1AC
Cybersecurity
A cyberattack is coming
Macri, 14
(Giuseppe, staff writer for the Daily Caller, citing NSA head Michael Rogers, “NSA Chief: US Will
Suffer A Catastrophic Cyberattack In The Next Ten Years,”
http://dailycaller.com/2014/11/21/nsa-chief-us-will-suffer-a-catastrophic-cyberattack-in-thenext-ten-years/, BC)
N ational S ecurity A gency and U.S. Cyber Command head Adm. Michael Rogers warned lawmakers during a
congressional briefing this week that
the U.S. would suffer a severe cyberattack against critical
infrastructure like power or fuel grids in the not-too-distant future.∂ “I fully expect that during my time as a
commander, we are going to be tasked with defending critical infrastructure in the United States,” Rogers said while citing findings
from an October Pew Research Center report. “ It’s
only a matter of the when, not the if , that we’re
going to see something dramatic … I bet it happens before 2025 .”∂ Rogers told the House Intelligence
Committee Thursday he expected the attack to occur during his tenure as head of NSA the U.S. military’s cyber-war branch, and that
it would likely come from state-sponsored hackers with ties to China, Russia or several other
countries, many of whom have already successfully breached the systems of critical U.S. industries.∂ “There are multiple nationstates that have the capability and have been on the systems,” Rogers told the committee, adding that many were engaged in
“reconnaissance” activities to surveil “specific schematics of most of our control systems.”∂ “There shouldn’t be any doubt in our
minds that there are nation-states and groups out there that have the capability… to shut down, forestall our ability to operate our
basic infrastructure, whether it’s generating power across this nation, whether it’s moving water and fuel,” Rogers said, warning
China and “one or two others” had already broken into the U.S. power grid.∂ Rogers
also predicted that in the coming years,
cyber criminals previously engaged in stealing bank, credit card and other financial data would start to be co-
opted by nation-states to act as “surrogates ,” obscuring countries’ fingerprints in the infiltration and theft
of information valuable to planning attacks.∂ The admiral added that such criminal groups, which are often Russian-speaking, have
already been using state-developed cyber tools.
Backdoors create vulnerabilities that threaten cyber infrastructure – makes
attacks likely
Burger et al 14
(Eric, Research Professor of Computer Science at Georgetown, L. Jean Camp, Associate
professor at the Indiana University School of Information and Computing, Dan Lubar, Emerging
Standards Consultant at RelayServices, Jon M Pesha, Carnegie Mellon University, Terry Davis,
MicroSystems Automation Group, “Risking It All: Unlocking the Backdoor to the Nation’s
Cybersecurity,” IEEE USA, 7/20/2014, pg. 1-5, Social Science Research Network,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2468604)//duncan
This paper addresses government policies that can influence commercial practices to weaken security in products and services sold
on the commercial market. The
debate on information surveillance for national security must include
consideration of the potential cybersecurity risks and economic implications of the information
collection strategies employed. As IEEE-USA, we write to comment on current discussions with respect to weakening
standards, or altering commercial products and services for intelligence, or law enforcement. Any policy that seeks to weaken
technology sold on the commercial market has many serious downsides, even if it temporarily advances the intelligence and law
enforcement missions of facilitating legal and authorized government surveillance.∂ Specifically, we define and address
the
risks of installing backdoors in commercial products, introducing malware and spyware into
products, and weakening standards. We illustrate that these are practices that harm America’s
cybersecurity posture and put the resilience of American cyberinfrastructure at risk . We
write as a technical society to clarify the potential harm should these strategies be adopted. Whether or not these strategies ever
have been used in practice is outside the scope of this paper.∂ Individual
computer users, large corporations and
on security features built into information technology products and
services they buy on the commercial market. If the security features of these widely available
products and services are weak, everyone is in greater danger. There recently have been
allegations that U.S. government agencies (and some private entities) have engaged in a number of activities
deliberately intended to weaken mass market, widely used technology. Weakening commercial products and
services does have the benefit that it becomes easier for U.S. intelligence agencies to conduct
surveillance on targets that use the weakened technology, and more information is available for law enforcement purposes. On
government agencies all depend
the surface, it would appear these motivations would be reasonable. However,
such strategies also inevitably
make it easier for foreign powers, criminals and terrorists to infiltrate these
systems for their own purposes.
Moreover, everyone
who uses backdoor technologies may be
vulnerable, and not just the handful of surveillance targets for U.S. intelligence agencies. It is the opinion of IEEE-USA’s
Committee on Communications Policy that no entity should act to reduce the security of a product or service sold on the commercial
market without first conducting a careful and methodical risk assessment. A complete risk assessment would consider the interests
of the large swath of users of the technology who are not the intended targets of government surveillance.∂ A
methodical
risk assessment would give proper weight to the asymmetric nature of cyberthreats, given that
technology is equally advanced and ubiquitous in the United States, and the locales of many of our adversaries. Vulnerable
products should be corrected, as needed, based on this assessment. The next section briefly describes some of the
government policies and technical strategies that might have the undesired side effect of reducing security. The following section
discusses why the effect of these practices may be a decrease, not an increase, in security.∂ Government
policies can
affect greatly the security of commercial products, either positively or negatively. There are a number of methods
by which a government might affect security negatively as a means of facilitating legal government surveillance. One inexpensive
method is to exploit pre-existing weaknesses that are already present in commercial software, while keeping these weaknesses a
secret. Another method is to motivate the designer of a computer or communications system to make those systems easier for
government agencies to access. Motivation may come from direct mandate or financial incentives. There are many ways that a
designer can facilitate government access once so motivated. For example, the
system may be equipped with a
“backdoor.” The company that creates it — and, presumably, the government agency that
requests it — would “know” the backdoor, but not the product’s (or service’s) purchaser(s). The hope is that
the government agency will use this feature when it is given authority to do so, but no one else
will. However, creating a backdoor introduces the risk that other parties will find the
vulnerability, especially when capable adversaries, who are actively seeking
security vulnerabilities, know how to leverage such weaknesses .∂ History illustrates that
secret backdoors do not remain secret and that the more widespread a backdoor, the more
dangerous its existence. The 1988 Morris worm, the first widespread Internet attack, used a
number of backdoors to infect systems and spread widely. The backdoors in that case were a set of secrets then
known only by a small, highly technical community. A single, putatively innocent error resulted in a large-scale
attack that disabled many systems. In recent years, Barracuda had a completely undocumented
backdoor that allowed high levels of access from the Internet addresses assigned to Barracuda. However, when it
was publicized, as almost inevitably happens, it became extremely unsafe, and Barracuda’s customers rejected
it.∂ One example of how attackers can subvert backdoors placed into systems for benign reasons occurred in
the network of the largest commercial cellular operator in Greece. Switches deployed in the system came
equipped with built-in wiretapping features, intended only for authorized law enforcement
agencies. Some unknown attacker was able to install software, and made use of these embedded
wiretapping features to surreptitiously and illegally eavesdrop on calls from many cell phones —
including phones belonging to the Prime Minister of Greece, a hundred high-ranking Greek dignitaries, and an
employee of the U.S. Embassy in Greece before the security breach finally was discovered. In essence, a backdoor
created to fight crime was used to commit crime.
