The Empiricists
PHI205 The Empiricists
Module Convener
Dr Niall Connolly
N.connolly@sheffield.ac.uk
Office hours: Mondays 3-4 & Tuesdays 3-4
Structure of the Course
Two one-hour lectures every week from week 1 to week 11, plus a one-hour seminar every
week from week 3 to week 11.
Lecture Times and Locations:
Mon 11-12 - Mappin LT11
Mon 1-2 - Hicks LT6
Seminar Times and Locations:
Fri 12-1 - Hicks Room F35
Fri 1-2 - RRB- A84 [Richard Roberts Building]
Assessment
Two coursework essays: A Mid-term assessment essay (25%) due 12 NOON Tue 17th March
2015 and an end of semester essay (25%) due 12 NOON Wed 20th May 2015. Plus two
questions in a two-hour, pre-released examination at the end of the module (50%)
Course Description
This course focuses on the work of three major figures in the history of philosophy whose
ideas have continuing relevance to contemporary debates: the so-called British Empiricists
Locke, Berkeley and Hume.
Empiricism, roughly, is the doctrine that everything we know is derived from experience.
Locke, Berkeley and Hume each endorse some form of this doctrine. But from a similar
starting point they end up in very different places.
The course will examine the ideas and arguments of Locke, Berkeley and Hume. It will pay
attention to the historical context but also it will investigate the continuing influence and
relevance of the empiricists’ theories and arguments, and look at recent answers to the
questions framed by Locke, Berkeley and Hume.
Debates about knowledge, perception, language, the mind and personal identity, causation
and natural laws all exhibit the influence of these seminal thinkers.
Topics Covered
The rough plan for the lectures is to start with a clarification of ‘empiricism’ particularly in
comparison with the ‘rationalism’ of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz. Locke’s attack on the
suggestion that there are innate ideas and principles seems to be intended as a challenge to
rationalist suppositions. We will investigate whether Locke’s arguments succeed against
their intended target and whether they are relevant to more recent forms of
innatism/nativism.
Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, on which the Locke lectures will focus,
seeks to ‘enquire into the Original, Certainty, and Extent of humane Knowledge; together,
with the Grounds and Degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent’ (Essay BkI, ch I). Locke saw
himself as laying the philosophical groundwork for the scientific advances of Newton and
Boyle. Reality as revealed by the new science is very different from the world as we
experience it. This discrepancy is explained by the distinction between Primary and
Secondary Qualities. We will examine Locke’s explanation and defense of this distinction
and Berkeley’s attack on it.
Berkeley was Locke’s most vociferous critic. When he didn’t deny Locke’s assumptions he
used them to draw conclusions that would be wholly unwelcome to Locke. Two central
planks (apparently) of Locke’s philosophy are the role of ideas – for Locke an idea is
‘whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks’ (Essay BkI, ch I) – and a
representational theory of perception according to which we the immediate objects of
perception are not external material bodies but ideas. We will investigate Locke’s view of
perception and criticisms of the representational theory.
The next topic from Locke is the topic of Personal Identity. Locke’s discussion of the Personal
Identity question - what is it for a person at a given time to be one and the same person as a
person at an earlier time – still sets the agenda for discussion of this question.
We will also cover Locke’s account of abstraction and Berkeley’s criticism. Our sense
experience, the source of all our knowledge and concepts for Locke, is made up of specific
ideas – the idea of this red patch I’m now seeing for instance. Locke seeks to explain how
we come to have abstract general ideas like ‘red’ or ‘triangle’. Berkeley argues there are no
such things.
Locke’s views on Language and meaning will be the next topic. Locke’s theory of meaning –
‘Words in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing, but the ideas in the
mind of him that uses them’ (Locke, Essay III.ii.2) will be examined in comparison with
contemporary theories of meaning.
Locke maintains that the ideas associated with the general words that we use to categorize
things are ideas of nominal essences – recognizable outward features – rather than ideas of
real essences: the internal structural properties responsible for things’ recognizable outward
features. Locke is critical of scholastic essentialism; but it will be investigated whether
contemporary essentialist views are touched by his critique.
George Berkeley is famous chiefly for his assertion that ‘to be is to be perceived’. He asserts
that ‘it is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains,
rivers, and in a word all sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from their
being perceived by the understanding.’ (PHK 4) All these items, in Berkeley’s view, exist only
in the minds of perceivers. If nobody was perceiving the Matterhorn it wouldn’t exist.
