Magical Causal Explanations
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Running Head: Magical Causal Explanations
Plausible Explanations: Magical Causal Explanation in Preschoolers
Caitlin M. Clark
Cornell University, College of Human Ecology
Author Notes
Caitlin M. Clark, Department of Human Ecology, Cornell University.
This study was completed as a Senior Honor’s Thesis in the Department
of Human Ecology. Funding was provided by the Marjorie A. Corwin
Undergraduate Research Fellows Endowment for Faculty Excellence. This
project would not have been possible without the guidance and advice given by
Dr. Tamar Kushnir. Her enthusiasm in my project and faith in me were
invaluable. Dr. Kushnir not only acted as a professor, but also as a friend and
mentor, and for this I cannot even begin to say a proper thanks. Thank you to Dr.
Marianella Casasola for her comments, edits and guidance throughout this
process. I would also like to thank the Early Childhood Cognition lab for being
there to record, transcribe and code when I was overwhelmed. Thank you to my
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friends and family who listened to me endlessly talk about this project and still
supported me throughout the year. Lastly, thanks to Walt Disney for teaching me
that you’re never too old to believe in magic.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Caitlin M.
Clark, Department of Human Development, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853.
Email: CaitlinClark11@gmail.com
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Abstract
The literature has repeatedly shown that children believe in magic and can
distinguish between fantasy and reality (Browne & Woolley, 2004; Harris et
al,1991; Phelps & Woolley, 1994; Sharon & Woolley, 2004; Subkotsky, 2001;
Taylor & Carlson, 1997; Woolley et al, 2004; Woolley et al, 2006; Woolley & Van
Reet, 2006). However, very little research has been done on the context of
magical thinking, specifically how children use magic to reason causally. The
present study explored magical causal explanations in 32 preschoolers, broken
into 16 3 year-olds and 16 4 year-olds. Children saw blocks activate a special toy
either working by contact or at a distance and were then asked to categorize
whether the event was magic or electric. They were then asked to activate the
toy themselves and then to correct the experimenter’s failed action. Children fell
into one of three categories. They were either Inconsistent in their
categorizations, Consistent One Responders, or Consistent Discriminators.
Consistent Discriminators chose distance as magic and contact as electric.
These children also discriminated in their action, using distance for magic. There
was also an effect of age on children’s use of magic. Older children were more
likely to invoke magic as an explanation.
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Plausible Explanations: Magical Causal Explanation in Preschoolers
There is no question that children are magical thinkers, as the research
has repeatedly found (Browne & Woolley, 2004; Harris et al.,1991; Phelps &
Woolley, 1994; Sharon & Woolley, 2004; Subkotsky, 2001; Taylor & Carlson,
1997; Woolley et al., 2004; Woolley et al, 2006; Woolley & Van Reet,
2006).Magic provides not just entertainment and wonder to a child; it also
functions as one of the first means for learning and reasoning about the world
around them. Children form beliefs and theories about culturally constructed
fantastical beings (Woolley, Boerger, & Markman, 2004) and they are able to
distinguish between fantasy and reality (Harris, Brown, Marriott, Whittall, &
Harmer, 1991). Research has started to explore children’s use of magic as an
explanatory tool. Phelps and Woolley (1994) proposed the idea that children
might use magical explanations when they lack adequate physical explanation.
The current study expands on this idea and attempts to assess whether children
do in fact use magic as an explanation when they lack other knowledge. When
presented with a concrete, mechanical event and a scientific or magic
explanation, which will children choose?
Magical Beliefs in Culture
When most people think of children’s magical beliefs, they immediately
think of the many fantasy characters that occur in culture. Most children believe
in fantasy entities tied to holidays and special events. Children believe in many
of these magical events and characters because these stories are perpetuated
by adults. Every year parents explain the appearance of presents under the
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Christmas tree as being put there by Santa Claus. Children are told that the
money under their pillow came from the tooth fairy. Woolley et al. (2004) created
the Candy Witch, a magical character that comes to children’s houses on
Halloween night, taking some of their candy in exchange for a toy. Surprisingly,
older children (mean age 4.9) who were visited by the Candy Witch had higher
levels of belief than did younger children (mean age 3.9). Though initially it might
seem that children got more credulous as they grew, the authors claim that
believing in the Candy Witch involved a level of cognitive maturity because the
older children had to take into account their previous ideas and work out the
seemingly magic events of Halloween night.