Two scenarios to a cyber attack—
First is the grid —a cyber attack causes collapse
Reuters 15
(Carolyn Cohn, reporter, 7-8-15, “Cyber attack on U.S. power grid could cost economy $1 trillion:
report,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/08/us-cyberattack-power-surveyidUSKCN0PI0XS20150708, BC)
A cyber attack which shuts down parts of the United States' power grid could cost as much as $ 1 trillion
to the U.S. economy, according to a report published on Wednesday.∂ Company executives are worried about security
breaches, but recent surveys suggest they are not convinced about the value or effectiveness of cyber insurance.∂ The report from
the University of Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies and the Lloyd's of London insurance market outlines a
scenario of an electricity blackout that leaves 93 million people in New York City and Washington DC without power.∂
scenario, developed by Cambridge, is technologically possible
once-in-200-year probability for which insurers should be prepared, the report said.∂
The
and is assessed to be within the
The hypothetical attack
causes a rise in mortality rates as health and safety systems fail, a drop in trade as
ports shut down and disruption to transport and infrastructure.∂
"The total impact to the U.S.
economy is estimated at $243 billion, rising to more than $1 trillion in the most extreme version of the scenario," the report said.
The losses come from damage to infrastructure and business supply chains, and are estimated over a five-year time period.∂ The
extreme scenario is built on the greatest loss of power, with 100 generators taken offline, and would lead to insurance industry
losses of more than $70 billion, the report added.∂ There
have been 15 suspected cyber attacks on the U.S.
electricity grid since 2000, the report said, citing U.S. energy department data.∂ The U.S. Industrial Control System Cyber
Emergency Response Team said that 32 percent of its responses last year to cyber security threats to critical infrastructure occurred
in the energy sector.∂ "The evidence of major attacks during 2014 suggests that attackers were often able to exploit vulnerabilities
faster than∂ defenders could remedy them," Tom Bolt, director of performance management at Lloyd's, said in the report.
An attack decimates US infrastructure within 15 minutes
NYT 10
(Michiko Kakutani, Pulitzer Prize winning book reviewer, citing Richard Clarke, former National
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism for the United States,
4-27-10, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27/books/27book.html?pagewanted=all, BC)
Blackouts hit New York, Los Angeles, Washington and more than 100 other
American cities. Subways crash. Trains derail. Airplanes fall from the sky.∂ Gas
pipelines explode. Chemical plants release clouds of toxic chlorine. Banks lose all
their data. Weather and communication satellites spin out of their orbits. And the
Pentagon’s classified networks grind to a halt, blinding the greatest military power
in the world.∂ This might sound like a takeoff on the 2007 Bruce Willis “Die Hard” movie, in which a group of cyberterrorists attempts to stage what it calls a “fire sale”: a systematic shutdown
According to the former counterterrorism czar Richard A. Clarke, however, it’s
a scenario that could happen in real life — and it could all go down in 15 minutes . While the United States has a first-rate cyberoffense
capacity, he says, its lack of a credible defense system, combined with the country’s heavy reliance on technology, makes it highly susceptible
to a devastating cyberattack.∂ “The United States is currently far more vulnerable to cyberwar than Russia or China,” he writes. “The U.S. is more at risk from cyberwar than are
of the nation’s vital communication and utilities infrastructure.
minor states like North Korea. We may even be at risk some day from nations or nonstate actors lacking cyberwar capabilities, but who can hire teams of highly capable hackers.”∂ Lest this sound like the augury
of an alarmist, the reader might recall that Mr. Clarke, counterterrorism chief in both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, repeatedly warned his superiors about the need for an aggressive plan to
there is a lack of
coordination between the various arms of the military and various committees in Congress over how to handle a potential attack. Once again, government
combat al Qaeda — with only a pallid response before 9/11. He recounted this campaign in his controversial 2004 book, “Against All Enemies.”∂ Once again,
agencies and private companies in charge of civilian infrastructure are ill prepared to handle a possible disaster. ∂ In these pages Mr. Clarke uses his insider’s knowledge of national security policy to create a
harrowing — and persuasive — picture of the cyberthreat the United States faces today. Mr. Clarke is hardly a lone wolf on the subject: Mike McConnell, the former director of national intelligence, told a Senate
committee in February that “
if we were in a cyberwar today, the United States would lose .”∂ And last November,
Steven Chabinsky, deputy assistant director for the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s cyber division, noted that the F.B.I. was looking into Qaeda sympathizers who want to develop their hacking skills and appear
to want to target the United States’ infrastructure.∂ Mr. Clarke — who wrote this book with Robert K. Knake, an international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations — argues that
because
the United States military relies so heavily upon databases and new technology, it is “highly
vulnerable to cyberattack. ” And while the newly established Cyber Command, along with the Department of Homeland Security, is supposed to defend the federal
government, he writes, “the rest of us are on our own”:∂ “
There is no federal agency that has the mission to defend
the banking system, the transportation networks or the power grid from
cyberattack .” In fact, The Wall Street Journal reported in April 2009 that the United States’ electrical grid had been penetrated by cyberspies (reportedly from China, Russia and other
countries), who left behind software that could be used to sabotage the system in the future.
Economic decline causes nuclear war
Harris and Burrows ‘9
(Mathew, PhD European History at Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council
(NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future:
Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis”
http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf)
Increased Potential for Global Conflict
Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and
interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended
consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history
may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to
Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful
effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the
sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that
this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which
the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic
environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and
nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline
if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist
believe that the
groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous
capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups_inheriting
organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks_and newly
emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become
self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of
economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty
of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East.
Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region
to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider
pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great
powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism
taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines
between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with
underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in
achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in
neighboring states like Israel, short
warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place
more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the
world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and
there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to
assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders
deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival
of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a
rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal
stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be
military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and
counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With
water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water
resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog
world.
Grid collapse leads to nuclear meltdowns
Cappiello 3/29/11 – national environmental reporter for The Associated Press, master’s
degrees in earth and environmental science and journalism from Columbia University
(Dina, “Long Blackouts Pose Risk To U.S. Nuclear Reactors” Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/29/blackout-risk-us-nuclearreactors_n_841869.html)//IS
should power be knocked out
it "would be
unlikely that power will be recovered in the time frame to prevent core meltdown."
