BEYOND COLD WAR POLITICS:
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND PRIME
MINISTER NEHRU
Kaydee Mueller
History 412
Eisenhower and His Times
December 8, 2008
Mueller 1
On December 9, 1959 President Dwight D. Eisenhower landed in New Delhi,
India as part of twenty day tour of eleven nations throughout the Middle East, Europe and
Africa. After his arrival, the President, along with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and
Indian President Rajendra Prasad attempted to drive from the airport Presidents house,
but the immeasurable crowds of local spectators made this nearly impossible, even
bringing the motorcade to a complete standstill mere miles from their destination. This
crowd, like others Eisenhower drew during his short trip to India, was numbered upwards
of one hundred thousand people, and was some of the largest crowds ever drawn by a
foreign dignitary. An on-site National Geographic reporter described the near hysteric
crowd—“Friendly crowds, shouting hysterically, surrounded the leaders. Greeters shoved
forward to touch Mr. Eisenhower or just his automobile. They crushed fenders, stove in
the trunk, and snapped off the radio antenna.”1 Eisenhower was no stranger to attracting
large crowds especially after he became an international hero following his World War
Two service, but few crowds can compare to those formed by the thousands of Indian
citizens who gathered to enthusiastically greet the President of the United States. It is
interesting to note that so many of the people of India, a relatively new independent
country with strong anti-imperialist sentiments were so enthusiastic in their greetings of
the President—a man who maintained a close, personal relationship with the once
imperial rulers of India, the British.2 This trip marked an impressive end to a two-term
presidency that has left behind many unanswered questions pertaining to his leadership
style, his effectiveness as a president, and more specifically, the strange relationship with
1
Gilbert M. Grosvenor, “When the President Goes Abroad: A dramatic pictorial record of Mr.
Eisenhower’s 11-nation tour of Asia, Africa and Europe,” National Geographic 117, no. 5 (May 1960):
614.
2
For more information on Eisenhower’s trip abroad in 1959 see Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace:
1956-1961; The White House Years (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1965), 486-513.
Mueller 2
Prime Minister Nehru, a strict non-alignment proponent whose political views were in
strong contrast to the goals of the United States during the Cold War.
The eight years during which Dwight D. Eisenhower served as the United States
President were a time of unwilling co-existence—democracy and communism, free-trade
and controlled economics, Eisenhower and Khrushchev. Both men, like the countries
they presided over, lived in a world seemingly divided into two camps, the communist
camp and the democratic camp, or to be more specific, the Soviet camp of the U.S.S.R
and the Western camp controlled by the Americans. But what many forget to recognize
was that a third option very much existed during the Cold War, and it was most often the
choice of developing countries recently freed from the constraints of colonial powers.
This camp played host to third world countries which chose to focus on national
development and thus refused to limit themselves by aligning with only one side of the
Cold War. In 1955, non-aligned leaders gained international recognition when, with the
help of Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Achmed Sukarno of Indonesia, Prime Minister
Nehru presented the policy of non-alignment to a coalition of third world countries at the
Bandung Conference of Asian and African Nations in Indonesia.3 Unlike his predecessors
in the Oval Office, Eisenhower’s presidency was one of constant interaction with the
Third World, and as this region consisted of a large proportion of the world population,
swaying these non-aligned countries to a western oriented point of view became an
essential goal of the Eisenhower administration.
Prime Minister Nehru was one of the most important leaders in the Third World,
and therefore gained a lot of attention from President Eisenhower, his cabinet and
Chester J. Pack Jr., “Thinking Globally and Acting Locally,” in The Eisenhower Administration, The
Third World, and The Globalization of the Cold War, eds. Kathryn C. Statler and Andrew L. Johns
(Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006), xii-xiii.
3
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advisors.4 Communications with and discussions of the Prime Minister take up a large
percentage of the papers detailing the United States foreign relations, and a significant
portion of foreign aid was earmarked for his nation. The Eisenhower Administration also
had a special interest in India because it was a budding democracy which shared
thousands of miles of border with the recently declared People’s Republic of China, a
domino fallen into Communist hands. Prime Minister Nehru, on the other hand,
recognized that both the Americans and the Soviets would be willing to lend millions, if
not billions of dollars of aid with the hopes of wooing India into their respective camps.
While his policy did encourage both sides of the Cold War to grant aid and encourage
investment in India, this was not an ulterior motive. Though it is easy to see that the
Americans and the Soviets both recognized India’s strategic importance and hoped to use
aid and investment to convince Nehru to join their bloc, Nehru was not claiming nonalignment to encourage more funding. In fact he often opted to go to the United Nations
or to request a loan, in place of direct economic aid or assistance. Nehru, therefore, could
not be wooed with the financial prowess of the United States, and it would take much
more for President Eisenhower to convince the Prime Minister to lean to the West during
the Cold War. The United States and India, as well as their respective leaders did share
4
In the academic world, the relationship between Eisenhower and Nehru often receives some attention,
but in respect to Eisenhower, Nehru is simply one of many foreign leaders with who he dealt, and
Eisenhower is often mentioned, but only in passing with regards to Nehru’s time in office. In Benjamin
Zachariah’s biography of Nehru, President Eisenhower is almost completely forgotten, yet the Prime
Minister visited the United States twice, and India received significantly more financial aid than other
Third World countries. Burton I. Kaufman acknowledges the aid given to India during the Eisenhower
Administration, but does not seem to analyze the importance of the aid or the hopes of improving relations
with India, in Trade and Aid. There have been many attempts to understand Eisenhower’s foreign policy
towards the Third World since he left office, and many scholars have attempted to analyze the relationship
with Nehru as one aspect of a whole. In The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India and
Pakistan Robert McMahon does mention the visit in 1956 and the success in forging closer ties between the
Eisenhower and Nehru, yet again only in passing. It is this theory that I aim to take one step further by
developing the relationship past correspondences and the importance of aid, to understanding the personal
relationship that developed while the two men met face to face and prompted them to accept one another
despite drastically differing on views of international affairs.