Some of Berkeley’s criticisms of Locke will have been covered already by the stage Berkeley
becomes the central focus of the lectures. Some of Berkeley’s key arguments for
Immaterialism (the denial that there are material substances) and Idealism (the thesis that
everything is a mind or mind-dependent) take Lockean assumptions as their starting point.
If, as Locke holds, what we (immediately) perceive when we perceive mountains and houses
and rivers, is ideas, then how can we know that there is anything above and beyond these
ideas that causes us to have the ideas? The coherence of our experience and the
discernable patterns suggest that ideas don’t pop up randomly, but Berkeley has another
explanation for the order we find in our experience (yes, it’s God).
Berkeley’s arguments for Immaterialism and Idealism in his major works the Principles of
Human Knowledge and the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, including the
(n)famous ‘Master Argument’, will be examined, as will the role God plays in Berkeley’s
world.
We will also look into how Berkeley tries to square his bizarre metaphysics with
commonsensical assumptions such as the assumption that when I stop looking at the
Matterhorn it continues to exist, and the assumption that you and I, when we look at the
Matterhorn, are looking at the same mountain.
Berkeley saw his Idealism as an alternative to the skepticism that seems hard to avoid if it is
taken that we don’t perceive external objects directly – that all we perceive directly are
ideas. David Hume embraced this skepticism.
The text under focus in the Hume component will be the Enquiry into Human Understanding
(1st Enquiry). This is more readable than Hume’s earlier Treatise of Human Nature, though
we will refer to this work for its discussion of personal identity.
Hume starts with a definition of a form of empiricism. The contents of the human mind –
what Locke called ‘ideas’ and Hume calls ‘perceptions’ – are divided into two types:
impressions and ideas. Impressions are distinguished from ideas by their comparative ‘force
and liveliness’ (Treatise I, I). Perceptions take the form of impressions when they ‘make
their first appearance’ (Treatise I, I). Ideas are ‘the faint images of [impressions] in thinking
and reasoning’ (Treatise I, I). Hume’s Copy Principle states that every simple idea is the copy
of some simple impression.
Hume will wield the copy principle in arguing that we have no idea of a necessary
connection between supposed causes and their supposed effects, nor even of our selves qua
individuals that endure over time. In each case there is no impression or impressions from
which the supposed idea could have arisen.
Hume’s seminal discussion of causation will be examined. There is a debate in the
interpretive literature over whether Hume denies that there are necessary connections
between causes and effects – that is maintains that the link between my kicking a ball and
its moving is coincidental – or whether he believes in necessary connections between causes
and effects but merely denies that we can have knowledge of them.
A related topic is Hume’s skepticism about Inductive reasoning. Hume seems to contend
that you don’t have any reason to believe that fire will continue to burn things rather than
freeze them.
Hume’s views about personal identity/the self will be examined, his discussion of free will,
and finally his (comparatively sensible) argument that we can never have good evidence that
a miracle has occurred.
Seminars
There will be two seminars (you must sign up for one of them) every week from
week 3 to week 11. Each seminar will focus on a text. You are required to read this
and bring a copy to the seminar.
Week 3: Locke on Innate Ideas
Locke, J. Essay concerning Human Understanding, Bk.I, ch ii No Innate Speculative
Principles
Week 4: Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities
Locke, J. Essay, Bk II. Ch. Viii
Week 5: Locke on Personal Identity
Locke, J. Essay, Bk. II. Ch. xxvii
Week 6: Berkeley against Abstract Ideas
Berkeley, G. Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction
Week 7: Berkeley’s arguments for Idealism
Berkeley, G. Principles of Human Knowledge, para. 1-24
Week 8: Hume on induction
Hume Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Sect.IV
Week 9: Hume on causation
Hume Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Sect.VII
Week 10: Hume on Personal Identity
Hume Treatise of Human Nature, I.IV.VI Personal Identity
Week 11: Hume on miracles
Hume Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Sect.X
Reading List
I’ve included a wide range of readings but I don’t expect anyone to read most or all
of them.
Highly Recommended texts starred and highlighted
Recommended texts highlighted
Topic 1. Locke on Innateness
*Locke J Essay concerning Human Understanding, Bk.I
Lowe EJ, Locke on Human Understanding, Routledge: 1995, ch 2
Aaron RI (1955) John Locke, Pt Two ch II
Woozley AD (1960) Introduction to the Fontana edition of Locke’s Essay, 3 No Innate Principles, 1624.