A 2003 federal analysis looking at how to estimate the risk of containment failure said that
by an earthquake or tornado
In Japan, it was a one-
two punch: first the earthquake, then the tsunami. Tokyo Electric Power Co., the operator of the crippled plant, found other ways to cool the reactor core and so far avert a full-scale meltdown without electricity. "Clearly the coping duration is an issue on
the table now," said Biff Bradley, director of risk assessment for the Nuclear Energy Institute. "The industry and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will have to go back in light of what we just observed and rethink station blackout duration." David
Japan shows what happens when you play
beat-the-clock and lose
A complete loss of electrical power, generally speaking, poses a major
problem for a nuclear power plant because the reactor core must be kept cool, and back-up
cooling systems – mostly pumps that replenish the core with water_ require massive
amounts of power to work. Without the electrical grid, or diesel generators, batteries can be
used for a time, but they will not last long with the power demands. And when the batteries
die, the systems that control and monitor the plant can also go dark, making it difficult to
ascertain water levels and the condition of the core. One variable not considered in the NRC
risk assessments of severe blackouts was cooling water in spent fuel pools, where rods once
used in the reactor are placed. With limited resources, the commission decided to focus its
analysis on the reactor fuel, which has the potential to release more radiation
Lochbaum, a former plant engineer and nuclear safety director at the advocacy group Union of Concerned Scientists, put it another way: "
." Lochbaum plans to use the Japan disaster to press lawmakers and the nuclear power industry to do more when it comes to coping with prolonged blackouts, such as having temporary
generators on site that can recharge batteries.
. An analysis of individual plant risks
released in 2003 by the NRC shows that for 39 of the 104 nuclear reactors, the risk of core damage from a blackout was greater than 1 in 100,000. At 45 other plants the risk is greater than 1 in 1 million, the threshold NRC is using to determine which
severe accidents should be evaluated in its latest analysis. The Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1, in Pennsylvania had the greatest risk of core melt – 6.5 in 100,000, according to the analysis. But that risk may have been reduced in subsequent years as
NRC regulations required plants to do more to cope with blackouts. Todd Schneider, a spokesman for FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co., which runs Beaver Creek, told the AP that batteries on site would last less than a week. In 1988, eight years after
labeling blackouts "an unresolved safety issue," the NRC required nuclear power plants to improve the reliability of their diesel generators, have more backup generators on site, and better train personnel to restore power. These steps would allow them
to keep the core cool for four to eight hours if they lost all electrical power. By contrast, the newest generation of nuclear power plant, which is still awaiting approval, can last 72 hours without taking any action, and a minimum of seven days if water is
supplied by other means to cooling pools. Despite the added safety measures, a 1997 report found that blackouts – the loss of on-site and off-site electrical power – remained "a dominant contributor to the risk of core melt at some plants." The events of
Sept. 11, 2001, further solidified that nuclear reactors might have to keep the core cool for a longer period without power. After 9/11, the commission issued regulations requiring that plants have portable power supplies for relief valves and be able to
manually operate an emergency reactor cooling system when batteries go out. The NRC says these steps, and others, have reduced the risk of core melt from station blackouts from the current fleet of nuclear plants. For instance, preliminary results of the
latest analysis of the risks to the Peach Bottom plant show that any release caused by a blackout there would be far less rapid and would release less radiation than previously thought, even without any actions being taken. With more time, people can be
evacuated. The NRC says improved computer models, coupled with up-to-date information about the plant, resulted in the rosier outlook. "When you simplify, you always err towards the worst possible circumstance," Scott Burnell, a spokesman for the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, said of the earlier studies. The latest work shows that "even in situations where everything is broken and you can't do anything else, these events take a long time to play out," he said. "Even when you get to releasing into
environment, much less of it is released than actually thought." Exelon Corp., the operator of the Peach Bottom plant, referred all detailed questions about its preparedness and the risk analysis back to the NRC. In a news release issued earlier this month,
all Exelon nuclear plants are able to safely shut down and keep the
fuel cooled even without electricity from the grid
a core melt at Peach Bottom could begin in one hour if electrical power on- and
off-site were lost, the diesel generators – the main back-up source of power for the pumps
that keep the core cool with water – failed to work and other mitigating steps weren't taken.
"It is not a question that those things are definitely effective in this kind of scenario,"
the company, which operates 10 nuclear power plants, said "
." Other people, looking at the crisis unfolding in Japan, aren't so sure. In the worst-case scenario, the NRC's 1990 risk
assessment predicted that
said Richard
Denning, a professor of nuclear engineering at Ohio State University, referring to the steps NRC has taken to prevent incidents. Denning had done work as a contractor on severe accident analyses for the NRC since 1975. He retired from Battelle Memorial
Institute in 1995. "They certainly could have made all the difference in this particular case," he said, referring to Japan. "That's assuming you have stored these things in a place that would not have been swept away by tsunami."
Nuclear meltdowns cause extinction
Lendman 3/13/11 – BA from Harvard University and MBA from Wharton School at the
University of Pennsylvania (Stephen, “Nuclear Meltdown in Japan” Rense,
http://rense.com/general93/nucmelt.htm)
For years, Helen Caldicott warned it's coming. In her 1978 book, "Nuclear Madness," she said: "As a physician, I contend that
nuclear technology threatens
life on our planet with extinction . If present trends continue, theair we breathe, the food
we eat, and the water we drink will soon becontaminated with enough radioactive
pollutants to pose a potential health hazard far greater than any plague humanity has ever
experienced." More below on the inevitable dangers from commercial nuclear power proliferation, besides added military ones. On March 11, New York Times writer Martin Fackler
headlined, "Powerful Quake and Tsunami Devastate Northern Japan," saying: " The 8.9-magnitude earthquake (Japan's strongest ever) set off a devastating tsunami
that sent walls of water (six meters high) washing over coastal cities in the north." According to Japan's Meteorological Survey, it was 9.0. The Sendai port city and other areas experienced heavy damage.
"Thousands of homes were destroyed, many roads were impassable, trains and buses (stopped) running, and power and cellphones remained down. On Saturday morning, the JR rail company" reported
Striking at 2:46PM Tokyo time, it caused vast destruction, shook city
skyscrapers, buckled highways, ignited fires, terrified millions, annihilated areas near Sendai, possibly killed thousands,
and caused a nuclear meltdown, its potential catastrophic effects far exceeding quake and
tsunami devastation, almost minor by comparison under a worst case scenario. On March 12, Times writer
three trains missing. Many passengers are unaccounted for.