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more than they would often admit though, and democracy, a dislike for Soviet
aggression, and a genuine hope for world peace allowed the two countries, and their
leaders to come together and form a working relationship during Eisenhower’s time in
the Oval Office.
Nehru5
By the time Eisenhower entered the Oval Office in January of 1953, India had
been an independent Republic for just three years. After spending many years as a colony
of the British Empire, India was attempting the near impossible feat of creating a
government while simultaneously eliminating the barriers to development such as
religious conflict between Muslims and Hindus, territorial disputes with China and
Pakistan, as well as the limits to social interaction controlled by the recently eliminated
caste system. In 1946, the Provisional Indian government was sworn in with Nehru as
Provisional Prime Minister. The hope of both the British and the Indians was that a
provisional government would make the transition of power as smooth as possible. Once
India declared official independence in 1950, Nehru was elected to the position of Prime
Minister and would serve at this post until his death in 1964. The accomplishments of the
Prime Minister are great: he created the world’s largest democracy, instituted plans for
economic and industrial development that would make India a leading example for
decolonized countries throughout the third world, and he maintained a position of strict
non-alignment in the polarized world of the Cold War.6 As the focus of this paper is the
5
To understand the relationship between Eisenhower and Nehru, it is important to explore the
development of their political views, the world in which they served and, finally, the development of their
personal relationship. To do so, I have tried to divide the paper into corresponding sections.
6
For this section of the paper, I have drawn from the recent bibliography of Nehru by Benjamin
Zachariah, whose scholarship seems the most current and lacking in bias. Benjamin Zachariah, Nehru
(London: Routledge, 2004), xxi, 118-140.
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policy of non-alignment and the relationship between Prime Minister Nehru and the
leader of those with whom he would not align, President Eisenhower, it is important to
define non-alignment, what it meant to the Prime Minister and how he developed and
applied this policy.
The Development of Non-Alignment
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s Jawaharlal Nehru was building an international
reputation as an accomplished statesman and negotiator. He was an early and outspoken
anti-colonialist, and became an inspirational leader for Third World countries struggling
to gain independence from colonial powers.7 After spending seven years in England,
earning a degree from Cambridge and passing the Bar Exam, Nehru returned to India just
before the outbreak of World War I. Though the country experienced a few small
movements for independence from the Crown, none were nation-wide. The need for
independence did not sweep the nation until Gandhi began to lead large, public, peaceful
protests against the imperial government. An agrarian movement against the British
government had begun, but no one in the cities or the Congress was actually aware of it.
It was only with Gandhi’s non-cooperation Movement that “peasants were able to link up
with and claim the authority of Gandhi,” and this alliance enabled the movement to
become a national phenomenon.8 The influence of Gandhi’s non-cooperation movement
on the Indian people, the quest for independence, and, individually on Nehru can not be
underestimated. It was also during his time as a young Gandhian that Nehru, like many of
India’s educated youth, was “forced to discover and confront the nakedness of
7
8
Ibid., xxi.
Ibid., 49.
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exploitation and poverty in India.”9 The realization that India was an impressively poor
country with a large number of the population illiterate and close to starvation forced the
future Prime Minister to realize the countries desperate need for economic and industrial
development. This realization would stick with the future Prime Minister, molding his
political and social policies for years to come.
The Great Depression and World War II marked a period of transition for both
India and Nehru. National independence was still the end-goal, but with the distraction of
economic crisis and world war, the Britons shelved any possibility of granting Indian
independence because the colony provided an ideal market for finished goods, a surplus
of raw materials, and an allied front during the War. Finally, in the Post War world, Great
Britain was unable to maintain an imperial government and simultaneously rebuild from
the damage of World War II, so it was on August 15, 1947 that the viceroy of British
India officially left, and the provisional government, with Nehru at it’s head, stepped in.
As the Prime Minister of India, Nehru recognized the special role the India would
play in the international community. During his tenure in office Nehru experienced the
formation of Israel and Pakistan, the decolonization of much of the Middle East, Asia and
Africa, the Korean War, the reconstruction of Western Europe, the formation of military
alliances such as NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact, the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China, the Kashmir conflict, and the overarching fluctuation of
tensions between the Soviet Union and the Western World. By the time Nehru was
chosen as India’s first Prime Minister, his reputation, prestige, and importance as a leader
in the third world made India an important strategic goal for both Cold War camps.
Though many countries were choosing to align with one side in the Cold War, a select
9
Ibid., 56.
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collection of leaders in the Third World choose to follow Nehru’s example and remain
uncommitted to either side, choosing instead to focus on national development. When
Nehru recognized the desperate poverty, exploitation, and underdeveloped state of his
country so many years before, he had inadvertently developed the policy that would
influence India’s foreign relations throughout his term.
Defining Non-Alignment
Once independence was declared India had quite a tumultuous road ahead, filled
with nation-building, economic development and industrial expansion. Nehru knew that
non-alignment was the best way to focus on national development, avoid military conflict
and to create a good reputation for India in the international community. Though many
grumbled about his policy at first, the people of India and eventually leaders throughout
the Western world would come to realize the necessity of a stance of non-commitment. If
Nehru was to get the people of India out of abject poverty he would need the financial
support of the international community. Throughout his time as Prime Minister, Nehru
consistently preferred the help of the United Nations, the World Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund to direct aid from the United States or the Soviet Union, but
this did not mean he was willing to refuse offers of trade, aid, and agricultural or military
tools from independent nations. He also recognized the weakness of the Indian Army,
especially when compared with the militaries of the world’s superpowers, and therefore
used non-alignment as a means of avoiding military conflict.10 The Prime Minister was
determined to achieve political and economic independence as well as social equality for
all Indian people. He recognized that the key problems preventing India’s successful
development was the economic distribution of wealth and was therefore willing to
10
Ibid., 157.