Wall G ‘Locke’s attack on innate knowledge’, Philosophy 49 (1974), pp.414-9. Reprinted in Tipton IC
ed (1977), Locke on Human Understanding, 19-24
Harris J. ‘Leibniz and Locke on innate ideas’, Ratio 16 (1974), 226-42. Reprinted in Tipton IC ed (1977),
Locke on Human Understanding, 25-40
Mackie JL 1976. Problems from Locke, ch 7
Atherton M (1983) ‘Locke and the issue over innateness, How Many Questions?’ Essays in Honor of
Sidney Morgenbesser. Reprinted in V. Chappell ed, Locke, Oxford Readings: 1998.
Jolley N ‘Leibniz and Malebranche on innate ideas’, Philosophical Review 92 (1988), pp.71-91
Carruthers P 1992. Human Knowledge and Human Nature, ch 4
(See also references in the bibliography in Tipton IC ed, Locke on Human Understanding, p.165.)
Topic 2. Locke and Berkeley on Primary and Secondary Qualities
*Locke J Essay, II.viii
*Berkeley G Principles of Human Knowledge, paras. 9-20
Galileo G (1623) Extract from The Assayer/Il Saggiatore, in Drake S, Discoveries and Opinions of
Galileo, pp.273-9
Boyle R (1666) The Origin of Forms and Qualities According to the Corpuscular Philosophy — in
Stewart MA ed (1991), Selected Philosophical Papers of Robert Boyle, esp. pp.18-53.
Alexander, P. ‘Boyle and Locke on primary and secondary qualities’, Ratio 16 (1974), 51-67. Reprinted
in Tipton IC ed (1977), Locke on Human Understanding, 62-76.
Bennett J. ‘Substance, reality and primary qualities’, American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965).
Reprinted in Martin CB & Armstrong DM eds., Locke and Berkeley, Macmillan, pp.86-124
Bennett J. Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes, Oxford UP: 1971, ch IV
Curley EM. ‘Locke, Boyle and the distinction between primary and secondary qualities’, Philosophical
Review 81 (1972).
Jackson R ‘Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities’, Mind 38 (1929). Reprinted
in Martin CB & Armstrong DM eds., Locke and Berkeley, Macmillan, 53-77.
Mackie JL 1976. Problems from Locke, ch 1
Lowe, EJ, Locke on Human Understanding, Routledge: 1995, pp.47-59
Campbell, J. ‘Locke on qualities’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1980), 567-85. Reprinted in V.
Chappell ed, Locke, Oxford Readings: 1998.
Stroud, B. ‘Berkeley v Locke on primary qualities’, Philosophy 55 (1980), 149-66
Maull, NL. ‘Berkeley on the limits of mechanistic explanation’. Turbayne CM ed (1982), Berkeley:
Critical and Interpretive Essays, 95-107
Wilson MD. ‘Did Berkeley completely misunderstand the basis of the primary-secondary quality
distinction in Locke?’ in Turbayne CM ed (1982), Berkeley: Critical and Interpretive Essays, 108-23.
Smith AD ‘Of primary and secondary qualities’, Philosophical Review 99 (1990), pp.221-54
Topic 3. Locke on Perception
*Mackie JL 1976. Problems from Locke, ch 2
Lowe EJ, Locke on Human Understanding, Routledge: 1995, ch 3
Jackson R ‘Locke’s version of the doctrine of representative perception’, Mind 39 (1930). Reprinted in
Martin CB & Armstrong DM eds., Locke and Berkeley, Macmillan, 125-54.
Woozley AD 1960. Introduction to the Fontana edition of Locke’s Essay, 4 The New Way of Ideas, 2435.
Bennett J 1971. Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes, Oxford UP, chs. 3 & 5
Matthews HE 1971. ‘Locke, Malebranche and the representative theory’, Locke Newsletter 2, 12-21.
Reprinted in Tipton IC ed (1977), Locke on Human Understanding, 55-61.
Mackie JL 1985. ‘Locke and representative perception’, Logic and Knowledge: Selected Papers I, 21424. Reprinted in V. Chappell ed, Locke, Oxford Readings: 1998.
Ayers M 1993. Locke: Epistemology and Ontology, Vol I Part III, Perceptual Knowledge
Topic 4. Locke on Personal Identity
*Locke, J. Essay, II.xxvii
Hume. D. Treatise of Human Nature I.iv.vi
Reid, T. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Essay III, chs. 4 & 6.