Matthew Wald headlined, "Explosion Seen at Damaged Japan Nuclear Plant," saying: "Japanese officials (ordered evacuations) for people living near two nuclear power plants whose cooling systems
broke down," releasing radioactive material, perhaps in far greater amounts than reported. NHK television and Jiji said the 40-year old Fukushima plant's outer structure housing the reactor "appeared to
have blown off, which could suggest the containment building had already been breached." Japan's nuclear regulating agency said radioactive levels inside were 1,000 times above normal. Reuters said
,
under a worst case core meltdown, all bets are off as the entire region and beyond will be
threatened with permanent contamination, making the most affected areas unsafe to live in.
the 1995 Kobe quake caused $100 billion in damage, up to then the most costly ever natural disaster. This time, from quake and tsunami damage alone, that figure will be dwarfed. Moreover
On March 12, Stratfor Global Intelligence issued a "Red Alert: Nuclear Meltdown at Quake-Damaged Japanese Plant," saying: Fukushima Daiichi "nuclear power plant in Okuma, Japan, appears to have
caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor downplayed its seriousness, adding that such an event "does not necessarily mean a nuclear disaster," that already may have happened - the ultimate nightmare
short of nuclear winter. According to Stratfor, "(A)s long as the reactor core, which is specifically designed to contain high levels of heat, pressure and radiation, remains intact, the melted fuel can be dealt
Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that
disaster killed nearly one million people worldwide from nuclear radiation exposure. In their book titled,
"Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment," Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko said: "For the past 23 years, it
has been clear that there is a danger greater than nuclear weapons concealed within
with. If the (core's) breached but the containment facility built around (it) remains intact, the melted fuel can be....entombed within specialized concrete" as at
nuclear power. Emissions from this one reactor exceeded a hundred-fold the radioactive
contamination of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." "No citizen of any
country can be assured that he or she can be protected from radioactive contamination. One
nuclear reactor can pollute half the globe. Chernobyl fallout covers the entire Northern
Hemisphere." Stratfor explained that if Fukushima's floor cracked, "it is highly likely that the melting fuel will burn through (its) containment system and enter the ground. This has never
happened before," at least not reported. If now occurring, "containment goes from being merely dangerous, time consuming and expensive to nearly impossible," making the quake, aftershocks, and
tsunamis seem mild by comparison. Potentially, millions of lives will be jeopardized. Japanese officials said Fukushima's reactor container wasn't breached. Stratfor and others said it was, making the
potential calamity far worse than reported. Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said the explosion at Fukushima's Saiichi No. 1 facility could only have been caused by a core meltdown. In
The possibility of an extreme catastrophe
can't be discounted. Moreover, independent nuclear safety analyst John Large told Al Jazeera that by venting radioactive steam from the inner reactor to the outer dome, a
fact, 3 or more reactors are affected or at risk. Events are fluid and developing, but remain very serious.
reaction may have occurred, causing the explosion. "When I look at the size of the explosion," he said, "it is my opinion that there could be a very large leak (because) fuel continues to generate heat."
Already, Fukushima way exceeds Three Mile Island that experienced a partial core meltdown in Unit 2. Finally it was brought under control, but coverup and denial concealed full details until much later.
If the cooling system fails
(apparently it has at two or more plants), the super-heated radioactive fuel rods will melt,
and (if so) you could conceivably have an explosion ," that, in fact, occurred. As a result,
According to anti-nuclear activist Harvey Wasserman, Japan's quake fallout may cause nuclear disaster, saying: "This is a very serious situation.
massive radiation releases may follow, impacting the entire region. "It could be,
literally, an apocalyptic event . The reactor could blow." If so, Russia, China, Korea and most parts of Western Asia will be affected. Many thousands will die,
potentially millions under a worse case scenario, including far outside East Asia. Moreover, at least five reactors are at risk. Already, a 20-mile wide radius was evacuated. What happened in Japan can
occur anywhere. Yet Obama's proposed budget includes $36 billion for new reactors, a shocking disregard for global safety. Calling Fukushima an "apocalyptic event," Wasserman said "(t)hese nuclear
plants have to be shut," let alone budget billions for new ones. It's unthinkable, he said. If a similar disaster struck California, nuclear fallout would affect all America, Canada, Mexico, Central America, and
parts of South America. Nuclear Power: A Technology from Hell Nuclear expert Helen Caldicott agrees, telling this writer by phone that a potential regional catastrophe is unfolding. Over 30 years ago, she
warned of its inevitability. Her 2006 book titled, "Nuclear Power is Not the Answer" explained that contrary to government and industry propaganda, even during normal operations, nuclear power
generation causes significant discharges of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as hundreds of thousands of curies of deadly radioactive gases and other radioactive elements into the environment every
nuclear plants are atom bomb factories. A 1000 megawatt reactor produces 500
pounds of plutonium annually. Only 10 are needed for a bomb able to devastate a large city,
besides causing permanent radiation contamination.
year. Moreover,
Second is retaliation
Cyber terror leads to nuclear exchanges – traditional defense doesn’t apply
Fritz 9 (Jason, Master in International Relations from Bond, BS from St. Cloud), “Hacking
Nuclear Command and Control,” International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and
Disarmament, 2009, pnnd.org)//duncan
This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this
research will use open source knowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures
might be compromised through computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists’
capabilities, strategies, and tactics. If
access to command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could
fake or actually cause one nuclear-armed state to attack another , thus provoking a
nuclear response from another nuclear power. This may be an easier alternative for
terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves. This
would also act as a force equaliser, and provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high
speed, removal of geographical distance, and a relatively low cost. Continuing difficulties in
developing computer tracking technologies which could trace the identity of intruders, and
difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses to computer
network operations, point towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to manage
nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing the hair trigger posture of existing
nuclear arsenals.¶ All computers which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration
and remote control. Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker methods,
such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and
maintenance entry points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead to
the installation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between
the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal how to access these closed networks directly.
Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on computer networks, including experimental
technology such as autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options, such as
nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command
centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier task. There is evidence to suggest
multiple attempts have been made by hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the US Navy to send
nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known as Perimetr was designed to
automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a
retaliatory response in the event that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for the
possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer network operations in an attempt to engage the system. ¶
Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further enhanced through additional computer
network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered attacks could be engineered. Terrorists could remotely
commandeer computers in China and use them to launch a US nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under
attack from the US and the US would believe China was responsible. Further, emergency
response communications
could be disrupted, transportation could be shut down, and disinformation, such as misdirection,
could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and maximizing destruction.
Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformation could also be used to
provoke uninformed responses.
For example, a nuclear strike between India and Pakistan could be coordinated
with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against key networks, so they would have further difficulty in identifying what happened
and be forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock out communications between these states so they cannot discuss the
situation. Alternatively, amidst
the confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of
responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty military
response. These false claims could be posted directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be
sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials. A sophisticated and
all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber terrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own,
without the need for compromising command and control centres directly.
Hegemony
Backdoors destroy US tech innovation and competitiveness
Kohn 14
(Cindy, writer for the Electronic Freedom Foundation, 9-26-14, “Nine Epic Failures of Regulating
Cryptography,” https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/09/nine-epic-failures-regulatingcryptography, BC)
For those who weren't following digital civil liberties issues in 1995, or for those who have forgotten, here's a refresher list of why
forcing companies to break their own privacy and security measures by installing a back door was
a bad idea 15 years ago:∂ It will create security risks. Don't take our word for it. Computer security expert
Steven Bellovin has explained some of the problems. First, it's hard to secure communications properly even between two parties.