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combing government planning with private investments and capitalistic endeavors,
creating a combination of socialist and capitalistic economic policies. He recognized the
importance of economics in maintaining the democratic government and understood that
if his plans for India’s development failed, the already strong Communist Party of India
(CPI) could make significant political gains, and the “Unprecedented Experiment in
Democracy” could fail.11
It was from a past of colonial exploitation, the need for development and
international support, the desire to avoid of military conflict, and an overall hope for
peace that Nehru created non-alignment. In 1965 Krishna Menon described the policy as
based on—
“(a)non-alignment, (b)support of the freedom of the colonial peoples and (c)
opposition to racism,” but they do not fully explain the conduct of contribution of
India in world affairs. World peace and co-existence as goals for motivating
factors more fully explain a great part of it. Ours is a world in which strife, war
and conflict are inherent in the relations between nations. The foreign policy of
India does not exclude the use of force or the threat of it…Nationalism plays both
a key and conclusive role in our motivations and conduct. Nonalignment is…the
policy of independence. It reserves and stoutly maintains that India will make its
own decisions in her national interest and in conformity with her ideas of what is
good in world interests. It is also a policy based on self-reliance and national
dignity.12
He then outlines the Five Principles on which Nehru ideologically based non-alignment
The Five Principles are ‘self-interest’ formulations. They are mutual respect,
mutual interests, non interference in others’ internal affairs and reciprocity. The
very idea or ‘mutuality’ is based on self-respect and self-interest. Not only does
respect which is not ‘mutual’ become subservience, but it fails to insure the
respect for oneself in which mutuality rest.13
11
Robert Trumbull, “Unprecedented Experiment in Democracy,” New York Times, January 20, 1952.
http://proquest.umi.com/pqd (accessed November 29, 2008).
12
V.K. Krishna Menon, “Progressive Neutralism,” in India’s Nonalignment Policy: Strengths and
Weaknesses, ed. Paul F. Power (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1967), 78-79.
13
Ibid.
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Menon, like many in the Indian government, was an ardent supporter of the Nehruvian
model and was even often viewed as an overly enthusiastic enforcer of non-alignment by
foreign governments. His reputation among American politicians was not favorable, as he
was prone to much harsher and dramatic statements than those made by the Prime
Minister. By 1955, with his government and international reputation more firmly secured
than ever, the Prime Minister met with other Third World leaders in Bandung, Indonesia
to discuss the development and effective use of non-alignment. India became an example
for countries struggling to shake free of colonial powers, as well as those trying to
develop politically, socially and economically independent of previous imperialist
rulers.14 It is also important to understand that though the Indian government refused to
align with one superpower or another, it was by no mean neutral. As Nehru explained “I
dislike the world neutrality, because there is a certain passivity about it and out policy is
not passive….It [is] a policy which flowed from out past history, from our recent past and
from our National Movement and from various ideas that we have proclaimed.”15 Nehru
instead remained non-aligned with a particular foreign power so he could interpret each
situation as it occurred and respond as best as possible. The Prime Minister believed that
by being aligned with a certain power, he would also be limited in his ability to negotiate
with others, and that his ultimate goal of world peace would be in jeopardy.16 By 1955,
the Indian government was a secure democracy. Nehru had effectively stabilized the
state, rationally calmed sectarian forces into coexistence, assumed control over the party,
achieved legitimacy for his democratic government and successfully made India the
Pack, “Thinking Globally and Acting Locally,” xii-xiii; Zacharian, Nehru, 217-220.
T.M.P Mahadevan, “Indian Philosophy and the Quest for Peace,” in India’s Nonalignment Policy:
Strengths and Weaknesses, ed. Paul F. Power (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1967), 1.
16
Ibid., 2.
14
15
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model colony for independent, but struggling, nations within the third world who hoped
to develop non-alignment as their foreign policy.17
Eisenhower’s Third World Policy
Before Eisenhower actually took office, the fear of Communism was rapidly
spreading throughout the Western world, especially the United States. The Truman
Doctrine guaranteed American support, especially militarily, to any country attempting to
fight against Communist imperialism. By the time Eisenhower took his position as
Commander in Chief, the United States was firmly entrenched in the Cold War, and was
currently fighting both Korean and Chinese Communist in the Korean War.18 In keeping
with his campaign promise to “Go to Korea”, Eisenhower did negotiate an armistice
ending the conflict in 1953.19 Peace was not only a term Eisenhower used to win the 1952
election, but it was a goal that was woven throughout his eight years in office. Though he
was no stranger to using militaristic means to influence other governments as Zachary
Karabell effectively demonstrates in his Architects of Intervention, he does not examine,
in detail, the fact that Eisenhower also believed that psychological warfare, financial aid,
American investment in foreign nations, and personal diplomacy could convince both
foreign leaders and the general public that the United States had their best interest at
heart, unlike the evil soviets.20
Aid
17
Zachariah, Nehru, 212-213.
It is an interesting, but little known fact, that while peace talks between the Chinese and Americans
were at a stand still, it was actually Prime Minister Nehru who, not so discreetly, spread rumors that the
Americans were considering nuclear attacks on the Chinese if they did not return to the negotiations.
Needless to say, the Chinese were quickly convinced to resume the talks.
19
Philip Geyelin, “I Shall Go to Korea,” Wall Street Journal, October 27, 1952.
20
Zachary Karabell, Architects of Intervention; The United States, the Third World and the Cold War:
1946-1962 (Baton Rouge, LA.: Louisiana State University Press, 1999).
18
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Foreign aid and economic support played a tremendous role during the
Eisenhower years, and a significant portion of the money went directly to the third world.
