includes federal and state public banks.
The indexation of government bonds was another change that was made in the
economic policy of the Military Regime in 1964. This practice helped to improve the
7
private savings because the government bonds did not lose its value with the existing
inflation.
After the realization of the reforms and the creation of new instruments of economic
policy, the inflation level6 have reduced and had a GDP growth from 1964 to 1967.
Moreover, during this period the conditions to the “Economic Miracle" were created, when
the government created the conditions to the inflow of capital into the country and better
expectations to the capitalist investment.
The second period (1968-1973): The Brazilian “Economic Miracle"
As I wrote, the period between 1968 and 1973 is called "Economic Miracle" in
history books. Although, when it is analyzed the economic policy adopted by the
government during this period and the international conjuncture it is possible to identify the
reasons of that high economic growth.7
Together, a strong executive power, unclear selection of regions and sectors to
receive investments, the loss of bargaining power of unions, and a salary policy which
squeezed the ages were the factors which have made the "Economic Miracle".
In addition, due to the high level of international liquidity and the establishment of
the Euromarket, the Brazilian exchange rate policy has stimulated inflows of capitals, and
also there were devaluations to protect the exporter’s income. Lastly, the government bonds
were used to stabilize the inflation.
As has been noted, the Brazilian economic "Economic Miracle" has occurred due to
the real possibilities of external and internal debts. The first debt was a consequence of the
financial opening performed by the Brazilian economy. The second debt was a
6
Inflation Rate (Annual variation in %): 1964= 94,14%; 1965=34,24%; 1966=39,12%; 1967=25,01%; 1968=25,49%;
Source: IPEA-DATA.
7 GDP growth (Annual variation in %): 1964=3,4%; 1965=2,4%; 1966=6,7%; 1967=4,2%; 1968=9,8%; 1969=9,5%;
1970=10,4%; 1971=11,3%; 1972=11,94%; 1973=13,97%. Source: IPEA-DATA.
8
consequence of the financial assets indexation. However, with this way of funding the
National economy has suffered from the first oil shock whose consequences were the
decrease of the possibilities of external debt.
The third period (1974-1979): 2nd PND (2nd National Development Plan)
During the period between 1974 and 1979 the Military Regime tried to make a
dream become a reality. The plan was to transform the Brazilian economy in an economic
power. Thus, the dream was planned and presented in the 2nd National Development Plan
whose objectives were ambitious:
(...) conclude the installation process of the heavy industry, incorporate the capital
goods industry and complement the industrial park of basic supplies [...] expand
the economic infrastructure with State investment, especially in the sectors of
energy, transportation and telecommunications (TAVARES, 1986, p. 43,
translated by the author).8
However, the development strategy which was adopted by the government to
perform the 2nd National Development Plan had not real basis to occur because the financial
sector, the production base, and the most part of the society have not given support for the
plan. The sectors which have given them support were the multinational corporations, the
mechanical industry, and the engineering and construction companies (TAVARES, 1986,
p.43).
Consequently, the 2nd National Development Plan has not achieved all the objectives
targeted. However, it had concrete effects in the Brazilian industrial infrastructure.9
In Portuguese: “(...) concluir o ciclo de instalação da indústria pesada, acabar de internar a indústria de bens de capital e
complementar o parque industrial de insumos básicos [...]; expandir os serviços de infraestrutura econômica a cargo das
empresas e autarquias estatais, sobretudo nos setores de energia, transportes e telecomunicações” (TAVARES, 1986, p.
43).
9 In the introduction of the book Capitalismo tardio e sociabilidade moderna written by João Manuel Cardoso de Mello
and Fernando Novais, it is possible to read about the optimism that was created in the Brazilian society during the period
between 1950 and 1979. The authors show us that after 1967 the economic progress produced an expectation that the
Brazilian society was almost accessing the "first world.” - MELLO, João Manuel Cardoso de; NOVAIS, Fernando
Antonio (Coaut. de). Capitalismo tardio e sociabilidade moderna. 2ª edição. São Paulo, SP: Editora da UNESP:
Campinas: FACAMP, 2009.
8
9
Although, in the end of the 1970 decade, the international conjuncture had changed, and the
State was high indebted. Some analysts have said that the Brazilian industrial policy
management was audacious, but it had bad lucky (TAVARES, 1986, p. 64).