This belief in fantasy entities cannot be explained by childhood credulity.
Children do not believe in these characters just because they are told they exist.
They already have a belief in magic, and they then hear adults tell these stories.
This interaction cements their beliefs. Children’s belief in this type of magic can
vary greatly. Each kindergarten class has one student who doesn’t believe in
Santa at all, and in every fourth grade class you can find that student who is still
clinging to his belief in the jolly old elf. This huge individual variation shows that
this belief in cultural magical entities is not universal and varies based on the
child.
Fantasy/Reality Distinction
Though children are magical thinkers, they are not completely credulous.
Young children are able to discriminate between reality and fantasy. Harris et al.
(1991) explored the fantasy/reality distinction in children, by simply asking them
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about real items, imagined items and supernatural imagined items. The children
(4- and 6-year-olds) easily differentiated between the real and imagined entities.
However, in a second experiment, children were shown a box and told to imagine
that there was a monster in it. Children then showed apprehension and caution
when approaching the box, even if they had earlier shown a clear distinction
between fantasy and reality. Harris et al. (1991) proposed an “availability” and
“transmigration” hypothesis. When children imagine a possibility, the idea is
easily brought to mind and more mentally available. This availability makes the
child start to believe that the event is more likely. Transmigration explains the
gap in knowledge between adults and children. Though there is not a huge
cognitive gap between children and adults, children lack certain biological and
physical knowledge to certainly rule out that magic exists, or that a monster is in
the box (Harris et al., 1991).
Children use context as one way to discriminate between magic and
reality. Woolley and Reet (2006) examined the effect of context on children’s
decisions about reality versus fantasy. Children were read either a book about
magic, science or everyday life. They were then exposed to a novel entity, with
reference to a scientist, a dragon or a child (depending on what book they had
read). Children used the story book context they had been exposed to when
discriminating whether the novel entity was real or not. Those who had heard the
science story said the novel entity was real, while those who were in the magic
condition thought the entity was magic. Children can evaluate new information
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and determine its reality status depending on context of the presentation
(Woolley & Reet, 2006).
In addition to context, children also use evidence to distinguish between
fantasy and reality. Tullos and Woolley (in press) concluded that children can use
physical evidence to discriminate between reality and fantasy and that this ability
increases between the ages of 4 and 6. They presented evidence (such as left
over feathers and twigs) about real and fantastic animals and then asked children
to reason about their existence. Their study showed children gathering and
using evidence to make judgments about reality. They also proposed that the
acquisition of these skills was developmental, improving with age. Context can
provide a very useful piece of evidence in the discrimination between fantasy and
reality.
Through the years, various researchers have created a measure called
Fantasy Orientation, which they used to assess a child’s association with the
fantasy world. How often a child participates in pretend and imaginary play and
whether or not they have an imaginary friend are some of the things used to
measure a child’s Fantasy Orientation. They also looked at children’s patterns of
impersonation in play, and what toys children chose to play with. Woolley et al.
(2004) found that a child’s measured Fantasy Orientation factored into their belief
of the Candy Witch. Those with high Fantasy Orientations had higher beliefs in
the Candy Witch than their peers with low fantasy orientation (Woolley et al.,
2004). All children vary in their Fantasy Orientation, providing more evidence to
the claim that magical beliefs in children are highly variable.
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Does a high fantasy orientation lead to understanding of the fantasy/reality
distinction or does it lead children to live more in a fantasy world with little
distinction between fantasy and reality? Sharon and Woolley (2004) explored the
fantasy/reality distinction in young children. Perhaps most interesting out of their
findings was that children with a higher fantasy orientation were more accurate in
labeling and categorizing real and fantastic figures. These children spent more
time engaging in imagination and fantasy than their low fantasy oriented peers.
Perhaps their familiarity with the fantasy world caused them to have more
knowledge of its limits. The study also provided a sketch of the development of
the reality/fantasy distinction. Very young children may be unsure about the
properties of real and fantastic entities. As they grow and gain experience they
lose this uncertainty. Children begin to treat real and fantasy figures differently,
attributing different qualities to the two groups and categorizing them by these
qualities. For example, older children and adults attributed human-like social
properties to real figures but not to fantasy figures (Sharon & Woolley, 2004).
