CMSDL Core Files 2015-2016
2015-2016
CMSDL Core Files
Researched by Hanna Nasser, Alix Dahl, David Song and Mike Baxter-Kauf (with
contributions from Cydney Edwards, Roman Motley, and Travis Ormsby)
Resolved: The United States federal government should
substantially curtail its domestic surveillance
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Core Files Table of Contents 1/4
*** STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE
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STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE SUMMARY
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STINGRAY 1AC—PLAN
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STINGRAY 1AC—HARMS (DEMOCRACY)
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STINGRAY 1AC—HARMS (RACIAL PROFILING)
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STINGRAY 1AC—RACIAL PROFILING ADVANTAGE
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STINGRAY 1AC—SOLVENCY
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2AC DEMOCRACY EXTENSIONS – ANSWERS TO: “STINGRAY UNDER CHECK NOW”
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2AC DEMOCRACY ADVANTAGE—STINGRAY VIOLATES
18
2AC DEMOCRACY ADVANTAGE—COPS LIE
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2AC DEMOCRACY ADVANTAGE—PRIVACY KEY TO DEMOCRACY
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2AC RACIAL PROFILING ADVANTAGE—STINGRAY PROFILES
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2AC RACIAL PROFILING ADVANTAGE—IMPACTS
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2AC EXTENSIONS – SOLVENCY (BANNING STINGRAY SOLVES)
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2AC SOLVENCY—FCC GOOD
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2AC ANSWERS TO: FCC CAN’T DECERTIFY
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2AC ANSWERS TO: TERROR DISADVANTAGE
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2AC ANSWERS TO CRIME DISADVANTAGE
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*** STINGRAY NEGATIVE
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1NC ANSWERS TO: DEMOCRACY ADVANTAGE
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1NC ANSWERS TO: RACIAL PROFILING ADVANTAGE
32
1NC ANSWERS TO: SOLVENCY
2NC/1NR EXTENSIONS (HARMS – RACIAL PROFILING) – RACIAL PROFILING IS INEVITABLE
2NC/1NR EXTENSIONS TO HARMS (DEMOCRACY) – STINGRAY ABUSES UNDER CHECK NOW
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34
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2NC/1NR EXTENSIONS TO: SOLVENCY—GOVERNMENT WILL KEEP DOING SURVEILLANCE
2NC/1NR EXTENSIONS TO: SOLVENCY—FCC FAILS (CIRCUMVENTION)
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TERROR DISADVANTAGE LINKS
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*** NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS AFFIRMATIVE
NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS SUMMARY
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NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 1AC –PLAN
NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 1AC – HARMS (PRIVACY)
NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 1AC – HARMS (PRIVACY)
NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 1AC – HARMS (RACISM)
NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 1AC – HARMS (RACISM)
NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 1AC – SOLVENCY
ANSWERS TO: TERRORISM DISADVANTAGE
ANSWERS TO: TERRORISM DISADVANTAGE
ANSWERS TO: CRIME DISADVANTAGE
2AC EXTENSIONS: PRIVACY
2AC EXTENSIONS: RACISM
2AC EXTENSIONS – SOLVENCY
*** NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS NEGATIVE
42
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1NC SOLVENCY
1NC RACISM HARMS
1NC PRIVACY HARMS
1NC PRIVACY HARMS
*** DRONE AFFIRMATIVE
56
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1AC
DRONES 1AC - PLAN
2AC HARMS FRONTLINES
2AC CIVIL LIBERTIES EXTENSIONS
61
62
67
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2AC CIVIL LIBERTIES EXTENSIONS - ANSWERS TO: OBAMA REGULATING DRONES NOW
2AC CIVIL LIBERTIES EXTENSIONS - IMPACT
2AC INNOVATION
2AC SOLVENCY
ANSWERS TO: ELECTIONS DISADVANTAGE (DRONES AFFIRMATIVE)
*** DRONE NEGATIVE
69
70
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73
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1NC ADVANTAGE FRONTLINES
1NC CIVIL LIBERTIES FRONTLINE
1NC INNOVATION FRONTLINE
1NC SOLVENCY FRONTLINE
2NC/1NR ADVANTAGE FRONTLINE EXTENSIONS
2NC/1NR CIVIL LIBERTIES
2NC/1NR INNOVATION
2NC/1NR SOLVENCY
ADVANTAGE FRONTLINE EXTENSIONS
ANSWERS TO: INHERENCY- EXTENSIONS
ANSWERS TO: CIVIL LIBERTIES- IMPACT FRAMING
2NC/1NR ANSWERS TO: SOLVENCY- EXTENSIONS
76
77
78
79
80
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82
83
84
85
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***TOPICALITY NEGATIVE
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1NC VIOLATIONS
89
**FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
1NC DRONE SURVEILLANCE- “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT” VIOLATION
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91
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1NC STINGRAY- “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT” VIOLATION
93
**CURTAIL ≠ ABOLISH
1NC SECURITY LETTERS- CURTAIL ≠ ABOLISH
2NC/1NR TOPICALITY BLOCKS
95
96
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2NC/1NR- ANSWERS TO: REASONABILITY
***”FEDERAL GOVERNMENT” VIOLATION
2NC/1NR - “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT”- EXTENSIONS
2NC/1NR - “ITS”- EXTENSIONS
**2NC/1NR DRONE AFFIRMATIVE
2NC/1NR DRONE AFFIRMATIVE- “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT”- OVERVIEW
2NC/1NR DRONE AFFIRMATIVE- “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT”- VIOLATION
**2NC/1NR STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE
2NC/1NR DRONE AFFIRMATIVE- “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT”- OVERVIEW
2NC/1NR STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE- “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT”- VIOLATION
***CURTAIL ≠ ABOLISH
**2NC/1NR NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS AFFIRMATIVE
2NC/1NR SECURITY LETTERS- CURTAIL ≠ ABOLISH – OVERVIEW
2NC/1NR SECURITY LETTERS- CURTAIL ≠ ABOLISH – INTERPRETATION EXTENSIONS
**TOPICALITY AFFIRMATIVE
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
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**2AC BLOCKS
2AC- DRONE AFFIRMATIVE- T “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT”
2AC- STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE- T “FEDERAL GOVERNMENT”
2AC SECURITY LETTERS
113
114
115
116
CRIME DISADVANTAGE
117
CRIME DA 1NC
118
CRIME DA 1NC
CRIME DA 1NC
CRIME DA 1NC
2NC/1NR LINK EXTENSIONS: GENERAL
2NC/1NR EXTENSIONS: NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS LINK
2NC/1NR LINK EXTENSIONS - DRONE SURVEILLANCE
2NC/1NR UNIQUENESS EXTENSIONS – CRIME LOW NOW
2NC/1NR IMPACTS TURNS CASE - SURVEILLANCE
2NC/1NR IMPACTS TURNS CASE – RACISM
2NC/1NR IMPACTS – ECONOMY
2NC/1NR IMPACT – POVERTY/STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE
119
120
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122
123
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CRIME DISADVANTAGE AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS
NON-UNIQUE: CRIME HIGH NOW
NO LINK - SURVEILLANCE DOESN’T REDUCE CRIME
ANSWERS TO: CRIME HURTS ECONOMY
133
134
135
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TERRORISM DISADVANTAGE
2NC/1NR EXTENSIONS: NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS LINK
138
143
LINKS—DRONES
147
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2NC/1NR UNIQUENESS—SURVEILLANCE SOLVES TERROR NOW
148
2NC/1NR EXTENSION: IMPACT (NUCLEAR TERRORISM)
150
IMPACT—TURNS THE AFF (RACISM)
151
IMPACT—TURNS THE AFF (CIVIL LIBERTIES)
153
IMPACTS—NUCLEAR TERRORISM CAUSES WAR
155
ANSWERS TO: SURVEILLANCE HASN’T STOPPED ANY ATTACKS
156
ANSWERS TO: BIOTERROR IMPOSSIBLE
157
TERRORISM DA AFFIRMATIVE ANSWERS
159
AFF—ARAB AMERICANS LINK TURN
160
AFF—SURVEILLANCE FAILS/NO LINK
161
AFF—NO IMPACT
163
AFF—LINK TURN: TARGETED SURVEILLANCE
164
AFF—NO LINK
167
**ELECTIONS DISADVANTAGE NEGATIVE
169
1NC HILLARY GOOD
**UNIQUENESS- HILLARY GOOD
UNIQUENESS- HILLARY GOOD- ANSWERS TO: BERNIE SANDERS
2NC/1NR- UNIQUENESS WALL- HILLARY GOOD
**LINKS- HILLARY GOOD
LINK WALL- DRONE AFFIRMATIVE
LINK WALL- STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE
LINK WALL- SECURITY LETTERS AFFIRMATIVE
2NC/1NR ANSWERS TO: NO LINK – SURVEILLANCE POLICY NOT KEY TO ELECTION
2NC/1NR ANSWER TO: NO LINK – ELECTION TOO FAR OFF
2NC/1NR ANSWER TO: IMPACT TURN – IRAN DEAL
**ELECTIONS DISADVANTAGE AFFIRMATIVE
170
173
174
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178
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183
184
185
187
188
193
**2AC BLOCKS
2AC HILLARY GOOD- LINK TURN STRATEGY
2AC HILLARY GOOD – IMPACT TURN STRATEGY
**A2- HILLARY GOOD- 1AR EXTENSIONS
1AR HILLARY GOOD – NON-UNIQUE: HILLARY LOSES NOW (BERNIE SANDERS)
1AR HILLARY GOOD – NON-UNIQUE: HILLARY LOSES NOW (GENERAL ELECTION)
WASHINGTON EXAMINER, 2015
1AR HILLARY GOOD – NO LINK – SURVEILLANCE DOESN’T SWING VOTES
1AR HILLARY GOOD – LINK TURN – SURVEILLANCE REFORM IS POPULAR
1AR HILLARY GOOD – IMPACT TURN – IRAN DEAL BAD
**STATES COUNTERPLAN NEGATIVE
1NC STATES COUNTERPLAN
2NC/1NR- STATES COUNTERPLAN- SOLVENCY- OVERVIEW
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2NC/1NR- STATES COUNTERPLAN- SOLVENCY- DRONE AFF
2NC/1NR- STATES COUNTERPLAN- SOLVENCY- SECURITY LETTERS
2NC/1NR- STATES COUNTERPLAN- SOLVENCY- STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE
2NC/1NR- STATES COUNTERPLAN- ANSWERS TO: PERMUTATION
2NC/1NR- STATES COUNTERPLAN- ANSWERS TO: FIFTY STATE FIAT BAD
**STATES COUNTERPLAN AFFIRMATIVE
215
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217
218
219
220
2AC- STATES COUNTERPLAN
2AC- STATES COUNTERPLAN- SOLVENCY DEFICIT- DRONE AFFIRMATIVE
2AC- STATES COUNTERPLAN- SOLVENCY DEFICIT- SECURITY LETTERS AFFIRMATIVE
2AC- STATES COUNTERPLAN- SOLVENCY DEFICIT- STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE
**CISA DISADVANTAGE NEGATIVE
221
223
224
225
226
1NC- CISA DISADVANTAGE
**UNIQUENESS
2NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- UNIQUENESS WALL
**LINK
2NC/1NR – CISA DISADVANTAGE- LINK WALL- DRONE AFFIRMATIVE
2NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- LINK WALL- STINGRAY AFFIRMATIVE
2NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- LINK WALL- SECURITY LETTERS
**IMPACT
2NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- ANSWERS TO: CISA GOOD
**CISA DISADVANTAGE AFFIRMATIVE
2AC- CISA DISADVANTAGE- LINK TURN STRATEGY
2AC- CISA DISADVANTAGE- IMPACT TURN STRATEGY
2AC- CISA DISADVANTAGE- DRONE AFFIRMATIVE- NO LINK/LINK TURN
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*** Stingray Affirmative
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Stingray Affirmative Summary
The Stingray is an IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) catcher. That is, it’s a device used for intercepting
mobile phone traffic by acting as a fake “cell tower.” The Stingray specifically can use this functionality to:
1. Obtain identifying information about a cell phone that can help facilitate wiretapping.
2. Locate a cell phone user
3. Capture the content of communications like calls and text messages.
4. Block service
The use of these devices has been criticized as a breach of privacy, as well as something that it is difficult to hold
agencies accountable for. Federal agencies have denied FOIA requests related to the devices because of “nondisclosure
agreements” with the corporation that creates them. They are also often used in secret and without obtaining any kind
of warrant.
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Stingray 1AC—Plan
We present the following plan: The FCC should decertify Stingray
catcher devices for use in law enforcement.
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Stingray 1AC—Harms (Democracy)
Contention One is Harms - Stingray devices hurt democracy
Law enforcement use StingRay devices, which illegally retrieve cell phone data from thousands of innocent civilians.
This violates the Fourth Amendment and endangers democracy.
Fakhoury 2012 (Hanni Fakhoury for Electronic Frontier Foundation “StingRays: The Biggest Technological Threat to Cell Phone Privacy You Don’t Know About”
October 22 Online https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/10/stingrays-biggest-unknown-technological-threat-cell-phone-privacy)
Beyond the government's conduct in this specific case, there is an even broader danger in law enforcement using these devices to locate suspects regardless of
whether they explain the technology to judges: these
devices allow the government to conduct broad searches amounting to
“general warrants,” the exact type of search the Fourth Amendment was written to prevent.
A Stingray—which could potentially be beamed into all the houses in one neighborhood looking for a particular
signal—is the digital version of the pre-Revolutionary war practice of British soldiers going door-to-door, searching Americans’ homes without rationale or
suspicion, let alone judicial approval. The Fourth Amendment was enacted to prevent these general fishing expeditions . As the
Supreme Court has explained, a warrant requires probable cause for all places searched, and is supposed to detail the scope of the search to ensure “nothing is left to
the discretion of the officer executing the warrant”.But if uninformed courts approve the unregulated use of Stingrays, they are essentially
allowing the
government to enter into the home via a cellular signal at law enforcement’s discretion and rummage at will without
any supervision. The government can’t simply use technology to upend centuries of Constitutional law to conduct a
search they would be prevented from doing physically.Stingrays Collect Data on Hundreds of Innocent PeopleAnd when police use a
Stingray, it’s not just the suspects’ phone information the device sucks up, but all the innocent people around such
suspect as well. Some devices have a range of “several kilometers,” meaning potentially thousands of people could
have their privacy violated despite not being suspected of any crime. This is another fact the government didn’t fully explain to the
magistrate judge in Rigmaiden.The government now claims it protected privacy by deleting all third-party data on its own after it collected it. But the government’s
unilateral decision to binge and purge comes with its own consequences. Now
there’s no way to know what exactly the government
obtained when it used the device.Had the government told the court what it really was planning on doing and the amount of information it would
obtain, the court may have exercised its constitutional role of ensuring the government narrowed its search. After all, it was for the court, not the government, to
decide how best to balance the government’s need for information with third-party privacy, and any suspect’s future interest in access to potentially exculpatory
information.
Constitutional violations like StingRay will create an unstoppable police state if they are not stopped.
Whitehead 2012 (John Whitehead for The Rutherford Institute “The Corporate Surveillance State: How the Thought Police Use Your Cell Phone to Track Your
Every Move” Online
https://www.rutherford.org/publications_resources/john_whiteheads_commentary/the_corporate_surveillance_state_how_the_thought_police_use_your_cell_)
Advanced technology now provides government agents and police officers with the ability to track our every move.
The surveillance state is our new society. It is here, and it is spying on you, your family and your friends every day. Worse yet, those in control are
using life’s little conveniences, namely cell phones, to do much of the spying. And worst of all, the corporations who produce these little conveniences are happy to
hand your personal information over to the police so long as their profit margins increase. To put it simply, the corporate-surveillance state is in full effect, and
there is nowhere to hide.Using the data transferred from, received by, and stored in your cell phone, police are now able to track your every move. Your
texts, web browsing, and geographic location are all up for grabs. Using “stingray” devices, often housed in mobile surveillance vans,
federal agents track the cell phones of unsuspecting people. By triangulating the source of a cell phone signal, agents
are able to track down the whereabouts of the person holding it. These surveillance sweeps target all cell phone
signals, not just those of criminal suspects. Examples of extralegal police surveillance in the years since 9/11 are numerous, from the NSA’s
warrantless wiretapping program to the NYPD’s spy network that targeted Muslims in the New York area.Unfortunately, the now widespread tactic of spying on
people via their cell phones resides in a legal grey area, which has allowed police agencies to take drastic steps to record the daily activity of all Americans. Whereas
cell phone tracking once fell only in the purview of federal agents, local police departments, big and small, are beginning to engage in cell phone tracking with little to
no oversight. Small police agencies are shelling out upwards of $244,000 to get the technology necessary to track cell phones. And as you might expect, most police
departments have attempted to keep knowledge of their cell phone tracking programs secret, fearing (as they should) a public backlash.Federal courts are divided on
the issue, some saying that a warrant is necessary before executing a cell phone search. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently
ruled that tracking the location of a cell phone without a warrant is legal and, thus, not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
This lack of concern for the
Fourth Amendment—which requires reasonable suspicion that you’re up to something illegal before the police
conduct surveillance on you—is widely shared among the federal and state courts. In fact, courts issue tens of thousands of cell
tracking orders a year, allowing police agencies to accurately pinpoint people’s locations within meters. Unless they’re charged with a crime, most people remain
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unaware that their cell data has been tracked.[…]On the rare occasion that a telecom corporation resists a police effort to spy on a particular cell phone customer,
there are methods by which companies are coerced to comply with the data requests. Telecoms are frequently harassed by the FBI with National Security Letters
(NSL), which are demands for user information without warrant or judicial oversight. These include a gag order, which prevents the recipient from discussing the
demand with others, including the media. Roughly 300,000 of these NSLs have been sent out since 2000, implying a massive spying effort on the part of the federal
government. One telecom is currently in a battle with the federal government over an NSL demanding user data. The telecom refused to abide by the NSL, and in
response the federal government has sued the telecom, insisting that their refusal jeopardizes national security. The end logic of this is that our
private data is
actually not private. The federal government claims that knowing our personal information is critical to preserving
national security, and thus neither telecoms nor users may resist the sharing of that information.Of course, corporations are just as interested in tracking
people’s daily activities as the government. Cell phone companies and the software companies that create applications for their devices track your personal
information so that they can market their services to you. Unfortunately, this leads to mass aggregation of user data which is then used by government agents to spy
on and track all cell phone users. For example, Carrier IQ, a software company, and cell phone manufacturers HTC and Samsung are currently in the midst of a classaction lawsuit brought by Android phone users whose phone activities are recorded by a “rootkit,” a piece of software surreptitiously installed on cell phones that
records the keystrokes of phone users. The FBI denied a December 2011 FOIA request to determine how the government was utilizing Carrier IQ’s software, as it
could have an adverse impact on ongoing investigations. The agency’s refusal suggests that not only is Carrier IQ spying on cell phone users for their corporate
purposes, but that federal agents are utilizing the software to conduct their own spying campaigns.Unfortunately, with intelligence gathering and surveillance doing
booming business, and corporations rolling out technologies capable of filtering through vast reams of data, tapping into underseas communication cables, and
blocking websites for entire countries, life
as we know it will only get worse. As journalist Pratap Chatterjee has noted, “[T]hese tools have
the potential to make computer cables as dangerous as police batons.” Telecoms hold on to user data, including text messages and
Internet browsing history, for months to years at a time. This, of course, has some ominous implications. For example, British researchers have
created an algorithm that accurately predicts someone’s future whereabouts at a certain time based upon where she and her friends have been in the past.
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Stingray 1AC—Harms (Racial Profiling)
Contention Two is Harms – Stingray devices are used for racial profiling
The government uses cell phone trackers like StingRay for racial profiling
Calabrese and Fulton 2012 (Christopher Calabrese and Sandra Fulton for The Leadership Conference. “Privacy Rights: A 21st Century Update” Online
http://www.civilrights.org/monitor/winter-2012/privacy-rights-a-21st.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/)
Despite the efforts of civil rights groups, the practice of racial profiling by members of law enforcement at the
federal, state, and local levels remains a widespread and pervasive problem affecting African-American, Muslim,
Latino, and other communities.In August 2011, an Associated Press report revealed a massive surveillance
department established within the New York Police Department (NYPD) after 9/11 to monitor Muslim neighborhoods and
infiltrate their community organizations. According to officials involved, undercover officers were sent to investigate all parts of daily life in
these communities including bookstores, bars, Internet cafes, and clubs looking for “hot spots” of “radicalization.” As part of a largely secret
police program, they spied on and recorded the lives of innocent Americans without any evidence of
wrongdoing.The NYPD has long viewed the Internet as dangerous territory. In a 2009 report it said:“The Internet plays an important role during the
radicalization process…. The Internet becomes a virtual ’echo chamber’ – acting as a radicalization accelerant while creating the path for the ultimate
stage of Jihadization. In the Jihadization phase, people challenge and encourage each other’s move to action. The Internet (sic) is now a tactical
resource for obtaining instructions on constructing weapons, gathering information on potential targets, and providing spiritual justification for an
attack.”It’s not known whether NYPD’s efforts to track Muslims involved government surveillance under ECPA because of the secrecy of the program.
Assuming ECPA applied, however, there is no question that the outdated nature of ECPA’s protections would have allowed these activities to proceed
with little transparency and judicial oversight.Additionally, recent studies have shown that minority communities use smart
phones at a significantly higher rate than the rest of the population. At the same time, the sensitive information
stored in these phones has become a hot commodity for law enforcement investigations. In just one year, Sprint
Nextel provided law enforcement agencies with the specific whereabouts of its customer more than 8 million times
without requiring a warrant or probable cause. The company even set up a website for law enforcement agents so they could access
these records from the comfort of their desks. “The tool has just really caught on fire with law enforcement ,” said Paul Taylor,
Sprint’s manager of electronic surveillance, in 2009. The fact that Sprint needs to employ a person with the title “manager of electronic surveillance” may
go a long way toward explaining why ECPA needs updating.[…]ConclusionThe Founding Fathers recognized that participants in a
democracy need privacy for their “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” That remains as true today as ever. But
privacy laws have not kept up as technology has changed the way Americans hold their personal information.
Outdated laws allow law enforcement to circumvent the right to privacy, probe personal communications and track an individual’s whereabouts
without any evidence of wrongdoing. In many circumstances, such a weak statutory scheme has a disproportionate impact on racial
minorities and people who may hold unpopular beliefs. Updating privacy laws to require a warrant for access to sensitive personal
information will ensure that police are following proper investigative guidelines and help to guard against profiling. It’s important to update ECPA in order
to maintain the robust privacy protections all Americans expect and deserve.
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Stingray 1AC—Racial Profiling Advantage
Racial profiling destroys community and national security, wastes law enforcement resources, damages minority
communities, and ruins counterterrorism efforts.
Calabrese and Fulton 2012 (Christopher Calabrese and Sandra Fulton for The Leadership Conference. “Privacy Rights: A 21st Century Update” Online
http://www.civilrights.org/monitor/winter-2012/privacy-rights-a-21st.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/)
Racial profiling forces individuals who have engaged in no wrongdoing to endure the burdens of law enforcement in
order to prove their innocence. For each criminal, terrorist, or undocumented immigrant apprehended through racial profiling, many more lawabiding
minorities are treated through profiling as if they are criminals, terrorists, or undocumented immigrants.[…] Texas State Judge Gillberto Hinajosa, the subject of
immigration-related profiling on many occasions, has stated that Southern Texas "feels like occupied territory … It does not feel like we're in the United States of
America."116 Such alienation
is a common consequence of being profiled. Exposure to racial profiling has behavioral as well
as emotional consequences. Many minorities who are entirely innocent of any wrongdoing choose to drive in certain automobiles and on certain routes,
or to dress in certain clothes, to avoid drawing the attention of police who might otherwise profile and stop them. 117 Or they choose to live in areas where they will
not stand out as much, thereby reinforcing patterns of residential segregation.118An example of behavioral changes in an effort to avoid racial
profiling in the counterterrorism context is provided by Khaled Saffuri. Saffuri, a Lebanese man living in Great Falls, Virginia, has said that he shaves closely and wears
a suit when he flies, then remains silent during flights and avoids using the aircraft's bathroom. Sometimes he avoids flying altogether in favor of long drives to his
destination.119Defenders of racial profiling argue that profiling is necessary and useful in the effort by law enforcement authorities to fight street-crime, combat
terrorism, and enforce the nation's immigration laws. The opposite is true: racial
profiling is in all contexts a flawed law enforcement tactic
that may increase the number of people who are brought through the legal system, but that actually decreases the hit
rate for catching criminals, terrorists, or undocumented immigrants. There are two primary reasons for this.To begin with, racial
profiling is a tactic that diverts and misuses precious law enforcement resources. This became clear in 1998 when the U.S. Customs Service
responded to a series of discrimination complaints by eliminating the use of race in its investigations and focusing solely on suspect behavior. A study found that this policy shift led to an almost 300
percent increase in the discovery of contraband or illegal activity.120Consider the inefficient allocation of scarce police resources in New Jersey when, as described in Chapter III (C) of this report local law
enforcement authorities stopped tens of thousands of Hispanic motorists, pedestrians, passengers, and others in a six-month period. Just 1,417 of the tens of thousands stopped were ultimately charged
with immigration offenses by the federal government.121Or, consider the April 2008 assault by more than 100 Maricopa County, Arizona deputies, a volunteer posse, and a helicopter on a small town of
6,000 Yaqui Indians and Hispanics outside of Phoenix, as described in Chapter III (C) above. After terrorizing the residents for two days, stopping residents and chasing them into their homes to conduct
the use of racial profiling—
and the focus on the many Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and other South Asians who pose no threat to national security—diverts law enforcement resources
away from investigations of individuals who have been linked to terrorist activity by specific and credible evidence.A
background checks, Sheriff Joe Arpaio's operation resulted in the arrest of just nine undocumented immigrants.122Turning to the counterterrorism context,
memorandum circulated to U.S. law enforcement agents worldwide by a group of senior law enforcement officials in October 2002 makes clear that race is an
ineffective measure of an individual's terrorist intentions. The memorandum, entitled "Assessing Behaviors," emphasized that focusing on the racial
characteristics of individuals was a waste of law enforcement resources and might cause law enforcement officials to
ignore suspicious behavior, past or present, by someone who did not fit a racial profile.123 One of the authors of the report noted:
"Fundamentally, believing that you can achieve safety by looking at characteristics instead of behaviors is silly. If your goal is preventing attacks … you want your eyes
and ears looking for preattack behaviors, not characteristics."124In sum, ending
racial profiling will result in the more efficient deployment
of law enforcement resources. As David Harris, a professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh Law School and a recognized expert on racial profiling,
explained in his June 2010 testimony before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary
Committee:[…]An
additional reason why racial profiling is not an effective law enforcement tactic is that it destroys the
relationship between local law enforcement authorities and the communities that they serve. This is particularly true with regard to the
enforcement of federal immigration laws by local police under the 287(g) program and other ICE ACCESS programs.When local police function as rogue immigration agents, fear—as opposed to trust—is
created in Hispanic and other immigrant communities. U.S. born children with parents who are either U.S. citizens or lawful residents may avoid coming in contact with police or other public officials
(including school officials) out of concern that they, their parents, or family members will be targeted by local law enforcement authorities for a check of their immigration status. Victims of domestic
violence who are immigrants may fear interacting with the police because of their immigration status, or the status of their families, or even their abusers, and the consequences of that fear can leave them
Respect and trust between law enforcement authorities and immigrant communities are
essential to successful police work. Racial profiling has a destructive impact on minority communities. How many community
in dangerous and violent situations.
members will step up to be "Good Samaritans" and report crimes or accidents, or offer help to a victim until the police arrive, if the risk of doing the good deed is an interaction with a police officer that may
result in a background check or challenge to immigration status? Perversely, the ultimate result of racial profiling in minority communities is precisely the opposite of the goal of effective local law
enforcement. It is for this reason that many police executives and police organizations have expressed concern that the enforcement of the immigration laws by local law enforcement authorities has a
6
The use of racial profiling in the counterterrorism context—as in the immigration context—
alienates the very people that federal authorities have deemed instrumental in the anti-terrorism fight. Arab and Muslim
"negative overall impact on public safety."12
communities may yield useful information to those fighting terrorism. Arabs and Arab Americans also offer the government an important source of Arabic speakers and translators. The singling out of
Arabs and Muslims for investigation regardless of whether any credible evidence links them to terrorism simply alienates these individuals and compromises the anti-terrorism effort. In particular, to the
extent that federal authorities use the anti-terrorism effort as a pretext for detaining or deporting immigration law violators, individuals who might have information that is useful in the fight against terrorism
may be reluctant to come forward. For a special registration program such as NSEERS, those individuals will choose not to register, thereby defeating the very purpose of the program.127
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Stingray 1AC—Solvency
Contention Three is Solvency:
The FCC Can Withdraw the Authority for Police to Employ Stingray Technology
Benson 2014 (Thor Benson, freelance writer.
THE ATLANTIC “The Briefcases that Imitate Cell Phone Towers”
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/09/the-briefcases-that-imitate-cell-phone-towers/380678/
The ACLU, on the other hand, wants to know if local police departments are using Stingrays to monitor citizens in a way that they feel should not be allowed. “At the
the FCC should be reevaluating these grants of authority to Harris to make sure that they're actually appropriate, in light of the
actual effect,” Wessler told me. If the FCC investigated this possibility and found they were mislead in how the Stingray
would be used by police, they could revoke the authorization for police departments using such technology. Whether it
very least,
be the crimes against minorities committed by police departments, the unprecedented militarization of the police in the past decade or the police acting as
appendages of the NSA, it's becoming clear that policies of police forces in the United States are broken. The ACLU and human rights groups around the country are
pleading for more information on what these authorities are doing in their day-to-day work, but they are forced to file information requests that only result in being
given parts of the greater picture. Instead of a few emails between Harris and the FCC, the ACLU wants a copy of the actual application that was sent. But for now,
they are limited to what the government is willing to give them—a string of emails between Harris employees and the FCC regulators who reviewed Harris's
application. And
from what they can tell based on those emails, today’s use of Stingrays lies in sharp contrast with how they
were approved.
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2AC Democracy Extensions – Answers to: “Stingray Under
Check Now”
New Stingray reforms have multiple loopholes and don’t apply to federal agents
Mint Press News, 2015 (http://www.mintpressnews.com/justice-departments-new-stingray-surveillance-policy-hasmajor-loophole/209338/, Sept 8)
The new policy [PDF] states “law enforcement agencies must now obtain a search warrant supported by probable
cause.” It proceeds to outline two exceptions: (1) “exigent circumstances” and (2) “exceptional circumstances where
the law does not require a warrant.”
The very existence of this categorical exception seems to entirely undermine the stated intention of the policy.
Several examples of “exigent circumstances” are outlined as justifications for not getting a warrant—to protect human
life or avert serious injury, to prevent imminent destruction destruction of evidence, to pursue a fleeing felon, to
prevent the escape of a suspect or convicted fugitive.
These are standard examples of situations, which have typically given law enforcement the authority to waive warrant
requirements. Yet, in privacy law, there is no “exceptional circumstances where the law does not require a warrant”
category of accepted exemptions to the Fourth Amendment.
As the policy outlines, “There may also be other circumstances in which, although exigent circumstances do not exist,
the law does not require a search warrant and circumstances make obtaining a search warrant impracticable.”
The Justice Department claims “such cases” will be “very limited” but does not bother to provide a single example of a
situation where human life would not be in danger, a fugitive would not be on the loose, evidence would be near
destruction, but law enforcement would be in circumstances that would make not getting a warrant acceptable.
Essentially, the Justice Department seeks to establish a “We Won’t Get a Warrant If We Don’t Feel Like It” loophole in
government policy.
Nate Freed Wessler, staff attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union, asserted, “The guidance leaves the door
open to warrantless use of Stingrays in undefined ‘exceptional circumstances,’ while permitting retention of innocent
bystander data for up to 30 days in certain cases.”
“The second exception listed in today’s policy for undefined ‘exceptional circumstances’ is potentially problematic,” EFF
stated. “We have no idea what that means, so we’re waiting to see if and how the exception will be used.”
Another problem with the new policy is that it does not apply to federal agents, who use Stingray surveillance in
“national security” investigations.
The policy applies only to state and local law enforcement agencies, which have partnered with federal agencies which
are part of the Justice Department. State and local law enforcement could choose not to be partners and continue to
follow their own rules for Stingray surveillance. It also is a policy, not law, which according to EFF means people have
their privacy violated cannot seek a remedy if law enforcement abuses these guidelines.
Recent Department of Justice Stingray reforms don’t go nearly far enough
US News and World Report, 2015
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/04/police-use-of-stingrays-that-gobble-phone-dataunaffected-by-new-federal-warrant-rule, Sept 4
The Justice Department is reining in federal agents’ use of cell-site simulators that collect in bulk information on
cellphone users in a specific geographic area, but privacy advocates aren't satisfied with initial steps toward shielding
location data of innocent Americans from warrantless collection.
Federal and local officials' use of the devices, the best-known being Stingrays made by Harris Corp., is cloaked in secrecy,
but appears often done without warrants and at times is concealed from courts, with police citing nondisclosure
agreements they signed with the FBI.
Now, the Justice Department announced Thursday, its employees and agents working under its umbrella in agencies
such as the FBI, the U.S. Marshals Service and Drug Enforcement Agency, must generally get a warrant to use cell-site
simulators.
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But the policy, which retains loopholes for exigent circumstances such as "hot pursuit of a fleeing felon" or to spare
someone from death or serious injury and for "very limited" exceptional circumstances, isn’t as far-reaching as
privacy advocates would like, and it doesn’t affect local law enforcement agencies when they are not working with
federal authorities.
Department of Justice Stingray reforms have limited power – we need the Aff plan
US News and World Report, 2015
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/04/police-use-of-stingrays-that-gobble-phone-dataunaffected-by-new-federal-warrant-rule, Sept 4
American Civil Liberties Union attorney Nathan Freed Wessler, one of the most prominent advocates of privacy
protections against Stingray use, says the effect of the new policy on state and local authorities appears limited.
“Disturbingly," he said in a statement, "the policy does not apply to other federal agencies or the many state and local
police departments that have received federal funds to purchase these devices."
Justice Department spokesman Patrick Rodenbush confirms the rules do no constrain law enforcement when they are
not working with the department's authorities
Recent Department of Justice policies on StingRay devices allow exceptions and don’t stop their use
Ars Technica, 2015 http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/09/fbi-dea-and-others-will-now-have-to-get-a-warrant-touse-stingrays/, September 3
Civil liberties advocates generally applauded the DOJ’s move, but felt that more could be done.
"It’s a welcome and overdue first step, but it is just a first step," Linda Lye, an attorney with the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) of Northern California, told Ars. "It doesn’t cover non-DOJ entities and it doesn’t cover
the locals."
Earlier this year Washington State joined Virginia, Minnesota and Utah in imposing a warrant requirement at
the state level.
She also pointed out that the new policy grants a non-warrant exception for well-understood "exigent
circumstances"—a situation Ars detailed recently—it also creates a new category of "exceptional
circumstances."
As the document states:
There may also be other circumstances in which, although exigent circumstances do not exist, the law does
not require a search warrant and circumstances make obtaining a search warrant impracticable. In such cases,
which we expect to be very limited, agents must first obtain approval from executive-level personnel at the
agency's headquarters and the relevant U.S. Attorney, and then from a Criminal Division [Deputy Assistant
Attorney General]. The Criminal Division shall keep track of the number of times the use of a cell-site simulator
is approved under this subsection, as well as the circumstances underlying each such use.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), for example, would be able to continue using stingrays
absent a warrant for now. However, Yates told reporters that DHS was working on its own policy, which is
likely to be similar.
Nathan Freed Wessler, an ACLU attorney, noted that the new policy also does not include any sort of
mandate that the states change their practices through its grant-issuing power. In many cases, state and
local law enforcement obtain the surveillance tools through federal grant money.
"One thing that DOJ would have in its power to do, and DHS could do this, is to tie its grant funding to this
policy," he said.
Warrantless Stingray surveillance is becoming more common in the status quo
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Klonick 2014 (Kate Klonik, lawyer and writer, currently a resident fellow at Yale Law School’s Information Society Project,
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/11/stingrays_imsi_catchers_how_local_law_enforcement_uses_an_invasive_surveillance.html)
One of the tools making it possible for Chief Wiggum to gather all your deets is known colloquially as a Stingray, a
portable gadget about the size of a box of doughnuts. They’re also known as “cell-site simulators,” because, well, that’s exactly what they do: A Stingray
mimics a cellphone tower and forces all nearby mobile phones or devices to connect to it. Every phone that connects
to the Stingray reports its number, GPS location, and the numbers of all outgoing calls and texts. That’s every location and
outgoing call and text log of every phone within a certain radius—up to several kilometers—of the Stingray, and that’s all without a warrant. It’s probably
not a huge surprise to most people in America today that the federal government has incredible surveillance technology that it uses occasionally on its own citizens.
(Hi, NSA!) But polling shows that only 27 percent of people think that this technology is focused on them, and even if not, half of Americans surveyed say that there
might be a margin of federal surveillance they’re willing to endure in the name of homeland security or fighting terrorism. But that logic is a much harder sell when it
local police, who have been acquiring Stingrays in increasing numbers. At least 46 state and local police
departments, from Sunrise, Florida, to Hennepin, Minnesota, have gotten cell-site simulators, which range widely in price from
$16,000 to more than $125,000 a pop. And like the federal government, local police are using this technology without any
judicial oversight. That means Barney Fife—or, if you’re looking for a more sinister example, think Denzel in Training Day—can walk into
your neighborhood with a Stingray, fire it up, and collect all the numbers, GPS, and call logs of every cellphone in the
area. If they’re looking for a specific number (hopefully, it’s not you), they can also use a Stingray to trick your phone
into being a personal GPS tracker and then use that warrantless cellphone tracking to enter your home and arrest
you—again without a warrant.
comes to
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2AC Democracy Advantage—Stingray Violates
StingRay capture data in an intrusive and unconstitutional manner; they should be banned for violating the Fourth
Amendment.
ACLU 2014 (“StingRays: The Most Common Surveillance Tool the Government Won’t Tell You About” Online
https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/StingRays_The_Most_Common_Surveillance_Tool_the_Govt_Won%27t_Tell_You_About.pdf)
Federal and state law enforcement entities across the country are using a powerful cell phone surveillance tool
commonly referred to as a “StingRay.” These devices are capable of locating a cell phone with extraordinary precision, but to do so they operate in
dragnet fashion, scooping up information from a target device, as well as other wireless devices in the vicinity. In addition, these devices can be
configured to capture the content of voice and data communications. Although the federal government has been
using these devices since at least 1995, and use by state and local governments is quite widespread, there are only a
handful of opinions addressing their use. At this juncture, few criminal defense attorneys are aware of these highly
intrusive but extremely common surveillance tools. This is entirely understandable because the federal government
has a policy of not disclosing information about this device. The government appears to be withholding information
from criminal defendants. It even appears to be providing misleading information and making material omissions to
judicial officers when it seeks purported court authorization to use this device – inaccurately referring to it as a “confidential source”
or calling it a different kind of device (like a pen register), and failing to alert courts to constitutionally material facts about the technology, such as the full breadth of
information it obtains from a suspect and its impact on third parties. As a result, courts are probably not aware that they are authorizing use of this device and have
not had an opportunity to rule on its legality, except in very rare instances.
The secrecy surrounding these devices is deeply troubling because this technology raises grave constitutional
questions. There is a compelling argument that StingRays should never be used. Because they operate in dragnet
fashion, they engage in the electronic equivalent of the “general searches” prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. But at
a minimum, law enforcement should obtain a warrant. Even in those instances when law enforcement obtains a warrant,
however, there are likely strong arguments that the warrant is invalid.
StingRay technology violates Fourth Amendment rights
Infosec 2014 (Infosec Technology Institute “StingRay Technology: How the Government Tracks Cellular Devices” Online
http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/stingray-technology-government-tracks-cellular-devices/)
StingRay technology raises serious privacy concerns because of the indiscriminate way it targets cellular devices in a
specific area. The dragnet way in which StingRay operates appears to be in contrast with the principle of various laws worldwide. Government and law
enforcement shouldn’t be able to access citizen’s private information without proving to a court order that must be issued
to support investigation activities.In the US, for example, the Fourth Amendment stands for the basic principle that the US
government cannot conduct a massive surveillance operation, also indicated as “general searches”. The Supreme Court
recently reiterated that principle in a case involving cell phone surveillance, and confirmed that law enforcement need a warrant to analyze data on the suspect’s
cellphone.Organizations for the defense of civil liberties ask governments to provide warrants to use surveillance technologies like StingRay. The warrant still
represents a reasonable mechanism for ensuring the right balance between the citizen’s privacy and law enforcement needs.Organizations such as the American Civil
Liberties Union and Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) highlighted the risks related to the indiscriminate collection of a so large amount of cellular data.“I
don’t think that these devices should never be used, but at the same time, you should clearly be getting a warrant,” said Alan Butler of EPIC.Unfortunately, cases such
as the one disclosed in this post suggest that governments
specific activities, but law
are using StingRay equipment in secrecy. In some cases, a court order is issued for
enforcement arbitrarily extends the use of technology in other contexts that may be menacing to
citizens’ privacy.
Stingray surveillance violates Americans’ 4th Amendment privacy rights
Fakhoury 2012 (Hanni Fakhoury for Electronic Frontier Foundation “StingRays: The Biggest Technological Threat to Cell Phone Privacy You Don’t Know About”
October 22 Online https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/10/stingrays-biggest-unknown-technological-threat-cell-phone-privacy)
Beyond the government's conduct in this specific case, there is an even broader danger in law enforcement using these devices to locate suspects regardless of
whether they explain the technology to judges: these
devices allow the government to conduct broad searches amounting to
“general warrants,” the exact type of search the Fourth Amendment was written to prevent. A Stingray—which could
potentially be beamed into all the houses in one neighborhood looking for a particular signal —is the digital version of the pre18
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Revolutionary war practice of British soldiers going door-to-door, searching Americans’ homes without rationale or suspicion, let alone judicial approval.
The
Fourth Amendment was enacted to prevent these general fishing expeditions. As the Supreme Court has explained, a warrant
requires probable cause for all places searched, and is supposed to detail the scope of the search to ensure “nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing
the warrant”.But if uninformed courts approve the unregulated use of Stingrays, they
are essentially allowing the government to enter into
the home via a cellular signal at law enforcement’s discretion and rummage at will without any supervision. The
government can’t simply use technology to upend centuries of Constitutional law to conduct a search they would be
prevented from doing physically.Stingrays Collect Data on Hundreds of Innocent PeopleAnd when police use a Stingray, it’s not just the
suspects’ phone information the device sucks up, but all the innocent people around such suspect as well. Some
devices have a range of “several kilometers,” meaning potentially thousands of people could have their privacy
violated despite not being suspected of any crime.
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2AC Democracy Advantage—Cops Lie
Cops purposefully mislead courts about their use of Stingray surveillance
Pell & Soghoian 2014 (Stephanie K. Pell and Christopher Soghoian, “YOUR SECRET STINGRAY’S NO SECRET ANYMORE: THE VANISHING GOVERNMENT
MONOPOLY OVER CELL PHONE SURVEILLANCE AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND CONSUMER PRIVACY, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology,
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v28/28HarvJLTech1.pdf)
Despite the fact that U.S. government agencies have used cellular surveillance devices for more than twenty years , the
2012 Judge Owsley opinion is one of only two known published magistrate opinions to address law enforcement use of this
technology. There are several possible reasons for this dearth of judicial analysis, but one of the most troubling possibilities may be a lack of knowledge on the
part of magistrate judges about the specific surveillance technique(s) they are authorizing, due to a lack of candidly presented explanatory information in the
government’s applications. In one set of DOJ emails obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) through a Freedom of Information Act request, for
example, a federal prosecutor in Northern California noted that “many agents are still using [cellular surveillance technology with a] pen register application [that]
does not make [the use of that technology] explicit.” Similarly, at a conference at Yale Law School in 2013, Judge
Owsley indicated that federal
agents may frequently obfuscate the planned use of a StingRay in authorization requests: “I may have seen them before and not
realized what it was, because what they do is present an application that looks essentially like a pen register application . . . . So any magistrate judge that is typically
In
Tacoma, Washington, the local police have used StingRay surveillance devices since 2009 and insist that they only do
so with approval from a judge. When asked about the police department’s statements in 2014, however, the presiding judge of the
local Superior Court told a reporter that the StingRay equipment had not been mentioned in any warrant applications
that he has seen. He also revealed that other judges in his court were similarly surprised to hear that the Tacoma
police were using the technology, stating that “[the judges] had never heard of it.” That prosecutors have not made
this information clear to judges often appears to be an intentional action. In the Rigmaiden case, for example, prosecutors conceded
looking at a lot of pen register applications and not paying a lot of attention to the details may be signing an application that is authorizing a Sting[R]ay.”
that the government had not made a “full disclosure to the magistrate judge [who issued the original order authorizing the surveillance] with respect to the nature
and operation of the [StingRay] device [used to locate Rigmaiden].” The reason for that lack of candor, the DOJ later told the court, was “because of the sensitive
nature of the device in terms of concerns out of the disclosure to third parties.” Likewise, two notable events in Florida suggest an intentional effort by local law
enforcement in that state to protect details about the use and functions of cellular surveillance technology. In a 2008 state case, police in Tallahassee used a StingRay
to locate a victim’s stolen phone in the defendant’s apartment. The police later revealed that they “did not want to obtain a search warrant because they did not
want to reveal information about the technology they used to track the cell phone signal.” In addition, an investigator with the technical operations unit of the
Tallahassee Police Department testified: “[W]e prefer that alternate legal methods be used, so that we do not have to rely upon the equipment to establish probable
In Sarasota, police have enacted a policy of
describing StingRay derived intelligence in depositions and reports as “‘information from a confidential source
regarding the location of the suspect . . . .’” According to emails obtained by the ACLU, this policy, which was requested by the U.S. Marshals, is
intended to shield information about the StingRay “so that [law enforcement] may continue to utilize this technology without the knowledge of
the criminal element.” Even if the aim of this policy is to keep the general public in the dark, by including misleading information in court
documents, the police are also preventing the courts from having a true understanding of the electronic surveillance
that is being conducted under their watch.
cause, [in order to avoid] reveal[ing] the nature [of the surveillance] and methods [used].”
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2AC Democracy Advantage—Privacy Key to Democracy
Stingrays destroy the privacy rights that are a necessary ingredient of effective democracy
McFarland, 2012 (Michael McFarland, S.J., a computer scientist with extensive liberal arts teaching experience and a special interest in the intersection of
technology and ethics, served as the 31st president of the College of the Holy Cross.
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/technology/internet/privacy/why-care-about-privacy.html)
privacy, as protection from excessive scrutiny, is necessary if individuals are to be free to be themselves.
Everyone needs some room to break social norms, to engage in small "permissible deviations" that help define a
person's individuality. People need to be able to think outrageous thoughts, make scandalous statements and pick
their noses once in a while. They need to be able to behave in ways that are not dictated to them by the surrounding
society. If every appearance, action, word and thought of theirs is captured and posted on a social network visible to
the rest of the world, they lose that freedom to be themselves. As Brian Stelter wrote in the New York Times on the loss of anonymity in
Therefore
today's online world, "The collective intelligence of the Internet's two billion users, and the digital fingerprints that so many users leave on Web sites, combine to
make it more and more likely that every embarrassing video, every intimate photo, and every indelicate e-mail is attributed to its source, whether that source wants
it to be or not. This intelligence makes the public sphere more public than ever before and sometimes forces personal lives into public view." 12
This ability to develop one's unique individuality is especially important in a democracy, which values and depends on
creativity, nonconformism and the free interchange of diverse ideas. That is where a democracy gets its vitality. Thus,
as Westin has observed, "Just as a social balance favoring disclosure and surveillance over privacy is a functional necessity for totalitarian systems, so a
balance that ensures strong citadels of individual and group privacy and limits both disclosure and surveillance is a prerequisite for liberal democratic societies. The
democratic society relies on publicity as a control over government, and on privacy as a shield for group and
individual life." When Brandeis and Warren wrote their seminal article on privacy over one hundred years ago, their primary concern was with the social
pressure caused by excessive exposure to public scrutiny of the private affairs of individuals. The problem for them was the popular press, which represented the
"monolithic, impersonal and value-free forces of modern society," 14 undermining the traditional values of rural society, which had been nurtured and protected by
local institutions such as family, church and other associations. The exposure of the affairs of the well-bred to the curiosity of the masses, Brandeis and Warren
feared, had a leveling effect which undermined what was noble and virtuous in society, replacing it with the base and the trivial. Even apparently harmless gossip,
when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil. It both belittles and perverts. It belittles by inverting the relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the
thoughts and aspirations of a people. When personal gossip attains the dignity of print, and crowds the space available for matters of real interest to the community,
what wonder that the ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative importance.... Triviality destroys at once robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling. No
enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can survive under its blighting influence. For Brandeis and Warren, privacy was a means of protecting the freedom of
the virtuous to maintain their values against the corrupting influence of the mass media that catered to people's basest instincts. Although the degrading effect of the
mass media is still a problem, today
a more serious threat to freedom comes from governments and other large institutions.
Over the last century, governments have developed sophisticated methods of surveillance as a means of controlling
their subjects.
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2AC Racial Profiling Advantage—Stingray Profiles
Modern surveillance, including StingRay, is used to discriminate against and segregate minorities and repress
dissidence. It is a part of a larger structure of racial injustice in America, and must be fought against.
Cyril 2015 (Malika Amala Cyril for The Progressive. “Black America’s State of Surveillance” Online http://www.progressive.org/news/2015/03/188074/blackamericas-state-surveillance)
It’s time for journalists to tell a new story that does not start the clock when privileged classes learn they are targets of surveillance. We need to understand that
data has historically been overused to repress dissidence, monitor perceived criminality, and perpetually maintain an
impoverished underclass.In an era of big data, the Internet has increased the speed and secrecy of data collection. Thanks to new surveillance technologies,
law enforcement agencies are now able to collect massive amounts of indiscriminate data. Yet legal protections and policies have not caught up to this technological
advance. Concerned advocates see mass surveillance as the problem and protecting privacy as the goal. Targeted surveillance is an obvious answer—it may be
discriminatory, but it helps protect the privacy perceived as an earned privilege of the inherently innocent.The trouble is, targeted surveillance
frequently
includes the indiscriminate collection of the private data of people targeted by race but not involved in any crime. […]
In a racially discriminatory criminal justice system, surveillance technologies reproduce injustice. Instead of reducing
discrimination, predictive policing is a face of what author Michelle Alexander calls the “New Jim Crow”—a de facto
system of separate and unequal application of laws, police practices, conviction rates, sentencing terms, and
conditions of confinement that operate more as a system of social control by racial hierarchy than as crime
prevention or punishment. In New York City, the predictive policing approach in use is “Broken Windows.” This approach to policing places an undue focus on quality of life crimes—
like selling loose cigarettes, the kind of offense for which Eric Garner was choked to death. Without oversight, accountability, transparency, or rights, predictive policing is just high-tech racial profiling—
indiscriminate data collection that drives discriminatory policing practices.
As local law enforcement agencies increasingly adopt surveillance technologies, they use them in three primary ways: to listen in on specific conversations on and offline; to observe daily movements of
individuals and groups; and to observe data trends. Police departments like Bratton’s aim to use sophisticated technologies to do all three.They will use technologies like license plate readers, which the
Electronic Frontier Foundation found to be disproportionately used in communities of color and communities in the process of being gentrified. They will use facial recognition, biometric scanning software,
which the FBI has now rolled out as a national system, to be adopted by local police departments for any criminal justice purpose.
They intend to use body and dashboard cameras, which have been touted as an effective step toward accountability based on the results of one study, yet storage and archiving procedures, among many
They will use Stingray cellphone interceptors. According to the ACLU, Stingray technology is an invasive cellphone
surveillance device that mimics cellphone towers and sends out signals to trick cellphones in the area into transmitting their locations and identifying information.
When used to track a suspect’s cellphone, they also gather information about the phones of countless bystanders who happen to be nearby.The same is true of
domestic drones, which are in increasing use by U.S. law enforcement to conduct routine aerial surveillance. While drones are currently unarmed, drone
manufacturers are considering arming these remote-controlled aircraft with weapons like rubber bullets, tasers, and tear gas.They will use fusion centers. Originally
designed to increase interagency collaboration for the purposes of counterterrorism, these have instead become the local arm of the intelligence community.
According to Electronic Frontier Foundation, there are currently seventy-eight on record. They are the clearinghouse for increasingly used “suspicious activity
reports”—described as “official documentation of observed behavior reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity.”
These reports and other collected data are often stored in massive databases like e-Verify and Prism. As anybody who’s ever dealt with gang databases knows, it’s
other issues, remain unclear.
almost impossible to get off a federal or state database, even when the data collected is incorrect or no longer true.Predictive policing
doesn’t just lead
to racial and religious profiling—it relies on it. Just as stop and frisk legitimized an initial, unwarranted contact between police and people of color,
almost 90 percent of whom turn out to be innocent of any crime, suspicious activities reporting and the dragnet approach of fusion
centers target communities of color. One review of such reports collected in Los Angeles shows approximately 75 percent were of people of color.This
is the future of policing in America, and it should terrify you as much as it terrifies me. Unfortunately, it probably doesn’t, because my life is at far greater risk than
the lives of white Americans, especially those reporting on the issue in the media or advocating in the halls of power.One of the most terrifying aspects of high-tech
surveillance is the invisibility of those it disproportionately impacts.The
NSA and FBI have engaged local law enforcement agencies and
electronic surveillance technologies to spy on Muslims living in the United States. […].But by far, the widest net is cast
over black communities. Black people alone represent 40 percent of those incarcerated. More black men are incarcerated than were held in slavery in 1850,
on the eve of the Civil War. Lest some misinterpret that statistic as evidence of greater criminality, a 2012 study confirms that black defendants are at
least 30 percent more likely to be imprisoned than whites for the same crime.This is not a broken system, it is a system working
perfectly as intended, to the detriment of all. The NSA could not have spied on millions of cellphones if it were not already spying on black people, Muslims, and
migrants.As
surveillance technologies are increasingly adopted and integrated by law enforcement agencies today, racial
disparities are being made invisible by a media environment that has failed to tell the story of surveillance in the
context of structural racism.Reporters love to tell the technology story. For some, it’s a sexier read. To me, freedom from repression and racism is far
sexier than the newest gadget used to reinforce racial hierarchy. As civil rights protections catch up with the technological terrain, reporting needs to catch up, too.
Many journalists still focus their reporting on the technological trends and not the racial hierarchies that these trends are enforcing. Martin Luther King Jr. once said,
“Everything we see is a shadow cast by that which we do not see.” Journalists have an obligation to tell the stories that are hidden from view.We
are living in
an incredible time, when migrant activists have blocked deportation buses, and a movement for black lives has
emerged, and when women, queer, and trans experiences have been placed right at the center. The decentralized
power of the Internet makes that possible.But the Internet also makes possible the high-tech surveillance that
threatens to drive structural racism in the twenty-first century. We can help black lives matter by ensuring that
technology is not used to cement a racial hierarchy that leaves too many people like me dead or in jail. Our communities need partners, not
gatekeepers.
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2AC Racial Profiling Advantage—Impacts
We have a moral obligation to stop racial profiling- it is dehumanizing and prevents justice from being served.
U.S. DOJ 2003 (Department of Justice “Fact Sheet on Racial Profiling” Online http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/June/racial_profiling_fact_sheet.pdf)
Racial profiling sends the dehumanizing message to our citizens that they are judged by the color
of their skin and harms the criminal justice system by eviscerating the trust that is necessary if law
enforcement is to effectively protect our communities.America Has a Moral Obligation to Prohibit Racial Profiling. Race-based assumptions in law
enforcement perpetuate negative racial stereotypes that are harmful to our diverse democracy, and materially impair our efforts to maintain a fair and
just society. As Attorney General John Ashcroft said, racial profiling creates a "lose-lose" situation because it destroys the potential for underlying trust
that "should support the administration of justice as a societal objective, not just as a law enforcement objective." The Overwhelming Majority of Federal Law
Enforcement Officers Perform Their Jobs with Dedication, Fairness and Honor, But Any Instance of Racial Profiling by a Few
Damages Our Criminal Justice System. The vast majority of federal law enforcement officers are hard-working public servants who perform a dangerous job with
dedication,fairness and honor. However, when law enforcement practices are perceived to be biased or
unfair, the general public, and especially minority communities, are less willing to trust and confide in officers, report crimes, be witnesses at trials,
or serve on juries. Racial Profiling Is Discrimination, and It Taints the Entire Criminal Justice System.Racial profiling rests on the erroneous assumption
that any particular individual of one race or ethnicity is more likely to engage in misconduct than any particular individual of other races orethnicities.
Racial profiling destroys community trust in police, which is essential to public safety.
Natarajan 2014 (Ranjana Natarajan for Washington Post “Racial Profiling Has Destroyed Public Trust In Police” Online
http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/12/15/racial-profiling-has-destroyed-public-trust-in-police-cops-are-exploiting-our-weak-lawsagainst-it/)
Profiling undermines public safety and strains police-community trust. When law enforcement
officers target residents based on race, religion or national origin rather than behavior, crimefighting is less effective and community distrust of police grows. A study of the Los Angeles
Police Departmentshowed that minority communities that had been unfairly targeted in the
past continue to experience greater mistrust and fear of police officers. To root out this ineffective tactic that
undermines public confidence, we need stronger policies against racial profiling at all levels — from local to federal — as well as more effective training
and oversight of police officers, and systems of accountability.
Racism makes all forms of violence inevitable. National Security Letters are only one part of a racist justice system, but we must
reject anything that contributes to racism
Memmi 2k
MEMMI Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ Unv. Of Paris Albert-; RACISM, translated by Steve Martinot, pp.163-165
The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved, yet for this very reason, it is a struggle
to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism. One cannot even let the monster in the house,
especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people which is to diminish what is human. To accept
the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which
we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which [person] man is not [themself] himself an outsider relative to someone
else?). Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated; that is it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The
anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to
humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduct only emerges from a choice:
one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to
conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a
moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism because racism signifies the exclusion of the other and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From
an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is “the truly capital sin.”fn22 It is not an accident that almost all of
humanity’s spiritual traditions counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical counsel respect for the weak, for
orphans, widows or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests
the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and
death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever
sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It
is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall,” says the bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both
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that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming once again someday . It is an ethical and a practical
appeal – indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality.
Because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice. A just society must be a society accepted by all. If this
contractual principle is not
accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True,
it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.
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2AC Extensions – Solvency (Banning StingRay Solves)
Federal law enforcement agencies use StingRay to search and seize cell phone data without court
oversight. This type of surveillance is very intrusive, and unless we intervene, the government will
continue to violate our rights.
ACLU 2014 (“StingRays: The Most Common Surveillance Tool the Government Won’t Tell You About” Online
https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/StingRays_The_Most_Common_Surveillance_Tool_the_Govt_Won%27t_Tell_You_About.pdf)
Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies have been using IMSI catchers to engage in dragnet searches and
seizures of information from cell phones without disclosing this use to the courts or criminal defendants. By shrouding
this technology in secrecy, the government has succeeded in deploying a highly intrusive form of surveillance . In cases
where the government may have used an IMSI catcher, vigorous advocacy is necessary to obtain full discovery and suppression of tainted evidence.
Unless criminal defense attorneys pursue these issues aggressively, the government will continue to write its own rules for conducting
surveillance, without the benefit of court oversight or an adversarial process.
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2AC Solvency—FCC Good
The FCC has technical expertise in regulating telecommunications networks to protect privacy
Genachowski 2011 (Julius Genachowski, FCC commissioner. Testimony: INTERNET PRIVACY: THE VIEWS OF THE FTC, THE FCC, AND NTIA JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, MANUFACTURING, AND TRADE AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 7/14/11. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72908/pdf/CHRG112hhrg72908.pdf)
technology can and must be part of the solution. I continue to encourage industry to take this very seriously, to use its expertise to
as the government’s expert agency on broadband and
communications networks with a long history of taking commonsense steps to protect consumer privacy, the FCC has
an important role to play going forward. Our network-focused privacy and data security rules are settled and legally
tested.
Now,
empower consumers, provide transparency, and protect data. And
FCC Chair Tom Wheeler is willing to defy the interests of the industries the FCC regulates
Reardon 2015 (Marguerite Reardon, CNET News reporter, “Net Fix: Why FCC's Wheeler is 'defying the greatest lobbyists in the world',
http://www.cnet.com/news/why-fccs-wheeler-is-defying-the-greatest-lobbyists-in-the-world/)
Net neutrality advocates, initially wary of Wheeler because of his past association with the industries he regulates,
now applaud his leadership. Reed Hastings, CEO of the Netflix video-streaming service, likens Wheeler's stance to the one
taken by business mogul Joseph Kennedy Sr. in 1934, when he was tasked with regulating Wall Street for the first time as chairman of the newly
formed Securities and Exchange Commission. "Chairman Wheeler is on the edge of making history by defying the greatest lobbyists
in the world -- from the telco and cable industry -- to secure an open and fast Internet for all Americans," Hastings said. "You have to
go back to Joseph Kennedy Sr. running the SEC to find as surprising and courageous an example of policy leadership
given the person's prior background." The once-powerful advocate for the cable and wireless companies has rocked
his former employers on their heels.
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2AC Answers to: FCC Can’t Decertify
They have everything they need—corporate lies in emails give FCC ability to decertify
Ars Technica, 2014 “New e-mail shows “stingray” maker may have lied to FCC back in 2010,” September 17th, 2014
(http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/09/new-e-mail-shows-stingray-maker-may-have-lied-to-fcc-back-in-2010/)
A newly published e-mail from 2010 shows that Harris Corporation, one of the best-known makers of cellular
surveillance systems, told the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that its purpose "is only
to provide state/local law enforcement officials with authority to utilize this equipment in emergency
situations."
That e-mail was among 27 pages of e-mails that were part of the company’s application to get FCC authorization to sell the
device in the United States. Neither the FCC nor Harris Corporation immediately responded to Ars’ request for comment, and
Harris traditionally stays mum on its operations.
"We do not comment on solutions we may or may not provide to classified Department of Defense or law enforcement
agencies," Jim Burke, a spokesman for Harris, told Ars last month.
If Harris has misrepresented how the devices are used as part of law enforcement operations, then
it would mark another controversial moment in the company's shrouded history. In recent months, more
information has come out about how stingrays have been used in violent crime investigations, including instances where cops
have lied to courts about the use of such technology.
Relatively little is known about how stingrays are precisely used by law enforcement agencies nationwide, although
documents have surfaced showing how they have been purchased and used in some limited
instances. Last year, Ars reported on leaked documents showing the existence of a body-worn stingray. In 2010, Kristin
Paget famously demonstrated a homemade device built for just $1,500.
Fightin' words
In a five-page letter by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler, the group indicated that
Harris has not been totally honest with the agency as to how the then "Sting Fish," and presumably
subsequent devices like the newer StingRay, TriggerFish, and HailStorm, were to be used by
American law enforcement. While StingRay is a trademark of Harris, stingray has come to be known
as the generic term that describes all such devices.
"Contrary to Harris’ claim, we now know—and Harris should have also been well-aware at the time—
that state and local law enforcement agencies were using devices in the StingRay line of
surveillance products for purposes other than emergency situations long before 2010, and
continued to do so after," the letter states. "To the extent the Commission relied on this representation in the
authorization and licensing process, its reliance is misplaced since the representation is clearly inaccurate."
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2AC Answers to: Terror Disadvantage
Most terrorist plots are foiled by traditional law enforcement methods, not cell phone tracking.
Bergen and Sterman 2013 (Peter Bergen and David Sterman for CNN “Did NSA Spying Prevent ‘Dozens’ of Terrorist Attacks?” Online
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/17/opinion/bergen-nsa-spying/)
On Thursday, Sens. Ron Wyden and Mark Udall, Democrats who both serve on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and have access to the
nation's most sensitive secrets, released a statement contradicting this assertion. "Gen. Alexander's testimony yesterday suggested that the NSA's bulk
phone records collection program helped thwart 'dozens' of terrorist attacks, but all of the plots that he mentioned appear to have been identified using
other collection methods," the two senators said.Indeed, a survey of court documents and media accounts of all the jihadist
terrorist plots in the United States since 9/11 by the New America Foundation shows that traditional law enforcement
methods have overwhelmingly played the most significant role in foiling terrorist attacks .This suggests that the NSA
surveillance programs are wide-ranging fishing expeditions with little to show for them .Alexander promised during his congressional
testimony that during this coming week more information would be forthcoming about how the NSA surveillance programs have prevented many attacks.A U.S. intelligence document provided to CNN by
a congressional source over the weekend asserts that the dragnetof U.S. phone data and Internet information from overseas users "has contributed to the disruption of dozens of potential terrorist plots
surveillance
yielded little of major value to prevent numerous attacks in the United States, but government officials may be able to point to
here in the homeland and in more than 20 countries around the world."The public record, which is quite rich when it comes to jihadist terrorism cases, suggests that the NSA
a number of attacks that were averted overseas.That may not do much to dampen down the political firestorm that has gathered around the NSA
surveillance programs. After all, these have been justified because they have supposedly helped to keep Americans safe at home.Homegrown jihadist
extremists have mounted 42 plots to conduct attacks within the United States since 2001 . Of those plots, nine involved an actual
terrorist act that was not prevented by any type of government action, such as the failed attempt by Faisal Shahzad to blow up a car bomb in Times
Square on May 1, 2010.Of the remaining 33 plots, the public record shows that at least 29 were uncovered by traditional law
enforcement methods, such as the use of informants, reliance on community tips about suspicious activity and
other standard policing practices.
Mass data collection like what StingRay is capable of does not keep us safe
Levinson-Waldman 2013 (Rachel Levinson-Waldman for New Republic “Against Our Values – And Bad at Keeping Us Safe” Online
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113416/nsa-spying-scandal-data-mining-isnt-good-keeping-us-safe)There are, needless to say, significant privacy and civilliberties concerns here. But there’s another major problem, too:
This kind of dragnet-style data capture simply doesn’t keep us safe.First, intelligence and law enforcement agencies are increasingly drowning in data; the more
that comes in, the harder it is to stay afloat. Most recently, the failure of the intelligence community to intercept the 2009 “underwear bomber” was blamed in
large part on a surfeit of information: according to an official White House review, a significant amount of critical information was “embedded in a large volume of
other data.” Similarly, the independent investigation of the alleged shootings by U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan at Fort Hood concluded that the “crushing volume” of
information was one of the factors that hampered the FBI’s analysis before the attack.Multiple security officials have echoed this assessment. As one veteran CIA
agenttold The Washington Post in 2010, “The problem is that the system is clogged with information. Most of it isn't of interest, but people are afraid not to put it
in.” A former Department of Homeland Security official told a Senate subcommittee that there was “a lot of data clogging the system with no value.” Even former
Defense Secretary Robert Gates acknowledged that “we’ve built tremendous capability, but do we have more than we need?” And the NSA itself was brought to a
grinding halt before 9/11 by the “torrent of data” pouring into the system, leaving the agency “brain-dead” for half a week and “[unable] to process information,”
as its then-director Gen. Michael Hayden publicly acknowledged.