During this new conjecture, the Brazilian economy had an external debt crisis, and
the development model of the Military Regime also has failed. One important characteristic
of this development model was the existence of a State of Exception. In my opinion, it is
relevant to understand this phenomenon to comprehend the development model of the
Military Regime in its totality. Therefore, I will expose about the State of Exception in the
next part of this section.
The State of Exception
Paulo Arantes (2014a) has written about the Coup d’état of 1964 and also about the
historical period which started with this fact. The philosopher argues that after 1964 was
started a period in the Brazilian society that can be called by Impunity Age. He is following
the arguments of Giorgio Agamben (2005) in his reflections about the State of Exception in
Brazil and has developed four arguments about this issue. Firstly I will expose them and
after I will show the relations between them and the development model of the Military
Regime.
First, the logic of exception created in Brazil after 1964 made the human body
fundamental for the Military Regime's action. Therefore, was created a disappearance
society in which torture and forced disappearance have become actions made by the State
and assisted by entrepreneurs (ARANTES, 2014a, p. 282). Arantes argues that this way of
managing the society cannot be reverted, and this fact has caused a decivilizing process in
the Brazilian society.
10
Second, after 1964, the logic of exception sought to deconstruct the main power of
politics which is able to design the future expectations of the society (ARANTES, 2014a, p.
294). Arantes argues that this objective was achieved during the Cold War when the social
punishment complex generalized the counterrevolutionary terror for all the Latin America.
Third, the State of Exception was an instrument which supported the capitalist
accumulation process in Brazil because it contributed to the loss of bargaining power of
unions. At this moment could be found a contradictory situation the society. On the one
hand, there were social rights in the Constitution, but, on the other hand, these rights were
suspended due to a constant exceptionality of power (ARANTES, 2014a, p. 313).
Fourth, there is a dictatorial past in the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, because in it
still exists terms from the Constitution of 1967 and from the amendment made in 1969.
Other point that Arantes highlights is that after 1988 the Brazilian Constitution was
amended over sixty times (ARANTES, 2014a, p. 289). This argument shows the
contemporary consequences of the State of Exception in Brazil.
I exposed these four arguments which were defended by Paulo Arantes because the
Brazilian State of Exception was responsible for violent actions against the opponents of
the Military Regime. This government’s violence also has attacked the unions.
Consequently, workers were inhibited to claim their labor rights. Additionally, this violence
has finished with the horizon of expectations that could be created through politics. Finally,
the laws which were created by the State of Exception still exists in the actual constitution.
Therefore, if my interpretation is not wrong, it is possible to affirm that the State of
Exception created during the Military Regime still exists in the Brazilian society. 10
10
The book O que resta da ditadura exposes the discussion about the Brazilian Dictatorship actuality. - TELES, Edson;
SAFATLE, Vladimir (org.). O que resta da ditadura: a exceção brasileira. São Paulo, SP: Boitempo, 2010.
11
However, it is metamorphosed into a democratic regime which has not the necessity of a
military government to make it work.
With these arguments in mind, Paulo Arantes argues that the Coup d’état of 1964
has placed the Brazilian society in the new time of the world, and I will expose this new
historical period in the next section.
The New Time of the World
Between 1993 and 1994, Eric Hobsbawm finished his book about the short
twentieth century without expectations about the future. The English historian could not see
a clear long-run horizon for the mankind. These were his words:
We do not know where we are going. We only know that history has brought us
to this point and - if readers share the argument of this book - why. However, one
thing is plain. If humanity is to have a recognizable future, it cannot be by
prolonging the past or the present. If we try to build the third millennium on that
basis, we shall fail. And the price of failure, that is to say, the alternative to a
changed society, is darkness (HOBSBAWM, 1995, p. 585).
In 2014, Paulo Arantes wrote a reflection about the twentieth century in his new
book which is entitled O novo tempo do mundo (The new time of the world), and after two
decades, his expectations are not so different from those that Hobsbawm has showed in the
end of Age of Extremes. Henceforth, I will expose the meaning of the new time of the
world, according to Paulo Arantes. After, I will make relations between this concept with
the previous sections.
It should be highlighted that the references of Paulo Arantes to create his reflections
are authors who research the world systems as Immanuel Wallerstein, Fernand Braudel,
Giovani Arrighi, Fernado Novais and others. Beyond them, Reinahrt Koselleck has a
12
crucial role in the framework established by Arantes because the concepts of
"space of
experience" and "horizon of expectations".11
The book and its first article have the same title The new time of the world.