Up to now, all the mentioned literature has just shown that children
discriminate between reality and fantasy. They do this through the use of culture,
context and evidence. Theory of Mind is critical in the fantasy/reality distinction.
Children need to understand that their thoughts are separate from real life in
order to distinguish between reality and the fantasies they believe in their own
mind.
Magic as an Explanation
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As children are beginning to distinguish between reality and fantasy and
employ magic beliefs in their thinking, they are also exploring the world and are
eager to find explanations for the things they see around them. Magic now
provides an explanation that many children are willing to accept. Phelps and
Woolley (1994) proposed that children of all ages use magical explanations when
they lacked adequate physical explanations. However, as they get older, their
use of magical beliefs decrease as they learn more about the physical world and
are provided with new explanations. It is at this point that children’s magical
beliefs begin to take on a sense of causality. After grasping the distinction
between reality and fantasy they are able to invoke magic in their explanations.
Children can use magic to explain violations of different laws. In their
study, Browne and Woolley explored children’s thoughts about violations of
physical (walking on the ceiling) mental (reading someone’s mind), and social (a
boy wearing a dress) laws. When children were presented with situations
violating certain laws and then asked if they required magic, children consistently
responded that physical violations require magic more than the social violations.
Older children (older 3-year-olds and 4-year-olds) also responded that mental
violations need magic more than social violations would. This result shows that
magic is not just used to explain physical violations. Children also use magic to
explain different types of violations (social, mental), for which they cannot provide
their own explanations.
Some researchers have been curious not just about the development of
magical thinking in children, but in the development of magical thinking
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throughout life. Subbotsky (2001) used an unusual event (a box which destroys
items put in it) to question children and adults about their magical causal
reasoning. The prevailing thought was that older children and adults would show
that they understood the distinction between a scientific and magic event through
their verbalizations and their actions. However, it seemed that throughout the
study, older children’s (9-year-olds) and adult’s actions seemed to show that they
accepted both magical and scientific explanations. The 9-year-olds actually
showed greater credulity towards a magic spell than a physical device
explanation, showing that even at this age, the children still held some belief in
magical explanations. The study showed that even adults retain some belief in
magical explanations. Causal judgments do not develop in a replacement
fashion. Magical thinking is not completely replaced by scientific reasoning.
Instead, these two types of causal reasoning coexist in the minds of children and
adults (Subbotsky, 2001).
Causal Reasoning
Preschool children possess a great deal of causal knowledge. Research
has proved over the last 30 years that even young children possess a sizeable
amount of causal knowledge about the world around them, and they use this
knowledge to reason about the physical, psychological and biological world.
(Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982; Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1995; Gelman &
Welman, 1991; Gopnik and Wellman, 1994; Inagaki & Hatano, 1993; Kalish,
1996; Keil, 1995; Leslie & Keeble, 1987; Oakes & Cohen, 1990; Perner, 1991;
Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992; Wellman, 1990).
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Spatial cues (for example, contact and at-a-distance) are very important to
a child’s perception of causal relations (Cohen & Oakes, 1993; Leslie & Keeble,
1987, Oakes & Cohen,1990, 1993). However, spatial cues are misleading. Many
causal events that children see in everyday life do not follow contiguity (Kushnir
& Gopnik, 2007). Sometimes, children have to reason about physical events that
are unusual, and may even seem magical to them. If given valid information
about causal mechanisms in a situation in which spatial contiguity is violated,
children are sometimes able to causally reason without using contiguity (Bullock,
1985; Bullock et al, 1982; Schlottmann, 1999; Schlottmann & Surian, 1999;
Shultz, 1982). Without contiguity information, children are also able to explain a
causal event if they receive implicit instructions (Bullock et al, 1982).
Kushnir and Gopnik (2005) found that 4 year old children use probability
when inferring causal strength. They presented children with a “detector” and
two different toys that make the “detector” go. One of the blocks worked on the
“detector” and made it go more than the other, with a 2/3 success rate. Children
consistently chose that block as the one that would make the toy go again.
Children were shown another two toys and told that some have special stuff
inside that make the “detector” go. Again, children chose the block that worked
2/3 of the time when they were asked to make the “detector” go again. Children
also tended to favor toys that gave results when the child intervened, showing
that intervention affected their judgment of the causal mechanism. They
preferred their own intervention as opposed to the intervention of the adult
experimenter because their intervention was less likely to be confounded.