Big data collection and mass surveillance will only make it harder for us to prevent crime and other disasters; it is near
impossible for law enforcement to effectively sort through the data.
WashingtonsBlog 2015 (“NSA Admits It Collects Too Much Information to Stop Terrorist Attacks” Online http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2015/05/nsaadmits-it-collects-too-much-info-to-stop-terror-attacks.html)
Top security experts agree that mass surveillance is ineffective … and actually makes us MORE vulnerable to
terrorism.For example, the former head of the NSA’s global intelligence gathering operations – Bill Binney – says that the mass surveillance
INTERFERES with the government’s ability to catch bad guys, and that the government failed to stop 9/11, the Boston Bombing, the Texas
shootings and other terror attacks is because it was overwhelmed with data from mass surveillance on Americans.Binney told Washington’s Blog:A good deal of the
Too much data and too many people for
the 10-20 thousand analysts to follow. Simple as that. Especially when they make word match pulls (like Google) and get dumps of data selected from close to 4 billion people.This is
failure is, in my opinion, due to bulk data. So, I am calling all these attacks a result of “Data bulk failure.”
the same problem NSA had before 9/11. They had data that could have prevented 9/11 but did not know they had it in their data bases. This back then when the bulk collection was not going on. Now the
problem is orders of magnitude greater. Result, it’s harder to succeed.Expect more of the same from our deluded government that thinks more data improves possibilities of success. All this bulk data
collection and storage does give law enforcement a great capability to retroactively analyze anyone they want. But, of course,that data cannot be used in court since it was not acquired with a
warrant.Binney and other high-level NSA whistleblowers noted last year:On December 26, for example, The Wall Street Journal published a lengthy front-page article, quoting NSA’s former Senior
Technical Director William Binney (undersigned) and former chief of NSA’s SIGINT Automation Research Center Edward Loomis (undersigned) warning that
NSA is drowning in useless
data lacking adequate privacy provisions, to the point where it cannot conduct effective terrorist-related surveillance and analysis.A recently disclosed internal NSA briefing
document corroborates the drowning, with the embarrassing admission, in bureaucratize, that NSA collection has been “outpacing” NSA’s ability to ingest, process, and store data – let alone analyze the
take.Indeed, the pro-spying NSA chief and NSA technicians admitted that the NSA was drowning in too much data 3 months before 9/11:In an interview, Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden, the NSA’s
the sheer volume and variety of today’s communications means “there’s
simply too much out there, and it’s too hard to understand.
director … suggested that access isn’t the problem. Rather, he said,
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2AC Answers to Crime Disadvantage
Not only are they used to spy on innocent civilians, StingRay devices allow actual criminals to walk free- law
enforcement has been releasing criminals to avoid disclosing secrets about StingRay because of non-disclosure
agreements. Banning StingRay devices would allow law enforcement to do their jobs without compromising citizen
privacy or safety.
Upriser 2014 (“FBI Lets Criminals Walk to Avoid Revealing This Secret Cell Phone Spying System Used by All Police” Online http://upriser.com/posts/the-fbichoosing-to-let-criminals-free-rather-than-reveal-stingray-secrets)
FBI just let another criminal walk rather than give details of their cell phone spying system "Stingray " -- a system is used by
local police, shockingly to locate and spy on criminal suspects all over the United States. However, they would apparently rather let suspects go
free than reveal in court the details of the high tech tracker. This device, called a "Stingray," tricks cell phones into revealing their locations.
Closely guarded details about how police Stingrays operate have been threatened this week by a judge's court order. The federal government has been using these
devices since at least 1995. Judge Patrick H. NeMoyer in Buffalo, New York, described a 2012 deal between the FBI and the Erie County Sheriff's Office in his court
order Tuesday. The judge, who reviewed the deal, said the
FBI instructed the police to drop criminal charges instead of revealing "any
information concerning the cell site simulator or its use." Erie police had long tried to keep that contract secret, but the judge rejected that
idea and ordered that details of the Stingrays be made public. "If that is not an instruction that affects the public, nothing is," NeMoyer wrote. The judge's order also
noted that Erie police had used Stingrays to track down several criminal suspects, a suicidal person and four missing people, including an 87-year-old with dementia.
Police spokesman Scott Zylka said they're now working with the FBI to appeal the judge's decision and keep the FBI agreement secret. ACLU is demanding details
about Stingray use under public records laws. Few people know Stingrays even exist — or that federal agents and police across the country are increasingly using
them to arrest people. It's a small device that mimics a cell phone tower, duping nearby cell phones into connecting to it rather than a real phone company tower.
There's a growing privacy concern because while police use the Stingrays to track down an individual, they can potentially grab text messages and phone call data on
thousands of innocent people. In November, we learned that federal agents regularly fly planes nationwide that spy on Americans' phone calls. We also know police
in at least 20 states use Stingrays, according to public records obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union. But everything
else is a mystery because
police agencies have non-disclosure agreements with the maker of Stingrays: the Harris Corporation based in Melbourne, Florida. They
also have similar hush-hush contracts with the FBI. There have been several examples of prosecutors dropping charges to keep quiet
about Stingrays. Late last year, Tallahassee police gave a sweet plea deal to a pot dealer who robbed someone with a BB gun. A felony charge with a four-year
prison sentence became a misdemeanor with six-months' probation because his defense attorney discovered police used a Stingray to locate him. Hanni Fakhoury, an
attorney with the pro-privacy Electronic Frontier Foundation, said Tuesday's court order was the first time it became clear that the use of Stingrays is a nationwide
tactic. "We've long suspected that's the policy, but now we know," he said. "It's crazy on a billion legal levels." The lead ACLU attorney on this case, Mariko Hirose,
described Stingrays as military grade equipment that has no place being used on unsuspecting American citizens. She also said that the FBI's tactic to stay quiet about
Stingrays makes little sense. Erie County spent more than $350,000 to buy two Stingray devices and related training and equipment. "Why are municipalities
spending so much money when they might have to drop the charges in the name of secrecy?" she asked. All of this raises the interesting question of won't all criminal
lawyers now demand Stingray records on their client as a matter of course? The ACLU put out a pamphlet for defense attorneys for exactly this reason. It seems that
if the authorities are obtaining their evidence illegally, then it should be challenged. Another very interesting detail about StingRays also recently came to light.
Stingrays make it temporarily impossible for anyone nearby to make a cell phone call. “Its use has the potential to intermittently disrupt cellular service to a small
fraction of Sprint's wireless customers within its immediate vicinity,” FBI Special Agent Michael Scimeca wrote in his explanation about the StingRay's capability to a
judge. “Any potential service disruption will be brief and minimized by reasonably limiting the scope and duration of the use of the Mobile Equipment.” Until now,
authorities have maintained that the StingRay doesn't intercept 911 emergency calls. Yet this disclosure raises the notion that the StingRay prohibits other emergency
calls in favor of investigations ranging from murder to minor theft. Additionally, the surveillance device also jams 3G and 4G networks. “Depending on how long the
jamming is taking place, there's going to be disruption,” ACLU chief technologist Chris Soghoian told Wired magazine. “When your phone goes down to 2G, your data
just goes to hell. So at the very least you will have disruption of Internet connectivity. And if and when the phones are using the StingRay as their only tower, there
will likely be an inability to receive or make calls.”
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*** Stingray Negative
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1NC ANSWERS TO: Democracy Advantage
Our rights are not at risk. Department of Justice now requires warrants for use of Stingray devices
Ars Technica, 2015 http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/09/fbi-dea-and-others-will-now-have-to-get-a-warrant-touse-stingrays/, September 3
The Department of Justice (DOJ) announced sweeping new rules Thursday concerning the use of cellsite simulators, often called stingrays, mandating that federal agents must now obtain a warrant in most
circumstances.
The policy, which takes effect immediately, applies to its agencies, including the FBI, the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the United States Marshals
Service, among others.
"Cell-site simulator technology has been instrumental in aiding law enforcement in a broad array of
investigations, including kidnappings, fugitive investigations and complicated narcotics cases," Deputy Attorney
General Sally Quillian Yates said in a statement. "This new policy ensures our protocols for this technology are
consistent, well-managed and respectful of individuals’ privacy and civil liberties."
The move comes after federal agencies, most notably the FBI, have tried to tightly control information about
stingrays for years. The FBI and the Harris Corporation, one of the primary manufacturers of the devices, have
refused to answer specifics questions from Ars.
Not only can stingrays be used to determine location by spoofing a cell tower, but they can also be used to
intercept calls and text messages. Once deployed, the devices intercept data from a target phone as well as
information from other phones within the vicinity. For years, federal and local law enforcement have tried to
keep their existence a secret while simultaneously upgrading their capabilities. Over the last year, as the
devices have come under increased scrutiny, new information about the secretive devices has come to light.
Ars has previously reported that while stingrays have been used at the local level for serious violent crimes,
they have also been used to investigate ATM robberies, and 911 hangups.
In 2015, federal authorities have shown a willingness to open up a little about the technology, although the FBI
declared in January that it has a right to use the devices in public without a warrant.
Moving forward
In addition to imposing a new warrant requirement, the new seven-page document also requires that DOJ
officials are to delete data of non-target phones that is collected by accident, and annually report how
often stingrays are used.
Stingray devices aren’t a serious threat to innocent people because they release non-target devices
Zetter, 2015 (Kim Zetter, award-winning senior staff reporter at Wired covering cybercrime, privacy, and security http://www.wired.com/2015/03/feds-admitstingrays-can-disrupt-cell-service-bystanders/)
Although Scimeca disclosed to the magistrate that the equipment could disrupt phone service, he didn’t elaborate about how the disruption might occur. Experts
once the stingray obtains the unique ID of a
device, it releases it so that it can connect to a legitimate cell tower, allowing data and voice calls to go through.
suspect it has something to do with the “catch-and-release” way stingrays work. For example,
“As each phone tries to connect, [the stingray] will say, ‘I’m really busy right now so go use a different tower. So
rather than catching the phone, it will release it,” says Chris Soghoian, chief technologist for the ACLU. “The moment
it tries to connect, [the stingray] can reject every single phone” that is not the target phone.
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1NC ANSWERS TO: Racial Profiling Advantage
Racist surveillance by the government and corporations is inevitable and has happened throughout
our history – people of color don’t trust or want the privacy rights the affirmative talks about
Cyril ’15 Cyril, Malkia A.- Malkia Amala Cyril is founder and executive director of the Center for Media Justice (CMJ) and
co-founder of the Media Action Grassroots Network, a national network of 175 organizations working to ensure media
access, rights, and representation for marginalized communities. April 15 2015 “Black America’s State of Surveillance”
http://www.progressive.org/news/2015/03/188074/black-americas-state-surveillance. July 7, 2015
Today, media reporting on government surveillance is laser-focused on the revelations by Edward Snowden that millions
of Americans were being spied on by the NSA. Yet my mother’s visit from the FBI reminds me that, from the slave pass
system to laws that deputized white civilians as enforcers of Jim Crow, black people and other people of color have
lived for centuries with surveillance practices aimed at maintaining a racial hierarchy. It’s time for journalists to tell a
new story that does not start the clock when privileged classes learn they are targets of surveillance. We need to
understand that data has historically been overused to repress dissidence, monitor perceived criminality, and
perpetually maintain an impoverished underclass. In an era of big data, the Internet has increased the speed and secrecy
of data collection. Thanks to new surveillance technologies, law enforcement agencies are now able to collect massive
amounts of indiscriminate data. Yet legal protections and policies have not caught up to this technological advance.
Concerned advocates see mass surveillance as the problem and protecting privacy as the goal. Targeted surveillance is
an obvious answer—it may be discriminatory, but it helps protect the privacy perceived as an earned privilege of the
inherently innocent. The trouble is, targeted surveillance frequently includes the indiscriminate collection of the private
data of people targeted by race but not involved in any crime. For targeted communities, there is little to no
expectation of privacy from government or corporate surveillance. Instead, we are watched, either as criminals or as
consumers. We do not expect policies to protect us. Instead, we’ve birthed a complex and coded culture—from jazz to
spoken dialects—in order to navigate a world in which spying, from AT&T and Walmart to public benefits programs
and beat cops on the block, is as much a part of our built environment as the streets covered in our blood.
National security is more important to democracy than personal privacy; getting rid of National Security Letters would be getting
rid of an important tool for fighting terrorism.
Debatewise No Date (“Privacy vs. Security: Yes Points” Online http://debatewise.org/debates/3040-privacy-vs-security/#)
The most important job of government is to “secure the general welfare” of its citizens. Security is a common good
that is promised to all Americans, and it must outweigh any personal concerns about privacy. The word “privacy” is
not found in the US Constitution so it cannot be claimed as a fundamental right. Surveillance is the secret watching of suspects’ private
activities. In the past this usually involved following people, or going through their trash. These days it is mostly electronic, with the police and intelligence agencies
listening into private phone conversations or reading emails (wiretapping). Surveillance can also involve looking at bank account details to see where money comes
and goes. All these are vital tools for tracking the actions of terrorists when they are planning attacks. The government cannot
stand by and wait until criminal acts are carried out: it must stop attacks before they happen.
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1NC Answers to: Solvency
No solvency – the Federal Communications Commission has no authority over Stingray devices
Law 360, 2015 “FCC Says It Doesn't Control 'StingRay' Cellphone Tracking,” April 29th, 2015
(http://www.law360.com/articles/649460/fcc-says-it-doesn-t-control-stingray-cellphone-tracking)
In a letter released by the U.S.Federal Communications Commission on Tuesday, Chairman Tom Wheeler told a
U.S. senator that the agency has essentially no authority over state and local law enforcement agencies’
use of cellphone tracking devices known as “StingRays.”
Wheeler’s response to an inquiry by Sen. Bill Nelson, D-Fla., confirmed that the FCC’s certification of the devices manufactured
by Harris Corp. was contingent upon the conditions that they only be sold to law enforcement officials and that state and local
agencies must coordinate their use of StingRays and other “International Mobile Subscriber Identity catchers” with the FBI, but
revealed the limitations of the FCC’s involvement.
“The commission has no information about the extent to which or conditions under which law
enforcement has obtained authority to use the devices,” Wheeler said.
In February, Nelson pointed to a Washington Post article that detailed local police departments’ use of StingRays to collect
data on phone calls, and asked the FCC to clarify its certification process and oversight of the devices .
Banning Stingray devices won’t work. The people who would enforce the ban don’t know enough about technology
to effectively keep them from operating.
Assange et. al, 2012 (Julian, editor-in-chief of WikiLeaks. Andy Muller-Maguhn, specialist on computers, telecommunications, and surveillance. Jacob
Appelbaum, computer security researcher. Jeremie Zimmerman, co-founder and spokesperson for the citizen advocacy group La Quadrature du Net. Conversation in
the book “Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of the Internet,” chapter titled “The Militarization of Cyberspace”)
democratic states within Europe are massively buying machines that allow them to act exactly outside the law in
regard to interception because they don’t need a court decision, they can just switch it on and do it, and this
technology can’t be controlled. JULIAN: But are there two approaches to dealing with mass state surveillance: the laws of physics; and the laws of man?
One is to use the laws of physics by actually building devices that prevent interception. The other is to enact democratic controls through the law to make sure people
must have warrants and so on and to try to gain some regulatory accountability. But strategic interception cannot be a part of that, cannot be meaningfully
constrained by regulation. Strategic interception is about intercepting everyone regardless of whether they are innocent or guilty. We must remember that it is the
core of the Establishment carrying such surveillance.
There will always be a lack of political will to expose state spying. And the
technology is inherently so complex, and its use in practice so secret that there cannot be meaningful democratic
oversight. ANDY: Or you spy on your own parliament. JULIAN: But those are excuses— the mafia and foreign intelligence— they are excuses that people will
accept to erect such a system. JACOB: The Four Horsemen of the Info-pocalypse: child pornography, terrorism, money laundering, and The War on Some Drugs.
JULIAN: Once you have erected this surveillance, given that it is complex, given that it is designed to operate in secret,
isn’t it true that it cannot be regulated with policy? I think that except for very small nations like Iceland, unless there are revolutionary conditions it is simply not
It is just not going to happen. It is too cheap and too easy to get around
political accountability and to actually perform interception. The Swedes got through an interception bill in 2008, known as the FRA-lagen
possible to control mass interception with legislation and policy.
which meant the Swedish signals intelligence agency the FRA could legally intercept all communication travelling through the country in bulk, and ship it off to the
United States, with some caveats. 48 Now how can you enforce those caveats once you’ve set up the interception system and the organization doing it is a secret spy
agency? It’s impossible. And in fact cases have come out showing that the FRA had on a variety of occasions broken the law previously. Many countries simply do it
off-law with no legislative cover at all. So we’re sort of lucky if, like in the Swedish example, they decided that for their own protection from prosecution they want to
go legal by changing the law. And that’s the case for most countries— there is bulk interception occurring, and when there is a legislative proposal it is to protect the
ass of those who are doing it. This technology is very complex; for example in the debate in Australia and the UK about proposed legislation to intercept all metadata,
most people do not understand the value of metadata or even the word itself. 49 Intercepting all metadata means you have to build a system that physically
intercepts all data and then throws everything but the metadata away. But such a system cannot be trusted. There’s no way to determine whether it is in fact
intercepting and storing all data without having highly skilled engineers with authorization to go in and check out precisely what is going on, and there’s no political
will to grant access. The problem is getting worse because complexity
and secrecy are a toxic mix. Hidden by complexity. Hidden by
secrecy. Unaccountability is built-in. It is a feature. It is dangerous by design.
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2NC/1NR Extensions (Harms – Racial Profiling) – Racial Profiling is Inevitable
Racial profiling is subconscious. The plan does nothing to address the cause, so it will continue even if the plan is in
effect
Stone 2010 (associate professor of social psychology at the University of Arizona, “Racist, prejudiced attitudes seep from our subconscious”, Arizona Daily Star
http://tucson.com/news/opinion/racist-prejudiced-attitudes-seep-from-our-subconscious/article_dd243e21-c99a-55af-851b-ba004f549c91.html)
The problem is that stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination are not entirely conscious and under our control.
Research shows that people tend to use race and ethnicity when they interact with others without knowing it, and this
leads to subconscious forms of racial and ethnic bias. There was a time in America when stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination against
racial and ethnic minorities were conscious, deliberate and widely accepted. The Jim Crow laws that once characterized race relations promoted prejudice and
discrimination in many of its most harmful forms. The Civil Rights Act ushered in new laws against institutionalized discrimination, and with them, new norms among
Americans against expressing blatant hatred based on race and ethnicity. Today, Americans simply do not condone or tolerate racism or other forms of bias. Cities
and organizations are boycotting Arizona because they believe that SB 1070 reintroduces explicit and deliberate forms of racism. Supporters of SB 1070 strongly deny
this and vehemently claim that they are not racist. Supporters of SB 1070 live and work with people of Mexican, Hispanic or Latino descent every day. How
can
people be racist when they interact daily across racial and ethnic boundaries? Whereas the conscious rejection of racism is critical to
maintaining the tight intergroup fabric of our community, it does not keep racial or ethnic biases from happening. Over the last decade, social psychologists have
discovered that people who explicitly reject racism can also hold subconscious negative attitudes and stereotypes about racial and ethnic minorities. When
these
thoughts and feelings operate outside of awareness, people can express hate and discriminate without realizing it.
Our brain has a leaky seal that drips hints of dislike when we interact with people who are racially or ethnically
different from us. Many subconscious acts of discrimination are subtle, like avoiding eye contact when talking to someone, or avoiding physical contact like a
handshake or placing money into a cashier's hand. In its worst form, subconscious bias leads people to refuse to let someone use the bathroom, make someone wait
in line while helping other customers or dismiss an application for a job. Subconscious racial and ethnic biases also cause people to mistakenly decide that the tool or
wallet in the hand of a minority individual is a gun. When
playing a shooter-style video game, people are more likely to accidently
shoot an unarmed black person than a white person. Some of these studies have been done with police officers who
are trained to avoid making such mistakes because of racial profiling.
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2NC/1NR Extensions to Harms (Democracy) – Stingray Abuses Under Check Now
The plan is not needed because the FBI is already starting to address possible Stingray abuses
Barrett 2015 (Devlin Barrett is a staff reporter for the Wall Street Journal http://www.wsj.com/article_email/u-s-will-change-stance-on-secret-phone-tracking1430696796-lMyQjAxMTI1NDA0MzEwNjMzWj)
The Justice Department will start revealing more about the government’s use of secret cellphone tracking devices and
has launched a wide-ranging review into how law-enforcement agencies deploy the technology, according to Justice
officials. In recent months, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has begun getting search warrants from judges to use
the devices, which hunt criminal suspects by locating their cellphones, the officials said. For years, FBI agents didn’t
get warrants to use the tracking devices. Senior officials have also decided they must be more forthcoming about
how and why the devices are used—although there isn’t yet agreement within the Justice Department about how much to reveal or how quickly.
The plan is not needed because courts are already starting to address possible Stingray abuses
Supreme Court of Florida 2014 (Written decision in Shawn Alvin Tracey v. State of Florida, 10/16/14, pages 44-45.
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2014/sc11-2254.pdf
For all the foregoing reasons, we
conclude that Tracey had a subjective expectation of privacy in the location signals
transmitted solely to enable the private and personal use of his cell phone, even on public roads, and that he did not voluntarily convey that
information to the service provider for any purpose other than to enable use of his cell phone for its intended purpose. We arrive at this conclusion in part by
engaging in the “normative inquiry” envisioned in Smith. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5. There, the Supreme Court cautioned that where an individual’s subjective
expectations have been “conditioned” by influences alien to the well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, a normative inquiry may be necessary to align the
individual’s expectations with the protections guaranteed in the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, we conclude that such a subjective expectation of privacy of location
as signaled by one’s cell phone—even on public roads—is an expectation of privacy that society is now prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable under the Katz
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (establishing the two-pronged “reasonable expectation of privacy” test).
Therefore, we hold that regardless of Tracey’s location on public roads, the use of his cell site location information emanating from his
cell phone in order to track him in real time was a search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment for which probable cause
was required. Because probable cause did not support the search in this case, and no warrant based on probable cause
authorized the use of Tracey’s real time cell site location information to track him, the evidence obtained as a result of that search
was subject to suppression.
States are Doing the Plan Now
Ars Technica, 2015 “FBI says search warrants not needed to use “stingrays” in public places,” January 5th, 2015
(http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/01/fbi-says-search-warrants-not-needed-to-use-stringrays-in-public-places/)
Hanni Fakhoury, an attorney for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, said some states and judges are pushing back
against stingrays.
"In Tacoma, judges now require police (to) specifically note they plan to use an IMSI catcher and
promise not to store data collected from people who are not investigation targets," he said.
"The Floridaand Massachusetts state supreme courts ruled warrants were necessary for real-time cell
phone tracking. Nine states—Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia,
andWisconsin—passed laws specifically requiring police to use a warrant to track a cell phone in real
time."
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2NC/1NR Extensions TO: Solvency—Government will keep
doing surveillance
You can’t challenge the surveillance state, it works hard to protect itself
Stanley 2013 (Jay Stanley, Senior Policy Analyst, Speech, Privacy & Technology Project, “How to Think About the National Security State,” American Civil Liberties
Union, Free Future, 9—5—13, www.aclu.org/blog/how-think-about-national-security-state)
2) Perpetuation,
protection, and expansion of self Like all life forms, bureaucracies seek to perpetuate themselves, and
just as species seek to spread their genes, bureaucracies seek to expand their budgets, payrolls, powers, and domain,
as political scientists have long noted. The FBI and NSA push for new surveillance powers such as the Patriot Act and the FISA
Amendments Act. TSA seeks to expand its airport role into other areas of American life. Agencies relentlessly overdramatize the threat of cybersecurity in order to grab more power and
By the same token, bureaucracies will generally do whatever it takes to protect their core interests and will
rarely if ever be seen sacrificing themselves. Not for principle, or truth, or justice, or morality.
bigger budgets.
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2NC/1NR Extensions TO: Solvency—FCC Fails (Circumvention)
The FCC will make it easy to get around the plan because they can’t say no to the wireless industry
Alster 2015 (Norm Alster, Journalism Fellow with the Investigative Journalism Project at the Harvard University Center for Ethics.
“Captured Agency How the
Federal Communications Commission Is Dominated by the Industries It Presumably Regulates” http://ethics.harvard.edu/files/center-forethics/files/capturedagency_alster.pdf)
Renee Sharp seemed proud to discuss her spring 2014 meeting with the Federal Communications Commission. As research director for the non-profit Environmental
Working Group, Sharp doesn‘t get many chances to visit with the FCC. But on this occasion she was able to express her concerns that lax FCC standards on radiation
from wireless technologies were especially hazardous for children. The FCC, however, should have little trouble dismissing those concerns. Arguing that current
standards are more than sufficient and that children are at no elevated risk from microwave radiation, wireless industry lobbyists don‘t generally have to set up
appointments months in advance. They are at the FCC‘s door night and day. Indeed, a former executive with the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association
(CTIA), the industry‘s main lobbying group, has boasted that the CTIA meets with FCC officials ―500 times a year.‖1 Sharp does not seem surprised. ―There‘s
no
question that the government has been under the influence of industry. The FCC is a captured agency ,‖ she said.2 Captured
agency. That‘s a term that comes up time and time again with the FCC. Captured agencies are essentially controlled by
the industries they are supposed to regulate. A detailed look at FCC actions—and non-actions—shows that over the
years the FCC has granted the wireless industry pretty much what it has wanted. Until very recently it has also granted cable what it
wants. More broadly, the FCC has again and again echoed the lobbying points of major technology interests.
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Terror Disadvantage Links
StingRay type surveillance is necessary. Banning it will destroy our ability to fight terrorism and protect our citizens.
Sulmasy 2013 (Glenn Sulmasy 2013 for CNN “Why We Need Government Surveillance” Online http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/10/opinion/sulmasy-nsasnowden/)
The current threat by al Qaeda and jihadists is one that requires aggressive intelligence collection and efforts . One has to
look no further than the disruption of the New York City subway bombers (the one being touted by DNI Clapper) or the Boston Marathon bombers to know that the
war on al Qaeda is coming home to us, to our citizens, to our students, to our streets and our subways.This
21st century war is different and
requires new ways and methods of gathering information. As technology has increased, so has our ability to gather
valuable, often actionable, intelligence. However, the move toward "home-grown" terror will necessarily require, by
accident or purposefully, collections of U.S. citizens' conversations with potential overseas persons of interest.An open society, such as
the United States, ironically needs to use this technology to protect itself. This truth is naturally uncomfortable for a
country with a Constitution that prevents the federal government from conducting "unreasonable searches and
seizures." American historical resistance towards such activities is a bedrock of our laws, policies and police procedures.But what might have been
reasonable 10 years ago is not the same any longer. The constant armed struggle against the jihadists has adjusted our beliefs on what we think
our government can, and must, do in order to protect its citizens.However, when we hear of programs such PRISM, or the Department of Justice getting phone
records of scores of citizens without any signs of suspicious activities nor indications of probable cause that they might be involved in terrorist related activities, the
American demand for privacy naturally emerges to challenge such "trolling" measures or data-mining.The executive branch, although particularly powerful in this
arena, must ensure the Congress is kept abreast of activities such as these surveillance programs. The need for enhanced intelligence activities is a necessary part of
the war on al Qaeda, but abuse can occur without ensuring the legislative branch has awareness of aggressive tactics such as these.Our Founding Fathers, aware of
the need to have an energetic, vibrant executive branch in foreign affairs, still anticipated checks upon the presidency by the legislature. Working together, the two
branches can ensure that both legally, and by policy, this is what the citizens desire of their government -- and that leaks such as Snowden's won't have the impact
and damage that his leaks are likely to cause.As for Snowden, regardless of how any of us feel about the national security surveillance programs at issue, he must be
extradited back to the U.S. for interviews and potential trial -- if for no other reason than to deter others from feeling emboldened to break the law in the same way
in the future.
Information we get from surveillance is vital to preventing terrorist plots, which are even more complex after 9/11. A
ban would weaken our defenses.
Hirsh 2013 [Michael Hirsh, chief correspondent, the National Journal, “The Next Bin Laden,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-next-bin-laden20131114, November 14 2013]
Ever since the death of Osama bin Laden, President Obama and his senior lieutenants have been telling war-weary Americans that the end of the nation’s longest
conflict is within sight. “Core al-Qaida is a shell of its former self,” Obama said in a speech in May. “This war, like all wars, must end.” That was the triumphal tone of
last year’s reelection campaign, too.The truth is much grimmer. Intelligence
officials and terrorism experts today believe that the death
of bin Laden and the decimation of the Qaida “core” in Pakistan only set the stage for a rebirth of al-Qaida as a global threat. Its
tactics have morphed into something more insidious and increasingly dangerous as safe havens multiply in war-torn or failed states—at
exactly the moment we are talking about curtailing the National Security Agency’s monitoring capability. And the jihadist who many terrorism experts believe is alQaida’s new strategic mastermind, Abu Musab al-Suri (a nom de guerre that means “the Syrian”), has a diametrically different approach that emphasizes quantity
over quality. The red-haired, blue-eyed former mechanical engineer was born in Aleppo in 1958 as Mustafa Setmariam Nasar; he has lived in France and Spain. Al-Suri
is believed to have helped plan the 2004 train bombings in Madrid and the 2005 bombings in London—and has been called the “Clausewitz” of the new alQaida.Whereas bin Laden preached big dramatic acts directed by him and senior Qaida leaders, al-Suri urges the creation of self-generating cells of lone terrorists or
small groups in his 1,600-page Internet manifesto. They are to keep up attacks, like multiplying fleas on a dog that finds itself endlessly distracted—and ultimately
dysfunctional. (A classic Western book on guerrilla warfare called The War of the Flea reportedly influenced al-Suri.) The attacks are to culminate, he hopes, in acts
using weapons of mass destruction.Recent terrorist attacks against U.S. targets, from the murderous 2009 spree of Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan at Fort Hood to the
Boston Marathon bombings last year, suggest that al-Suri’s philosophy dominates al-Qaida’s newly flattened hierarchy. The late Yemeni-American imam Anwar alAwlaki, who preached this strategy and induced Hasan’s attack, is said to have developed his ideas from al-Suri’s. Meanwhile, with new refuges in North Africa, Syria,
and Yemen, jihadists have much more territory from which to hatch plots unmolested.Yet the politics at home are changing as the threat abroad is growing. The
revelations dribbled out by fugitive leaker Edward Snowden have outraged members of Congress and world leaders, including those of close allies such as Germany
and France. They say they are aghast at American overreach. Writing in Der Spiegel, Snowden justified himself this way: “Instead of causing damage, the usefulness of
the new public knowledge for society is now clear, because reforms to politics, supervision, and laws are being suggested.” Thanks to him, Congress will almost
certainly rein in the National Security Agency’s data-trolling methods—though it’s not yet clear how much.But the agency’s
opponents may not realize
that the practice they most hope to stop—its seemingly indiscriminate scouring of phone data and emails—is precisely
what intelligence officials say they need to detect the kinds of plots al-Suri favors. For the foreseeable future, al-Suri’s approach will mean more
terrorist attacks against more targets—albeit with a much lower level of organization and competence. “It’s harder to track. Future attacks against the homeland will
be less sophisticated and less lethal, but there’s just going to be more of them,” says Michael Hayden, the former NSA director who steered the agency after 9/11
toward deep dives into Internet and telephonic data. Adds Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, “I think al-Qaida’s capabilities for a strike into
the United States are more dangerous and more numerous than before 9/11.” For better or worse,
the only hope to track them all is an
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exceptionally deep, organized, and free-ranging intelligence apparatus, experts say.Intelligence officials who are well briefed in the
technical aspects of NSA surveillance also note that global communications are vastly more complex than they were as recently as 9/11, not just in terms of speed
and bandwidth but also in the kinds of digital paths they can take. Messages can travel partly by air and partly by cable, for example, and the NSA must keep up. “If
you take the diffuse physical environment [of more failed-state havens] and you layer that with the diffuse communications environment, and then you layer that
with the diffuse ideological environment—more lone wolves, for example—that makes for a far more generally dangerous environment,” says a knowledgeable U.S.
government official who asked to remain anonymous. All of which means that despite very legitimate questions about whether the National Security Agency is going
beyond what the law and Constitution allow, Americans probably need the NSA now more than ever.
Without Stingray style surveillance devices, terrorists will be able to remain anonymous
Gamma Group 2011 (manufacturer of a Stingray style device.
“3G-GSM Tactical Interception and Target Location”
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/810727-772-gamma-group-catalogue-3g-gsm-tactical.html)
Cellular networks have created a haven for criminals and terrorists. Over GSM & 3G networks, criminals and terrorist
can remain anonymous, able to continue illegal activities on a global scale without fear of action because:
● No Local Registration is required - criminals are able to use pre-paid SIM cards or foreign SIM cards without
the need to supply any information
● Post-Paid Subscription Fraud - criminals are easily able to reprogram phones with a fake identity or use stolen
phones and SIM cards.
Although powerful Strategic/Countrywide surveillance monitoring tools are at the disposal of Law Enforcement Agencies, the ability to monitor specific
criminals/targets critically requires having specific target identity data. In the case of cellular networks the fundamental information is the IMSI (unique identifier or
serial number of the SIM) and the IMEI (unique identifier or serial number of the handset)
The IMSI and IMEI is highly prized data, and to protect users it is not normally transmitted within cellular networks. However, if the data is obtained, then Law
Enforcement Agencies have all they need to monitor Target(s). The challenge is how to overcome the protective security messages within cellular networks
protecting their subscribers and covertly elicit specific target user data. Fortunately, to assist Law Enforcement Agencies we
are able to offer solutions which
these challenges. Tactical off-air solutions are available which are able to emulate the cellular network in order to:
1. Indentify & Locate GSM Target(s) Cell-phones
can overcome
Determine and locate the identity of a Target(s) GSM cell-phone by pretending to be the real network and tricking the phone to register accordingly. This process
allows the unique identity of the phone (IMEI) and the SIM card (IMSI) to be covertly captured, and designated a Target to be precisely located.
2. Identify & Locate 3G Target(s) cell-phones
Determine and locate the identity of a Target(s) 3G cell-phone by pretending to be the real network and tricking the phone to register accordingly. THis process
allows the unique identity of the phone (IMEI) and the SIM card (IMSI) to be covertly captured, and designated Targets to be precisely located.
3. Intercept the Voice and SMS Communication of Designated Targets
The communication of Target(s) under surveillance can be captured without their knowledge, including:
●
all Voice calls & SMS either made or received by Target(s)
●
spoof the identity of Target(s) to falsely send SMS or Voice calls
●
divert Calls/SMS so they are not received by the Target(s)
the ability to edit all SMS before they are received by the Target(s)
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*** National Security Letters Affirmative
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National Security Letters Summary
National security letters are notices from the government to allow the FBI to gain access to information relevant to national security
investigations. By law, they can’t access content (but can access phone records, numbers, etc.). There is a lot of controversy around
them because they are used very frequently, and the FBI has been caught misusing them. Also, because there is no court oversight,
some people feel that they have a high potential for abuse and are not constitutional.
National Security Letters (NSLs) are one way that the government has to find out information about people.
How does information about my activities get collected?
Many of the things you do in your life involve interacting with a company that keeps a record of what you’ve been up to. Search for
things online? The search company keeps track of it. Make a phone call or send a text? Your phone company has a record of it. Buy
something at the grocery store? If you use one of those “rewards cards”, the store keeps a record of what you bought. Since so
much of your life involves electronic communication, the companies that facilitate those communications have a lot of records
about you.
Why do these companies collect this information?
Companies keep these records partly to provide you with better service, but mostly so they know what kinds of advertisements
might work on you.
What does the government want with this information?
The government might want the information in order to find out if you’ve been doing anything illegal. They might want to know if
you’ve been searching for how to build bombs or texting known criminals.
Do the companies have to give information about me to the government?
Yes. Section 505 of the USA PATRIOT Act allows the FBI to send an NSL to a company and order them to turn their records over to
the FBI.
Will the company tell me if they turn my information over to the government?
Not usually. The law also allows the FBI to issue a “gag order” about the letter. This means that when a person at a company receive
a NSL, they can’t tell anyone about it. Not the person whose information is being turned over. Not their coworkers. Not even their
family. If they tell anyone about it, they could go to jail.
Isn’t an NSL basically the same as a search warrant?
NSLs are not like warrants. In order to get a warrant, the FBI would need to convince a judge that they had probable cause to believe
a search would reveal evidence of a crime. If the judge is not convinced, the FBI can’t perform the search. NSLs are “administrative
subpeonas” that the FBI issues themselves. They don’t need a judge’s permission to send out an NSL and they don’t need to prove to
anybody that the search is likely to reveal evidence of a crime.
Doesn’t the Constitution require the government to get warrants when they want to search my stuff?
The FBI doesn’t need a warrant to get these kinds of records about you because of something called “third party doctrine.” In
general, you are only protected from government searches in situations where you have “reasonable expectation of privacy.” In your
house, you have such an expectation, so the government almost always needs a warrant to search there. But courts have ruled that
you don’t have a reasonable expectation of privacy for records about your activities kept by third parties like Google, Verizon, or
Cub. Since you allowed those parties to know information about you, the courts say that you can’t reasonably expect it to be private.
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National Security Letters 1AC –Plan
We propose the following plan:
The United States federal government should ban the use of National Security Letters
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National Security Letters 1AC – Harms (Privacy)
Contention One: Harms - Privacy
National Security Letters are an abuse of power that enables needless mass government
surveillance, which violates privacy and threatens democracy
Washington Post, 2007
(“My National Security Letter Gag Order” March 23: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/22/AR2007032201882.html/)
The Justice Department's inspector general revealed on March 9 that the FBI has been systematically abusing
one of the most controversial provisions of the USA Patriot Act: the expanded power to issue "national security
letters." It no doubt surprised most Americans to learn that between 2003 and 2005 the FBI issued more than
140,000 specific demands under this provision -- demands issued without a showing of probable cause or prior
judicial approval -- to obtain potentially sensitive information about U.S. citizens and residents. It did not,
however, come as any surprise to me.Three years ago, I received a national security letter (NSL) in my capacity as
the president of a small Internet access and consulting business. The letter ordered me to provide sensitive
information about one of my clients. There was no indication that a judge had reviewed or approved the
letter, and it turned out that none had. The letter came with a gag provision that prohibited me from telling
anyone, including my client, that the FBI was seeking this information. Based on the context of the demand -- a
context that the FBI still won't let me discuss publicly -- I suspected that the FBI was abusing its power and that the
letter sought information to which the FBI was not entitled. Rather than turn over the information, I contacted
lawyers at the American Civil Liberties Union, and in April 2004 I filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of
the NSL power. I never released the information the FBI sought, and last November the FBI decided that it no
longer needs the information anyway. But the FBI still hasn't abandoned the gag order that prevents me from
disclosing my experience and concerns with the law or the national security letter that was served on my
company. In fact, the government will return to court in the next few weeks to defend the gag orders that are
imposed on recipients of these letters. Living under the gag order has been stressful and surreal. Under the threat
of criminal prosecution, I must hide all aspects of my involvement in the case -- including the mere fact that I
received an NSL -- from my colleagues, my family and my friends. When I meet with my attorneys I cannot tell my
girlfriend where I am going or where I have been. I hide any papers related to the case in a place where she will not
look. When clients and friends ask me whether I am the one challenging the constitutionality of the NSL statute, I
have no choice but to look them in the eye and lie.I resent being conscripted as a secret informer for the
government and being made to mislead those who are close to me, especially because I have doubts about the
legitimacy of the underlying investigation.The inspector general's report makes clear that NSL gag orders have
had even more pernicious effects. Without the gag orders issued on recipients of the letters, it is doubtful that
the FBI would have been able to abuse the NSL power the way that it did. Some recipients would have spoken
out about perceived abuses, and the FBI's actions would have been subject to some degree of public scrutiny. To be
sure, not all recipients would have spoken out; the inspector general's report suggests that large telecom
companies have been all too willing to share sensitive data with the agency -- in at least one case, a telecom
company gave the FBI even more information than it asked for. But some recipients would have called attention to
abuses, and some abuse would have been deterred.I found it particularly difficult to be silent about my concerns
while Congress was debating the reauthorization of the Patriot Act in 2005 and early 2006. If I hadn't been under a
gag order, I would have contacted members of Congress to discuss my experiences and to advocate changes in the
law. The inspector general's report confirms that Congress lacked a complete picture of the problem during a
critical time: Even though the NSL statute requires the director of the FBI to fully inform members of the
House and Senate about all requests issued under the statute, the FBI significantly underrepresented the
number of NSL requests in 2003, 2004 and 2005, according to the report.I recognize that there may sometimes
be a need for secrecy in certain national security investigations. But I've now been under a broad gag order for
three years, and other NSL recipients have been silenced for even longer. At some point -- a point we passed long
ago -- the secrecy itself becomes a threat to our democracy. In the wake of the recent revelations, I believe more
strongly than ever that the secrecy surrounding the government's use of the national security letters power
is unwarranted and dangerous. I hope that Congress will at last recognize the same thing.
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National Security Letters 1AC – Harms (Privacy)
Without privacy, there is no democracy
TruthOut 2013
(“Without Privacy There Can Be No Democracy TruthOut September 24 Online: http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/19039-without-privacy-there-can-be-nodemocracy#)
The president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, spoke this morning at the United Nations and delivered a powerful indictment of
spying by the NSA on behalf of the United States. She said, "Without respect for a nation's sovereignty, there is no basis
for proper relations among nations," adding that "Brazil knows how to protect itself. Brazil ... does not provide shelter to
terrorist groups. We are a democratic country."The Brazilian president is so outraged at American spying, both on her
country and on her personal emails and her personal life, that she canceled a state dinner with President Obama.
While most Americans see this as a rift between Brazil in the United States over the issue of our spying on them,
President Rousseff highlighted the most important point of all elsewhere in her speech this morning.She said, "Without
the right of privacy, there is no real freedom of speech or freedom of opinion, and so there is no actual
democracy."This is not just true of international relations. It's also true here within the United States.Back before the
Kennedy administration largely put an end to it, J Edgar Hoover was infamous in political circles in Washington DC for his
spying on and blackmailing of both American politicians and activists like Martin Luther King. He even sent King tapes of
an extramarital affair and suggested that King should consider committing suicide.That was a shameful period in
American history, and most Americans think it is behind us. But the NSA, other intelligence agencies, and even local
police departments have put the practice of spying on average citizens in America on steroids.As Brazil's President points
out, without privacy there can be no democracy. Democracy requires opposing voices; it requires a certain level of
reasonable political conflict. And it requires that government misdeeds be exposed. That can only be done when
whistleblowers and people committing acts of journalism can do so without being spied upon.Perhaps a larger
problem is that well over half – some estimates run as high as 70% – of the NSA's budget has been outsourced to private
corporations. These private corporations maintain an army of lobbyists in Washington DC who constantly push for more
spying and, thus, more money for their clients. With the privatization of intelligence operations, the normal system of
checks and balances that would keep government snooping under control has broken down. We need a new Church
Commission to investigate the nature and scope of our government spying both on our citizens and on our allies.But
even more than that we need to go back to the advice that President Dwight Eisenhower gave us as he left the
presidency in 1961. Eisenhower warned about the rise of a military-industrial complex, suggesting that private forces
might, in their search for profits, override the protective mechanisms that keep government answerable to its people.
dThat military-industrial complex has become the military-industrial-spying-private-prison complex, and it is far greater
a threat to democracy then probably was envisioned by Eisenhower. Government is the protector of the commons.
Government is of by and for we the people. Government must be answerable to the people. When the functions of
government are privatized, all of that breaks down and Government becomes answerable to profit. It's time to
reestablish the clear dividing lines between government functions and corporate functions, between the public space
and the private space.
A critically important place to start that is by ending the privatization within our national investigative and spying
agencies.
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National Security Letters 1AC – Harms (Racism)
Contention 2: Harms - Racism
National Security Letters have been part of a larger pattern of racial profiling and subjugation since 9/11, it
is almost impossible to prove racial profiling in a surveillance attempt
Kleiner 2010
(“Racial Profiling in the Name of National Security: Protecting Minority Travelers Civil Liberties in the Age of Terrorism” Yevgenia S. Kleiner November 1 Online:
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=twlj
Government-sponsored ethnic and racial profiling in the form of computerized and behavioral screening initiatives
implemented as a response to 9/11 has led to the subjection of minorities to increased scrutiny and suspicion in
American airports. In the name of national security, safety protocols are being enacted in non-uniform ways that
disproportionally infringe on minority passengers’ civil liberties and reinforce harmful racial stereotypes. Focusing on
the dissonance between basic freedoms guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the security policies
implemented by the federal government, this Note argues that the disparity in scrutiny received by minority travelers is
counterproductive because it reinforces racism and ethnocentrism as social norms and fails to ensure a consistent level
of protection for all passengers. This Note ultimately advocates for a federal government mandate that delineates a
universal, race-blind standard for the level of scrutiny (and accompanying procedures) that all passengers should be
subjected to while traveling aboard commercial aircraft.[…] The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act signaled the beginning
of an era of reduced judicial oversight of surveillance by the federal government.70Although the Fourth Amendment
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and normally requires probable cause forgovernment interference,
no convenient provision exists to explicitly define the way the Amendment should be read in light of a potential terrorist
threat.71 As a result, the USA PATRIOT Act granted the government wide-sweeping investigative powers by permitting it
to obtainwarrants without a demonstration of the truthfulness of its allegations.72 Furthermore, provisions under
Section 505 of the USA PATRIOT Actgranted the Department of Justice the freedom to use administrative subpoenas
called National Security Letters to obtain records of individuals’electronic communications without judicial
oversight.73 This provision essentially means that National Security Letters enable federal officials to obtain
information on anyone, because the Act does not require officials to demonstrate probable cause or a compelling
need for access to the information.74 It was not until 2003 that Attorney General John Ashcroft finally admitted in a
statement before the House Judiciary Committee that the USA PATRIOT Act had lowered the standard of proof for a
warrant to something “lower than probable cause,” and that it had enabled federal officials to investigate citizens
who were neither spies nor terrorists.75 Unfortunately, this admission did not lessen the burden on wrongfully
targeted minorities who wish to assert their constitutional rights: in addition to proving a violation of their Fourth
Amendment Due Process rights, individuals alleging a racial profiling claim against the government are required to
show that the relevant government agency violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
complying with a “purposefully discriminatory policy.”76 Not surprisingly, meeting such a high burden of proof is
usually difficult, if not impossible since government agencies are reluctant to admit such grievous error.77
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National Security Letters 1AC – Harms (Racism)
Racism makes all forms of violence inevitable. National Security Letters are only one part of a racist justice
system, but we must reject anything that contributes to racism
Memmi 2k
MEMMI Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ Unv. Of Paris Albert-; RACISM, translated by Steve Martinot, pp.163-165
The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved, yet for this very reason, it is a struggle
to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism. One cannot even
let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in
us and in other people which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to
endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is
to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which [person] man is not [themself] himself an outsider
relative to someone else?). Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated; that is it
illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in
question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to humanity. In that sense, we
cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduct only emerges from a
choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its
consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the
establishment of a human order for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a
moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism because racism signifies the exclusion of the other and his or her
subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious
language, racism is “the truly capital sin.”fn22 It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions
counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical counsel respect for
the weak, for orphans, widows or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested
commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things
considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this
is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is
permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust
society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they
treat you with respect. “Recall,” says the bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you
ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming once again someday. It is an
ethical and a practical appeal – indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the
condition for all theoretical and practical morality. Because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political
choice. A just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict,
violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but
the stakes are irresistible.
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National Security Letters 1AC – Solvency
Banning national security letters solves immediately – only federal action works
Weigant, 2014 (Chris, Huffington Post contributor,
http://www.chrisweigant.com/2014/01/16/obama-should-announce-ban-on-national-security-letters)
National security letters are nothing short of an abuse of power. Their use has exploded since 9/11, with the total
issued now in the hundreds of thousands. National security letters, for those unaware of their definition, are
search warrants issued by the executive branch with no signoff from the judicial branch. The F.B.I. can (and
does) write out a letter demanding certain information (from an Internet Service Provider, for instance, or a
phone company) be turned over to the government. No judge signs off on the order. They cannot be appealed.
In fact, up until very recently, they could not even legally be talked about by the recipient. There was a "gag
order" clause in the letter which stated that the letter's mere existence was a national secret which could not be
disclosed to anyone, forever.
This, quite obviously, gives law enforcement officers absolute power over searching anything they felt like, in
the sacred name of national security. With no legal recourse whatsoever. That is tyrannic power, folks. In fact,
historically, it is no different than the abuses of King Louis XVI which led to the French Revolution. Back then,
such orders were called lettres de cachet. But no matter what language you use, such non-judicial seizure
orders issued on the sole say-so of the executive power are laughably unconstitutional today.
I'm not the only one to make this assertion, either. There have been a number of court cases where federal
judges have banned national security letters from being issued, on the grounds that they are indeed blatant
affronts to the United States Constitution (the First and Fourth Amendments in particular). The last such
judgment was handed down last year, in fact. But somehow, no matter how many times the federal government
loses such cases in court, national security letters never seem to quite go away. Just last week, the head of the F.B.I.
was arguing against the recommendation that a judge sign off on such search warrants -- which would be a
moot point unless the feds were still in the habit of issuing such orders, wouldn't it?
Obama's blue-ribbon commission is right. National security letters are nothing short of an abuse of executive
power -- one that the Constitution specifically addresses. There's a reason why the Fourth Amendment exists,
to put this another way, and a big part of that reason is to forever ban such abuses of power by the executive
branch of the government. If the F.B.I. (or any other federal agency) feels it needs to search any records in any
national security case, then they should have to present their case to a judge and get it signed off, just like any
other court order. Having this check on executive power is a fundamental part of what this country was
founded upon.
President Obama should say so, tomorrow. He should announce he is issuing an executive order (or rule change or
whatever else is necessary) stating that national security letters will no longer be issued without the signature of a judge
on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (who are cleared to handle such national security issues). Even
simpler, Obama should just announce a ban on the use of national security letters altogether, and that in their place
the F.B.I. and all other federal agencies will be issuing national security search warrants instead. No congressional
action should be necessary to achieve this -- Obama should be able to change this with the stroke of a pen.
I've been calling for the end to national security letters for a long time now, beginning back when George W.
Bush was in office. It's not a partisan issue, for me. I don't care who is in the Oval Office, such letters are a plain
abuse of power and should not be allowed in the United States of America. President Obama was forced into
creating a commission to study intelligence gathering. His commission recommended doing away with nonjudicial national security letters. Federal judges have pointed out again and again just how blatantly
unconstitutional such power is. So there should be nothing stopping Barack Obama -- a former constitutional
professor himself -- from announcing tomorrow that national security letters will now all have to be approved
by a judge before they can be issued. It is the right thing to do, and the time to make this change is indeed long
overdu
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Answers to: Terrorism Disadvantage
National Security Letters are not necessary for national security- they needlessly violate the privacy of
thousands of innocent Americans
Sanchez, 2014
(“Can We Do Without National Security Letters?” Julian Sanchez January 9, Online: http://justsecurity.org/5351/national-security-letters/)
Former top FBI attorney Michael Woods (Quoted in Eric Lichtblau’sBush’s Law) has summarized the ethos that led to the
massive explosion of NSLs issued in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks:All of a sudden, every lead needed to be looked at. The
atmosphere was such that you didn’t want to be the guy who overlooked the next Moussaoui. . . . If you’re telling the FBI
people over and over you need to be preemptive, you need to get out there before something happens, you’re pushing
people toward a fishing expedition. We heard over and over again, connect the dots, and we were pushing the envelope and
doing things that, in the old days, would have seemed beyond the pale.That is certainly an understandable initial reaction, but
at this point it seems fair to question whether the use of such an invasive tool is really necessary as a means of checking out
every possible lead. When NSL authority was initially expanded, after all, the requirement that records obtained be relevant
to an “authorized investigation” was understood to refer to full investigations, predicated on “specific and articulable facts”
providing “reasonable grounds” to believe some real national security threat exists. The guidelines were only later, in 2003,
altered to allow their use in “preliminary” investigations based on “information or allegations” suggesting a possible threat—
and before long, such investigations accounted for the majority of NSLs issued.If the inability to chase down a sufficient
number of thin leads had been at the root of the failure to detect the 9/11 plot, this might well be a reasonable response,
but the evidence is fairly overwhelming at this point that this was not the case. The problem, rather, was a failure to
“connect dots” by sharing information about known threats across agencies, rather than insufficiently promiscuous collection
of dots. Needless to say, the vast majority of the thousands of Americans whose information is collected pursuant to NSLs
are not, in fact, terrorists—nor, in all likelihood engaged in criminal wrongdoing of any kind. So if the objection is that such
large-scale use of NSLs to collect data about Americans is likely to be infeasible when advance approval is required, one good
answer might be: Yes, that is the point. Candidate Barack Obama presumably thought so when hedeclared his intention to
put an end to the use of “National Security Letters to spy on citizens who are not suspected of a crime.”NSL authorities have
already given rise to misuses the Justice Department’s Inspector General characterized as widespread and serious—but the
disclosure of the FISC opinions authorizing bulk collection of metadata under Section 215 of the Patriot Act adds further
grounds for concern. The “relevance” standard that the FISC construed to permit huge volumes of irrelevant records as a
means of sifting through them for a minuscule fraction of relevant ones, after all, is the same standard found in the NSL
statutes. The FISC, to be sure, stressed the many extrastatutory safeguards it had imposed on the NSA’s metadata programs
in order to limit the invasion of innocent Americans’ privacy, but the presence or absence of those safeguards cannot really
bear on the threshold question of whether the records obtained are “relevant.” Would any FBI agent be so bold as to issue an
NSL for the records of all subscribers at a major cell carrier? Almost certainly not, at least in the current climate. But with this
broad understanding of “relevance” now on the record, and being openly defended by the Justice Department, it is easy to
imagine smaller scale fishing expeditions operating on the same theory—perhaps applying to all users of a particular Web site
or online service.Finally, it bears noting that the courts may well force the administration’s hand if it does not undertake its
own reforms. One court has already held that NSLs, with their presumptive gag orders, violate the First Amendment—though
that ruling has been stayed pending appellate review. So it is at least an open question whether they can survive in their
current form whether or not the administration is eager for reform. Fortunately, there is little reason to think that intelligence
agencies would be hobbled if deprived of a tool relatively little used before the passage of the Patriot Act, or that the use of
intrusive methods to “check out” Americans by the tens of thousands is essential to protecting American security.[…]If the NSL
gag provisions can be weakened sufficiently to pass First Amendment muster, such a compromise solution might represent
the elusive “balance” between privacy interests and the need to quickly evaluate leads in the initial phases of investigations.
But the burden should be on the intelligence community to establish that even more limited authority is genuinely
necessary. The absence of broad NSL powers prior to the Patriot Act does not appear to have been a major factor in the
failure to detect the 9/11 attacks, and the public has not been made aware of any cases where such easy access to sensitive
information has enabled the discovery of some plot or terror cell that would otherwise have gone undetected. The claim
that the FBI cannot investigate effectively without a tool that has existed in its current form for roughly a decade should be
seen as an extraordinary one—demanding equally extraordinary evidence before we accept it.
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Answers to: Terrorism Disadvantage
National Security Letters are intrusive tools that are not as effective as other, more ethical national security efforts.
German and Richardson, 2012
(“National Security Letters: Building Blocks for Investigations or Intrusive Tools?” Michael German and Michelle Richardson for the ABA Journal September 1, Online:
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/national_security_letters_building_blocks_for_investigations_or_intrusive_t/
During the original Patriot Act debates, Attorney General John Ashcroft called librarians opposing the legislation “hysterical,” and now Valerie Caproni
and Steven Siegel argue that criticism of NSLs is “hyperbole.” Caproni and Siegel repeat the FBI’s previous assertions that NSLs are
“critical tools” in the government’s national security arsenal, but there is no public data to support this statement and, despite
Caproni and Siegel’s denials, there is ample evidence that this overbroad authority has been abused, as any unchecked
power usually is.The founders designed our constitutional system of government to prevent abuse of power through checks and balances between the
branches and robust procedural protections where the government attempts to deprive an individual of his rights. Indeed, the most fully developed
processes for the protection of civil rights exists within the criminal justice system, which makes the Caproni-Siegel comparison of NSLs to grand jury
subpoenas most misplaced.The grand jury, made up of ordinary citizens, is designed to serve as an independent check on
law enforcement authority by protecting people against unfounded charges. As the United States Attorneys’ Manual notes, the grand jury’s
which reduces the risk of
unnecessary, suspicionless data collection. And in grand jury proceedings, the role of prosecutors—who are bound by the ethical
obligations of their profession—is also a curb against law enforcement overreach. None of these protections exist with
NSLs or other surveillance tools geared toward intelligence collection rather than criminal prosecution. The FBI has the sole discretion to issue NSLs
power is limited by its narrow function of determining whether to bring an indictment for a criminal violation,
with virtually no independent oversight. Moreover, a grand jury’s indictment only starts the criminal justice process, after which additional rights attach
and affirmative discovery obligations are imposed on the government. The government’s obligation to disclose sources and methods of evidencegathering during trial is likewise a deterrent to improper collection, as the exclusionary rule compels suppression of illegally obtained evidence. The
secrecy required in grand jury proceedings is designed to protect the privacy of the witnesses and individuals investigated, not to hide the government
conduct from independent oversight and public accountability, as is the case with intelligence tools like NSLs. Victims of NSL abuse have no way of
knowing their rights have been violated, and no remedy.The truth is that NSLs are intrusive tools. While the Supreme Court did fail to
protect personal data held by third parties in 1976, as Caproni and Siegel point out, Congress then stepped in to protect financial, credit and
communications records, which most Americans consider sensitive and private information. The pre-Patriot NSL authorities Caproni and Siegel mention
were limited to collecting information about suspected foreign agents or international terrorists. The Patriot Act expansion of NSL authorities allows the
collection of data about any American the FBI deems “relevant” to an espionage or terrorism investigation, with no independent review. And given the
technological advancements that have occurred since the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision, which now leave vast amounts of personal information
unprotected on third-party servers, trusting the government to be judicious with its access to such data through NSLs or other tools is even more
misplaced.Caproni and Siegel also note that NSL recipients rarely challenge the government’s demands, which isn’t surprising given that NSLs seek
records pertaining to someone other than the recipient. When the entities that hold private information show as little interest in protecting it as the
government, everyone should worry. And it’s interesting that in the three cases in which NSL recipients challenged these demands, the government
withdrew the NSL requests rather than defend them in court, thereby mooting challenges to the underlying statute and throwing into doubt the
government’s justification for making these requests in the first place.Finally, consider the FBI’s continuing minimization of the abuse discovered by the
inspector general. The FBI’s own audit found legal violations in 9.43 percent of its NSL files, and the IG later determined that
the FBI underreported the number of NSL violations by a factor of three. These figures justify calling the abuse pervasive, and denying
their importance only raises further skepticism that Americans can trust government agents with such unfettered power. The IG did indeed say the FBI
made strides toward reform in 2008, but concluded that “it is too soon to definitively state whether the new systems and controls developed by the FBI
and the department will eliminate fully the problems with the use of NSLs.”
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CMSDL Core Files 2015-2016
Answers to: Crime Disadvantage
The FBI misuses National Security Letters- many are issued, with few prosecutions. A ban would stop the abuse, not increase
crime.
Fraase 2013
(“National Security Letter Report” Michael Fraase March 11, Online: http://www.farces.com/national-security-letter-report/)
A Justice Department reportindicates that the FBI illegally obtained
personal information including banking and telephone records on thousands of
US citizens. The information was gathered without court subpoena through the use of national security letters, the scope of which was significantly
expanded under the Patriot Act. These national security letters, intended to be used only in cases of emergency, were used “without an
emergency or even without an investigative case,” according to Dan Eggen and John Solomon’s report in the Washington Post. The national security
letters were, in some cases, used retroactively.More than 143,000 requests for information on more than 52,000 individuals were issued
from 2003-05, figures much higher than those reported to Congress.Some politicians responded by calling for restrictions on the Patriot Act and
have pledged investigatory hearings. Senate Majority Whip Richard Durbin (D-Illinois) has been calling for a review of the Bush administration’s use of national
security letters for two years told Eggen and Solomon that the report “confirms the American people’s worst fears about the Patriot Act.” Retraction letters flew
across Washington last week as administration representatives sought to correct their sworn testimony that the use of national security letters was well-regulated.
National Security Letters are for use only in terrorism or espionage cases; our plan would have little to no effect on non-national
security related crime.
German and Richardson, 2012
(“National Security Letters: Building Blocks for Investigations or Intrusive Tools?” Michael German and Michelle Richardson for the ABA Journal September 1, Online:
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/national_security_letters_building_blocks_for_investigations_or_intrusive_t/
Many federal agencies use administrative (not court-approved) subpoenas to obtain information relating to their duties—there are more than 300
instances where the law grants such powers. NSLs are a type of administrative subpoena that can be invoked only in terrorism and
espionage investigations. They can be issued by the FBI to limited types of third-party records’ custodians, and the custodians are responsible
for gathering and producing responsive materials to the FBI. The custodian can object if compliance would be burdensome, and the FBI cannot simply
take materials from the custodian. For that reason, NSLs should not be confused with search warrants . Search warrants are issued
based on a finding of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate; the person on whom a search warrant is served has no option to decline to
cooperate, and the entity serving the search warrant is authorized to seize material from the custodians. Moreover, the scope of a search warrant is set
by the specific finding of the magistrate and can be quite broad, depending on the underlying facts. In contrast, NSLs have a strictly defined scope that
has been set by Congress.
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2AC Extensions: Privacy
National Security Letters violate the first and fourth amendments; the FBI has ignored Presidential requests to end the use of
National Security Letters. Banning gag orders is not enough, we need to put an end to National Security Letters themselves.
Froomkin, 2015
(“FBI Flouts Obama Directive to Limit Gag Orders on National Security Letters” The Intercept February 19, Online: https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/19/fbiflouts-obama-directive-limit-gag-orders-national-security-letters/)
Despite the post-Snowden spotlight on mass surveillance, the intelligence community’s easiest end-run around the Fourth
Amendment since 2001 has
been something called a National Security Letter.FBI agents can demand that an Internet service provider, telephone company or
financial institution turn over its records on any number of people — without any judicial review whatsoever — simply by writing
a letter that says the information is needed for national security purposes. The FBI at one point was cranking out over 50,000 such letters a year; by
the latest count, it still issues about 60 a day.The letters look like this:Recipients are legally required to comply — but it doesn’t stop there. They
also aren’t allowed to mention the order to anyone , least of all the person whose data is being searched. Ever. That’s because National Security
Letters almost always come with eternal gag orders. Here’s that part:That means the NSL process utterly disregards the First Amendment as
well.More than a year ago, President Obama announced that he was ordering the Justice Department to terminate gag orders “within a
fixed time unless the government demonstrates a real need for further secrecy.”And on Feb. 3, when the Office of the Director of National
Intelligenceannounced a handful of baby steps resulting from its “comprehensive effort to examine and enhance [its] privacy and civil liberty protections” one of the
most concrete was — finally — to cap the gag orders:In response to the President’s new direction, the FBI will now presumptively terminate National Security Letter
nondisclosure orders at the earlier of three years after the opening of a fully predicated investigation or the investigation’s close.Continued nondisclosures orders
beyond this period are permitted only if a Special Agent in Charge or a Deputy Assistant Director determines that the statutory standards for nondisclosure continue to
be satisfied and that the case agent has justified, in writing, why continued nondisclosure is appropriate.Despite the use of the word “now” in that first sentence,
however, the FBI has yet to do any such thing. It has not announced any such change, nor explained how it will implement it, or when.Media inquiries
were greeted with stalling and, finally, a no comment — ostensibly on advice of legal counsel.“There is pending litigation that deals with a lot of the same questions
you’re asking, out of the Ninth Circuit,” FBI spokesman Chris Allen told me. “So for now, we’ll just have to decline to comment.”FBI lawyers are working on a court
filing for that case, and “it will address” the new policy, he said. He would not say when to expect it.There is indeed a significant case currently before the federal
appeals court in San Francisco. Oral arguments were in October. A decision could come any time.But in that case, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), which is
representing two unnamed communications companies that received NSLs, is calling for the entire NSL statute to be thrown out as unconstitutional — not for a
tweak to the gag. And it has a March 2013 district court ruling in its favor.“The gag is a prior restraint under the First Amendment, and prior restraints have to meet
an extremely high burden,” said Andrew Crocker, a legal fellow at EFF. That means going to court and meeting the burden of proof — not just signing a letter.Or as
the Cato Institute’s Julian Sanchez put it, “To have such a low bar for denying persons or companies the right to speak about government orders they have been
served with is anathema. And it is not very good for accountability.”In a separate case, a wide range of media companies (including First Look Media, the non-profit
digital media venture that produces The Intercept) aresupporting a lawsuit filed by Twitter, demanding the right to say specifically how many NSLs it has received.But
simply releasing companies from a gag doesn’t assure the kind of accountability that privacy advocates are saying is required by the
Constitution.“What the public has to remember is a NSL is asking for your information, but it’s not asking it from you,” said Michael German, a former FBI agent
who is now a fellow with the Brennan Center for Justice. “The vast majority of these things go to the very large telecommunications and financial companies who
have a large stake in maintaining a good relationship with the government because they’re heavily regulated entities.”So, German said, “the number of NSLs that
would be exposed as a result of the release of the gag order is probably very few. The person whose records are being obtained is the one who should receive some
notification.”A time limit on gags going forward also raises the question of whether past gag orders will now be withdrawn. “Obviously there are at this point literally
hundreds of thousands of National Security Letters that are more than three years old,” said Sanchez. Individual review is therefore unlikely, but there ought to be
some recourse, he said. And the further back you go, “it becomes increasingly implausible that a significant percentage of those are going to
entail some dire national security risk.”The NSL program has a troubled history. The absolute secrecy of the program and resulting lack of
accountability led to systemic abuse as documented by repeated inspector-general investigations, including improperly authorized NSLs, factual
misstatements in the NSLs, improper requests under NSL statutes, requests for information based on First Amendment protected activity, “after-thefact” blanket NSLs to “cover” illegal requests, and hundreds of NSLs for “community of interest” or “calling circle” information without any determination
that the telephone numbers were relevant to authorized national security investigations
The FBI has a history of misusing data tools and covering it up. Federal agents frequently violate privacy rules- 70% since 2002
have involved National Security Letters
RTE News, 2007
(“FBI Agents Broke The Rules 1,000 Times” RTE News June 14, Online: http://www.rte.ie/news/2007/0614/90049-fbi/)
An internal FBI audit has found the agency violated rules more than 1,000 times while collecting
data on US domestic phone calls, e-mails and financial transactions in recent years. The Washington Post
reported today that the number of violations uncovered by the audit was far greater than those previously documented in a Justice Department report in
March. The
vast majority of newly discovered violations were instances in which telephone companies and Internet providers gave agents
phone and e-mail records the agents did not request and were not authorised to collect. The
agents retained the information in their files, which mostly concerned suspected terrorist or espionage activities, according to the report . The new
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audit covers just 10% of the FBI's national security investigations since 2002, so the actual number of
violations in the FBI's domestic surveillance efforts probably number several thousand. Of the more than 1,000
violations uncovered by the new audit, about 700 involved the provision of information by phone companies and other communications
firms that exceeded what the FBI's National Security Letters had sought. However, some two dozen of the newly discovered
violations involved agents' requests for information that US law did not allow them to have, the audit
found. National Security Letters allow the FBI to compel the release of private information such as communications or financial records without getting
court authority. Their use has grown since the 11 September 2001 attacks. More than 19,000 such letters were issued in 2005 seeking 47,000 pieces of
information. FBI officials said the audit found no evidence that any agent knowingly or willingly violated the laws or that supervisors encouraged such
violations.