Cryptography with a back door adds a third party, requiring a more complex protocol, and as Bellovin puts it: "Many
previous attempts to add such features have resulted in new, easily exploited security flaws rather than better law enforcement access." It doesn't end
there. Bellovin notes:∂ Complexity in the protocols isn't the only problem; protocols require computer programs to implement them, and more
complex code generally creates more exploitable bugs. In the most notorious incident of this type, a cell phone switch in Greece was hacked by an
unknown party. The so-called 'lawful intercept' mechanisms in the switch — that is, the features designed to permit the police to wiretap calls easily —
was abused by the attacker to monitor at least a hundred cell phones, up to and including the prime minister's. This attack would not have been
possible if the vendor hadn't written the lawful intercept code. ∂ More recently, as security researcher Susan Landau explains, "an IBM researcher found
that a Cisco wiretapping architecture designed to accommodate law-enforcement requirements — a system already in use by major carriers — had
numerous security holes in its design. This would have made it easy to break into the communications network and surreptitiously wiretap private
communications."∂ The same is true for Google, which had its "compliance" technologies hacked by China. ∂ This isn't just a problem for you and me
and millions of companies that need secure communications. What will the government itself use for secure communications? The FBI and other
government agencies currently use many commercial products — the same ones they want to force to have a back door. How will the FBI stop people
from un-backdooring their deployments? Or does the government plan to stop using commercial communications technologies altogether? ∂ It won't
stop the bad guys. Users who want strong encryption will be able to get it — from Germany, Finland, Israel, and many other places in the world where
it's offered for sale and for free. In 1996, the National Research Council did a study called "Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society,"
nicknamed CRISIS. Here's what they said:∂ Products using unescrowed encryption are in use today by millions of users, and such products are available
from many difficult-to-censor Internet sites abroad. Users could pre-encrypt their data, using whatever means were available, before their data were
accepted by an escrowed encryption device or system. Users could store their data on remote computers, accessible through the click of a mouse but
otherwise unknown to anyone but the data owner, such practices could occur quite legally even with a ban on the use of unescrowed encryption.
Knowledge of strong encryption techniques is available from official U.S. government publications and other sources worldwide, and experts
understanding how to use such knowledge might well be in high demand from criminal elements. — CRISIS Report at 303∂ None of that has changed.
And of course, more encryption technology is more readily available today than it was in 1996. So unless the goverment wants to mandate that you are
forbidden to run anything that is not U.S. government approved on your devices, they won't stop bad guys from getting access to strong encryption.∂
It will harm innovation . In order to ensure that no "untappable" technology exists, we'll likely
see a technology mandate and a draconian regulatory framework . The implications of this
for America's leadership in innovation are dire. Could Mark Zuckerberg have built
Facebook in his dorm room if he'd had to build in surveillance capabilities before launch in order to
avoid government fines? Would Skype have ever happened if it had been forced to include an artificial
bottleneck to allow government easy access to all of your peer-to-peer communications? This has especially
serious implications for the open source community and small innovators. Some open source
developers have already taken a stand against building back doors into software.∂ It will harm
US business . If, thanks to this proposal, US businesses cannot innovate and cannot offer truly
secure products, we're just handing business over to foreign companies who don't
have such limitations . Nokia, Siemens, and Ericsson would all be happy to take a heaping
share of the communications technology business from US companies. And it's not just telecom carriers and
VOIP providers at risk. Many game consoles that people can use to play over the Internet, such as the Xbox,
allow gamers to chat with each other while they play. They'd have to be tappable, too.
Data proves
Bloomberg, 13
(Allan Holmes, staff writer, 9-10-13, “NSA Spying Seen Risking Billions in U.S. Technology Sales,”
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-10/nsa-spying-seen-risking-billions-in-u-stechnology-sales, BC)
Reports that the
National Security Agency persuaded some U.S. technology companies to build so-called
backdoors
into security products, networks and devices to allow easier surveillance are similar to how the House Intelligence
Committee described the threat posed by China through Huawei.∂ Just as the Shenzhen, China-based Huawei lost business after the
report urged U.S. companies not to use its equipment, the
NSA disclosures may reduce U.S. technology sales
overseas by as much as $180 billion, or 25 percent of information technology services, by 2016,
according to Forrester Research Inc., a research group in Cambridge, Massachusetts.∂ “ The National
Security Agency will kill the U.S. technology industry singlehandedly ,” Rob Enderle, a
technology analyst in San Jose, California, said in an interview. “These companies may be just dealing with the difficulty in
meeting our numbers through the end of the decade.”∂ Internet companies, network equipment manufacturers and encryption tool
makers receive significant shares of their revenue from overseas companies and governments.∂ Cisco Systems Inc., the world’s
biggest networking equipment maker, received 42 percent of its $46.1 billion in fiscal 2012 revenue from outside the U.S., according
to data compiled by Bloomberg. Symantec Corp., the biggest maker of computer-security software based in Mountain View,
California, reported 46 percent of its fiscal 2013 revenue of $6.9 billion from markets other than the U.S., Canada and Latin
America.∂ Intel Corp., the world’s largest semiconductor maker, reported 84 percent of its $53.3 billion in fiscal 2012 revenue came
from outside the U.S., according to data compiled by Bloomberg.∂ ‘Exact Flipping’∂ The New York Times, the U.K.’s Guardian and
ProPublica reported in early September that NSA has cracked codes protecting e-mail and Web content and convinced some
equipment and device makers to build backdoors into products.∂ That followed earlier reports that the NSA was obtaining and
analyzing communications records from phone companies and Internet providers.∂ The revelations have some overseas
governments questioning their reliance on U.S. technology.∂ Germany’s government has called for home-grown Internet and e-mail
companies. Brazil is analyzing whether privacy laws were violated by foreign companies. India may ban e-mail services from Google
Inc. and Yahoo Inc., the Wall Street Journal reported. In June, China Daily labeled U.S. companies, including Cisco, a “terrible security
threat.”∂ “One year ago we had the same concern about Huawei,” James Staten, an analyst at Forrester, said in an interview. “Now
this is the exact flipping of that circumstance.”∂ Tarnished Reputations∂ An Information Technology and Innovation Foundation
report in August found U.S.
providers of cloud services -- which manage the networks, storage, applications and
computing power for companies --
stand to lose as much as $35 billion a year as foreign
companies, spooked by the NSA’s surveillance, seek non-U.S. offerings.∂
products and services based on a company’s reputation, and
“Customers buy
the NSA has single-handedly tarnished the
reputation of the entire U.S. tech industry ,” said Daniel Castro, the report’s author and an analyst with the
non-partisan research group in Washington, in an e-mail. “I suspect many foreign customers are going to be shopping elsewhere for
their hardware and software.”
