G.O.L.D.
Confidential Document, Not For Public Release
Global Operational Leaders in Defense L.L.C.
(G.O.L.D.)
Nathaniel Fritz, Ivan Zhivkov, Anna Castillo
Privileged Access Memorandum for the Russian Ministry of Defense
Client: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
Topic: Security along border with Ukraine
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G.O.L.D.
Confidential Document, Not For Public Release
The Solution Russian Federation - Ukraine Border Security
Executive Summary:
The political situation in Ukraine and specifically the instability in the Donbass along
Russia’s border requires attention to border security policies. The fighting is spilling
over from Ukraine into Russia and a strengthening of border security presence is
necessary along with improving communication channels between the Federal Security
Service (FSS) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) to ensure coordination and response.
Establishing additional border outposts for monitoring as well as expanding the border
security zone helps protect Russian citizens’ wellbeing and prevent illegal crossing. All of
this, if conducted with open communication to NATO, OSCE, EU, and UN bodies will
ensure that the Russian Federation’s actions are seen as proportional responses in
defense and deterrence.
Problem:
The Russian Federation needs to take action to secure the new border between Crimea
and Ukraine. Additionally steps must be taken along the existing Ukrainian border to
increase Russia’s preparedness to respond to the instability next door and deter
irresponsible action from the new government in Kiev.
Failure to properly secure the border could result in the conflict spreading across the
border. Additional traffickers in illicit activities could seek to utilize the instability
within Ukraine to expand across the border in Russian Federation territory. Crimea
must be kept secure from Ukrainian efforts to undermine the people’s referendum to
join Russia.
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Background:
1954 saw the transfer of the Crimea region from Russia to Ukraine under the Soviet
Union. In 1994 Crimea was again stated to be a portion of Ukraine under the Budapest
Memorandum on Security Assurances. However, both of these occurred without the
input of the Crimean populace and with dubious legal groundings given that Krushchev
did not have the authority to unilaterally authorize this under Soviet law and the
Russian Federation was under great pressures to comply in 1994 and working through
political turmoil at home.
More recently, Ukraine has undergone a regime change from President Viktor
Yanukovych to President Petro Poroshenko following the 2014 Maidan Revolution. This
has resulted in a worsening of relations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine as
the new regime insists on scapegoating ongoing issues onto Moscow. Pro-Russian
groups and ethnic Russians are regularly attacked and fear for their lives in the current
political situation as ultra-Ukrainian nationalists attack them in the streets.1
March 16, 2014 saw Crimeans vote on a referendum to join Russia and overwhelmingly
supported the move with 96.77 percent of the population voting for it.2 Additionally the
government in Kiev refuses to accept the results of the referendum in Crimea regarding
joining Russia.
Denyer, Simon, and Anna Nemstova. "Ukraine Suffers Deadliest Day in Months; 34 Killed in
Odessa." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 2 May 2014. Web. 08 Dec. 2015.
1
2
"Crimea Declares Independence, Seeks UN Recognition." RT English. RT, 17 Mar. 2014. Web. 08 Dec.
2015.
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This led to ethnic Russians in the Donbass region to pursue promises from Kiev that
they would receive a fair voice in the government. Unfortunately Kiev responded with a
military response to ensure all provinces fall in line with the official government line.
The ongoing political disagreements between NATO and EU states over the nature of
the Ukraine crisis has creating a politically fraught situation and severed lines of
communication. However the beginnings of cooperation in the Syrian crisis have
reopened some lines of military and diplomatic communication, setting a good
precedent for cooperation and coordination of Russian activities to avoid a negative
perception of actions taken to secure the border.
Even after the conclusion of the Donbass conflict the Russian Federation must possess a
sufficient deterrent to ensure that reprisals over Crimea are prevented and that a
struggling Ukraine does not become a hotbed for illicit activity, such as trafficking. It is
with an eye on not only the present, but also future threats that we have prepared the
following recommendations.