Mass surveillance is unconstitutional and a threat to democracy
The New York Times Editorial Board, 2013
(“Surveillance: A Threat to Democracy” June 11, Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/opinion/surveillance-a-threat-to-democracy.html
A new Washington Post-Pew Research Center pollfound that a majority of Americans are untroubled by revelations about the National Security
Agency’s dragnet collection of the phone records of millions of citizens, without any individual suspicion and regardless of any connection to a
counterterrorism investigation.Perhaps the lack of a broader sense of alarm is not all that surprising when President Obama, Senator Dianne Feinstein,
the Democratic chairwoman of the Intelligence Committee, and intelligence officials insist that such surveillance is crucial to the nation’s antiterrorism
efforts. But Americans should not be fooled by political leaders putting forward a false choice. The issue is not whether the government should
The question is whether the security goals can be achieved by less-intrusive or
without trampling on democratic freedoms and basic rights. Far too little has been said on this
question by the White House or Congress in their defense of the N.S.A.’s dragnet .The surreptitious collection of “metadata” — every
bit of information about every phone call except the word-by-word content of conversations — fundamentally alters the relationship
between individuals and their government.Tracking whom Americans are calling, for how long they speak, and from where,
vigorously pursue terrorists.
sweeping means,
can reveal deeply personal information about an individual. Using such data, the government can discover intimate details about a person’s lifestyle and
beliefs — political leanings and associations, medical issues, sexual orientation, habits of religious worship, and even marital infidelities. Daniel Solove,
a professor at George Washington University Law School and a privacy expert, likens this program to a Seurat painting. A single dot may seem like no
big deal, but many together create a nuanced portrait .The
effect is to undermine constitutional principles of
personal privacy and freedom from constant government monitoring. The American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit on Tuesday,
challenging the program’s constitutionality, and it was right to do so.The government’s capacity to build extensive, secret digital dossiers on such a mass
at odds with the vision and intention of the nation’s framers who crafted the Fourth
Amendment precisely to outlaw indiscriminate searches that cast a wide net to see what can be caught. It also attacks First
Amendment values of free speech and association.In a democracy, people are entitled to
know what techniques are being used by the government to spy on them, how the records are being held and for how long, who
will have access to them, and the safeguards in place to prevent abuse. Only then can they evaluate official claims that the correct
balance between fighting terrorism and preserving individual liberty has been struck, and decide if they are willing to accept
diminished privacy and liberty. If Americans have been slow to recognize the dangerous overreach of the N.S.A.’s phone
scale is totally
surveillance, it is largely because they have scant information to judge the government’s conduct.Even if most Americans trust President Obama not to
abuse their personal data, no one knows who will occupy the White House or lead intelligence operations in the future. The government’s capacity to
assemble, keep and share information on its citizens has grown exponentially since the days when J. Edgar Hoover, as director of the F.B.I., collected
terrorist threats need to catch up.
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2AC Extensions: Racism
Government has a history of infiltrating peaceful groups, mass surveillance is incompatible with human rights and democracy
Stallman 2013
(“How Much Surveillance Can Democracy Withstand?” Richard Stallman October 14, Online: http://www.wired.com/2013/10/a-necessary-evil-what-it-takes-fordemocracy-to-survive-surveillance/
The current level of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human rights. To recover our freedom and restore
democracy, we must reduce surveillance to the point where it is possible for whistleblowers of all kinds to talk with journalists without being spotted. To
do this reliably, we must reduce the surveillance capacity of the systems we use.Using free/libre software, as I’ve advocated for 30 years, is the first step in taking
control of our digital lives. We can’t trust non-free software; the NSA uses and even creates security weaknesses in non-free software so as to invade our own
computers and routers. Free software gives us control of our own computers, but that won’t protect our privacy once weset foot on the internet.Bipartisan legislation
to “curtail the domestic surveillance powers” in the U.S. is being drawn up, but it relies on limiting the government’s use of our virtual dossiers. That won’t suffice
to protect whistleblowers if “catching the whistleblower” is grounds for access sufficient to identify him or her. We need to go further.Thanks to Edward Snowden’s
disclosures, we know that the current level of general surveillance in society is incompatible with human rights. The repeated harassment and prosecution of
dissidents, sources, and journalists provides confirmation. We need to reduce the level of general surveillance, but how far? Where exactly is the maximum tolerable
level of surveillance, beyond which it becomes oppressive? That happens when surveillance interferes with the functioning of democracy: when whistleblowers
(such as Snowden) are likely to be caught.DON’T AGREE WE NEED TO REDUCE SURVEILLANCE? THEN READ THIS SECTION FIRSTIf whistleblowers don’t dare reveal
crimes and lies, we lose the last shred of effective control over our government and institutions. That’s why surveillance that enables the state to find out who has
talked with a reporter is too much surveillance — too much for democracy to endure.An unnamed U.S. government official ominously toldjournalists in 2011 that the
U.S. would not subpoena reporters because “We know who you’re talking to.” Sometimes journalists’ phone call records are subpoena’d to find this out, but
Snowden has shown us that in effect they subpoena all the phone call recordsof everyone in the U.S., all the time.Opposition and dissident activities need to keep
secrets from states that are willing to play dirty tricks on them. The ACLU has demonstrated the U.S. government’s systematic practice of
infiltrating peaceful dissident groups on the pretext that there might be terrorists among them. The point at which surveillance is too much
is the point at which the state can find who spoke to a known journalist or a known dissident.Information, Once Collected, Will Be Misused When people
recognize that the level of general surveillance is too high, the first response is to propose limits on access to the accumulated data. That sounds nice, but it won’t fix
the problem, not even slightly, even supposing that the government obeys the rules. (The NSA has misled the FISA court, which said it was unable to effectively hold
the NSA accountable.) Suspicion of a crime will be grounds for access, so once a whistleblower is accused of “espionage”, finding the “spy” will provide an excuse to
access the accumulated material.
The state’s surveillance staff will misuse the data for personal reasons too. Some NSA agents used U.S. surveillance systems to track their lovers — past, present, or
wished-for — in a practice called “LoveINT.” The NSA says it has caught and punished this a few times; we don’t know how many other times it wasn’t caught. But
these events shouldn’t surprise us, because police have long used their access to driver’s license records to track down someone attractive, a practice known
as “running a plate for a date.”Surveillance data will always be used for other purposes, even if this is prohibited. Once the data has been accumulated and the
state has the possibility of access to it, it may misuse that data in dreadful ways.
Total surveillance plus vague law provides an opening for a massive fishing expedition against any desired target. To make journalism and democracy safe,
we must limit the accumulation of data that is easily accessible to the state.Robust Protection for Privacy Must Be TechnicalThe Electronic
Frontier Foundation and other organizations propose a set of legal principles designed to prevent the abuses ofmassive surveillance. These principles include,
crucially, explicit legal protection for whistleblowers; as a consequence, they would be adequate for protecting democratic freedoms — if adopted completely and
enforced without exception forever.However, such legal protections are precarious: as recent history shows, they can be repealed (as in the FISA Amendments
Act), suspended, or ignored.Meanwhile, demagogues will cite the usual excuses as grounds for total surveillance; any terrorist attack, even one that kills just
a handful of people, will give them an opportunity.
If limits on access to the data are set aside, it will be as if they had never existed: years worth of dossiers would suddenly become available for misuse by the state
and its agents and, if collected by companies, for their private misuse as well. If, however, we stop the collection of dossiers on everyone, those dossiers won’t exist,
and there will be no way to compile them retroactively. A new illiberal regime would have to implement surveillance afresh, and it would only collect data starting at
that date. As for suspending or momentarily ignoring this law, the idea would hardly make sense.
We have a moral obligation to stop racial profiling- it is dehumanizing and prevents justice from being served.
U.S. DOJ 2003 (Department of Justice “Fact Sheet on Racial Profiling” Online http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/June/racial_profiling_fact_sheet.pdf)
Racial profiling sends the dehumanizing message to our citizens that they are judged by the color of their skin and harms the criminal justice system
by eviscerating the trust that is necessary if law enforcement is to effectively protect our communities.America Has a Moral Obligation to Prohibit
Racial Profiling. Race-based assumptions in law enforcement perpetuate negative racial stereotypes that are harmful to our diverse democracy, and
materially impair our efforts to maintain a fair and just society. As Attorney General John Ashcroft said, racial profiling creates a "lose-lose" situation
because it destroys the potential for underlying trust that "should support the administration of justice as a societal objective, not just as a law enforcement
objective." The Overwhelming Majority of Federal Law Enforcement Officers Perform Their Jobs with Dedication, Fairness and Honor, But Any Instance of Racial
Profiling by a Few Damages Our Criminal Justice System. The vast majority of federal law enforcement officers are hard-working public servants who perform
a dangerous job with dedication,fairness and honor. However, when law enforcement practices are perceived to be biased or unfair, the general public, and
especially minority communities, are less willing to trust and confide in officers, report crimes, be witnesses at trials, or serve on juries. Racial
Profiling Is Discrimination, and It Taints the Entire Criminal Justice System.Racial profiling rests on the erroneous assumption that any particular individual
of one race or ethnicity is more likely to engage in misconduct than any particular individual of other races orethnicities.
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Trying to reform National Security Letters doesn’t work. We need to ban them because the FBI can’t
be trusted to comply with the law
American Bar Association Journal, 2012 (Sept, 1.
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/national_security_letters_building_blocks_for_investigations_or_intrusiv
e_t/)
There are also demonstrated problems with how the FBI handles data it receives in response to an NSL. Rather than
using NSLs as an investigative tool, as Congress clearly intended by only allowing them to be used when the information
sought was relevant to an ongoing investigation, the FBI was using NSLs for mass data collection. The Inspector General
found FBI agents often carelessly uploaded information produced in response to NSLs into FBI databases without
reviewing it to evaluate its importance to the investigation or even to ensure the proper data was received. As a result,
information received in error was improperly retained and illegally shared throughout the intelligence community.
The Inspector General detailed several incidents where the FBI collected private information regarding innocent
people not relevant to any authorized investigation, entered it into FBI case files, and/or uploaded it into FBI
databases—simply because the FBI agents requested records for the wrong telephone numbers or for the wrong time
periods. In two other incidents, information for individuals not relevant to FBI investigations was uploaded into FBI
databases, even though the FBI case agent had written on the face of the documents: “Individual account records not
relevant to this matter. New subscriber not related to subject. Don’t upload.” Similarly, agents consistently failed to
report or recognize when they received information from NSL recipients that was beyond the scope of the NSL request.
Agents self-reported the overproduction of unauthorized information in only four of the 557 instances the Inspector
General identified.
Congress foresaw some of these information-sharing and accuracy problems. In 2006, it voted to reauthorize other
portions of the Patriot Act that were scheduled to expire. That legislation required the attorney general and director of
national intelligence to study whether minimization requirements were feasible in the context of NSLs. The report was
due in February 2007, and to date there is still no public information confirming that this report was ever sent to
Congress, or even written. However, during the Patriot reauthorization efforts of 2009-2011, members of Congress did
state that some sort of internal minimization procedures were voluntarily adopted. Without public oversight, the
effectiveness of these internal procedures in protecting the rights of innocent Americans remains in doubt. As the NSL
saga reveals, internal controls unchecked by independent oversight are insufficient to prevent abuse.
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*** National Security Letters Negative
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1NC Solvency
National Security Letters are very limited in scope and pose very little threat to civilian
privacy.
Heritage Foundation 2008 (Charles Stimson and Andrew Grossman. March 14. “National Security Letters: Three Important Facts.”
Accessed on the web: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/03/national-security-letters-three-important-facts)
NSLs are narrowly tailored and subject to more and stronger procedural protections and
oversight than ever before.The kind of information that the government may obtain from the
use of NSLs is far more limited than many realize. Contrary to popular misconceptions, the
government cannot use NSLs to wiretap, to access e-mails, or to conduct any kind of
surveillance. Rather, NSLs allow the government to retrieve the sort of mundane business
records that, while exposing little or no personal information, are extremely useful in
uncovering terrorist activities. These records include lists of financial accounts, some bank records, and telephone subscriber
information and toll records.
Though some citizens believe that these types of records should be obtained only with a court-issued warrant,
the Supreme Court has
stated clearly that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated when these types of ordinary
business records are shared with the government.[18]The Court has reasoned that when citizens open business accounts
and create business records, they hold no reasonable expectation of privacy in the existence of the accounts and records. In many cases, this is
intuitive: For example, a major piece of evidence in the trial of Scott Peterson for the murder of his wife was a receipt from the hardware store he visited
shortly before the murder to purchase a bag of cement, which prosecutors alleged he used to make anchors to sink his wife's body.[19]This sort of
evidence is routinely obtained with little oversight in police and grand jury investigations. Unlike with NSLs, however, obtaining documents in such
investigations requires no signoffs from high-level officials who could be held accountable for misuse and no reporting or auditing. Convening grand
juries is time-consuming, expensive, and otherwise cumbersome, however, making them unsuitable for national security investigations. They also offer
far fewer procedural protections than NSLs.
Further, despite the limited scope of information that is retrievable with NSLs, they are
actually subject to greater privacy protections, by statute, regulation and practice, than ever
before.
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1NC Racism Harms
Racist surveillance by the government and corporations is inevitable and has happened throughout
our history – people of color don’t trust or want the privacy rights the affirmative talks about
Cyril ’15 Cyril, Malkia A.- Malkia Amala Cyril is founder and executive director of the Center for Media Justice (CMJ) and
co-founder of the Media Action Grassroots Network, a national network of 175 organizations working to ensure media
access, rights, and representation for marginalized communities. April 15 2015 “Black America’s State of Surveillance”
http://www.progressive.org/news/2015/03/188074/black-americas-state-surveillance. July 7, 2015
Today, media reporting on government surveillance is laser-focused on the revelations by Edward Snowden that millions
of Americans were being spied on by the NSA. Yet my mother’s visit from the FBI reminds me that, from the slave pass
system to laws that deputized white civilians as enforcers of Jim Crow, black people and other people of color have
lived for centuries with surveillance practices aimed at maintaining a racial hierarchy. It’s time for journalists to tell a
new story that does not start the clock when privileged classes learn they are targets of surveillance. We need to
understand that data has historically been overused to repress dissidence, monitor perceived criminality, and
perpetually maintain an impoverished underclass. In an era of big data, the Internet has increased the speed and secrecy
of data collection. Thanks to new surveillance technologies, law enforcement agencies are now able to collect massive
amounts of indiscriminate data. Yet legal protections and policies have not caught up to this technological advance.
Concerned advocates see mass surveillance as the problem and protecting privacy as the goal. Targeted surveillance is
an obvious answer—it may be discriminatory, but it helps protect the privacy perceived as an earned privilege of the
inherently innocent. The trouble is, targeted surveillance frequently includes the indiscriminate collection of the private
data of people targeted by race but not involved in any crime. For targeted communities, there is little to no
expectation of privacy from government or corporate surveillance. Instead, we are watched, either as criminals or as
consumers. We do not expect policies to protect us. Instead, we’ve birthed a complex and coded culture—from jazz to
spoken dialects—in order to navigate a world in which spying, from AT&T and Walmart to public benefits programs
and beat cops on the block, is as much a part of our built environment as the streets covered in our blood.
National security is more important to democracy than personal privacy; getting rid of National Security Letters would be getting
rid of an important tool for fighting terrorism.
Debatewise No Date (“Privacy vs. Security: Yes Points” Online http://debatewise.org/debates/3040-privacy-vs-security/#)
The most important job of government is to “secure the general welfare” of its citizens. Security is a common good
that is promised to all Americans, and it must outweigh any personal concerns about privacy. The word “privacy” is
not found in the US Constitution so it cannot be claimed as a fundamental right. Surveillance is the secret watching of suspects’ private
activities. In the past this usually involved following people, or going through their trash. These days it is mostly electronic, with the police and intelligence agencies
listening into private phone conversations or reading emails (wiretapping). Surveillance can also involve looking at bank account details to see where money comes
and goes. All these are vital tools for tracking the actions of terrorists when they are planning attacks. The government cannot
stand by and wait until criminal acts are carried out: it must stop attacks before they happen.
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National Security Letters are rarely abused, consistently reviewed, and necessary for national security.
Heritage Foundation 2008 (Charles Stimson and Andrew Grossman. March 14. “National Security Letters: Three Important Facts.” Accessed on the web:
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/03/national-security-letters-three-important-facts)
National security letters (NSLs) "continue to be important tools in the FBI's national security
investigations," according to a major audit of NSL use released yesterday.[1] The audit, commissioned by Congress and undertaken by the
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Justice, is meant to uncover any abuses, errors, or shortcomings in the use of NSLs.[2] This
year's audit report, issued one year after the first such report, commends the FBI for making "significant progress" in implementing recommendations
from the previous report and the FBI leadership for making it a "top priority" to correct mistakes in the use of NSLs.[3]Despite the high praise for ongoing
critics will predictably
assert that privacy violations from NSLs are widespread and significant. But the two reports, taken together,
show otherwise. Though both reports show that the FBI has sometimes struggled to measure up to its own standards in using NSLs, they also
reveal that incidents of misuse were infrequent and unintentional and did not involve any criminal misconduct. In many
compliance efforts and strong numbers (84 possible violations out of about 50,000 requests) in this year's report,
cases, misuse was actually due to third parties supplying information beyond the scope of the NSL request, not to any action by the FBI.Like last year's
report, this year's report criticizes the Bureau for failing to follow applicable statutes, guidelines, and internal policies in some cases. The OIG notes,
however, that because only one year has passed since the issuance of its first NSL report, it is too early for the FBI's corrective measures made since
then to be reflected in the data.[4]While the FBI won praise for its efforts to improve its use of NSLs, the audit notes
that Congress has failed to act on a small but significant recommendation from last year's report that would clarify the scope and applicability of NSLs in
the telecommunications domain.[5] The Department of Justice submitted draft legislative language in just four months, but Congress has not taken up
the matter in the seven months since then.[6]NSLs serve very narrow but important counterterrorism and counterintelligence purposes. As explained
below, because of the kinds of information that can be sought with NSLs, they are not searches that trigger Fourth Amendment protections and so do
not require a warrant. NSLs
are very limited in the amount of information they can request, serve as a
highly effective substitute for more invasive intelligence operations, and have a long and largely
uncontroversial history. They were used long before 9/11 and have been subject to extensive congressional
oversight.Understanding the following three facts about NSLs is key to any informed discussion of their use and propriety
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1NC Privacy Harms
National Security Letters are so narrow in scope, banning them would not solve anything. Even if we do have privacy
issues in the United States, National Security Letters are not the problem.
Caproni and Siegel 12 (Valerie Caproni and Steven Siegel for American Bar Association. “National Security Letters: Building Blocks for Investigation or Intrusive
Tools?” Online http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/national_security_letters_building_blocks_for_investigations_or_intrusive_t/)
Congress first granted the Federal Bureau of Investigation the authority to use National Security Letters in 1986.
This authority ensured that the FBI would have the necessary tools to investigate threats to the national security posed by terrorists and spies because
Congress had, at the same time, enacted statutory privacy protection to certain classes of records held by third-party businesses. Congress
then
understood a principle that remains true to this day: To appropriately and efficiently investigate threats to the
national security, the FBI needs the ability to gather very basic information about individuals, including
information about their finances, where they live and work, and with whom they are in contact, without alerting
the targets that it is doing so.The NSL authority is now and always has been quite limited. First, unlike grand jury
subpoenas that can be used to collect any nonprivileged document from any person or entity, the FBI can use
NSLs only to obtain a very
narrow range of information from a very narrow range of third-party businesses: NSLs can be used to obtain transactional
information from wire or electronic communications service providers (e.g., telephone companies and Internet service providers); financial institutions
(e.g., banks and credit card issuers); and credit reporting agencies. Other documents that can be critical to a national security investigation (e.g., hotel
records, employment records) cannot be obtained using an NSL. Second, unlike grand jury subpoenas that can be issued in any sort of criminal case,
NSLs can only be used during duly authorized national security investigations . Finally, unlike grand jury subpoenas that can
be issued by any assistant U.S. attorney or Department of Justice prosecutor, no matter how junior or inexperienced,
NSLs can only be issued
with very high-level FBI approval.Although the NSL authority is quite limited, NSLs are nevertheless critical tools
that enable FBI investigators to gather the sort of basic information needed as the “building blocks” of national
security investigations. It is not an exaggeration to say that virtually every significant national security
investigation, whether of an individual suspected of planning to wreak havoc through an act of terrorism or of an
individual suspected of spying on the United States for the benefit of a foreign nation, requires the use of NSLs
for at least some critical information.
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*** Drone Affirmative
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1AC
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Drones 1AC - Plan
We present the following plan: The United States Federal Government should
substantially curtail its use of warrantless unpiloted aerial vehicles in the United
States
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Contention One is Harms - Civil Liberties:
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is operating drones in over 30 cities in the status quo- these
surveillance operations are conducted without warrants
Washington Post 2015 - “FBI behind mysterious surveillance aircraft over US
cities”http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-behind-mysterious-surveillance-aircraft-over-uscities/2015/06/02/030ce2e2-0959-11e5-951e-8e15090d64ae_story.html, June 2
The FBI is operating a small air force with scores of low-flying planes across the country using video and sometimes
cellphone surveillance technology — all hidden behind fictitious companies that are fronts for the government, The
Associated Press has learned.¶ The surveillance equipment is generally used without a judge’s approval, and the FBI says the
flights are used for specific investigations. The agency says it uses front companies to protect the safety of the pilots and aircraft, shielding their
identities from would-be suspects on the ground.¶ In a recent 30-day period, an AP review found, the FBI flew above more than 30
cities in 11 states across the country, including parts of Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Minneapolis, Phoenix,
Seattle, and Southern California.
Drones threaten our basic rights- warrantless surveillance is becoming the norm among law
enforcement
Molko 2013- Robert, “The Drones Are Coming! ¶ WILL THE FOURTH AMENDMENT STOP THEIR ¶ THREAT TO OUR
PRIVACY?” http://practicum.brooklaw.edu/sites/default/files/print/pdfs/journals/brooklyn-law-review/volume78/issue-4/blr_v78iv_1.pdf
Over the years, courts ¶ have permitted aerial ¶ surveillance from navigable airspace where civilian planes or ¶ helicopters routinely fly,¶ 9¶ although they have
prohibited such ¶ surveillance if it occurred from unusually low altitudes.¶ 10¶ Today,
however, advances in surveillance and optics
technology ¶ have made it possible to detect¶ very small objects from high ¶ altitudes.¶ 11¶ In addition to these advances,
stealth technology¶ 12¶ enables drones to hover above us, silently monitoring ¶ everything we do in areas exposed to the
sky.¶ 13¶
Drone ¶ technology, when carried to its ¶ extreme, threatens to destroy ¶ whatever vestiges of privacy remain in modern
society, even in ¶ areas like a secluded, fenced-i¶ n backyard or private estate. ¶ Many local law enforcement agencies have already ¶ begun
implementing these aerial surveillance technologies. For ¶ example, the city of Lancaster,¶ California recently began using ¶ aerial surveillance to
monitor the city’s neighborhoods.¶ 14¶ There, ¶ a plane will fly above the city for up to ten hours a day.¶ 15¶ “Drones are [also] being considered by [San Francisco]
Bay ¶ Area law enforcement agencies as¶ a cost-cutting way to replace ¶ helicopters . . . and use technology to fight crime and save ¶ lives.”¶ 16¶ Moreover, North
Dakota police recently used a drone to ¶ monitor activity on a ranch to determine when its occupants ¶ would be unarmed in order to avoid a violent shootout when
apprehending the suspects. 17¶ Police in Gadsden, Alabama, ¶ bought “a lightweight ¶ drone . . . to help in¶ drug investigations.”¶ 18¶ Authorities in Tampa Bay,
Florida, considered using drones for ¶ security surveillance at the 2012 Republican National ¶ Convention.¶ 19¶ The Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office in Texas ¶ has
even considered arming a drone with rubber bullets and ¶ tear gas.¶ 20¶ These
represent only a small sampling of local law ¶ enforcement
agencies that have begun to use drones.¶ 21¶ At the same time, two private software companies, ¶ Apple and Google, used aerial surveillance and
military-grade ¶ cameras in a race to create detailed, three-dimensional images ¶ of city and residential streets throughout the world.¶ 22¶ These ¶ cameras are so
powerful that “they can show objects just four ¶ inches wide” and “potentially see into homes through skylights ¶ and windows.”¶ 23¶ Apple’s rush to outdo Google
led to its ¶ catastrophic premature release of three-dimensional visual ¶ flyovers in Apple Maps in September 2012, which it has been ¶ trying to correct ever since.
On the legislative side, on February 14, 2012, President ¶ Obama signed into law the FAA Modernization and Reform Act ¶ of 2012.¶ 25¶ This
law requires the
FAA to expedite the process of ¶ authorizing both public and private use of drones in the ¶ national navigable airspace.¶
26¶ This statutory mandate will ¶ inevitably reduce our privacy through increased aerial surveillance ¶ of neighborhoods
and public places by law enforcement drones, ¶ bringing us ever closer to an Orwellian state.¶ 27¶ Indeed, “[t]he ¶ government has
predicted that as many as 30,000 drones will be ¶ flying over U.S. skies by the end of the decade.”¶ 28¶ Some experts ¶ predict that those drones will be¶ used by
“journalists, police ¶ departments, disaster rescue te¶ ams, scientists, real estate ¶ agents, and private citizens.”¶ 29
This is the most important impact in the debate- the judge must reject all invasions of liberty
Petro 1974 - Professor of Law @ Wake Forest University. University of Toledo Law Review Spring 1974, page. 480
However, one may still insist, echoing Ernest Hemingway—“I believe in only one thing: liberty”. And it is always well to bear in mind David Hume’s observation: “It
is
seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once.” Thus, it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of
no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism
and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhenistyn. Ask Milovan Djilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value
and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion
of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with undying spirit.
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Contention Two is Harms - Innovation:
Drone technology is inevitable- the plan ensures that it is used responsibly. This increases public
confidence in drones, enabling commercial innovation
The National Journal 2013- February 21, “The Backlash Against Drones”
http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-backlash-against-drones-20130221
The Seattle Police Department’s planned demonstration of its small surveillance drones quickly devolved into a noisy
protest. Angry residents attending the community meeting in October chanted “No drones!” drowning out officers’ attempts to explain how the unmanned aerial
vehicles would support certain criminal investigations, help out during natural disasters, and assist in search-and-rescue operations. Now it’s clear that Seattle’s
drones, purchased with federal grants, won’t be flying over the metro area anytime soon. Amid
backlash from civil-liberties advocates and
citizens worried about government invasion of their privacy, the mayor earlier this month tabled any drone
ambitions—for now.¶ Public concerns are not limited to Seattle. Lawmakers in at least 11 states want to restrict the use
of drones because of fears they will spy on Americans, and some are pushing to require warrants before the robots collect evidence in
investigations. Just this month, the Virginia General Assembly passed a two-year moratorium on drones. The outcry comes after the Electronic Frontier Foundation
sued last year for a list of drone applicants within the U.S. When that information went public, staff attorney Jennifer Lynch says, “it
really got people up in
arms about how drones are being used, and got people to question their city councils and local law-enforcement
agencies to ask for appropriate policies to be put in place to regulate drone usage.Ӧ Drones change the game: Nearly continuous
surveillance could be possible without a physical intrusion such as a property search or an implanted listening device. The flying robots can carry high-powered
cameras, even facial-recognition software or thermal imaging to “see” through walls. They can hover, potentially undetected, for hours or days at a time.¶ As of yet,
however, there are no laws governing the use of domestic drones when it comes to privacy. Unless
Congress or the executive branch moves to
regulate the robots’ use before they take to the skies en masse, states will likely continue to try to limit or ban drone
use altogether, which could stymie their potential for other, beneficial uses. And failing to enact privacy limits only
increases the likelihood of an incident in which the public perceives that the technology is being misused.¶ The Federal
Aviation Administration, which is charged with overseeing drone implementation in the U.S., says its focus is “totally on safety,” not privacy worries. “We are
concerned about how it’s being used only to the extent it would affect the safety of the operation,” says FAA spokesman Les Dorr.
Commercial drones are the lynchpin of U.S. growth and leadership- addressing privacy concerns will
reduce bureaucratic pressure and enable innovation
Washington Monthly 2015“Why is American Losing the Commercial Drone Wars?”
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/junejulyaugust_2015/features/why_is_america_losing_the_comm0558
94.php?page=all
Commercial drones, then, could be a fundamental technology driving innovation and growth in coming years. As the
world’s traditional leader in aviation technology (and, for better or worse, the world’s foremost military drone pioneer), the U.S. ought to command this
industry.¶ There’s only one hitch: companies like Airware can’t sell many of their products in the U.S. That’s because the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been slow to write the regulations drone makers need to test and operate in
U.S. airspace. This past February, after years of missed deadlines, the FAA finally published a draft version of regulations for small drones—a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM), in Washington argot. The finished version of the rule probably won’t be ready until late 2016 or early 2017, according to the Government
Accountability Office.
Meanwhile, countries such as the UK, France, Switzerland, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan have had
rules for testing and using drones on the books for several years—rules significantly less restrictive than those in the FAA’s recent NPRM.¶ As
a result, American firms are being lured abroad by the more flexible regulatory frameworks of foreign governments. Google is
testing package delivery drone technology in Australia. Amazon is doing the same in Canada. Airware is busy selling its products to drone companies in Australia and
Europe. Meanwhile, a company called DJI, based in Shenzhen, China, now dominates the world market for smaller, lower-cost commercial drones.¶ The
business
press and tech websites are filled with stories slamming the FAA’s tardy and constricted regulations. It seems like a
classic example of incompetent federal bureaucracy getting in the way of economic progress . Conservatives certainly see it that
way. “The FAA is failing big time,” writes Marc Scribner, a fellow with the Competitive Enterprise Institute, because the agency is “mired in its own bureaucracy.”
“The FAA is adopting a hyper-precautionary principle position that is holding back innovation,” Adam Thierer, a fellow at the
libertarian Mercatus Center at George Mason University, has written.¶ Of course, there’s good reason to be careful and deliberate when it comes to easing
restrictions on commercial drones. Nobody
wants unmanned aircraft snooping through bedroom windows or getting sucked into
jet engines. Still, conservative critics have a point. Other advanced countries have already found ways to allow this
industry to grow, with no notable safety problems so far. Why is the FAA lagging?
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Commercial drones are key to agriculture- data collection provides vital information to protect
against food shortages
Washington Monthly 2015“Why is American Losing the Commercial Drone Wars?”
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/junejulyaugust_2015/features/why_is_america_losing_the_comm0558
94.php?page=all
But perhaps the most important immediate application is agriculture. Drones could “provide detailed scouting
information on weed emergence, insect infestations, and potential nutrient shortages,” Jeff Vanderwerff of the American Farm
Bureau Federation told the U.S. Senate this spring. This valuable information allows the farmer to catch these threats “before they
develop into significant and catastrophic problems.” Down the road, drones could also enable so-called field-based
phenotyping. This involves flying drones over test fields and taking images of experimental varieties of crops designed to, say, build more biomass or thrive in the
heavy-rains-followed-by-drought conditions that climate change is causing. Plant geneticists would then analyze the data from the drones to
see which tweaks they’ve made to the plants’ DNA actually work best under real-life conditions. This, in theory, could dramatically
speed up the process and lower the cost of developing new and better crop strains. “Maybe ‘Holy Grail’ is overstating it,” says Sam Fiorello, CEO of the Donald
Danforth Plant Science Center in St. Louis, which provides cutting-edge research for AgTech startups, “but it’s a huge advance in plant research.”
The prospect of food insecurity alone causes conflict
Klare 2013, Michael T., April 22, Author and Professor of Peace and World-Security Studies, Hampshire College,
Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-t-klare/resource-scarcity-climate-change_b_3132268.html
Start with one simple given: the prospect of future scarcities of vital natural resources, including energy, water, land, food, and critical minerals.
This in itself would guarantee social unrest, geopolitical friction, and war. It is important to note that absolute scarcity
doesn’t have to be on the horizon in any given resource category for this scenario to kick in. A lack of adequate supplies to meet
the needs of a growing, ever more urbanized and industrialized global population is enough. Given the wave of extinctions that scientists are
recording, some resources -- particular species of fish, animals, and trees, for example -- will become less abundant in
the decades to come, and may even disappear altogether. But key materials for modern civilization like oil, uranium, and copper will simply
prove harder and more costly to acquire, leading to supply bottlenecks and periodic shortages. Oil -- the single most important commodity in the international
economy -- provides an apt example. Although global oil supplies may actually grow in the coming decades, many experts doubt that they can be expanded
sufficiently to meet the needs of a rising global middle class that is, for instance, expected to buy millions of new cars in the near future. In its 2011 World Energy
Outlook, the International Energy Agency claimed that an anticipated global oil demand of 104 million barrels per day in 2035 will be satisfied. This, the report
suggested, would be thanks in large part to additional supplies of “unconventional oil” (Canadian tar sands, shale oil, and so on), as well as 55 million barrels of new
oil from fields “yet to be found” and “yet to be developed.” However, many
analysts scoff at this optimistic assessment, arguing that
rising production costs (for energy that will be ever more difficult and costly to extract), environmental opposition,
warfare, corruption, and other impediments will make it extremely difficult to achieve increases of this magnitude. In other
words, even if production manages for a time to top the 2010 level of 87 million barrels per day, the goal of 104 million barrels will never be reached and the world’s
major consumers will face virtual, if not absolute, scarcity. Water provides another potent example. On an annual basis, the supply of drinking water provided by
natural precipitation remains more or less constant: about 40,000 cubic kilometers. But
much of this precipitation lands on Greenland,
Antarctica, Siberia, and inner Amazonia where there are very few people, so the supply available to major
concentrations of humanity is often surprisingly limited. In many regions with high population levels, water supplies are already relatively sparse.
This is especially true of North Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East, where the demand for water continues to grow as a result of rising populations, urbanization,
and the emergence of new water-intensive industries. The result, even when the supply remains constant, is an environment of increasing scarcity. Wherever you
look, the picture is roughly the same: supplies of critical resources may be rising or falling, but rarely do they appear to be outpacing demand, producing a sense of
widespread and systemic scarcity. However
generated, a perception of scarcity -- or imminent scarcity -- regularly leads to
anxiety, resentment, hostility, and contentiousness. This pattern is very well understood, and has been evident
throughout human history. In his book Constant Battles, for example, Steven LeBlanc, director of collections for Harvard’s Peabody Museum of Archaeology
and Ethnology, notes that many ancient civilizations experienced higher levels of warfare when faced with resource shortages brought about by population growth,
crop failures, or persistent drought. Jared Diamond, author of the bestseller Collapse, has detected a similar pattern in Mayan civilization and the Anasazi culture of
New Mexico’s Chaco Canyon. More recently, concern over adequate food for the home population was a significant factor in Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931
and Germany’s invasions of Poland in 1939 and the Soviet Union in 1941, according to Lizzie Collingham, author of The Taste of War. Although the global supply of
most basic commodities has grown enormously since the end of World War II, analysts
see the persistence of resource-related conflict in
areas where materials remain scarce or there is anxiety about the future reliability of supplies. Many experts believe, for example,
that the fighting in Darfur and other war-ravaged areas of North Africa has been driven, at least in part, by competition among desert tribes for access to scarce water
supplies, exacerbated in some cases by rising population levels.
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Contention Three is Solvency:
Requiring warrants for drone surveillance resolves privacy concerns while allowing for drone use in
critical national security matters- this no links all disadvantages
Congress.gov 2012- “H. R. 5925” https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/5925/text
To protect individual privacy against unwarranted governmental intrusion through the use of the unmanned aerial vehicles commonly called drones, and for other
purposes. ¶ Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, ¶ SECTION 1. Short title. ¶ This Act may
be cited as the “Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012”. ¶ SEC. 2. Prohibited use of drones. ¶ Except
as provided in section 3, a
person or entity acting under the authority of the United States shall not use a drone to gather evidence or other
information pertaining to criminal conduct or conduct in violation of a regulation except to the extent authorized in a
warrant issued under the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. ¶ SEC. 3. Exceptions. ¶ This Act does
not prohibit any of the following: ¶ (1) PATROL OF BORDERS.—The use of a drone to patrol national borders to prevent
or deter illegal entry of any immigrants or illegal substances. ¶ (2) EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES.—The use of a drone by a
law enforcement party when exigent circumstances exist. For the purposes of this paragraph, exigent circumstances
exist when the law enforcement party possesses reasonable suspicion that under particular circumstances, swift action
to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect, or
destruction of evidence. ¶ (3) HIGH RISK.—The use of a drone to counter a high risk of a terrorist attack by a specific
individual or organization, when the Secretary of Homeland Security determines credible intelligence indicates there is
such a risk. ¶ SEC. 4. Remedies for violation. ¶ Any aggrieved party may in a civil action obtain all appropriate relief to prevent or remedy a violation of this Act. ¶
SEC. 5. Definitions. ¶ In this Act: ¶ (1) The term “drone” means any powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide
vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. ¶ (2) The term “law
enforcement party” means a person or entity authorized by law to investigate or prosecute offenses against the United States.
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2AC Harms Frontlines
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2AC Civil Liberties Extensions
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2AC Civil Liberties Extensions - ANSWERS TO: Obama Regulating Drones Now
Obama’s directive on drones is too vague and does not fully regulate their use
Levin 2015- Alan, Bloomberg, “Obama Drone Policy Gives FBI Leeway on Privacy Decisions”
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-17/obama-drone-policy-gives-fbi-leeway-to-decide-what-s-private
The White House’s attempt to set privacy policies for government agencies using drones doesn’t go far enough for civilliberties advocates in the U.S.¶ President Barack Obama’s directive on how unmanned aircraft may be used to gather
information on citizens is too vague and lacks protections such as getting a judge’s permission before using drones for
surveillance, said Neema Singh Guliani, legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union.¶ “That’s simply not strong enough, given how
invasive drones can be,” Guliani said in an interview.¶ As aviation regulators struggled to find a way to govern the flood of drones in U.S. skies, law
enforcement agencies including the FBI began using the new technology before government-wide policies could be written.¶ Obama tried to correct that
on Sunday, issuing a directive that sets limits on how unmanned aircraft may be used by federal agencies to gather
information on people. While the White House said government drones must be used lawfully and “consistent with the Constitution,” civil-liberties
advocates are zeroing in on another phrase in the directive: Gathering information on drones may only be done for an
“authorized purpose.”¶ “The guidance is pretty vague and doesn’t act to restrict what law enforcement can use
drones for.” Guliani said.
Additionally, lack of oversight and accountability to the public means drone use will rise
exponentially, altering the very character of American life
ACLU 2011- December, American Civil Liberties Union. “Protecting Privacy ¶ From Aerial Surveillance:¶
Recommendations for Government Use of Drone Aircraft”
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/protectingprivacyfromaerialsurveillance.pdf
In short, all the pieces appear to be lining up for the eventual introduction of routine aerial surveillance in American life—a
development that would profoundly change the character of public ¶ life in the United States.¶ We need a system of rules to
ensure that we can enjoy the benefits of this technology without ¶ bringing us a large step closer to a “surveillance
society” in which our every move is monitored, ¶ tracked, recorded, and scrutinized by the authorities. In this paper, we outline a set of protections ¶ that we
believe would protect Americans’ privacy in the coming world of drones. ¶ Aerial surveillance from manned aircraft has been ¶ with us for decades. One of the first
aircraft the Wright ¶ brothers built was a surveillance aircraft, and it was ¶ sold to the U.S. Army. Many common uses of drone ¶ aircraft—search and rescue, fighting
wildfires, dangerous tactical police operations—are beneficial. In
the 1980s the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth ¶ Amendment does
not categorically prohibit the government from carrying out warrantless aerial surveillance of private property. ¶ But
¶
manned aircraft are expensive to purchase, operate and maintain, and this expense has ¶ always imposed a natural limit on the government’s aerial surveillance
capability. Now
that surveillance can be carried out by unmanned aircraft, this natural limit is eroding. The prospect of ¶
cheap, small, portable flying video surveillance machines threatens to eradicate existing practical ¶ limits on aerial
monitoring and allow for pervasive surveillance, police fishing expeditions, and ¶ abusive use of these tools in a way that
could eventually eliminate the privacy Americans have ¶ traditionally enjoyed in their movements and activities.
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2AC Civil Liberties Extensions - Impact
1. Extend our Petro evidence- life is not worth living without basic freedoms and a guarantee of
privacy. Totalitarianism robs us of our individual worth. This answers their Cummisky evidence. A
consequentialist framework presumes that each life being weighed is said to have equal and unique
worth, however absent the affirmative, individuals do not have unique worth since the state does
not regard the life of its citizens as an end in itself, but a means to national security.
2. Even if there are other instances of invasion of privacy we will win that drones are particularly
harmful – our evidence states that routine aerial surveillance will alter the very character of
American life since citizens will be perpetually watched. The routine, persistent, and
inconspicuous nature of drone technology makes it different from other forms of government
intrusion
3. Our evidence does state that FBI surveillance can occur without a warrant because drones can fly
overhead without detection they can monitor areas of an individual’s home without explicit
permission
4. Privacy rights are key to a meaningful life- it forms the basis of the social contract between
individuals and the state
Foster 2008- Oxford University Press, Human Rights and Civil Liberties pg. 159 ¶
The right to privacy, or the right to private life, is at the heart of individual freedom and the right to be free from
arbitrary state interference. Traditionally, the right to privacy referred to the right to be let alone and the right to enjoy
one's individual space, which the state or other individuals should not penetrate. This includes the right to enjoy one's
property as well as being free from physical interference and thus allows the individual to enjoy an individual and private
existence within a state; although in Niemietz v Germany (1992) 16 EMIR 97 the European Court held that the notion of private life was not restricted to the
person’s inner circle, but includes the right to develop and establish relationships with other human beings. The enjoyment of privacy and private life
is, therefore, essential in honoring the 'social contract', whereby the state allows the individual basic individual rights
irrespective of their allegiance to and dependence on the state. Privacy or private life may also refer to the right of
personal autonomy and human dignity, demanding the individual has the right to make choices about the, life, such as whom they marry, whether they
should undertake medical treatment, or whether they have the right to die (Pretty v United Kingdom (2002)35 EHRR 1). Equally, the right to private life
can be used alongside the right to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment and thus protect a person from attacks
on their person or personal dignity (Costello-Roberts United Kingdom (1993) 19 EHRR 112). More specifically, the right to private life, referred to in this
context as the light to privacy, includes the right to choose and practice one's sexual orientation free from undue interference or prosuiption by the state, and
privacy is often referred to in connection to the right to lit free from press intrusion or the right to withhold, or access,
personal information.
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2AC Innovation
1. There is an impact to food insecurity- prefer our 1AC evidence states that the prospect alone
could cause conflict- as countries feel food insecure they will either stat wars to divert public
attention away from food shortages or start them to gain resources
2. Drone innovation is not inevitable- extend our 1AC evidence, the commercial drone industry
is still at a beginning stage. To ensure that innovation and investment continues, key privacy
concerns must be resolved first
3. The Drone industry is not resilient- our evidence indicates that public opinion forms the basis
of all legislation that curtails the use of commercial drones
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2AC Solvency
1. Piloted aerial surveillance does not pose the same risks to privacy as drone surveillanceextend our congress.gov evidence, the plan allows for the commercial and civilian uses for
drones that their evidence refers to, it merely requires that a warrant be issued if the
government wants to conduct specific investigations.
2. The plan is the best compromise between an outright ban of drones and unfettered drone usage.
By requiring warrants, the plan shores up U.S. credibility and ensures the protection of key privacy
rights while securing the beneficial aspects of drones.
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ANSWERS TO: Elections Disadvantage (Drones Affirmative)
(NOTE: Use only with LINK TURN strategy, NOT Impact Turn strategy)
Link Turn: Concern over drone usage is bipartisan and on the rise
Catherine Crump, Jay Stanley, 2-11-2013, "Why Americans Are Saying No to Domestic Drones," Slate Magazine,
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/02/domestic_surveillance_drone_bans_are_sweeping_t
he_nation.html)//GV
In the past year, the American public has begun to pay more and more attention to the issue of domestic surveillance
drones. And now, recent events suggest we might be seeing the emergence of a genuine national movement against the
use of surveillance drones by law enforcement. With any luck, this may even set the stage for a wider dialogue about the increasingly intrusive technologies that
are intended to catch crooks—but that all too often cast an overly broad net. Last week, after an especially raucous city council hearing, the Seattle police department terminated its drones
program and agreed to return the purchased equipment to the manufacturer. This came just days after both houses of the Virginia state legislature passed historic bills imposing a two-year
moratorium on the use of drones by law enforcement and regulatory agencies in the state. In Florida, a potentially even more significant bill imposing a judicial warrant requirement on
police use of drones continued to march toward passage. Similar legislation has been proposed in at least 13 other state legislatures around the country so far. Of
all the threats
to privacy that we face today, why have drones caught the attention of the American public to such a remarkable
degree? One possibility is that there’s something uniquely ominous about a robotic “eye in the sky.” Many privacy invasions are abstract and invisible—data mining, for example, or the
profiling of Internet users by online advertisers. Drones, on the other hand, are concrete and real, and the threat requires no explanation. But they are just the most visible example of a host
of new surveillance technologies that have the potential to fundamentally alter the balance of power between individuals and the state. Physically tailing a suspect requires teams of police
officers working 24/7, but now police can slap GPS devices on a suspect’s car and then sit in the station house tracking his movements on a laptop. Now that the wholesale surveillance of
American life is becoming cheap and easy, legal protections are all the more important. The
drone issue has also gained momentum because the
concern over it is bipartisan. While Democrats get most of the credit for pushing back on national surveillance
programs, it was the Republican Party’s 2012 platform that addressed domestic surveillance drones, stating that “we support pending legislation to prevent unwarranted or
unreasonable governmental intrusion through the use of aerial surveillance.” The ACLU of Virginia, for instance, teamed up with one of the state’s most conservative lawmakers to introduce
a drone regulation bill in the state House of Delegates, while its Senate companion bill was introduced by a progressive. Florida’s drone regulation legislation is being almost entirely pushed
by conservatives—and in most states, the legislative efforts we’ve seen so far have been conservative or bipartisan.
Privacy issues are always less partisan than
many other political questions, but the support for action on drones from both left and right has been remarkable. It’s
notable how different all of this is from the way surveillance technologies are normally adopted. There has actually been an opportunity for debate before
drones have been widely deployed. We have the Federal Aviation Administration to thank for this state of affairs. At least for now, drones are largely banned by the
FAA, which is concerned about the obvious safety issues: We can’t have our skies filled with flying robots colliding with passenger aircraft or plummeting into people’s houses. (This state of
affairs will not last: Congress has ordered the FAA to integrate drones into the national airspace by 2015.) What we usually see happen with new law enforcement technologies is that
agencies quickly and quietly snap them up, making their deployment a fait accompli before the public even learns of their existence, let alone has a chance to debate their privacy
implications or democratically decide upon the correct balance between privacy and police power. At that point, taking privacy into account is an uphill battle because the tax dollars have
already been spent and the technology integrated into the department’s approach to crime fighting. With drones, on the other hand, because of the safety and regulatory issues they raise,
we have a chance to do it right. The American public and our elected representatives can, for once, get ahead of the deployment curve—we can raise awareness, propose protections, and
build support for them before the problems hit us in the face. If done right, this moment of hyperawareness about privacy could become a more permanent state of affairs: Ryan Calo of
Stanford’s Center for Internet and Society suggested in a December 2011 paper that because of their “disquieting” nature, drones “could be just the visceral jolt society needs” to spark
broader changes in how Americans conceptualize privacy problems. Ultimately, the best solution on drones would be for Congress to pass strong, uniform rules protecting everyone across
the nation and putting privacy concerns to rest. For example, law enforcement agents should not make drones general tools of surveillance but should instead utilize them only where they
have a specific reason to believe that use of one will turn up evidence of criminal activity. Ideally, those protections would become a model for other, perhaps less vivid but equally intrusive
But unless and until Congress acts, state and local resolutions and rules are the best
thing Americans can do to protect our privacy from the enormously invasive potential of domestic surveillance
drones. The upsurge in local activism around the country is just what’s needed to make this happen.
technologies such as cellphone location tracking.
Link Turn: Americans hate domestic drone usage
Rasmussen Reports, 2-13-2012, "Voters Are Gung-Ho for Use of Drones But Not Over the United States," No
Publication,
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/afghanistan/voters_are_gung_ho_for_use_of_drones_but_not_over_the_united_states)//GV
Congress passed legislation last week that will make it easier for U.S. police agencies to use drones for surveillance in
this country, but 52% of voters are opposed. Only 30% favor the use of unmanned drones for domestic surveillance. Seventeen percent (17%) are undecided. The
United States has used the drones to go after terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan. Voters' perceptions that the situation in Iraq will get better have fallen to an all-time low. There's similar
pessimism about Afghanistan, but voters are still relatively confident that the United States and its allies are winning the war on terror. (Want a free daily e-mail update? If it's in the news,
it's in our polls). Rasmussen Reports updates are also available on Twitter or Facebook. The survey of 1,000 Likely Voters was conducted on February 10-11, 2012 by Rasmussen Reports. The
margin of sampling error is +/- 3 percentage points with a 95% level of confidence. Field work for all Rasmussen Reports surveys is conducted by Pulse Opinion Research, LLC. See
methodology. Sixty-eight
percent (68%) of voters say they have followed recent news reports about the United States' use
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of unmanned drone aircraft, with 31% who have been following Very Closely. Most voters of any political persuasion are supportive of the use
of drones to kill terrorists, but Republicans (88%) are even more enthusiastic than Democrats (65%) and voters not affiliated with either party (74%). A plurality (45%) of Democrats thinks
avoiding diplomatic problems with countries like Pakistan is more important than using drones to kill terrorists, but 66% of GOP voters and 45% of unaffiliateds disagree. There's general
agreement among the groups, however, that the president can go it alone with drones without seeking Congress' approval.
Similarly, all three generally are
opposed to the use of drones domestically, but Republicans (45%) are less strongly opposed than Democrats (53%)
and unaffiliated voters (59%).
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*** Drone Negative
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1NC Advantage Frontlines
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1NC Civil Liberties FRONTLINE
1. Privacy invasions are inevitable- drone technology is not uniquely harmful
Thompson 2013 – Richard, legislative attorney, April, “Drones in Domestic Surveillance Operations: Fourth
Amendment Implications and Legislative Responses” Congressional Research Service
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42701.pdf
The crucial question, then, is whether drones have the potential to be significantly more invasive than traditional
surveillance technologies such as manned aircraft or low-powered cameras— technologies that have been upheld in
previous cases. In this vein, some have asked whetherusing sophisticated digital platforms on a drone is any different from
attaching the same instrument to a lamppost or traditional aircraft.108 Take, for example, the tracking of license plates.
Currently, many states and municipalities employ automatic license plate readers
(ALPRs), which are usually mounted on police vehicles or stationary objects along the streets, to
take a snapshot of a license plate as a car drives by, and store this information in a large database for possible later use
by law enforcement.109 It is alleged that these devices can be used to track a person’s movements when police aggregate the data from a multitude of ALPR
stations.110 A majority of the reviewing federal circuit courts have held that a person has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his license plate number.111
2. No risk of drone abuse - the federal government is increasing oversight of drone use in the status
quo
Washington Post 2015- “FAA rules might allow thousands of business drones”, Feb 15
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/faa-releases-proposed-rules-for-domestic-droneuse/2015/02/15/6787bdce-b51b-11e4-a200-c008a01a6692_story.html
While the FAA rules are designed to exploit the economic potential of drones without jeopardizing aviation safety,
the order issued Sunday by
President Obama is intended to safeguard personal privacy and require the federal government to be more
forthcoming about when and where it uses drones to conduct surveillance.¶ All federal agencies, for example, would have
to disclose where they conduct drone operations within the United States, as well as their policies for storing and
protecting personal information collected from surveillance flights. Agencies would also have to issue an annual report detailing the types
of missions they flew in the previous year.¶ The order will have a large impact on the Defense Department and law enforcement
agencies such as the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security, which uses drones to patrol the nation’s borders.
The FBI has been especially secretive about its drone operations, even ducking lawmakers’ queries about how many it has and how often they are used.¶ “It is a
very big deal and a very positive step,” said Lisa Ellman, a former Justice Department official who helped prepare the presidential order and works on
drone issues as a lawyer in private practice. The agencies, she said, “understand that even with all the benefits of drones, the American public has concerns —
concerns about privacy and concerns about accountability.Ӧ In addition, Obama
directed the Commerce Department to work with
companies and the drone industry to develop a voluntary code of conduct for the private sector regarding surveillance
and privacy protections.
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1NC Innovation FRONTLINE
1. No impact to food insecurity- several studies prove there is no correlation between a lack of
food and conflict
Salehyan 2007 – Professor of Political Science – University of North Texas (Idean, “The New Myth About Climate
Change”, Foreign Policy, August 13 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922)
First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing
environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources
is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and
insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International
Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989
and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If
global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and
drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict
elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been
experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil
war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental
refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most
extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much
more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters.
2. Drone innovation is inevitable- the plan’s boost in not necessary
McNeal, 2014 Gregory, professor at Pepperdine University School of Law and a contributor to Forbes. He is an expert
in law and public policy with a specific focus on security, technology and crime. Drones and Aerial Surveillance:
Considerations For Legislators, November http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/10/dronesaerial-surveillance-legislators/Drones_Aerial_Surveillance_McNeal_FINAL.pdf?la=en, /Bingham-MB
The domestic use of drones by law enforcement is a popular topic following passage of the FAA Modernization and
Reform Act of 2012. The act directed that the FAA must integrate unmanned aircraft systems—drones—into the
national airspace by September of 2015 . A number of organizations have expressed concern over the possibility that
thousands of drones will be crowding the skies, some armed with sophisticated cameras. The ACLU, for example, has
been quite vocal in its criticism releasing a report that sets out their concerns over the prospect of intrusive aerial
surveillance without proper safeguards. While a robust public debate over the use of domestic drones is warranted,
the conclusion that widespread privacy violations are imminent is premature. While the FAA Modernization and
Reform Act seeks the integration of unmanned aircraft into U.S. airspace by September 30, 2015, most of the
provisions dealing with unmanned aircraft create a broad framework under which the FAA can explore the uses and
feasibility of integration of this new technology. The key sections of the law direct the Secretary of Transportation and
the Administrator of the FAA to draft plans, standards, and rules to ensure that drone integration proceeds in a safe
and legal manner. In short, this is a public process where civil liberties and privacy groups will no doubt have a voice in
crafting rules, and that voice seems to be at least as effective as the industry association’s voice. What is left out of the
process is what state and local governments will do with the technology, and that is the primary focus of this paper.
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1. Turn- the aff’s characterization of drones is overblown- their insistence on regulating drones
leaves the most invasive forms of piloted aerial surveillance intact
McNeal 2014- Gregory, professor, Pepperdine University, School of Law, “Drones and ¶ Aerial Surveillance: ¶
Considerations For Legislators” Brookings Institute
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/10/drones-aerial-surveillancelegislators/Drones_Aerial_Surveillance_McNeal_FINAL.pdf?la=en
The looming prospect of expanded use of unmanned aerial vehicles, colloquially known as drones, has raised understandable concerns for lawmakers.[1]
Those
concerns have led some to call for legislation mandating that nearly all uses of drones be prohibited unless the
government has first obtained a warrant. Privacy advocates have mounted a lobbying campaign that has succeeded in
convincing thirteen states to enact laws regulating the use of drones by law enforcement, with eleven of those thirteen
states requiring a warrant before the government may use a drone.[2] The campaigns mounted by privacy advocates oftentimes make a
compelling case about the threat of pervasive surveillance, but the legislation is rarely tailored in such a way to prevent the harm that
advocates fear. In fact, in every state where legislation was passed, the new laws are focused on the technology (drones)
not the harm (pervasive surveillance). In many cases, this technology centric approach creates perverse results, allowing
the use of extremely sophisticated pervasive surveillance technologies from manned aircraft, while disallowing
benign uses of drones for mundane tasks like accident and crime scene documentation, or monitoring of industrial
pollution and other environmental harms.
3. Requiring warrants does not resolve key privacy issues with drones- their 1AC Congress.gov
evidence indicates that law enforcement can still use drone technology “in the case of
emergencies” this is the status quo policy and it has been abused
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2NC/1NR Advantage Frontline Extensions
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2NC/1NR Civil Liberties
1. Extend our 1NC Washington Post Evidence, Obama directed the FAA to disclose the locations
of drone operations
2. Extend our Thompson evidence, drones are not a unique threat to privacy, automatic license
plate readers, and other NSA-type surveillance measures by the USFG are all alternate
causalities
3. Obama’s new drone directive addresses many of the civil liberties concerns associated with
drone use- the affirmative is unnecessary
Forbes 2015- Gregory S. McNeal, contributor “What You Need To Know About The Federal Government's Drone
Privacy Rules” http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2015/02/15/the-drones-are-coming-heres-what-presidentobama-thinks-about-privacy/
The President requires Federal agencies to examine their drone policies prior to the adoption of new drone technology
and at least every three years thereafter. The Order notes that drones must only be used in a matter consistent with the
Constitution, Federal law, and other applicable regulations and policies. It also reaffirms that individuals have the right
to seek access to and amendment of records associated with drone usage.¶ The President created new requirements for the collection of
information by drones. The Order requires that agencies only collect information “to the extent that such collection or use is
consistent with and relevant to an authorized purpose.” Information collected by drones that is not maintained in a system of records covered
by the Privacy Act, shall not be disseminated outside the agency unless dissemination is required by law, or fulfills an authorized purpose and complies with agency
requirements. If information
collected using drones contains personally identifiable information (PII) that information shall
not be retained for more than 180 days unless the retention is determined to be: necessary to an authorized mission of
the retaining agency, maintained in a system of records covered by the Privacy Act, or is required to be retained for a
longer period by any other applicable law or regulation.
The FBI does not undertake long-term, warrantless, surveillance missions- specific, targeted
instances do not violate the 4th amendment
Washington Times 2013- Stephan Dinan, July 29, “FBI says it doesn’t need warrant to use drones”
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/29/fbi-says-it-doesnt-need-warrant-use-drones/
The FBI has told Congress it does not need to get a warrant to conduct surveillance with drones, in a letter laying out
some of the top federal law enforcement agency’s policies for how it uses unmanned aerial vehicles.¶ In a July 19 letter
to Sen. Rand Paul, Stephen D. Kelly, assistan
t director for the FBI’s congressional liaison office, said the agency has used drones in 10 instances, including twice for “national
security” cases and eight times for criminal cases. The FBI authorized the use of drones in three other criminal cases but didn’t deploy them.¶
Then, in a follow-up letter Mr. Paul released Monday, Mr. Kelly said they don’t believe they ever need to obtain a
warrant to conduct drone surveillance as long as it’s done within guidelines.¶ He said they take their lead from several Supreme Court
cases that don’t deal directly with drones but do cover manned aerial surveillance. In those cases the court ruled that a long as the areas
observed were in public view and no law enforcement officer was trespassing, no privacy rights were violated.¶ In one case a
concurring opinion by one of the justices said that there could be a problem if an agency were conducting long-term warrantless
surveillance of someone in public, because that could constitute an unreasonable search in violation of the
Constitution’s Fourth Amendment.¶ “We do not use UAVs to undertake such surveillance,” Mr. Kelly said.¶ Mr. Paul had been
holding up the nomination of James B. Comey Jr. to become the new FBI director, using the blockade as a way to try to force the administration to divulge more
information on the FBI’s drone surveillance.¶ Current Director Robert S. Mueller III revealed the agency’s use of drones in a congressional hearing earlier this summer.
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1. Prefer our Salehyan evidence- there is no correlation between food shortages and conflicthe cites multiple studies that prove a lack of food means countries do not have the resources
to wage war
2. Extend our 1NC McNeal evidence- the drone industry is a burgeoning one- lack of public
confidence will change the billion dollar potential of the industry for investors
3. Extend our 1NC Thompson evidence- prefer this evidence it makes predictions about what the
commercial drone industry will be like in
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2NC/1NR Solvency
1. Extend our 1NC McNeal evidence- by focusing on unpiloted surveillance, the affirmative
leaves piloted instances of surveillance intact, our evidence indicates that piloted
surveillance poses a greater threat to civil liberties
2. Requiring warrants does not solve the affirmative’s internal links- the status quo requires
warrants before searches, however, drones can hover over any area undetected, which means
surveillance will continue even with warrants. The affirmative only regulates usage without
addressing the technology itself.
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Advantage Frontline Extensions
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ANSWERS TO: Inherency- Extensions
Obama’s new drone directive solves the affirmative- it prohibits the use of federal funds for drones
that are outside of constitutional bounds
Forbes 2015- Gregory S. McNeal, contributor “What You Need To Know About The Federal Government's Drone
Privacy Rules” http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2015/02/15/the-drones-are-coming-heres-what-presidentobama-thinks-about-privacy/
The Executive Order addresses civil liberties mostly by referencing existing laws. Specifically, the Order calls on agencies
to ensure they have policies to prohibit collection, use, retention, or dissemination of data in a manner that would
violate the First Amendment, or would illegally discriminate based on protected categories like ethnicity, race,
gender, etc. It also requires that drone related activities are performed in a manner consistent with the Constitution,
applicable laws, Executive Orders, and other Presidential directives. The Order also requires agencies to ensure they have in place a means
to receive, investigate, and address privacy, civil rights and civil liberties complaints.¶ Oversight and accountability of Federal drone operations
will require creation of new procedures or modification of existing procedures. Agencies will be required to ensure their
oversight procedures including audits or assessments, comply with existing policies and regulations. Federal government
personnel and contractors who work on drone programs will require rules of conduct and training, and procedures will need to be implemented for
reporting suspected cases of misuse or abuse of drone technologies.
The FBI uses drones in a very limited capacity and steps are being taken to ensure responsible use
Al Jazeera 2013- June 20th “FBI says drones used to monitor people in US”
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2013/06/20136191854968801.html
The US uses drones for surveillance in some limited law-enforcement situations, the head of FBI has said, prompting additional debate
about the Obama administration's use of domestic surveillance.¶ Robert Mueller's acknowledgement came in response to questions on Wednesday from members of
the Senate Judiciary Committee who said they wanted to know more about the federal government's increasing use of unmanned aircraft.¶ "Does
the FBI use
drones for surveillance on US soil?" Republican Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa asked during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing.¶ "Yes,"
Mueller said, adding that the use was in "a very, very minimal way and very seldom".¶ Mueller did not go into detail, but the FBI
later released a statement that said unmanned aircraft were used only to watch stationary subjects and to avoid
serious risks to law-enforcement agents.¶ The Federal Aviation Administration approves each use, the statement said.¶ "I will tell you that our
footprint is very small," Mueller said in his testimony.¶ "We have very few [drones] and of limited use, and we're exploring not
only the use but also the necessary guidelines for that use."
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ANSWERS TO: Civil Liberties- Impact Framing
Consequentialism subsumes their impact framing- even under a deontological framework, one
must weigh the costs and benefits of ethical decisions- the judge should adopt this framework
when evaluating the round- if we win that our strategy is net-better than the affirmative’s for
human flourishing, we should win the debate
Spragens 2000 – Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Harvard University (Thomas A., Political Theory and
Partisan Politics- "Rationality in Liberal Politics" pg 81-2)
My thesis that all three layers/forms of political association are important in a well-ordered liberal democracy also implies the untenability of Rawls's argument that
agreement regarding norms of social justice is a possible and sufficient way to overcome the deficiencies of the modus vivendi approach. In the first place, as I have
argued in more detail elsewhere, the
fundamental unfairness of life and the presence of gratuitous elements in the moral
universe make it impossible to settle rationally upon a single set of distributive principles as demonstrably fair (See also,
Spragens 1993). Simply put, the problem is that the contingencies of the world ineluctably allocate assets and sufferings quite unfairly. We can cope with and
try to compensate for these "natural injustices," but only at the price of introducing other elements of unfairness or
compromising other moral values. The other major problem in this context is that real world human beings are not deontologists:
their moral intuitions about distributive justice are permeated and influenced by their moral intuitions about the'
good. The empirical consequence of these two difficulties is the falsification of Rawls's hermeneutic claims about an overlapping consensus. Rational people
of good will with a liberal democratic persuasion will be able to agree that some possible distributive criteria are
morally unacceptable. But, as both experience and the literature attest, hopes for a convergence of opinion on
definitive principles of distributive justice are chimerical.
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2NC/1NR ANSWERS TO: Solvency- Extensions
The affirmative does nothing to regulate piloted aerial surveillance- this is more dangerous than
drones
McNeal 2014- Gregory, professor, Pepperdine University, School of Law, “Drones and ¶ Aerial Surveillance: ¶
Considerations For Legislators” Brookings Institute
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2014/10/drones-aerial-surveillancelegislators/Drones_Aerial_Surveillance_McNeal_FINAL.pdf?la=en
Privacy advocates contend that with drones, the government will be able to engage in widespread pervasive surveillance because drones are cheaper to operate than
their manned counterparts.