Butler, Joseph, ‘Of Personal Identity’ in Personal Identity ed. John Perry. (1975) University of California
Press; Berkeley.
Flew, A. ‘Locke and the problem of personal identity’, Philosophy 27, (1951), pp.53-68. Reprinted in
Martin CB & Armstrong DM eds., Locke and Berkeley, 155-78.
Hughes, M.W. ‘Personal Identity: A Defence of Locke’, Philosophy 50, 1975, pp.169-187.
Helm, P. ‘Locke’s Theory of Personal Identity’, Philosophy 54, 1979, pp.173-185.
Allison, H.E. ‘Locke’s theory of personal identity: a re-examination’, Journal of the History of Ideas 27,
(1976), pp.41-58. Reprinted in Tipton IC ed (1977), Locke on Human Understanding, 105-22.
Noonan, H. ‘Locke on personal identity’, Philosophy 53, (1978), pp.343-51
Lowe, E.J. Locke on Human Understanding, Routledge: 1995, ch 5
Mackie, J.L.1976. Problems from Locke, chs. 5 & 6
Alston, W.P. and Bennett, J. ‘Locke on people and substances’, Phil Review 97 (1988), 25-46
Ayers, M. 1991. Locke Volume II: Ontology, Part III, pp.205-92
Winkler, K.P. ‘Locke on personal identity’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 29 (1991), pp.201-26.
Reprinted in V. Chappell ed, Locke, Oxford Readings: 1998.
Topic 5. Abstract Ideas: Locke v Berkeley
*Locke, J. Essay II.xi-xii, III.iii.6, IV.vii.9
Berkeley, G. 1709. An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision, paras. CXX-CXXVII.
*Berkeley, G. Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction
Hume, D. THN, I.I.vii ‘Of abstract ideas’
Jolley, Locke: his Philosophical Thought, pp. 49-54
Beardsley, M.C. ‘Berkeley on abstract ideas’, Mind 52 (1943). Reprinted in Martin CB & Armstrong
DM eds., Locke and Berkeley, Macmillan, 409-25.
Chappell, “Locke’s Theory of Ideas”, in Chappell (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Locke
Mackie, J.L. 1976. Problems from Locke, ch 4
Lowe, E.J. Locke on Human Understanding, Routledge: 1995, ch 7
Winkler, Berkeley: An Interpretation, ch. 2
Bennett, J. 1971. Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes, Oxford UP, chs. 1-2
Warnock, G.J. 1953. Berkeley, ch 4
Tipton, I.C. 1974. Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism, ch 5.
Flage, D.E. ‘Berkeley on abstraction’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 (1987), 483-501
Topic 6. Locke on Meaning
*Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding III.i-iii & vi
Hume Treatise of Human Nature, I.I
Hume Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, secs. II-III
Bennett J [1971], Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes, Oxford UP, chs. I & IX
Blackburn S Spreading the Word ch.2
Kretzmann N ‘The main thesis of Locke’s semantic theory’, Philosophical Review 77 (1968), pp.175-96.
Reprinted in IC Tipton ed, Locke on Human Understanding, pp.123-40.
Hacking I. 1975. Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?, Section A, esp. ch.5
Ashworth EJ. ‘Locke on language’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1984), pp.45-73. Reprinted in V.
Chappell ed, Locke, Oxford Readings: 1998.
Pears D 1990. Hume’s System, ch I
Lowe EJ, Locke on Human Understanding, Routledge: 1995, ch 7
Lowe EJ 1996. Subjects of Experience, ch. 6.
Topic 7. Locke on essence
*Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding III.vi; III.ix (esp. §12), III.x.
Lowe, E.J. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Locke on Human Understanding, ch. 4
Mackie, J.L. Problems from Locke, ch.3 and ch. 5, sec. 3
Atherton, M. ‘The inessentiality of Lockean essences’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1984), 27793. Reprinted in V. Chappell ed, Locke, Oxford Readings: 1998.
Jolley, N. Locke: his Philosophical Thought, pp. 66-78
Ayers, ‘Locke versus Aristotle on Natural Kinds’, Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981)
Ayers, M. 1991. Locke Volume II: Ontology, Part Ia
Kripke, S. (1970) ‘Naming and necessity’, in G. Harman & D. Davidson eds., Semantics of Natural
Language. Reprinted as Naming and Necessity, Blackwell: 1980. ch 3.
Putnam, H. (1975) ‘The meaning of “meaning”’, in K. Gunderson ed., Language, Mind and Knowledge.