Yet many in the Congress were against foreign aid because it did not necessarily
guarantee an alliance. As Chester J. Pach emphasizes, “The President urged Congress to
approve increased spending on economic aid for Third World countries but he
encountered considerable resistance. Eisenhower considered foreign assistance ‘the
cheapest insurance in the world’ against the spread of Soviet influence….He challenged
the common criticism that foreign aid was nothing more than a ‘giveaway program’.21
The Eisenhower Administration recognized that each country required a policy that was
especially designed to incorporate specific political, social and economic variants. In
Iran, for instance, when the Shah enjoyed United States support, the popularly elected Dr.
Mohammed Mosaddeq was covertly removed from power, despite the seeming
contradiction to the democratic policies of the United States.22
While Eisenhower was certainly willing to use the military power of the United
States to intervene in foreign affairs, he also recognized when a more peaceful method of
intervention could be just as effective. Neutral countries like India and Yugoslavia
certainly fell into this category, but the administration often encountered significant
resistance from other government branches when requesting aid for non-aligned
countries. Though “India’s neutral and nonaligned foreign policy and its program of
national economic planning and centralized control alienated many congressmen”
Eisenhower “justified economic assistance to India as a means of strengthening the forces
of democracy in Asia…and regarded India as the principal test of the theories behind
21
22
Pack, “Thinking Globally and Acting Locally,” xiii.
For more details on the CIA’s coup of Mosaddeq see Karabell, Architects of Intervention, 50-91.
Mueller 12
development aid.”23 In terms of Yugoslavia, Eisenhower met resistance when proposing
aid, but again stoutly defended his proposal by emphasizing “the military and
psychological benefits derived from Yugoslavia’s break with the Soviet Union.”24 To the
Eisenhower administration, winning the Third World could be done in various ways, and
he often incorporated all resources of financial aid, psychological warfare, and military
support and personal diplomacy to gain supportive governments and populations. While
the long term effects of these decisions has left many countries in unfavorable conditions,
Eisenhower’s decision to intervene or provide American aid most often achieved his
goals of the time.
Tito
After World War II Josip Broz Tito declared the Federated People’s Republic of
Yugoslavia under the Yugoslav Communist Party and attempted to unite the Yugoslav
people under a flag of national pride. President Truman and his advisors were
immediately suspicious of the Communist leader, but after his fallout with Stalin and the
Soviet Union, Tito became an essential part of the anti-Communist policy in Europe. “By
1947, [an] ‘anticipation of fragmentation within the international communist movement’
led the Truman administration to begin to develop a strategy ‘aimed at driving a wedge’
between the Soviets and their allies.”25 But, before the relationship with the Soviet Union
soured, Yugoslavia was considered “fully within the pro-Russian bloc of States” and
“increased the opportunity for the Soviets to spread Communism to Italy and Greece.” 26
23
Burton I. Kaufman, Trade and Aid, Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy 1953-1961, (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 69-70.
24
Ibid.
25
Lorraine M. Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War, (University
Park, PA.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 8.
26
Ibid., 9.
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After over two years of distrust and friction between the United States and Yugoslavia,
the relationship suddenly improved when, in 1948, Stalin and Tito split over Tito’s
refusal to acquiesce to Soviet demands to give up his nation’s sovereignty and
independence. After the split, the administration recognized that “the split was genuine
and that it marked the first substantial challenge to Soviet leadership within the
international communist movement [and] led to U.S. assistance for the Tito regime.
Tito’s bid for autonomy also represented a destabilizing influence within the bloc…By
assisting Yugoslavia; the United States could demonstrate that autonomous communist
regimes would receive a cordial welcome in the West.”27 Truman and later, Eisenhower
were willing to recognize and support Tito’s independent Yugoslavia because he stood
against the Soviet Union, and was therefore a friend to the West. In the way that any
friend of the Soviets was an enemy of the United States, for instance the Communist
government in China, any enemy of the Soviet Union could be a friend, or at least an
associate, of the United States. Tito was often more interested in national issues than in
aligning strictly with the West, and because of his stance as a Communist the American
government remained suspicious of him, but he was invaluable in the fight against the
imperialistic desires of the Communist.28 Once in office, the Eisenhower governments
opted to continue Truman’s policy of using Yugoslavia to drive a wedge between the
Soviets and the surrounding satellite states of Eastern Europe, as well as to prevent the
continued spread of Communism throughout the continent. To do this Eisenhower
supplied Tito with tremendous financial and military aid, but unlike his relationship with
Nehru, Eisenhower never formed a personal connection with the Yugoslav leader. The
27
28
Idib., 43-44.
Ibid., 235-236,
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two men coexisted and used each other for personal and national gains, but remained
separated by their chosen mode of government, never fully able to accept one another.
In India, unlike Iraq and Yugoslavia, the United States Executive Branch
recognized and respected the fact that Nehru enjoyed tremendous, almost demigod like
popularity and could not simply be pushed out of power. The administration realized that
psychological warfare and propaganda alone would not be enough to win the support of
the Indian government. Supporters of Nehru, and therefore non-alignment, would not be
easily convinced to join the Western fight against Communism, and it would take
recognition and respect of the government’s foreign policy to make any progress towards
cooperation between the United States and the Indian government. Throughout his first
years in office, many in Eisenhower’s administration were confused by Nehru’s stance
against aligning. The confusion leaked into public opinion and “Nehru’s position
[became] a puzzle to the West.”29 Included in the column is a comic (see Figure one)
which clearly illustrates how few in the West understood non-alignment. Thus, the
executive branch was forced to get creative, and on the advice of a study of India
prepared by the Indian Embassy for the Department of State, began to recognize the
importance of respecting India’s government.
Make a special effort to treat India as a grown-up in the family of nations. This
will involve: (a) Informing the GOI of our readings of facts on important issues
by messages to Nehru by the President or the Secretary of State in the most
important cases… (b) Informing and as often as possible consulting the GOI in
advance on important major moves of general importance…(c) Consulting the
GOI in advance on our thinking and proposed action on issues directly affecting
India… (d) Show friendliness by accommodating India on small matters of
importance to her.30
A.M. Resenthal, “Nehru’s Position a Puzzle to West,” New York Times, January 1, 1956.