While drones are cheaper to operate, the drones most law enforcement agencies can afford are
currently far less capable than their manned counterparts (oftentimes these drones are small remote controlled helicopters or airplanes,
capable of a flight time of less than one hour). The surveillance equipment that can be placed on these drones is also far less
intrusive than that which can be mounted to manned aircraft. Moreover, the term “unmanned aircraft” is also
misleading as there are no systems currently available to law enforcement that can conduct fully autonomous
operations, all systems need an operator for part of the mission. Thus, in almost all instances drones are less capable than manned
aerial surveillance platforms, and while the platform is cheaper (but less capable), the personnel costs still remain
constant as an officer is required to operate the drone. Granted, there are very sophisticated systems used by the military, but even if law
enforcement agencies were able to afford the highly sophisticated multi-million dollar Predator and Reaper systems like those used for surveillance on battlefields,
those systems (both the aircraft and the ground control station) are more expensive than manned helicopters, require a
ground crew to launch and recover the aircraft, and require both a pilot and a camera operator. In light of these facts, the
legislation being pushed by privacy advocates has been explicitly directed at drone technology, not because the
technology represents an actual threat to civil liberties, but because someday in the future, the technology may be
intrusive.[7]
The plan does nothing about commercial drone surveillance
Slate 2015- February 2015 “The Rules of the Sky”
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/02/faa_small_commercial_drone_rules_don_t_adequate
ly_address_privacy_concerns.html
But what about privacy? Drones—including small drones, and especially those driven by commercial motives to
voraciously gather all kinds of information—can pose significant privacy threats. They see from new vantage points, they are far
lower-cost than older aerial technologies, and they can move over boundaries that otherwise protect activity from
sight. These are only a few reasons why drones have been predicted to be a “privacy catalyst”—the drivers of robust discussions about the enactment of new
privacy regulations.¶ The FAA has very little to say about privacy, which might not be surprising . It is primarily an agency concerned with
aircraft safety. When the Electronic Privacy Information Center, a public interest group focused on privacy policy, petitioned
the FAA in 2012 to address the threat from drones to privacy and civil liberties, the FAA responded that it “prioritizes its
rulemaking projects based on issues that are crucial to the safety of the aviation community and the traveling public.”
Similarly, in the required privacy impact assessment that accompanied the FAA’s draft drone rules, the FAA acknowledge privacy concerns over
drone operations but pointed elsewhere for legal solutions.
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***Topicality Negative
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1NC Violations
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**Federal Government
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1NC Drone Surveillance- “Federal Government” Violation
A. Interpretation1. Federal government is the national government that expresses power
Black’s Law Dictionary, 2004 8th Edition, June 1, , pg.716.
Federal government. 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political
units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national politics
matters – Also termed (in federal states) central government. 2. the U.S. government – Also termed national
government. [Cases: United States -1 C.J.S. United States - - 2-3]
2. “Its” refers to the subject preceding it and means ownership
Cambridge Dictionary “Its”, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/its)
Definition
belonging to or relating to something that has already been mentioned
The dog hurt its paw.
Their house has its own swimming pool.
The company increased its profits.
I prefer the second option - its advantages are simplicity and cheapness.
B. Violation- Drones are used primarily by local law enforcement and the federal government has
no jurisdiction over its use, which means the affirmative is not curtailing federal government
surveillance
National Journal 2015- “Few Privacy Limitations Exist on How Police Use Drones”
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/few-privacy-limitations-exist-on-how-police-use-drones-20150205, Feb 5
As drones become cheaper and more capable, more police departments across the country are asking for and getting
federal approval to use them for law enforcement.¶ But the Federal Aviation Administration only takes safety into consideration when it grants a
law enforcement agency approval to use drones, leaving privacy protections to legislation—which, depending on the state in
question, may or may not exist.¶ Agencies as large as the Michigan State Police and as small as the Grand Forks County [N.D.] Sheriff's Department have
received FAA approval to use drones. Most departments use them for missions like search-and-rescue or for photographing a
crime scene or an accident site.¶ But unless a law enforcement agency is within one of the 14 states that have passed
privacy legislation limiting how police can use drones, there's little in theory keeping it from using a drone for a less
innocuous end—such as surveillance without a warrant. "While the federal government retains responsibility for the
airspace, under most circumstances a state/local government can impose restrictions on the agencies for which it's
responsible," an FAA spokesperson said in an emailed statement.¶ Members in the House and Senate introduced bills in the previous
Congress that would have required police everywhere in the country to obtain a warrant before using drones for
surveillance, but the bills died at the end of the year.
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C. Standards
1. Limits- allowing the affirmative to claim advantages off of non-USFG surveillance practices
unlimits the topic; any non-federal surveillance measure from local traffic cameras to license plate
readers becomes a viable affirmative- a limited topic is an educational topic- the fewer affirmatives
we can focus on, the more in-depth our discussions
2. Negative ground- as long as the affirmative does not have to stick to the USFG, they will find the
most miniscule local surveillance action as a means to bypass links to politics Das, elections,
national security Das, and other core negative generics.
a. There is an education DA to a loss of ground- debating about politics, elections, and
national security teaches debaters about vital issues regarding national security
D. Prefer competing interpretations- if our definition is net-better for debate, that is, it is more
limited and educational then vote negative
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1NC Stingray- “Federal Government” Violation
A. Interpretation1. Federal government is the national government that expresses power
Black’s Law Dictionary, 2004 8th Edition, June 1, , pg.716.
Federal government. 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political
units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national politics
matters – Also termed (in federal states) central government. 2. the U.S. government – Also termed national
government. [Cases: United States -1 C.J.S. United States - - 2-3]
2. “Its” refers to the subject preceding it and means ownership
Cambridge Dictionary “Its”, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/its)
Definition
belonging to or relating to something that has already been mentioned
The dog hurt its paw.
Their house has its own swimming pool.
The company increased its profits.
I prefer the second option - its advantages are simplicity and cheapness.
B. Violation- Stingray technology is not used by the Federal government, only local law
enforcement
Klonick 2014- Kate, fellow at Yale Law School’s Information Society Project, November 14, “Stingrays: Not Just for
Feds!”
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/11/stingrays_imsi_catchers_how_local_law_enforcemen
t_uses_an_invasive_surveillance.single.html
From Ferguson to Senate hearings, the news of local police arming themselves with federal-grade equipment—tanks, riot gear, M16 rifles—has captivated everyone
from civil libertarians to lawmakers. But
in the national debate surrounding police militarization, the most effective weapons may
have been overlooked: Beyond arming themselves like the federal government, local police are also spying on you like
the federal government—using sophisticated surveillance technology without warrants.¶ One of the tools making it
possible for Chief Wiggum to gather all your deets is known colloquially as a Stingray, a portable gadget about the size of a box of
doughnuts. They’re also known as “cell-site simulators,” because, well, that’s exactly what they do: A Stingray mimics a cellphone tower and forces all nearby mobile
phones or devices to connect to it. Every
phone that connects to the Stingray reports its number, GPS location, and the numbers
of all outgoing calls and texts. That’s every location and outgoing call and text log of every phone within a certain radius—up to several kilometers—of the
Stingray, and that’s all without a warrant.¶ It’s probably not a huge surprise to most people in America today that the federal government has incredible surveillance
technology that it uses occasionally on its own citizens. (Hi, NSA!) But polling shows that only 27 percent of people think that this technology is focused on them, and
even if not, half of Americans surveyed say that there might be a margin of federal surveillance they’re willing to endure in the name of homeland security or fighting
terrorism.¶ But
that logic is a much harder sell when it comes to local police, who have been acquiring Stingrays in
increasing numbers. At least 46 state and local police departments, from Sunrise, Florida, to Hennepin, Minnesota,
have gotten cell-site simulators, which range widely in price from $16,000 to more than $125,000 a pop. And like the federal government, local
police are using this technology without any judicial oversight. That means Barney Fife—or, if you’re looking for a more sinister example,
think Denzel in Training Day—can walk into your neighborhood with a Stingray, fire it up, and collect all the numbers, GPS, and call logs of every cellphone in the area.
If they’re looking for a specific number (hopefully, it’s not you), they can also use a Stingray to trick your phone into
being a personal GPS tracker and then use that warrantless cellphone tracking to enter your home and arrest you—
again without a warrant.
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C. Standards
1. Limits- allowing the affirmative to claim advantages off of non-USFG surveillance practices
unlimits the topic; any non-federal surveillance measure from local traffic cameras to license plate
readers becomes a viable affirmative- a limited topic is an educational topic- the fewer affirmatives
we can focus on, the more in-depth our discussions
2. Negative ground- as long as the affirmative does not have to stick to the USFG, they will find the
most miniscule local surveillance action as a means to bypass links to politics Das, elections,
national security Das, and other core negative generics.
a. There is an education DA to a loss of ground- debating about politics, elections, and
national security teaches debaters about vital issues regarding national security
D. Prefer competing interpretations- if our definition is net-better for debate, that is, it is more
limited and educational then vote negative
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**Curtail ≠ Abolish
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1NC Security Letters- Curtail ≠ Abolish
A. Interpretation
1. To curtail is to reduce or restrict
Oxford English Dictionary http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/curtail
Definition of curtail in English:¶ verb¶ [with object]¶ 1Reduce in extent or quantity; impose a restriction on: civil
liberties were further curtailed
2. Abolish is to put an end to
Oxford English Dictionary http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/abolish
Definition of abolish in English:
verb
[with object]
Formally put an end to (a system, practice, or institution):
B. The plan does not curtail surveillance, it abolishes the surveillance practice of security letters
C. Standards
1. Limits- allowing the affirmative to claim two interpretations of curtail (restrict and abolish)
doubles the number of viable affirmatives; a limited topic is an educational topic- the fewer
affirmatives we can focus on, the more in-depth our discussions
2. Negative Ground- the negative will not be able to read counterplans that test the affirmative
by banning a surveillance practice altogether
D. Prefer competing interpretations- if our definition is net-better for debate, that is, it is more
limited and educational, then vote negative
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2NC/1NR Topicality Blocks
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2NC/1NR- ANSWERS TO: Reasonability
Reject reasonability
1. It is too vague and encourages judge intervention- what constitutes a “reasonable” level of
predictability is too subjective; what one team finds reasonable another might find
unreasonable. Also, absent a debate about the specific costs and benefits of words, the judge
will be left to decide for themselves whether they think the affirmative is reasonable
2. Topicality is good for debate- under their interpretation we would not debate about the
comparative merits of different interpretations in the resolution, this means we lose vital
cost- benefit analysis skills
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***”Federal Government” Violation
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2NC/1NR - “Federal Government”- Extensions
Federal means relating to the national government of the United States
Black’s Law Dictionary, 1999
federal, adj. Of or relating to a system of associated governments with a vertical division of governments into national
and regional components having different responsibilities; esp., of or relating to the national government of the United
States.
Federal government is central government
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY WORDNET, 1997, p. http://www.dictionary.com/search?q=federal%20government.
Federal government. n: a government with strong central powers.
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2NC/1NR - “Its”- Extensions
‘Its’ means ownership ownership
Glossary of English Grammar Terms, 2005
(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)
Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or
ownership.
EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)
Its means possession
Encarta, 2009 (Encarta World English Dictionary,
http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861622735)
its [ its ]
adjective Definition: indicating possession: used to indicate that something belongs or relates to something
The park changed its policy.
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**2NC/1NR Drone Affirmative
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2NC/1NR Drone Affirmative- “Federal Government”- Overview
1. Extend our 1NC Black’s Law and Cambridge Dictionary evidence, the phrase, “The Federal
Government should curtail its domestic surveillance”, can only refer to the federal
government’s surveillance
2. Extend our violation- drones are used for surveillance by local law enforcement not by
federal law enforcement. This puts them in a solvency double bind either: a) they only curtail
federal government surveillance, in which case they cannot solve their internal links or b)
they curtail both, in which case they are extra topical, extra topicality is a voting issue for
predictability and ground- it allows the affirmative to claim advantages based on untopical
portions of the plan text
3. Extend our reasons to prefer- by curtailing non-federal government surveillance, the
affirmative broadens the scope of the topic, a limited topic is better for our education since
we will have in depth discussions on a small number of affirmatives. Also, by having a nonusfg actor, the affirmative does not link to many core negative generics, which are also vital
for topic education
4. Prefer a competing interpretations model when evaluating topicality it’s the only objective
way to determine what the words in the resolution mean
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2NC/1NR Drone Affirmative- “Federal Government”- Violation
The affirmative regulates only local law enforcement surveillance
NEW YORK TIMES 2013- “Rise of Drones in U.S. Drives Efforts to Limit Police Use”
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/16/technology/rise-of-drones-in-us-spurs-efforts-to-limituses.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
For now, drones for civilian use run on relatively small batteries and fly short distances. In principle, various sensors, including cameras,
can be attached to them. But there is no consensus in law on how the data collected can be used, shared or stored.¶ State and local government
authorities are trying to fill that void. As they do, they are weighing not only the demands of the police and civil
libertarians but also tricky legal questions. The law offers citizens the right to take pictures on the street, for instance, just as it protects citizens from
unreasonable search.¶ State legislatures have come up with measures that seek to permit certain uses, while reassuring citizens against
unwanted snooping.¶ Virginia is furthest along in dealing with the issue. In early February, its state Legislature passed a two-year
moratorium on the use of drones in criminal investigations, though it has yet to be reviewed by the governor.¶ In several
states, proposals would require the police to obtain a search warrant before collecting evidence with a drone.
Here’s more evidence, surveillance drones are used primarily by local law enforcement
Washington Times 2012- December 10, “Homeland Security increasingly lending drones to local police”
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/dec/10/homeland-security-increasingly-loaning-drones-to-l/
Since then, the Washington Guardian has confirmed, DHS and its Customs and Border Protection agency have deployed drones — originally bought to guard
America’s borders — to assist local law enforcement and other federal agencies on several occasions.¶ The practice is raising questions inside and outside
government about whether federal officials may be creating an ad-hoc, loan-a-drone program without formal rules for engagement, privacy protection or taxpayer
reimbursements. The drones used by CPB can cost between $15 million and $34 million each to buy, and have hourly operational costs as well.¶ In addition, DHS
recently began distributing $4 million in grants to help local law enforcement buy its own, smaller versions of drones,
opening a new market for politically connected drone makers as the wars overseas shrink.¶ The double-barreled lending
and purchasing have some concerned that federal taxpayers may be subsidizing the militarization of local police forces
and creating new threats to average Americans’ privacy.
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**2NC/1NR Stingray Affirmative
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2NC/1NR Drone Affirmative- “Federal Government”- Overview
1. Extend our 1NC Black’s Law and Cambridge Dictionary evidence, the phrase, “The Federal
Government should curtail its domestic surveillance”, can only refer to the federal
government’s surveillance
2. Extend our violation- stingrays are used for surveillance by local law enforcement not by
federal law enforcement. This puts them in a solvency double bind either: a) they only curtail
federal government surveillance, in which case they cannot solve their internal links or b)
they curtail both, in which case they are extra topical, extra topicality is a voting issue for
predictability and ground- it allows the affirmative to claim advantages based on untopical
portions of the plan text
3. Extend our reasons to prefer- by curtailing non-federal government surveillance, the
affirmative broadens the scope of the topic, a limited topic is better for our education since
we will have in depth discussions on a small number of affirmatives. Also, by having a nonusfg actor, the affirmative does not link to many core negative generics, which are also vital
for topic education
4. Prefer a competing interpretations model when evaluating topicality it’s the only objective
way to determine what the words in the resolution mean
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2NC/1NR Stingray Affirmative- “Federal Government”- Violation
Stingray technology is used only by local law enforcement
Scientific American 2015 “What Is the Big Secret Surrounding Stingray Surveillance?”
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-the-big-secret-surrounding-stingray-surveillance/, June 25
Given the amount of mobile phone traffic that cell phone towers transmit, it is no wonder law enforcement agencies
target these devices as a rich source of data to aid their investigations. Standard procedure involves getting a court order to obtain phone
records from a wireless carrier. When authorities cannot or do not want to go that route, they can set up a simulated cell phone
tower—often called a stingray—that surreptitiously gathers information from the suspects in question as well as any
other mobile device in the area.¶ These simulated cell sites—which collect international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI), location and other data from
mobile phones connecting to them—have become a source of controversy for a number of reasons. National and local law enforcement agencies
closely guard details about the technology’s use, with much of what is known about stingrays revealed through court documents and other
paperwork made public via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests.¶ One such document recently revealed that the Baltimore Police
Department has used a cell site simulator 4,300 times since 2007 and signed a nondisclosure agreement with the FBI that instructed prosecutors
to drop cases rather than reveal the department’s use of the stingray. Other records indicate law enforcement agencies have used the
technology hundreds of times without a search warrant, instead relying on a much more generic court order known as a pen register and trap
and trace order. Last year Harris Corp., the Melbourne, Fla., company that makes the majority of cell site simulators, went so far as to petition the Federal
Communications Commission to block a FOIA request for user manuals for some of the company’s products.
Local law enforcement use stingray devices
ABC 7 NEWS 2014- December 3, “Investigation: Law enforcement use secret 'Stingray' devices to track cell phone signals”
http://abc7.com/news/investigation-law-enforcement-use-secret-devices-to-track-cell-phone-signals/421190/
Law enforcement agencies across the U.S. and in Southern California are using a device so secret that agencies are
required to sign a non-disclosure agreement before they can buy or use it.¶ The device is commonly referred to as a "Stingray," although
several companies manufacture models under various brand names, including "Kingfish" and "Hailstorm."¶ "Local law enforcement can do things
now that we used to relegate to the realm of spies and espionage," ABC7 intelligence expert Hal Kempfer tells Eyewitness News.¶ Stingraytype devices trick a target's cell phone into connecting to it by masquerading as the strongest cell phone tower in the area -- one phones think belongs to a phone
carrier like Verizon or AT&T.¶ The tracking device pinpoints a cell phone's location down to about three yards and extracts the numbers of all incoming and outgoing
calls.
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***Curtail ≠ Abolish
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**2NC/1NR National Security Letters Affirmative
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2NC/1NR Security Letters- Curtail ≠ Abolish – Overview
1. Extend our 1NC Oxford English Dictionary evidence- “to abolish” and “to curtail” are two
different actions- the framers of the resolution, if they had intended for the USFG to ban
their surveillance practices rather than curtail it, would have used the term “abolished”.
2. Extend the violation- the plan text calls for the federal government to “ban” security letters
which is different from substantially curtailing it
3. Prefer this interpretation of the resolution- it allows the negative to read the ban
surveillance counterplan, which is an essential component of negative ground on this topic.
Also, the affirmative underlimits the resolution. By claiming affirmatives that both ban and
curtail surveillance they essentially double the size of the resolution. A limited resolution is
key to in depth education on the topic.
4. Prefer a competing interpretations model when evaluating topicality it’s the only objective way
to determine what the words in the resolution mean
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2NC/1NR Security Letters- Curtail ≠ Abolish – Interpretation Extensions
Curtail means to reduce or limit
Merriam Webster Dictionary
curtail
verb cur·tail \(ˌ)kər-ˈtāl\
: to reduce or limit (something)
Abolish means to officially end or stop something
Merriam Webster Dictionary
abolish
verb abol·ish \ə-ˈbä-lish\
: to officially end or stop (something, such as a law) : to completely do away with (something)
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**Topicality Affirmative
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**2AC Blocks
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2AC- Drone Affirmative- T “Federal Government”
A. We meet their interpretation- the Federal Government uses drones in the status quo
The Guardian 2013- Dan Roberts, “FBI admits to using surveillance drones over US soil”
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/19/fbi-drones-domestic-surveillance
The FBI has admitted it sometimes uses aerial surveillance drones over US soil, and suggested further political debate and legislation
to govern their domestic use may be necessary.¶ Speaking in a hearing mainly about telephone data collection, the bureau's director, Robert Mueller, said it used
drones to aid its investigations in a "very, very minimal way, very seldom".¶ However, the
potential for growing drone use either in the US, or
involving US citizens abroad, is an increasingly charged issue in Congress, and the FBI acknowleged there may need to
be legal restrictions placed on their use to protect privacy.¶ "It is still in nascent stages but it is worthy of debate and legislation down the
road," said Mueller, in response to questions from Hawaii senator Mazie Hirono.¶ Advertisement¶ Hirono said: "I think this is a burgeoning concern for
many of us."¶ Dianne Feinstein, who is also chair of the Senate intelligence committee, said the issue of drones worried her far more than telephone and internet
surveillance, which she believes are subject to sufficient legal oversight.¶ "Our footprint is very small," Mueller told the Senate judiciary committee. "We have very
few and have limited use."¶ He
said the FBI was in "the initial stages" of developing privacy guidelines to balance security threats with civil
liberty concerns.¶ It is known that drones are used by border control officials and have been used by some local law enforcement authorities
and Department of Homeland Security in criminal cases.
B. Counter- Interpretation: Its means associated with
Oxford Dictionaries Online, No Date (“Its”, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/its?view=uk)
its
Entry from World dictionary
Pronunciation:/ɪts/
possessive determiner
belonging to or associated with a thing previously mentioned or easily identified: turn the camera on its side
he chose the area for its atmosphere
C. We meet- the affirmative reduces surveillance that is associated with the federal government
D. Prefer our interpretation
1. Ground- most surveillance is undertaken at the local level, by law enforcement, by limiting out
these affirmatives, the aff is left defending only a handful of potential federal government
reductions
2. Topic education- debating about surveillance by local law enforcement is key to topic education,
these debates are the most salient to current events
E. Prefer reasonability to competing interpretations- if the affirmative is predictable then we should
not lose to their interpretation. Predictability is the best standard for topicality. If the negative can
predict that they’d debate a drone affirmative on this topic then that leaves ample time to research
case specific strategies and links
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2AC- Stingray Affirmative- T “Federal Government”
A. We meet their interpretation- the Federal Government uses stingray technology in the status
quo
ACLU 2014- American Civil Liberties Union, June 27, “STINGRAYS: The Most Common Surveillance Tool the
Government Won't Tell You”
Abouthttps://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/StingRays_The_Most_Common_Surveillance_Tool_the_Govt_Won%27
t_Tell_You_About.pdf
“STINGRAYS: The Most Common Surveillance Tool the Government Won't Tell You About”
Federal and state law enforcement entities across the country are using a powerful cell phone surveillance tool
commonly referred to as a “Sting Ray.” These devices are capable of locating a cell phone with extraordinary precision, but to do so they operate in
dragnet fashion, scooping up information from a target device, as well as other wireless devices in the vicinity. In addition, these devices can be configured to
Although the federal government has been using these devices since at least
1995, and use by state and local governments is quite widespread, there are only a handful of published opinions
addressing their use.
capture the content of voice and data communications.
B. Counter- Interpretation: Its means associated with
Oxford Dictionaries Online, No Date (“Its”, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/its?view=uk)
its
Entry from World dictionary
Pronunciation:/ɪts/
possessive determiner
belonging to or associated with a thing previously mentioned or easily identified: turn the camera on its side
he chose the area for its atmosphere
C. We meet- the affirmative reduces surveillance that is associated with the federal government
D. Prefer our interpretation
1. Ground- most surveillance is undertaken at the local level, by law enforcement, by limiting out
these affirmatives, the aff is left defending only a handful of potential federal government
reductions
2. Topic education- debating about surveillance by local law enforcement is key to topic education,
these debates are the most salient to current events
E. Prefer reasonability to competing interpretations- if the affirmative is predictable then we should
not lose to their interpretation. Predictability is the best standard for topicality. If the negative can
predict that they’d debate a drone affirmative on this topic then that leaves ample time to research
case specific strategies and links
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2AC Security Letters
A. We meet their interpretation- the affirmative curtails the use of the security letters by the
USFG
B. Counter-interpretation- to curtail is to ban
Vocabulary.com http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/curtail
To curtail something is to slow it down, put restrictions on it, or stop it entirely. If I give up cake, I am curtailing my cake-eating.
C. Prefer our interpretation
1. Ground- most advantage internal links are predicated on the government stopping a
surveillance action. The literature does not make the distinction between a partial reduction
and an outright ban, the negative, leaves the affirmative with very little advantage ground
D. Prefer reasonability to competing interpretations- if the affirmative is predictable then we
should not lose to their interpretation. Predictability is the best standard for topicality. If the
negative can predict that they’d debate a drone affirmative on this topic then that leaves ample
time to research case specific strategies and links
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Crime Disadvantage
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Crime DA 1NC
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Crime DA 1NC
A. Uniqueness: Long term trends show crime rates dropping significantly
Fuchs 2015 (Erin Fuchs, 1-27-2015, "It's Incredible How Much Safer America Has Become Since The 1980s," Business
Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/fbi-crime-report-shows-america-is-still-getting-safer-2015-1)
Violent crime and property crime in America both decreased in the first half of 2014, the FBI said in a new preliminary
report released Tuesday. The FBI's latest crime statistics reflects a long-term trend. Even though America's local police
are more militarized than ever, the crime rate has been steadily falling in the past two decades. In the 1980s property
crime and violence were both much more common, spurring politicians to bill themselves as "tough on crime" in order
to get elected in America. (Presidential candidate Michael Dukakis famously lost against George H.W. Bush, who ran a
tough-on-crime campaign.) These days that tough-on-crime rhetoric isn't as common, and there's a excellent reason
why. Crime stats consistently show that the country is getting safer. In 2013, the number of murders in America
dropped 4.4% to 14,196 — down signifcantly from its peak of 24,703 in 1991. The drop in homicides is even more
obvious when you look at individual cities that once had bad reputations. New York recorded 2,245 homicides at its peak
in 1990 but only 328 by 2014. Los Angeles had 2,589 homicides in 1992 but only 254 last year. Washington, D.C., a much
smaller city, saw its murder number decline from a peak of 443 homicides in 1992 to only 105 last year. Overall, violent
crimes including homicide, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery dropped 38% between 1992 and 2011. The dramatic
plunge in violent crime shocked many experts, who predicted America would just get more violent. "Recent declines
in rates of violent crime in the United States caught many researchers and policymakers off guard," criminology
professor Gary LaFree wrote back in 1999. "These declines were perhaps more surprising in that they came on the heels
of dire predictions about the rise of a generation of 'superpredators' who would soon unleash the full force of their
destructive capacities on an already crime-weary nation." Crime experts have yet to come up with a unified theory for
why America has gotten so much safer. However, one of the more plausible reasons for the falling violent crime rate is
that many cities in America have more police per capita than they used to — and those police officers have gotten
better at doing their job. An omnibus crime bill passed in 1994 provided funding for 100,000 new police officers in the
US as and set aside $6.1 billion for crime prevention programs. In reality, the number of cops on the street only
increased by 50,000 to 60,000 in the 1990s, but that was still a bigger increase than in previous decades, according to
Levitt's analysis of FBI data. In New York City, which had a particularly sharp drop in violent crime, the police force
expanded by 35% in the 1990s. The mere presence of more police officers can obviously be a big crime deterrent.
During the 1990s, these police officers has also became more strategic — in part because they began to use
computerized systems to track crimes and find out where they should deploy their officers. So-called "hot spot policing"
is one of the most effective new strategies, political scientist James Q. Wilson has written in The Wall Street Journal.
"The great majority of crimes tend to occur in the same places," Wilson writes. "Put active police resources in those
areas instead of telling officers to drive around waiting for 911 calls, and you can bring down crime." One Minneapolisbased study that Wilson cited found that for every minute a police officer spent at a "hot spot" more time passed before
another crime was committed in that spot after he left. There are other theories about why violent crime decreased,
including that it was because America got its crack epidemic under control and because the US economy grew stronger.
Steven Levitt, the economist who wrote the best-seller "Freakonomics," proposed one of the more controversial
theories about the crime drop, which was that the legalization of abortion in 1973 was partly responsible. If it weren't
for abortion, the theory goes, many unwanted children would have been been grown up to be criminals by the 1990s.
An even more bizarre theory ties the rise of lead in the atmosphere to increases in violent crime. Lead emissions rose
from the 1940s to the 1960s, while crime rose from the 1960s through the 1980s — when children exposed to lead were
becoming adults. In an extensive look at the lead/violence theory, Kevin Drum of Mother Jones cited research that found
"even moderately high levels of lead exposure are associated with aggressivity, impulsivity, ADHD, and lower IQ. And
right there, you've practically defined the profile of a violent young offender."
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Crime DA 1NC
B. Link: Surveillance is an irreplaceable tool for preventing crime; efforts to end government
surveillance compromise public safety. In truth, surveillance has little potential for abuse
compared to the potential for fighting crime.
Armstrong 13 (Stuart Armstrong for Aeon “The Strange Benefits of a Total Surveillance State” Online http://aeon.co/magazine/society/the-strangebenefits-of-a-total-surveillance-state/)
The first, and most obvious, advantage of mass surveillance is a drastic reduction in crime. Indeed, this is the
advantage most often put forward by surveillance proponents today. The evidence as to whether current surveillance
achieves this is ambiguous; cameras, for instance, seem to have an effect on property crime, but not on incidences of
violence. But today’s world is very different from a panopticon full of automatically analysed surveillance devices that
leave few zones of darkness.If calibrated properly, total surveillance might eradicate certain types of crime almost
entirely. People respond well to inevitable consequences, especially those that follow swiftly on the heels of their
conduct. Few would commit easily monitored crimes such as assault or breaking and entering, if it meant being
handcuffed within minutes. This kind of ultra-efficient police capability would require not only sensors capable of
recording crimes, but also advanced computer vision and recognition algorithms capable of detecting crimes quickly.
There has been some recent progress on such algorithms, with further improvements expected. In theory, they would
be able to alert the police in real time, while the crime was still ongoing. Prompt police responses would create nearperfect deterrence, and violent crime would be reduced to a few remaining incidents of overwhelming passion or
extreme irrationality.If surveillance recordings were stored for later analysis, other types of crimes could be eradicated
as well, because perpetrators would fear later discovery and punishment. We could expect crimes such as low-level
corruption to vanish, because bribes would become perilous (to demand or receive) for those who are constantly under
watch. We would likely see a similar reduction in police brutality. There might be an initial spike in detected cases of
police brutality under a total surveillance regime, as incidents that would previously have gone unnoticed came to light,
but then, after a short while, the numbers would tumble. Ubiquitous video recording, mobile and otherwise, has already
begun to expose such incidents.On a smaller scale, mass surveillance would combat all kinds of abuses that currently
go unreported because the abuser has power over the abused. You see this dynamic in a variety of scenarios, from the
dramatic (child abuse) to the more mundane (line managers insisting on illegal, unpaid overtime). Even if the victim is
too scared to report the crime, the simple fact that the recordings existed would go a long way towards equalising
existing power differentials. There would be the constant risk of some auditor or analyst stumbling on the recording, and
once the abused was out of the abuser’s control (grown up, in another job) they could retaliate and complain, proof in
hand. The possibility of deferred vengeance would make abuse much less likely to occur in the first place.
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Crime DA 1NC
C. Impact - Continued surveillance along with a reduction in crime would reduce police
brutality, war, and the possibility of a global pandemic.
Armstrong 13 (Stuart Armstrong for Aeon http://aeon.co/magazine/society/the-strange-benefits-of-a-total-surveillance-state/)
We would likely see a similar reduction in police brutality. There might be an initial spike in detected cases of police brutality under
a total surveillance regime, as incidents that would previously have gone unnoticed came to light, but then, after a short while, the
numbers would tumble. Ubiquitous video recording, mobile and otherwise, has already begun to expose such incidents.[…]With
reduced crime, we could also expect a significant reduction in police work and, by extension, police numbers. Beyond a rapidreaction force tasked with responding to rare crimes of passion, there would be no need to keep a large police force on hand. And
there would also be no need for them to enjoy the special rights they do today. Police officers can, on mere suspicion, detain you,
search your person, interrogate you, and sometimes enter your home. They can also arrest you on suspicion of vague ‘crimes’
such as ‘loitering with intent’. Our present police force is given these powers because it needs to be able to investigate. Police
officers can’t be expected to know who committed what crime, and when, so they need extra powers to be able to figure this out,
and still more special powers to protect themselves while they do so. But in a total-surveillance world, there would be no need for
humans to have such extensive powers of investigation. For most crimes, guilt or innocence would be obvious and easy to
establish from the recordings. The police’s role could be reduced to arresting specific individuals, who have violated specific
laws.If all goes well, there might be fewer laws for the police to enforce. Most countries currently have an excess of laws,
criminalising all sorts of behaviour. This is only tolerated because of selective enforcement; the laws are enforced very rarely, or
only against marginalised groups. But if everyone was suddenly subject to enforcement, there would have to be a mass legal
repeal. When spliffs on private yachts are punished as severely as spliffs in the ghetto, you can expect the marijuana legalisation
movement to gather steam. When it becomes glaringly obvious that most people simply can’t follow all the rules they’re supposed
to, these rules will have to be reformed. In the end, there is a chance that mass surveillance could result in more personal
freedom, not less.The military is another arm of state power that is ripe for a surveillance-inspired shrinking. If cross-border
surveillance becomes ubiquitous and effective, we could see a reduction in the $1.7 trillion that the world spends on the military
each year. Previous attempts to reduce armaments have ultimately been stymied by a lack of reliable verification. Countries can
never trust that their enemies aren’t cheating, and that encourages them to cheat themselves. Arms races are also made worse by a
psychological phenomenon, whereby each side interprets the actions of the other as a dangerous provocation, while interpreting its
own as purely defensive or reactive. With cross-border mass surveillance, countries could check that others are abiding by the rules,
and that they weren’t covertly preparing for an attack. If intelligence agencies were to use all the new data to become more
sophisticated observers, countries might develop a better understanding of each other. Not in the hand-holding, peace-and-love
sense, but in knowing what is a genuine threat and what is bluster or posturing. Freed from fear of surprising new weapons, and
surprise attacks, countries could safely shrink their militaries. And with reduced armies, we should be able to expect reduced
warfare, continuing the historical trend in conflict reduction since the end of the Second World War.Of course, these considerations
pale when compared with the potential for mass surveillance to help prevent global catastrophic risks, and other huge disasters.
Pandemics, to name just one example, are among the deadliest dangers facing the human race. The Black Death killed a third of
Europe’s population in the 14th century and, in the early 20th century, the Spanish Flu killed off between 50 and 100 million people.
In addition, smallpox buried more people than the two world wars combined. There is no reason to think that great pandemics are a
thing of the past, and in fact there are reasons to think that another plague could be due soon. There is also the possibility that a
pandemic could arise from synthetic biology, the human manipulation of microbes to perform specific tasks. Experts are divided as
to the risks involved in this new technology, but they could be tremendous, especially if someone were to release, accidentally or
malevolently, infectious agents deliberately engineered for high transmissibility and deadliness.You can imagine how many lives
would have been saved had AIDS been sniffed out by epidemiologists more swiftlyMass surveillance could help greatly here, by
catching lethal pandemics in their earliest stages, or beforehand, if we were to see one being created artificially. It could also
expose lax safety standards or dangerous practices in legitimate organisations. Surveillance could allow for quicker quarantines,
and more effective treatment of pandemics. Medicines and doctors could be rushed to exactly the right places, and microquarantines could be instituted. More dramatic measures, such as airport closures, are hard to implement on a large scale, but
these quick-response tactics could be implemented narrowly and selectively. Most importantly, those infected could be rapidly
informed of their condition, allowing them to seek prompt treatment.With proper procedures and perfect surveillance, we could
avoid pandemics altogether. Infections would be quickly isolated and eliminated, and eradication campaigns would be shockingly
efficient. Tracking the movements and actions of those who fell ill would make it much easier to research the causes and pathology
of diseases. You can imagine how many lives would have been saved had AIDS been sniffed out by epidemiologists more
swiftly.Likewise, mass surveillance could prevent the terrorist use of nukes, dirty bombs, or other futuristic weapons. Instead of
blanket bans in dangerous research areas, we could allow research to proceed and use surveillance to catch bad actors and bad
practices. We might even see an increase in academic freedom.
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2NC/1NR Link Extensions: General
Domestic surveillance deters crime – Cleveland proves
Marie Avilez Catherine Ciriello Christophe Combemale Latif Elam Michelle Kung Emily LaRosa Cameron Low Madison
Nagle Rachel Ratzlaff Shriver Colin Shaffer December 10, 2014 CMU Ethics, History, and Public Policy Senior Capstone
Project
http://www.cmu.edu/hss/ehpp/documents/2014-City-Surveillance-Policy.pdf Security and Social Dimensions of City
Surveillance Policy
Analysis and Recommendations for Pittsburgh
There were many significant, interesting trends identified in the Satisfaction Survey. 56% of “business owners” were dissatisfied with the CPD according to the survey.
In response to this, CPD began working with City Council to implement a Wireless Video Surveillance Camera System to install a pilot system of five wireless relays
connected with nine cameras surrounding “critical infrastructure in downtown Cleveland.”85 The goal of this system is to support and develop effective preventative
and protective measures to deter crime. While this project began in 2008, it significantly expanded in 2011 to reach a total of 19 total cameras and five wireless relays
which are directed to the Office
of Emergency Management where the data is recorded and stored for up to 30 days. This office is not directly related to
a larger function of protecting Clevelanders and visitors from natural disasters or terror attacks, thus making it
part of the Department of Homeland Security. It is interesting that a major surveillance/public safety initiative like this is taken out of the hands of
CPD, but it makes sense that Homeland Security is controlling the feed. However, CPD Downtown Services Unit has the ability to also monitor the feeds. This ability
stems from a partnership between Homeland Security and the various law enforcement offices throughout the country, not only
Cleveland, to promote a safer country from terror. It would follow that Pittsburgh would have a relationship with Homeland Security should its efforts
with domestic surveillance come to fruition. A second interesting trend dealt with the methodology of asking questions regarding crime and the
CPD, but rather has
responses. The survey structured questions on crime as whether or not it was a CPD issue or a total community issue. Between 61-69% of respondents stated it was a
community issue, not one for which the CPD is solely responsible86. There is some ambiguity here because nothing is mentioned about what exactly the community
could/should do. The only mentioned societal tool to help police is called Crimestoppers, which is an anonymous tip line that offers cash rewards for
information about crimes. This is not exactly “camera” surveillance, but it is
a form of human surveillance that the city uses to help deter
crime. There is no information reported about the correlation between the amount of crime reported/taking place before or after the implementation of
Crimestoppers. To put this system in a different light, there could be a motive of investigating crime, but that did not come through in the reports compiled. When
dealing with neighborhood safety, 84% “totally agreed” that they feel safe in their own neighborhood during the day and 63% feel safe in their own neighborhood at
night. In both instances, the strongest dissenting group was the age group 18-24. When dealing with other neighborhoods, 73% “totally agreed” that they feel safe in
other neighborhoods during the day while only 40% stated they felt safe in other neighborhoods at night. The strongest dissenting groups were from a particular
district and from the number of respondents who were from the economic background earning less than $50k/year87. Again, there is incomplete information on the
respondents from this district, (same with the other districts) as well as those earning less than $50k/year. There may be some overlap in this group and there may be
non-statistically significant numbers associated with these groups meaning the pool of respondents that fit these particular groups could be underrepresented. While
Cleveland’s survey had its defects in terms of clarity, we argue that it lays a solid foundation for Pittsburgh to build on with the hope of
better understanding the relationship between city residents and law enforcement so that it can create sound
guidelines for surveillance technologies and practice.
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2NC/1NR Extensions: National Security Letters Link
National Security Letters serve a very important purpose in solving high profile cases,
banning them would destroy an important tool in fighting crime.
Heritage Foundation 2008 (Charles Stimson and Andrew Grossman. March 14. “National Security Letters: Three Important Facts.”
Accessed on the web: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/03/national-security-letters-three-important-facts)
Fact No. 2: NSLs help the FBI to "connect the dots" by using the least invasive and most effective means possible.
As noted in each of the two OIG reports, NSLs
have proven to be invaluable tools in counterterrorism and counterintelligence
investigations. According to the FBI, the principal uses of NSLs are to:Establish evidence to support FISA applications for electronic surveillance, physical
searches, or pen register/trap and trace orders;Assess communication or financial links between investigative subjects or others;Collect information
sufficient to fully develop national security investigations;Generate leads for other field divisions, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and other federal agencies or to
pass to foreign governments;Develop analytical products for distribution within the FBI;Develop information that is provided to law enforcement authorities for use
in criminal proceedings;Collect information sufficient to eliminate concerns about investigative subjects and thereby close national security investigations;
andCorroborate information derived from other investigative techniques.[12]Information
obtained from each type of NSL has allowed
investigators to crack cases, especially in the realms of counterterrorism and counterintelligence . A brief examination of the
success stories outlined in the OIG reports under each type of NSL proves the point. The following examples, excerpted from the OIG report, show how
counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations are supported through the lawful use of NSLs:[…]As these examples
illustrate, NSLs are an extremely effective method of obtaining basic data that are crucial to discovering, monitoring, and undermining
terrorist activities. They can also be used to exonerate and are frequently used in place of more invasive methods, such
as surveillance, searches, and seizures, that are authorized by law and often applicable.
Banning National Security Letters would be banning a harmless, yet vital, tool that the FBI uses in national security investigations.
Caproni and Siegel 12 (Valerie Caproni and Steven Siegel for American Bar Association. “National Security Letters: Building Blocks for Investigation or Intrusive
Tools?” Online http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/national_security_letters_building_blocks_for_investigations_or_intrusive_t/)
Second, putting aside the hyperbole about the inherent sensitivity of the information, to consider whether the NSL standard is too low, one must consider whether
the standard required in a national security investigation is in sync or out of sync with the standard that exists to get the exact same information in other contexts.
The fact is that information obtainable with an NSL is also obtainable with a grand jury subpoena in any criminal investigation and with an administrative subpoena in
narcotics investigations. Although such investigations are obviously important, their purpose is to investigate crimes that generally pose far less danger to public
safety and the national security than is posed by the targets of national security investigations. The standard for issuance of a grand jury or administrative subpoena is
that the information sought must be relevant to the crime being investigated. It would be exceedingly odd public policy to make it harder for
investigators who are investigating threats to the national security to get basic transactional data than it is for investigators who
are investigating routine federal crimes to get the exact same information.
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2NC/1NR Extensions: StingRay Link
Banning tools like StingRay only make it harder for to prevent crime
Volokh 02 (Eugene Volokh for The Responsive Community “The Benefits of Surveillance” Online http://www2.law.ucla.edu/volokh/camerascomm.htm)
But even if there is slippage, it’s important that the potential for abuse is limited and limitable. The danger isn’t the government
looking into homes, or tapping private telephone conversations. Rather, it’s that cameras in public places will be abused by officials who want to
harass or blackmail their political enemies.
There are such rotten apples in government. If you think that there are very many and that law enforcement is fundamentally corrupt, you should oppose
any extra tools for the police, because in your perspective the tools would more likely be used for ill than for good, but I don’t take so dim a view. I think that for all
its faults, law enforcement is filled mostly with decent people. And more importantly, good law enforcement is vitally necessary to the safety of
citizens of all classes and races.
Instead of denying potentially useful tools to the police, we should think about what control mechanisms we can set up
to make abuse less likely, and we should recognize that some surveillance tools can themselves decrease the risk of government
abuse rather than increase it.
Cellphone tracking is vital for catching criminal suspects; it was instrumental in catching the Boston bomber
Warren 13 (Laura Warren for WRDW News “Cellphone Tracking Used to Catch Boston Bomber, Local Criminals” Online
http://www.wrdw.com/home/headlines/Cell-phone-tracking-used-to-catch-Boston-bomber-local-criminals-204180651.html)
The whole world watched as police searched for the second suspect in the Boston bombings. A cellphone left behind in a hijacked car
helped lead them to Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's hiding spot.Ed Deveau, chief of police in Watertown, says, "We were able to ping that phone and find out it was in
Watertown, and it was heading in a certain neighborhood of Watertown."Police can have cellphone companies ping cellphones, allowing them to find out how close
to a certain cell tower the phone is. But, now, most phones come with built in GPS technology, making the signal much easier to track.Just last week, local
investigators used the same technology to track down a suspect in an Augusta murder.It all started with a shooting that happened at Biltmore Place in south Augusta
last Tuesday, killing a mother and injuring her two adult children.Scanner chatter revealed that the police were tracking the suspect, Steve Lawrence Allen, on his
cellphone.Scanner traffic: "Download text messages and look at it, that way you'll know whether it's him or not ... download text messages and look at it, that way
you'll know whether it's him or not ... Is he making calls or texting from it, or is it a possibility that he's turned it on?"The search ended 100 miles away in Toombs
County. But tracking your cellphone brings up privacy issues. On the one hand, it can be a great tool for catching criminals.Lonzo Clark agrees,
saying, "It's no big deal because you got nothing to hide. If you not hiding anything, it should all be all right ."Others, like Lauren Smith, say
it borders on an invasion of privacy."We need to be careful how we use technology, and there's appropriate ways, and there's problematic ways," Smith
said.Benjamin Hutton agrees, saying, "I understand the urgency and the desire to be safe, but I also think in 20 to 30 years, we might look back and say to ourselves,
that was kind of a bad idea."It's a sticky issue because just last August, the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled that law enforcement does not need a
warrant to track your cellphone, but Congress has been tossing around a bill that would overturn that.
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2NC/1NR Link Extensions - Drone Surveillance
Drones Used to Combat Crime
Chris Francescani, 3-4-2013, Journalist for Reuters, "Domestic drones are already reshaping U.S.crime-fighting,"
Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/04/us-usa-drones-lawenforcement-idUSBRE92208W20130304
"But the reality is you'll have a mission like that once or twice a year," he said. "The real utility of unmanned aerial
systems is not the sexy stuff. It's the crime scene and accident reconstruction." Miller's department in rural western
Colorado has the widest approval to fly drones of any local law enforcement agency in the U.S. Mesa has flown 40
missions in just over three years, "none of them surveillance," said Miller, who crafted the department's drone
program and spent a year devising training protocol for fellow deputies before receiving FAA approval. "We can now
bring the crime scene right into the jury box, and literally re-enact the crime for jurors," he said. Miller can program the
department's GPS-enabled, 3.5-pound DraganflyerX6 quad copter to fly two concentric circles, at two elevations,
capturing about 70 photos, for about $25 an hour.
Drone Are Effective Crime-Fighting Tools
Tina Moore, 5-20-2014, police reporter, "NYPD considering using drones to fight crime," NY Daily News,
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/nypd-drones-fight-crime-article-1.1799980
Big brother may be watching and listening more closely than ever — as
the NYPD considers using drones and other gizmos to fight crime
in the city. Police Commissioner Bill Bratton said the unmanned machines equipped with cameras and tiny microphones could
help spy on crime hotspots — like housing projects, where shootings are up about 32% this year. “Myself, I’m supportive of the concept
of drones, not only for police but for public safety in general,” Bratton said Tuesday. “It’s something that we actively keep looking at and stay aware of.” Bratton,
speaking in front of the City Council’s Public Safety Committee, said the drones could also help the FDNY more quickly determine the extent of a fire. John Miller, the
NYPD’s head of intelligence, said cops have been studying flying drones. They’re looking at “what’s on the market, what’s available.” Miller said the NYPD has
yet to deploy a drone, but called
the technology a potentially valuable weapon against crime. While drones don’t appear to be part
of the city’s immediate future, the NYPD has already budgeted $500,000 for a pilot program to test gunshot detectors. Sensors connected to
police cameras detect the sound of gunshots and then direct cops to their origin. The NYPD tested the detectors in Brownsville,
Brooklyn, in 2011 — but the program never expanded citywide. The expense for the new round of gadgets would have to first be approved by City
“They’re extraordinarily effective,” Bratton
said. “The mayor is supportive of it as are many members of the Council. ...The best systems are those that you can tie in with your camera systems.
You not only get recording of the gunshots but you get the camera activation right away. ” Miller said the gunshot detection
system could be tied in with cameras — which could include drones — to give cops a photograph of a shooter. “You could see an application
where a drone could be not only a very effective crimefighting tool but could actually show you where the bad guys
are going leaving the scene,” he said. Bratton sat on the board of ShotSpotter, a company that makes the detectors, before returning to his post
Council and Mayor de Blasio, who has been supportive of the idea of shot detectors in the past.
as the city’s top cop in January. He said the bidding process hasn’t begun.
Drones Offer Effective Methods to Reduce Crime
No Author, 3-26-2014, "Domestic Drones To Enhance U.S. Patrol Procedures," No Publication,
http://inpublicsafety.com/2014/03/domestic-drones-to-enhance-u-s-patrol-procedures/
These drones allow the Tijuana police to patrol areas without announcing their presence. They also give police a
tactical advantage because drone operators can provide timely and accurate reports to responding patrol officers.
Tijuana Chief of Police Alejandro Lares wants to use the patrol drones to prevent crime in his city. Chief Lares has
stated that he is not hiding the drones from the public and wants anyone who lives or visits the city to know that they
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will be safe because the police are watching day and night with the drones. The drone cameras are capable of nightvision operations so Chief Lares is promising 24/7 drone police patrol coverage when his fleet of drones are fully
operational. At this point, they are still experimenting and working out policies and tactics for how best to use the drone
platforms for observation and crime prevention. The Tijuana 3D Robotics drones can be programmed to fly a specific
pattern or manually flown by a trained operator. Chief Lares stated that one drone is equivalent to 20 police officers
patrolling. As the Tijuana experiment continues, early signs indicate that Chief Lares is correct in the fact that his agency
is experiencing quicker response times to crimes because of the drone’s capability of offering real-time observation
and reporting.
Drones Provide an Advanced Method to Provide Crime
Michelle Fredrickson, 10-24-2014, Science Communications student at Washington State University, "Drones Add a
New Dimension to Crime Scene Investigations," Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pro-journo/dronesadd-a-new-dimensio_b_6033392.html
Anyone who's watched the U.S. TV show "CSI" has probably seen officers carefully measuring the distance between
every object in a room, and between every speck of evidence, in order to precisely reproduce the crime scene. Police
must ensure they have all the information they need before releasing a crime scene, because there's no going back to
it. But now, in some areas, drones are simplifying the process, taking 15 minutes to do what takes hours by hand.In
Mesa County, Colorado, the sheriff's department takes a unique approach. A drone shoots 90 photos in a grid, with a
programmable amount of overlap in the images, in order to have enough information from enough angles to re-create
the scene in 3-D. This conglomeration of photos is called Orthographic Mosaic Imaging, or orthomosaics, said Ben Miller,
Mesa County's unmanned aircraft program director at the Sheriff's Office. While taking photos manually to aid in crime
scene reconstruction is not a new concept, drones can do many things helicopters can't, and at a fraction of the cost,
Miller said."One, you can't get that close to the ground because you'll destroy the crime scene with a helicopter. And
two, you can't take 90 photos with a big aircraft--it's just not practical," he said.
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2NC/1NR Uniqueness Extensions – Crime Low Now
Crime rate at its lowest – multiple warrants solve
Feeney 14 (Nolan Feeney, 11-10-2014, "Violent Crime Drops to Lowest Level Since 1978," TIME,
http://time.com/3577026/crime-rates-drop-1970s/) LO
There were 1.16 million violent crimes in 2013 Violent crime in the U.S. fell 4.4 percent last year to the lowest level in decades, the FBI
announced Monday. In 2013, there were 1.16 million violent crimes, the lowest amount since the 1978’s 1.09 million violent crimes, Reuters reports. All types of
violent crimes experienced decline last year, with rape dropping 6.3 percent, murder and non-negligent manslaughter
dropping 4.4 percent and robbery dropping 2.8 percent. The rate of violent crime is 367.9 crimes for every 100,000
people, which marked a 5.1 percent decline since 2012. The rate has fallen each year since at least 1994. Possible
reasons for the decline include the country’s high incarceration rate, an aging population and an increased use of
security cameras and cell phone videos capturing incidents.
Crime rates dropping significantly
Chettiar 2/11 (Inimai M. Chettiar Is The Director Of The Justice Program At New York University Law School’S
Brennan Center., 02-11-15, "Locking More People Up is Counterproductive," Atlantic,
http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/the-many-causes-of-americas-decline-in-crime/385364/) LO
The Crime Decline The drop in crime stands as one of the more fascinating and remarkable social phenomena of our time.
For decades, crime soared. Cities were viewed as unlivable. Politicians competed to run the most lurid campaign ads and sponsor the most
punitive laws. Racially tinged “wedge issues” marked American politics from Richard Nixon’s “law and order” campaign of 1968 to the “Willie Horton” ads
credited with helping George H.W. Bush win the 1988 election. But over the past 25 years, the tide of crime and violence seemed to simply
recede. Crime is about half of what it was at its peak in 1991. Violent crime plummeted 51 percent. Property crime fell
43 percent. Homicides are down 54 percent. In 1985, there were 1,384 murders in New York City. Last year there were
333. The country is an undeniably safer place. Growing urban populations are one positive consequence. During that same period, we saw the birth of mass
incarceration in the United States. Since 1990, incarceration nearly doubled, adding 1.1 million people behind bars. Today, our nation has 5 percent of the world’s population and 25 percent
of the world’s prison population. The United States is the world’s most prodigious incarcerator.
Crime rates continuing to fall
Chokshi 14 (Niraj Chokshi, 12-29-2014, "In major cities, murder rates drop precipitously," Washington Post,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/01/02/in-major-cities-murder-rates-drop-precipitously/) LO
In 1990, at the height of a decade-long crime wave that swept the nation, 2,245 people were murdered in New York City. In 2014, police investigated just 328 homicides in the five
boroughs — a precipitous drop of 85 percent that’s being duplicated in major cities across the country. Preliminary figures suggest 2014
will continue a decade-long trend of falling crime rates, especially in major cities once plagued by violent crime.
Criminologists say the decrease is linked to several factors, some of which are the product of smart policing, others
completely out of authorities’ control. But they also say the lack of a consensus on what’s gone right has them convinced that crime rates could spike once again. “I
don’t think anyone has a perfect handle on why violence has declined,” said Harold Pollack, the co-director of the University of Chicago Crime Lab. “So everyone is a bit nervous that things
could turn around.” But the numbers are encouraging: Chicago recorded an all-time high of 504 killings in 2012, but just two years later homicides were down to 392, and the overall crime
rate has declined to its lowest rate since 1972. Charlotte, N.C., recorded 42 killings last year, the lowest number since Mecklenburg County began keeping records in 1977. Philadelphia’s
murder rate has declined from 322 in 2012 to 245 this year. Just 19 slayings were recorded in San Jose, the nation’s 11th-largest city, down from 24 the year before. Even crime-plagued
Detroit, which has one of the highest murder rates in the country, is improving: The 304 homicides recorded this year are down from 333 in 2013, the lowest rate since 2010 and the secondlowest number since 1967. In the first half of the year, Phoenix police investigated just 43 homicides, down from 52 in the first half of 2013; final statistics for the Phoenix area haven’t been
released yet. Kansas City, Mo., was on pace to reach its lowest rate since 1967, too. Mid-year statistics in Dallas showed the city on pace to record just half the murders of its peak in 2004.
Camden, N.J., has seen the number drop by more than 50 percent since 2012. Murders in Columbus, Ohio, hit a six-year low. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
Bureau of Justice Statistics both collect crime data at the end of each year and issue reports throughout the year. Final statistics for 2014 won’t be available for several months. But the trend
lines are clear: The number of violent crimes has declined since 2006, according to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program. The number of violent crimes committed per 100,000 people
has been dropping even longer, from a high of 758 in 1991 to 367.9 in 2013. The rate hasn’t topped 500 per 100,000 people since 2001. James Alan Fox, a crime statistics expert and
professor of criminology, law and public policy at Northeastern University, pointed to four major factors contributing to the falling crime rate across the country: — Long prison sentences,
which have lengthened on average since sentencing reform initiatives in many states in the 1990s, have kept more criminals behind bars, albeit at a significant cost to state budgets. —
Improved community policing strategies are sending cops to places where crime is more likely to occur, as a prevention method. Technologies
like video surveillance
and acoustic sensors, which can hear gunshots before residents report a crime, are improving police response, too. —
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2NC/1NR Impacts Turns Case - Surveillance
Fear of crime spurs local surveillance in other areas – turns case
Ali Winston 9-11-2013 The East Bay Express
http://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/we-are-being-watched/Content?oid=3706988 We Are Being Watched Our
fear of another 9/11 resulted in the erosion of our privacy rights. And now our fear of crime is pushing the surveillance
state to a whole new level
OAKLAND, Calif. (September 11, 2013) -- It's been a dozen years since three jetliners hurtled into the World Trade Center in Lower Manhattan and the Pentagon,
leaving 2,996 people dead, injuring 6,000, and setting the stage for more than a decade of American war and occupation in Central Asia and the Middle East. The
events on September
11 also resulted in the fundamental alteration of American society: Our international borders are
now lined with additional fences, security cameras, and thousands of new Border Patrol agents as drones sweep the
skies above. And the National Security Agency -- first under President George W. Bush and now under President Barack Obama -- routinely collects our phone
records and emails and monitors our Internet activity. Our government, in short, has increasingly infringed on our privacy rights and our civil liberties as part of the
so-called War on Terror. And our nation, scarred by the fear of more terrorist attacks, has allowed it to happen. From Congress' easy passage of the Patriot Act to the
mandatory use of biometrics to identify welfare recipients to the storing of arrestees' DNA in dozens of states -- including California -- regardless of whether they
were convicted of a crime or not, these changes have penetrated every aspect of our relationship with government. And now many local
public agencies -backed by generous funding from the US Department of Homeland Security, an agency established to fight terrorism -- are taking government
surveillance to a new level: They're installing high-resolution surveillance cameras on street corners, buying license plate readers to monitor people's
movements, and building large "intelligence centers" to collect and analyze data. And they're doing it not to protect residents from the new threats posed
by terrorists in the 21st century, but to combat an age-old societal fear: crime. "Since 9/11, we've seen a huge shift with justifications and
implementations," said Linda Lye, a staff attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California. Lye has emerged as one of the sharpest critics of law
enforcement surveillance programs, speaking out against both the Alameda County Sheriff's proposed purchase of drones earlier this year and Oakland's sweeping
new surveillance center. "On one hand, we've got the need to fight terrorism, but what we see on the ground is purportedly anti-terrorist strategies being deployed
in fairly mundane ways that alter the relationship between the community and the government." For example, there are now dozens of so-called "fusion
centers" -- intelligence centers initially set up by Department of Homeland Security for counter-terrorism purposes that are now migrating toward an
"all-crimes" focus -- across the country, including in San Francisco, where the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) is located. Law
enforcement agencies around the region feed information to NCRIC through a system called Suspicious Activity Reporting, and each department has at least one
"terrorist liaison officer" tasked with delivering potentially actionable information to the fusion center. There
is also a strong connection between
the expansion of the government's surveillance apparatus and the War on Drugs: NCRIC shares personnel and office space with the
Northern California High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, a federal counter-narcotics effort that brings federal resources -- including aspects of the US military -- to
bear on drug trafficking and drug-related crime. The East Bay, long known for its progressive values, is not exempt from this trend. Years of spiraling crime in Oakland
have provided the impetus for a rapid expansion of the surveillance and intelligence-gathering capabilities of area law enforcement. This summer's furor in Oakland
over the construction of the Domain Awareness Center -- a federally funded, citywide surveillance hub originally intended as an anti-terrorism tool for the Port of
Oakland -- is only the most overt manifestation of this trend. Cities as divergent as Piedmont, Richmond, and San Leandro have turned to surveillance systems that
were designed originally to fight terrorism in order to deal with the threat -- real or perceived -- of violent crime. At the same time, the
rush by local
governments to add new ways to keep tabs on citizens is being accompanied by virtually no oversight -- and no laws
designed to prevent abuses. The plethora of new surveillance programs is also raising questions about whether our local
governments may soon have the ability to monitor our daily movements, using street cameras and license plate readers to track us from
the time we leave our homes in the morning to when we return home at night -- and whether such continual surveillance violates our constitutional rights. In
addition, at least one high-ranking staffer in the City of Oakland has expressed the desire to use electronic surveillance to monitor political activity. In other words,
the privacy rights and civil liberties we've given up since 9/11 to fight the War on Terror are being further eroded in the Fight Against Crime.
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2NC/1NR Impacts Turns Case – Racism
Crime creates fear and discrimination against minorities and women
Theo Lorenc (et al), 2014, London School of Hygiene
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK262852/ Crime, fear of crime and mental health: synthesis of theory and systematic reviews of interventions and
qualitative evidence. Public Health Research, No. 2.2 (Chapt 3) Theo Lorenc (et al),1,* Mark Petticrew,1 Margaret Whitehead,2 David Neary,2 Stephen Clayton,2 Kath
Wright,3 Hilary Thomson,4 Steven Cummins,5 Amanda Sowden,3 and Adrian Renton6. March 2014 1 Department of Social and Environmental Health Research,
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK 2 Department of Public Health and Policy, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK 3 Centre for Reviews
and Dissemination, University of York, York, UK 4 MRC Social and Public Health Sciences Unit (SPHSU), University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK 5 School of Geography,
Queen Mary University of London, London, UK 6 Institute for Health and Human Development, University of East London, London, UK * Corresponding author
Third, as suggested earlier, the
impacts of fear of crime are highly unequally distributed, and these inequalities tend to closely
shadow the existing power relationships within society. The experience of fear of crime as a pervasive factor in one’s day-to-day existence is one
that disproportionately affects women, ethnic minorities and people living in material disadvantage. For many people, fear of
crime may refer as much to the latent violence that is implicit in discriminatory social structures as to the manifest violence that is
measured by crime statistics; the inescapability of such fear, and its symbolic resonance with the marginalisation and devaluation of oppressed groups, may amplify
its effect on mental health and well-being. Some scholars
individual victimisation and structural inequality.74,75
have utilised the concept of ‘spirit injury’ to encapsulate this link between
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2NC/1NR Impacts – Economy
Crime increases have a strongly negative effect on growth
Eleftherios Goulas & Athina Zervoyianni April 2012 University of Patras (Greece) Econ Department
http://www.rcfea.org/RePEc/pdf/wp51_12.pdfWP 12-51 The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA), Italy
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND CRIME: DOES UNCERTAINTY MATTER?
Although there is a growing body of literature on the link between crime and macroeconomic performance, there is no crosscountry evidence on the impact on economic growth of the crimeuncertainty interaction. Yet, if the growth-uncertainty relationship is negative, as many empirical
studies suggest7 , and the uncertainty-crime relationship is positive, then the
crime-uncertainty interaction should exert a strong negative
impact on economic growth. Our results support this view. We find evidence that increasing crime has no independent negative effect on
growth under favorable economic conditions and thus under circumstances of low macroeconomic uncertainty. Higher-than-average macroeconomic uncertainty,
however, enhances the adverse impact of crime on growth, making the effect of the crime-uncertainty interaction highly significant and negative. Accordingly,
crime appears to be particularly harmful to growth in bad times, that is, when worsening economic conditions make the
return to investment less secure. This result has important policy implications. Since the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, the degree of uncertainty
surrounding macroeconomic performance in many countries has increased. At the same time, the opportunity cost of engaging in certain types of crime activity,
including property crime and drug trafficking, has fallen for a number of individuals who have experienced a reduction in income as a result of the global financial
crisis of 2007-2009 and of the recent European debt crisis. So, increased total crime is a possibility. Accordingly, the
combined effect of higher-than average
macroeconomic uncertainty and possibly higher-than-average crime may well be a further reduction in growth rates in the coming years.
Increased crime takes down our economic recovery
Eleftherios Goulas & Athina Zervoyianni April 2012 University of Patras (Greece) Econ Department
http://www.rcfea.org/RePEc/pdf/wp51_12.pdfWP 12-51 The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA), Italy
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND CRIME: DOES UNCERTAINTY MATTER?
This paper seeks to add to the existing crime literature by exploring to what extent the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty influences the way that changes in crime impact on growth. For
this purpose, we examine how the interaction between accelerations of crime and macroeconomic uncertainty affect per-capita income growth, after controlling for other explanatory
variables typically included in growth regressions. We use annual data
from 25 countries for the period 1991- 2007 and two alternative measures of uncertainty, based on the
that the effect on growth of
increased crime is asymmetric: as uncertainty regarding the future prospects of the economy increases, increasing levels of
crime become more harmful to growth. In particular, we find that accelerations of crime exert a strong adverse influence on
growth when interacted with high levels of macroeconomic uncertainty but have no statistically significant impact on growth when interacted with low macroeconomic uncertainty. This
indicates that crime mainly contributes to reducing economic growth in bad times, that is, when worsening economic conditions, and thus
higher-than-average uncertainty regarding the future state of the economy and poor business climate, make the return on private investment less secure. By contrast,
conditional variance of industrial production and the unconditional variance of a survey-based consumer sentiment indicator. We find
in good times, when the perceived degree of macroeconomic uncertainty is low, crime accelerations exert no independent adverse influence on growth. This result has important policy
implications. It suggests that viewing crime as an important impediment to growth can be misleading if information regarding the future prospects of the economy is not explicitly taken into
account.
Enhanced crime results in poverty because businesses cannot strive
POVERTY AND CRIME: BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE Poverties.org
Published Apr 2011 - Updated Apr 2013 http://www.poverties.org/poverty-and-crime.html (ac: 7-6-15)
Poverty and crime have a very "intimate" relationship that has been described by experts from all fields, from sociologists to economists. The UN and the World Bank
both rank crime high on the list of obstacles to a country’s development. This means that governments trying to deal with poverty often also have to face the issue of
crime as they try to develop their country's economy and society. Crime prevents
businesses from thriving by generating instability and
uncertainty (at micro and macroeconomic levels). This is true in markets of all sizes, national, regional, municipal and
even neighborhood-al (okay the word doesn’t exist). That's why having a business in a ghetto is rarely a good idea. The vicious cycle of poverty and crime
International organisations also blame crime – including corruption – for putting at risk Africa's chances of development
nowadays. The same goes for Latin America. Crime has this capacity to generate vicious cycles causing unemployment,
economic downturns and instability. Poverty and crime combined together leave people with two choices: either take
part in criminal activities or try to find legal but quite limited sources of income - when there are any available at all.
Unemployment, poverty and crime Starting from the 1970s, studies in the US pointed more and more at the link between unemployment, poverty and crime. After
that other connections with income level, time spent at school, quality of neighborhood and education were revealed as well. Fresh research from the UK even
indicates that economic cycles may affect variations in property and violent crimes. But most importantly, what reveals the unmistakable connection between
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poverty and crime is that they’re both geographically concentrated - in a strikingly consistent way. In other words, where you
find poverty is also
where you find crime. Of course this doesn't include "softer" crimes such as corruption which causes massive damage to people's lives but in a more indirect
type of violence.