Situation Analysis and Recommendations:
With an increase in clashes, both in terms of occurrences and intensity, Russian towns
and villages near the Russian-Ukrainian border continue to see the consequences of
border skirmishes. Although sporadic, fighting between Ukrainian government troops
and separatists are spilling over into Russian territory. Ukrainian troops have been
fleeing into Russian territory following clashes with separatists. Further, as Ukrainian
government troops continue to utilize mortars against separatists, the risk of shells
missing their intended targets and landing in Russian territory is increasing. Mortar
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shells from the Ukrainian side are increasingly causing severe damage in Russian
checkpoints, and resulting in death and injury to Russian citizens.
Current Situation Review:
Violence along the Russia-Ukraine border is largely sporadic, though it is often intense.
A majority of the violence reported surrounds checkpoints along the border. That is,
Russian checkpoints along the Russian-Ukrainian border experience shelling from the
Ukrainian side.3 Specifically, the Russian checkpoint of Novoshakhstinsk in Rostov was
shelled by mortars causing significant damage and injuries to Russian citizens. 4
Meanwhile, checkpoints on the Ukrainian side of the border are also experiencing heavy
violence.5 This violence is largely due to clashes between Ukrainian government forces
and separatists. In a number of occasions, Ukrainian border guards have even crossed
into Russian territory to flee after being engaged by separatists in long and intense gun
fights.6
As stated previously, shells from the Ukrainian side of the border are reaching Russian
territory. Accordingly, Russian border cities and citizens residing in them are living
under constant threat. For example, in the border town of Belgorod, citizens feared
walking in the streets due to the instability along the border.
Review of Existing Policies:
Russian checkpoint on Ukraine border comes under fire, RT (June 20, 2014), available at
https://www.rt.com/news/167392-russia-checkpoint-fire-ukraine/.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
3
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Currently, the Russian army has troops and a significant amount of weaponry at a
“base” in the town of Matveev-Kurgan in Rostov.7 Rostov is located east of the Ukrainian
border city of Donetsk. Military weaponry in Matveev-Kurgan include mobile rocket
launchers, tanks, and artillery pieces.8 Furthermore, additional troops have been sent to
the Ukrainian border near Donetsk as a measure to boost security and fortify the
border.9 Troops deployed include special forces units, paratroopers, as well militia
units.10
Due to the unstable border situation, border crossings between the Ukraine and Russia
have been limited. In some border towns and villages, border crossings have been
limited to only busses and foot traffic.11 Additionally, at checkpoints that have suffered
violence, additional police reserves, as well as border guards, have been deployed. 12
However, the checkpoint at Gukovo on the border with Ukraine’s Lugansk region has
seen an increase in border crossings from Ukraine.13 People crossing the borders are
travelling with family and a significant amount of luggage.14 Accordingly, it looks like
Maria Tsvetkova, Exclusive: Russia masses heavy firepower on border with Ukraine – witnesses,
Reuters (May 27, 2014), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-militaryidUSKBN0OC2K820150527#vioA0WUrObisVrVP.97.
8 Id.
9 Russia deployed more troops to Ukraine border to ensure security – Kremlin, RT (June 20, 2014),
available at https://www.rt.com/news/167280-russia-kremlin-troops-ukraine/.
10 Mark Hosenball, Russian Buildup On Ukraine Border Seen By Western Governments, Reuters (Mar.
26, 2014), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/26/russia-ukraine_n_5037591.html.
11 Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, Caught Between Russia And Ukraine, Border Cities Share Only Worry, NPR
(Mar. 30, 2014), available at http://www.npr.org/2014/03/30/296516967/caught-between-russia-andukraine-border-cities-share-only-worry.
12 Russian checkpoint on Ukraine border comes under fire, RT (June 20, 2014), available at
https://www.rt.com/news/167392-russia-checkpoint-fire-ukraine/.