“India, 1957-1962, A Study,” in et. al. eds. John Glennon, Foreign Relations of the United States,
volume viii South Asia 1955-1957, (Washington D.C.: Department of State Publications, 1987), 399.
29
30
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The Eisenhower Administration also recognized that the Indian government had
developed a reputation as an important member of the international community and to
gain favor with the Indian government, the United States must first offer respect. But
still, something was different between the President and Prime Minister, they maintained
a special relationship of respect that went beyond politics and was developed primarily
through the private talks in Washington D.C. and the Gettysburg Farm.
Eisenhower and Nehru: A Lasting Relationship
When the relationship between Dwight D. Eisenhower and Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru is studied, it is often as part of the larger picture of their time in office,
regarding Eisenhower’s approach to the Third World, or Nehru’s policy of nonalignment. Yet, the two men developed an important personal relationship, evident, if
nowhere else, in the fact that the Prime Minister holds the special honor of being the only
head of state to spend the night at Eisenhower’s personal farm in Gettysburg,
Pennsylvania. Though the early years of Eisenhower’s presidency proved rocky for the
two men, contemporary world events forced the men to recognize that they had more in
common than the differences which stood to divide them. The two men were united in
their views against Soviet aggression, in their hopes for a successful democracy in India,
and most importantly (and idealistically) a hope for eventual and lasting peace.
The Early Years
Once Eisenhower won the 1952 election and began his eight year tenure as the
President of the United States, Prime Minister Nehru had developed a position of almost
Mueller 16
total power within India and a reputation as a successful mediator and accomplished
diplomat within the international community.31
It is difficult to overstate Nehru’s importance and prestige on the Indian and
international scenes...he had unchallenged sway over both the government and the
ruling Congress party. As minister of external affairs, he was the principle
architect of India’s foreign policy and was intimately involved in managing its
diplomacy….Nehru was recognized as the most outstanding figure in the Third
World, a major statesman who had become a force to be reckoned with in
international affairs.32
With this reputation, it was impossible for the Eisenhower administration to ignore the
leader of India, and on a larger scare, the Third World. Unlike his predecessors,
Eisenhower was dealing directly with the leaders of newly independent countries
throughout the world, and the administration quickly set to gather intelligence and
develop programs for this new arena, hoping to enlarge the western sphere of influence
against the Soviets. In 1953, an intelligence report on Nehru’s attitude towards
Communism suggested that his enthusiasm for Communism had begun to wane, and this
could prove valuable to creating anti-Soviet sympathies in the region. “In a confidential
conversation with Ambassador Bowles…Nehru reiterated the view that the USSR is
presently an aggressor…and even went so far as to state that he fully understood the
American position of balancing Soviet forces in Europe.”33 Already, the US government
recognized the importance of gaining favor with the Prime Minister because of his status
within the Third World, as well as the strategic importance of friendly relations with
India due to its geographic location. “The most serious effects of the loss of South Asia to
“Probable Developments in South Asia,” in et. al. eds. John Glennon, FRUS, 1952-1954 volume XI,
part 2: Africa and South Asia (Washington D.C.: Department of State Publication, 1983), 1074.
32
Howard B. Schaffer, Ellsworth Bunker: Global Troubleshooter, Vietnam Hawk, (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 56-57.
33
Research for Near East, South Asia and Africa, “Nehru’s Attitudes Toward Communism, the Soviet
Union, and Communist China, No. 6269, Date: July 24, 1953,” in eds. Praveen K. Chaudhry and Martha
Vanduzer-Snow The United States and India: A History Through Archives, The Formative Years,
(Thousand Oaks, CA.: SAGE Publications, 2008), 295.
31
Mueller 17
Communist control would be psychological and political. It would add to the Soviet Bloc
five countries…and would extend Communist control to include nearly half of the
world’s population. Loss of South Asia…would greatly reduce confidence in the capacity
of the free world to halt the expansion of Communism.”34 India, as the largest democratic
nation within South Asia, was clearly crucial in the US plans to prevent the spread of
Communism throughout Asia. Despite problems of poverty, low standards of living,
religious conflict, and dissatisfaction with the declaration of an independent Pakistan and
an increasingly ineffective Congress, American policy makers had high hopes that India
would succeed in its quest for democracy.35 More importantly, they recognized that “the
continuation of US economic aid would contribute to Indian stability and might
encourage a more favorable attitude toward the West…despite its independent and
neutral policies, India’s general disposition will probably remain favorable to the West in
the East-West struggle.”36 Despite consistent declarations of neutrality by Indian
government officials and Nehru himself, American officials remained hopeful that by
combining the democratic tendencies of India with economic aid and an increasingly
personal relationship between Nehru and Eisenhower, India would continue to lean more
towards the West in the politics of the Cold War.37
In attempts to further US-Indian relations upon the recognition of India’s political,
economic and strategic importance, both Vice President Richard Nixon and Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles included India on their separate tours of South Asia and Africa,
34
“Consequences of Communist Control Over South Asia,” in FRUS 1952-1954, volume XI, part 2:
Africa and South Asia, 1063.
35
“Probable Developments in South Asia,” FRUS 1952-1954, volume XI, 1074-1087.
36
Ibid., 1089.
37
John Foster Dulles, “Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President: November 30, 1954,” in
FRUS 1952-1954, volume XI Africa and South Asia, part 2, 1786.