Violent crime is costly
Robert J. Shapiro is the chairman of Sonecon, LLC, a senior fellow of the Georgetown University McDonough School of Business, an advisor to the International
Monetary Fund, director of the NDN Globalization Initiative, and chairman of the U.S. Climate Task Force. Kevin A. Hassett is director of economic policy studies
and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. The Economic Benefits of Reducing Violent Crime A Case Study of 8 American Cities June 19, 2012
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/report/2012/06/19/11755/the-economic-benefits-of-reducing-violent-crime/ (ac: 7-6-15)
Violent crimes are costly. Murders, rapes, assaults, and robberies impose concrete economic costs on the victims who
survive as well as the families of those who lose their lives, in the loss of earnings and their physical and emotional
tolls. Violent crimes also impose large costs on communities through lower property values, higher insurance
premiums, and reduced investment in high-crime areas. In addition, violent crimes impose significant costs on taxpayers,
who bear the financial burden of maintaining the police personnel and operations, courts, jails, and prisons directed
toward these crimes and their perpetrators. Fortunately, the incidence of violent crimes in the United States has fallen sharply over the last 20
years. From 1960 to 400 1990 the rates of these crimes rose sharply as did their attendent costs. Over that period murder rates nearly doubled, rates of rape and
robbery increased fourfold, and the rate of assault quintupled. Since the early 1990s, however, rates of most violent crimes have been cut nearly in half. (see Figure 1)
Surveillance checks crime – the US proves this is essential for economic growth
Rohit Choudhry Mar 4 2015 Addl DG in the Punjab Police
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/good-policing-a-must-for-economic-growth/49254.html Good policing a
must for economic growth
This result has important policy implications for India. Besides boosting the investor confidence, the programmes that directly or indirectly
prevent crime can also generate substantial economic benefits by reducing crime-related costs incurred by victims (medical care costs, lost earnings,
and property loss/damage), communities, and the criminal justice system which includes state, and central government funds spent on police protection, legal and adjudication services, and
correction programmes. Further, there are the opportunity costs associated with the criminal's choice to engage in illegal rather than legal and productive activities and the indirect losses
suffered by the victims, including pain and suffering, decreased quality of life, and psychological distress. In
the US alone, more than 23 million criminal offences were committed
billion in economic losses to the victims and $179 billion in government expenditures on police
protection, judicial and legal activities, and corrections. However, the western world has been consistent in its efforts to raise the policing standards. In America, the fall in
crime rate began around 1991; in Britain it began around 1995; in France, property related crimes rose until 2001 but it has fallen by a third since. While the sociological
in 2007, resulting in approximately $15
changes like the young becoming increasingly sober and well behaved and repopulating the inner cities, economic and other factors like the end of the crack-cocaine epidemic in the 1990s
are widely credited with reducing crime. Better policing, which includes both crime prevention and detection measures, have also contributed significantly to this phenomenon. Combination
of community
policing and intensive targeting of crime "hotspots" with the help of "CompStat'", which is a data-driven model of policing, has
transformed the way streets are protected. Technology has improved the effectiveness of detective work too. The advent of mobile-phone call analysis and
surveillance, Internet data connectivity, online banking and surveillance cameras have all increased the chances of
tracking the digital foot prints and criminals getting caught and punished. The crime and economy correlation would suggest that adequate
allocation in budgets for improving the policing could only be considered as prudent and productive spending by the governments. In the
US, COPS programme had a strong federal support and the support of the US President, funds to the tune of $9 billion were provided by the federal
government to implement the community policing schemes all over the country. Rule of law and economic growth The rule of law indicator
measures the extent to which individuals and firms have confidence in and abide by the rules of society; in particular, it measures the functioning and independence of the
judiciary, including the police, the protection of property rights, the quality of contract enforcement, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Judicial and the police independence are strongly linked to growth as it promotes a stable investment environment. Also, according to one study, the difference between
developing economies that observe rule of law and economies that do not, is a more than 3 per cent growth in GDP. Realising the need for an
environment of rule of law as an essentiality for economic growth, the Chinese government also has implemented a comprehensive legal system to shift from a system of "rule by man" to
"rule by law". The Chinese government stresses on strong terms that police administration and operation must be guided by legislative provisions and has passed numerous laws and
regulations in relation to police administration and operation, ushering in a new era of police development in China. CRIMINAL
activity can drag the entire
economy by discouraging domestic and foreign direct investments, reducing the competitiveness of business organisations, and
reallocating resources. It creates uncertainty and inefficiency in the business environment. Thus, law and order is considered an
important function for the state to perform and is placed among minimal functions of the state in addressing market failure. In today's globalised world, the
increasing flows of economic investment and business traffic between the nations bring into focus the relationship between
investment confidence and security and crime, the latter being important in terms of both official crime rates and the fear of crime. Recently,
the Government of South Africa, in its green paper on policing acknowledged that high levels of violent crime in South Africa are having a significant negative impact on the country's
economy. Rise of violent crimes was costing the country dearly due to loss of productivity and foreign investment.
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2NC/1NR Impact – Poverty/Structural Violence
Crime causes poverty
Lippman, 91. (Theo, author of Spiro Agnew’s America and Editor at the Baltimore Sun. March 30, 1991.) DOA: 7/6/15. BALTIMORE SUN.
“Poverty Doesn’t cause crime. Crime Causes Poverty.” Retrieved from: http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-03-30/news/1991089022_1_cost-ofcrime-poverty-fight-crime // JW
POVERTY DOESN'T cause crime.
Crime causes poverty. Therefore, to fight poverty, fight crime. How does crime cause poverty?
Suppose your family lives just above the poverty line. A burglar breaks into your house and steals all your clothes. What it costs you to replace them drops you into poverty,
since you no longer have the minimum needed for food and shelter. Or suppose you're on your way home from work. A mugger takes your paycheck and beats you up so
badly that you have to miss another week's work. Losing two weeks' pay is impoverishing at many levels.
In 1988, according to the Department of Justice, "the total
estimated cost of crime to victims was $16.6 billion. This estimate includes losses from property theft or damage, cash losses, medical
expenses and other costs. The estimate was derived by summing crime victims' estimates of the amount of stolen
cash, the value of stolen property, medical expenses and the amount of pay lost from work because of
injuries, police-related activities, court-related activities, or time spent repairing or replacing property."
Poverty is the deadliest form of structural violence – it is equivalent to an ongoing nuclear war.
Gilligan, 96’ [James, Former Director of Mental Health for the Massachusetts Prison System, Violence, p.] // JW
In other words, every fifteen years, on the average, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed
in a nuclear that caused 232 million deaths; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from
poverty throughout
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Crime Disadvantage Affirmative Answers
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Non-unique: Crime High Now
2015 marks the rise of crime rates
Gold 6/5 (Ashley Gold, 6-5-2015, "Why has the murder rate in some US cities suddenly spiked?," BBC News,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32995911) LO
Murder and violent crime rates have risen in multiple US cities since the beginning of 2015, after falling for two
decades. Some have put this down to a so-called Ferguson effect, referring to the protests against perceived police
brutality, that sometimes became violent. Could that be true? What do the statistics say? There are no national figures on crime in the US available yet for 2015,
but some cities have released their own figures. In New York City, the murder rate has gone up by 20% in 2015 compared with the first few
months of 2014. Mayor Bill de Blasio called a special news conference at which he acknowledged the increase, but said it could be contained. He said he had faith in the New York
Police Department that they will "turn the tide". In other cities, there are similar increases reported. In Baltimore, murders are up 37% and in Los Angeles, violent crime is up by
27% (although murders are down 2%). In Houston, murders are up nearly 50% so far this year. What is the Ferguson effect? This is a term coined by St Louis Police Chief Sam Dotson,
whose police officers had been one of the forces dealing with the summer protests and riots in Ferguson, Missouri, following the fatal shooting of black teenager Michael Brown. He said in
November his police
officers had been drawing back from everyday enforcement due to fears they could be charged. As a
result, he said, the "criminal element is feeling empowered". The phrase was repeated recently by Heather MacDonald, a fellow at the US Manhattan
Institute, in a piece for the Wall Street Journal. The Ferguson effect, she said, was taking hold across the country "under the onslaught
of anti-cop rhetoric". Multiple police officers Ms MacDonald spoke to told her police morale is at an all-time low and
they are now worried about being charged, recorded and assaulted while trying to do their jobs and keep
communities safe. "Unless the demonisation of law enforcement ends, the liberating gains in urban safety will be
lost," she wrote. Baltimore's police boss, Anthony Batts, said the riots had another effect on crime. Scores of pharmacies had been looted and the surge in the supply of drugs has
"thrown off the balance" between gangs in the city, he said. "There's enough narcotics on the streets of Baltimore to keep it intoxicated for a year," he said.
Crime rates rising – specifically targeting black and the inner-city poor
Wood 6/6 (Chip Wood, 6-6-2015, "Why Crime Rates Are Soaring," The NewAmerican,
http://www.thenewamerican.com/reviews/opinion/item/21015-why-crime-rates-are-soaring) LO
It’s being called “the Ferguson effect.” It’s the explosion of violent crimes in major U.S. cities, thanks to the ways
police have been demoralized — and criminals have been emboldened — in the aftermath of police shootings of
supposedly innocent blacks. In Baltimore, there were 43 homicides in the month of May. This is the highest murder rate
there in more than 40 years, when the city’s population was almost 50 percent bigger than it is now. This brings the death toll for the year to 116 people,
the vast majority of them blacks. Heather Mac Donald, the Thomas W. Smith fellow at the Manhattan Institute, described the situation in a May 29 column, “The New
Nationwide Crime Wave.” Her piece carried the subtitle, “The
consequences of the ‘Ferguson effect’ are already appearing. The main
victims of growing violence will be inner-city poor.” Here’s how her article began: The nation’s two-decades-long crime decline
may be over. Gun violence in particular is spiraling upward in cities across America. In Baltimore, the most pressing question every
morning is how many people were shot the previous night. Gun violence is up more than 60% compared with this time last year , according
to Baltimore police, with 32 shootings over Memorial Day weekend. May has been the most violent month the city has seen in 15 years. But
Baltimore isn’t the only major city that has seen crime rates soar. Homicides in Atlanta were up 32 percent in the first five months of the year. In Chicago, which
already was contending for the title “Murder Capital of the Country” because of the high death rate there, homicides are up 17 percent so far this year. In New York,
homicides are up almost 13 percent. In St. Louis, robberies were up 43 percent during the first four months of this year. During the same period, homicides increased
by 25 percent. St. Louis Police Chief Sam Dotson said a major reason for the increase is that “the criminal element is feeling empowered.” Of course it is! What else
would you expect to happen when the media are only too eager to portray police as racist killers and when public officials, from city mayors to the president of the
United States, are all too willing to play into this false narrative? Remember the demonization of police that occurred after the shooting of Michael Brown in
Ferguson, Missouri? Although it was later proved that Brown attacked police officer Darren Wilson and wasn’t standing with his hands up, trying to surrender, the lie
that he was doing so led to the slogan “Hands up, don’t shoot” being used by demonstrators all over the country. The mainstream media were only too willing to
repeat every dishonest smear against the police. Publicity hound and racist agitator Al Sharpton got massive exposure for every scurrilous attack on the police that he
uttered. Who cared what the truth was? The
real tragedy here is that it is blacks who are the biggest victims of the soaring crime
rates. They’re being raped, robbed, shot and molested by black criminals in increasing numbers. Before this year,
violent crimes in America had been declining for the past two decades. Now, crime rates are soaring. As Mac Donald wrote: If
these decriminalization and deincarceration policies backfire, the people most harmed will be their supposed beneficiaries: blacks, since they
are disproportionately victimized by crime. Right! But will this be enough to get the Democrats who run virtually every big city in America to change
their policies or for the mainstream media to expose the lies that help fuel the mayhem? Not a chance. I’m afraid things will only get worse, especially
in our inner cities, before they get better — maybe a lot worse. Until next time, keep some powder dry.
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No Link - Surveillance doesn’t reduce crime
Studies show surveillance doesn’t stop crime
Ali Winston 9-11-2013 The East Bay Express
http://www.eastbayexpress.com/oakland/we-are-being-watched/Content?oid=3706988 We Are Being Watched Our
fear of another 9/11 resulted in the erosion of our privacy rights. And now our fear of crime is pushing the surveillance
state to a whole new level
The Domain Awareness Center -- Oakland's planned surveillance hub that is being designed to collect data from at least 150 city and port cameras, 40
license plate readers, gunshot detectors, alarm notifications, and intelligent video programs -- is the broadest surveillance project in the region and has
attracted the most criticism. Funded entirely through federal grant money and being built on a contract by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) -- a
defense contractor with a record of making shoddy products; producing cost overruns; and defrauding municipal, federal, and foreign governments -- the surveillance
center has also attracted heavy criticism for its lack of privacy or data retention policies, as well as for its plans to incorporate cameras from the Oakland Unified
School District, the Oakland Coliseum, and freeways. But
expanded electronic surveillance has also garnered widespread support from city
residents who are fed up with crime and are willing to trade their privacy rights and civil liberties for the chance of being safer -- much as Americans have
done throughout the past decade in the fight against terrorism. "People who probably in a 'normal' or less fearful crime-ridden situation would not think about
wanting more cameras, but in the reality of today, I'm getting people saying, 'Can't we get more cameras in these places?'" said Dan Kalb, who represents North
Oakland (one of the city's less crime-impacted neighborhoods) on the city council. "They want to be able to walk back from BART to their homes -- four blocks -without fearing having to do it. People are taking cabs from Rockridge BART home. It's a shame that it's gotten to that point." While much of the official rhetoric
about the surveillance center has revolved around Oakland's high crime rate, a
substantial body of research reveals that video surveillance
does not impact violent crime. In London, where there are 4.2 million surveillance cameras, police studies last decade concluded that the expansion
of the surveillance state had not resulted in decreased crime. Furthermore, video surveillance by law enforcement raises
concerns about racial profiling. In Lansing, Michigan, an independent study of surveillance cameras concluded that black residents were twice as likely to
be under continual surveillance than white residents.
No data support surveillance deterrence – it doesn’t reduce crime but trades off with more
effective approaches
Mark Schlosberg August 2007 The California ACLU Affiliates
https://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/police_practices/under_the_watchful_eye_the_proliferation_of_video_s
urveillance_systems_in_california.pdf Under the Watchful Eye The Proliferation of Video Surveillance Systems in
California (and Nicole A. Ozer, co author)
Even in the face of this evidence, law enforcement and government officials in California continue to claim that cameras deter crime. In San
Francisco, for example, the Director of the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice admitted, at a public hearing on the proposed expansion of the city’s video surveillance
program, that he was unaware of any studies demonstrating the effectiveness of cameras and that there had been no comprehensive study of San Francisco’s
system. Yet, he continued to assert that cameras would deter crime.81 Likewise, in Clovis, Police Captain Robert Keyes asserted that cameras contributed to a
reduction in crime, despite the fact that “there’s
nothing other than anecdotal evidence to support that.”82 The ACLU survey found that
no California jurisdiction with video surveillance cameras has conducted a comprehensive evaluation of their effectiveness. As comprehensive studies
strongly suggest cameras do not deter crime , the rationale of deterrence falls short of justifying either the cameras’ expense or their intrusion into
privacy. Another justification for video surveillance is that its purported ability to capture evidence of criminal activity could potentially increase the success of
criminal prosecutions. In London, the role of CCTV cameras in identifying the men involved in the 2005 terrorist attacks has been highly publicized. Cameras
undoubtedly capture some evidence of criminal activity, but in the limited studies available, evidence
suggests that the impact of video footage
on prosecutions may not be as significant as policy-makers expect. First, some evidence suggests that cameras make little difference in the number of
crimes actually solved. The Glasgow study cited above, for example, found that “the cameras appeared to have little effect on the clearance rates for crimes and
offenses generally. Comparing statistics before and after installation of the cameras, the clear-up rate increased slightly, from 62 to 64 percent. Once these figures
were adjusted for general trends, however, the research analysts concluded that the clear-up rate fell from 64 to 60 percent.”83 Second, while some crimes are
certainly captured on film, some law enforcement agencies appear to overestimate the degree to which the footage helps law enforcement
actually convict criminals. In Maryland, for example, Margaret Burns, a spokesperson for the state attorney’s office, told reporters for the Washington Times that the
office has not “found them to be a useful tool to prosecutors . . . they’re good for circumstantial evidence, but it definitely isn’t evidence we find useful to convict
somebody of a crime . . . We have not used any footage to resolve a violent-crime case.”84 According to a study by the Maryland state attorney’s office, of the nearly
2,000 arrests made on the basis of video camera footage, the vast majority concluded in an outright dismissal or a conviction for minor crimes. The office is now
questioning the large amount of taxpayer money spent on the program. “Do these prosecutorial results support millions of dollars in tax expenditures? There will
have to be a public debate about this,” Burns said.85 In Cincinnati, Ohio, police also found cameras to be ineffective. A University of Cincinnati study found that the
city’s program, which began in 1998, merely shifted crime beyond the view of the cameras. According to Captain Kimberly Frey, “We’ve never really gotten anything
useful from them . . . we’ve never had a successful prosecution . . . we’re trying to use . . . money for other things. Video surveillance costs more than the cameras
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alone: The dollars used to buy the system are not spent in a vacuum. Public
safety budgets are stretched very thin, especially in many urban areas,
so money dedicated to video surveillance often comes at the expense of potentially more effective measures, such as lighting,
community policing initiatives, and increased foot patrols. Compare the lack of evidence of video surveillance’s ability
to reduce crime with the remarkable results that improved lighting produces. A survey commissioned by the British Home Office
looked at 13 lighting studies in Great Britain and the United States and evaluated the cumulative impact. The study found a 20 percent average decrease in crime,
with reductions in every area of criminal activity including violent crime. In fact, in two areas “financial savings from reduced crimes greatly exceeded the financial
costs of the improved lighting.” The report concluded: Street lighting benefits the whole neighborhood rather than particular individuals or households. It is not a
physical barrier to crime, it has no adverse civil liberties implications, and it can increase public safety and effective use of neighborhood streets at night. In short,
improved lighting seems to have no negative effects and demonstrated benefits for law-abiding citizens.87 Intensive foot patrols
have shown similar results—reductions in crime, including violent crime, of 15 to 20 percent.88 These findings suggest that from a law enforcement and
public safety perspective alone, the dedication of scarce resources to video surveillance systems may not only be an inefficient and
ineffective use of funds, it may actually be counterproductive.
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Answers to: Crime Hurts Economy
No clear crime-economy relationship
John Roman 9-23-2013 Urban Institute, Justice Policy Center Sr Fellow
http://www.citylab.com/work/2013/09/puzzling-relationship-between-crime-and-economy/6982/The Puzzling
Relationship Between Crime and the Economy Criminologists say bad economies create more crime; economists say the
opposite. But recent data reveals neither explanation is right.
Looking at the relationship between GDP and crime back to the earliest reliable crime data from 1960 supports both positions,
suggesting there is no relationship between economic growth and crime. In the first part of the series, rising GDP is associated with
rapidly increasing crime. In the second part, it is associated with declining crime. In the middle, there is no relationship at all. Most macroeconomic data
show the same pattern. Consider consumer confidence data going back to the inception of the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment data in 1978.
Again, the consumer confidence data show no relationship between consumer sentiment and crime rates. That, however, is
because the relationship was strongly negative prior to 1992 (meaning more confident consumers=less crime). After 1992, the pattern reverses, and the better the
economy, the more crime there is. The bottom line: Crime is episodic and there is no singular effect of the economy on crime. In order to
understand and prevent crime, it is therefore necessary to understand what type of period we are in. It’s also necessary to understand what forces are at work
locally, rather than focus on the national picture. Next week, I will address that point.
The correlation between crime and the economy is not consistent.
JOHN ROMAN senior fellow in the Justice Policy Center at the Urban Institute, where he focuses on evaluations of innovative crime-control policies
and justice programsSep 24, 2013 The Puzzling Relationship Between Crime and the Economy http://www.citylab.com/work/2013/09/puzzling-relationshipbetween-crime-and-economy/6982/
But as the figures below show, the
relationship between crime and the economy is not as obvious as it seems, and focusing on that
at the relationship between GDP and crime back to the earliest reliable
crime data from 1960 supports both positions, suggesting there is no relationship between economic growth and
crime. In the first part of the series, rising GDP is associated with rapidly increasing crime. In the second part, it is associated with declining crime. In the middle,
relationship obscures more important predictors. Looking
there is no relationship at all. Most macroeconomic data show the same pattern. Consider consumer confidence data going back to the inception of the University of
Michigan Consumer Sentiment data in 1978. Again, the consumer confidence data show no relationship between consumer sentiment and crime rates. That,
however, is because the relationship was strongly negative prior to 1992 (meaning more confident consumers=less crime). After 1992, the pattern reverses, and the
better the economy, the more crime there is. The bottom line: Crime
is episodic and there is no singular effect of the economy on crime.
In order to understand and prevent crime, it is therefore necessary to understand what type of period we are in. It’s
also necessary to understand what forces are at work locally, rather than focus on the national picture. Next week, I will
address that point
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Terrorism Disadvantage
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1NC Terrorism DA
A. Uniqueness
Counter­terrorism is successful now because of Obama’s tough approach
Benen 15 (Steve Benen, American political writer and MSNBC contributor "The scope of Obama’s counter-terrorism
successes," MSNBC, www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/the-scope-obamas-counter-terrorism-successes, accessed
6-19-15]
Whenever the political world’s attention turns to matters of national security and terrorism, Republican criticisms of
President Obama feature familiar talking points. The president isn’t “aggressive” enough, they say. His approach must
be “tougher,” like the policies adopted by the Bush/Cheney administration. Obama’s counter­terrorism policies are so
ineffective, the right insists, that the White House won’t even use the specific words – “radical Islamic terrorism” – that
Republicans demand to hear. But the gap between GOP rhetoric and national-security reality continues to grow. We
learned yesterday, for example, that a U.S. airstrike killed Nasir al­Wuhaysh, al Qaeda’s No. 2 official – and the top guy
in al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. As Rachel noted on the show last night, his death is a “huge deal,” especially
given the terrorist plots al- Wuhaysh has helped oversee. NBC News had a helpful report yesterday on the frequency
with which U.S. strikes have successfully targeted al Qaeda’s top leaders. Since Navy SEALs killed [Osama bin Laden] in
2011, American drone strikes have taken out seven potential candidates to succeed him as the leader of what was once
the most­feared terror gang. The targeted attacks started within weeks of bin Laden’s death. Three al Qaeda higher­ups
were killed in June, August and September of 2011, followed by another three in late 2012 and early 2013.... Now, the
death of 38-year-old Wuhayshi – killed in a strike on Friday – is seen by American intelligence officials as a major blow
to al Qaeda, which is struggling with decimated ranks and ideological competition from the Islamic State. I’m reminded
of this piece in The Atlantic last fall, when Jeffrey Goldberg, hardly a liberal, wrote, “Obama has become the greatest
terrorist hunter in the history of the presidency.” It’s a detail Republicans simply don’t know what to do with, so they
ignore it and pretend the president is indifferent to matters of national security, all evidence to the contrary
notwithstanding. While GOP officials and candidates continue to insist that what really matters is word-choice, Obama’s
counter-terrorism strategy includes so many successes, they no longer generate much attention. Notice, for example,
just how little chatter al­Wuhaysh’s death garnered yesterday.
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1NC Terrorism DA
B. Link: the Perception of Strength in surveillance operations deters terrorism
Pittenger 2014 US Rep. Robert Pittenger, chair of Congressional Task Force on Terrorism, “Bipartisan bill on NSA data collection protects
both privacy and national security” - Washington Examiner, 6/9/14, http://washingtonexaminer.com/rep.-robert-pittenger-bipartisan-bill-on-nsadata-collection-protects-both-privacy-and-nationalsecurity/article/2549456?custom_click=rss&utm_campaign=Weekly+Standard+Story+Box&utm_source=weeklystandard.com&utm_medium=refer
ral
This February, I
took that question to a meeting of European Ambassadors at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. During the conference, I asked
What role does intelligence data collection
three questions: 1. What is the current worldwide terrorist threat? 2. What is America’s role in addressing and mitigating this threat? 3.
play in this process, given the multiple platforms for attack including physical assets, cyber,
chemical,
biological
,
nuclear and the electric
grid? Each ambassador acknowledged the threat was greater today than before 9/11, with al Qaeda and other extreme Islamist
terrorists stronger, more sophisticated, and having a dozen or more training camps throughout the Middle East and Africa. As to the role of the
United States, they felt our efforts were primary and essential for peace and security around the world. Regarding the
intelligence-gathering, their consensus was, “We want privacy, but we must have your intelligence .” As a European foreign minister stated
to me, “Without U.S. intelligence, we are blind.” We cannot yield to those loud but misguided voices who view the world as void of the deadly and
destructive intentions of unrelenting terrorists. The number of terrorism-related deaths worldwide doubled between 2012 and 2013, jumping from
10,000 to 20,000 in just one year. Now is not the time to stand down. Those who embrace an altruistic worldview should remember
that vigilance and strength have deterred our enemies in the past. That same commitment is required today to defeat those
who seek to destroy us and our way of life. We must make careful, prudent use of all available technology to counter their
sophisticated operations if we are to maintain our freedom and liberties.
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1NC Terrorism DA
C. Internal Link
Information we get from surveillance is vital to preventing terrorist plots, which are even more complex after 9/11. A ban would
weaken our defenses.
Hirsh 2013 [Michael Hirsh, chief correspondent, the National Journal, “The Next Bin Laden,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-next-bin-laden20131114, November 14 2013]
Ever since the death of Osama bin Laden, President Obama and his senior lieutenants have been telling war-weary Americans that the end of the nation’s longest
conflict is within sight. “Core al-Qaida is a shell of its former self,” Obama said in a speech in May. “This war, like all wars, must end.” That was the triumphal tone of
last year’s reelection campaign, too.The truth is much grimmer. Intelligence officials and terrorism experts today believe that the death of bin
Laden and the decimation of the Qaida “core” in Pakistan only set the stage for a rebirth of al-Qaida as a global threat. Its tactics have morphed
into something more insidious and increasingly dangerous as safe havens multiply in war-torn or failed states—at exactly the moment we are talking about
curtailing the National Security Agency’s monitoring capability. And the jihadist who many terrorism experts believe is al-Qaida’s new strategic mastermind, Abu
Musab al-Suri (a nom de guerre that means “the Syrian”), has a diametrically different approach that emphasizes quantity over quality. The red-haired, blue-eyed
former mechanical engineer was born in Aleppo in 1958 as Mustafa Setmariam Nasar; he has lived in France and Spain. Al-Suri is believed to have helped plan the
2004 train bombings in Madrid and the 2005 bombings in London—and has been called the “Clausewitz” of the new al-Qaida.Whereas bin Laden preached big
dramatic acts directed by him and senior Qaida leaders, al-Suri urges the creation of self-generating cells of lone terrorists or small groups in his 1,600-page Internet
manifesto. They are to keep up attacks, like multiplying fleas on a dog that finds itself endlessly distracted—and ultimately dysfunctional. (A classic Western book on
guerrilla warfare called The War of the Flea reportedly influenced al-Suri.) The attacks are to culminate, he hopes, in acts using weapons of mass destruction.Recent
terrorist attacks against U.S. targets, from the murderous 2009 spree of Army Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan at Fort Hood to the Boston Marathon bombings last year,
suggest that al-Suri’s philosophy dominates al-Qaida’s newly flattened hierarchy. The late Yemeni-American imam Anwar al-Awlaki, who preached this strategy and
induced Hasan’s attack, is said to have developed his ideas from al-Suri’s. Meanwhile, with new refuges in North Africa, Syria, and Yemen, jihadists have much more
territory from which to hatch plots unmolested.Yet the politics at home are changing as the threat abroad is growing. The revelations dribbled out by fugitive leaker
Edward Snowden have outraged members of Congress and world leaders, including those of close allies such as Germany and France. They say they are aghast at
American overreach. Writing in Der Spiegel, Snowden justified himself this way: “Instead of causing damage, the usefulness of the new public knowledge for society is
now clear, because reforms to politics, supervision, and laws are being suggested.” Thanks to him, Congress will almost certainly rein in the National Security Agency’s
data-trolling methods—though it’s not yet clear how much.But the agency’s opponents may not realize that the practice they most hope to
stop—its seemingly indiscriminate scouring of phone data and emails—is precisely what intelligence officials say they need to detect
the kinds of plots al-Suri favors. For the foreseeable future, al-Suri’s approach will mean more terrorist attacks against more targets —albeit
with a much lower level of organization and competence. “It’s harder to track. Future attacks against the homeland will be less sophisticated and less
lethal, but there’s just going to be more of them,” says Michael Hayden, the former NSA director who steered the agency after 9/11 toward deep dives
into Internet and telephonic data. Adds Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, “I think al-Qaida’s capabilities for a strike into the United States
are more dangerous and more numerous than before 9/11.” For better or worse, the only hope to track them all is an exceptionally deep,
organized, and free-ranging intelligence apparatus, experts say.Intelligence officials who are well briefed in the technical aspects of NSA surveillance
also note that global communications are vastly more complex than they were as recently as 9/11, not just in terms of speed and
bandwidth but also in the kinds of digital paths they can take . Messages can travel partly by air and partly by cable, for example, and the NSA
must keep up. “If you take the diffuse physical environment [of more failed-state havens] and you layer that with the diffuse communications environment, and
then you layer that with the diffuse ideological environment—more lone wolves, for example—that makes for a far more generally dangerous environment,” says a
knowledgeable U.S. government official who asked to remain anonymous.All of which means that despite very legitimate questions about whether the National
Security Agency is going beyond what the law and Constitution allow, Americans probably need the NSA now more than ever.
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1NC Terrorism DA
D. Counter-terrorism is vital- terrorists will go nuclear if we let our guard down.
New York Times 2012 (Kenneth Brill and Kenneth Luongo. March 15. “Nuclear Terrorism: A Clear Danger.” Accessed online:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/nuclear-terrorism-a-clear-danger.html?_r=0)
Terrorists exploit gaps in security. The current global regime for protecting the nuclear materials that terrorists desire for their ultimate weapon is far from
seamless. It is based largely on unaccountable, voluntary arrangements that are inconsistent across borders. Its weak links make it dangerous and
inadequate to prevent nuclear terrorism.Later this month in Seoul, the more than 50 world leaders who will gather for the second Nuclear Security
Summit need to seize the opportunity to start developing an accountable regime to prevent nuclear terrorism. There is a consensus among
international leaders that the threat of nuclear terrorism is real, not a Hollywood confection. President Obama, the leaders of 46
other nations, the heads of theInternational Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations, and numerous experts have called nuclear
terrorism one of the most serious threats to global security and stability. It is also preventable with more aggressive
action.At least four terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, have demonstrated interest in using a nuclear device. These groups operate in or near states
with histories of questionable nuclear security practices. Terrorists do not need to steal a nuclear weapon. It is quite possible to make an improvised
nuclear device from highly enriched uranium or plutonium being used for civilian purposes. And there is a black market in such material. There have
been 18 confirmed thefts or loss of weapons-usable nuclear material. In 2011, the Moldovan police broke up part of a smuggling ring attempting to sell
highly enriched uranium; one member is thought to remain at large with a kilogram of this material A terrorist nuclear explosion could kill
hundreds of thousands, create billions of dollars in damages and undermine the global economy . Former Secretary
General Kofi Annan of the United Nations said that an act of nuclear terrorism “would thrust tens of millions of people into
dire poverty” and create “a second death toll throughout the developing world. Surely after such an event, global leaders
would produce a strong global system to ensure nuclear security. There is no reason to wait for a catastrophe to build such a system.The conventional
wisdom is that domestic regulations, U.N. Security Council resolutions, G-8 initiatives, I.A.E.A. activities and other voluntary efforts will prevent nuclear
terrorism. But existing global arrangements for nuclear security lack uniformity and coherence.There are no globally agreed standards for effectively
securing nuclear material. There is no obligation to follow the voluntary standards that do exist and no institution, not even the I.A.E.A., with a mandate
to evaluate nuclear security performance.This patchwork approach provides the appearance of dealing with nuclear security; the reality is there are gaps
through which a determined terrorist group could drive one or more nuclear devices.Obama’s initiative in launching the nuclear security summit process
in Washington in 2010 helped focus high-level attention on nuclear security issues. Unfortunately, the actions produced by the 2010 Washington Summit
and that are planned for the upcoming Seoul Summit are voluntary actions that are useful, but not sufficient to create an effective global nuclear security
regime.The world cannot afford to wait for the patchwork of nuclear security arrangements to fail before they are strengthened. Instead, we need a
system based on a global framework convention on nuclear security that would fill the gaps in existing voluntary arrangements. This framework
convention would commit states to an effective standard of nuclear security practices, incorporate relevant existing international agreements, and give
the I.A.E.A. the mandate to support nuclear security by evaluating whether states are meeting their nuclear security obligations and providing assistance
to those states that need help in doing so.Nuclear terrorism is a real and present danger for all states, not just a few. Preventing
it is an achievable goal. The current focus on nuclear security through voluntary actions, however, is not commensurate with either the risk or
consequences of nuclear terrorism. This must be rectified. If the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit makes this a priority, there can be an effective global
nuclear security regime in place before this decade ends.
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2NC/1NR Extensions: National Security Letters Link
National Security Letters serve a very important purpose in countering terrorism and
upholding national security
Heritage Foundation 2008 (Charles Stimson and Andrew Grossman. March 14. “National Security Letters: Three Important Facts.”
Accessed on the web: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/03/national-security-letters-three-important-facts)
Fact No. 2: NSLs help the FBI to "connect the dots" by using the least invasive and most effective means possible.
As noted in each of the two OIG reports, NSLs
have proven to be invaluable tools in counterterrorism and
counterintelligence investigations. According to the FBI, the principal uses of NSLs are to:Establish evidence to
support FISA applications for electronic surveillance, physical searches, or pen register/trap and trace orders; Assess communication or
financial links between investigative subjects or others;Collect information sufficient to fully develop national security
investigations;Generate leads for other field divisions, Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and other federal agencies or to pass to foreign
governments;Develop analytical products for distribution within the FBI;Develop information that is provided to law enforcement authorities for use in
criminal proceedings;Collect information sufficient to eliminate concerns about investigative subjects and thereby close national security investigations;
andCorroborate information derived from other investigative techniques.[12]Information
obtained from each type of NSL
has allowed investigators to crack cases, especially in the realms of counterterrorism and
counterintelligence. A brief examination of the success stories outlined in the OIG reports under each type of NSL proves the point. The
following examples, excerpted from the OIG report, show how counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations
are supported through the lawful use of NSLs:[…]As these examples illustrate, NSLs are an extremely effective method
of obtaining basic data that are crucial to discovering, monitoring, and undermining terrorist activities.
They can also be used to exonerate and are frequently used in place of more invasive
methods, such as surveillance, searches, and seizures, that are authorized by law and often applicable.
National Security Letters are an irreplaceable tool in counterterrorism efforts and the FBI is committed to using them ethically.
F.B.I No date (Federal Bureau of Investigation. No date. “Response to DOJ Inspector General’s Report on FBI’s Use of National Security Letters.” Accessed online at
http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/response-to-doj-inspector-general2019s-report-on-fbi2019s-use-of-national-security-letters)
Washington, D.C. – In
the post-9/11 world, the National Security Letter (NSL) remains an indispensable
investigative tool. NSLs contribute significantly to the FBI’s ability to carry out its national security
responsibilities by directly supporting its counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and
intelligence missions. NSLs also allow the FBI to obtain information to eliminate concerns about individuals
and close down investigations with a high degree of confidence there is no terrorism or adverse intelligence-gathering threat. We
are pleased the Inspector General concurs with the FBI concerning the value of the NSL tool.“The Inspector General conducted a fair and objective
review of the FBI’s use of a proven and useful investigative tool,” said Director Robert S. Mueller, III, “and his finding of deficiencies in our processes is
unacceptable. We
strive to exercise our authorities consistent with the privacy protections and civil
liberties that we are sworn to uphold. Anything less will not be tolerated. While we’ve already taken some steps to address these
shortcomings, I am ordering additional corrective measures to be taken immediately,” Mueller said. Importantly, the OIG found no
deliberate or intentional misuse of authorities, whether NSL statutes or Attorney General Guidelines. Nevertheless, the OIG
review identified several areas of inadequate auditing and oversight of these vital investigative tools, as well as inappropriate processes, and these are
is implementing reforms to the process designed to correct those
deficiencies identified – with accountability. Those steps include strengthening internal controls,
changing policies and procedures to improve oversight of the NSL approval process, barring certain practices
findings of significant concern.As a result, Director Mueller
identified in the Inspector General’s report, and ordering an expedited inspection.The FBI will work together with DOJ’s National Security Division and
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Office to implement these reforms. Throughout this process, the FBI will continue to work closely with the OIG to gauge
progress and consider any additional reforms.
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National Security Letters are necessary to keep America safe
Heritage Foundation 2008 (Charles Stimson and Andrew Grossman. March 14. “National Security Letters: Three Important Facts.”
Accessed on the web: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/03/national-security-letters-three-important-facts)
In sum, there are extensive judicial, statutory, regulatory, and institutional protections in place to ensure that NSLs are not misused and do not violate
Americans' privacy rights. With the number of NSLs issued every year, it is inevitable that there will be some mistakes; but as the OIG report recognizes,
Congress authorized the FBI to use
NSLs in counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations. Both OIG reports related to the FBI's use of
NSLs unequivocally state that NSLs are an indispensable tool in national security investigations. Law enforcement officials,
working closely with the intelligence community, need the tools contained within those
authorized NSLs to keep Americans safe and to prevent future terrorist attacks.
the FBI has taken major steps to improve protections and reduce their number.Conclusion
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2NC/1NR Extensions: StingRay Link
Phone surveillance is necessary; arguments to the contrary ignore the very real threat of a terrorist
attack.
Walpin 13 (Gerald Walpin for The National Review “We Need NSA Surveillance” Online
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/355959/we-need-nsa-surveillance-gerald-walpin)
After repeatedly, and correctly, proclaiming that phone and e-mail surveillance by the NSA is both necessary and
constitutional, the president has succumbed to left and libertarian pressure: He has proposed installation in NSA of “a full-time
civil-liberties and privacy officer” and other mechanisms in “the transparency community.” A “transparency community” within an
“intelligence community” is an unworkable oxymoron. Any “civil-liberties and privacy” officer installed in NSA would, to show that
he is performing, have to impede intelligence activities — a burden we do not need in our already difficult war on terrorism. Our
Constitution’s authors and proponents warned against bowing to the sort of demagoguery that lies behind attacks on the NSA
program as an unconstitutional invasion of our rights. The Federalist Papers — the bible of the Constitution’s meaning — warn at the
outset (No. 1) of those who invoke supposed rights of the people to oppose the government’s efforts to defeat an enemy seeking to
destroy us: “A dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the people, than under the
forbidding appearance of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government.” Continuing, “Publius” (probably Alexander Hamilton)
explains why: “History will teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to the introduction of despotism than
the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by
paying an obsequious court to the people, commencing Demagogues and ending Tyrants.” This warning is repeated: The
Government’s “powers” for “the common defense . . . ought to exist without limitation: because it is
impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent
extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them” (No. 23). Again, our Founding
Fathers opposed “every project that is calculated to disarm the government of a single weapon, which
in any possible contingency might be usefully employed for the general defense and security ” (No. 36).
Abraham Lincoln reiterated that view when attacked for violating constitutional rights by suspending habeas corpus: “Would not the
official oath be broken, if the government should be overthrown, when it was believed that disregarding the single law would tend
to preserve it?” Our Founders’ and Lincoln’s teaching is even stronger when applied to the NSA: Its surveillance program violates no
constitutional provision. It examines only the addressee and sender on e-mails, and telephone numbers called and called from. The
Supreme Court has long held that such information is not privacy-protected by the Fourth Amendment.
As a former federal prosecutor, I often obtained such evidence, through law-enforcement tools known as pen registers and mail
covers. Consider this real-life event: Over weeks, twelve jewelry stores in different locations are robbed, apparently by one group of
unidentified robbers. Police obtain from telephone companies cell-phone records to locate any phone(s) used within 30 minutes’
distance of each robbery. Analyzing the data, they identify robbery suspects. No claim of “violation” of constitutional rights would
void the suspects’ conviction. No reason to treat better those attempting to destroy this country. That enemy exists, the evidence
for it consisting of 3,000 lives lost on 9/11, the Boston Marathon massacre, and even the unsuccessful terrorist attacks on our
airplanes and at Times Square. The NSA program is logical. Our intelligence people know phone numbers or area codes used by
terrorists in various world locations. Wouldn’t you want our intelligence services to know who in the United States called those
numbers and area codes and to examine the information to determine whether those calls were innocent or not? I certainly would.
If this program had been applied to identify the Boston bombers, that attack could have been prevented. Apparently recognizing
that their constitutional argument on the NSA program itself is meritless, many opponents insist on a slippery slope of
imagined horribles. They assert that, while using sender and recipient identities for security purposes is lawful, possessing the
content of the messages would enable that to be used too, unconstitutionally — despite NSA’s denial that it has been done, and
despite the absence of contrary evidence. That imagined horrible is akin to depriving all soldiers and police officers of their guns
because it is conceivable that some power-hungry president or governor could, in the future, employ armed soldiers or police to
seize autocratic power. Imagined horribles do not supersede the reality of terrorists seeking to destroy us.
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Without Stingray style surveillance devices, terrorists will be able to remain anonymous
Gamma Group 11 (manufacturer of a Stingray style device. “3G­GSM Tactical Interception and Target
Location”
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/810727-772-gamma-group-catalogue-3g-gsm-tactical.html)
Cellular networks have created a haven for criminals and terrorists. Over GSM & 3G networks, criminals
and terrorist can remain anonymous, able to continue illegal activities on a global scale without fear of
action because:
•
● No Local Registration is required - criminals are able to use pre-paid SIM cards or
foreign SIM cards without the need to supply any information •
● Post-Paid Subscription Fraud - criminals are easily able to reprogram phones with a
fake identity or use stolen phones and SIM cards. Although powerful Strategic/Countrywide
surveillance monitoring tools are at the disposal of Law Enforcement Agencies, the ability to
monitor specific criminals/targets critically requires having specific target identity data. In the
case of cellular networks the fundamental information is the IMSI (unique identifier or serial
number of the SIM) and the IMEI (unique identifier or serial number of the handset)
The IMSI
and IMEI is highly prized data, and to protect users it is not normally transmitted within cellular
networks. However, if the data is obtained, then Law Enforcement Agencies have all they need to
monitor Target(s). The challenge is how to overcome the protective security messages within
cellular networks protecting their subscribers and covertly elicit specific target user data.
Fortunately, to assist Law Enforcement Agencies we are able to offer solutions which can
overcome these challenges. Tactical off-air solutions are available which are able to emulate the
cellular network in order to: 1. Indentify & Locate GSM Target(s) Cell-phones Determine and
locate the identity of a Target(s) GSM cell-phone by pretending to be the real network and
tricking the phone to register accordingly. This process allows the unique identity of the phone
(IMEI) and the SIM card (IMSI) to be covertly captured, and designated a Target to be precisely
located. 2. Identify & Locate 3G Target(s) cell-phones Determine and locate the identity of a
Target(s) 3G cell-phone by pretending to be the real network and tricking the phone to register
accordingly. THis process allows the unique identity of the phone (IMEI) and the SIM card (IMSI)
to be covertly captured, and designated Targets to be precisely located. 3. Intercept the Voice
and SMS Communication of Designated Targets The communication of Target(s) under
surveillance can be captured without their knowledge, including: ● all Voice calls & SMS either made or received by Target(s) ● spoof the identity of Target(s) to falsely send SMS or Voice calls ● divert Calls/SMS so they are not received by the Target(s) the ability to edit all SMS
before they are received by the Target(s) 146
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Links—Drones
Drones are critical to combat bio- and chemical-terror
Koerner 2015 (Matthew R [Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2015]; DRONES AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: REDEFINING EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY; 64 Duke L.J. 1129; kdf)
Senator Dianne Feinstein, a staunch advocate of governmental surveillance n1 and Chairman of the 113th Congress's Senate Intelligence Committee, n2 recently
found herself, rather ironically, as the target of surveillance. n3 One day at her home, Senator Feinstein walked to the window to check on a protest that was taking
place outside. n4 Much to her surprise, a small drone n5 hovered on the other side of the window, only inches away, spying on her. n6 The drone immediately flew
away. n7 Senator Feinstein's experience is just one example of drones being used for surveillance within the United States. But her story and others like it n8 have
sparked significant controversy over the use of drones for domestic surveillance, which falls within a broader debate [*1131] on privacy and governmental
Advocates of robust federal surveillance policies champion governmental
surveillance as the only way to prevent terrorist and cyber attacks against the United States .
n10 President Barack Obama defended these surveillance programs as ""modest encroachments on
privacy'" that "strike the "right balance' between national security and civil liberties." n11 In comparison, privacy advocates envision these surveillance
surveillance programs. n9
programs leading to a dystopian, totalitarian government watching over its citizenry - undetected but omnipresent. n12 References to George Orwell's Nineteen
drones currently provide many practical
benefits and their projected applications seem limitless. n15 Based on their obvious advantage of being
unmanned, drones have the capability to conduct missions previously considered too risky,
dangerous, or impracticable. These applications are also provided at continuously decreasing costs and with
the latest technological sophistication, such as the capability to see through physical obstructions, to detect various
chemical and biological agents in the air, to recognize human faces and license plates, and to fly
Eighty-Four n13 abound. n14 [*1132] Apart from the surrounding privacy-concerns debate,
in strategic, coordinated formations. n16
The plan grounds drones – blocking preventive measures
McNeal 2014 (Gregory [prof at Pepperdine University]; Drones and Aerial surveillance:
Considerations for Legislators; Nov; www.brookings.edu/research/reports2/2014/11/dronesand-aerial-surveillance; kdf)
To counter the threat of surveillance, privacy advocates have focused solely on requiring warrants before
the use of drones by law enforcement. Such a mandate oftentimes will result in the grounding
of drone technology in circumstances where law enforcement use of drones would be
beneficial and largely non-controversial. For example, in light of the Boston Marathon bombing,
police may want to fly a drone above a marathon to ensure the safety of the public. Under
many bills, police would not be allowed to use a drone unless they had a warrant, premised upon
probable cause to believe a crime had been or was about to be committed. This requirement exceeds current Fourth Amendment protections with regard to the
reasonableness of observing activities in public places. What this means is that the police would need to put together a warrant application with sufficient facts to
That application would need to define with particularity the place
to be searched or the persons to be surveilled. All of this would be required to observe people gathered in a public place, merely
because the observation was taking place from a drone, rather than from an officer on a rooftop or in a helicopter . In a circumstance like a
marathon, this probable cause showing will be difficult for the police to satisfy . After all, if the police
knew who in the crowd was a potential bomber, they would arrest those individuals. Rather, a marathon is the type of
event where the police would want to use a drone to monitor for unknown attackers, and in
the unfortunate event of an attack, use the footage to identify the perpetrators. This is
precisely the type of circumstance where the use of drone could be helpful, but unfortunately
it has been outlawed in many states. To make matters worse, this type of drone surveillance
would pose little to no harms to privacy. A marathon is a highly public event, the event is televised, it takes place on streets where
prove to a judge that they had probable cause.
there are surveillance cameras and spectators are photographing the event. Moreover, in the states where drones have been banned (unless accompanied by a
This technology centric
approach has done little to protect privacy, but will certainly harm public safety, depriving law
enforcement of a tool that they could use to protect people.
warrant), the police have not been prohibited from using any other type of surveillance equipment --- just drones.
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2NC/1NR Uniqueness—Surveillance Solves
Terror Now
US preventing terrorist attacks now due to intelligence
McDONOUGH ‘15
DOUG McDONOUGH -managing editor at Plainview Herald. Internally quoting James Olson – who has 31 years as an
American spy – “U.S. winning the war on terror” – MyPlainview.com - February 28, 2015 http://www.myplainview.com/news/article_c1881ec4-bf9b-11e4-a9b1-b342ff9491d6.html
James Olson is blunt in his assessment. "Make no mistake, our country is at
war," he said Thursday while keynoting the annual Plainview Chamber of Commerce banquet. "It's a war on terror, and it will be long, bloody and deadly. But
America will win this war because our best young people today are stepping forward in droves." While
many of those are putting on uniforms and joining the ranks of the nation's combat forces on the front lines, still more are going in harm's way behind the scenes as
counterintelligence operatives. "We are on the front lines in the war on terror," Olson warns. "And we will be hit again, inside
our own borders. It will be a weapon of mass destruction, and no region or sector is immune from
this attack. The best way to combat this threat is through good intelligence."
After spending 31 years as an American spy,
The war on terror is on the brink — status quo surveillance solves, but removal
of any one part can cause collapse.
Hamilton 15 — Lee Hamilton, Professor of Practice and International Law at Indiana
University, Director of the Center on Congress at Indiana University, J.D. from DePauw
University, 2015 (“To Win the War on Terror, We Must Win the War of Ideas,” Huffington Post,
February 20th, accessible online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lee-h-hamilton/to-win-thewar-on-terror-_b_6722214.html, accessed on 6-20-15)
Clearly then, the unpredictable danger posed by terrorism has not subsided. The fact that
terrorism is becoming increasingly decentralized makes dealing with it even more difficult.
While ISIS has become the major terrorist group, it is one of many groups engaged in deadly
activities, including al-Qaeda.
The question now is: Can we roll ISIS back? To do so, we need a more comprehensive approach and a
unity of effort that fully engages the president, Congress, our military and intelligence
capabilities, and our allies around the world.
Without doubt, we have experienced considerable success in the fight against terror. Almost
weekly we hear of top terrorist leaders being removed by our drone and other anti-terrorism
strikes. Yet somehow the terrorists seem to recover quickly and keep coming. Our attacks,
while effective, haven't quite quelled the terrorists' momentum, which is reflected by the numbers of
members and new recruits. In 2001, by one estimate, we identified about 300 al-Qaeda members and affiliates worldwide. In 2015,
there are more than 30,000 al-Qaeda fighters in Syria alone.
We should not forget the successes we've had in the fight against terror. At the same time,
surveying the current landscape suggests that the U.S. and its allies need to up their games
considerably in dealing with ISIS and other terrorist groups.
Upping our game will require that we focus more intently on several critical components of
our counterterrorism policy. Among those components is intelligence. Because it can prevent
attacks, intelligence is everyone's favorite weapon in the fight against terrorism.
Simply put, even the smallest amount of information , combined with other bits of
information, can prevent a massive attack . However, gathering meaningful intelligence has
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become an increasingly formidable task, since, once again, we're not dealing with a single
state. We're faced with a diffuse threat and groups that continue to evolve, spread out and
decentralize. ISIS is expanding beyond Syria and Iraq to Libya, Egypt, Algeria and other
countries.
Widespread Surveillance Programs are Keeping Terror Plots in Check—Massive
Attacks Would Have Taken Place Without It
Boot ’13 Max Boot is a Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. In 2004, he
was named by the World Affairs Councils of America as one of "the 500 most influential people in the United States in
the field of foreign policy." In 2007, he won the Eric Breindel Award for Excellence in Opinion Journalism. From 1992
to 1994 he was an editor and writer at the Christian Science Monitor. Boot holds a bachelor's degree in history, with
high honors, from the University of California, Berkeley and a master's degree in history from Yale University. Boot
has served as an adviser to U.S. commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is the published author of Invisible Armies:
An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present. From the article: “Stay calm and let the NSA
carry on” - LA Times – June 9th - http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/09/opinion/la-oe-boot-nsa-surveillance20130609
After 9/11 there was a
expectation of more terror attacks on the U S So far that
hasn't happened
on the whole we have been a lot safer than
most security experts
expected. In light of
N S A monitoring telephone
calls
it is worthwhile to ask Why is that? It is certainly not due to any change of heart
among our enemies.
50 terror attacks on
the American homeland had been foiled since 2001.
,
widespread
many
ist
nited
tates.
. We haven't escaped entirely unscathed (see Boston Marathon, bombing of), but
, including me,
the current controversy over the
and emails,
ational
ecurity
gency's
of
:
Radical Islamists still want to kill American infidels. But the vast majority of the time, they fail. The Heritage Foundation estimated last year that
ist
Some, admittedly, failed through sheer incompetence on the part of the would-be terrorists. For instance, Faisal
Shahzad, a Pakistani American jihadist, planted a car bomb in Times Square in 2010 that started smoking before exploding, thereby alerting two New Yorkers who in turn called police, who were able to defuse it. But it would be naive to adduce all of our security
more attacks would have succeeded absent the ramped-up counter-terror
efforts undertaken by the U.S. intelligence community
a large element of the
success lies in use of
communications intercepts.
That is the
success to pure serendipity. Surely
ism
, the military and law enforcement. And
intelligence community's
its
special intelligence — that is,
The CIA is notoriously deficient in human intelligence — infiltrating
spies into terrorist organizations is hard to do, especially when we have so few spooks who speak Urdu, Arabic, Persian and other relevant languages. But the NSA is the best in the world at intercepting communications.
most important technical advantage we have in the battle against fanatical foes who will not
hesitate to sacrifice their lives to take ours Which brings us to the
monitoring
programs
Another program provides
access to all the emails, videos and other data found on the servers of major Internet firms
such as Google
these intelligence-gathering activities raise the specter of
ordinary American citizens
. In fact, there are considerable
safeguards built in programs to ensure that doesn't happen The phone-monitoring program
does not allow the NSA to listen in on conversations without a court order. All that it can do is
to collect information on the time, date and destination of phone calls.
.
current kerfuffle over two NSA
that have been exposed by the Guardian and the Washington Post. One program apparently collects metadata on all telephone calls made in the United States.
, Apple and Microsoft. At first blush
Big Brother snooping on
who might be cheating on their spouses or bad-mouthing the president
to both
.
It should go without saying that it would be pretty useful to know
if someone in the U.S. is calling a number in Pakistan or Yemen that is used by a terrorist organizer. As for the Internet-monitoring program, reportedly known as PRISM, it is apparently limited to "non-U.S. persons" who are abroad and thereby enjoy no
constitutional protections. These are hardly rogue operations. Both programs were initiated by President George W. Bush and continued by President Obama with the full knowledge and support of Congress and continuing oversight from the federal judiciary. That's
It's possible that government
But there is no evidence of abuse so far
that these programs have been effective in disrupting
why the leaders of both the House and Senate intelligence committees, Republicans and Democrats alike, have come to the defense of these activities.
programs could be abused
and plenty of evidence
terror plots.
, these
— in the lack of successful terrorist attacks —
ist
, like all
— see, for example, the IRS making life tough on tea partiers.
Granted there is something inherently creepy about Uncle Sam scooping up so much information about us. But Google, Facebook, Amazon, Twitter, Citibank and other companies know at least as much about us, because they use
very similar data-mining programs to track our online movements. They gather that information in order to sell us products, and no one seems to be overly alarmed. The NSA is gathering that information to keep us safe from terrorist attackers. Yet somehow its
actions have become a "scandal," to use a term now loosely being tossed around. The real scandal here is that the Guardian and Washington Post are compromising our national security by telling our enemies about our intelligence-gathering capabilities. Their news
stories reveal, for example, that only nine Internet companies share information with the NSA. This is a virtual invitation t o terrorists to use other Internet outlets for searches, email, apps and all the rest. No intelligence effort can ever keep us 100% safe, but
to
stop or scale back the NSA's special intelligence efforts would amount to unilateral
disarmament against terror
in a war
ism that is far from over.
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2NC/1NR Extension: Impact (Nuclear Terrorism)
Surveillance prevents war and terrorist attacks
Armstrong 13 (Stuart Armstrong for Aeon “The Strange Benefits of a Total Surveillance State” Online
http://aeon.co/magazine/society/the-strange-benefits-of-a-total-surveillance-state/)
The military is another arm of state power that is ripe for a surveillance-inspired shrinking. If cross-border surveillance becomes
ubiquitous and effective, we could see a reduction in the $1.7 trillion that the world spends on the military each year. Previous
attempts to reduce armaments have ultimately been stymied by a lack of reliable verification. Countries can never trust that their
enemies aren’t cheating, and that encourages them to cheat themselves. Arms races are also made worse by a
psychological phenomenon, whereby each side interprets the actions of the other as a dangerous provocation, while
interpreting its own as purely defensive or reactive. With cross-border mass surveillance, countries could check that others
are abiding by the rules, and that they weren’t covertly preparing for an attack. If intelligence agencies were to use all the new data
to become more sophisticated observers, countries might develop a better understanding of each other. Not in the hand-holding,
peace-and-love sense, but in knowing what is a genuine threat and what is bluster or posturing. Freed from fear of surprising new
weapons, and surprise attacks, countries could safely shrink their militaries. And with reduced armies, we
should be able to expect reduced warfare , continuing the historical trend in conflict reduction since the end of the
Second World War. […]Likewise, mass surveillance could prevent the terrorist use of nukes, dirty bombs, or
other futuristic weapons. Instead of blanket bans in dangerous research areas, we could allow research to proceed and use
surveillance to catch bad actors and bad practices. We might even see an increase in academic freedom.
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Impact—Turns the Aff (Racism)
Terror attack spikes racial hate crimes
Akram 2002
Et al - SUSAN MUSARRAT AKRAM, Professor and Supervising Attorney - Boston University International Human Rights
Clinical Program. “Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law after September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and
Muslims.” NYU Annual Survey of American Law 58 (2002), 295-355.
http://www.privacysos.org/sites/all/files/akram.pdf
Times of crisis are often accompanied by hostility toward minorities in the United States. For
Arabs and Muslims, this may be even more problematic, as perpetrators of hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims
frequently fail to differentiate among persons based on religion or ethnic origin, from
Pakistanis, Indians, Iranians, and Japanese to Muslims, Sikhs and Christian Arabs .89 The
widespread perception in the United States is that Arabs and Muslims are identical and eager to
wage a holy war against the United States.90 In fact, according to a 1993 report, only 12% of the Muslims in the United States at
that time were Arab,91 and Arab Mus-lims are even a minority in the Arab-American community.92 Although there are Muslim “extremists,” the
majority of Muslims are “decent, law-abiding, productive citizens.”93 Because
of the lack of differentiation between different
acts by small groups of Arabs and Muslims often have been followed by
generalized hostility toward entire communities of Arabs and Muslims in the United States. For
types of Arabs and Muslims, terrorist
example, after Lebanese Shi’a gunmen in 1985 highjacked TWA Flight 847 to Beirut, beat an American on the plane to death, and held the remaining
passengers hostage for over two weeks,94 violent attacks against persons of Arab and Muslim origin occurred across the United States.95 Islamic
centers and Arab-American organizations were vandalized and threatened. A Houston mosque was firebombed. A bomb exploded in the AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Committee office in Boston, severely injuring two policemen. 96 Later that same year, after terrorists hijacked the Achille
Lauro cruise liner and murdered a passenger, a wave of anti-Arab violence swept the country, including the bombing of an American- Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee office that killed its regional executive director.97
History proves terrorism leads to hate crimes and backlash
King, 2012
(Ryan D. King is an associate professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Albany
in the United States., “Terrorist Attacks and Hate Crimes: Lessons from 9/11”,
http://extremisproject.org/2012/12/terrorist-attacks-and-hate-crimes-lessons-from-911/,
December 10, 2012, ak.)
Yet there is also a story to be told about the aftermath, and among the lessons we learned from 9/11 is that a backlash in
the form of hate crime is likely to follow. The murder of Balbir Sodhi was one of many hate crimes
perpetrated against Muslims and Arabs, or those who appeared to be of that faith or
ethnicity, beginning on September 11th, 2001. According to hate crime statistics provided by the FBI, there
were over 1,000 hate crimes with an anti-Muslim or anti-Arab motive during the fourteen-day
period beginning on September 11th.* By comparison, fewer than 300 hate crimes with this motivation were reported to the FBI between
January 1st and September 10th of that year. If we focus only on anti-Islamic hate crimes (omitting anti-Arab), 60% of the hate crimes that year occurred during that two-week
post-9/11 hate crime wave was fueled largely by the emotion of anger and the desire for
retribution that pervaded the United States, a fact that should not surprise us. The 20th century is replete with examples of
mass violence against minority groups that were ignited by terrorist attacks or assassinations.
stretch. The
For instance, the Kristallnacht pogrom that took of the lives of many German Jews in November of 1938 followed the assassination of a German diplomat at the hands of a
psychologist Brian Lickel and his colleagues refer to this tendency as ‘vicarious retribution’ – a
proclivity to punish innocent third parties who in some way resemble the perpetrators of an
attack – and this sentiment is often found in the wake of terrorist acts. When my colleagues, Ilir Disha (University at
Jewish youth. The
Albany and lead author of the study) and James Cavendish (University of South Florida), and I wrote about post-9/11 hate crimes in the United States in the
journal Social Problems, we focused on the broader lessons to be learned from the 9/11 case. Our study looked at the pre and post-9/11 hate crimes in detail,
breaking down crimes by day and type to answer some fundamental questions. For instance, how long did the post-9/11 hate crime wave last? Were hate crimes
more likely to be perpetrated in New York and Washington than places not directly targeted by the terrorists? Were these crimes perpetrated by organized groups?
And what, if anything, might be done to stymie hate crime waves in the future? Our results suggest a few patterns. Hate crime waves following terrorist attacks are
intense but short in duration With respect to the first issue – the duration of the hate crime wave – our analysis shows that post 9/11 hate crimes took the form of a
peak more than a plateau (see Figure below). The crime wave began abruptly on September 11th and reached its highpoint within 48 hours, and the subsequent
decline was nearly as rapid. In short, we can expect hate crime waves following terrorist attacks by foreign groups to be immediate and intense, but ultimately
short in duration. There is some evidence that hate crime levels never fully returned to pre-9/11 averages, but clearly the initial wave quickly subsided. Attacks are
geographically dispersed and victimization risk is associated with target population size We also find that hate crimes increased across the country. That Balbir
Sodhi was murdered thousands of miles from the site of the attacks is not anomalous. Anti-Muslim hate crimes increased in Mesa as well as New York; in Chicago
as much as in Washington. Among the few demographic characteristics that help sort out where Arabs and Muslims were at higher risk are the size of these
respective populations. Intuitively, the raw number of hate crimes was more likely in counties with larger Arab and Muslim populations, largely because of
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opportunity; more targets equate to more crimes. Yet if we look at the rate of hate crimes per Arab or Muslim population, our analysis suggests that individual
Arabs and Muslims were at higher risk of victimization where they were small in number. Counties with large Arab populations, such as Wayne County in Michigan
(largest city is Detroit) experienced more hate crimes than other large counties, but when standardizing this number by the Arab population the rate was far smaller
than other counties. From the victim’s perspective we might say there is safety in numbers. Evidence suggests hate crimes were rarely the work of organized hate
groups Finally, there is no evidence that a sizeable proportion of hate crime was perpetrated by organized hate groups. According to the Southern Poverty Law
the number of anti-Muslim hate groups increased after the
attacks of 2001, yet the FBI data and media reports of hate crimes indicate that people like Frank Roque were the more common perpetrator – angry men with a
Center, an organization that tracks extremist groups,
grievance, but not actively involved with an extremist organization. Two additional points are pertinent to the aftermath of mass terrorism, particularly as it relates to hate
crime. First, is the post 9/11 hate crime wave unique? Or should we expect a similar backlash in other settings? In my assessment 9/11 is unique only in its magnitude. We saw a
smaller but hardly negligible increase in hate crimes against Muslims following the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995, for which responsibility was initially attributed to Islamic
fundamentalists (it was soon revealed that an American, Timothy McVeigh, was responsible, and the anti-Muslim attacks ceased). As the economist Steven Machin has found in
his research, attacks against Muslims also rose sharply following the bombing of the London Underground in July of 2005. A violent wave of anti-Islamic attacks also followed a
backlash seems predictable, particularly following lethal attacks
in which responsibility is attributed to a specific minority group. Finally, can anything be done to prevent hate crimes
deadly attack on a train in India in February of 2002. A
against innocent civilians if another terrorist attack occurs? My guess is there is little that local or federal governments could have done to prevent the murder of Mr. Sodhi.
However, if the goal is to minimize the intensity of attacks on innocent third parties following a terrorist act, two actions are worth trying. The first is simply disseminating
Arabs and Muslims (and Sikhs as well) should take extra precautions during the week following a terrorist attack in
clearly at a higher risk of victimization during the week or two
after an attack such as 9/11 or July 7. A second action calls on leaders to confront the issue early and publicly. About a week following the 9/11 attacks
information to at-risk populations.
which Islamist fundamentalists are suspects. They are
President Bush gave a speech stating that the true faith of Islam was not about terrorism, and that Muslim Americans should be treated with respect. Whether this speech truly
had an effect is beyond the scope of this blog (although hate crimes decreased after the speech), but setting the tone at the top is among the few weapons in the government’s
the lessons of 9/11 suggest that the potential for
reactionary crime and violence is high, and we should plan accordingly.
arsenal. Our first hope is that terrorism does not occur. But if it does,
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Impact—Turns the Aff (Civil Liberties)
Even an infinitesimal risk of our disad should outweigh the aff – all of their
harms assume “potential” surveillance and ignore that another domestic terror
attack would decimate the civil liberties that exist now
Friedman, 2013
(Thomas L. Friedman became The New York Times foreign affairs Op-Ed columnist in 1995. He
joined the paper in 1981, after which he served as the Beirut bureau chief in 1982, Jerusalem
bureau chief in 1984, and then in Washington as the diplomatic correspondent in 1989, and
later the White House correspondent and economic correspondent. Mr. Friedman was awarded
the 1983 Pulitzer Prize for international reporting (from Lebanon) and the 1988 Pulitzer Prize for
international reporting (from Israel). He also won the 2002 Pulitzer Prize for commentary. Mr.
Friedman is the author of “From Beirut to Jerusalem,” which won the National Book Award in
1989. He has written several other books, including “Hot, Flat and Crowded,” an international
best seller. Born in Minneapolis, Mr. Friedman received a B.A. degree in Mediterranean studies
from Brandeis University in 1975. In 1978 he received a master’s in modern Middle East studies
from Oxford, “Blowing a Whistle”, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/opinion/friedmanblowing-a-whistle.html, June 12, 2013, ak.)