Tech leadership in the private sector is uniquely key to heg
Segal 4
(Adam, director of the Program on Digital and Cyberspace Policy at the Council on Foreign
Relations (CFR), An expert on security issues, technology development, November/December
2004 Issue, “Is America Losing Its Edge,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/unitedstates/2004-11-01/america-losing-its-edge, BC)
The
U nited S tates' global primacy depends in large part on its ability to develop new technologies and
industries faster than anyone else . For the last five decades, U.S. scientific innovation and
technological entrepreneurship have ensured the country's economic prosperity
and military power . It was Americans who invented and commercialized the semiconductor,
the personal computer, and the Internet; other countries merely followed the U.S. lead.∂ Today, however, this
technological edge-so long taken for granted-may be slipping, and the most serious challenge is coming from
Asia. Through competitive tax policies, increased investment in research and development (R&D), and preferential policies for
science and technology (S&T) personnel, Asian governments are improving the quality of their science and ensuring the exploitation
of future innovations. The
percentage of patents issued to and science journal articles published by
scientists in China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan is rising. Indian companies are quickly becoming the
second-largest producers of application services in the world, developing, supplying, and managing database and other types of
software for clients around the world. South
Korea has rapidly eaten away at the U.S. advantage in the
manufacture of computer chips and telecommunications software. And even China has made
impressive gains in advanced technologies such as lasers, biotechnology, and advanced materials
used in semiconductors, aerospace, and many other types of manufacturing.∂ Although the United States'
technical dominance remains solid, the globalization of research and development is exerting considerable pressures on the
American system. Indeed, as the United States is learning, globalization cuts both ways: it is both a potent catalyst of U.S.
technological innovation and a significant threat to it. The
new technologies; it
United States will never be able to prevent rivals from developing
can remain dominant only by continuing to innovate faster than
everyone else.
keep its privileged position in the world, the U nited S tates must
get better at fostering technological entrepreneurship at home.
But this won't be easy; to
This is correlation is supported by a consensus of international relations theory
Taylor 4 (Massachusetts Institute of Technology research assistant Department of Political Science)
(Mark Zachary, Ph.D. candidate, lecturer, “The Politics of Technological Change: International Relations
versus Domestic Institutions” http://web.mit.edu/polisci/research/wip/Taylor.pdf)
Technological innovation is of central importance to the study of international relations (IR), affecting almost every aspect
of the sub-field.2 First and foremost, a nation’s technological capability has a significant effect on its economic
growth, industrial might, and military prowess; therefore relative national technological capabilities necessarily
influence the balance of power between states, and hence have a role in calculations of war and
alliance formation. Second, technology and innovative capacity also determine a nation’s trade profile,
affecting which products it will import and export, as well as where multinational corporations will base
their production facilities.3 Third, insofar as innovation-driven economic growth both attracts investment and produces surplus capital, a nation’s
technological ability will also affect international financial flows and who has power over them.4
Thus, in broad theoretical terms, technological change is important to the study of IR because of its overall implications for both the relative and absolute
power of states. And if theory alone does not convince, then history
also tells us that nations on the technological ascent
generally experience a corresponding and dramatic change in their global stature and influence,
such as Britain during the first industrial revolution, the United States and Germany during the second industrial revolution, and Japan during the
twentieth century.5 Conversely, great
powers which fail to maintain their place at the technological frontier
and fade from influence on international scene.6 This is not to suggest that technological innovation alone
determines international politics, but rather that shifts in both relative and absolute technological capability have a
major impact on international relations, and therefore need to be better understood by IR scholars indirect source of military
doctrine. And for some, like Gilpin quoted above, technology is the very cornerstone of great power
domination, and its transfer the main vehicle by which war and change occur in world politics.8
Jervis tells us that the balance of offensive and defensive military technology affects the incentives for
war.9 Walt agrees, arguing that technological change can alter a state’s aggregate power, and
thereby affect both alliance formation and the international balance of threats.10 Liberals are less directly
concerned with technological change, but they must admit that by raising or lowering the costs of using force,
technological progress affects the rational attractiveness of international cooperation and
regimes.11 Technology also lowers information & transactions costs and thus increases the applicability of international institutions, a cornerstone of
generally drift
Liberal IR theory.12 And in fostering flows of trade, finance, and information, technological change can lead to Keohane’s interdependence13 or Thomas
Friedman et al’s globalization.14 Meanwhile, over at the “third debate”, Constructivists cover the causal spectrum on the issue, from Katzenstein’s
“cultural norms” which shape security concerns and thereby affect technological innovation;15 to Wendt’s “stripped down technological determinism” in
which technology inevitably drives nations to form a world state.16 However most Constructivists seem to favor Wendt, arguing that new technology
changes people’s identities within society, and sometimes even creates new cross-national constituencies, thereby affecting international politics.17 Of
course, Marxists tend to see technology as determining all social relations and the entire course of history, though they describe mankind’s major fault
lines as running between economic classes rather than nation-states.18 Finally, Buzan & Little remind us that without advances in the technologies of
transportation, communication, production, and war, international systems would not exist in the first place.19
We control uniqueness, competition among states for relative status is
inevitable—promoting US primacy is the only option
Wohlforth 09 – Professor of government @ Dartmouth College. [William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and
Great Power War,” World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009]
Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of
the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative
capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels
of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. 6 Building
on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among
major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and
clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is.
Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great
power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system
they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social
status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation
to others.7 “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”8 While one actor might increase its
status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend
to be zero sum.9 I begin by describing the puzzles facing predominant theories that status competition might solve. Building
on recent research on social identity and status seeking, I then show that under certain conditions the
ways decision makers identify with the states they represent may prompt them to frame issues
as positional disputes over status in a social hierarchy. I develop hypotheses that tailor this scholarship to the domain of
great power politics, showing how the probability of status competition is likely to be linked to polarity . The rest
of the article investigates whether there is sufficient evidence for these hypotheses to warrant further refinement and testing. I pursue this in three
ways: by showing that the
theory advanced here is consistent with what we know about large-scale patterns
of great power conflict through history; by [End Page 30] demonstrating that the causal mechanisms it identifies did drive
relatively secure major powers to military conflict in the past (and therefore that they might do so again if the world were bipolar or multipolar); and by
showing that observable evidence concerning the major powers’ identity politics and grand strategies under unipolarity are consistent with the theory’s
expectations. Puzzles of Power and War Recent research on the connection between the distribution of capabilities and war has concentrated on a
major war arises out of a power shift
in favor of a rising state dissatisfied with a status quo defended by a declining satisfied state.10
hypothesis long central to systemic theories of power transition or hegemonic stability: that
Though they have garnered substantial empirical support, these theories have yet to solve two intertwined empirical and theoretical puzzles—each of
which might be explained by positional concerns for status. First, if the material costs and benefits of a given status quo are what matters, why would a
state be dissatisfied with the very status quo that had abetted its rise? The rise of China today naturally prompts this question, but it is hardly a novel
situation. Most of the best known and most consequential power transitions in history featured rising challengers that were prospering mightily under
the status quo. In case after case, historians argue that these revisionist powers sought recognition and standing rather than specific alterations to the
existing rules and practices that constituted the order of the day. In each paradigmatic case of hegemonic war, the claims of the rising power are hard
to reduce to instrumental adjustment of the status quo. In R. Ned Lebow’s reading, for example, Thucydides’ account tells us that the rise of Athens
posed unacceptable threats not to the security or welfare of Sparta but rather to its identity as leader of the Greek world, which was an important
cause of the Spartan assembly’s vote for war. 11 The issues that inspired Louis XIV’s and Napoleon’s dissatisfaction with the status quo were many and
varied, but most accounts accord [End Page 31] independent importance to the drive for a position of unparalleled primacy. In these and other
hegemonic struggles among leading states in post-Westphalian Europe, the rising challenger’s dissatisfaction is often difficult to connect to the material
costs and benefits of the status quo, and much contemporary evidence revolves around issues of recognition and status. 12 Wilhemine Germany is a
fateful case in point. As Paul Kennedy has argued, underlying material trends as of 1914 were set to propel Germany’s continued rise indefinitely, so
long as Europe remained at peace.13 Yet Germany chafed under the very status quo that abetted this rise and its elite focused resentment on its chief
trading partner—the great power that presented the least plausible threat to its security: Great Britain. At fantastic cost, it built a battleship fleet with
no plausible strategic purpose other than to stake a claim on global power status. 14 Recent historical studies present strong evidence that, far from
fearing attacks from Russia and France, German leaders sought to provoke them, knowing that this would lead to a long, expensive, and sanguinary war
that Britain was certain to join.15 And of all the motivations swirling round these momentous decisions, no serious historical account fails to register
German leaders’ oft-expressed yearning for “a place in the sun.” The second puzzle is bargaining failure. Hegemonic theories tend to model war as a
conflict over the status quo without specifying precisely what the status quo is and what flows of benefits it provides to states.16 Scholars generally
follow Robert Gilpin in positing that the underlying issue concerns a “desire to redraft the rules by which relations among nations work,” “the nature
and governance of the system,” and “the distribution of territory among the states in the system.” 17 If these are the [End Page 32] issues at stake, then
systemic theories of hegemonic war and power transition confront the puzzle brought to the fore in a seminal article by James Fearon: what prevents
states from striking a bargain that avoids the costs of war? 18 Why can’t states renegotiate the international order as underlying capabilities
distributions shift their relative bargaining power? Fearon proposed that one answer consistent with strict rational choice assumptions is that such
bargains are infeasible when the issue at stake is indivisible and cannot readily be portioned out to each side. Most
aspects of a given
international order are readily divisible, however, and, as Fearon stressed, “both the intrinsic complexity and richness of most
matters over which states negotiate and the availability of linkages and side-payments suggest that intermediate bargains typically will exist.”19 Thus,
most scholars have assumed that the indivisibility problem is trivial, focusing on two other rational choice explanations for bargaining failure:
uncertainty and the commitment problem. 20 In the view of many scholars, it is these problems, rather than indivisibility, that likely explain leaders’
inability to avail themselves of such intermediate bargains. Yet recent
research inspired by constructivism shows how
issues that are physically divisible can become socially indivisible, depending on how they relate
to the identities of decision makers.21 Once issues surrounding the status quo are framed in positional
terms as bearing on the disputants’ relative standing, then, to the extent that they value their standing itself, they
may be unwilling to pursue intermediate bargaining solutions. Once linked to status, easily
divisible issues that theoretically provide opportunities for linkages and side payments of various sorts may themselves be seen as
indivisible and thus unavailable as avenues for possible intermediate bargains. The historical record
surrounding major wars is rich with evidence suggesting that positional concerns over status
frustrate bargaining: expensive, protracted conflict over what appear to be minor issues; a propensity on the part of
decision makers to frame issues in terms of relative rank even when doing so makes bargaining
harder; decision-makers’ [End Page 33] inability to accept feasible divisions of the matter in dispute even when
failing to do so imposes high costs; demands on the part of states for observable evidence to confirm their estimate of an improved
position in the hierarchy; the inability of private bargains to resolve issues; a frequently observed compulsion for the public attainment
of concessions from a higher ranked state; and stubborn resistance on the part of states to which such demands are addressed even
when acquiescence entails limited material cost. The literature on bargaining failure in the context of power shifts remains
inconclusive, and it is premature to take any empirical pattern as necessarily probative. Indeed, Robert Powell has recently proposed that indivisibility is
not a rationalistic explanation for war after all: fully rational leaders with perfect information should prefer to settle a dispute over an indivisible issue
by resorting to a lottery rather than a war certain to destroy some of the goods in dispute. What might prevent such bargaining solutions is not
indivisibility itself, he argues, but rather the parties’ inability to commit to abide by any agreement in the future if they expect their relative capabilities
to continue to shift.22 This is the credible commitment problem to which many theorists are now turning their attention. But how it relates to the
information problem that until recently dominated the formal literature remains to be seen. 23 The larger point is that positional concerns for status
may help account for the puzzle of bargaining failure. In the rational choice bargaining literature, war is puzzling because it destroys some of the
benefits or flows of benefits in dispute between the bargainers, who would be better off dividing the spoils without war. Yet what happens to these
models if what matters for states is less the flows of material benefits themselves than their implications for relative status? The salience of this
Mainstream
theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has
implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34]
question depends on the relative importance of positional concern for status among states. Do Great Powers Care about Status?
with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a
state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions
for war or peace. But
the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging
from neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and
psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status
comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather
than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.25 People often seek tangibles not so much because of
the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status
will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security
and/or prosperity. Pg. 33-35//1ac
Heg is key to global stability and solves major conflicts
Thayer 6
(Associate Professor of Defense and Strategic Study @ Missouri State University, Former
Research Fellow @ International Security Program @ Harvard Belfer Center of Science and
International Affairs (Bradley, “In Defense of Primacy,” The National Interest,
November/December)
A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power-the diplomatic, economic and
military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, either because the United States lacks the power to
maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into
the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called
for retrenchment.1 Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military
commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a
modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower
and seapower to defend its interests. But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it
would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security
and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can
America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft
power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and
wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the
foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So the debate revolves around the desirability
of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action but they fall to realize what is good
about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND
strategy of ensuring American
primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American
oil flow around the world, that the global trade and
global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like
monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the
United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East
Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed,
retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats
will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it
cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must
be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To
make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators
prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there
is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is
what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies
overseas, away from .American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while
they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence
that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present,
commands the "global common"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space-allowing the United States to project its power far from its
borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies
are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased.' This is not an advantage that
should be relinquished lightly. A remarkable fact about international politics today--in
a world where American primacy is
clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course,
this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United
States for their own purposes, their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their
security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements-and they include almost all of the major economic and
military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states
U.S.
primacy--and the bandwagoning effect-has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the
aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies.