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Kushnir and Gopnik (2007) further explored causal reasoning in 3- and 4year-olds through the use of an action-at-a-distance design. In this study, the
detector was used in many different ways. Sometimes it was activated
deterministically (all the time) and sometimes probabilistically (more than half).
Action-at-a-distance referred to the conditions when the detector was activated
when a toy was simply held above it (not making any contact). Children were
able to take into account new evidence in the four tasks. When something
worked before, but a new condition such as action-at-a-distance was introduced,
they were able to change their prior beliefs about the causality. The study
showed that causal learning is not rigid and domain specific, but rather flexible.
Children can revise their causal reasoning when they are presented with new
evidence.
As children’s causal mechanism knowledge grew, their use of magical
explanations decreases (Phelps & Woolley, 1994). Causal mechanisms are
extremely important in the development of magical thinking and the
fantasy/reality distinction. A solid grasp of the fantasy/reality distinction is
established concurrently as children’s conception of causal links between their
mind and reality improve. Woolley, Browne and Boerger (2006) found that in
children, magic followed the causal rules that (1) cause precedes effect and (2)
causes are exclusive. They showed children a wishing box with 10 smaller trick
boxes containing everyday items inside. Children watched the experimenter
wish for certain objects and were then asked to determine if the outcomes were
caused by wishing or something else. The many outcomes violated causal rules
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such as priority, consistency and exclusivity. They repeated this experiment
twice, but instead of using a wishing machine, they once used a regular machine
with buttons and then again used a toy with blocks and marbles to demonstrate a
simple causal action. They found that children’s causal thinking about wishing
was similar to the way they causally reasoned about the working of a machine
and a toy.
Hypothesis
Most of the research on children’s magical thinking has used abstract
stories and situations. We are interested in exploring children’s magical thinking
in ordinary situations that children have no explanation for, through the use of a
mechanical device. How does real world causal knowledge interact with
children’s magical thinking? What kind of explanations will they use to explain
the activation of a “detector”? When presented with either science or magic,
which will they choose?
Woolley et al. (2006) mention “Many of the machines with which children
interact may seem quite magical to them.” However, they do not expand on this
very interesting concept. Today’s child interacts with many electronic devices that
may seem magical on a daily basis. Remote controls, DVD players, and stereos
are all objects that children often encounter, yet children do not understand how
they work. How do children reason about these seemingly magical devices?
Past research has shown that children use context to help in their
discrimination between fantasy and reality (Woolley & Reet, 2006). Context may
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be important in children’s use of magic as a causal explanation. What happens in
a real-world, mechanical context?
Browne and Woolley (2004) studied children’s thoughts about various kinds of
violations, and found that children consistently responded that magic is needed
more in a physical violation than in other kinds of violations (i.e., social). When
children see a hard-to-believe mechanical, physical event, will they be more likely
to invoke magic as an explanation than when they see an easier to believe
event? Similar to Phelps and Woolley (1994), we believe that in such a situation,
in which children lack physical explanations, they will use magical explanations.
We believe that when X causes Y, but children do not understand the causal
mechanism, they will invoke magic.
Woolley et al. (2004) found that older children (mean age 4.9 years) were
stronger believers in the Candy Witch than the younger children (mean age 3.9
years). When studying children’s use of evidence to discriminate between
fantasy and reality, Tullos and Woolley (in press) proposed that abilities required
in this discrimination were developmental. Similarly, we expect to find a
developmental trend, in which older children will invoke magic in their
explanations of a mechanical event more than the younger children. We expect
the ability to use magic as a causal explanation to improve with age.
Many view magic as an explanation children use in place of an “I don’t know”
answer. They believe children use magic as a naïve excuse explanation. Harris
et al. (1991) proposed that children used magic only when they lack all other
knowledge. To many, it is an explanation to fall back on when all else fails.
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However, it is our belief that children use magic as a legitimate causal tool. To
children, it is a sophisticated explanation that requires them to think and theorize
about causal mechanism. Many children believe in magic even when they have
knowledge (such as biological and physical knowledge) about reality.
Method
Participants
Participants were 52 preschool aged children, consisting of 26 3 year-olds
(average age 41.82 months) and 26 4 year-olds (average age 55.32 months).
Children were recruited from local preschools and day care centers in Ithaca, NY.