Therefore, can be inferred that also had an old time of the world, and Paulo Arantes argues
that this period has started with the navigations and when the Europeans have arrived in
America. This fact transformed the existing conceptions about the world which ceased to be
flat and limited to be understood as round, unitary and global.
After these events, populations from different regions with contrasting cultures have
come into contact with each other. Thereupon, the comparison between different social
realities and techniques – which were incomparable – become possible. Thus, the
possibility of the existence of the notion of progress was opened. About this issue, Paulo
Arantes argues with the ideas of Reinhart Koselleck:
The geographical opening up of the globe brought to light various but coexisting
cultural levels which were, through the process of synchronous comparison, then
ordered diachronically. Looking from civilized Europe to a barbaric America was
a glance backward […]. Comparisons promoted the emergence in experience of a
world history, which was increasingly interpreted in terms of progress. A constant
impulse leading to progressive comparison was drawn from the fact that
individual peoples or states, parts of the earth, sciences, Stände, or classes were
found to be in advance of the others. From the eighteenth century on, therefore, it
was possible to formulate the postulate of acceleration; or conversely from the
point of view of those left behind, the postulate of drawing level or overtaking
(KOSELLECK, 2004a, p. 238).
After this is a key point in the human history the horizon of expectation was
separated from the space of experience, and this was a great revolution in the European
society. Moreover, it was opened a period of great expectations to the European world.
According to Paulo Arantes, three hundred years were necessary for the consolidation of
“This brings us to the thesis: experience and expectation are two categories appropriate for the treatment of historical
time because of the way that they embody past and future. The categories are also suitable for detecting historical time in
the domain of empirical research since, when substantially augmented, they provide guidance to concrete agencies in the
course of social or political movement” (KOSELLECK, 2004b, p. 258).
11
13
the ideology of progress and it had happened with the French Revolution. At this point, he
argues with Immanuel Wallerstein.
The French Revolution itself was the end point of a long process, not in France
alone but in the entire capitalist world-economy as a historical system. For, by
1789, a goodly part of the globe had been located inside this historical system for
three centuries already. And during those three centuries, most of its key
institutions had been established and consolidated: the axial division of labour,
with a significant transfer of surplus-value from peripheral zones to core zones;
the primacy of reward to those operating in the interests of the endless
accumulation of capital; the interstate system composed of so-called sovereign
states, which however were constrained by the framework and the ‘rules’ of this
interstate system; and the ever-growing polarization of this world-system, one
that was not merely economic but social, and was on the verge of becoming
demographic as well (WALLERSTEIN, 1994, p. 5).
The French Revolution has opened two hundred years of hope and expectations for
those which were inside the modern world-economy. However, at the beginning of the
twentieth century, the period of progress suffered a shock with the I World War - when
started the Catastrophe Era. This period has showed to mankind the destruction power that
itself had built. Nevertheless, the Golden Age of capitalism has started after those
catastrophes and it has reformed the system. It was a moment wherein capitalism was
unrecognizable.
Paulo Arantes argues that the event which point out the end of the Golden Age is
the fall of the Berlin Wall. Additionally, he argues that at this moment opens the new time
of the world which is characterized by the existence of a perennial situation where the
future has been consumed by the present time12. Therefore, in the new time of the world
there are low expectations and the society is just seeing possibilities of social change
waiting for the revolution, war or a big crash (ARANTES, 2014b, p.94). As can be
perceived, it is a period emergency which has expectations of exception.
12
This is the main characteristic of the new time of the world. According to Paulo Arantes, in the present time there is no
horizon of expectations which means that there are no long-term projects. In other words, there is only conjuncture.
14
Final remarks
In this paper, I have argued that the Golden Age of capitalism could happen, on the
one hand, due to the historical conjuncture which was created after thirty years of crises
and, on the other hand, because the Bretton Woods Monetary Agreement has oriented that
style of economic development. Consequently, when the agreement failed, the same
happened with the Golden Era.
In the second section of this paper, I have exposed that during the end of the Golden
Age of capitalism the Brazilian Military Regime got external financing to complete the
industrialization process and that the State of Exception assisted the government in doing it.