13 OSCE: No Russian violations on Ukrainian border,RT (Aug. 7, 2014), available at
https://www.rt.com/news/178668-osce-russia-ukraine-border/.
14 Id.
7
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Confidential Document, Not For Public Release
most of those crossing the border are not tourists, but really indicates a more permanent
move.15
Recommendations for border security policy:
Given the current dynamics in the Donbass region, it is imperative for the Russian
Federation to adopt comprehensive measures to guarantee security along the border
with Ukraine. We recommend the following strategies to prevent the conflict in Donbass
from spilling into Russian sovereign territory:

Expand the Border Security Zone: Expansion of the current limits of the Border
Security Zone would directly benefit Russia’s security. Ukraine’s army has longrange missile capability that can strike targets beyond the Zone. Through
expanding the zone, you will ensure greater area of operations for the Federal
Security Service (FSS). It will ensure greater timeframe for detection if a rocket
enters Russian airspace and allow for proper measures to be taken.

Establish easier communication with the Federal Security Service: Through
mutual collaboration, the Ministry of Defense can utilize the intelligence
gathering expertise of the FSS and make informed decisions if a defense situation
may arise. Through a secure line of communication with the FSS, the Defense
Ministry can directly monitor the situation on the Ukrainian border and
determine if greater numbers of Russian armed forces are necessary to maintain
security. Additionally should a mobilization of forces be necessary they will be
15
Id.
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acting upon the shortest possible timeline to assure maximum response
effectiveness.

Build four military outposts in the Border Security Zone: This will deter
incursions by Ukrainian forces and guarantee homeland protection. A Quick
Reaction Force will be stationed in each outpost to ensure that the border is
protected, that enemy shells and rockets do not enter Russian territory, and if a
Russian soldier is taken hostage by Ukrainian forces, a quick rescue operation
would take place. The outposts will serve as intelligence gathering centers on
security issues pertaining to Ukraine and can directly communicate with the
Ministry of Defense.
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Confidential Document, Not For Public Release
The recommended sites for the four outposts are: Belgorod, Rostov, Rossosh, and near
the Luhansk border region. These are the areas around the Donbass region where the
heaviest fighting is occurring.
Proposals for managing international image:
Protecting Russia’s image abroad while ensuring security at home is one of the top
concerns. The four outposts are a defensive measure and must be portrayed as such to
the international community. Troop numbers should be kept constant at those outposts,
as not to incite a security dilemma with Ukraine and NATO. Only light weaponry and
anti-missile defense systems should be permitted to the outposts, in order to avoid
compromising the strategic position that they occupy with inundated international
reaction. Lastly, transparency in operations at the outposts must be considered as a
viable alternative to international condemnation. Working together with the
international community while remaining firm on such issues of national importance
will show strength and garner respect from allies and adversaries alike. Ensuring that
NATO, OSCE, EU, and UN bodies are aware of force disposition as well as the reality on
the ground ensures that there will be no basis for claiming Russian actions are anything
but defensive. In the event that a breach or attack occurs requiring response it will be
good to have these existing channels to ensure that actions are taken openly and in
accordance with international norms.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, the main concern for the Ministry of Defense is security along the
Ukrainian border. Containing the violence in Donbass and ensuring that it does not spill
into Russia is of the utmost importance since it will directly protect Russian citizens.
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Improving the current border security apparatus through expansion of the Border
Security Zone would ensure a greater area of operation for the FSS. A secure line of
communication with FSS would allow for better assessment of the activity in Donbass.
In conjunction with the creation of the four military outposts, this will enable the
Ministry of Defense to directly monitor the situation on the ground, ensure stability in
the volatile region, and protect Russian citizens. These actions jointly will serve as direct
and decisive moves aimed at securing the border, alleviating the threat, and creating a
long-tern solution.
If this proposal is accepted we look forward to strengthening the recommendations
based on the most up to date information the Ministry of Defense can provide.
G.O.L.D.
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