Mueller 18
early in Eisenhower’s time in office. These visits were the first signs that the current
administration recognized and respected India’s importance in the international
community. Later aims to further the relationship between India and the United States
developed as advisors began to suggest that the President invite Nehru to visit the United
States in late 1954. As relations between India and the United States continued to
deteriorate as a result of disagreements over relations with the Communist government in
China, military aid for Pakistan, and military alliances within Southeast Asia, the
Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, South Asian and African Affairs drafted the
following memorandum—
Because of widespread Indian resentment toward these policies of
substantial economic aid programs for India and our information and cultural
efforts to improve the United States-Indian relations have in a sense become
holding operations rather than means of extending our influence. It is entirely
possible that the Congress may be tempted in the future to cut India off from
special economic assistance…since no significant change to which India objects
in likely we should find some means of making those policies more acceptable to
India. In my opinion the only way in which that might be done would be through
a personal approach of Prime Minister Nehru by President Eisenhower himself…
Madame Pandit believes that if Nehru were to spend two days with the President
himself in informal surroundings…it might effect a profound change in the Prime
Minister’s attitudes toward the United States.38
Though the visit would not come to fruition for over two years, the fact that policy
makers began emphasizing the importance of a possible visit by Nehru suggests that they
believed the only way to gain Indian support would be to convince the Prime Minister
that he and the American President, and by extension, their two nations had much in
common.
The years between the first recommendation that Nehru visit and the actual trip in
“Harold G. Josif and Henry T. Smith, Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Easter, South Asian and African Affairs (Byroade) o the Secretary of State, November 4, 1954”, in FRUS
1952-1954, volume XI Africa and South Asia, part 2, 1772-1773.
38
Mueller 19
December of 1956 were tumultuous times for both the United States and India. While the
United States was creating and maintaining the Baghdad and South East Asian Treaty
Organization (SEATO), organizing the overthrow of the new President of Guatemala,
managing the repercussions from the Supreme Court decisions to uphold Brown v. Board
of Education and developing an interstate highway act, India was equally as busy. The
relatively new republic was hoping that a Five Year Plan (1951-1955) would jump start
agricultural and industrial development, announcing optimism for the spread of nonalignment throughout the recently independent countries of the Third World, attempting
to mediate between two superpowers and encouraging the limitation of an arms race,
discouraged by Portuguese refusal to return the territory of Goa (a remaining colonial
holding dating back to the sixteenth century), hoping to avoid territorial conflict with
Communist China through friendly diplomacy and, finally, attempting to mend the rift
between itself and the recently declared Pakistan over the region of Kashmir.39 In the
summer of 1955, plans to invite the Prime Minister began to take root, but the situation
devolved when it was revealed that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev would be visiting
India just weeks before the dates intended for Nehru’s trip to the US. American policy
makers “did not want to appear to be climbing on the bandwagon of building up Nehru
too much.”40 After the Soviet Premiers visit though, popular opinion practically
demanded a similar visit to improve US-Indian relationships—“The KhrushchevBulganin tour, in which they also upheld India’s claim to Kashmir against Pakistan while
attempting to tar the United States with the colonialist brush, has reinforced the
“NSC 5701: Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy Toward South Asia (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Ceylon and Nepal,” FRUS 1955-1957 volume VIII: South Asia, 29-41.
40
“Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of State for near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs
(Allen) to the Secretary of State,” FRUS 1955-1957 volume VIII: South Asia, 290.
39
Mueller 20
conviction of responsible Washington officials that the free but neutralist nations of Asia
must be handled with special care.”41 That special care called for by The New York Times
came in the fore of an official invitation for Nehru to visit the United States in the
summer of 1956. While on tour of South Asia, Secretary of States John Foster Dulles
stopped in India to extend the Presidents invitation to the Prime Minister. This invitation
was seen as an illustration of “the new attention being given to the problem of the
‘uncommitted world’” and would provide the two world leaders with a chance to discuss
the issues of non-commitment, India’s nationalistic ambitions, colonial aspirations of the
worlds superpowers, and the recognition of Communist China.42 When Nehru accepted
the invitation to visit, US-Indian relations were somewhat strained, as the two nations
foreign policies continued to clash over the settlement of Kashmir, the return of Goa from
the Portuguese government, American involvement in military pacts and India’s relations
with the Soviet Union. Though the meeting was originally set for the seventh of July, the
two men were forced to reschedule, preferring “to hold their private talks at a time when
it was certain no strain would be imposed on the President” during his recuperation.43 As
international conflicts arose over the Suez Canal and anti-Soviet uprisings in Hungary the
Prime Ministers visit continued to increase in importance because the two heads of state
would need to work together to bring peace to the international community.
The Visit to the United States
41
Elie Abel, “Dulles Sets Visit to India in March,” New York Times, January 14, 1956. http://proquest
.umi.com (accessed on December 2, 2008).
42
“Nehru is Invited to White House: Acceptance Seen,” New York Times, March 15, 1956.
http://proquest.umi.com (accessed December 2, 2008).
43
Edwin L. Dale Jr., “Eisenhower, Nehru Postpone Parley,” New York Times, June 26, 1956.
http://proquest.umi.com (accessed December 2, 2008).
Mueller 21
Though one meeting between world leaders is rarely enough to create stable and
lasting bonds that stand the test of domestic and international strife, the meeting between
President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Nehru could not have come at a better time to
improve relations and help develop a sense of respect and understanding between the two
men. On Saturday, December 16, 1956, the Prime Minister arrived for a four day visit to
the United States. According to a Presidential Brief developed to prepare Eisenhower for
the visit, the United States had five objectives for the visit—
(1) To increase Mr. Nehru’s respect and appreciation of the general objectives of
American foreign policy, (2) to bring out such broad and significant areas of
agreement between the United states and India as the development of broader
international cooperation, the need for armament control and inspection
safeguards, economic expansion liberties and representative institutions; (3) to
‘agree to disagree’ on those specific foreign policy issues which clearly involve
differing Indian and American concepts of national security and national interest,
(4) to give a sympathetic hearing to the Prime Minister’s views and make him feel
he has been consulted on the problems discussed, and (5) to establish a closer
personal relationship between the President and the Prime Minister.44
The Prime Ministers visit, though short was of significant strategic importance to the
Eisenhower administration, and if it proceeded smoothly, could tremendously improve
United States-Indian relations.