Reprinted in Putnam’s Mind, Language and Reality, pp.215-71
Smith, A.D. ‘Natural Kind Terms: A Neo-Lockean Theory’, European Journal of Philosophy 13 (2005),
pp.70-88.
Topic 8. Berkeley’s Arguments for Idealism
*Berkeley, G. Principles of Human Knowledge, paras. 1-24, paras. 34-40, paras. 45-55.
*Berkeley, G. Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, First Dialogue
Russell, B. History of Western Philosophy, London: Allen & Unwin, 1946, Bk III, ch XVI
Warnock, G.J. [1953]
Berkeley, ch 6
Cummins, P.D. ‘Berkeley’s likeness principle’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 4 (1966). Reprinted
in C.B. Martin & D.M. Armstrong eds, Locke and Berkeley: a collection of critical essays, London:
Macmillan, 1968, pp.353-63.
Gallois, A. ‘Berkeley’s Master Argument’, Philosophical Review 83 (1974), pp.55-69.
Bennett, J. Locke, Berkeley and Hume: central themes, Oxford: Clarendon, ch VI
Tipton, I.C. Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism, London: Methuen, 1974, ch 2 & ch 5
Grayling, A.C. Berkeley: The Central Arguments, London: Duckworth, 1986, ch 2
Winkler, K. P. Berkeley: An Interpretation ch 6
Rickless, S. Berkeley’s Argument for Idealism
Stoneham, T. Berkeley’s World, ch. 4.
Topic 9. Berkeley’s immaterialism: objections and replies
*Berkeley, G. Principles of Human Kkowledge 45-48
*Berkeley, G. Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, (pp247-248 in Works ed. Luce &
Jessop)
Winkler, K. P. Berkeley: An Interpretation ch 7 ‘Unperceived Objects’
Glauser, R, ‘Berkeley on the Numerical Identity of What Several Immediately Perceive (Three
Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous III 247–8)’ Philosophy Compass 7:8 517-530
Topic 10. Berkeley and God
Mabbott, J.D.‘The place of God in Berkeley’s philosophy’, Journal of Philosophical Studies 6, 1931, 1829.
Bennett, J. 1965. ‘Berkeley and God’, Philosophy 40, 1965, 207-21.
Furlong, E.J. ‘Berkeley and the tree in the quad’, Philosophy 41, 1966, pp. 400-408.
(All reprinted in C.B. Martin & D.M. Armstrong eds, Locke and Berkeley: a collection of critical essays,
London: Macmillan, 1968, pp. 364-79, 380-99, & 400-408.)
Bennett, J. Locke, Berkeley and Hume: central themes, Oxford: Clarendon, ch VII.
Tipton, I. ‘Descartes’ demon and Berkeley’s world’, Philosophical Investigations 15, 1992, pp.111-130.
Botterill, G. ‘God and First Person in Berkeley’, Philosophy 82, 2007, pp.87-114.
Topic 11. Hume on Induction
*Hume Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Sect.IV & Sect.V Pt.I
Hume Treatise of Human Nature, I.III.VI ‘Of the inference from the impression to the idea’
Hume?? The Abstract of the Treatise (http://people.rit.edu/wlrgsh/Abstract.pdf)
Russell, B. 1912. The Problems of Philosophy, ch 6
Strawson, P.F. 1952. An Introduction to Logical Theory, ch 9.II.
Popper, K.R. 1972. Objective Knowledge, ch 1
Swinburne, R. ed. The Justification of Induction (contains the chapter from Russell and also Paul
Edwards’ paper on ‘Russell's doubts about induction’)
Stove, D.C. 1965. ‘Hume, probability, and induction’. Philosophical Review 74, pp.160-77 (reprinted in
V.C. Chappell ed, Hume, pp.187-212)
Millican, P. 2002. ‘Hume’s sceptical doubts concerning induction’. In P. Millican ed., Reading Hume on
Human Understanding, Oxford: Clarendon, 2002, pp.107-173
Stroud, B. Hume, chs III and IV
Topic 12. Hume on Causation
*Hume Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, sec. VII
Hume Treatise of Human Nature, I.III esp. secs. II, VI, XIV
Bennett, J. 1971. LBH, chs XI & XII
Stroud, B. Hume, chs III and IV
Robinson, J.A. 1962. ‘Hume’s two definitions of “cause”’, Philosophical Quarterly XII, 162-71.
Reprinted in Chappell VC ed, Hume.