Materials
The detector used is identical to that used by Kushnir and Gopnik (2005),
and is a wood box with a plastic Lucite top. The box can be activated to light up
and play music when the experimenter hits a hidden switch. The objects used
with the detector in the categorization and action tasks are 12 wooden, cube
blocks, painted blue. There are also two boxes, identical in shape in size. One
has a picture of a lightning bolt, signifying electricity on it. The other has a
picture of a wand on it, signifying magic. Each picture is the same size and is
placed on the same spot of each box.
Procedure
Task 1 – Categorization
The experimenter introduces the child to the blicket detector, or “toy” and
says “Here is my new toy. I just got this toy and I brought it to show you. Let’s
see how it works.” The experimenter then takes out the blue blocks, and tells the
child they are “things.” The child is also told “Some of these things are electric
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and work because they have electricity inside them. Some of these things are
magic and work because they have magic stuff inside them.” The order of
presenting electricity and magic is counterbalanced. Then the experimenter
presents each of the boxes, pointing out the picture on the box and explaining
which one is for magic things and which one is for electric things. The child is
then told that they were going to watch the things and pick which box they go in.
The experimenter shows 8 demonstrations with the “things.” Four times, the thing
makes contact with the blicket detector and activates it. The other four times, it
works at a distance. The experimenter holds the “thing” over the blicket detector
and it is activated. The order of these 8 demonstrations is counterbalanced. After
each demonstration, the experimenter holds the “thing” out to the child and asks,
“Which box does this go in?” The child then places it in one of the two boxes.
Task 2 – Action
The experimenter tells the child that they are going to get a chance to try
with two new blue “things.” The child is told that one has magic in it, and is asked
to “Make it go!” Then the child is presented with another “thing”, but this time they
are told that it is an electric one. The order here is counterbalanced. The same
number of children were presented with an electric “thing” first. Children attempt
to make the blicket toy go by either making contact or working at-a-distance.
After they try two “things” themselves, the experimenter says “Let me try again.”
The experimenter then makes contact with the blicket detector, but it is not
activated. The experimenter looks confused, gives the “thing” to the child and
asks if they can make it go. This is repeated, but this time, the experimenter fails
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with action at-a-distance. The order of contact and at-a-distance is
counterbalanced.
Results
The results of the categorization task are presented first, followed by the
results of the Action tasks.
Categorization Task
Children’s categorizations were coded into one of five response
categories. The percent of the time (out of the four distance and four contact
demonstrations) the child chose distance as magic and the percent of the time
the child chose contact as distance was calculated. Children who categorized
50% of the contact events as magic and 50% of the distance events as magic
were coded as “Inconsistent.” Children who put the majority of the things (contact
and distance) in the magic box were coded as “All Magic.” On the other hand,
children who put the majority of the things (contact and distance) in the electric
box were coded “No Magic.” Children who put the 75% or more of the distance
things in the magic box, and 25% or less of the contact things in the magic box
were coded “Distance is Magic.” Children who did the reverse, and put 75% or
more of the contact things in the magic box and 25% or more of the distance
things in the electric box were coded “Contact is Magic.”
The categorization task investigated how children would categorize
different physical events by observing when children use magic and electricity as
an explanation. Age in years and the percent of the time children categorized
distance as magic were correlated, r(50) = .302, p = .029.
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Fig. 1 presents the number of children in each response category
(explained previously). Looking at the responses, it became apparent that there
were three groups of children. Fig. 2 shows the results split into these groups.
The first group was the Inconsistent children. There were 17 children in this
group (11 3-year-olds and 6 4-year-olds).
The “No Magic” group and the “All Magic” response categories made up
the second group of “Consistent One Response.” This group consisted of 20
children (9 3-year-olds and 11 4-year-olds). Within this group there was a
marginal age difference between the 3- and 4-year-olds and whether these
children categorized everything as magic, 2(1, N = 20) =3.104, p = .078. The 4year-olds were more likely to categorize everything as magic while the 3-yearolds were more likely to categorize everything as electric (no magic).
The last group of children was “Consistent Discrimination.” This group was
made up of 15 children (6 3-year-olds and 9 4-year-olds). These were children
that discriminated between contact and distance, and consistently categorized
one action as magic and the other as electric (not magic). There was a significant
difference between children choosing distance as magic and contact as magic,
2(1, N = 15) = 5.4, p = .020. Children were more likely to categorize distance as
magic and contact as electric.