I’m glad I live in a country with people who are vigilant in defending civil liberties. But as I listen to the debate about the disclosure of two government
programs designed to track suspected phone and e-mail contacts of terrorists, I do wonder
if some of those who unequivocally defend this
behaving as if 9/11 never happened — that the only thing we have to fear is
government intrusion in our lives, not the intrusion of those who gather in secret cells in Yemen,
Afghanistan and Pakistan and plot how to topple our tallest buildings or bring down U.S. airliners with
bombs planted inside underwear, tennis shoes or computer printers. Yes, I worry about potential
government abuse of privacy from a program designed to prevent another 9/11 — abuse that, so
far, does not appear to have happened. But I worry even more about another 9/11. That is, I worry
about something that’s already happened once — that was staggeringly costly — and that
terrorists aspire to repeat. I worry about that even more, not because I don’t care about civil liberties, but
because what I cherish most about America is our open society, and I believe that if there is
one more 9/11 — or worse, an attack involving nuclear material — it could lead to the end of
disclosure are
the open society as we know it . If there were another 9/11, I fear that 99 percent of Americans
would tell their members of Congress: “Do whatever you need to do to, privacy be damned, just
make sure this does not happen again .” That is what I fear most. That is why I’ll reluctantly, very reluctantly,
trade off the government using data mining to look for suspicious patterns in phone numbers
called and e-mail addresses — and then have to go to a judge to get a warrant to actually look
at the content under guidelines set by Congress — to prevent a day where, out of fear, we give government a license to look at anyone, any email, any phone call, anywhere, anytime. What we don't need is to give up our freedoms just to address levels
of paranoia that are, frankly, infantile. So I don’t believe that Edward Snowden, the leaker of all this secret material, is some heroic
whistle-blower. No, I believe Snowden is someone who needed a whistle-blower. He needed someone to challenge him with the argument that we
don’t live in a world any longer where our government can protect its citizens from real, not imagined, threats without using big data — where we still
have an edge — under constant judicial review. It’s
not ideal. But if one more 9/11-scale attack gets through, the
cost to civil liberties will be so much greater. A hat tip to Andrew Sullivan for linking on his blog to an essay by David Simon, the
creator of HBO’s “The Wire.” For me, it cuts right to the core of the issue. “ You would think that the government was
listening in to the secrets of 200 million Americans from the reaction and the hyperbole being tossed
about,” wrote Simon. “And you would think that rather than a legal court order, which is an inevitable
consequence of legislation that we drafted and passed, something illegal had been discovered to the
government’s shame. Nope. ... The only thing new here, from a legal standpoint, is the scale on which the F.B.I. and N.S.A. are
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apparently attempting to cull anti-terrorism leads from that data. ... I know it’s big and scary that the government wants a database of all phone calls.
And it’s scary that they’re paying attention to the Internet. And it’s scary that your cellphones have GPS installed. ... The
question is not
should the resulting data exist. It does. ... The question is more fundamental: Is government accessing the
data for the legitimate public safety needs of the society, or are they accessing it in ways that abuse individual liberties
and violate personal privacy — and in a manner that is unsupervised. And to that, The Guardian and those who are wailing
jeremiads about this pretend-discovery of U.S. big data collection are noticeably silent. We
don’t know of any actual abuse .” We do need to be constantly on guard for abuses. But the fact is, added Simon, that for at least
the last two presidencies “this kind of data collection has been a baseline logic of an American anti-terrorism
effort that is effectively asked to find the needles before they are planted into haystacks, to prevent even such modest, grass-rooted conspiracies as
the Boston Marathon bombing before they occur.” To be sure, secret programs, like the virtually unregulated drone attacks, can lead to real excesses
that have to be checked. But here is what is also real, Simon concluded: “ Those
planes really did hit those buildings. And
that bomb did indeed blow up at the finish line of the Boston Marathon. And we really are in a
continuing, low-intensity, high-risk conflict with a diffuse, committed and ideologically motivated
enemy. And, for a moment, just imagine how much bloviating would be wafting across our political
spectrum if, in the wake of an incident of domestic terrorism, an American president and his administration
had failed to take full advantage of the existing telephonic data to do what is possible to find those
needles in the haystacks.” And, I’d add, not just bloviating. Imagine how many real restrictions to our
beautiful open society we would tolerate if there were another attack on the scale of 9/11 .
Pardon me if I blow that whistle.
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Impacts—Nuclear Terrorism Causes War
Terrorist retaliation causes nuclear war – draws in Russia and China
Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic
Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack:
Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the
worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the
category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between
two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring
would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted
major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear
weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated
entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear
attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is
just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could
precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between
two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the
that as long as the
place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear
war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear
proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. t may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of
nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might
well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the
most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist
behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United
States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some
reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of
science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in
tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency
if the act of
a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was
fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out
of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively,
nuclear terrorism came as
Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington
North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly
Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear
Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing
tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had
already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not
be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to
increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict
with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy
war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too:
should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened
tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the
pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible
perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on
its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia
and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the
terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its
would be left with a very short list consisting of
nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of
reality, it
is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of
U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the
temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would
probably still meet with a devastating response.
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ANSWERS TO: Surveillance Hasn’t Stopped
Any Attacks
Information contributes to our safety even if it doesn’t singlehandedly prevent
attacks
Lewis ‘14
James Andrew Lewis is a senior fellow and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies in Washington, D.C., where he writes on technology, security, and the international
economy. Before joining CSIS, he worked at the US Departments of State and Commerce as a Foreign Service officer
and as a member of the Senior Executive Service. His diplomatic experience included negotiations on military basing
in Asia, the Cambodia peace process, and the five-power talks on arms transfer restraint. Lewis received his Ph.D.
from the University of Chicago. “Underestimating Risk in the Surveillance Debate” - CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES - STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM – December http://csis.org/publication/underestimating-risk-surveillance-debate
Assertions that a collection program contributes nothing because it has not singlehandedly
prevented an attack reflect an ill-informed understanding of how the United States conducts
collection and analysis to prevent harmful acts against itself and its allies. Intelligence does not work as it is
portrayed in films—solitary agents do not make startling discoveries that lead to dramatic, lastminute success (nor is technology consistently infallible). Intelligence is a team sport. Perfect knowledge does not exist and success is the product of the efforts of
teams of dedicated individuals from many agencies, using many tools and techniques, working together to assemble fragments of data from many sources into a coherent
Analysts assemble this mosaic from many different sources and based on experience and intuition. Luck is still more
ability to blend different sources of
intelligence has improved U.S. intelligence capabilities and gives us an advantage over some opponents.
picture.
important than anyone would like and the alternative to luck is acquiring more information. This
Aff demand to “name one attack the program stopped” is wrong and a poor
standard.
Branda ‘14
(et al; JOYCE R. BRANDA, Acting Assistant Attorney General, BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEES - Amicus Brief for Smith v.
Obama – before the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. “Amici” means “friend of the court” and – in this
context - is legal reference to the Reporters Committee – October 2nd - https://www.eff.org/document/governmentssmith-answering-brief)
Plaintiff asks the government to show more, claiming that the program is an unconstitutional means of serving the paramount
need of preventing terrorist attacks because the government has not “describe[d] a single instance” in which the
program has “actually stopped an imminent attack” or “aided . . . in achieving any objective that was time-sensitive in nature.” Pl.
Br. 33 (quoting Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d. at 40). The Constitution does not require an anti-terrorism program to have
demonstrably prevented a specific terrorist attack to be reasonable. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 676 n.3 (“a demonstration of danger as
to any particular airport or airline” is not required since “[i]t is sufficient that the Government have a compelling interest
in preventing an otherwise pervasive societal problem from spreading”); Cassidy, 471 F.3d at 84-85; MacWade, 460 F.3d at 272. Nor is
it problematic that the Section 215 program is only “one means” among many government programs that work
together to accomplish the paramount goal of countering terrorism. Pl. Br. 35. To protect the Nation, the government employs a
range of counter-terrorism tools and investigative methods in concert, which often serve different functions in order to complement one
another in the service of achieving the overarching goal of preventing attacks. Those tools rarely, however, operate in isolation, and
nothing in the Fourth Amendment’s special needs jurisprudence requires a showing that any single program is essential or itself prevented a particular attack. The
government has provided examples in which the Section 215 program provided timely and valuable
assistance to ongoing counter-terrorism investigations. See ER 74-75.
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ANSWERS TO: Bioterror Impossible
Synthetic biology makes bioterror inevitable- creates means and motive
Rose, 14 -- PhD, recognized international biodefense expert [Patrick, Center for Health &
Homeland Security senior policy analyst & biosecurity expert, National Defense University
lecturer, and Adam Bernier, expert in counter-terrorism, "DIY Bioterrorism Part II: The
proliferation of bioterrorism through synthetic biology," CBRNePortal, 2-24-14,
www.cbrneportal.com/diy-bioterrorism-part-ii-the-proliferation-of-bioterrorism-throughsynthetic-biology/, accessed 8-16-14]
In Part I of this series, we examined how the advancement of synthetic biology has made bio-engineering accessible
to the mainstream biological community. Non-state actors who wish to employ biological agents for ill intent are
sure to be aware of how tangible bio-weapons are becoming as applications of synthetic
biology become more affordable and the probability of success increases with each scientific breakthrough. The willingness of nonstate actors to engage in biological attacks is not a new concept; however, the past biological threat environment has been subdued compared to that
of conventional or even chemical terrorism. The frequency and deadliness of biological attacks has, thankfully, been limited; much of which can be
attributed to the technical complexity or apparent ineptitude of the perpetrators developing biological weapons. Despite
the infrequency and
ineffectiveness of biological attacks in the last four decades, the threat may be changing with the
continued advancement of synthetic biology applications. Coupled with the ease of info rmation
sharing and a rapidly growing do-it-yourself-biology (DIYbio) movement (discussed in Part I), the
chances of not only , more attacks , but potentially more deadly ones will inevitably increase .¶
During the last half century terrorist organizations have consistently had an interest in using biological weapons
as a means of attacking their targets, but only few have actually made a weapon and used it. The attraction is that terrorist activities with biological
weapons are difficult to detect and even more difficult to attribute without a specific perpetrator claiming responsibility. Since 1971 there have been
more than 113,113 terrorist attacks globally and 33 of them have been biological. The majority of bio-terrorism incidents recorded occurred during the
year 2001 (17 of the 33); before 2001 there were 10 incidents and since 2001 there were 6 (not counting the most recent Ricin attacks). The lack of a
discernable trend in use of bio-terrorism does not negate the clear intent of extremist organizations to use biological weapons. In fact, the capacity to
harness biological weapons more effectively today only increases the risk that they will successfully be employed. ¶
The landscape is
changing : previously the instances where biological attacks had the potential to do the most harm (e.g., Rajneeshees cult’s Salmonella attacks in
1984, Aum Shinri Kyo’s Botulinum toxin, and Anthrax attacks in the early 90’s) included non-state actors with access to large amounts of funding and
scientists. Funding and a cadre of willing scientists does not guarantee success though. The
assertion was thus made that biological
weapons are not only expensive, they require advanced technical training to make and are even
more difficult to effectively perpetrate acts of terrorism with. While it is difficult to determine with certainty whether the expense
and expertise needed to create biological weapons has acted as a major deterrent for groups thinking of obtaining them, many experts would argue
that the cost/expertise barrier makes the threat from biological attacks extremely small. This assertion is supported by the evidence that the vast
majority of attacks have taken place in Western countries and was performed by Western citizens with advanced training in scientific research.¶ In
the past decade the cost/expertise assertion has become less accurate. Despite the lack of biological attacks,
there are a number of very dangerous and motivated organizations that have or are actively
pursuing biological weapons. The largest and most outspoken organization has been the global Al Qaeda network, whose leaders have
frequently and passionately called for the development (or purchase) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The principal message
from Al Qaeda Central and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has included the call to use biological WMDs to
terrorize Western nations. Al Qaeda has had a particular focus on biological and nuclear weapons because of their potential for greatest harm. Osama
Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Anwar al-Awlaki have all called for attacks using biological weapons, going so far as to say that Muslims everywhere
should seek to kill Westerners wherever possible and that obtaining WMDs is the responsibility of all Muslims. Before the US-led invasion of
Afghanistan, Al Qaeda had spent significant funds on building a bio-laboratory and had begun collecting scientists from around the world; however, the
Afghanistan invasion and subsequent global War on Terrorism is thought to have disrupted their capabilities and killed or captured many of their
assets. Despite the physical setbacks, this disruption
does not appear to have changed the aggressive attitude
towards obtaining WMDs (e.g., more recently U.S. Intelligence has been concerned about AQAP
attempting to make Ricin).¶ The emergence of synthetic biology and DIYbio has increased the
likelihood that Al Qaeda will succeed in developing biological WMDs. The low cost and
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significantly reduced level of necessary expertise may change how many non-state actors
view bio logical weapons as a worthwhile investment. This is not to say that suddenly anyone
can make a weapon or that it is easy. To the contrary making an effective biological weapon
will still be difficult, only much easier and cheaper than it has been in the past.¶ The rapid
advancements of synthetic bio logy could be a game changer , giving organizations currently
pursuing biological weapons more options, and encouraging other organizations to reconsider
their worth. Because the bar for attaining bio logical weapons has been lowered and is likely to
continue to be lowered
as more advances in biological technology are made, it is important that the international community begin to
formulate policy that protects advances in science that acts to prevent the intentional misuse of synthetic biology. Disregard
for this
consideration will be costly. A successful attack with a potent biological weapon, where no
pharmaceutical interventions might exist, will be deadly and the impact of such an attack will
reverberate around the globe because biological weapons are not bound by international
borders.
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Terrorism DA Affirmative Answers
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Aff—Arab Americans Link Turn
Link Turn - Mass surveillance kills law enforcement coop with US-Arab
Americans – that’s key to check terror.
Risen 2014
(Internally quoting Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow on foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. Tom Risen is a
reporter for U.S. News & World Report. “Racial Profiling Reported in NSA, FBI Surveillance” - U.S. News & World
Report - July 9, 2014 - http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/07/09/racial-profiling-reported-in-nsa-fbisurveillance)
The National Security Agency and the FBI have reportedly been overzealous trying to prevent terrorist attacks to
the point that anti-Islamic racism in those agencies led to the surveillance of prominent
Muslim-Americans, revealing a culture of racial profiling and broad latitude for spying on U.S.
citizens. An NSA document leaked by former agency contractor Edward Snowden to reporter Glenn Greenwald shows 202 Americans targeted
among the approximately 7,485 email addresses monitored between 2002 and 2008, Greenwald’s news service The Intercept reports. To monitor
Americans, government agencies must first make the case to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that there is probable cause that the targets
are terrorist agents, foreign spies or “are or may be” abetting sabotage, espionage or terrorism. Despite this filter The Intercept identified five MuslimAmericans with high public profile including civil rights leaders, academics, lawyers and a political candidate. Racial profiling of Muslims by security
officers has been a controversy since the terrorist attacks of 2001 spiked fears about al-Qaida trainees preparing more attacks. The New York Police
Department has disbanded its unit that mapped New York’s Muslim communities that designated surveillance of mosques as “terrorism enterprise
investigations” after pressure from the Justice Department about aggressive monitoring by police. A 2005 FBI memo about surveillance procedures
featured in The Intercept story uses a fake name “Mohammed Raghead” for the agency staff exercise. This latest report about email surveillance of
successful Muslim-Americans is akin to “McCarthyism” that fed paranoia about communist spies during the Cold War, says Reza Aslan, a professor at
the University of California, Riverside. “The
notion that these five upstanding American citizens, all of them prominent public
individuals, represent a threat to the U.S. for no other reason than their religion is an
embarrassment to the FBI and an affront to the constitution,” Aslan says. There is a risk of radicalization among
citizens Americans, evidenced by some who have gone to fight jihads in Syria and Somalia, but mass shootings carried out by U.S. citizens of
various racial backgrounds occurs much more often, says Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow on foreign policy at
the Brookings Institution. Since 1982, there have been at least 70 mass shootings across the U.S. “We have seen very
little domestic terrorism in the U.S.,” Felbab-Brown says. This lack of terrorism is due in part to the
willingness of the Islamic community to cooperate with law enforcement to identify possible
radical threats , out of gratitude that the U.S. is a stable, secure country compared with the Middle East, she says. “ That could go
sour if law enforcement becomes
too aggressive,
too extreme ,” she says.
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Aff—Surveillance Fails/No Link
Current surveillance techniques are unsuccessful – ISIS is beginning to evade
them
Dale 14 (Helle Dale, a senior fellow in public diplomacy focusing on US outreach to foreign countries, published on the Daily
Signal, “ISIS Is Getting Smarter About Avoiding U.S. Surveillance,” http://dailysignal.com/2014/11/21/isis-getting-smarter-avoidingu-s-surveillance/, November 21st, 2014) aj
Social media can be a double-edged sword for terrorists groups such as ISIS, a fact that its
leadership appears to be aware of. According to recent reports, the group’s top cadre has
curtailed electronic communications, hoping to shrink its footprint and exposure to western
intelligence agencies. A terrorist group of the 21st century, ISIS is adept at the use of social
media, producing “cruelly effective” propaganda, as retired Marine Corps Gen. John Allen has
put it. Yet, that same propaganda also has provided a wealth of information for the U.S. and
other governments. As reported by The Daily Beast’s Shane Harris, who cited U.S. intelligence
sources, ISIS is changing its “communications strategy.” It is encrypting its electronic
communications, limiting its online presence and using services that delete messages as soon
as they are sent. Its top cadre uses couriers rather than electronic devices to deliver orders,
making them elusive in the U.S.-led surveillance campaign. As human intelligence is hardly
available on the ground, especially in Syria, and the number of unmanned drones is limited,
cyber surveillance has been a key tool in the fight against ISIS. Yet, although ISIS leadership
may be wise to its cyber vulnerabilities, its followers are not as easy to control in the
electronic sphere. The group disseminates its grisly propaganda on social media, and its
thousands of followers and recruits continue to post pictures and information on their social
media accounts. According to reports by communications expert James Farwell published by the
London-based Institute for International Strategic Studies, “advances in technology may
eventually leave the group vulnerable to cyber attacks, similar to those reportedly urged by
U.S. intelligence sources to intercept and seize funds controlled by Mexican drug cartels.”
Communications strategy must be a critical component in combatting this latest form of violent
Islamism, which itself uses propaganda so effectively to magnify its own image of invulnerability.
Most effectively, writes Farwell, would be a message that shows the opposite, that the United
States and its allies are powerful and determined to win. (Though unfortunately that has hardly been
forthcoming yet.) Communications strategy is currently in the hands of Rick Stengel, undersecretary of state for public diplomacy.
Stengel recently attended a meeting with Arab nations in Kuwait to discuss precisely this issue and encourage their participation in
the communications battle. It is clear though, as Farwell writes, that information warfare should be seamless with military tactics,
Strategic communication is as
important today as at any time during the Iraq and Afghan wars.
allowing Gen. Allen to coordinate the resources of the whole of the U.S. government.
No link – targeted warrants, which plan allows, solve the terror disad just as
well.
Wyden ‘14
(et al; This amicus brief issued by three US Senators - Ron Wyden, Mark Udall and Martin Heinrich. Wyden and Udall
sat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and had access to the meta-data program. “BRIEF FOR AMICI
CURIAE SENATOR RON WYDEN, SENATOR MARK UDALL, AND SENATOR MARTIN HEINRICH IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT, URGING REVERSAL OF THE DISTRICT COURT” – Amicus Brief for Smith v. Obama – before the United
States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals - Appeal from the United States District Court District of Idaho The Honorable B.
Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding Case No. 2:13-cv-00257-BLW – Sept 9th, 2014 – This Amicus Brief was
prepared by CHARLES S. SIMS from the law firm PROSKAUER ROSE LLP. Amici” means “friend of the court” and – in
this context - is legal reference to Wyden, Udall, etc. This pdf can be obtained at:
https://www.eff.org/document/wyden-udall-heinrich-smith-amicus)
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As members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, amici Senators Wyden and Udall have for
years participated in the oversight of government surveillance conducted under the Patriot Act that they
knew would astonish most Americans. They sought to warn the public about those activities as best they could without disclosing classified
information. They also co-sponsored an amendment to the Patriot Act’s reauthorization that sought to address the problem of government officials
“secretly reinterpret[ing] public laws and statutes” and “describ[ing] the execution of these laws in a way that misinforms or misleads the public.” See
157 Cong. Rec. S3360 (daily ed. May 25, 2011) (introducing SA 384 to S. 990, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011)); see also 157 Cong. Rec. S3386 (daily ed. May 26,
2011) (statement of Sen. Wyden) (“The fact is anyone can read the plain text of the PATRIOT Act. Yet many Members of Congress have no idea how the
law is being secretly interpreted by the executive branch.”); 157 Cong. Rec. S3258 (daily ed. May 24, 2011) (statement of Sen. Udall) (“Congress is
granting powers to the executive branch that lead to abuse, and, frankly, shield the executive branch from accountability”). Now that the government’s
bulk call-records program has been documented and exposed, the
executive branch has retreated from frequently repeated
claims about its necessity and expressed an intent to end government bulk collection under section 215. Press Release, FACT SHEET: The
Administration’s Proposal for Ending the Section 215 Bulk Telephony Metadata Program (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/03/27/fact-sheet-administration-s-proposal-ending-section-215-bulk-telephony-m (“White House Press Release”). While Senators Udall,
Heinrich and Wyden broadly support a policy aimed at ending the government’s indiscriminate collection of telephony metadata, they share a concern
that there is no plan to suspend the bulk collection of Americans’ phone records in the absence of new legislation, which is not necessarily imminent.
Meanwhile, the government continues to defend its bulk call-record collection program vigorously against statutory and constitutional challenges in
the courts. Amici
submit this brief to respond to the government’s argument that its collection of bulk call
records is necessary to defend the nation against terrorist attacks. Amici make one central point: as members
of the committee charged with overseeing the National Security Agency’s surveillance, amici have reviewed this
surveillance extensively and have seen no evidence that the bulk collection of Americans’ phone records has
provided any intelligence of value that could not have been gathered through means that
caused far less harm to
the
privacy interests
of millions of Americans. The government has at its disposal a number of
authorities that allow it to obtain the call records of suspected terrorists and those in contact with suspected terrorists. It appears to amici that these
more targeted authorities could have been used to obtain the information that the
government has publicly claimed was crucial in a few important counterterrorism cases.
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Aff—No Impact
Terrorism isn’t a threat to our existence – Obama confirms, intelligence hasn’t
found any nuclear terrorism
Mueller and Stewart 15 (John Mueller and Mark Stewart, professor of political science at
Ohio State University and engineer and risk analyst at the University of Newcastle in Australia, 224-2015, "Terrorism poses no existential threat to America. We must stop pretending
otherwise," Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/24/terrorismposes-no-existential-threat-to-america)//MJ
One of the most unchallenged, zany assertions during the war on terror has been that terrorists present an existential
threat to the United States, the modern state and civilization itself. This is important because the overwrought expression, if
accepted as valid, could close off evaluation of security efforts. For example, no defense of civil liberties is likely to be terribly
effective if people believe the threat from terrorism to be existential. At long last, President Barack Obama and other top officials
are beginning to back away from this absurd position. This much overdue development may not last, however. Extravagant
alarmism about the pathological but self-destructive Islamic State (Isis) in areas of Syria and Iraq may cause us to backslide. The
notion that international terrorism presents an existential threat was spawned by the traumatized in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11. Rudy Giuliani, mayor of New York at the time, recalls that all “security experts” expected “dozens and dozens
and multiyears of attacks like this” and, in her book The Dark Side, Jane Mayer observed that “the only certainty shared by virtually
the entire American intelligence community” was that “a second wave of even more devastating terrorist attacks on America was
imminent”. Duly terrified, US intelligence services were soon imaginatively calculating the number of trained al-Qaida
operatives in the United States to be between 2,000 and 5,000. Also compelling was the extrapolation that, because the 9/11
terrorists were successful with box-cutters, they might well be able to turn out nuclear weapons. Soon it was being
authoritatively proclaimed that atomic terrorists could “destroy civilization as we know it” and that it was likely that a
nuclear terrorist attack on the United States would transpire by 2014. No atomic terrorists have yet appeared (al-Qaida’s
entire budget in 2001 for research on all weapons of mass destruction totaled less than $4,000), and intelligence has been far
better at counting al-Qaida operatives in the country than at finding them. But the notion that terrorism presents an
existential threat has played on. By 2008, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff declared it to be a “significant existential”
one - carefully differentiating it, apparently, from all those insignificant existential threats Americans have faced in the past. The
bizarre formulation survived into the Obama years. In October 2009, Bruce Riedel, an advisor to the new administration, publicly
maintained the al-Qaida threat to the country to be existential. In 2014, however, things began to change. In a speech at Harvard in
October, Vice President Joseph Biden offered the thought that “we face no existential threat – none – to our way of life or
our ultimate security.” After a decent interval of three months, President Barack Obama reiterated this point at a press conference,
and then expanded in an interview a few weeks later, adding that the US should not “provide a victory to these terrorist networks by over-inflating their importance
and suggesting in some fashion that they are an existential threat to the United States or the world order.” Later, his national security advisor, Susan Rice, echoed
the point in a formal speech. It is astounding that these utterances – “blindingly obvious” as security specialist Bruce Schneier puts it – appear to mark the first time
any officials in the United States have had the notion and the courage to say so in public. Whether that development, at once remarkable and absurdly belated, will
have some consequence, or even continue, remains to be seen. Senators John McCain and Lindsay Graham have insisted for months that Isis presents an
existential threat to the United States. An alarmed David Brooks reported that financial analysts have convinced themselves that the group has the potential to
generate a worldwide “economic cataclysm.” And General Michael Flynn, recently retired as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, has been insisting that the
terrorist enemy is “committed to the destruction of freedom and the American way of life” while seeking “world domination, achieved through violence and
bloodshed.” It was reported that his remarks provoked nods of approval, cheers and “ultimately a standing ovation” from the audience. Thus even the most modest
imaginable effort to rein in the war on terror hyperbole may fail to gel.
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Aff—Link Turn: Targeted Surveillance
Link Turn - Mass surveillance makes us less safe against terrorists
Schneier 15 [Bruce Schneier is an American cryptographer, computer security and privacy specialist, and writer.,
http://digg.com/2015/why-mass-surveillance-cant-wont-and-never-has-stopped-a-terrorist, March 25th,
In his latest bestseller, Data and Goliath, world-renowned security
expert and author Bruce Schneier goes
deep into the world of surveillance, investigating how governments and corporations alike monitor nearly our every
move. In this excerpt, Schneier explains how we are fed a false narrative of how our surveillance state
is able to stop terrorist attacks before they happen. In fact, Schneier argues, the idea that our government is able
to parse all the invasive and personal data they collect on us is laughable. The data-mining conducted every day only
seems to take valuable resources and time away from the tactics that should be used to fight
terrorism. Illustration: Electronic Frontier Foundation/Hugh D'Andrade The NSA repeatedly uses a connectthe-dots metaphor to justify its surveillance activities. Again and again — after 9/11, after the
Underwear Bomber, after the Boston Marathon bombings — government is criticized for not
connecting the dots. However, this is a terribly misleading metaphor. Connecting the dots in a coloring book is easy, because
they’re all numbered and visible. In real life, the dots can only be recognized after the fact. That doesn’t stop us from demanding to
know why the authorities couldn’t connect the dots. The warning signs left by the Fort Hood shooter, the Boston Marathon
bombers, and the Isla Vista shooter look obvious in hindsight. Nassim Taleb,
an expert on risk engineering, calls this
tendency the “narrative fallacy.” Humans are natural storytellers, and the world of stories is much more tidy,
predictable, and coherent than reality. Millions of people behave strangely enough to attract the FBI’s notice, and almost all of them
are harmless. The
TSA’s no-fly list has over 20,000 people on it. The Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment,
also known as the watch list, has 680,000, 40% of whom have “no recognized terrorist group affiliation.” Data
mining is offered as the technique that will enable us to connect those dots. But while corporations are successfully mining our
personal data in order to target advertising, detect financial fraud, and perform other tasks,
three critical issues make
data mining an inappropriate tool for finding terrorists. The first, and most important, issue is
error rates. For advertising, data mining can be successful even with a large error rate, but finding
terrorists requires a much higher degree of accuracy than data-mining systems can possibly
provide. Data mining works best when you’re searching for a well-defined profile, when there are a reasonable number of events
per year, and when the cost of false alarms is low. Detecting credit card fraud is one of data mining’s security success stories: all
credit card companies mine their transaction databases for spending patterns that indicate a stolen card. There are over a billion
active credit cards in circulation in the United States, and nearly 8% of those are fraudulently used each year. Many credit card thefts
share a pattern — purchases in locations not normally frequented by the cardholder, and purchases of travel, luxury goods, and
easily fenced items — and in many cases data-mining systems can minimize the losses by preventing fraudulent transactions. The
only cost of a false alarm is a phone call to the cardholder asking her to verify a couple of her purchases. Similarly, the IRS uses data
mining to identify tax evaders, the police use it to predict crime hot spots, and banks use it to predict loan defaults. These
applications have had mixed success, based on the data and the application, but they’re all within the scope of what data mining can
accomplish. Terrorist
plots are different, mostly because whereas fraud is common, terrorist attacks
are very rare. This means that even highly accurate terrorism prediction systems will be so
flooded with false alarms that they will be useless. The reason lies in the mathematics of detection. All
detection systems have errors, and system designers can tune them to minimize either false
positives or false negatives. In a terrorist-detection system, a false positive occurs when the system mistakenly
identifies something harmless as a threat. A false negative occurs when the system misses an actual attack. Depending on how you
“tune” your detection system, you can increase the number of false positives to assure you are less likely to miss an attack, or you
can reduce the number of false positives at the expense of missing attacks. Because terrorist attacks are so rare, false positives
completely overwhelm the system, no matter how well you tune. And I mean completely: millions of people will be falsely accused
for every real terrorist plot the system finds, if it ever finds any. We might be able to deal with all of the innocents being flagged by
the system if the cost of false positives were minor. Think about the full-body scanners at airports. Those alert all the time when
scanning people. But a TSA officer can easily check for a false alarm with a simple pat-down. This
doesn’t work for a more
general data-based terrorism-detection system. Each alert requires a lengthy investigation to
determine whether it’s real or not. That takes time and money, and prevents intelligence
officers from doing other productive work. Or, more pithily, when you’re watching everything, you’re not seeing
anything. The US intelligence community also likens finding a terrorist plot to looking for a needle
in a haystack. And, as former NSA director General Keith Alexander said, “you need the haystack to find the needle.” That
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statement perfectly illustrates the problem with mass surveillance and bulk collection. When
you’re looking for the needle, the last thing you want to do is pile lots more hay on it. More
specifically, there is no scientific rationale for believing that adding irrelevant data about innocent
people makes it easier to find a terrorist attack, and lots of evidence that it does not. You might be
adding slightly more signal, but you’re also adding much more noise. And despite the NSA’s “collect it all” mentality, its own
documents bear this out. The military intelligence community even talks about the problem of “drinking from a fire hose”: having so
much irrelevant data that it’s impossible to find the important bits. The NSA's Utah Data Center Photo Credit: Electronic Frontier
Foundation We saw this problem with the NSA’s eavesdropping program: the false positives overwhelmed the system. In the years
after 9/11, the NSA passed to the FBI thousands of tips per month; every one of them turned out to be a false alarm. The cost was
enormous, and ended up frustrating the FBI agents who were obligated to investigate all the tips. We also saw this with the
Suspicious Activity Reports —or SAR — database: tens of thousands of reports, and no actual results. And all the telephone
metadata the NSA collected led to just one success: the conviction of a taxi driver who sent $8,500 to a Somali group that posed no
direct threat to the US — and that was probably trumped up so the NSA would have better talking points in front of Congress. The
second problem with using data-mining techniques to try to uncover terrorist plots is that each
attack is unique. Who would have guessed that two pressure-cooker bombs would be delivered
to the Boston Marathon finish line in backpacks by a Boston college kid and his older brother?
Each rare individual who carries out a terrorist attack will have a disproportionate impact on the criteria used to decide who’s a
likely terrorist, leading
to ineffective detection strategies. The third problem is that the people the
NSA is trying to find are wily, and they’re trying to avoid detection. In the world of personalized marketing,
the typical surveillance subject isn’t trying to hide his activities. That is not true in a police or
national security context. An adversarial relationship makes the problem much harder, and means that most commercial
big data analysis tools just don’t work. A commercial tool can simply ignore people trying to hide and assume benign behavior on the
part of everyone else. Government data-mining techniques can’t do that, because those are the very people they’re looking for.
Adversaries vary in the sophistication of their ability to avoid surveillance. Most criminals and terrorists — and political dissidents,
sad to say — are pretty unsavvy and make lots of mistakes. But that’s no justification for data mining; targeted surveillance could
potentially identify them just as well. The question is whether mass surveillance performs sufficiently better than targeted
surveillance to justify its extremely high costs. Several analyses of all the NSA’s efforts indicate that it does not. The three problems
listed above cannot be fixed. Data mining is simply the wrong tool for this job, which means that all the mass surveillance required
to feed it cannot be justified. When he was NSA director, General Keith Alexander argued that ubiquitous surveillance would have
enabled the NSA to prevent 9/11. That seems unlikely. He wasn’t able to prevent the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013, even
though one of the bombers was on the terrorist watch list and both had sloppy social media trails — and this was after a dozen post9/11 years of honing techniques. The NSA collected data on the Tsarnaevs before the bombing, but hadn’t realized that it was more
important than the data they collected on millions of other people. This point was made in the 9/11 Commission Report. That report
described a failure to “connect the dots,” which proponents of mass surveillance claim requires collection of more data. But what
the report actually said was that the intelligence community had all the information about the plot without mass surveillance, and
that the failures were the result of inadequate analysis. Mass surveillance didn’t catch underwear bomber Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab in 2006, even though his father had repeatedly warned the U.S. government that he was dangerous. And the liquid
bombers (they’re the reason governments prohibit passengers from bringing large bottles of liquids, creams, and gels on airplanes in
their carry-on luggage) were captured in 2006 in their London apartment not due to mass surveillance but through traditional
investigative police work. Whenever
we learn about an NSA success, it invariably comes from targeted
surveillance rather than from mass surveillance. One analysis showed that the FBI identifies
potential terrorist plots from reports of suspicious activity, reports of plots, and investigations of
other, unrelated, crimes. This is a critical point. Ubiquitous surveillance and data mining are not suitable tools for
finding dedicated criminals or terrorists. We taxpayers are wasting billions on mass-surveillance programs, and not getting the
security we’ve been promised. More importantly, the money we’re wasting on these ineffective surveillance programs is not being
spent on investigation, intelligence, and emergency response: tactics that have been proven to work. The
NSA's surveillance
efforts have actually made us less secure.
Mass surveillance creates useless data, allows for terrorist attacks
Patrick Eddington, 2015, "No, Mass Surveillance Won't Stop Terrorist Attacks," 1/27,
http://reason.com/archives/2015/01/27/mass-surveillance-and-terrorism#.bejqzr:U8Io, analyst in Homeland Security and Civil
Liberties at the Cato Institute, and an assistant professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. From 20042010, he served as communications director and later as senior policy advisor to Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ). Eddington’s legislative
portfolio included the full range of security-related issues, with an emphasis on intelligence policy reform in the areas of
surveillance, detainee interrogation, and the use of drones, both in overseas and domestic contexts.¶ From 1988 to 1996, Eddington
was a military imagery analyst at the CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center
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The recent terrorist attack on the office of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo generated a
now-familiar meme: Another terrorist attack means we need more surveillance.¶ Sen. Bob
Corker (R-Tenn.) said that while "Congress having oversight certainly is important ... what is
more important relative to these types of events is ensuring we don't overly hamstring the
NSA's ability to collect this kind of information in advance and keep these kinds of activities from
occurring." Similarly, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) spoke of his "fear" that "our intelligence
capabilities, those designed to prevent such an attack from taking place on our shores, are
quickly eroding," adding that the government surveillance "designed to prevent these types of
attacks from occurring is under siege."¶ A recent poll demonstrates that their sentiments are widely shared in
the wake of the attack.¶ But would more mass surveillance have prevented the assault on the
Charlie Hebdo office? Events from 9/11 to the present help provide the answer:¶ 2009: Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab—i.e., the "underwear bomber"—nearly succeeded in downing the airline
he was on over Detroit because, according to then-National Counterterrorism Center (NCC)
director Michael Leiter, the federal Intelligence Community (IC) failed "to connect, integrate,
and fully understand the intelligence" it had collected.¶ 2009: Army Major Nidal Hasan was able
to conduct his deadly, Anwar al-Awlaki-inspired rampage at Ft. Hood, Texas, because the FBI
bungled its Hasan investigation.¶ 2013: The Boston Marathon bombing happened, at least in
part, because the CIA, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FBI, NCC, and National Security
Agency (NSA) failed to properly coordinate and share information about Tamerlan Tsarnaev and
his family, associations, and travel to and from Russia in 2012. Those failures were detailed in a
2014 report prepared by the Inspectors General of the IC, Department of Justice, CIA, and DHS.¶
2014: The Charlie Hebdo and French grocery store attackers were not only known to French and
U.S. authorities but one had a prior terrorism conviction and another was monitored for years
by French authorities until less than a year before the attack on the magazine.¶ No, mass
surveillance does not prevent terrorist attacks.¶ It’s worth remembering that the mass
surveillance programs initiated by the U.S. government after the 9/11 attacks—the legal ones
and the constitutionally-dubious ones—were premised on the belief that bin Laden’s hijackerterrorists were able to pull off the attacks because of a failure to collect enough data. Yet in
their subsequent reports on the attacks, the Congressional Joint Inquiry (2002) and the 9/11
Commission found exactly the opposite. The data to detect (and thus foil) the plots was in the
U.S. government’s hands prior to the attacks; the failures were ones of sharing, analysis, and
dissemination . That malady perfectly describes every intelligence failure from Pearl Harbor to
the present day.¶ The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (created by Congress in
2004) was supposed to be the answer to the "failure-to-connect-the-dots" problem. Ten years
on, the problem remains, the IC bureaucracy is bigger than ever, and our government is
continuing to rely on mass surveillance programs that have failed time and again to stop
terrorists while simultaneously undermining the civil liberties and personal privacy of every
American. The quest to "collect it all," to borrow a phrase from NSA Director Keith Alexander,
only leads to the accumulation of masses of useless information, making it harder to find real
threats and costing billions to store.¶ A recent Guardian editorial noted that such masssurveillance myopia is spreading among European political leaders as well, despite the fact that
"terrorists, from 9/11 to the Woolwich jihadists and the neo-Nazi Anders Breivik, have almost
always come to the authorities’ attention before murdering."¶ Mass surveillance is not only
destructive of our liberties, its continued use is a virtual guarantee of more lethal intelligence
failures. And our continued will to disbelieve those facts is a mental dodge we engage in at our
peril.
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Aff—No Link
Data shows no meaningful terror plots have been stopped via mass surveillance
Osterndorf 15 [Chris Osterndorf, reporter for the Daily Dot, “Edward Snowden is right—NSA surveillance won't stop
terrorism”, http://www.dailydot.com/opinion/edward-snowden-mass-surveillance-nsa-america/, March 17th, 2015//Rahul]
It appears that Snowden season is approaching once again. The controversial whistleblower made a surprise
appearance via Google Hangout at SXSW this week, where his remarks proved captivating as always. Essentially a less flashy sequel
to his ACLU speech from 2014, Snowden only spoke to a few people this time around, engaging in a conversation with a select group
of leaders from America’s tech sector. In particular, he urged tech companies to become "champions of privacy," suggesting that
they use their power to help shield Americans from an increasingly watchful government. In addition to speaking at SXSW in Austin,
Snowden also said a few words at FutureFest in London, where he warned that massive surveillance
won't stop terrorism. In this instance, Snowden is absolutely correct, and it’s time we start heeding his
advice. At this point, the only people clinging to this idea is an effective is the NSA themselves. In 2013, NSA Director Gen. Keith
Alexander went before the House Intelligence Committee to testify to claim that increased surveillance had helped to stop terrorist
threats over 50 times since 9/11, including attacks on U.S. soil such as a plot to blow up the New York Stock Exchange and a defunct
scheme to fund an overseas terrorist group. Other witnesses in the same hearing also suggested that the Snowden leaks had harmed
America greatly. “We are now faced with a situation that because this information has been made public, we run the risk of losing
these collection capabilities,” stated Robert S. Litt, general counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “We’re not
going to know for many months whether these leaks in fact have caused us to lose these capabilities, but if they do have that effect,
there is no doubt that they will cause our national security to be affected.” However, the details the NSA provided in this hearing
were somewhat hazy, and a closer look at the numbers indicates the benefits of increased surveillance may not be so clear-cut after
all. Research
from International Security found that out of the 269 terrorist suspects
apprehended since 9/11, 158 were brought in through the use of traditional investigative
measures. That’s almost 60 percent of all who were arrested. Meanwhile, 78 suspects were
apprehended through measures which were “unclear” and 15 were implicated in plots but were
not apprehended, while the remaining 18 were apprehended by some form of NSA surveillance.
Eighteen is no small number when you’re discussing matters of national security; however, the
above statistics do not necessarily indicate that mass surveillance was responsible for the
apprehension of these 18 terrorists or whether these suspects were detained under more traditional surveillance
measures. Moreover, the evidence suggests that traditional means of combatting terrorism are more effective than surveillance
when it comes to overall arrests. Additional
analysis from the New America Foundation further supports
these findings. Examining 225 post-9/11 terrorism cases in the U.S., their 2014 report found that the
NSA’s bulk surveillance program “has had no discernible impact on preventing acts of
terrorism, ” citing traditional methods of law enforcement and investigation as being far more effective in the majority of cases.
In as many as 48 of these cases, traditional surveillance warrants were used to collect evidence, while more than half of the cases
were the product of other traditional investigative actions, such as informants and reports of suspicious activity. In fact, New
America determined that the
NSA has only been responsible for 7.5 percent of all counterterrorism
investigations and that only one of those investigations led to suspects being convicted based on
metadata collection. And that case, which took months to solve, as the NSA went back and forth with the FBI, involved
money being sent to a terrorist group in Somalia, rather than an active plan to perpetrate an attack on U.S. soil. According to the
report’s principal author Peter Bergen, who is the director of the foundation’s National Security Program and their resident
terrorism expert, the
issue has less to do with the collection of data and more to do with the
comprehension of it. Bergen said, “The overall problem for U.S. counterterrorism officials is not that
they need vaster amounts of information from the bulk surveillance programs, but that they
don’t sufficiently understand or widely share the information they already possess that was
derived from conventional law enforcement and intelligence techniques.” Of course, even when all of the
data has been collected, it still isn’t enough to stop a terrorist attack. “It’s worth remembering that the mass surveillance programs
initiated by the U.S. government after the 9/11 attacks—the legal ones and the constitutionally dubious ones—were premised on
the belief that bin Laden’s hijacker-terrorists were able to pull off the attacks because of a failure to collect enough data,” asserts
Reason’s Patrick Eddington. “Yet in their subsequent reports on the attacks, the Congressional Joint Inquiry (2002) and the 9/11
Commission found exactly the opposite. The data to detect (and thus foil) the plots was in the U.S. government’s hands prior to the
attacks; the failures were ones of sharing, analysis, and dissemination.” So once again, we see that the key is not collection, but
comprehension. If all of this still doesn’t seem like enough evidence that mass surveillance is ineffective, consider that a White
House review group has also admitted the NSA’s counterterrorism program “was not essential to preventing attacks” and that a
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large portion of the evidence that was collected “could readily have been obtained in a timely manner using conventional [court]
orders.” But mass surveillance isn’t just the United States’ problem. Research has shown that Canada's Levitation project, which also
involves collecting large amounts of data in the service of fighting terrorism, may be just as questionable as the NSA’s own data
collection practices. Meanwhile, in response to the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, British Prime Minister David Cameron has
reintroduced the Communications Data Bill, which would force telecom companies to keep track of all Internet, email, and cellphone
activity and ban encrypted communication services. But support for this type of legislation in Europe doesn't appear to be any
stronger than in North America. Slate’s Ray Corrigan argued, “Even if your magic terrorist-catching machine has a false positive rate
of 1 in 1,000—and no security technology comes anywhere near this—every time you asked it for suspects in the U.K., it would flag
60,000 innocent people.” Fortunately, the cultural shift against increased data collection has become so evident in the U.S. that even
President Obama is trying to get out of the business of mass surveillance; the president announced plans last March to reform the
National Security Agency's practice of collecting call records, which have yet to come to fruition. Benjamin Franklin famously said
that “those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.” While this
quote has been notoriously butchered and misinterpreted over the years, it has now become evident that we shouldn’t have to give
up either of these things in pursuit of the other. The U.S. is still grappling with how to fight terrorism in this technologically advanced
age, but just because we have additional technology at our disposal, doesn’t mean that technology is always going to be used for the
common good. You may believe Edward Snowden to be a traitor or a hero, but on this matter, there is virtually no question: Mass
surveillance is not only unconstitutional, it is also the wrong way to fight terrorism.
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**Elections Disadvantage Negative
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1NC Hillary Good
A. Hillary Clinton is poised to win the election- she is polling higher than
every other Republican and Democratic contender and wins Latino vote
Poughkeepsie Journal, 2015
(http://www.poughkeepsiejournal.com/story/news/nation/2015/09/14/marist-poll-clinton-leadstrump/72273596, Sept 14)
When it comes to the general election, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is the leading
in the polls among nationally registered voters, according to the most recent Marist Poll.
Clinton leads businessman Donald Trump 53 percent to 40 percent among nationally registered
voters. Meanwhile, Donald Trump, who has local ties as the owner of the Trump National Golf
Club – Hudson Valley, in Stormville, is leading his Republicans rivals with more than 30 percent
of the vote, but has 13 points less than Clinton, according to the poll.
Ted Cruz, comes in third with 33 points and Marco Rubio and Jeb Bush are tied for fourth with
30 points.
Meanwhile, a gap is emerging among Latino voters. Clinton has 69 percent of the Latino vote
compared with Trump who has 22 percent. President Barack Obama won the Latino vote in
2012 over Mitt Romney by 44 points, according to the Marist Poll.
B. Link- recent polls prove the public views domestic surveillance as a
necessary evil-the plan makes Americans feel more vulnerable to
national security issues
Pew Research Center 2013- “Majority Views NSA Phone Tracking as Acceptable Anti-terror
Tactic” http://www.people-press.org/2013/06/10/majority-views-nsa-phone-tracking-asacceptable-anti-terror-tactic/
A majority of Americans – 56% – say the National Security Agency’s (NSA) program tracking
the telephone records of millions of Americans is an acceptable way for the government to
investigate terrorism , though a substantial minority – 41% – say it is unacceptable. And while the public is more evenly
divided over the government’s monitoring of email and other online activities to prevent possible terrorism, these views are largely
unchanged since 2002, shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.¶ The
latest national survey by the Pew Research
Center and The Washington Post, conducted June 6-9 among 1,004 adults, finds no indications
that last week’s revelations of the government’s collection of phone records and internet
data have altered fundamental public views about the tradeoff between investigating possible
terrorism and protecting personal privacy.¶ Currently 62% say it is more important for the
federal government to investigate possible terrorist threats, even if that intrudes on personal
privacy. Just 34% say it is more important for the government not to intrude on personal privacy, even if that limits its ability to
investigate possible terrorist threats.¶ These opinions have changed little since an ABC News/Washington Post survey in January
2006. Currently, there are only modest partisan differences in these opinions: 69%
of Democrats say it is more
important for the government to investigate terrorist threats, even at the expense of personal
privacy, as do 62% of Republicans and 59% of independents.
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C. Internal Link- vulnerability means the American public will elect a
republican,
Kuttner 2015- Robert, The American Prospect, co-founder and co-editor of The American
Prospect, and professor at Brandeis University's Heller School
“National Security and the 2016 Election”
http://prospect.org/article/national-security-and-2016-election
So, like it or not, the
2016 presidential election will be about national security. And most Americans
and most voters will be very fearful of the threat that the Islamic State represents and confused
about how we should respond.¶ In its lifetime, the United States has faced countless threats, and it has overreacted to many. Often in
the 20th century, the U.S. government acted as an agent of U.S. corporate interests, wrapping them in the broader rhetoric of the Cold War. And the
Cold War itself led to policies that were often excessive and self-defeating, not the least of which was Vietnam. ¶ That
said, the Islamic
State is a true threat, and one that presents difficult if not impossible choices. It is hydra-headed. Lop off
one leader and 10 others appear.¶ The threat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban was easy compared to this new one. These organizations actually had a
command structure that could be monitored and disrupted. ¶ The Islamic State and kindred groups represent a throwback to barbarism, yet because of
the broad unrest of hundreds of millions of people, their cause has appeal on the ground. And the West has precious few allies in the region that can
plausibly serve as either ideological or military counterweights. ¶ Even if the West had the stomach for ground warfare in a war of civilizations, it is not
clear where the theatres of operation would be. There is potentially a band that stretches all the way from Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria, through
Libya and Somalia, into the region of Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, that is vulnerable to the most brutal sort of Islamist
fundamentalism.¶ There are three broad strands of thinking on how the United States ought to respond. One is basically isolationist. Let them stew in
their own juices. My wife taught me a terrific Polish proverb that translates, "Not my circus, not my monkeys." ¶ There are some conservatives who
espouse this view, such as Rand Paul and the Cato Institute, some lefties like Noam Chomsky who think this retribution is the West's just dessert for its
past sins, as well as such centrist foreign policy scholars as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. ¶ I am a little queasy about such views because I find
the prospect of the Islamic State taking over much of the world frightening. Even if you write off the fates of hundreds of millions of people (half them
women by the way), the march of the Islamic State really does increase the chances of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of people who don't
mind blowing up the world, because they are certain that they are bound for glory. ¶ The second strand of thinking might be called Wilsonian. The U.S.,
in this view, has a duty to intervene because of the need to bring true Enlightenment democracy to regions that are otherwise vulnerable to the appeal
of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Well, based on the events of the past 15 years, good luck to that. ¶ The third viewpoint we might call realpolitik. It
argues that the West needs to act against the threat of the Islamic State, even if that means getting into bed with some unsavory people -- the very
people whose dominance in the region helped seed the unrest that led to fundamentalist Islam. Are we to say that the Saudi monarchy is the lesser
evil? How about Bashar al-Assad?¶ There have been times in American history when we sided with lesser evils against greater ones, our wartime
alliance with Stalin against Hitler being the epic case. Henry Kissinger, the ultimate foreign policy realist, persuaded Richard Nixon to embrace Red
China as a counterweight to the USSR, back in an era when China really was ferociously communist as well as brutal. ¶ The problem is that President
So we will go
into the 2016 election with the electorate feeling very uneasy about our national security, and
with Democrats somewhat on the defensive.¶ Normally, that would help the Republicans. Except that no
Obama has vacillated between wanting to be Wilson and wanting to be Kissinger. Whatever the policy, it needs to be coherent.
Republican first-tier presidential candidate has foreign policy experience.¶ Let's see. Chris Christie can see the World Trade Center from his window.
Scott Walker led wars -- on unions and on the University of Wisconsin. Marco Rubio sees national security through the prism of immigration and Cuba.
And Jeb Bush has only the proxy foreign policy expertise of his family connections -- which did not perform so well.¶ Which
brings us to
Hillary Clinton. On the plus side, she was Secretary of State. On the minus side, she was
Secretary of State.¶ She is also female, which some retrograde voters associate with weak -- and she
has bent over backwards to be the most hawkish of the Democrats, a posture that could wear better than expected as more threats unfold. But
whatever you think of her views, Clinton does have more national security chops than anyone else in the field.
D. Impact - Hillary Clinton is the only candidate who can preserve Iran deal
Real Clear Politics 2015, “Earnest: Hillary Clinton's Role In Bringing Iranians To Negotiating
Table "A Testament To Her Diplomatic Skill" March 20
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2015/03/20/earnest_hillary_clintons_role_in_bringing_
iranians_to_negotiating_table_a_testament_to_her_diplomatic_skill.html
At Friday's White House press briefing, White House
press secretary Josh Earnest praised former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton for helping to bring the Iranians to the negotiating table,
calling it a "testament to her diplomatic skill."¶ Earnest was answering a question from FOX News' Ed Henry
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regarding what role Secretary Clinton had in getting these negotiations started.¶ JOSH EARNEST: Secretary Clinton
did the
difficult diplomatic work that was required to get some of our allies in the region to cooperate
with the broader international community to prevent the importation, or at least limit the
importation of Iranian oil, and that is what maximized the pressure that has compelled the
Iranians to come to the negotiating table. I think that is a testament to her diplomatic skill that we have reached a
point that we have convened serious negotiations like the ones that are currently taking place.
E. Failure to sustain the Iran deal causes global war through miscalculation
PressTV, 2013 (“Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks fail,”
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/11/13/334544/global-nuclear-war-likely-if-iran-talks-fail/)
A global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in the coming months should the
world powers fail to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, an American analyst says.¶ “If the talks fail, if the
agreements being pursued are not successfully carried forward and implemented, then there
would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran before [US
President Barack] Obama leaves office and that’s a very great danger that no one can
underestimate the importance of,” senior editor at the Executive Intelligence Review Jeff Steinberg told Press TV on
Wednesday. ¶ “The United States could find itself on one side and Russia and China on the other and
those are the kinds of conditions that can lead to miscalculation and general roar,” Steinberg said. ¶
“So the danger in this situation is that if these talks don’t go forward, we could be facing a
global conflict in the coming months and years and that’s got to be avoided at all costs when
you’ve got countries like the United States, Russia, and China with” their arsenals of “nuclear
weapons,” he warned. ¶ The warning came one day after the White House told Congress not to impose new sanctions against
Tehran because failure in talks with Iran could lead to war.
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**Uniqueness- Hillary Good
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Uniqueness- Hillary Good- ANSWERS TO: Bernie Sanders
Bernie Sanders will not get the democratic nomination- 2016 isn’t 2008 and
he’s no Obama
Washington Post 2015 - “Bernie Sanders isn’t Barack Obama, and 2016 isn’t 2008” http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/bernie-sanders-isntbarack-obama-and-2016-isnt-2008/2015/07/17/5d85377e-2b37-11e5-bd33-395c05608059_story.html, July 17
Hillary Clinton is once again campaigning for president as the prohibitive front-runner, and once
again, she faces a challenge from an insurgent progressive outsider with grass-roots support.
Once again, while Clinton (re)introduces herself to voters in a low-key listening tour of sorts, her challenger is drawing huge
audiences — 10,000 in Madison, Wis., 8,000 in Portland, Maine, 5,000 in Denver and overflow crowds in Iowa’s small towns and
elsewhere.¶ Eight years ago, Clinton led in the polls for most of 2007, only to lose the Iowa caucuses — and, eventually, the
Democratic nomination — to a favorite of the party’s progressive base. It’s feeling a bit like deja vu. “If she doesn’t change the terms
of the race, she’s going to lose. Again,” former Mitt Romney strategist Stuart Stevens warned in the Daily Beast this month.¶ It
may be tempting to compare the race between Clinton and Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) to the
epic race between Clinton and Sen. Barack Obama: Sanders, like Obama, has consolidated a
good portion of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. Sanders, like Obama, is raising millions from smalldollar donors on the Internet. Sanders, like Obama, is channeling the anger and frustration of some in the party. Then, it was about
the Iraq war; now, it’s about Wall Street.¶ But
that’s where the similarities end. From the perspective of
someone who worked on his campaign and in his White House, it’s clear that Obama’s race
against Clinton is not a useful example. Understanding the dynamics at play in the 2016 primaries requires looking
further back at history. And unfortunately for Sanders, history shows that there are only two types of
Democratic insurgent candidates: Barack Obama and everyone else.¶ The current system for
selecting nominees in the Democratic Party is less than 50 years old. After the disastrous 1968 campaign
and nominating convention in Chicago, the party abandoned the smoke-filled rooms of yore and shifted to a series of primaries and
caucuses. The 1972 nomination went to the grass-roots favorite, Sen. George McGovern (S.D.), who used the new rules to edge out
establishment picks Hubert Humphrey and Henry “Scoop” Jackson. (McGovern won only Massachusetts and the District of Columbia
in the general election against Richard Nixon.) In
nearly every election since then, an anti-establishment
figure has sought the nomination.
Hillary will win the nomination – history proves endorsements are key
New York Times, 2015
(http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/us/elections/presidential-candidatesdashboard.html, September 17)
“Since 1980, the single best predictor of a party’s nominee is the number of endorsements
from party elites — elected officials and prominent past party leaders — in the months before
primaries begin,” as the political scientist Lynn Vavreck put it. Why? Political elites have a
better sense of which candidates can endure a long campaign, and they can influence voters
and donors by praising or criticizing candidates. One distinguishing feature of the 2016 cycle is
how few top Republicans have endorsed any candidate so far — Jeb Bush has received
endorsements from 6.6 percent of Republican senators, representatives and governors,
compared with Hillary Clinton’s 59 percent of Democratic officials.
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History proves Bernie won’t win because he has little support from black voters
Washington Post 2015 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2015/09/17/bernie-sanderss-surge-doesnt-mean-the-democratic-race-is-wide-openheres-why/, Sept 17)
But now, Hillary Clinton’s current popularity with African Americans dramatically exceeds
black support for Bernie Sanders. These data from daily surveys by Gallup in July and August,
indicate that most black people are unfamiliar with Sanders and that he is not particularly
popular among those that recognized his name.
So the challenge for Sanders is clear: a little known Senator, from an almost all-white state,
who has been criticized by black activists for preaching a message of economic equality that
ignores the historic and ongoing circumstances entangling race and class in the United States,
somehow needs to galvanize minority support for his candidacy against an opponent who has
been extremely popular with blacks and Latinos for over two decades.
Early wins by Sanders in Iowa and New Hampshire are unlikely to change that, too. Gary Hart,
whose 1984 candidacy is often compared to Sanders’s current campaign, could not translate
his better-than-expected strong showing in the Iowa caucuses and resounding victory in the
New Hampshire primary into a broader coalition beyond his white base. Nor could Barack
Obama’s early-state momentum erode Hillary Clinton’s strong support from Latinos in the 2008
primary.
Bernie can’t win Southern state primaries because he doesn’t have minority
votes
Washington Post 2015 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2015/09/17/bernie-sanderss-surge-doesnt-mean-the-democratic-race-is-wide-openheres-why/, Sept 17)
The remaining columns of the display show Hillary Clinton dominating Sanders among nonwhite voters both nationally and in South Carolina. (YouGov did not report percentages by race
in Iowa and New Hampshire because there were so few non-whites in the sample.) As the New
York Times recently reported, the Clinton campaign is looking to such strong support in
southern states with large minority electorates as a firewall against her rivals.
With non-whites comprising almost half of Barack Obama’s electoral coalition in 2012, Bernie
Sanders must make serious inroads with minority voters to have any chance of becoming the
Democratic presidential nominee.
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2NC/1NR- Uniqueness Wall- Hillary Good
Hillary Clinton will win the Hispanic vote- latest Univision poll proves
The Fiscal Times 2015 “As Trump Surges in the Polls, Hispanic Voters Flock to Hillary
Clinton” http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2015/07/17/Trump-Surges-Polls-Hispanic-Voters-FlockHillary-Clinton, July 17
The Washington Post reports that Hillary Clinton’s campaign is thrilled with the contrast
between Trump’s take-no-enemies approach and Clinton’s more seasoned and sober leadership
style and fluency in discussing domestic and foreign policy issues.¶ While Trump has made headlines by
denouncing illegal immigrants from Mexico as rapists, murderers and criminals and vowing to build a wall along the southwest
border to prevent further illegal crossings,
Clinton has spoken on the need for comprehensive immigration
reform, including a pathways to citizenship for many of the more than 11 million illegal
immigrants in the country.¶ Related: Ted Cruz on Donald Trump – I ‘Salute’ Him ¶ More important, though, is that –
whether or not he ultimately wins the GOP nomination—the bombastic Trump may be assuring his party’s failure in trying to woo
Latino voters.
A new Univision News poll shows that seven in ten Hispanic voters have a negative
view of Trump. And in a hypothetical matchup, Clinton beats Trump and other potential GOP
opponents by huge margins among Hispanic voters.¶ The Univision findings are part of a larger
bipartisan polling project conducted by the research firms of Bendixen & Amandi International
and the Tarrance Group to establish a baseline for attitudes of Hispanic voters on a range of
issues and candidates. Roughly 90 percent of Hispanic voters interviewed said they have heard
about Trump’s insulting comments, and when they have read specific remarks, nearly 8 in 10
say they find them offensive.
Hillary will win because of the strong economy
The Week, 2015 (http://theweek.com/articles/559639/why-economy-almost-guarantees-hillary-
win-almost, June 10)
If Mitt Romney couldn't beat President Obama in 2012 when the jobless rate was almost 8
percent, how can the next Republican nominee beat Hillary Clinton in 2016 when the
unemployment rate could be under 5 percent?
That's the big question Republican presidential candidates must ask themselves. And the
unpleasant political possibility for the GOP's White House hopefuls is that the improving U.S.
economy is, well, "likeable enough" for voters to give Democrats four more years in the Oval
Office. At the very least, the economy might be such a strong tailwind for Democrats that Jeb
Bush, Marco Rubio, or whoever else the GOP puts up would need to run a near-flawless
campaign to win.
Now, there are no economic guarantees here. Maybe the Yellen Fed will start reading too much
Austrian economics, freak out about inflation, and crank up interest rates so high that it causes a
recession. Of course, that's unlikely. The more likely scenario is more of the same, and the
slow-but-steady Obama-era recovery keeps chugging along.
Sure, the Fed probably will raise rates sometime this year. With inflation low, however, the pace
of tightening should be gradual. And even if economic growth doesn't accelerate much, it seems
good enough to keep generating gobs of jobs and a much lower unemployment rate. In a new
analysis, for instance, Goldman Sachs says the U.S. economy will add another 3.5 million net
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new jobs over the next year and half — on top of the 12 million created since the recovery
began — bringing the jobless rate to 4.8 percent by Election Day 2016. Compare that to the
Great Recession peak of 10 percent. Even a wooden politician like Clinton should be able to run
a successful "stay the course" campaign on those numbers.
Hillary will win because of white women voters, especially on security issues
The Week, 2015 (April 13, http://theweek.com/articles/549305/hillary-coalition-why-whitewomen-play-kingmaker-2016)
Democrats can win without white women, but they will win much easier with them,
particularly if they swing just a few percent of the vote among college-educated white women
in states like Wisconsin, Indiana, and North Carolina.
How? If the election hinges on foreign policy, Clinton can pick off women who want a stable
world and a strong leader who can make sense of the chaos. If there's a turn towards the
economy, the substance of her proposals will matter. But her general appeal has surprising
strengths, too.
In 2014, 58 percent of white women said they'd vote for Clinton a matchup with named
Republicans. And among voters without college degrees, the split between men and women
was profound, which, as The Washington Post noted, is striking because non-college whites of
both genders tend to oppose Democrats. Being female — or being Hillary — confers a real
advantage.
These numbers will fluctuate. And they will drop, inevitably. But Clinton's ceiling is surprisingly
high among a particular group of voters who haven't chosen a Democratic presidential
candidate in recent memory. White women are why Clinton is in such strong shape now. They
will be the key to her eventual success or defeat.
Scandals don’t matter – people vote for Hillary whether or not they believe her
HNGN, 2015
http://www.hngn.com/articles/96445/20150529/americans-hillary-clinton-dishonestuntrustworthy-still-strong-leader.htm, May 29
While only 39 percent said Clinton is honest and trustworthy, most voters still think she would
be a strong leader.
Sixty percent of respondents said Clinton has strong leadership qualities, while 37 percent
disagreed. Voters were divided 48 to 47 on whether Clinton cares about their needs and
problems. Among Democratic voters, 84 percent said they think Clinton cares about their
problems, while 42 percent of independents said the same.
If the Democratic primary were held today, Clinton would win by a long shot. Fifty-seven
percent said they would vote for Clinton, while 15 percent preferred Vermont Sen. Bernie
Sanders and 9 percent said they would vote for Vice President Joe Biden.
Clinton also leads when matched up head-to-head against nearly every Republican presidential
potential. Clinton leads Sen. Rand Paul of Kentucky by 4 points, 46 percent to 42 percent, and
leads Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida by 4 points, 45 percent to 41 percent.
"Can you get low marks on honesty and still be a strong leader? Sure you can," said Tim
Malloy, assistant director of the Quinnipiac University Poll. "Hillary Clinton crushes her
democratic rivals and keeps the GOP hoard at arm's length."
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**
Links- Hillary good
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Link Wall- Drone Affirmative
The drone lobby is massively influential and will backlash against Democrats
because of the plan and fund the GOP
Martin and Viveca 2012 (Gary Martin and Viveca Novak, “Drones: Despite Problems, A Push
to Expand Domestic Use”, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/11/drones-despiteproblems-a-push-to-e/, November 27, 2012)
WASHINGTON – Are unmanned aircraft, known to have difficulty avoiding collisions, safe to use
in America’s crowded airspace? And would their widespread use for surveillance result in
unconstitutional invasions of privacy? Experts say neither question has been answered
satisfactorily. Yet the federal government is rushing to open America’s skies to tens of
thousands of the drones – pushed to do so by a law championed by manufacturers of the
unmanned aircraft. The drone makers have sought congressional help to speed their entry into
a domestic market valued in the billions. The 60-member House of Representatives’ “drone
caucus” _ officially, the House Unmanned Systems Caucus – has helped push that agenda.
And over the last four years, caucus members have drawn nearly $8 million in drone-related
campaign contributions , an investigation by Hearst Newspapers and the Center for Responsive
Politics shows. The Federal Aviation Administration has been flooded with applications from
police departments, universities and private corporations, all seeking to use drones that range
from devices the size of a hummingbird to full-sized aircraft like those used by the U.S. military
to target al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan and elsewhere. PATROLLING THE BORDER Domestic
use of drones began with limited aerial patrols of the nation’s borders by Customs and Border
Patrol authorities. But the industry and its allies pushed for more , leading to provisions in the
FAA Modernization and Reform Act, signed into law on Feb. 14 of this year. cuellar.jpgThe law
requires the FAA to fully integrate the unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, into national airspace
by September 2015. And it contains a series of interim deadlines leading up to that one: This
month, the agency was supposed to produce a comprehensive plan for the integration, and in
August it was required to have a plan for testing at six different sites in the U.S. Neither plan has
been issued. “These timelines are very aggressive,” said Heidi Williams, a vice president of the
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, one of the stakeholders taking part in a working group
put together by the FAA to help develop a regulatory plan. “These issues are very complex, and
we have a long way to go.” Many potential uses for unmanned aircraft, which are cheaper to
operate than piloted planes or helicopters, have been identified. Among them: monitoring
pipelines and power lines, finding lost hikers, surveying crops, and assessing environmental
threats and damage from natural disasters. The FAA has predicted that 30,000 drones could be
flying in the United States in less than 20 years, sharing space with commercial, military and
general aviation. An FAA official, who spoke on background, said “one of the main safety issues”
with drones is lack of ability to “sense and avoid other aircraft.” A September report by the
Government Accountability Office identified the same concern: “Obstacles include the inability .