United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability
to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the where it can be stymied by opponents.
American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any
military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A.
Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand
countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezeula. Of course, countries like India,
for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only
the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these
states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power.
China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as
targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would
work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see,
from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela,
Iran, Cuba-it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of
regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of
an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic
the current international
order - free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is
directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the
effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider
current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons:
Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse.
Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the
United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Rai Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)."
Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American
primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more
peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical
antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American
primacy helps keep a number of
complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea
and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all
war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax
Americana does reduce
war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United
States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the
countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are
more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy.
In addition, once
states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly
reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more
transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general,
democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of
Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not
even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the
short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better
off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October
2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military
power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia
and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic
progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy
has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global
economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and
commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity
that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The
United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces
American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes
the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps
the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher
at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth,
market
economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed
Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free
alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides.
Plan
The United States federal government should prohibit federal agencies from
mandating the deployment of vulnerabilities in domestic data security technologies.
Solvency
The plan bans backdoors entirely—that strengthens cyber security and
revitalizes tech competitiveness
McQuinn, 14
(Alan McQuinn is a research assistant with the Information Technology and Innovation
Foundation (ITIF), “The Secure Data Act could help law enforcement protect against
cybercrime,” 12-19-14, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/227594-the-securedata-act-could-help-law-enforcement-protect-against, BC)
Last Sunday, Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) wrote an op-ed describing the role that U.S. law
enforcement should play in fostering stronger data encryption to make information technology
(IT) systems more secure. This op-ed explains Wyden’s introduction of the the Secure Data Act,
which would prohibit the government from mandating that U.S. companies build “backdoors” in
their products for the purpose of surveillance . This legislation responds directly to recent
comments by U.S. officials, most notably the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director
James Comey, chastising Apple and Google for creating encrypted devices to which law
enforcement cannot gain access. Comey and others have argued that U.S. tech companies
should design a way for law enforcement officials to access consumer data stored on those
devices. In this environment, the Secure Data Act is a homerun for security and privacy and is a
good step towards reasserting U.S. competitiveness in building secure systems for a global
market. ∂ By adopting its position on the issue the FBI is working against its own goal of
preventing cybercrime as well as broader government efforts to improve cybersecurity. Just a
few years ago, the Bureau was counseling people to better encrypt their data to safeguard it
from hackers. Creating backdoor access for law enforcement fundamentally weakens IT systems
because it creates a new pathway for malicious hackers, foreign governments, and other
unauthorized parties to gain illicit access. Requiring backdoors is a step backwards for companies
actively working to eliminate security vulnerabilities in their products. In this way, security is a
lot like a ship at sea, the more holes you put in the system—government mandated or not—the
faster it will sink. The better solution is to patch up all the holes in the system and work to prevent
any new ones. Rather than decreasing security to suit its appetite for surveillance, the FBI should
recognize that better security is needed to bolster U.S. defenses against online threats. ∂ The
Secure Data Act is an important step in that direction because it will stop U.S. law
enforcement agencies from requiring companies to introduce vulnerabilities in their products. If
this bill is enacted, law enforcement will be forced to use other means to solve crimes, such as by
using metadata from cellular providers, call records, text messages, and even old-fashioned
detective work. This will also allow U.S. tech companies, with the help of law enforcement, to
continue to strengthen their systems, better detect intrusions, and identify emerging threats. Law
enforcement, such as the recently announced U.S. Department of Justice Cybersecurity Unit—a
unit designed solely to “deter, investigate, and prosecute cyber criminals,” should work in
cooperation with the private sector to create a safer environment online. A change of course is
also necessary to restore the ability of U.S. tech companies to compete globally , where
mistrust has run rampant following the revelations of mass government surveillance. ∂ With the
113th Congress at an end, Wyden has promised to reintroduce the Data Secure Act again in the
next Congress. Congress should move expediently to advance Senator Wyden’s bill to promote
security and privacy in U.S. devices and software. Furthermore, as Congress marks up the
legislation and considers amendments, it should restrict not just government access to devices,
but also government control of those devices. These efforts will move the efforts of our law
enforcement agencies away from creating cyber vulnerabilities and allow electronics
manufacturers to produce the most secure devices imaginable.
Closing backdoors strengthens digital security—that doesn’t trade off with law
enforcement priorities
Bankston 15
(Kevin Bankston is the Director of New America’s Open Technology Institute and Co-Director of
New America’s Cybersecurity Initiative, 7-7-15, “It’s Time to End the “Debate” on Encryption
Backdoors,” http://justsecurity.org/24483/end-debate-encryption-backdoors/, BC)
Tech companies, privacy advocates, security experts, policy experts, all five members of
President Obama’s handpicked Review Group on Intelligence and Communications
Technologies, UN human rights experts, and a majority of the House of Representatives all agree:
Government-mandated backdoors are a bad idea . There are countless reasons why this is
true, including: They would unavoidably weaken the security of our digital data, devices, and
communications even as we are in the midst of a cybersecurity crisis; they would cost the US tech
industry billions as foreign customers — including many of the criminals Comey hopes to catch — turn to more secure
alternatives; and they would encourage oppressive regimes that abuse human rights to demand
backdoors of their own.∂ Most of these arguments are not new or surprising. Indeed, it was for many of the same
reasons that the US government ultimately rejected the idea of encryption backdoors in the 90s, during what
are now called the “Crypto Wars.”
We as a nation already had the debate
that Comey is demanding — we
had it 20
years ago! — and the arguments against backdoors have only become stronger and more
numerous with time. Most notably, the 21st century has turned out to be a “Golden Age for
Surveillance ” for the government. Even with the proliferation of encryption, law enforcement has
access to much more information than ever before: access to cellphone location information about
where we are and where we’ve been, metadata about who we communicate with and when, and
vast databases of emails and pictures and more in the cloud. So, the purported law
enforcement need is even less compelling than it was in the 90s . Meanwhile, the security
implications of trying to mandate backdoors throughout the vast ecosystem of digital communications services have only gotten
more dire in the intervening years, as laid out in an exhaustive new report issued just this morning by over a dozen heavy-hitting
security experts.∂ Yesterday, Comey conceded that after a meaningful debate, it may be that we as a people decide that the benefits
of widespread encryption outweigh the costs and that there’s no sensible, technically feasible way to guarantee government access
to encrypted data. But the fact is that we had that debate 20 years ago, and we’ve been having it again for nearly a year. We are not
talking past each other; a wide range of advocates, industry stakeholders, policymakers, and experts has been speaking directly to
Comey’s arguments since last fall. Hopefully he will soon start listening, rather than dooming us to repeat the mistakes of the past
and dragging us into another round of Crypto Wars.∂ We
have already had the debate that Comey says he
wants. All that’s left is for him to admit that he’s lost.