Action Task
Children’s responses to the action task were coded. Children were coded
as either “all contact” “all distance” “distance=magic” or “contact=magic.” “All
contact children made contact with the blicket detector when handed each thing
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(both magic and electric). “All distance” children used distance when handed
both “things.” “Distance=magic” children used distance when handed a magic
thing and contact when handed an electric thing. “Contact=magic” children used
contact when handed a magic thing and distance when handed an electric thing.
The child’s action task was analyzed using the groups created in the
categorization task (Inconsistent, Consistent one response and Consistent
Discrimination). There was no difference in the response patterns of the
Inconsistent group and the One Response group, 2(1, N = 37) = .091, p = .7633.
Combining these two groups, there was a significant effect of children choosing
“all contact,” 2(1, N = 37) = 7.811, p = .005. The Consistent Discrimination group
was different from the other two groups, and they discriminated between magic
and distance in their action responses more than the One Response group, 2 (1,
N = 35) = 7.758, p = .005.
The Inconsistent, Consistent One Response and Consistent
Discrimination groups were used again when analyzing the failed action task.
Amongst these groups, children’s responses were coded into “all contact,” “all
distance, “corrected,” and “imitate.” “All contact” and “all distance” meant the
child activated the blicket detector exclusively by contact or distance after the
experimenter failed both times. “Corrected” meant the children used contact
when the experimenter failed with distance, and distance when the experimenter
failed with contact. Children who coded “imitate” used the same action they had
seen the experimenter use.
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Again, there was no difference in the response patterns of the Inconsistent
and Consistent One Response group, 2(1, N = 37) = .854, p = .356. The
children in these two groups also significantly used only contact to activate the
detector, 2(1, N = 37) = 10.242, p = .001. Amongst the Consistent One
Response group, there was no difference in using only contact between the
children who categorized “all magic” and “no magic” in the first task, 2(1, N = 20)
= 2.074, p = .150. When compared to the Consistent One Response group, the
Consistent Discrimination group was more likely to discriminate in their actions,
and use both contact and distance to activate the detector, 2(1, N = 36) = 4.415,
p = .036.
Discussion
The present study examined children’s use of magic as an explanation in
a physical, real life context. It was hypothesized that children would invoke magic
in their explanations after seeing a harder to believe physical event (in this study,
seeing a detector activated by hovering something above it). The children fell
into three different response groups. One of these groups, the Consistent
Discrimination gives evidence to our hypothesis that children will categorize a
harder to believe event as magic. These children were more likely to categorize
at-a-distance activation as magic, and contact activation as electric. This same
group of children was also more likely to discriminate between at-a-distance and
contact in their own action and activation of the detector. This discriminatory
pattern suggests that these children might be using a theory, in which they are
showing some understanding of the underlying causal mechanism involved.
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The two other groups, the Inconsistent children and the Consistent One
Response children did not discriminate in their categorization or their own
actions. When they were able to activate the detector themselves, they showed a
contact bias, activating the detector by contact every time. Though the
Consistent One Response group did categorize according to a specific pattern or
method (choosing either magic or electricity and staying with that explanation
throughout the categorization) they did not continue to use this method when
they were able to use their own actions.
The children in the Consistent Discrimination group understood that
contact and distance work for different reasons. The experimenter showed them
different reasons and explanations for the events they saw. They were then able
to think about these explanations and discriminate between the physical events,
designating a different explanation to each of the two different events (contact or
at-a-distance). These children were also able to use both actions and
discriminate in their own actions and activation of the detector. To these children,
both explanations had value and were equally plausible explanations. If children
are provided with an explanation, there will be a group of children (just like the
group of Consistent Discrimination in the present study) willing to accept and
think about provided explanations and use them to discriminate in their actions.
While the discriminating children understood the experimenter’s
description of the magic and electric “things” and the proceeding demonstrations
as explanations, the children in the Consistent One Response group saw this as
evidence instead of explanation. They took the evidence they had seen for one
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action and consistently used only that action. These children are not yet using
explanations to discriminate. Instead, they are being safe, taking in the evidence
they saw in the activation of the detector and continuing to use that method.
Though the categorization task might suggest that these children are using
smallest inkling of theory when categorizing all the events into either magic or
electric, their consistent of use of contact in the action task shows that they don’t
have a theory. Instead, they are sticking to what evidence has already shown
them works.