. . to sense and avoid other airborne objects in a manner similar to manned aircraft.” In addition,
the GAO report said, “Concerns about national security, privacy and interference with Global
Positioning System signals have not been resolved.” FAA Administrator Michael Huerta told a
conference on drones earlier this year in Las Vegas that the agency is making progress working
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through the issues. FAA is working with “collision avoidance experts” from the Defense
Department, NASA and private firms to determine what standards and requirements should be
set. SOURCES OF FUNDS House members from California, Texas, Virginia and New York on the
bipartisan “drone caucus” received the lion’s share of the funds channeled to lawmakers from
dozens of firms that are members of the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems
International, Hearst and CRP found. Eleven drone caucus lawmakers from California, where
many aviation firms are located, received more than $2.4 million from manufacturers’ political
action committees and employees during the 2012 and 2010 election cycles, according to CRP
tabulation of Federal Election Commission reports. Eight Texas House members in the caucus
received more than $746,000. And four caucus members from New York got more than
$185,000 from companies connected to the business of unmanned vehicles. Rep. Henry Cuellar,
D-Laredo, said drone manufacturers contribute just as other interest groups do. “We get
contributions from media PACs, from teachers, from doctors and from a whole lot of companies
that produce drones,” Cuellar said. EDUCATING LAWMAKERS The House “drone caucus” was
established three years ago. Senate lawmakers followed suit this fall. Sen. Joe Manchin, DW.Va., co-chairman of the fledgling Senate drone caucus, said the caucus would help frame
future legislation because the use of drones “carries great potential – and great risk.” The
Senate caucus has only eight members, including Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand, D-N.Y. Gillibrand did
not return a request for comment. Cuellar also said the purpose of the House caucus is to
educate other members on the need for and uses of drones for public safety, border
enforcement, search-and-rescue and commercial uses. mckeon.jpgThe global market for drones
is expected to double in the next decade, from $6.6 billion to $11.4 billion, and could top $2.4
billion in the U.S. alone, said Philip Finnegan, director of corporate analysis with the Teal Group,
an independent research group which studies the industry. Growth in UAV technology and
operations is encouraged by AUVSI, which represents drone and systems manufacturers. AUVSI
firms have been far more generous to Republicans than Democrats when it comes to campaign
donations. According to CRP analysis, GOP drone caucus members received 74 percent of the
group’s donations. In the House, the top recipient was Rep. Howard “Buck” McKeon, R-Calif.,
chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. He received $833,650 in drone-related
campaign contributions. McKeon and Cuellar are co-chairmen of the caucus. Other Republican
California lawmakers – Reps. Darrell Issa, Jerry Lewis, Duncan Hunter and Ken Calvert – each
received more than $200,000 from drone firms. And in Texas, Rep. Silvestre Reyes, D-El Paso, a
former U.S. Border Patrol sector chief who lost his seat in the Democratic primary, received
$310,000. Rep. Michael McCaul, R-Austin, chairman of the House Homeland Security
subcommittee on oversight, received $100,000, and Cuellar received almost $77,000. The two
have pushed for drone surveillance of the U.S.-Mexico border. CRP’s analysis also showed that
companies with drone aircraft currently used by the military , but with potential civilian
applications, were among the largest donors to caucus members. Those firms include BAE
Systems, which makes the Mantis and Taranis drones; Boeing Co., maker of the hydrogenfueled Phantom Eye; Honeywell International, RQ-16 T-Hawk; Lockheed Martin , RQ-170
Sentinel; Raytheon Co., Cobra; and General Atomics, Pred ator. PRIVACY CONCERNS
mccaul.jpgSome lawmakers remain skeptical. Along with civil rights advocates, they worry over
government eavesdropping, surveillance photography and other potential privacy violations.
“The drones are coming,” shouted Rep. Ted Poe, R-Humble, earlier this year from the House
floor, as he warned of encroachment by government into the rights of citizens. A North Dakota
court upheld the arrest of a Lakota, N.D., farmer by a police SWAT team using information from
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a Customs and Border Protection Predator drone over the northern U.S.-Canadian border. The
June 2011 incident began when several cows found their way to Rodney Bossart’s 3,000-acre
farm. He claimed ownership of the wayward bovines and allegedly brandished firearms at law
enforcement officials. During the ensuing standoff, a SWAT team received surveillance
information from Customs and Border Protection, gathered from a high-flying Predator drone.
That information was used to locate and arrest the farmer. The Bossart case was apparently the
first use of national security surveillance to aid the arrest of a U.S. citizen on non-terror-related
charges. More such cases should be expected, said Jay Stanley, a senior policy analyst with the
American Civil Liberties Union. “Based on current trends, technology development, law
enforcement interest, political and industry pressure, and the lack of legal safeguards – it is clear
that drones pose a looming threat to Americans’ privacy,” Stanley said. Law enforcement
agencies say drones will better protect the safety of officers and the public in dangerous
situations, and can be used for search and rescue during natural disasters. They have joined
drone manufacturers in pressuring Congress to relax limitations.
Americans support drones usage
U.S. News, 7-17-2015, "Poll: Americans OK with some domestic drones," NBC News,
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/06/13/12205763-poll-americans-ok-withsome-domestic-drones-but-not-to-catch-speeders?lite)//GV
This undated photo provided by U.S. Customs and Border Protection shows an unmanned drone used to patrol the U.S.-Canadian border.
The planes, which are based out of North Dakota, venture as far as Eastern Washington on their patrols. Americans
overwhelmingly support the use of drones for patrolling U.S. borders, tracking
down criminals and aiding search-and-rescue missions, but they don’t want the unmanned craft used to issue speeding tickets, according to
a poll. The Monmouth University Polling Institute of New Jersey said it tested the four scenarios in anticipation of a national push that,
according to estimates from the Federal Aviation Administration, could see up to 30,000
drones patrolling U.S. skies within a decade.
The FAA, under orders from Congress in a bill signed into law Feb. 14 by
President Barack Obama, is expediting the expansion of domestic drone use.
And that’s OK with most Americans, the
poll found. “Americans clearly support using drone technology in special circumstances,
but they are a bit leery of more routine use by local law enforcement agencies,” Patrick Murray, director of the Monmouth University
Polling Institute, said in a statement. The FAA issued 61 drone authorizations between November 2006 and June 30, 2011, including 13 for
local police agencies and one for a state police agency. About 20 went to colleges and universities and others went to federal agencies.
Survey: World's opinion of US, Obama slips The Department of Homeland Security, through the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
in 2012 offered about $830 million in grants to states and cities for emergency preparedness. Drones could be funded under several of its
programs. The Monmouth University poll of 1,708 people called June 4-6 has a margin of error of 2.4 percent, the Institute said. Its chief
findings: More
than half of Americans, 56 percent, had read “some” or a “great
deal” about the U.S. military use of drones. The rest, about 44 percent, read “just a little or none at all.”
About two out of three Americans, or 67 percent, oppose the use of drones to issue speeding tickets. About 23 percent support it. 64
percent support the use of drones to control illegal immigration on the
nation’s borders. 80 percent support the use of drones to help with search
and rescue missions. 67 percent support the use of drones to track down
runaway criminals. 64 percent are “very concerned” or “somewhat concerned” about their privacy if U.S. law enforcement
uses drones with high-tech cameras.
Americans support the US of drones for policing- outweighs
privacy concerns
Steve Watson, 9-28-2012, "Almost Half Of All Americans Support Domestic
Surveillance Drones," http://www.infowars.com/almost-half-of-all-americans-supportdomestic-surveillance-drones/)//GV
Close to half of Americans say they are in favour of police departments deploying surveillance drones domestically. According to
a survey conducted by The Associated Press and The National Constitution Center, 44
percent support the idea of police using unmanned aerial vehicles to track
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suspects and carry out investigations. Only 36 percent said that they
“strongly oppose” or “somewhat oppose” police use of drones, according to
the survey. The poll also found that only one third of Americans say they are significantly concerned about their privacy being
eroded by the adoption of drones by police forces throughout the country. Thrity-five percent of respondents said they were “extremely
concerned” or “very concerned” when asked if they believed that police departments’ use of drones for surveillance would impact their
privacy. Almost exactly the same number,
36 percent, noted that they were “not too concerned” or “not
concerned at all”, while twenty-four percent were neutral on the issue, saying they were only
“somewhat concerned” about a potential loss of privacy.
David Eisner, president and CEO of the constitution
center in Philadelphia, told the AP that he was somewhat baffled by the response to the poll:
US public generally supports domestic drones
Mike Davin, 8-19-2013, "Poll shows Americans support multiple domestic drone
uses," No Publication, http://thebusinessofrobotics.com/law-policy/poll-showsamericans-support-multiple-domestic-drone-uses/)//GV
A poll conducted by Monmouth University last month shows that the U.S. public supports certain
domestic uses of unmanned aerial vehicles, particularly applications related to search and rescue.
However, most Americans haven’t heard a lot about the use of UAVs by law enforcement within the U.S. and harbor some privacy concerns.
Of the individuals surveyed, 60 percent had heard “a great deal” or “some” about the use of UAVs by the U.S. military overseas. In contrast,
less than half (47 percent) could say the same about the use of UAVs by law enforcement agencies within the United States. Nevertheless,
respondents were not closed off to the idea of using UAVs domestically . While the vast majority were
unenthusiastic about being issued a speeding ticket by a UAV,
83 percent supported their use for search and
rescue missions and 62 percent supported their use to control illegal immigration. These attitudes
mirror those seen in a similar survey conducted by the university last year. With regard to weaponized UAVs
within U.S. borders, a slight majority (52 percent) supported their use by
law enforcement in hostage situations. Fewer (44 percent) supported using armed drones to patrol U.S.
borders. When asked about privacy concerns associated with law enforcement using unmanned systems, 49 percent said they were “very
concerned” while 20 percent were “somewhat concerned.” Responses also showed some skepticism about whether federal and state law
enforcement would use UAVs appropriately, with only 11 percent “very confident” in federal agencies and 12 percent in local police
departments.
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Link Wall- Stingray Affirmative
The public is increasingly willing to allow law enforcement to spy on them if it
keeps them safer
NEW YORK TIMES 2013- New York Times, 5/01, “U.S. poll finds-strong-acceptance-forpublic-surveillance” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/us/poll-finds-strong-acceptance-forpublic-surveillance.html
Americans overwhelmingly favor installing video surveillance cameras in public places, judging
the infringement on their privacy as an acceptable trade-off for greater security from terrorist
attacks, according to the latest New York Times/CBS News Poll.¶ A week after the Boston Marathon attack, which was unraveled
after the release of video footage of the two suspects flushed them out of hiding, 78 percent of people said surveillance cameras
were a good idea, the poll found.¶ The receptiveness to cameras on street corners reflects a public that regards terrorism as a fact
of life in the United States — 9 out of 10 people polled said Americans would always have to live with the risk —
but also a
threat that many believe the government can combat effectively through rigorous law
enforcement and proper regulation.¶ For all that confidence, there are lingering questions about the role of the
nation’s intelligence agencies before the attacks, with people divided about whether they had collected information that could have
prevented them (41 percent said they had; 45 percent said they had not).¶ The murkiness of the case — the Tsarnaev brothers’ ties
to the Caucasus; the warnings from Russian intelligence about potential extremist sympathies — has clearly left an impression on
the public. A majority, 53 percent, said the suspects had links to a larger terrorist group, while 32 percent said they had acted
alone.¶ President Obama, in a White House news conference on Tuesday, defended the performance of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security, saying the agencies had done their job, while acknowledging, “This is hard
stuff.Ӧ The
poll suggested that Americans are willing to tolerate further tough measures to foil
future attacks. Sixty-six percent said information about how to make explosives should not be allowed on the Internet, where
it would be available to aspiring terrorists, even if some would view that as a form of censorship. Thirty percent
said it should be permitted in the interest of free expression.
Millennials like the NSA
Santos, Red Alert Politics staff writer, 2015
(Maria, “Poll: The NSA is more popular among millennials than any other generation”, 3-4,
http://redalertpolitics.com/2015/03/04/poll-nsa-popular-among-millennials-generation/)
Pew’s new poll on public views of various government agencies finds that a lot of agencies are
viewed favorably by the majority of Americans—including the NSA, CDC, CIA, and VA. The IRS,
however, is the one agency with a favorable-view percentage below 50 percent—no surprise here. Some of the most interesting
numbers come from views of the NSA. Overall, 51 percent view the agency favorably, and 37
percent unfavorably. Democrats are bigger fans than Republicans—58 to 47 percent. (The CIA
is the only agency that Republicans favor more than Democrats—64 to 46 percent.) And
millennials—generally thought to distrust institutions—have more favorable views of the
NSA than any other generation. 61 percent of 18-29 years view the NSA favorably. That
number dwindles down to 55 percent within the 30-49 age group, and down further, to 40
percent, among those 65 and older.
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Link Wall- Security Letters Affirmative
Americans fear terrorism more than the loss of civil liberties
Gao, 5/29 (George, Pew Research, 2015, http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/05/29/what-americans-think-about-nsa-surveillance-national-security-and-privacy/)
Overall, Americans hold
nuanced views on the issue: A majority is against the government
collecting bulk data on its citizens, and most believe there are not adequate limits on the types of data collected. But
Americans do generally support monitoring the communications activity of suspected
terrorists. The expiring Section 215 of the Patriot Act enables the government to collect phone metadata, with authority from a
secret national security court known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court – details that former National Security Agency
contractor Edward Snowden leaked to news organizations two years ago. Also expiring are the law’s “lone wolf” and “roving
wiretap” provisions, which, respectively, enable the government to collect data on non-U.S. suspects who are not linked to foreign
governments or terrorist groups, and enable officials to monitor certain suspects on multiple communication devices rather than a
single one. Pew Research Center has been studying various dimensions of Americans’ views about national security, surveillance and
privacy. Here are some key takeaways: 1Americans' Views of NSA SurveillanceA majority of Americans (54%) disapprove of the U.S.
government’s collection of telephone and internet data as part of anti-terrorism efforts, while 42% approve of the program.
Democrats are divided on the program, while Republicans and independents are more likely to disapprove than approve, according
to a survey we conducted last spring. 2More broadly, most Americans don’t see a need to sacrifice civil liberties to be safe from
terrorism: In spring 2014, 74% said they should not give up privacy and freedom for the sake of safety, while just 22% said the
opposite. This view had hardened since December 2004, when 60% said they should not have to give up more privacy and freedom
to be safe from terrorism. While
they have concerns about government surveillance, Americans also
say anti-terrorism policies have not gone far enough to adequately protect them. More (49%)
say this is their bigger concern than say they are concerned that policies have gone too far in
restricting the average person’s civil liberties (37%), according to a January survey. While Americans held this view between
2004 and 2010, they briefly held the opposite view in July 2013, shortly after the Snowden leaks.
Most voters support surveillance, including Democrats
Agiesta, 6/1 (Jennifer, “Poll: 6 in 10 back renewal of NSA data collection,” CNN, 2015,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/01/politics/poll-nsa-data-collection-cnn-orc/)
Washington (CNN) Americans overwhelmingly want to see Congress renew the law enabling the
government to collect data on the public's telephone calls in bulk, though they are split on whether
allowing that law to expire increases the risk of terrorism in the U.S. With the provisions of the Patriot Act which
allow the National Security Administration to collect data on Americans' phone calls newly
expired, a new CNN/ORC poll finds 61% of Americans think the law ought to be renewed,
including majorities across party lines, while 36% say it should not be reinstated. Republican leaders in the Senate are
working to pass a bill to reinstate the law, after delays led by Sen. Rand Paul (R-Kentucky), whose presidential campaign has been
noted for its appeal to independent voters and younger Republicans, and other surveillance opponents led to the law's expiration at
12:01 a.m. Monday. But Paul's stance on the issue is unlikely to bring him many fans within his own party. Support for renewal peaks
among Republicans, 73% of whom back the law. Democrats
largely agree, with 63% saying the law should be
renewed. Independents are least apt to back it, with 55% saying renew it and 42% let it expire. Liberals, regardless of partisan
affiliation, are most likely to say the law should not be renewed, 50% say so while 48% want to see it renewed. About half of
Americans, 52%, say that if the law is not renewed, the risk of terrorism here in the U.S. would remain about the same. Still, a
sizable 44% minority feel that without the law, the risk of terrorism will rise. Just 3% feel it would
decrease. The sense that the risk will rise is greatest among Republicans, 61% of whom say the risk
of terrorism will climb if the NSA is unable to collect this data. Among Democrats and independents, less than
half feel the risk of terrorism would increase if the program ended. The poll reveals a steep generational divide on the data
collection program. Among those under age 35, just 25% say the risk of terrorism would increase without NSA data collection. That
more than doubles to 60% among those age 65 or older. Those under age 35 are also split on whether the law should be renewed at
all, 50% say it should be renewed while 49% say it should not. Among those age 35 or older,
65% back renewal of the law.
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2NC/1NR Answers to: No Link – Surveillance Policy Not Key to
Election
National Security outweighs any economic considerations for 2016 for voters
Kraushaar and Roarty 15 [Josh Krushaar and Alex Roarty, political editor for National Journal, and pens the weekly
"Against the Grain" column. Kraushaar has held several positions since joining Atlantic Media in 2010, including as managing editor
for politics at National Journal, Alex is the chief political correspondent for National Journal Hotline. “GOP Poll: Foreign Policy, Not
Economy, Voters’ Top Concern”, http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/gop-poll-foreign-policy-not-economy-voters-top-concern20150414, April 14th, 2015//Rahul]
GOP poll is reinforcing Republican strategists' conviction that foreign policy will be a major
issue in 2016—one the party believes it can wield to its advantage against Democratic congressional candidates and Hillary
Clinton. The internal survey, conducted by the GOP firm OnMessage, found that security issues ranked first on a list
of top priorities for voters, ahead of economic growth, fiscal responsibility , and moral issues, among
others. A 22 percent plurality of all respondents ranked it as the top issue, compared with 13 percent who listed economic growth as
their top concern. (14 percent listed "fiscal responsibility" at the head of their list.) The
poll was conducted March 23
to 25 for the Republican super PAC American Action Network, the John Boehner-linked third party group
that spent tens of millions of dollars last election aiding House Republican campaigns. The poll surveyed 1,400 people and has a
margin of error of 2.6 percent. The
findings confirm other surveys showing national security has spiked
as a leading issue in the upcoming elections. In January, the Pew Research Center found that, for the first time in
five years, an equal share of voters rated defending the U.S. against terrorism (76 percent) as important a policy priority as the
economy (75 percent). Foreign
policy moved down the list of public concerns following the 2008
financial crisis, but the polls are a sign the issue has returned with vigor to the public
consciousness. And Republicans see the surveys as a sign that the issue is poised to help their candidates in an important way
for the first time since public opinion turned against the Iraq War after the 2004 election. "It really started before the [2014]
election, as ISIS
and their conquest really took center stage … probably about midsummer, we
started noticing that concerns about foreign affairs and defense were popping up," said Wes
Anderson, a Republican pollster who conducted the survey. "Honestly, we haven't seen that since 2004 in any real
significance. [It was present] in 2006, but obviously in a very negative way for Republicans."
Voters worry about terrorism more than the economy
Ariel Edwards, Huffington post reporter-Levy Become A Fan, 3-5-2015, "Americans Expect The
2016 Elections To Focus On Foreign Policy," Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/05/2016-foreign-policy-poll_n_6811176.html)//GV
Overall, Americans
are about equally likely to say the economy has gotten better over the past year as they
contrast, by a 50-point margin, they say the
threat of terrorism is increasing, as opposed to decreasing. And while the gulf between the parties in perceptions
of the economy are wide, the gap on terrorism is even wider. Republicans are 20 points more likely than Democrats to say the economy is
getting worse, but 35 points more likely to say terrorism is increasing.
are to say it has gotten worse, a more positive outlook than last year. By
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Unpopular move by Obama would kill Hillary’s campaign – we’re at the tipping
point
Judis, 2014 (John B., “History Shows That Hillary Clinton Is Unlikely to Win in 2016,” New
Republic, November 17, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120303/democrats-hillaryclinton-could-lose-2016-presidential-election)
The chief obstacle that any Democratic nominee will face is public resistance to installing a
president from the same party in the White House for three terms in a row. If you look at the presidents since
World War II, when the same party occupied the White House for two terms in a row, that party’s candidate lost in the next election
six out of seven times. The one exception was George H.W. Bush's 1988 victory after two terms of Ronald Reagan, but Bush, who
was seventeen points behind Democratic nominee Michael Dukakis at the Republican convention, was only able to win because his
campaign manager Lee Atwater ran a brilliant campaign against an extraordinarily weak opponent. (Democrats might also insist that
Al Gore really won in 2000, but even if he had, he would have done so very narrowly with unemployment at 4.0 percent.) There are
three reasons why the three-term obstacle has prevailed. The first and most obvious has been because the
incumbent has
become unpopular during his second term, and his unpopularity has carried over to the
nominee. That was certainly the case with Harry Truman and Adlai Stevenson in 1952, Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey in
1968, Gerald Ford (who had succeeded Richard Nixon) in 1976, and George W. Bush and John McCain in 2008. The second reason
has to do with an
accumulation over eight years of small or medium-sized grievances that, while not
affecting the incumbent’s overall popularity, still weighed down the candidate who hoped to succeed him.
Dwight Eisenhower remained highly popular in 1960, but some voters worried about repeated recessions during his presidency, or
about his support for school integration; Bill Clinton remained popular, and unemployment low, in 2000, but his second term had
been marred by the Monica Lewinsky scandal, and coal-state voters worried about Democrats’ support for Kyoto while white
Southern voters worried about the administration’s support for African American causes. The third reason
has to do with
the voters’ blaming party gridlock between the president and congress partly on the president
and his party. That was a factor in 1960—James McGregor Burns was inspired to write The
Deadlock of Democracy by the Eisenhower years—and it was also a factor in the 2000 elections. In the 2016 election, not
just one, but all three of these factors will be in play and will jeopardize the Democratic nominee.
Obama and his administration are likely to remain unpopular among voters. There is already an
accretion of grievances among Obama and the Democrats that will carry over to the nominee.
These include the Affordable Care Act, which, whatever benefits it has brought to many Americans, has alienated many senior
citizens (who see the bill as undermining Medicare), small business owners and employees, and union leaders and workers whose
benefits will now be taxed. Add to these the grievances around the administration’s stands on coal, immigration, guns, and civil
rights, including most recently its support for the protestors in Ferguson. There are, of course, many
voters who would
vote for a Republican regardless of who had been in office, but there are many voters in the
middle (especially in presidential years) whose vote, or failure to vote at all, will be swayed by a
particular grievance. That certainly hurt Al Gore in 2000, McCain in 2008, and could hurt the Democratic nominee in 2016.
It’s a very rough measure, but you can look at the shift in the independent vote in 1960, 1968, 1976, 2000, and 2008 to see how the
accretion of grievances can sway voters in the middle. There are, of course, mitigating factors that could help a Democrat to succeed
in 2016. Demography and turnout are important, although not decisive. (A Democrat still has to win over 40 percent of the white
vote to succeed, as well as nearly 70 percent of the Hispanic vote.) The quality of the candidate is also important. If the opposition
party nominates candidates who are ineffective, as Dukakis was, or are incapable of moving to the center (either temperamentally
or because of party pressures), then the candidate of the party in the White House can win. Equally, if the party in the White House
nominates someone who is greatly admired (as Herbert Hoover was in 1928), or runs a terrific campaign (as Bush-Atwater did in
1988), they can win. Can the Democrats overcome the third-term hitch in 2016? If the
nominee is Hillary Clinton, as
now appears likely, she should be able to command significant support among women and minorities—two key Democratic
constituencies. Her experience gives her credibility as a candidate (the dynastic factor is primarily of interest to the press). And she is
not positioned too far to the left. But in her 2008 run, neither she nor her campaign managers displayed the political skill of the last
presidential victors. And she
will have difficulty dissociating herself from the voters’ disapproval of
Obama’s administration.
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2NC/1NR Answer to: No Link – Election Too Far Off
Presidential election is decided based on perceptions made now
Sosnik 2015 [Doug Sosnik, senior adviser to President Clinton and co-wrote a New York Times best-seller. “The End of the 2016
Election Is Closer Than You Think”, 7/12 http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/07/the-end-of-the-2016-election-is-closerthan-you-think-119947_Page2.html#.VaUvsflVhBc
The end of the 2016 presidential election is actually much closer than you might think. In every
game there are decisive moments that determine the ultimate outcome. We like to think that presidential
elections are dramatic fall campaigns pitting party against party, but the truth is that the most
decisive moments often occur long before the general election kicks off. If history is any guide, the
outcome of next year’s presidential campaign will likely be determined before the Republican
Party has even selected their nominee. That uncomfortable fact means that the longer and more divisive the
Republican primary, the less likely the party will be to win back the White House in 2016. In eight out of the last nine
presidential elections these decisive periods of time can all be traced back to the run up to the
general election—not the fall campaign. With the exception of the 2000 election—which was an outlier on every
front—voters locked in their attitudes about the direction of the country, the state of their own well-being and the presidential
candidates—and their political party—prior to the start of the general election. Once voters’ views solidified, subsequent campaign
events or activities simply served to reinforce their initial perceptions about the candidate and party best prepared to lead the
country. In general, the job
approval ratings of the incumbent president, regardless of whether they are running
as a proxy for the electorate’s mood and have historically been the most
accurate predictor of election outcomes. And the public’s view of the state of the economy and its expectations for
for reelection, serve
the future are the strongest drivers of the job approval ratings of the sitting president. Since 1980 there have been five presidential
elections where the incumbent had a job approval rating near or above 50 percent prior to the start of the general election. In each
of these elections, the incumbent’s party won the election. In the three instances when the incumbent president’s job approval fell
below 40 percent prior to the start of the general election, their party lost each time. Conventional wisdom has it that the 1980
presidential election was an exception to this rule, but in truth that race only bolsters the pattern. The lore from the race had Jimmy
Carter headed to re-election before his support disintegrated in the final two weeks of the election, leading to a massive defeat at
the hands of Ronald Reagan. But that analysis ignored the most significant factors that ultimately determined the outcome of the
election. It’s true that Carter led in the polls in the three-way race until the middle of October. However, by mid-May his job
approval rating had dropped to 38 percent; it remained under 40 percent for the rest of the campaign. Despite the fact that he led in
the polls until mid-October, Carter’s job approval numbers reflected the fact that the country had decided six months before the
election that they had had enough of him. By the end of October the anti-incumbent vote had consolidated around Reagan, with
Carter’s final 41 percent vote reflecting his low approval ratings throughout the year. Since
Reagan’s 1980 victory, the
media have continued to over-emphasize the significance of the general election in
presidential races. Rather than reporting on the fundamentals that will ultimately determine
election outcomes, the media continue to place a relentless focus on the daily tracking polls—despite the fact that they have
proven increasingly inaccurate over the last 20 years. The last presidential race is a good example. In 2012, reporters who followed
the ups and downs of the tracking polls concluded that Romney had surged following the first presidential debate. But in reality
Obama had already put the election away long before the Republicans had selected their
nominee. Obama’s final 51 percent of the vote closely tracked his job approval numbers that remained steady and well within
that range during the last year of his first term. It’s not just history that suggests that the significance of the general election has
diminished. There has also been a steady increase in voters casting ballots long before Election Day, with 33 states plus the District
of Columbia allowing some form of early voting. Today, every state west of the Mississippi allows early voting. In three of those
states—Colorado, Oregon and Washington—all votes are cast by mail before Election Day. In the 2012 election, nationwide 32
percent of all ballots were cast early, with an increasing number of states allowing voting to begin 45 days before Election Day. In
these states ballots are being cast prior to the fall presidential debates. There is every indication that past trends will continue to
hold in 2016 and that the outcome of the presidential election will come into focus well before the general election. During this
period when voters are beginning to seriously contemplate the type of person they want to lead the country, the Republicans will
likely be in the middle of a prolonged and messy internecine intra-party fight—a fight that the unique attributes of the 2016 election
will likely make more vocal, extreme and prolonged than the party will wish. This period
of primaries and caucuses
will be marked by a relentless barrage of negative ads by the candidates designed to drive
down the image of their opponents. At the same time, Republicans will be focused on locking down the hearts
and minds of their right-wing base voters rather than appealing for mainstream support. If these challenges aren’t enough, there are
a series of factors—when taken together—during this critical period that that will further complicate Republicans’ attempts to take
back the White House.
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2NC/1NR Answer to: Impact Turn – Iran Deal
The deal imposes new restrictions and monitoring solve that are key to prevent
Iranian Proliferation
Cirincione 7/14 (Joe, president of Ploughshares Fund and author of Nuclear Nightmares:
Securing the World Before It Is Too Late, former director for non-proliferation at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, “A Huge Deal; This agreement will shrink wrap Iran’s
nuclear program for a generation,” Slate, 7/14/2015,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2015/07/iran_and_united_states_
nuclear_deal_why_this_historical_deal_is_what_we.1.html)//duncan
The deal just struck by Iran, the United States, and five other world powers in Vienna is a
major victory for U.S. national security. It shrinks Iran’s nuclear complex down to a token
capability and wraps it in a permanent inspection and monitoring regime.¶ The new agreement doesn’t
overthrow the clerical regime ruling Iran. It doesn’t change Iran’s policies toward Israel or its Arab neighbors. And it doesn’t force Iran to end the
repression of its own people.¶
The agreement
forged between Iran and the world’s powers does only one thing, but it is a big one:
It
reverses and contains what most experts consider the greatest nuclear proliferation
challenge in the world. Whatever else Iran may do in the world, it will not do it backed with
the threat of a nuclear weapon.¶ U.S. negotiators went into the Iran talks with three key objectives: cut off all of Iran’s pathways to
a nuclear bomb, put in place a monitoring system to catch any Iranian cheating, and keep together the global coalition that can snap back sanctions if
Iran breaks the deal. After 22 months of hard bargaining they have emerged with that and more. This
detailed 100-plus-page
agreement dismantles much of Iran’s nuclear program, freezes it, and puts a camera on it.¶
The deal eliminates the three ways Iran could build a bomb.¶ First, without the deal, Iran could
use its centrifuges to purify enough uranium for one or more bombs within weeks. These high-tech
machines are the size and shape of water heaters but made of specialized metal alloys. They spin uranium gas at supersonic speeds, cascading the gas
through assemblies of thousands of machines. When it reaches a purity level of about 5 percent, the gas can be turned into a powder form used to
make fuel rods for nuclear reactors.¶ Iran
says that is all it wants to do—make fuel. The problem is that the
same machines in the same facilities can keep going until the uranium is enriched to 90
percent purity. Then the gas can be turned into the metal core of a weapon.¶ This deal blocks
that path. Iran has agreed to rip out over two-thirds of the 19,000 centrifuges it has installed.
Just over 5,000 centrifuges will be allowed to continue enriching uranium. All will be located at
one facility at Natanz. The deep underground facility at Fordow that so worried Israeli planners (since it could not be
destroyed with their weapons) will be shrunk to a couple of hundred operating centrifuges—and these are prohibited from doing
any uranium enrichment. They will be used to purify other elements and be closely monitored. ¶ Furthermore,
Iran must shrink its stored stockpile of uranium gas from some 10,000 kilograms to just 300
kilograms—and cannot enrich any uranium above 3.67 percent. This limit lasts for 15 years. ¶
Together, these cuts mean that even if Iran tried to renege on the agreement, it would take it at least a
year to make enough uranium for one bomb —more than enough time to detect the effort and
take economic, diplomatic, or military steps to stop it.¶ Uranium path, blocked.¶ Without the deal there
is a second way Iran could make a bomb—with plutonium. The bomb at Hiroshima was made of uranium; the bomb
at Nagasaki was made of plutonium. Unlike uranium, plutonium does not exist in nature. It is made inside nuclear reactors, as part of the fission
process, and then extracted from the spent fuel rods. Iran
is constructing a research reactor at Arak that would
have produced about 8 kilograms of plutonium each year, or enough theoretically for about
two bombs.¶ Under the new deal, Iran has agreed to completely reconfigure the Arak reactor so that it
will produce less than 1 kilogram a year. The old core will be shipped out of the country. Further,
Iran has agreed to never build facilities that could reprocess fuel rods and all spent fuel will be
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shipped out the country.¶ Plutonium path, blocked.¶ Finally, without the deal Iran could try to build a
covert facility where it could secretly enrich uranium. The verification and monitoring system
required by this deal makes that all but impossible.¶ Inspectors will now track Iran’s uranium
from the time it comes out of the ground to the time it ends up as gas stored in cylinders. There
will be state-of-the-art fiber-optic seals, sensors, and cameras at every facility, inventories of all equipment, tracking of scientists and nuclear workers,
and 24/7 inspections. Inspectors
will also monitor the manufacture of all centrifuges and related
machinery. A special “procurement channel” will be set up through which all of Iran’s
imported nuclear-related equipment must go.¶ This makes it extraordinarily difficult for Iran
to cheat. Iran might want to set up a covert enrichment plant, but where would it get the
uranium? Or the centrifuges? Or the scientists? If a 100 scientists suddenly don’t show up for
work at Natanz, it will be noticed. If the uranium in the gas doesn’t equal the uranium mined,
it will be noticed. If the parts made for centrifuges don’t end up in new centrifuges, it will be
noticed. Iran might be able to evade one level of monitoring but the chance that it could
evade all the overlapping levels will be remote.¶
Covert path, blocked.¶ This agreement, however, does leave Iran with
significant capabilities. It would be better if the entire nuclear complex was razed to the ground and the earth salted so it could never be rebuilt.¶ But
we are not Rome and Iran is not Carthage. Such
a deal was the preferred option of most nonproliferation
experts, including myself, 12 years ago when Iran’s enrichment program was first disclosed. But the Bush administration rejected talks with Iran,
when it had only a few dozen centrifuges. “We don’t negotiate with evil,” said Vice President Dick Cheney, “we defeat it.” That strategy failed. Iran’s
talks with the European Union collapsed; Iran had 6,000 centrifuges by the end of the Bush administration, and even as sanctions against it increased,
Iran built thousands more.¶ The interim agreement reached in November of 2013 froze that progress, and rolled back some of the most dangerous
parts, including the stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned with his cartoon bomb diagram at
the U.N. could lead to an Iranian bomb “within weeks.”¶ This final comprehensive agreement goes much further. It is cleverly crafted so that all sides
can claim victory. Iran can say with pride that its rights have been recognized, that sanctions will be lifted, and that it will not destroy a single nuclear
facility.¶ And they will be correct. The
beauty of this agreement is that Iran gets to keep its buildings and
we get to take out all the furniture.¶ Centrifuges cut by two-thirds, research and new facilities
limited for 10 years.¶ Uranium gas stockpile cut by 97 percent, no new enrichment above 4
percent and no new facilities for 15 years.¶ Plutonium production in new reactor cut 90
percent, no new reactors for 15 years.¶ Monitoring of all centrifuge manufacturing for 20
years.¶ Confinement of all purchases to monitored procurement channel for 25 years.¶
Monitoring of all uranium mines for 25 years.¶ Permanent ban on any nuclear weapons
research or activities.¶ Permanent ban on reprocessing of fuel to extract plutonium.¶
Permanent intrusive inspections.¶ These terms effectively freeze the program for longer than
it has been in full operation. It will shrink and confine Iran’s nuclear work for a generation.
The Deal creates cooperation and barriers that solve proliferation
Slavin 7/14 (Barbara, Washington correspondent for Al-Monitor, a senior fellow at the
Atlantic Council and author of "Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the US and the Twisted Path
to Confrontation,” been to Iran 9 times, “Iran nuclear deal shifts tectonic plates in the Middle
East,” Al Jazeera, 7/14/2015, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/7/14/iran-nucleardeal-shifts-mideast-tectonic-plates.html)//duncan
Iran and a U.S.-led consortium of the world’s top powers have achieved a historic agreement
that should keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons for at least a decade and could lay the
basis for broader cooperation on the multiple crises roiling the Middle East.¶ U.S. officials were quick
to underline that other differences with Iran remain — over its support for groups on the State Department’s terrorism list, its
human rights abuses and its challenge of Israel’s right to exist. But there was no disguising the sense that the
tectonic plates
of international relations are shifting in promising if, for many old U.S. regional allies, unsettling ways.¶
Exhausted diplomats from Iran, the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany, Russia and China (the P5+1) as well as the European Union
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finalized a 159-page joint comprehensive plan of action in the middle of the night in Vienna as the last piece of what negotiators
have called a Rubik’s Cube locked into place. This was a disagreement over how long restrictions should be maintained over Iran’s
conventional arms trade even as other sanctions imposed because of its nuclear activities are lifted several months from now. ¶
Economic impact of Iranian sanctions being lifted 3:00¶ President Barack
Obama, addressing Americans at the
unusually early hour of 7 a.m., said the deal “meets every single one of the bottom lines we
established” to block four pathways to an Iranian nuclear weapon. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani,
speaking to his nation shortly afterward, declared the agreement a “win-win situation for both parties” that preserves Iranian honor
and scientific achievements while ending crippling [devastating] economic sanctions.¶ What follows is a complicated process of
implementation that will certainly be challenged by opponents in several countries but that could be viewed as an achievement as
historic as the U.S. opening to China and U.S.-Soviet détente in the 1970s.¶ Obama alluded to an earlier era of arms talks when he
quoted President John F. Kennedy, saying, “Let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate.”¶ The essence of
the agreement has been known since April 2, when negotiators accepted parameters for a final accord. Their arduous task since
then has been to flesh out those parameters, expanding a one-page Iran–European Union statement into a 30,000-word tome that
includes five technical annexes.¶ The
heart of the trade-off is an Iranian promise to substantially restrict
its nuclear program for more than a decade in return for relief from European and United Nations
sanctions and a waiver of U.S. secondary sanctions that impede other countries from doing business with Iran.¶ Among the
surprises is relief of U.S. sanctions on selling commercial airplanes to Iran — a provision that should delight both U.S. companies
such as Boeing and beleaguered Iranians who risk their lives by flying on antiquated jets.¶ According
deal will restrict four potential paths to nuclear weapons:¶ First,
to U.S. officials, the
it will reduce by two-thirds the
number of centrifuges Iran currently has installed — from 19,000 to 6,000 — of which only
5,060 will be allowed to enrich uranium for the next decade at a facility at Natanz that is
vulnerable to military attack.¶ Of the remaining centrifuges, a few hundred will be allowed to operate
at an underground plant at Fordow but will not be allowed to enrich uranium. Excess centrifuges will
be dismantled and stored under constant electronic surveillance.¶ Second, Iran will cap enrichment at Natanz at
3.67 percent of the isotope U-235 (far below weapons grade) for 15 years and reduce its
stockpile of 10,000 to 12,000 kilograms of low-enriched uranium by 98 percent, to 300 kilograms —
a quarter of what would be required for a single nuclear weapon if it were further refined to weapons
grade.¶ Third, a heavy-water reactor under construction at Arak will be modified so that it will
produce only a tiny amount of plutonium, another potential fuel for weapons. Iran will not build a facility to
reprocess the spent fuel, which will be exported.¶ These steps are intended to extend the amount of time it
would take Iran to enrich sufficient material for a nuclear weapon from three months at
present to 12 to 14 months for the next decade. Other restrictions on research and development of more
advanced centrifuges are meant to keep Iran from rapidly ramping up uranium enrichment capacity from 2026 to 2030.¶ The
fourth pathway to a bomb — the so-called sneakout — is addressed by intensified
monitoring and verification, including the resolution of questions about past military
dimensions of the Iranian program. According to an agreement with the I nternational A tomic
E nergy A gency, the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, Iran will allow the agency to visit sites where
military-related nuclear activity is believed to have taken place, including Parchin, a military base that Iran
has paved over three times to elude detection of suspected prior weapons research.¶ Iran will implement the
additional protocol of the Nuclear N on- P roliferation T reaty and provide access to inspectors “where
necessary and when necessary,” in the words of Obama, if Iran is suspected of illicit activity. A joint commission will be
set up to supervise implementation and resolve the inevitable disputes.
Nuclear Deal prevents Iranian Proliferation
Tabatabai 7/13 (Ariane, visiting assistant professor in the Security Studies Program at the
Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and an associate in the Belfer Center's
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International Security Program and Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University, “After
a historic nuclear agreement, challenges ahead for Iran,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,
7/13/2015, http://thebulletin.org/after-historic-nuclear-agreement-challenges-aheadiran8504)//duncan
After months of intense negotiations and several extensions, Iran
and six world powers finally reached a
comprehensive nuclear deal on Tuesday in Vienna. The historic agreement accomplishes several
things that benefit the non-proliferation regime and international security. It curbs Iran’s
nuclear activities and allows the international community to verify that Tehran’s program is
peaceful. In doing so, the deal stops a 10th country from developing nuclear weapons. It also allows
Iran to take steps toward normalizing its political and economic relationship with the rest of the world. In short, both sides have
reason to celebrate. As global attention moves on, though, Iran still faces major challenges ahead.¶ What was accomplished. While
many back home on both sides have been pushing their negotiators to do better, it's important to remember that a deal can only be
sustainable if both parties walk away feeling like they gained more than they conceded. Advocates of zero enrichment for Iran have
missed this point all along, pushing for a full Iranian capitulation. Even if such a deal had been concluded—which wouldn’t have
happened—it wouldn't have lasted. ¶ The
P5+1—China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States—can
now leave the negotiating table with the assurance that they have effectively checked
sensitive Iranian nuclear activities. They have essentially closed off any possibility of Iran
getting the Bomb using plutonium , by getting it to agree to redesign the Arak heavy water
reactor, a virtually irreversible step, and formalizing Tehran’s pledge not to reprocess
plutonium. The agreement also scales back Iran’s uranium enrichment program , limiting the
activity to a single facility, Natanz, and reducing its capacity by two thirds. The Fordow plant,
meanwhile, which was a key proliferation concern, is being repurposed as a research and
development site. This step lengthens Iran’s breakout time, or the amount of time it would
take between choosing to build a nuclear weapon and accumulating enough fissile material
to do so.¶
The agreement, furthermore, includes a permitted procurement channel, so that Iran can continue working on its
nuclear program without resorting to black market equipment. This means that Iran will get state-of-the-art technology, and ensures
the international community will know what Iran is doing and how it is doing it. Last but
not least, the prospects of a so-called “sneak out” have been minimized: The Iranian nuclear
program will be heavily monitored at all stages, from milling and mining all the way through
to enrichment. The International Atomic Energy Agency will do the monitoring to ensure that Tehran complies with its
that
obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. (Iran is voluntarily implementing the latter
under the deal, pending its formal ratification through the legislative process.)¶ With this level of scrutiny,
community can make sure that Iran's nuclear program remains peaceful.
the international
It can also pat itself on the
back for bringing a country back into compliance through a negotiated process, rather than yet another military solution. Even critics
of the deal who were in favor of military intervention admitted that their option wouldn’t have been a lasting solution; some said
the United States would have kept having to "mow the lawn," with all the costs that would have entailed. Instead, the
United
States and its negotiating partners walk away with what looks like a durable and effective
solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis and a step forward for the non-proliferation regime.
The Iran deal sets parameters that prevent proliferation
Logan and Glaser 7/14 (Justin, director of foreign policy studies at the Cata institute, John,
graduate student in International Security at George Mason University, “Iran nuclear deal a clear
success,” CNN, 7/14/2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/14/opinions/glaser-logan-irannuclear-deal-positive/)//duncan
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(CNN)The
deal just struck between the U.S., world powers, and Iran is an historic achievement
that decreases the likelihood of an Iranian nuclear weapon and forestalls the risk of another
costly U.S. war in the Middle East.¶
But while the diplomats in Vienna are finished wrangling over the final details, the
Obama administration is by no means finished fighting for the agreement's survival. Congress has 60 days with which to review the
deal for final approval, and while Republicans may not have a veto-proof majority, they -- along with some Democrats -- remain
vehemently opposed to any plausible peaceful resolution.¶ The debate over Iran diplomacy was really two debates, in which each
side was arguing over something different. On
the one side was a strikingly broad consensus of nearly the
entire arms control community, which recognizes what the deal can achieve in terms of
nonproliferation and regional stability. On the opposing side is the Iran hawk community, which focused less on the
nuclear issue than on finding ways to isolate and ultimately destroy Iran's clerical regime, by military force if necessary, nuclear
program or not.¶ The
near-consensus among arms controllers is due to the deal's strong
nonproliferation features. Under the deal, Iran would reduce its stockpile of centrifuges by
two-thirds and dismantle about 97% of its low-enriched uranium. For 15 years, the Iranians
will be prohibited from enriching any uranium at their Fordow site and the Arak reactor for
plutonium production would be permanently disabled.¶ Throughout, Iran would be subject to
one of the most robust and intrusive inspection regimes in the world , with continuous video
monitoring of its uranium mines for the next 25 years and monitoring of centrifuge production
facilities for 20 years. Expanded inspections under the Additional Protocol are permanent.¶ As 30
nonproliferation experts attested to in a statement in April, "the agreement reduces the
likelihood of destabilizing nuclear weapons competition in the Middle East, and strengthens
global efforts to prevent proliferation , including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty."¶ Under
breakout time -- the amount of time it would take to produce one bombs-worth
of highly enriched uranium if it decided to do so -- would be extended to roughly one year, up
from roughly three months at the interim agreement's inception.¶ To review these technical parameters and
feverishly warn that the deal "paves the way for a nuclear Iran," as Sen. David Perdue, R-Georgia, and
others recently have is bizarre. Similarly, to declare as Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Florida, recently did that the deal would produce "a
the deal, Iran's
cascade of proliferation" in the region relies on an array of interlocking dubious assumptions.¶ What these wildly divergent
assessments seem to indicate is that the sides were arguing over different problems. For
the arms control community,
the problem was an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. For them, given the one-two punch of
political reality and the terms of the agreement, the deal was a good thing. It significantly
reduced the probability of an Iranian nuclear weapon and could meet both sides' minimum
standard of necessity.¶ For neoconservatives and interventionist Democrats, the nuclear
program was but one piece of a much larger problem: a looming Persian menace that threatened to
dominate the Middle East. This explains the specious nonproliferation arguments offered in
opposition to the deal, as well as the increased warnings of Iranian "regional hegemony" heard in the run-up to the deal.¶
These sorts of arguments are tendentious in the extreme, because on their own terms they
fall short. The nuclear agreement is indeed helpful from the point of view of nonproliferation,
and Iran has no path to regional hegemony in the policy-relevant future. Instead, these claims seem to be part of a
larger strategy under which everything that happens tied to Iran is treated as a threat.¶ But the question in the context
of nuclear diplomacy was never a choice between a neutered, Israel-recognizing liberal Iran or
an empowered nuclear theocracy. It was between a nasty but weak regional power with little
power-projection capability, closer or further away from a nuclear weapons capability. And on
these terms, the agreement must be viewed as a clear success.
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**Elections Disadvantage Affirmative
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**2AC Blocks
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2AC Hillary Good- Link Turn Strategy
1. Non-Unique: Hillary won’t win
A) She’s behind Bernie Sanders in the primary
Christian Today, 2015
(http://www.christiantoday.com/article/hillary.clinton.loses.lead.in.democratic.race.as.bernie.sanders.soars.in.latest.poll/64240.ht
m, Sept 8)
Hillary Clinton has lost her status as the frontrunner in the race for the Democratic
presidential candidate, a new poll revealed.
A survey conducted by NBC News/Marist showed that Clinton has lost her lead to fellow
Democratic presidential candidate Sen. Bernie Sanders, who now holds a commanding ninepoint lead over the former Secretary of State.
In July, a similar poll showed Clinton leading over Sanders by as much as 10 percentage points.
Clinton recently figured in a controversy for using a private email server during her time as
Secretary of State, leading to accusations that she might have caused the leakage of top-secret
intelligence information.
The same survey also showed that Sanders is already gaining ground on Clinton in Iowa,
considered as one of the areas whose primaries more often than not indicate the results of
the White House race.
Sanders managed to chip away Clinton's lead among possible Democratic voters in Iowa by only
13 percentage points, according to the survey. Clinton got the nod of 38 percent of the
respondents, while Sanders got the approval of 27 percent.
In New Hampshire, another area where primaries are considered crucial, Clinton
is only a distant second to Sanders, garnering only 32-percent from the respondents. The
Vermont senator got support from 41 percent of the state's likely Democratic voters.
B) Multiple polls show Hillary will lose to GOP candidates next November
Red Alert Politics, 2015
(http://redalertpolitics.com/2015/09/11/hillary-clinton-loses-edge-republicans-general-election, Sept 11)
If the polls in early September are any inclination, it’s going to be an unbearable month for
the Hillary Clinton presidential campaign.
A CNN/ORC poll conducted from Sept. 4-8 found Clinton losing or tied with the three major
GOP frontrunners – Donald Trump, Ben Carson, and former Florida Gov. Jeb Bush.
Clinton’s numbers fell the most drastically against Trump, her lead fell by 24 points from
June to September where they are now tied at 48 percent.
Carson leads the Democratic frontrunner by 51 to 46 percent and Bush leads her more
narrowly by 49 to 47 percent.
This isn’t the first poll that had Clinton falling behind Republican challengers.
A Survey USA poll released last week had Trump beating her by 5 points, a Public Policy
Polling report from Sept. 3 showed her tied with Carson, and a Fox News Poll from midAugust had Bush beating the Democratic frontrunner by 44 to 42 percent.
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2. Link Turn – Voters, especially independents, hate surveillance – plan helps
Hillary
Ackerman and Siddiqui, 5/18 (Spencer and Sabrina, “NSA surveillance opposed by American voters from all
parties, poll finds,” The Guardian, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/may/18/us-voters-broadly-opposed-nsasurveillance)
With five days in the legislative calendar remaining before a pivotal aspect of the Patriot Act expires, a new
poll shows
widespread antipathy to mass surveillance, a sense of where the debate over the National Security Agency’s
powers stands outside of Washington. Commissioned by the American Civil Liberties Union and carried out by the Global Strategy
Group and G2 Public Strategies, the
poll of 1,001 likely voters found broad opposition to government
surveillance across partisan, ideological, age and gender divides. Sixty percent of likely voters
believe the Patriot Act ought to be modified, against 34% that favor its retention in its current form. The NSA uses
Section 215 of the Patriot Act as the legal basis for its daily collection of all Americans’ phone data, as the Guardian revealed in June
2013 thanks to whistleblower Edward Snowden, a practice that a federal appeals court deemed illegal on 7 May. Opposition to
reauthorizing the Patriot Act without modification cuts against a bill by the GOP Senate leader, Mitch McConnell of Kentucky. The
poll found 58% of Republicans favor modification, the subject of a rival bipartisan bill that recently passed the House,
with only 36% of them favoring retention. Self-identified “very conservative” voters favor modification by a 59% to 34% margin.
The margins for Democrats are similar to those for Republicans. Independent voters, however,
are even less enthusiastic about mass domestic surveillance: 71% want the Patriot Act
modified, versus 22% who favor keeping it as it is, which pollster Greg Strimple called “intense”. More
than three-quarters of likely voters the poll interviewed opposed related aspects of current
surveillance authorities and operations. Eighty-two percent are “concerned” about
government collection and retention of their personal data. Eighty-three percent are concerned about
government access to data stored by businesses without judicial orders, and 84% want the same judicial protections on their virtual
data as exist for physical records on their property. The same percentage is concerned about government use of that data for noncounter-terrorism purposes. “Consensus
on this issue is bipartisan,” said Strimple.
3. No link - Surveillance policy won’t swing votes in the election
Kelly, 2014 Erin, USA Today, “Government snooping proves weak campaign issue.”
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/10/14/nsa-spying-privacy-congressional-election/17216313/
Government spying on American citizens has sparked public outrage, but it has not caught fire
as a major issue in this year's congressional election. "Politicians don't see a lot of votes in the
privacy issue because it's something that divides the American people," said Darrell West,
founding director of the Center for Technology Innovation at the Brookings Institution. "There
are people who are angry about government surveillance, but there are others who believe the
government needs to keep doing it to protect the country from terrorists." In June, a poll by the
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press said 54% of Americans said they disapproved
of the National Security Agency's mass collection of millions of Americans' phone records, and
42% said they approved. The mass-data collection was revealed in June 2013 by former NSA
contractor Edward Snowden. It's difficult for congressional candidates to use the issue against
their opponents in some of the states with the most hotly contested elections, said Julian
Sanchez, a senior fellow and privacy expert at the Cato Institute. "In a lot of purple states,
there's a libertarian streak that cuts across party lines," Sanchez said. "You can find Democratic
and Republican candidates who are equally likely to be opposed to government surveillance."
The issue has been overshadowed in most races by concerns about jobs, the economy and the
battle to stop the Islamic State, West said. "There are certainly people who are worried about
privacy, but it's a smaller circle than those worried about Syria or the economy," he said.
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4 Backing out of Iran deal won’t cause war – neither Iran nor Israel want to fight
Miller 2015 – (vice president at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, July 24,
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/07/24/why-war-isnt-inevitable-if-congress-rejects-iran-nuclear-deal/)
Last week Secretary of State John Kerry said bluntly about the Iran deal: “This is a choice
between a diplomatic solution and war.” But is that really the case?
Much of the Obama administration’s efforts to sell this accord have involved shackling the
public and congressional debate with this binary choice and the horrific consequences should
Congress reject the accord and overturn a presidential veto.
The administration’s logic goes something like this: Congress takes the hit for sinking the accord;
Iran reaps a huge propaganda victory and divides the world powers with which it has been
negotiating for months (the “P5 +1,” or the five permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council and Germany); the sanctions regime collapses; Iran then accelerates its nuclear
program; Israel threatens war and attacks if Iran achieves “break out” or nuclear weapon
threshold. By this thinking, the U.S. is invariably drawn into war because Iran gets close to a
weapon or because we have to support Israel. And if Iran goes to produce an actual weapon, the
U.S. could strike Iran directly.
A congressional override of the president’s veto would make it impossible for the president to
waive critical oil and banking sanctions against Iran. But would the July 14 deal then be scuttled,
with our allies jumping ship on sanctions and Iran then breaking out? War isn’t necessarily
what follows from all this. Yes, the odds of resuming negotiations to get a better deal seem
unlikely. But so does the prospect of inexorable confrontation. Consider:
Politics and propaganda: With Congress taking the major hit for scuttling the accord, Iran would
immediately intensify its propaganda war and seek to reap political and financial benefits. No
doubt, those would be considerable. But the fact that the Obama administration rushed to pass
a U.N. Security Council resolution serves to avert the horrific scenario Mr. Kerry and President
Barack Obama have laid out. Just because the U.S. can’t lift congressionally imposed sanctions
doesn’t mean that other elements of the resolution couldn’t kick in. Hardliners might argue for
walking away. But Iran is too clever to walk away from the prospect of trying to divide the
P5+1–and it stands to gain a lot from getting the International Atomic Energy Agency to certify
that Tehran held up its part of the commitments to be eligible for considerable sanctions relief.
So while U.S. sanctions, particularly those dealing with international banking, would still bite the
Iranian economy, Tehran could still benefit enormously . For commercial reasons alone–
because opening Iran would bring huge business opportunities to Moscow and Beijing–the
Russians and Chinese , and possibly the Germans , are likely to support an Iranian campaign
for partial relief from U.N. sanctions. A German trade delegation is already in Iran.
Why go to war? The theory that conflict with Iran is inevitable rests on several highly arguable
contentions . First is the assumption that Iran is willing to accelerate its nuclear program and to
either break out or sneak out to a weapon and thus court a military response from Israel or
the United States. The second big assumption is that Israel is just itching for an opportunity to
unilaterally strike Iran with or without Washington’s approval. In the wake of a no vote by
Congress, neither of these developments are certainties . Israel is implacably opposed to the
deal, but Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is pretty risk-averse ; he would have to think long
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and hard about launching strike in which Israel is operating at the margins of its capacity,
particularly without a reason that would justify the severe international consequences.
And why would Iran want to provide such a reason as long as it could play the Security Council
card and pocket the political and economic benefits that would flow from being cooperative?
For Tehran, the smarter option in the wake of Congress blocking the accord would be to exploit
the appetite for international investment and pick up as many chits as possible on the global
stage by blaming the failure and missed opportunity on Washington. This isn’t a perfect
outcome, but it’s a more compelling choice for Iran’s leadership than a headlong plunge into
war . That course stands to bring Iran few benefits and many risks. Tehran is also aware that its
ally Hezbollah is bogged down in Syria as part of Iran’s campaign to support Bashar al-Assad,
which limits Tehran’s regional assets to use against Israel in the event of a military strike. If
Congress blocks the nuclear agreement, the mullahs will take their time and consider all of Iran’s
options. Courting a major strike from Israel and the U.S. isn’t necessarily one of them.
5. No Link – Voters aren’t even paying attention yet to the election
Jackson, 2015 (Natalie, senior data scientist for Huffington Post)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/2016-election-polls-value_55f83910e4b09ecde1d9b328,
September 15th
But another way of viewing the data is that even with these anomalies, only 27 percent of
Americans are paying close attention to the 2016 presidential race -- meaning more than 7 in
10 are not. There are, after all, still four months to go before the first primary votes are cast,
and 14 months before the general election. Most Americans just don't live and breathe
politics even when Trump is involved.
Focusing on the great majority of Americans who aren't yet following the race very closely
provides a reality check on how much stock we place in the current polling. Every week brings
new polls showing Trump leading the Republicans and Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) gaining on his
Democratic rival Hillary Clinton, and those new polls trigger the writing of thousands of words
about what it all means. But if 73 percent of Americans aren't really paying attention, what do
these horserace polls actually show?
For national primary polls, the answer is probably not much. All the candidates are focusing
their efforts on New Hampshire, Iowa and sometimes South Carolina because these states vote
first. But the three states make up only about 3 percent of the nation's population. The other 97
percent probably haven't had much exposure to the candidates and -- with the exception of
those few paying close attention -- are likely responding to the poll question with not much
information.
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2AC Hillary Good – Impact Turn Strategy
1. Non-Unique: Hillary won’t win
A. She’s behind Bernie Sanders in the primary
Christian Today, 2015
(http://www.christiantoday.com/article/hillary.clinton.loses.lead.in.democratic.race.as.bernie.sanders.soars.in.latest.poll/64240.ht
m, Sept 8)
Hillary Clinton has lost her status as the frontrunner in the race for the Democratic
presidential candidate, a new poll revealed.
A survey conducted by NBC News/Marist showed that Clinton has lost her lead to fellow
Democratic presidential candidate Sen. Bernie Sanders, who now holds a commanding ninepoint lead over the former Secretary of State.
In July, a similar poll showed Clinton leading over Sanders by as much as 10 percentage points.
Clinton recently figured in a controversy for using a private email server during her time as
Secretary of State, leading to accusations that she might have caused the leakage of top-secret
intelligence information.
The same survey also showed that Sanders is already gaining ground on Clinton in Iowa,
considered as one of the areas whose primaries more often than not indicate the results of
the White House race.
Sanders managed to chip away Clinton's lead among possible Democratic voters in Iowa by only
13 percentage points, according to the survey. Clinton got the nod of 38 percent of the
respondents, while Sanders got the approval of 27 percent.
In New Hampshire, another area where primaries are considered crucial, Clinton
is only a distant second to Sanders, garnering only 32-percent from the respondents. The
Vermont senator got support from 41 percent of the state's likely Democratic voters.
B. Multiple polls show Hillary will lose to GOP candidates next November
Red Alert Politics, 2015
(http://redalertpolitics.com/2015/09/11/hillary-clinton-loses-edge-republicans-generalelection, Sept 11)
If the polls in early September are any inclination, it’s going to be an unbearable month for
the Hillary Clinton presidential campaign.
A CNN/ORC poll conducted from Sept. 4-8 found Clinton losing or tied with the three major
GOP frontrunners – Donald Trump, Ben Carson, and former Florida Gov. Jeb Bush.
Clinton’s numbers fell the most drastically against Trump, her lead fell by 24 points from
June to September where they are now tied at 48 percent.
Carson leads the Democratic frontrunner by 51 to 46 percent and Bush leads her more
narrowly by 49 to 47 percent.
This isn’t the first poll that had Clinton falling behind Republican challengers.
A Survey USA poll released last week had Trump beating her by 5 points, a Public Policy
Polling report from Sept. 3 showed her tied with Carson, and a Fox News Poll from midAugust had Bush beating the Democratic frontrunner by 44 to 42 percent.
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2. No link - Surveillance policy won’t swing votes in the election
Kelly, 2014 Erin, USA Today, “Government snooping proves weak campaign issue.”
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/10/14/nsa-spying-privacy-congressional-election/17216313/
Government spying on American citizens has sparked public outrage, but it has not caught fire
as a major issue in this year's congressional election. "Politicians don't see a lot of votes in the
privacy issue because it's something that divides the American people," said Darrell West,
founding director of the Center for Technology Innovation at the Brookings Institution. "There
are people who are angry about government surveillance, but there are others who believe the
government needs to keep doing it to protect the country from terrorists." In June, a poll by the
Pew Research Center for the People and the Press said 54% of Americans said they disapproved
of the National Security Agency's mass collection of millions of Americans' phone records, and
42% said they approved. The mass-data collection was revealed in June 2013 by former NSA
contractor Edward Snowden. It's difficult for congressional candidates to use the issue against
their opponents in some of the states with the most hotly contested elections, said Julian
Sanchez, a senior fellow and privacy expert at the Cato Institute. "In a lot of purple states,
there's a libertarian streak that cuts across party lines," Sanchez said. "You can find Democratic
and Republican candidates who are equally likely to be opposed to government surveillance."
The issue has been overshadowed in most races by concerns about jobs, the economy and the
battle to stop the Islamic State, West said. "There are certainly people who are worried about
privacy, but it's a smaller circle than those worried about Syria or the economy," he said.
3
Hillary will maintain the Iran deal, which leads to nuclear war
Podhoretz, 2015
Norman, http://www.wsj.com/articles/israels-choice-conventional-war-now-or-nuclear-war-later-1438125451, July 28th
For our negotiating partners, the new goal was to open the way to lucrative business contracts,
but for Mr. Obama it was to remove the biggest obstacle to his long-standing dream of a U.S.
détente with Iran. To realize this dream, he was ready to concede just about anything the
Iranians wanted—without, of course, admitting that this was tantamount to acquiescence in
an Iran armed with nuclear weapons and the rockets to deliver them.
To repeat, then, what cannot be stressed too often: If the purpose were still to prevent Iran
from getting the bomb, no deal that Iran would conceivably agree to sign could do the trick,
leaving war as the only alternative. To that extent, Mr. Obama is also right. But there is an
additional wrinkle. For in allowing Iran to get the bomb, he is not averting war. What he is
doing is setting the stage for a nuclear war between Iran and Israel.
The reason stems from the fact that, with hardly an exception, all of Israel believes that the
Iranians are deadly serious when they proclaim that they are bound and determined to wipe the
Jewish state off the map. It follows that once Iran acquires the means to make good on this
genocidal commitment, each side will be faced with only two choices: either to rely on the fear
of a retaliatory strike to deter the other from striking first, or to launch a pre-emptive strike of
its own.
Yet when even a famous Iranian “moderate” like the former President Hashemi Rafsanjani has
said—as he did in 2001, contemplating a nuclear exchange—that “the use of even one nuclear
bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is
not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality,” how can deterrence work?
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4 No Link – Voters aren’t even paying attention yet to the election
Jackson, 2015 (Natalie, senior data scientist for Huffington Post)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/2016-election-polls-value_55f83910e4b09ecde1d9b328,
September 15th
But another way of viewing the data is that even with these anomalies, only 27 percent of
Americans are paying close attention to the 2016 presidential race -- meaning more than 7 in
10 are not. There are, after all, still four months to go before the first primary votes are cast,
and 14 months before the general election. Most Americans just don't live and breathe
politics even when Trump is involved.
Focusing on the great majority of Americans who aren't yet following the race very closely
provides a reality check on how much stock we place in the current polling. Every week brings
new polls showing Trump leading the Republicans and Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) gaining on his
Democratic rival Hillary Clinton, and those new polls trigger the writing of thousands of words
about what it all means. But if 73 percent of Americans aren't really paying attention, what do
these horserace polls actually show?
For national primary polls, the answer is probably not much. All the candidates are focusing
their efforts on New Hampshire, Iowa and sometimes South Carolina because these states vote
first. But the three states make up only about 3 percent of the nation's population. The other 97
percent probably haven't had much exposure to the candidates and -- with the exception of
those few paying close attention -- are likely responding to the poll question with not much
information.
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**A2- Hillary Good- 1AR Extensions
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1AR Hillary Good – Non-Unique: Hillary Loses Now (Bernie
Sanders)
Bernie is beating Hillary across all Democratic groups, including women and
young voters
Breitbart, 2015 (http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/09/13/poll-berniesanders-surging-hillary-clinton-cratering, Sept 13)
Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) has opened a 22-point lead over Democrat frontrunner Hillary
Clinton in New Hampshire, home of the nation’s first primary.
The new poll, from YouGov/CBS News Battleground, finds Sanders with 52 percent support
among Democrats in the Granite State, far ahead of Clinton’s 30 percent support. Vice President
Joe Biden, who is not yet a candidate, trails with 9 percent support.
In Iowa, the first caucus state to vote, Sanders has a solid 10 point lead over Clinton. Sanders
has 43 percent, Clinton 33 percent and Biden has the support of 10 percent of Democrats.
Former Maryland Gov. Martin O’Malley, whose campaign has struggled to gain attention, has 5
percent.
In New Hampshire, Sanders beats Clinton in every age demographic. Among the youngest
voters, though, he has a 62-point advantage over Clinton. Hillary Clinton does best among voters
aged 45-64, but she still loses that group by 2 points.
Surprisingly, Sanders also best Clinton among women in New Hampshire. He leads Clinton by 11
points among female voters, long assumed to be an important foundation of support for
Clinton. Among male voters, Sanders leads by 38 points.
Sanders also leads Clinton among women in Iowa. He leads Clinton by 52-points among the
youngest voters, while Clinton beats him by 17 points among the oldest voters in the Hawkeye
State.
Joe Biden leads both Clinton and Sanders as the preferred “second-choice” for voters in New
Hampshire. Almost one-third of Democrats rank him as their second-choice, while 23 percent
say Clinton and 12 percent name Sanders. This suggests that if Biden were to formally enter the
race, there would be another reshuffling of the poll results. It is possible that Hillary Clinton
would run third in New Hampshire.
There is more bad news for Hillary Clinton, though. Only 24 percent of Democrats said Clinton’s
growing email scandal has affected their vote. In other words, there are other factors underlying
the Democrat voter surge to Sanders. It is possible that the voter move to Sanders isn’t simply
due to questions over Hillary Clinton, but rather enthusiasm for Sanders and his economic
populist message. That suggests Hillary will have to shift much further to the left to quell the
Sanders’ rebellion.
Hillary Clinton can no longer just assume that her difficulties are due to questions about her
email use as Secretary of State. Even if those questions were magically put to rest this week, she
is going to have to confront the rising Sanders more directly. He is soundly beating her across all
Democrat groups.
Bernie is ahead and has momentum
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New York Post, 2015 (Sept 13, http://nypost.com/2015/09/13/bernie-is-wiping-thefloor-with-hillary-in-latest-polls)
Sen. Bernie Sanders is generating enthusiasm — and Hillary Rodham Clinton anything but,
according to new polls released Sunday.
Sanders is leading Clinton by 10 points in Iowa and 22 points in New Hampshire, according to
the CBS/YouGov surveys.
