Framing Effects in Ethical Dilemmas
Research project in experimental philosophy
(experimental ethics)
Funded by AHRC
Investigators
Natalie Gold (PI)
University of
Edinburgh
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Andrew Colman
(Co-I)
Briony Pulford
(Co-I)
University of
Leicester
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University of
Leicester
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Objectives
(1) To gain a better understanding of the ways in which context affects
moral decisions. We propose to achieve this by running a series of
experiments that systematically vary the context of a set of questions, in a
way that is informed by philosophical and psychological theory. Previous
research has focused on a very narrow range of cases and contexts. We
plan to expand these in order to identify predictable factors that affect
moral decisionmaking, and investigate whether these factors are morally
relevant or not.
(2) To contribute to the debate about the validity of using thoughtexperiments and intuitions in moral arguments. Thought experiments are
widely used in ethics, and some philosophers argue that it is important for
our moral theories to be compatible with our moral intuitions. Opposing
this, some philosophers point out that our judgments are subject to
psychological biases such as "framing effects" and argue that appeals to
intuitions should be banished from philosophical argument. The
psychological literature on framing effects was not designed to tackle the
questions that philosophers discuss. By running experiments that are
targeted at distinctions that philosophers make, ascertaining whether they
have support in the general population and what the causes are of intuitive
moral judgments, we can generate data that directly bears on the debate
about philosophical methodology.
(3) To make a methodological contribution to experimental philosophy. We
propose to do this by introducing an experimental methodology that is
widely used in psychology and economics. We will combine this with
philosophical inquiry and analysis to create an innovative new approach to
experimental philosophy.
(4) To discriminate between different theories of the underlying causes of
moral decision-making. Previous work in this area has often been done in
the context of theory-building. We take a neutral stand, aiming to tease
out the implications of these theories in situations for which they were not
originally designed, and to design experiments that discriminate between
them.
(5) To produce research that can be used to guide those who are involved
in moral policy-making decisions. If the description of a problem affects
moral judgments, then it is important for those making moral decisions to
know the features of the context that may affect their judgments, so that
they can take them into account when decision-making. More specifically,
the structural problem we will address (whether to prevent a harm to many
by causing or allowing harm to a few) is present in a range of policy
questions. For example when a surgical team chooses between allowing
triplets to die in their mother's womb and killing one of them to save the
other two, or when a government decides whether to nationalize a building
society, which would protect its savers and mortgagees but harm its
shareholders by reducing the value of its shares to zero. The results from
our research should feed in to the ethical training that public sector
decision-makers receive in, for example, health care, legal and financial
professions.
Summary
A recent trend in philosophy is experimental ethics, where researchers elicit
subjects' moral judgments and investigate the moral psychology behind
them. One finding is that moral judgments change depending on the
context of the problem as it is described to the subjects. For example,
consider the question of whether it is acceptable to sacrifice one life to
save five in two different contexts:
The Trolley problem: A trolley is running out of control down a railway
track. In its path are five people who will be killed if it continues on its
course. By operating a lever, you can divert the trolley on to a different
track, where a solitary man in its path will be killed. Is it morally
permissible to operate the lever?
The Footbridge problem: A trolley is running out of control down a railway
track. In its path are five people who will be killed if it continues on its
course. You are on a footbridge over the tracks next to a large man. The
only way to save the five people is to push the man off the bridge, into the
path of the trolley, where only he will be killed. Is it morally permissible to
push the man off the footbridge?
Most people say that it is acceptable to make the sacrifice in the first
problem but not in the second. In this project, we propose to investigate what
factors drive these moral judgments and their relation to morally relevant
features of the context. It is intended as an interdisciplinary project using
methods from, and making contributions to, both philosophy and psychology.
The core of the research will be a series of experiments in ethics. As well as
generating useful data and testing hypotheses, this will also be a
methodological contribution, systematically introducing methods of testing
from economics and social psychology to the philosophical debate. We aim to
identify features that predictably affect moral judgment (even if people
cannot articulate them), and we hope to use our results to discriminate
between different theories of moral decision-making.
Total value of the award: £151,217
Some key references
Appiah, A. (2008) Experiments in ethics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Foot, P. (1967). The problem of abortion and the doctrine of double effect.
Oxford Review, 5, 5-15.
Greene, J. D. (2007). Why are VMPFC patients more utilitarian? A dualprocess theory of moral judgment explains. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 11, 322-323.
Hauser, M. D. (2007). Moral minds: How nature designed our universal
sense of right and wrong. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
Kahneman, D. (1994). The cognitive psychology of consequences and
moral intuition. The Tanner Lecture in Human Values. Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan.
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (Eds.). (2000). Choices, values, and frames.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kamm, F. M. (2007) Intricate Ethics New York, Oxford University Press.
Knobe, J. & Nichols, S. (2008) Experimental Philosophy. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Mikhail, J. (2007). Universal moral grammar: Theory, evidence, and the
future. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11, 143-152.
Thomson, J. J. (1976). Killing, letting die, and the Trolley problem. The
Monist, 59, 204-217.