Following a meeting with the Secretary of State, the Prime Minister and the
President drove to the Eisenhower’s private farm in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Because
the farm was isolated in a small town, but just over an hour north of the Capital, it proved
a preferred retreat for the President and it was here where he often engaged in a sort of
offhand diplomacy. Visitors to the farm included various American politicians, the vicepresident, French leader Charles De Gaulle, and by the end of 1959, even Soviet Premier
Nikita Khrushchev. Though most visits only lasted the afternoon, they proved invaluable
“Briefing Paper-Nehru Visit, December 16-20, 1956,” Whitman Files, International Series, Box 28,
Folder 1. Eisenhower Library. Accessed at Eisenhower National Historic Site.
44
Mueller 22
in enabling the President to improve personal relationships with various political leaders
of his time. Popular opinion, like that of the President and his advisors, suggests that the
goal was not to come to any firm decisions regarding domestic of international policies
but to simply discuss various issues as means to get to know one another— “No hard
decisions are expected for the Eisenhower-Nehru talks,” but it also “no small gain that
the elected heads of the world’s two larges democracies have so extensive an opportunity
to exchange views and to gain mutual understanding.” 45 Prime Minister Nehru’s visit to
the farm deserves special recognition, if for nothing but the fact that he was the only
political leader to actually spend the night. While at the farm, the two men spent fourteen
hours in private, but relaxed discussion, notably free of ministers of defense and
secretaries of state.46 Despite the long talks, the two men also took the time for a public
tour the Presidents farm, noting his prized Black Angus cattle herd, and the local
battlefields. As their conversations continued back in Washington D.C. the two men dealt
in great detail with many issues, most notably, Communist China, India’s policy of
neutrality, the uprisings in Hungary, the American position in the Suez crisis, the conflict
with Pakistan, and the possibility of continued American aid. Though no treaty was
signed and no new programs emerged from the four day trip, it is clear that the leaders of
the United States and India had developed a more intimate relationship, and Eisenhower,
in particular, had achieved the goal to agree to disagree.
I liked Prime Minister Nehru. I deeply sympathize with the agonizing problems
that the Chinese aggression later caused his nations. He sincerely wanted to help
his people and lead then to higher levels of living and opportunity; I think it only
fair to conclude that he was essential to his nation. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was
Chalmers M. Roberts, “Indian Leader Going With Ike to Gettysburg,” Washington Post, December
17, 1956.; “ Mr. Nehru’s Visit”, New York Times, December 20, 1956. http://proquest.umi.com/pqd
(accessed on December 2, 2008).
46
Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 108.
45
Mueller 23
not easy to understand; few people are, but his was a personality of unusual
contradictions.47
Not only did the meeting have the immediate of signaling to the American and Indian
people that the two nations were now on a much friendlier basis, but the effects of the
meeting were also seen towards the end of Eisenhower’s term in office, when he
reciprocated Nehru’s visit by going to India.
Short Term Implications of Nehru’s Visit
The timing of Nehru’s visit could hardly have been better, as events in Egypt and
Hungary were currently pushing the Prime Minister away from the Soviet Union. Nehru
was impressed by the fact that the United States Ambassador to the United Nations,
Henry Cabot Lodge, had recently “led the move to demand British and French
withdrawal from Egypt” instead of refusing to intervene in support of the European
allies.48 In addition, the violent repression of Hungarian uprisings by Soviet troops had
the Indian Prime Minister reconsidering his stance that, though non-aligned, often leaned
slightly towards the USSR. Many speeches given by Nehru in the weeks leading up to his
visit suggested that Nehru “had much kinder words for U.S. policy past and present,” as
well as overflowing personal tributes for President Eisenhower.”49
As implied by a
telegram from the American Ambassador to India just weeks before Nehru’s visit, Nehru
came to the United States looking to specifically improve relations.
Basic fact is that American prestige is higher than it has been for several years
and at a times when India [is] more susceptible to accepting American moral and
material leadership as counterweight to UK-Commonwealth ties, loss of prestige
of USSR, and uneasy political social and economic rivalry with Red
47
Ibid., 113.
Richard H. Rovere, “Letters From Washington,” The New Yorker, December 13, 1956. Gettysburg
College Microfilm Collection.
49
“National Affairs,” Time 68 no. 25 (December 17, 1956), 17. Gettysburg College Microfilm
Collection.
48
Mueller 24
China….Nehru, therefore, comes to Washington in a sensitive position of
weakness. He and his advisers know that they have fumbled internationally, that
the UK no longer represents acceptably alternative leadership to US…As
consequence, we feel opportunities of personal diplomacy are offered President
which could start process of our filling vacuum resulting from loss of prestige by
USSR and UK…and of securing greater Indian sympathy with free world, and
specifically, US political objectives.50
In a press conference held at the trips conclusion, it was clear that though no important
decisions had been made, the two leaders had certainly created the belief that their
leaders were now on friendlier terms which would enable cooperation in the future.
Multiple news papers reported that though no official political decisions had been made,
there was a belief that the two men had reached “a greater understanding” of one
another.51 “It can be said that two of the world’s most important leaders know one
another better and have a keener appreciation of the problems and aspirations of their
respective peoples than they had before.”52 As Nehru told reporters, “‘I think India and
American will get along very well in the future in international affairs. When asked if he
felt the talked would contribute to world peace, he relied: ‘I certainly do.’”53 The Prime
Minister also expressed hope and the belief that Eisenhower now more accurately
grasped his policy of non-alignment, and that he as well understood the Presidents
international policies, as well as the history behind them. As leaders of the two largest
democracies in the world, Prime Minister Nehru and President Eisenhower had many
things in common. A desire to see democracy succeed, a strong anti-colonialist view,
hopes for India’s economic and social development, a dislike for aggression and
Frederic Bartlett, “Telegram from the Embassy in India to the Department of State,” FRUS 1955-1957
volume VIII, South Asia, 320.