Ducasse, C.J. 1966. ‘Critique of Hume’s conception of causality’, Journal of Philosophy LXIII, 141-8.
Mackie, J.L. 1974. The Cement of the Universe, ch 1 ‘Hume’s Account’, pp.4-28.
Strawson, G.1989. The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume, Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Pears, D. 1990. Hume’s System, chs 5-7
Carroll, J. 1990 ‘The Humean tradition’, Philosophical Review XCIX, 185-219
Craig, E. 2002. ‘The idea of necessary connexion’. In P. Millican ed., Reading Hume on Human
Understanding, Oxford: Clarendon, 2002, pp.211-29
Strawson, G. 2002. ‘David Hume: objects and power’. In P. Millican ed., Reading Hume on Human
Understanding, Oxford: Clarendon, 2002, pp.231-57
Read, R. & Richman, K.A. eds. 2000. The New Hume Debate, Routledge.
Topic 13. Hume on Personal Identity
*Hume Treatise of Human Nature, I.IV.II & I.IV.VI
* Hume Treatise of Human Nature - Appendix, pp.633-6 in Selby-Bigge
Bennett, J. 1971. Locke, Berkeley, Hume ch XIII
Stroud, B. Hume, ch VI
Penelhum, T. 1955 ‘Hume on personal identity’, Philosophical Review LXIV, 571-89. Reprinted in
Chappell VC ed, Hume, 213-39.
Pears, D. 1990. Hume’s System, chs 8-9
Cummins, P.D. 1973. ‘Hume’s disavowal of the Treatise’, Philosophical Review LXXXII, 371-9
Haugeland, J. 1998. ‘Hume on personal identity’. In J. Haugeland, Having Thought, (Harvard UP,
1998), pp.63-71.
Broackes, J. 2002. ‘Hume, belief, and personal identity’. In P. Millican ed., Reading Hume on Human
Understanding, Oxford: Clarendon, 2002, pp.187-210
Topic 14. Hume on Freedom
Hume Treatise of Human Nature (II.III.I-II)
*Hume Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, sec. VIII
Botterill, G. 2002. Hume on Liberty and Necessity. In P. Millican ed., Reading Hume on Human
Understanding, Oxford: Clarendon, 2002, pp.277-300. Also:Ayer, A.J. 1954. Philosophical Essays (London: Macmillan).
Hobart, R.E. 1934. ‘Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceivable Without It’, Mind XLIII,
pp.1-27.
Penelhum, T. 1975. Hume, (London: Macmillan).
Russell, P. 1983. ‘On the Naturalism of Hume’s “Reconciling Project”’, Mind XCII, pp. 593-600.
Russell, P. 1988. ‘Causation, Compulsion, and Compatibilism’, American Philosophical Quarterly 25,
pp. 313-21.
Schlick, M. 1939. Problems of Ethics, translated by D. Rynin (New York: Prentice-Hall).
Stroud, B. 1977. Hume, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), ch VII
Topic 15. Hume on Miracles
*Hume Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, sec. X
Broad, C.D. 1916. ‘Hume’s theory of the credibility of miracles’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
XVII, pp.77-94
Flew, A. 1959. ‘Hume’s check’. Philosophical Quarterly 9, pp.1-18
Swinburne, R. 1970. The Concept of Miracle, Macmillan
Coady, C.A.J. 1973. ‘Testimony and observation’. American Philosophical Quarterly 10, pp.149-55
Gaskin, J.C.A. 1978. Hume’s Philosophy of Religion (London: Macmillan), ch.8.
Hambourger, R. 1980. ‘Belief in miracles and Hume’s Essay’. Nous 14, pp.587-604
Mackie, J.L. 1982. The Miracle of Theism, Oxford: Clarendon, ch.1
Sobel, J.H. 1987. ‘On the evidence of testimony for miracles: a Bayesian reconstruction of David
Hume’s analysis’. Philosophical Quarterly 37, pp.166-86.
Garrett, D. 1997. Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy (Oxford UP), ch.7.
Garrett, D. 2002. ‘Hume on testimony concerning miracles’. In P. Millican ed., Reading Hume on
Human Understanding, Oxford: Clarendon, 2002, pp.301-34
Plagiarism
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Plagiarism (either intentional or unintentional) is the stealing of ideas or work of another
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paraphrasing ideas, passages, sections, sentences, paragraphs, drawings, graphs and other
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commissioning either the whole assignment or part of it and implies a clear intention to
deceive the examiners. The University also takes an extremely serious view of any student
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