This study found that as children increased in age, so did the amount of
times they categorized at-a-distance as magic. Amongst the Consistent One
Responders in the categorization task, there was an age difference. 4-year-olds
more often responded that everything was magic, whereas the 3-year-olds were
more skeptical and responded that everything was electric (in other words, there
was no magic). Both of these findings provide evidence to our hypothesis that
invoking magic as an explanation was developmental and increased with age.
Phelps and Woolley (1994) claimed that as children get older and learn
more about the physical world and gain new explanations, their magical beliefs
decrease. In the present study however, younger children are more skeptical
and the older children are the one using magic as an explanation. This is easily
seen in the Consistent One Response group, but can also be seen in the
Consistent Discrimination group. The older children in this group accept and use
magic as a plausible explanation.
Magical Causal Explanations
23
The results in the present study are more consistent with the findings of
Woolley et al. (2004), in which older children had stronger beliefs in a magical
character (the Candy Witch). The authors believed that believing in this kind of
magical character involved a higher level of cognitive functioning than children
who dismissed it. Children who believed had to take conflicting evidence such as
their own ideas and what they heard from those around them and form a theory
about the Candy Witch.
In the present study a similar thing might be happening. Perhaps magic,
just as any kind of physical or scientific explanation, requires knowledge and a
level of somewhat mature cognitive functioning in order for a child to use it as an
explanation. Magic is not a naïve explanation, and children in the study use it as
a legitimate causal tool.
As Subbotsky (2001) claimed, scientific reasoning does not replace
magical thinking. Magical thinking still exists to an extent in adults. The two types
of causal reasoning can coexist, as seen in the Consistent Discrimination group.
They are able to invoke both magic (a magical explanation) and electricity (a
scientific explanation). As children get older, their knowledge of other causal
explanations grows, but this does not mean magical thinking is immediately
replaced.
Sharon and Woolley (1994) explained that as children get older, they lose
uncertainty about the properties of real and magical entities. As these children
grow and gain experience, they treat real and magical figures differently,
attributing different qualities to reality and magic, and categorizing things by
Magical Causal Explanations
24
these qualities. The present study found something similar. The children in the
Consistent Discrimination group were able to take in the experimenter’s reasons
and explanation and attribute different qualities to the different events. Using
these new qualifications for magic and electric, they categorized the events they
saw. Other groups did not show such discrimination patterns, perhaps because
they are still in the stage of uncertainty about real and magical properties, and
therefore they cannot yet discriminate between the magical and electric events.
The present study’s methodology was not perfect. It is hard to tell if the
contact bias in the action task exists because children were being reinforced by
the first action they saw. This is possible, though half of the children saw distance
as the first action, and they still used contact all the time. It can also be claimed
that the order of the tasks should not have been the same for each child.
Children may have learned from the repetition of the categorization task, and this
could have affected their action. Perhaps the study can be replicated, but with a
randomized task order.
Future research would benefit from considering the effect of Fantasy
Orientation on a child’s use of magic as a causal explanation. Replicating the
current study, but adding on a measure of each child’s Fantasy Orientation would
be useful. This would make it possible to see if children with higher Fantasy
Orientations are more likely to invoke magic in their explanations. A longitudinal
study would also be valuable in exploring how a child’s use of magic as a causal
explanation changes, as they get older. At what age will the use of magic begin
to decrease? The current study, in its unique real life, mechanical context
Magical Causal Explanations
25
provides the possibility of many future studies. Future research and knowledge
will make it possible to delve deeper into children’s cognition and study how they
reason and explain the world around them.
Magical Causal Explanations
26
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Figure 1
Categorization Responses
Number of Children in Response Category
12
10
8
6
3 Year Olds
4 Year Olds
4
2
0
Irregular
No Magic
All Magic
Distance is
Magic
Contact is
Magic
Magical Causal Explanations
31
Figure 2
Categorization Responses
Number of Children in Response Category
12
Inconsistent
10
Consistent One Response
8
Consistant Discrimination
6
3 Year Olds
4 Year Olds
4
2
0
Irregular
No Magic
All Magic
Distance is
Magic
Contact is
Magic
Magical Causal Explanations
32
Figure Captions
Figure 1. Frequency of categorization responses
Figure 2. Frequency of categorization responses split into three new groups,
Inconsistsent, Consistent One Response and Consistent Discrimination