51
Warren Rogers Jr., “Ike, Nehru End Four Days of Talks, Announce ‘Greater Understanding,’”
Washington Post, December 21, 1956. http://proquest.umi.com/pqd (accessed on December 2, 2008).
52
Cabell Phillips, “Talks with Nehru Typify U.S. Personal Diplomacy,” New York Times, December 23,
1956. http://proquest.umi.com/pqd (accessed on December 2, 2008).
53
Chalmers M. Roberts, “Premier Declares U.S., India Have Reached Better Understanding,”
Washington Post, December 20, 1956. http://proquest.umi.com/pqd (accessed on December 2, 2008).
50
Mueller 25
imperialism, and an overall hope for eventual world peace. Though the two men often
disagreed over foreign policy, Soviet strategies towards other countries, and the
importance of military alliances, Nehru’s visit in the last month of 1956 allowed the two
men to develop a working relationship based on common beliefs, rather than those which
could divide them. Though a strict anti-Communist throughout his first term in office
President Eisenhower had developed a policy that was more accepting and understanding
of non-alignment by the time Nehru came to visit. It can not be suggested that
Eisenhower would not have simply rather had all non-aligned countries join the western
world against the Soviets, but knowing that this was highly unlikely, by meeting Nehru
Eisenhower was able to use his charm and good-natured personality to form a lasting
bond with the creator and leader of the so called non-committed world. This personal
diplomacy that would continue to prove effective throughout Eisenhower’s second term
as other world leaders would visit Washington D.C. as well as during his diplomatic trips
around the world.
The visit of Prime Minister Nehru to Washington D.C. and the Gettysburg Farm
presented Eisenhower with the opportunity to cement a relationship that had previously
been on shaky foundation. Almost constant differences in opinions created a rift between
the two world leaders that appeared almost beyond repair until the seemingly fated visit
in December. The combination of a shift in the winds resulting from the Suez Canal crisis
and a harsh Soviet reaction to Hungarian protests, common hopes for a peaceful future,
and the friendly, impossible not-to-like personality of President Eisenhower transformed
the rapport between the two heads of state from one of cool regard to that of friendship
and cooperation. When Eisenhower’s final years in office began to come to a close, he
Mueller 26
often considered the possibility of an international trip to mark the end of his time served.
Visiting the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Northern Africa seemed to be a good
final diplomatic step and the “best use of this remaining time for the benefit of the United
States.”54Not only did he feel that “face-to-face, friendly discussions offer advantages
that can scarcely be realized through written communication,” but he also noted that
when foreign heads of state visited the United States they hope to “demonstrate the
friendliness of his people toward ours.”55 By visiting eleven countries towards his last
days in office, Eisenhower felt he could take advantage of his personal popularity
throughout the world to enhance the international reputation of the United States. “‘In
every country’ he said ‘I hope to make widely known America’s deepest desire: a world
in which all nations may prosper in freedom, justice and peace, unmolested and
unafraid.’56” In each country, the American President drew massive crowds, but few were
able to compare to the masses that turned out to greet Eisenhower throughout India. The
Presidents popularity with the Indian people can be seen in reports from his arrival, his
ovation at the Indian Parliament, and most clearly in those detailing the crowd at a civic
reception which suggest that over half a million people came to listen to the President and
the Prime Minister speak.57 Though his goal was to impress upon the people of the world
that the United States was a peaceful and friendly nation, he was also on a diplomatic
mission. While in India, the President participated in formal and informal talks with
Indian politicians, most often the Prime Minister, and when reflecting upon his final
dinner in India the President said—“During the time we spent there I felt closer to Mr.
54
Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 489.
Ibid.
56
“ National Affairs,” Time 74 no. 24 (December 14, 1959): 12.
57
Ibid., 503.
55
Mueller 27
Nehru than on any of the other occasions we had been together. He talked of India, her
history, her needs, her principle problems, both domestic and foreign and of his hopes for
her. His views were palpably honest and sincere….Understandings between our two
governments had deepened, I felt, and our ease of communication improved.”58 When
Eisenhower began his first term as the President of the United States many believed
Prime Minister Nehru would be a proverbial thorn in his side, often leaning towards
support of American enemies while simultaneously refusing to align with wither of the
two superpowers of the Cold War, but by the time he left office in 1961, Nehru had
become both a personal friend to Eisenhower and a political friend to the United States.
Though Nehru would never ally with the United States, and insisted on always putting
the interests of India before any others, the implementation of personal diplomacy during
the visits in 1956 and 1959 allowed Eisenhower to create a bond that, though tested,
proved strong enough to withstand future disagreements and international conflict.
58
Ibid., 504.
Mueller 28
Figure 1: From A. M. Rosenthal, “Nehru’s Position a Puzzle to West,” The New York
Times, January 1, 1956.
Mueller 29
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Additional Reading
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American Academy of Political and Social Science 401 (May, 1972): 85-94.
Karabell, Zachary. Architects of Intervention; The United States, the Third World and the
Cold War: 1946-1962. Baton Rouge, LA.: Louisiana State University Press, 1999.
Lodge, Henry Cabot. As It Was: An Inside View of Politics and Power in the ‘50s and
‘60s. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1976.
Mueller 31
McMahon, Robert J. The Cole War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and
Pakistan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
Pruden, Caroline. Conditional Partners: Eisenhower, the United Nations, and the Search
for a Permanent Peace. Baton Rouge, LA.: Louisiana State University Press,
1998.
Rotter, Andrew J. Comrades at Odds: The United States and India 1947-1964. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2000.