And when the Golden Age has finished, the Brazilian economy entered in a crisis due to the
high value which reached the external debt after the increase of the American interest rates
in 1979. Albeit this has occurred, I also argued that structural changes had been done in the
Brazilian economy.
In the third section, I have exposed an interpretation of the contemporary capitalism
made by Paulo Arantes. For him, a period of perennial conjuncture has started after the
Golden Age of the capitalism.
In conclusion, I argue that the Military Regime was responsible to introduce the new
time of the world in Brazil which brought decreasing expectations about the future and
perennial conjuncture.
There are still some problems that emerged while I was writing this paper. I could
not develop all of them, but I will continue to develop them during my research.
15
First, I should improve my argument that Military Regimes have taken place both in
Brazil and in Latin America during the Golden Age. Despite of that, it is not possible to
argue that these regions had experienced the same Golden Age as it occurred in Europe.
Second, I should deep the research about the Military's comprehension of Brazil and
the projects that they would perform in this country. This research might start in the
transition period between the Empire period and the Republic one and could help me
understanding the values which guided the practices of this institution.
The third problem goes beyond the objectives of my research, however, it is part of
the contemporary debate about the crisis of the capitalist system. Here I would refer myself
to the values which ground our reflections and critics and in my opinion it still exists
questions about economic history that must be done: Is it plausible to think in the repetition
of the Golden Era? Which are our future expectations? Which are the main political and
economic reforms for us? Is it possible to accomplish them in a democratic State? In
conclusion, there is no lack of reflective questions for those who research the contemporary
capitalism.
References
AGAMBEN, Giorgio. State of exception. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 2005.
(Portuguese version) Estado de exceção. São Paulo, SP: Boitempo, 2004.
ARANTES, Paulo. 1964. In: O novo tempo do mundo: e outros ensaios sobre a era da
emergência. 1ª edição. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2014a. pp. 281-314.
ARANTES, Paulo. O novo tempo de mundo. In: O novo tempo do mundo: e outros
ensaios sobre a era da emergência. 1ª edição. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2014b. pp. 2797.
BELLUZZO, Luiz Gonzaga de Mello. O declínio de Bretton Woods e a emergência dos
mercados “globalizados”. Economia e sociedade: revista do Instituto de
Economia da UNICAMP. v. 4, n. 4-5, p. 11-20, 1995.
16
HOBSBAWM, Eric. Age of extremes: the short twentieth century 1914-1991. London:
Abacus, 1995. (Portuguese version) Era dos extremos: o breve século XX: 19141991. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1995.
IANNI, Octávio. As estratégias de desenvolvimento. In: TOLEDO, Caio Navarro de (org.).
1964: visões críticas do golpe: democracia e reformas no populismo. 2ª edição.
Campinas, SP: Editora da UNICAMP, 2014. p. 167-172.
KOSELLECK, Reinhart. Neuzeit: Remarks on the Semantics of Modern Concepts of
Movement. In: Future past: on the semantics of historical time. New York, NY:
Columbia University Press, 2004a, pp. 222-254.
KOSELLECK, Reinhart. “Space of Experience” and “Horizon of Expectation”: Two
Historical Categories In: Future past: on the semantics of historical time. New
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2004b, pp. 255-275.
MELLO, João Manuel Cardoso de; NOVAIS, Fernando Antonio (Coaut. de). Capitalismo
tardio e sociabilidade moderna. 2ª edição. São Paulo, SP: Editora da UNESP:
Campinas: FACAMP, 2009.
NUNES, Leonardo Dias. Correção monetária e tensões sociais no Brasil
contemporâneo (1963-1974). 2012. 94 p. Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade
Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia, Campinas, SP.
PAULA, Luiz Fernando Rodrigues de. Tamanho, dimensão e concentração do sistema
bancário no contexto de alta e baixa inflação no Brasil. In: Nova Economia. v. 8, n.
1, p. 87-116, jul. /dez. 1998.
TAVARES, Maria da Conceição de Almeida. O grande salto para o caos: o plano cruzado
em posfácio. 2ª edição. Rio de Janeiro, RJ: Jorge Zahar, 1986.
TELES, Edson; SAFATLE, Vladimir (org.). O que resta da ditadura: a exceção
brasileira. São Paulo, SP: Boitempo, 2010.
WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel. The Agonies of Liberalism: What Hope Progress? New Left
Review,1994, p. 5.
17