The polls found the Vermont independent is thumping Clinton, 43 percent to 33 percent,
among Iowa Democrats and 52 to 30 percent in New Hampshire, but Clinton leads in South
Carolina 46 to 23.
But the biggest difference, the pollsters found, is enthusiasm — Sanders is generating it and
Clinton is not.
The Democratic base prefers Bernie Sanders
The Daily Beast 2015- “This Is How Hillary Loses the Primary” July 9
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/09/this-is-how-hillary-loses-the-primary.html
Something remarkable is happening in American politics. For the first time in our history, a
socialist is running a close second and gaining ground on the front-runner in a presidential
race.¶ Anyway you look at it, Senator Bernie Sanders is making history and may very well play a
deciding role in who will be the next president. How real is the Sanders movement? Well, at this point in his
campaign in 2007, Barack Obama had 180,000 donors on his way to setting records with lowdonor contributions; Bernie Sanders has 250,000.¶ How’s he doing with voters in early states? “The next time
Hillary Rodham Clinton visits New Hampshire, she need not look over her shoulder to find Bernie Sanders; the Vermont
Senator is running right alongside her in a statistical dead heat for the 2016 Democratic
presidential nomination, according to a CNN/WMUR poll,” wrote The New York Times on June 25.¶ But lest the Sanders
surge in New Hampshire be dismissed as neighboring state advantage, the Clinton campaign seems even more worried about losing
Iowa. In a carefully orchestrated bit of expectation lowering, Clinton campaign manager Robby Mook recently said, “the caucuses
are always such a tough proving ground” and Clinton campaign spokeswoman Jennifer Palmeri said, “We are worried about
[Sanders].”¶ Here’s what we know has happened so far in the Democratic primary for president. Since
Hillary Clinton
started spending money, hiring staff and campaigning, she has lost votes. In Iowa and New Hampshire,
she was doing better in the polls in January than she is today. Heck, she had more votes last month than she has today.¶ Politics is
about trends and the one thing we know is that trends escalate in speed as elections near. Even starting out with the huge lead that
she did, Clinton can’t allow Sanders to keep gaining votes while she loses votes in the hope that the bleeding won’t be fatal in the
long run.¶ Thinking that little tricks like getting an “organizer” to introduce the candidate at a rally will change an image built over
four decades in politics is like McDonald’s thinking they can take on Starbucks because they now sell espresso.¶ So
far Clinton’s
approach has been to try to demonstrate to the element of the party that finds Sanders so
appealing that she is really one of them. This seems like an extremely flawed strategy that plays
directly to Sanders’s strengths. If the contest is going to come down to who can be the most pure liberal, the best bet is
on the guy who actually is a socialist. Particularly when running against someone with Hillary Clinton’s long
record of being everything that the current left of her party hates.¶ The truth is, Hillary Clinton has
supported every U.S. war since Vietnam. She supported not only DOMA, which her husband signed, but a
travel ban on those who were HIV positive. She supported welfare cuts (remember her husband’s efforts toward “ending
welfare as we know it”?). She supports the death penalty and campaigned in her husband’s place during the 1992 New
Hampshire primary when he left to oversee the execution of an African-American man whose suicide attempt left him brain
damaged.
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1AR Hillary Good – Non-Unique: Hillary Loses Now (General Election)
Hillary will lose key swing states to GOP candidates
The Hill, 2015
http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/250836-poll-finds-clinton-losing-to-fourrepublicans-in-iowa, August 11
Other polls show Clinton well ahead in Iowa of her rivals for the Democratic nomination, but the
new survey is likely to add to the sense that Clinton could be vulnerable in a general election
battle.
A recent survey by Quinnipiac showed Clinton trailing GOP candidates in the swing states of
Iowa, Colorado and Virginia. Other polls have suggested voters don’t trust Clinton.
Hillary has lost the support of white women, her base
Washington Examiner, 2015
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/msnbc-clinton-losing-the-white-womanvote/article/2572134, Sept 16
Democratic frontrunner Hillary Clinton is hemorrhaging support from white female voters, as
this once supposedly locked-down voting bloc is now considering other candidates, MSNBC's
Andrea Mitchell warned Tuesday.
"Hillary Clinton is reaching out to that group that she had always counted on, white women
voters, who are now abandoning her in droves during the last two months," the cable news
anchor reported Tuesday.
This supposed mass exodus has left Clinton's campaign scrambling to find a way to win back a
group that she has "always counted on."
"This after seeing her support among white women in one new poll go from 71 percent in July
to just 42 percent now, a 29 percent drop in only eight weeks as Clinton has been hammered
with questions about her private emails," Mitchell said.
Democrats will lose General but Economic growth could be Black Swan
Fair 5/27 (Ray Fair, professor of economics at Yale University, has predicted 7
out of 9 elections, author of ‘Predicting Presidential Elections and Other Things’,
5/27/15, ‘In 2016's presidential race, the winner will be ...’,
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0527-fair-election-prediction20150527-story.html, 7/1/15, ACC)
Since 1978, based on data going back to 1916, I've documented how four conditions affect
voting patterns. The first is whether the president is running again. If so, this has a positive
effect on votes for the president. The second is how long a party has controlled the White
House . Voters like change; when a party has been in power for two or more consecutive
terms, this has a negative effect on votes for that party's candidate. The third is the slight but
persistent bias in favor of the Republican Party. Finally, the state of the economy : A good
economy at the time of the election has a positive effect on votes for the incumbent party
candidate . The economic variables that matter are the rate of inflation and output (GDP)
growth. Of particular importance is GDP growth in the first three quarters of the election year.
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These first three conditions are working against the Democrats in 2016. The president is not
running; the Democrats have been in power for two terms; there is that lingering Republican
bias. According to the equation behind my work, then, the economy has to be very strong
between now and the election for the Democrats to have a good chance of winning . Most
economists believe the economy will grow at about a 3% annual rate between now and
November 2016 . If that happens, my equation predicts the Democrats will win about 46% of
the vote in a two-party contest. In order for them to win more than 50%, the economy would
need to grow at about 4% , and even in that case their predicted vote share would climb only
slightly above the halfway mark. My equation's average prediction error over the 25 elections
since 1916 is between 2.5 and 3.5 percentage points. Assuming the economy does indeed
grow at 3%, the probability that the Democrats will win is low, between about 5% and 13%.
Republicans have cause for confidence. My analysis is, of course, based on the assumption that
the future will be like the past. What if voters start caring more about income inequality than
economic growth, and perceive the Republicans to be poor on that issue? Or what if the GOP
nominates someone further from the mainstream than ever before? Shifts in priorities can
never be ruled out, but the best I can say is that the conditions that sway voters appear to
have been fairly stable for 100 years — and my equation has a fairly good track record. In
seven of the nine contests between 1980 and 2012, my equation correctly predicted which
party would win the popular vote . It was wrong in 1992, when it predicted that Clinton would
lose. (There was a strong third-party candidate that year, Ross Perot, which may have been a
problem.) And it was wrong in 2012, when it predicted President Obama would win only 49% of
the vote and he got 52%. All along, however, I said the prediction fell within the margin of error.
A prediction of the sort I have just made is different from predictions using polls. Although
polls can at times be fairly accurate, at least near the time of the election, they are not
causal. The theory behind my analysis is that the economy and the other conditions have a
causal effect on voting behavior . Given an economic forecast, I can make a prediction at any
time — I don't even need to know who's running. I made my first prediction for the 2016
election in November, at which time I predicted, as now, that the Republicans would win if the
economy turned out as currently expected . If a more robust economy does not materialize, it
is likely that after 18 months of essentially nonstop campaigning, the Democratic nominee
will lose — through no fault of her own.
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1AR Hillary Good – No Link – Surveillance doesn’t swing votes
No link- both candidates share the same surveillance policy
Anderson, 2015 Jake, Global Research, June 19. “Ten Ways Hillary Clinton and Jeb Bush Are
Basically the Same Presidential Candidate.”
http://www.globalresearch.ca/10-ways-hillary-clinton-and-jeb-bush-are-basically-the-samepresidential-candidate/5456953
3. They both support the Patriot Act and NSA mass surveillance Both Clinton and Bush
supported the Patriot Act from the day it was secretly drafted, only days after 9/11. They both
voted for its reauthorization in 2006. This unconstitutional bill granted the government
unprecedented powers of civilian detainment, as well as access to private data. When the FISA
laws were updated by the Patriot Act, programs like PRISM enabled the NSA to collect millions
of phone records from Americans with no suspected ties to terrorism. Hillary Clinton has
expressed concern over privacy issues, but when she has had the chance to take a real stand
on them, she has consistently avoided doing so. Meanwhile, Jeb Bush applauded President
Obama’s expansion of NSA surveillance, proclaiming: “I would say the best part of the Obama
administration would be his continuance of the protections of the homeland using the big
metadata programs, the NSA being enhanced.” Fret no more, cynics of the American political
system. When it comes to the erosion of civil liberties, bipartisanship is still possible.
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1AR Hillary Good – Link Turn – Surveillance reform is popular
Surveillance reform is popular among most Americans – plan helps Hillary
Page, 2014 (Susan, “Poll: Most Americans now oppose the NSA program,” USA Today, January
20, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/01/20/poll-nsa-surveillance/4638551/)
WASHINGTON -- Most
Americans now disapprove of the NSA's sweeping collection of phone
metadata, a new USA TODAY/Pew Research Center Poll finds, and they're inclined to think there
aren't adequate limits in place to what the government can collect. President Obama's announcement
Friday of changes in the surveillance programs has done little to allay those concerns: By 73%-21%, those who paid attention to the
speech say his proposals won't make much difference in protecting people's privacy. The poll of 1,504 adults, taken Wednesday
through Sunday, shows a public that is
more receptive than before to the arguments made by former
NSA contractor Edward Snowden. His leak of intelligence documents since last spring has fueled a global debate over
the National Security Agency's surveillance of Americans and spying on foreign leaders. Those surveyed now split, 45%-43%, on
whether Snowden's disclosures have helped or harmed the public interest. The snapshot of public opinion comes as the White
House, the intelligence agencies and Congress weigh significant changes in the way the programs are run. In his address, Obama
insisted no illegalities had been exposed but proposed steps to reassure Americans that proper safeguards were in place. By
nearly 3-1, 70%-26%, Americans say they shouldn't have to give up privacy and freedom in order
to be safe from terrorism. That may reflect the increasing distance from the Sept. 11 attacks more than a decade ago that
prompted some more of the more aggressive surveillance procedures. "In trading off between civil liberty and national security, the
American public decisively favors national security when it feels the threat acutely and imminently but tilts in the other direction
when the threats seem more remote," says Peter Feaver, a National Security Council aide for presidents George W. Bush and Bill
Clinton. Among those who paid attention to Obama's speech, only
13% say his proposals to rein in the
surveillance programs would make it more difficult for the government to fight terrorism. Only half of
those surveyed said they had paid even a little attention to the speech, however. The president called for a third party rather than
the government to hold the massive stores of phone metadata, and he said intelligence analysts would need a court order to search
it except in emergencies. He proposed establishing a panel of independent lawyers who could argue in some cases before the supersecret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court. And he said the United States would stop eavesdropping on friendly foreign
leaders. Attitudes
toward the surveillance program have turned more negative since last June
and July, when the Snowden revelations were new. In polls in June and July 2013, more Americans approved of
the program than disapproved. Now, by 53%-40%, a majority disapproves.
Link Turn- the public is weary of surveillance- recent polls prove Americans are
more worried about government surveillance than terrorism
The Guardian 2013- July 29, “Major opinion shifts, in the US and Congress, on NSA
surveillance and privacy” http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/29/poll-nsasurveillance-privacy-pew
Numerous polls taken since our reporting on previously secret NSA activities first began have
strongly suggested major public opinion shifts in how NSA surveillance and privacy are viewed.
But a new comprehensive poll released over the weekend weekend by Pew Research provides the most
compelling evidence yet of how stark the shift is.¶ Among other things, Pew finds that "a majority of
Americans – 56% – say that federal courts fail to provide adequate limits on the telephone and
internet data the government is collecting as part of its anti-terrorism efforts." And "an even
larger percentage (70%) believes that the government uses this data for purposes other than
investigating terrorism." Moreover, "63% think the government is also gathering information
about the content of communications." That demonstrates a decisive rejection of the US
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government's three primary defenses of its secret programs: there is adequate oversight; we're not listening
to the content of communication; and the spying is only used to Keep You Safe™.¶ But the most striking finding is this
one:¶ "Overall, 47% say their greater concern about government anti-terrorism policies is that
they have gone too far in restricting the average person's civil liberties, while 35% say they are more
concerned that policies have not gone far enough to protect the country. This is the first time in Pew Research
polling that more have expressed concern over civil liberties than protection from terrorism
since the question was first asked in 2004."¶ For anyone who spent the post-9/11 years
defending core liberties against assaults relentlessly perpetrated in the name of terrorism, polling data like that is nothing
short of shocking. This Pew visual underscores what a radical shift has occurred from these recent NSA disclosures:
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1AR Hillary Good – Impact Turn – Iran Deal Bad
Their impact has it backwards – Iran deal hurts US hegemony and leads to war by
pushing allies toward Russia and China
Washington Free Beacon, 2015
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/retired-air-force-general-iran-nuclear-deal-couldencourage-allies-to-align-with-russia-china, September 9th
The chair of a council of prominent military leaders argued in testimony on Capitol Hill Wednesday that
the Iranian nuclear deal could encourage U.S. allies in the Middle East to align themselves with other
world powers such as Russia or China.
Retired Air Force Gen. Chuck Wald, who co-chairs the Iran Strategy Council at the Jewish Institute for
National Security Affairs, testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the implications of
the nuclear agreement being pushed by the Obama administration.
Wald, who served as deputy commander of United States European Command, explained that the
agreement “undermines U.S. credibility” from the perspective of both allies and enemies in the Middle
East by making U.S. commitment to alliances appear “weakened.”
This in turn, Wald said, could prompt allies to “seek protection elsewhere” and enemies to “feel
emboldened” against the United States.
“Some U.S. allies have made clear they believe this deal will not prevent a nuclear Iran and, that by
proceeding with the [agreement], the United States is disrupting the regional balance of power and
endangering them,” Wald said. “Other regional partners have noted that the deal empowers Iran to
redouble its destabilizing regional activities, making the Middle East a more dangerous place. ”
“There is anger—even a sense of betrayal—among U.S. allies in the region,” the retired general added,
pointing to expressions of concern about the deal from Israel and other allies.
Wald said that giving the impression that the United States was faltering in its commitment was
“dangerous,” suggesting that it could encourage America’s allies to act alone against Iran or to seek help
from Russia or China.
“This could mean taking matters into their own hands, as Israel previously has done or Saudi Arabia
decided to do earlier this year by unilaterally launching an air campaign against Iranian-backed rebels in
Yemen. Such actions, if not backed by the overwhelming force of the U.S. military, could spark reprisals
that spiral into wider regional conflict,” Wald told House lawmakers.
“Alternatively, our regional allies might seek other guarantors of their security,” he continued. “Whether
this means accepting Iranian hegemony or allying with other powers—such as Russia or China—the result
would be detrimental to U.S. influence and interests in the region.”
Wald said that allies could decide to terminate cooperation with the United States, making it
impossible for the United States to “project power in the Middle East.”
“Basing and overflight rights are critical to maintaining and deploying a deterrent force,” Wald said. “The
perception that we are no longer committed to our allies’ security could risk the revocation of those rights
and spark a vicious cycle of destabilization.”
The Iran deal leads to terrorism and nuclear war
Duncan 2015 – on the Foreign Affairs; the Homeland Security; and the Natural Resources committees, author of the Countering Iran in
the Western Hemisphere Act (Jeff, The Obama Doctrine: A path to conflict,, July 25 http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/249131the-obama-doctrine-a-path-to-conflict)//JJ
The deal the P5+1 struck with Iran shatters American and Israeli security , potentially placing our great
country and our strategic allies in harm’s way. In essence, this deal legitimizes Iran as a nuclear
threshold state , unfortunately bringing the United States closer to a deadly military confrontation with
the zealous Shiite theocracy.
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If Congress fails to block this deal and sanctions against Iran are lifted, then America will essentially
subsidize the world’s largest state-sponsor of terrorism with a $ 150 billion payday. The mullahs will
use this money to support terrorism around the globe and further their imperialistic ambitions
through their proxies across the Middle East . This payday will help the ayatollah’s consolidate its hold
on power. It will not help the United States or our allies ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear
weapons capability. I suspect American capitulation will only make the Orwellian chants of “death to
America” and “death to Israel” louder.
To allege that the only alternative to this current deal is military action is specious. It is the essence of
naiveté to believe that rewarding the Iranian regime – who seeks the “annihilation” of Israel and
complete hegemony over the Middle East – will lead to anything other than armed conflict. The truth is
that the Obama administration not only rewarded Iranian intransigence by caving at the negotiating
table, but will permit the West to subsidize it .
This deal greatly reduces the strength of American deterrence against Iran. After 5 years, they may
reengage in the global conventional arms trade, while after 8, attain ballistic missiles. These arms will
surely go to terrorist proxy groups who currently kill Americans and our allies.
The Administration may say we retain the “military option” in case Iran makes a mad dash to the bomb.
But this ignores how the deal weakens American deterrence. For example, Russia has already
confirmed plans to ship state of the art S-300 surface-to-air missiles to the Iranians making control of
the air more difficult . Iran will be allowed to grow their military and emboldened to confront
American power .
Supporters of this agreement argue that it is the only way to prevent armed conflict with Iran.
Perversely, this agreement actually makes war with Iran more likely . The deal lifts virtually all major
restrictions against Iran in about 10-15 years, gearing up the ayatollahs to have the ability to break out
in days , not months or weeks. Tehran’s nuclear infrastructure is left in place with the ayatollahs
retaining the ability to “weaponize” quickly. In just a few years down the road, restrictions on Iran’s
centrifuges and limitations on its nuclear facilities, including the number of heavy water reactors, will
be abandoned .
Furthermore, without adequate provisions in place to inspect Iran’s nuclear programs and sites, or
effective compliance measures to efficiently implement snapback sanctions, Iranian centrifuges will
spin .
Congress has a moral duty to restore clarity and rationale to America’s diplomacy efforts by voting
against this absurdly irrational foreign policy strategy. We must return to a rational strategy aimed to
protect us and our allies from the Iranian nuclear threat.
Iran will emerge as a nuclear threshold state with the international community’s stamp of legitimacy .
This is precisely why Iran’s vociferous political leaders and ayatollahs have been rejoicing since the
deal was announced.
If there was ever a quintessential issue that could so easily unite Democrats and Republicans alike, it’s
this one. When it comes to matters of national security and deterrence against enemies, party politics
should take a back seat.
A pivotal moment for Congress is upon us. When the time comes to vote on the Iranian nuclear accord,
I intend to vote against the deal, and strongly encourage my esteemed colleagues on both sides of the
aisle to do the same. We are fortunate to know Iranian ambitions: Death to Israel, Death to America.
History will record this fatal error. I hope Congress will not be complicit in ushering in a policy that will
surely lead to a future – and more difficult – conflict .
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**States COUNTERPLAN Negative
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1NC States Counterplan
Counterplan Text: The 50 states and all relevant territories should <insert
affirmative plan text>
Solvency: The counterplan solves- The 50 states have taken the lead on
protecting individuals from federal government surveillance
BBC 2015- April 27, “US states take aim at NSA over warrantless surveillance”
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32487971
These days Stickland, a Texas state representative, isn't spending most of his time worrying about the government "stealing"
through high taxes or onerous regulation - standard political fare for the kind of conservatives who populate the state capitol in
Austin.¶ Instead
his cause has been what he sees as government theft of privacy - the unlawful
acquisition by the National Security Agency of personal information in the form of metadata
about electronic communications by US citizens.¶ The particular target of his ire is the Texas Cryptologic Center, an
NSA facility located near San Antonio. He has proposed a state law cutting off the building's access to public utilities - water and
electricity - until
the agency ceases what he says is unconstitutional warrantless data collection.¶ "I
believe the first role of government is to protect the personal rights and liberties of its citizens,"
says the Republican, who has represented a district near Dallas for two years. "Before we build a road
or anything else, we have to ensure that those exist for every Texan."¶ "I believe that it is my responsibility as a representative at the
state level to fight against that kind of tyranny," he continues. "Whether it's from the federal government or a foreign entity, it
doesn't matter."¶ The
Texas bill is just one of the most recent examples of a growing movement
among states - both liberal and conservative - to end government support for NSA facilities.¶
Last year California became the first to pass what's been called a Fourth Amendment
Protection Act. Its law prohibited the state from providing support to a federal agency "to collect electronically stored
information or metadata of any person if the state has actual knowledge that the request constitutes an illegal or unconstitutional
collection".¶ This
year 15 other states have introduced some kind of anti-NSA legislation, including
politically diverse locations like liberal Washington and Maryland and conservative Oklahoma
and Mississippi.¶ The movement has been championed by the Tenth Amendment Center and its OffNow coalition, which
provides support and model legislation to politicians like Stickland interested in challenging the NSA.¶ According to Mike Maharrey,
communications director for the centre, the California law, with its "actual knowledge" provision, is significantly weaker than they
had hoped - but
a good first step in the nation's most populous state.¶ He says they came up with
the suggested legislation because they don't trust the US Congress to do anything to keep the
NSA in check. The Patriot Act, which authorises the NSA surveillance programme, is up for renewal in May, and Republican
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has already proposed that it be extended to 2020.¶ "I'm not really faithful in things that are
going on in Washington, DC," he says. "People
can make a difference more rapidly and more readily at
the state level."¶ He adds that state politicians are generally more responsive to their
constituents. "A lot of phone calls make a state legislator really nervous," he says. Maharrey says his proposed
legislation is just the latest example of a US tradition of states expressing their independence
from an intrusive federal government. He says the movement's inspiration was the efforts of Northern states to
undermine the federal requirement to return fugitive slaves prior to the Civil War.¶ "It's called the anti-commandeering doctrine,"
he says. "The
federal government cannot force the states to provide personnel or resources to any
federal regulation or federal act or federal process. If the feds want to do it they can do it, but
they have to do it themselves."
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2NC/1NR- States COUNTERPLAN- SolvencyOverview
Extend our 1NC BBC evidence, the states are more responsible with surveillance
than the federal government- our evidence indicates that states have already
begun passing legislation to curb government intrusion, proving that they can
do the plan
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2NC/1NR- States COUNTERPLAN- SolvencyDrone Aff
States and localities are taking the lead on banning domestic drone surveillance
Swanson 2013 - David, author War is a Lie “Banning Surveillance: What States and Localities
Can Do About Drones” http://www.occupy.com/article/banning-surveillance-what-states-andlocalities-can-do-about-drones
Charlottesville, Va., passed a resolution that urged the state of Virginia to adopt a two-year
moratorium on drones (which it did), urged both Virginia and the U.S. Congress to prohibit
information obtained from the domestic use of drones from being introduced into court, and
to preclude the domestic use of drones equipped with "anti-personnel devices, meaning any projectile, chemical,
electrical, directed-energy (visible or invisible), or other device designed to harm, incapacitate, or otherwise negatively impact a
human being." It also pledged that Charlottesville would "abstain from similar uses with city-owned, leased, or borrowed drones."¶
St. Bonifacius, Minn., passed a resolution with the same language as Charlottesville, plus a ban on anyone operating a drone "within
the airspace of the city," making a first offense a misdemeanor and a repeat offense a felony.¶ Evanston,
Ill., passed a
resolution establishing a two-year moratorium on the use of drones in the city with exceptions
for hobby and model aircraft and for non-military research, and making the same recommendations to the
state and Congress as Charlottesville and St. Bonifacius.¶ Northampton, Mass., passed a resolution urging the
U.S. government to end its practice of extrajudicial killing with drones, affirming that within the
city limits "the navigable airspace for drone aircraft shall not be expanded below the longestablished airspace for manned aircraft" and that "landowners subject to state laws and local
ordinances have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the airspace and that no drone
aircraft shall have the 'public right of transit' through this private property," and urging the state
and Congress and the FAA "to respect legal precedent and constitutional guarantees of privacy,
property rights, and local sovereignty in all matters pertaining to drone aircraft and navigable
airspace."¶ Other cities, towns, and counties should be able to pass similar resolutions. Of course, stronger and more
comprehensive resolutions are best. But most people who learned about the four resolutions above just
leaned that these four cities had "banned drones" or "passed an anti-drone resolution."¶ The
details are less important in terms of building national momentum against objectionable uses of drones. By including both
surveillance and weaponized drones, as all four cities have done, a resolution campaign can find
broader support. By including just one issue, a resolution might meet fewer objections. Asking a city just to make
recommendations to a state and the nation might also meet less resistance than asking the city to take actions itself. Less can be
more.¶ Localities
have a role in national policy. City councilors and members of boards of supervisors take an oath to
and towns routinely send petitions to Congress for all
kinds of requests. This is allowed under Clause 3, Rule XII, Section 819, of the Rules of the House
of Representatives. This clause is routinely used to accept petitions from cities, and memorials
from states.¶ The same is established in the Jefferson Manual, the rulebook for the House originally written by Thomas
support the Constitution of the United States. Cities
Jefferson for the Senate. In 1967, a court in California ruled (Farley v. Healey, 67 Cal.2d 325) that "one of the purposes of local
government is to represent its citizens before the Congress, the Legislature, and administrative agencies in matters over which the
local government has no power. Even in matters of foreign policy it is not uncommon for local legislative bodies to make their
positions known."¶ Abolitionists passed local resolutions against U.S. policies on slavery. The anti-apartheid movement did the same,
as did the nuclear freeze movement, the movement against the PATRIOT Act, the movement in favor of the Kyoto Protocol, etc. No
locality is an island. If we become environmentally sustainable, others will ruin our climate. If we ban assault weapons, they'll arrive
at our borders. And
if the skies of the United States are filled with drones, it will become ever more
difficult for any city or state to keep them out.
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2NC/1NR- States COUNTERPLAN- SolvencySecurity Letters
The states can legally deny the FBI’s security letter- this solves the affirmative’s
internal links
Doyle 2014- Charles, Senior Specialist in American Public Law “National Security Letters in¶
Foreign Intelligence Investigations:¶ Legal Background”
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33320.pdf¶
The ancestor of the first NSL letter provision is a statutory exception to privacy protections¶
afforded by the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA).14 Its history is not particularly instructive ¶ and consists primarily of a
determination that the exception in its original form should not be too¶ broadly construed.15 But the exception was just that, an
exception. It was neither an affirmative¶ grant of authority to request information nor a command to financial institutions to
provided¶ information when asked.
It removed the restrictions on the release of customer information¶
imposed on financial institutions by the Right to Financial Privacy Act, but it left them free to¶
decline to comply when asked to do so.¶ [I]n certain significant instances, financial institutions [had] declined to grant
the FBI access¶ to financial records in response to requests under [S]ection 1114(a). The FBI informed the¶ Committee that the
problem occurs particularly in States which have State constitutional¶ privacy protection
provisions or State banking privacy laws. In those States, financial¶ institutions decline to grant
the FBI access because State law prohibits them from granting¶ such access and the RFPA,
since it permits but does not mandate such access, does not¶ override State law. In such a situation,
the concerned financial institutions which might¶ otherwise desire to grant the FBI access to a customer’s record will not do so,
because State law does not allow such cooperation, and cooperation might expose them to liability to the¶ customer whose records
the FBI sought access. H.Rept. 99-690, at 15-6 (1986).
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2NC/1NR- States COUNTERPLAN- SolvencyStingray Affirmative
Some state governments have already taken the lead on banning warrantless
tracking of cellphones- other states are sure to follow
Watchdog.org 2015 -Eric Boehm, bureau chief Pennsylvania Independent, May 29th“State governments taking the
‘sting’ out of surveillance”, 5/29
State governments are laying down an example for Congress to follow when it comes to limiting
electronic surveillance.¶ As Congress continues to debate the future of the National Security
Agency’s telephone metadata collection program, Washington state has banned the warrantless use of similar technology that allows law enforcement to track cell phones. Police using so-called
“stingrays,” also known as simulated cell towers, now have to get approval from a judge, and they will have to use the devices to
seek specific individuals rather than sweeping all calls in a certain area.¶ “The warrant-less, illegal collection of data, not only by the
federal government but by our state agencies; we understand that it violates the constitution,” said state Rep. David Taylor, RYakima, who sponsored the bill. “It’s a civil liberties issue, a civil rights issue; I think it’s an issue that’s ripe for everybody.”¶
Ballotpedia¶ SHUT IT DOWN: State Rep. David Taylor, R-Yakima, says states must place limits on illegal, warrant-less electronic
surveillance by law enforcement.¶ The
bill got broad bipartisan support as it sailed through the
Washington Legislature and was signed earlier this month by Gov. Jay Inslee, a Democrat.¶
Washington becomes the first state to place such limitations on the use of stingrays. A few states are considering
similar bills and one other, Virginia, has already approved one.¶ Taylor told Watchdog.org he believes the
stingray technology can be a useful tool for law enforcement, but without requiring a warrant it was wide open for abuse.¶ Stingrays
work by essentially fooling cell phones into thinking they’re cell towers. The devices, about the size of a small suitcase, can be used
to monitor calls and track all phones within a given area.¶ They’ve been used by the FBI and local police since at least 2008, but their
existence has been kept under wraps thanks to non-disclosure agreements between the feds, local cops and the company that
manufactures the devices.¶ Use of stingray devices did not become public knowledge until 2013, when the ACLU successfully
exposed the FBI’s use of the surveillance technology with a Freedom of Information Act request.¶ In Washington, an investigation by
the Tacoma News Tribune revealed judges had given police the authority to use stingrays — apparently without realizing exactly
what they were doing.¶ “If they use it wisely and within limits, that’s one thing,” Ronald Culpepper, the presiding judge of Pierce
County Superior Court, told the newspaper last year. “I would certainly personally have some concerns about just sweeping up
information from non-involved and innocent parties — and to do it with a whole neighborhood? That’s concerning.”¶ Taylor says the
revelation prompted his legislation.¶ In addition to requiring police to get a warrant from a judge before using a stingray device in an
investigation, the new law requires that police disclose to the judge how they intend to use the technology. Police are also required
to immediately delete any data collected on individuals that are not a part of the investigation.¶ ¶ Image via ACLU¶ LISTENING IN:
The FBI has given stingray technology to local police departments in a number of states, but the
secrecy of the program means no one is sure exactly how many departments are using them.¶
Police and law enforcement groups in Washington seem to agree with Taylor. Though they wield considerable power
in state governments across the country, law enforcement lobbyists did not attempt to fight the
bill’s passage.¶ The lack of opposition was a surprise to Taylor, who said he expected a lengthy battle.¶ “Its incumbent upon
each and every one of us as individual states to take action and correct the situation,” Taylor told Watchdog.org. “We did it and I
hope other states will follow suit.”¶ But police in other states are putting up a fight.¶ In California, a similar bill requiring a warrant
before cops can use stingrays and other electronic surveillance technology is working its way through the Legislature.¶ But law
enforcement groups say the legislation would hurt their ability to go after child predators.¶ The bill has been stuck in the committee
process since mid-March, but a hearing is scheduled for this week.¶ In Texas, two bills would place similar restrictions on how and
when cell phone interceptor technology could be used by law enforcement.¶ And Virginia actually beat Washington to the punch.
The state Legislature there approved a bill requiring a warrant before stingrays can be used, but
even though the bill was signed by Gov. Terry McAuliffe in March, it will not become law until
July.¶ In signing the Washington measure, Inslee used his executive discretion to waive the waiting period and make the new law
effective immediately.¶ The ACLU says at least 50 police agencies in 20 states have been revealed to use the devices, but the exact
number is unknown. It
has praised legislative and judicial efforts, like the one in Washington, to
place limitations on law enforcement’s ability to cast a wide net of electronic surveillance. ¶
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2NC/1NR- States COUNTERPLAN- ANSWERS
TO: Permutation
1. Prefer the counterplan alone
a. Extend our 1NC BBC evidence; the federal government is not suited to
ensure privacy protections, national security concerns will always trump
individual liberty. However, the states have proven that they respond to
the public’s privacy concerns with concrete legislative reductions in
domestic surveillance
b. The permutation links to the net benefit- the plan is perceived as a
democratic president being “soft” on national security matters- this
decreases the chances of a Hillary Clinton presidency
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2NC/1NR- States COUNTERPLAN- ANSWERS
TO: Fifty State Fiat Bad
50 state fiat is good
1. Education- weighing the costs and benefits of federal versus state policy
is crucial to effective policymaking skills- most real world policy making
involves deciding whether to implement a policy at the local or federal
level
2. Ground- the topic is very large and most of the literature is skewed
affirmative- without the States Counterplan, the negative is stuck
defending the status quo. The affirmative also has built in advantages
such as the first and last speech
3. Reject the argument not the team- if the affirmative wins that 50 state
fiat is illegitimate do not vote us down. Instead, disregard the
COUNTERPLAN and weigh the net benefit against the affirmative’s
impacts
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**States COUNTERPLAN Affirmative
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2AC- States Counterplan
1. Permutation do both- the counterplan is not functionally competitivethe 50 states and the USFG can do the plan- this would shield the link to
the net benefit, if the 50 states do the affirmative along with the federal
government, it will not spur backlash against the democrats or with
members of congress
2. The counterplan cannot solve- the most pernicious forms of surveillance
occur at the federal level, the counterplan has no jurisdiction over FBI
surveillance
NEW YORK TIMES 2015- New York Times, “F.B.I. Is Broadening Surveillance Role, Report
Shows” http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/12/us/politics/beyond-nsa-fbi-is-assuming-a-largersurveillance-role-report-shows.html
WASHINGTON — Although the government’s warrantless surveillance¶ program is associated with
the National Security Agency, the Federal¶ Bureau of Investigation has gradually become a
significant player in¶ administering it, a newly declassified report shows.¶ In 2008, according to the report, the F.B.I.
assumed the power to¶ review email accounts the N.S.A. wanted to collect through the “Prism”¶
system, which collects emails of foreigners from providers like Yahoo and¶ Google. The bureau’s top
lawyer, Valerie E. Caproni, who is now a Federal¶ District Court judge, developed procedures to make sure no such accounts¶
belonged to Americans.¶ Then,
in October 2009, the F.B.I. started retaining copies of¶ unprocessed
communications gathered without a warrant to analyze for its¶ own purposes. And in April 2012, the
bureau began nominating new email¶ accounts and phone numbers belonging to foreigners for collection,¶ including through the
N.S.A.’s “upstream” system, which collects¶ communications transiting network switches.¶ That
information is in a 231page study by the Justice Department’s¶ inspector general about the F.B.I.’s activities under the
FISA Amendments¶ Act of 2008, which authorized the surveillance program. The report was¶ entirely
classified when completed in September 2012. But the government has now made a semi-redacted version of the report public in
response to a¶ Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by The New York Times.¶ The Times filed the lawsuit after a wave of
declassifications about¶ government surveillance activities in response to leaks by the former¶ intelligence contractor Edward J.
Snowden.¶ The report was delivered late Friday to The Times. In it, the inspector¶ general, Michael E. Horowitz, concluded that the
F.B.I. was doing a good¶ job in making sure that the email accounts targeted for warrantless¶ collection belonged to noncitizens
abroad.¶ But parts of the report remained heavily redacted. For example, there¶ was only one uncensored reference to the Prism
system. It was not clear¶ why the Justice Department had redacted all the other references to Prism¶ in the report; the name of that
program and many details about it have¶ been declassified and were discussed in a July 2014 report by the Privacy¶ and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board.¶ David McCraw, a Times lawyer, said the newspaper may challenge the¶ redactions at a later stage in the
Freedom of Information Act litigation.¶ The
report also filled in a gap about the evolving legality of the¶
warrantless wiretapping program, which traces back to a decision by¶ President George W. Bush
in October 2001 to direct the N.S.A. to collect¶ Americans’ international phone calls and emails,
from network locations on¶ domestic soil, without the individual warrants required by the
Foreign¶ Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA. The Times revealed that program in¶ December 2005.¶ After the
article appeared, telecommunications providers that had¶ voluntarily participated in the program were sued, and a Federal District¶
Court judge in Detroit ruled that the program was illegal, although that¶ decision was later vacated. The Bush administration sought
to put the¶ program on more solid legal footing by gaining orders from the Foreign¶ Intelligence Surveillance Court approving it In
January 2007, the Bush administration persuaded the court’s Judge¶ Malcolm Howard to issue an order to telephone and network
companies¶ requiring them to let the security agency target foreigners’ accounts for¶ collection without individual warrants. But in
April 2007, when the order¶ came up for renewal before Judge Roger Vinson, he said that it was illegal.¶ Judge Vinson’s resistance
led Congress to enact, in August 2007, the¶ Protect America Act, a temporary law permitting warrantless surveillance¶ of foreigners
from domestic network locations. The
next year, Congress¶ replaced that law with the FISA Amendments
Act.¶ Last month, as a result of separate Freedom of Information Act¶ lawsuits by The Times and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, the¶ government declassified the identities of the judges who disagreed in early¶ 2007 and several court filings from
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that episode. But it remained unclear¶ what the N.S.A. had done in June and July of 2007.¶ The
newly declassified report
said Judge Vinson issued an order on¶ May 31, 2007, that allowed existing surveillance to
continue by approving¶ collection on a long list of specific foreign phone numbers and email¶
addresses. But after that, when the agency wanted to start wiretapping an¶ additional person, it had to ask the court for
permission.¶ The report said that “the rigorous nature of the FISA Court’s probable¶ cause review of new selectors submitted to the
various FISA Court judges¶ following Judge Vinson’s May 31, 2007, order caused the N.S.A. to place¶ fewer foreign selectors under
coverage than it wanted to.” That
and other¶ factors “combined to accelerate the government’s efforts”
to persuade¶ Congress to enact the Protect America Act.
3. 50 State Fiat is a reason to reject the team
A. Not real world- surveillance practices that occur at the federal level
are under USFG jurisdiction and cannot be wished away by state
actors
B. Education- the topic is about the federal government curtailing its
surveillance, the negative shifts the discussion towards 50 state
solvency, which was not the framers’ intention for the resolution
C. Ground- it’s unfair for the affirmative to have to defend against a
counterplan that results in the entirety of the plan, there is not much
literature on a difference between the federal and state governments
doing the plan
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2AC- States COUNTERPLAN- Solvency Deficit- Drone Affirmative
1. The COUNTERPLAN cannot solve the privacy advantage- our 1AC
evidence is predicated on FBI use of drones, this is the federal bureau of
investigation, and thus, the states do not have the jurisdiction to
regulate FBI activity
2. The COUNTERPLAN cannot solve the credibility advantage- our 1AC
internal link evidence states that the United States erodes international
confidence in human rights regimes by not upholding their
commitments- the states cannot resolve international perception only
federal action can, the impacts are global warming and hegemony
3. The COUNTERPLAN cannot solve the innovation advantage- our 1AC
evidence indicates that state governments are banning drones to resolve
privacy concerns, this triggers the impact to the advantage- the 1ac
solvency evidence indicates that federal legislation is necessary to
reform drones to alleviate privacy concerns, which boosts the
commercial drone industry, the impact is conflict through food scarcity
4. Here’s more evidence- the FBI is operating a secret fleet of drones, the
states cannot solve
Huffington Post 2015- “FBI Confirms Wide-Scale Use Of Surveillance Flights Over
U.S. Cities” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/02/fbi-surveillanceflights_n_7490396.html, June 2
The FBI is operating a small air force with scores of low-flying planes across the U.S. carrying
video and, at times, cellphone surveillance technology -- all hidden behind fictitious companies that are fronts
for the government, The Associated Press has learned.¶ The planes' surveillance equipment is generally used
without a judge's approval, and the FBI said the flights are used for specific, ongoing
investigations. In a recent 30-day period, the agency flew above more than 30 cities in 11 states
across the country, an AP review found.¶ Aerial surveillance represents a changing frontier for law enforcement, providing
what the government maintains is an important tool in criminal, terrorism or intelligence probes. But the program raises
questions about whether there should be updated policies protecting civil liberties as new
technologies pose intrusive opportunities for government spying.
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2AC- States COUNTERPLAN- Solvency Deficit- Security Letters
Affirmative
1. The COUNTERPLAN cannot solve any of the case- extend our 1AC
evidence, the FBI has been requesting national security letters from the
federal government, only they have the authority to OK the use of
security letters, not the state governments
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2AC- States COUNTERPLAN- Solvency Deficit- Stingray
Affirmative
1. There are over 50 federal agencies that use stingray technology- the
counterplan cannot solve
ACLU No Date- American Civil liberties Union, https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-trackingdevices-whos-got-them
The map below tracks what we know, based on press reports and publicly available documents,
about the use of stingray tracking devices by state and local police departments. Following the
map is a list of the federal law enforcement agencies known to use the technology throughout
the United States. The ACLU has identified 53 agencies in 21 states and the District of
Columbia that own stingrays, but because many agencies continue to shroud their purchase and use of stingrays in
secrecy, this map dramatically underrepresents the actual use of stingrays by law enforcement
agencies nationwide.¶ Stingrays, also known as "cell site simulators" or "IMSI catchers," are invasive cell phone surveillance
devices that mimic cell phone towers and send out signals to trick cell phones in the area into transmitting their locations and
identifying information. When used to track a suspect's cell phone, they also gather information about the phones of countless
bystanders who happen to be nearby. Click here for more info on stingrays.
2. The COUNTERPLAN cannot solve the racism advantage- our 1AC Kleiner
evidence states that stingray technology targets persons of color an
ongoing federal practice since 9/11, only the plan can set precedent at
the federal level.
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**CISA DISADVANTAGE Negative
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1NC- CISA DISADVANTAGE
A. Uniqueness- CISA will not pass in the status quo- too much senate opposition
Washington Examiner 2015 - “Senate vote falls short of approving defense act with CISA
amendmentӦ http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/senate-vote-falls-short-of-approvingdefense-act-with-cisa-amendment/article/2566527, June 22
Memories are long in the Senate, and it will probably take Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, RKy., more than a week or two to get over the rebuff he suffered on the floor when he tried to
attach cybersecurity legislation as an amendment to a pending defense bill.¶ That procedural
gambit was blocked on June 11 by most Democrats and three Republicans, just days after McConnell's move to renew
National Security Agency surveillance authorities was similarly rejected. ¶ Last week, McConnell walked away from a reporter without
comment when asked about prospects in July for the cybersecurity bill, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing Act, which would
encourage the sharing of cyberthreat indicators between government and industry with liability protection for participating companies. Critics of the bill say it places
more personal information in government hands and raises profound concerns over privacy. And that
it could also open the door to retributive hacking by government and private companies. ¶ Later, McConnell said the cyber bill "is important, it's a priority, we will continue to look for a way forward."
B. Link- The plan restricts government surveillance- CISA will be deemed
necessary to bridge the gap
Flores 2014- Christian, Medill school of journalism reporter, “CISA puts Congress in rough
spotӦ http://nationalsecurityzone.org/site/cisa-puts-congress-in-rough-spot/
The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence passed the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014 – or CISA – last month.
But, as with recent attempts at passing other cyber security bills, Congress is once again put in a delicate position.¶ On
the one
hand, past cyber attacks from China and Russia – as well as the fear of future ones – has led
Congress to try and step up with cybersecurity bills.¶ “The continued cybercriminal activity and threats have
become so great that everyone realizes something has to be done,” said Jerry Irvine of the National Cyber Security Task Force.
“While this may not be the best or even the correct reaction, it is necessary to get something in place now.”¶ But
that last part
about the bill perhaps not being the best or correct reaction has been the exact complaint by
those opposed to the perceived privacy intrusions that come tacked on to CISA.¶ “The Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence…continues to attempt to expand the ability of the government
to engage in mass surveillance of online communications by Americans without adequate
protections for privacy…while at the same time shielding companies providing this information from consequences even if
they violate the law,” said Ray Trygstad, a retired U.S. Navy Security Manager and current Associate Director of Cyber Security and
Forensics Education at the Illinois Institute of Technology.¶ The
proposed bill – drafted by Senate Intelligence
Committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) and Vice Chairman Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.) –
removes legal barriers for private companies to share cyber threat information with the
government voluntarily. This means companies will receive liability protection for the data sharing if used for cyber security
purposes. The government can also share information with the companies.¶ CISA passed the Intelligence Committee
with an overwhelming 12-3 vote. But U.S. Senators Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Mark Udall (DColo.) have been two of the most vocal senators opposed to CISA, stating concerns over the
combination of the lack of privacy protections and the bill perhaps not materially improving
cyber security. They issued the following statement:¶ “Cyber-attacks on U.S. firms and infrastructure pose a serious threat to
America’s economic health and national security. We agree there is a need for information-sharing between the federal government
and private companies about cybersecurity threats and how to defend against them.. However,
we have seen how the
federal government has exploited loopholes to collect Americans’ private information in the
name of security The only way to make cybersecurity information-sharing effective and
acceptable is to ensure that there are strong protections for Americans’ constitutional privacy
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rights. Without these protections in place, private companies will rightly see participation as bad for business.Ӧ An Electronic
Frontier Foundation – or EFF – article and Trygstad point to President Obama’s signing of Executive Order 13636 as a good start to
ensuring national cyber security. The
executive order directed the Department of Homeland Security to
expand information-sharing programs in a way that provides more privacy protections than CISA
and previous cyber security bills.¶ The EFF article also raises concerns with CISA and previously proposed cybersecurity
bills. The article calls to question what exactly is a “cybersecurity purpose” and “cybersecurity threat,” two phrases used in CISA,
arguing that these broad definitions “grant new spying power to companies.”¶ But
these broad definitions are
inevitable with all of the advancements in cyber crime, Irvine says.¶ “Unfortunately because of
the ever changing technologies and risks that are associated with cyber events, it is difficult if
not impossible to provide more specific definitions as both purposes and threats of cyber
criminals continuously changes,” Irvine said.
C. Impact – CISA devastates investor confidence, ongoing trade talks, and
every other facet of the economy
Human Rights Watch 2013- Human Rights Watch, July 15, “How the NSA Scandal Hurts the
Economy”
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/15/how-nsa-scandal-hurts-economy
The National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance scandal has been devastating to the U.S.
government’s credibility as an advocate for Internet freedom. But as the EU-U.S. trade talks began last week,
the impact on U.S. technology companies and a fragile American economy may be even
greater.¶ Every new revelation suggests far more surveillance than imagined and more involvement by telephone and Internet
companies, with much still unknown. One of the most troubling aspects of this spying is that foreign
nationals abroad have no privacy rights under U.S. law. Foreigners using the services of global companies are
fair game. (There is also a certain irony to the revelations considering that some European governments such as Germany and the
Netherlands are strong U.S. allies on Internet freedom but may simultaneously be targets of U.S. surveillance online). ¶ A
July 1
report by Der Spiegel on the NSA spying on European officials infuriated governments a week
before negotiations started on a massive U.S.-EU trade agreement that could be worth almost
$272 billion for their economies and 2 million new jobs. Officials throughout Europe, most notably French
President Francois Hollande, said that NSA spying threatens trade talks. ¶ The French government unsuccessfully
called for a two week postponement of the trade talks. The next day it had to address allegations in Le Monde
of its own domestic mass surveillance program.¶ For the Internet companies named in reports on NSA
surveillance, their bottom line is at risk because European markets are crucial for them. It is too
early assess the impact on them, but the stakes are huge . For example, Facebook has about 261 million active monthly
European users compared to about 195 million in the U.S. and Canada, and 22 percent of Apple’s net income came from Europe in
the first quarter of 2013. ¶ Europe
was primed for a backlash against NSA spying because people care
deeply about privacy after their experience of state intrusion in Nazi Germany and Communist
Eastern Europe. And U.S. spying on Europeans via companies had been a simmering problem since at least 2011.¶ In June
2011, Microsoft admitted that the United States could bypass EU privacy regulations to get vast amounts of cloud data from their
European Customers. Six months later, U.K.-based BAE Systems stopped using the company’s cloud services because of this issue.¶
A major 2011 European Union survey released that June found that “[t]hree out of four
Europeans accept that revealing personal data is part of everyday life, but they are also worried
about how companies – including search engines and social networks – use their information.”
Only 22 percent trusted e-mail, social networking, and search companies with their data.¶ Then the European Parliament issued a
report on privacy in October 2012 confirming Microsoft’s claim and urging new privacy protections between the EU and the United
States. The EU tried, but the Financial Times reported that senior Obama administration officials and tech industry representatives
successfully lobbied against it.¶ The NSA scandal has brought tensions over spying to a boil. German prosecutors may open a
criminal investigation into NSA spying. On July 3, Germany’s Interior Minister said that people should stop using companies like
Google and Facebook if they fear the U.S. is intercepting their data. On July 4, the European Parliament condemned spying on
Europeans and ordered an investigation into mass surveillance. The same day, Neelie Kroes, the EU’s chief telecom and Internet
official, warned of “multi-billion euro consequences for American companies” because of U.S. spying in the cloud.¶ The companies
have belatedly distanced themselves from the NSA and called for more transparency. Google, Microsoft, Yahoo! and Facebook, are
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in a particularly tough spot as members of the Global Network Initiative, a group (including Human Rights Watch) formed to verify
whether companies respect freedom of expression and privacy online.¶ Their role in NSA surveillance raises serious questions about
whether they have done their utmost to protect billions of people’s privacy or whether it is even possible to know since virtually
everything is classified. Yahoo! unsuccessfully challenged a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act request in 2008, the New York Times
reported and the company is trying to publicly release its petition to the government. But on July 11, The Guardian reported that
Microsoft helped the NSA and FBI bypass its own encryption to access its users’ data, based on documents from Edward Snowden.¶
Transparency is an important first step. Its absence only exacerbates a trust deficit that
companies already had in Europe. And trust is crucial. Google’s chief legal officer recognized this on June 19 when he
said, “Our business depends on the trust of our users,” during a web chat about the NSA scandal.
Some companies have been aggressive in trying to disclose more, and others have not. But unless the U.S. government
loosens strictures and allows greater disclosure , all U.S. companies are likely to suffer the
backlash .¶ Since the story broke, the United States has allowed companies to disclose the number of FISA requests they
receive, but only combined with all law enforcement requests in ranges of 1,000. So the exact number is impossible to determine.¶
Google has been the most aggressive, including by petitioning the FISA court. Microsoft hasfollowed. Apple, Yahoo!, and Facebook
are starting to report aggregate data in the wake of the NSA fallout.¶ Companies should press for meaningful disclosure about the
scope and scale of government surveillance and their role in it. They also need to support laws and policies, including changes to
surveillance laws, to protect their customers’ privacy. Ultimately, they need to show how they actually protect users from
government spying.¶ The
Obama administration needs to recognize and mitigate the serious
economic risks of spying while trying to rebuild its credibility on Internet freedom. The July 9
hearing of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is a start, but much more is needed. More disclosure about the surveillance
programs, more oversight, better laws, and a process to work with allied governments to increase privacy protections would be a
start.¶ The European customers of Internet companies are not all al Qaeda or criminals, but that is essentially how U.S. surveillance
efforts treat them.
If this isn’t fixed, this may be the beginning of a very costly battle pitting U.S.
surveillance against European business, trade, and human rights.
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**Uniqueness
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2NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- Uniqueness Wall
Democrats and libertarians successfully blocked passage in the status quo, but
they need to sustain that momentum
Politico 2015 “Democrats block cyber bill, leaving measure in limbo
http://www.politico.com/story/2015/06/democrats-cybersecurity-cyber-bill-block-limbo-gopamendments-118890.html, June 11
Democrats made good on their threats to block a bipartisan cybersecurity bill on Thursday, after
they were infuriated by Republican procedural moves to pass the bill with only limited amendments, something Democrats called a
“cynical ploy.”¶ The
partisan blowup marked a stunning turn for legislation that’s enjoyed broad
support. The measure had gained new urgency after the Office of Personnel Management announced 4 million federal
employees’ records had been breached — at the hands of Chinese hackers, according to anonymous federal officials.¶ Story
Continued Below¶ Privacy
advocates in both parties had wanted to strengthen personal data
protections in the measure, but Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s (R-Ky.) procedural gambit made it next to
impossible to make those changes.¶ So Democrats and libertarian-leaning Republicans banded together to
defeat McConnell’s plan to attach the cyberthreat information sharing legislation to the
National Defense Authorization Act days. The procedural vote was 56-40, with McConnell needing 60 votes to
advance the cyber bill.¶ The majority of Democrats were joined by several Republicans, including Sens. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), Mike Lee
(R-Utah) and Dean Heller (R-Nev.), to block the bill from moving forward.¶ On the other side, a handful of Democrats, including Sens.
Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.), Mark Warner (D-Va.) and Bill Nelson (D-Fla.), voted with McConnell to advance the cyber measure.
CISA is too unpopular with dems, privacy groups, and the president to pass
SC Magazine 2015- “OPM breach exposed SSNs, personnel records of all fed workers”
http://www.scmagazine.com/opm-breach-larger-than-anticipated-worker-info-on-dark-web/article/420348, June 12
Calling Senate Democrats out for a 56-40 voteThursday that failed to garner enough support to more the Defense Authorization Bill
forward, and with it the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), that Republicans had attached to the bill, Senate Majority
Whip John Cornyn, R-Texas, said “the refusal to move forward with this legislation, particularly the cybersecurity part of this
discussion, is just unconscionable.Ӧ CISA
had enjoyed bipartisan support, easily passing the Senate
Intelligence Committee in a14-1 vote in March, although it continued to draw criticism from
privacy groups.¶ After the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) revealed a data breach that is now believed to have
exposed the social security numbers and personnel information on every federal worker, Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell, R-Ky., tried to attached CISA to the Defense Authorization Bill and fast track its
passage.¶ Prior to the vote and amid Republican criticism, Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid
noted that Democrats had been trying for five years to pass a cybersecurity bill but it was
consistently blocked by Republicans. ¶ “So why does the Republican leader now come and say look how strong I am on
cybersecurity, look at me, I lifted my cybersecurity weights this morning,” Reid said in a statement issued the day before the vote.
“But what he's done is now he's going to put cybersecurity on this bill the President has said
he's going to veto.”
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**Link
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2NC/1NR – CISA DISADVANTAGE- Link Wall- Drone Affirmative
Restricting armed domestic drones popular- shores up political capital for
passage
FoxNews 2013 (Fox News, “Lawmakers eye regulating domestic surveillance drones”,
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/05/19/congress-eyes-regulating-drones/, May 19,
2013)
Amid growing concern over the use of drones by police and government officials for
surveillance, a bipartisan group of lawmakers is pushing to limit the use of unmanned
surveillance "eyes in the sky" aircraft . Rep. James Sensenbrenner, R-Wis., along with Rep.
Zoe Lofgren, D-Calif., and Rep. Ted Poe, R-Texas, is sponsoring legislation that would codify
due process protections for Americans in cases involving drones and make flying armed
drones in the U.S. sky illegal . Sensenbrenner believes it is necessary to develop new standards to address the privacy
issues associated with use of drones — which can be as small as a bird and as large as a plane. "Every advancement in crime fighting
technology, from wiretaps to DNA, has resulted in courts carving out the Constitutional limits within which the police operate,"
Sensenbrenner said at a House Judiciary subcommittee hearing Friday on the issues surrounding drones. The subcommittee heard
from experts who were divided on what actions Congress should take to address the new technology. But the four witnesses all
agreed that drones raised new, often unprecedented questions about domestic surveillance. "Current
law has yet to
catch up to this new technology," said Chris Calabrese, legislative counsel for the American
Civil Liberties Union. Calabrese said he supported immediate regulation of the drone industry and said his biggest concern
was the overuse of drones by police and government officials for surveillance. But Calabrese said he doesn't want to hinder the
growth of drones with the power to do good, including helping find missing persons, assisting firefighters and addressing other
emergencies. Tracey
Maclin, a professor with the Boston University School of Law, said the issues
raised by drones haven't been addressed by courts before because the technology goes
beyond what humans had been capable of through aerial surveillance. Past court rulings,
"were premised on naked-eye observations — simple visual observations from a public place,"
he said. Rep. Cedric Richmond, D-La., said he wanted to know when drone technology will
advance to the point where Congress will have to act on the issue. He said he was concerned
about the effect on privacy. "At what point do you think it's going to get to a point where we have to say what a
reasonable expectation of privacy is?" Richmond said. Republicans expressed similar concerns. "It seems to
me that Congress needs to set the standard, rather than wait and let the courts set the
standard," Poe said. " Tech nology is great — as long as it's used the right and proper way ," Rep. Jason
Chaffetz, R-Utah, said at Friday's hearing. Some experts urged caution. Gregory McNeal, an associate law professor at Pepperdine
University, said writing laws to cover drones will be difficult because the technology continues to improve and Congress could think
it's addressing key issues, only to have new ones emerge. He compared drones to the privacy concerns raised by development of the
Internet in the 1990s. Regulating then, he said, could have stymied the rapid growth of the Internet and wouldn't have addressed
today's Internet privacy issues. If Congress feels compelled to act, McNeal said, it should think in terms broader than a "drone
policy" and set standards for surveillance or realistic expectations of privacy. "A technology-centered approach to privacy is the
wrong approach," he said. But the ACLU's Calabrese said Congress should work quickly. "This
can't be adequately
addressed by existing law," he said. "Manned aircraft are expensive to purchase. Drones' low
cost and flexibility erode that natural limit. They can appear in windows, all for much less than
the cost of a plane or a helicopter." A future with domestic drones may be inevitable. While civilian drone use is
currently limited to government agencies and some public universities, a law passed by Congress last year requires the Federal
Aviation Administration to allow widespread drone flights in the U.S. by 2015. According to FAA estimates, as many as 7,500 civilian
drones could be in use within five years.
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The plan functions as an olive branch for bipartisanship- massively popular gets
republicans the necessary votes
Greenwald 2013 (Glenn Greenwald, Business Insider, “GLENN GREENWALD: The US Needs To
Wake Up To Threat Of Domestic Drones”, http://www.businessinsider.com/drone-threatsstrikes-us-2013-3, March 30, 2013)
Notably,
this may be one area where an actual bipartisan/trans-partisan alliance can
meaningfully emerge , as most advocates working on these issues with whom I've spoken say that libertarianminded GOP state legislators have been as responsive as more left-wing Democratic ones in
working to impose some limits. One bill now pending in Congress would prohibit the use of
surveillance drones on US soil in the absence of a specific search warrant, and has bipartisan
support . Only the most authoritarian among us will be incapable of understanding the multiple dangers posed by a domestic
drone regime (particularly when their party is in control of the government and they are incapable of perceiving threats from
increased state police power). But the
proliferation of domestic drones affords a real opportunity to
forge an enduring coalition in defense of core privacy and other rights that transcends
partisan allegiance , by working toward meaningful limits on their use. Making people aware of exactly what these unique
threats are from a domestic drone regime is the key first step in constructing that coalition.
Limiting domestic drones is popular- shores up support for CISA
Sasso 2012 (Brendan Sasso, “Lawmakers mull restrictions on domestic drones”,
http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/264189-lawmakers-mull-restrictions-ondomestic-drones, October 25, 2012)
At Thursday's forum, lawmakers, academics and privacy advocates worried that widespread drone
use would pose a serious threat to privacy. "Persistently monitoring Americans' movements
can reveal their political identity, their religious views and even how safe your marriage is,
how strong it is," Rep. Hank Johnson (D-Ga.) said. "Both parties cast a skeptical eye toward
drone surveillance in law enforcement," he added. Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas) emphasized
that he believes drones are essential for killing suspected terrorists overseas and monitoring
the border, and he said drones have a "real benefit and use" for law enforcement. But he
added that he would support legislation to limit their use in domestic airspace. Chris
Calabrese, legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union, explained that drones can
be equipped with surveillance technologies such as night-vision cameras, body scanners and
license plate readers. " Drones should only be used if subject to a powerful framework that
regulates their use in order to avoid abuse and invasions of privacy," he said. The lawmakers
and witnesses agreed that domestic drones should not be equipped with weapons , like the
military drones that fly over Afghanistan. But David Crump, a professor at the Houston University Law Center, said
Poe should revise his legislation to allow for more uses of drones. He said the law should make it clear that police can use drones in
hostage situations, car chases and for security around sensitive government buildings or officials. He predicted that as drones
become more widespread, a university may want to use a drone to televise views of a sports game.
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2NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- Link Wall- Stingray Affirmative
The plan has the kind of bipartisan support necessary to get republicans a win
on CISA
Washington House Republicans 2015- “Rep. Taylor's 'drone' and 'stingray' bills pass the
state House” http://houserepublicans.wa.gov/uncategorized/rep-taylors-drone-and-stingraybills-pass-state-house, March 4
Legislation passed the state House of Representatives today setting parameters around the
state's use of drones and cell site simulators, commonly called "stingrays."¶ Rep. David Taylor, R-Moxee,
sponsored both bills and said today was a good day for open government advocates and those who value individual freedom and
liberty.¶ "Today's
actions by the House prove once again that freedom and liberty are not
partisan issues," said Taylor. "When we work together we can do great things for Washington citizens."¶ House Bill 1639
creates new guidelines for when a state or local agency can use extraordinary sensing devices (ESD) or "drones," and what they can
do with the personal information gathered. Specifically, the bill:¶ Prohibits state agencies from procuring an extraordinary sensing
device (ESD) without an appropriation by the Legislature and prohibits a local agency from procuring an ESD without explicit
approval of its governing body.¶ Requires agencies to publish written policies for the use of ESDs and to minimize collection and
disclosure of personal information.¶ Prohibits agencies from operating an ESD and disclosing personal information unless specifically
authorized by the act.¶ Allows agencies to operate an ESD without obtaining a warrant if the agency does not intend to collect
personal information.¶ Allows agencies to operate an ESD and disclose personal information from the operation under certain
circumstances.¶ Excludes all evidence collected by an ESD from all court, legislative, or regulatory proceedings if the collection or
disclosure of personal information violates any provision of this act.¶ Creates a legal cause of action for damages where an individual
claims a violation of this act injured his or her business, person, or reputation.¶ Requires agencies to maintain records related to
each use of an ESD and file an annual report with the Office of Financial Management.¶ Taylor
said the bill is similar to
bipartisan legislation he proposed last year. His previous bill placing restrictions on drones
passed the Legislature but was vetoed by Gov. Jay Inslee. The governor then placed a limited moratorium on
the state's use of drones and convened a task force to study the issue more thoroughly.¶ "While the task force didn't come to a clear
consensus, we did take some of their suggestions and cleaned up the language of the bill a little bit," said Taylor. "With the amount
of lawmakers on both sides of the aisle pushing for this bill, I don't anticipate the governor will veto it this time around."¶ House Bill
prohibits the use of cell site simulators, commonly referred to as "stingrays," unless a
warrant is issued.¶ A cell site simulator is a device that emits a signal mimicking a cellphone tower. It allows law enforcement
1440
agencies to capture detailed information from a suspect's cell phone, including location and who the person calls or texts. ¶ "As
technology evolves and is enhanced, electronic privacy is an important component to consider," said Taylor. "I have serious concerns
about information collected from third parties when these devices are used and we will hopefully address that at some point in the
future. For
now, we're drawing a clear line in the sand and saying you can't use this new
technology unless you go to a judge and convince them to give you a warrant to do so."¶ HB 1440
passed the House unanimously. HB 1639 passed the House 73-25. Both bills now move to the state Senate for
further consideration.¶ The 105-day 2015 legislative session is scheduled to end April 26.
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2NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- Link Wall- Security Letters
Empirically proven that surveillance reforms enjoy bipartisan support
The Nation 2014 John Nichols, co-author with Robert W. McChesney of Dollarocracy: How
the Money and Media Election Complex is Destroying America, “NSA Reform Is Blocked by
Constitutionally Disinclined Senate Republicans” http://www.thenation.com/article/could-markudall-make-last-ditch-difference-nsa-reform/, Nov 19
The vital cause of NSA reform—which seemed to be gaining strength as not just citizens but
their elected representatives came to recognize the consequences of the issues raised by
Edward Snowden’s leaks—has hit a rough spot in recent weeks. Allies of the cause are being defeated or
abandoning their principles and major initiatives are failing.¶ The first bad news came November 4, when Colorado Senator
Mark Udall lost his campaign for a second term. In his first term, the Democrat had emerged as one of the steadiest,
and frequently most aggressive, critics of National Security Agency abuses. Arguing that there was “a groundswell
of public support for reform,” and that such reform had to “reject half-measures that could still allow the government to
collect millions of Americans’ records without any individual suspicion or evidence of wrongdoing,” Udall worked with
Oregon Democrat Ron Wyden and Kentucky Republican Rand Paul to get Congress to crack
down on the NSA. ¶ Udall is still in the Senate until January, and he moved in the immediate aftermath of his defeat to gain
Senate support for at least a small measure of NSA reform. But even that initiative fell short Tuesday night, as Udall and his
allies could muster only fifty-eight of the sixty needed votes to prohibit the NSA from holding the phone records of Americans and to
establish better procedures for challenging the claims and initiatives of government agencies that overreach. ¶ Though the measure
fell far short of what was needed, the American Civil Liberties Union argued that the so-called “USA
Freedom Act,” which was
our chance to turn the tide
on suspicionless mass surveillance, restoring some of the crucial privacy protections lost with
passage of the Patriot Act in 2001.”
introduced by outgoing Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy, D-Vermont, “is
Here’s more evidence- the plan’s introduction would create an unusual alliance
between dems and republicans
NEW YORK TIMES 2015- “Patriot Act Faces Revisions Backed by Both Parties”
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/01/us/politics/patriot-act-faces-revisions-backed-by-bothparties.html, May 1
After more than a decade of wrenching national debate over the intrusiveness of government intelligence agencies, a bipartisan
wave of support has gathered to sharply limit the federal government’s sweeps of phone and Internet records.¶ On Thursday, a bill
that would overhaul the Patriot Act and curtail the so-called metadata surveillance exposed by Edward J. Snowden was
overwhelmingly passed by the House Judiciary Committee and was heading to almost certain passage in that chamber this month.¶
An identical bill in the Senate — introduced with the support of five Republicans — is gaining support over the objection of Senator
Mitch McConnell, Republican of Kentucky, who is facing the prospect of his first policy defeat since ascending this year to majority
leader.¶ The
push for reform is the strongest demonstration yet of a decade-long shift from a
singular focus on national security at the expense of civil liberties to a new balance in the postSnowden era.¶ Under the bipartisan bills in the House and Senate, the Patriot Act would be
changed to prohibit bulk collection, and sweeps that had operated under the guise of socalled National Security Letters issued by the F.B.I. would end. The data would instead be stored by the
phone companies themselves, and could be accessed by intelligence agencies only after approval of the secret Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act court.¶ The legislation would also create a panel of experts to advise the FISA court on privacy, civil liberties, and
technology matters, while requiring the declassification of all significant FISA court opinions. ¶ The debate has resulted in a
highly
unusual alliance of House Speaker John A. Boehner, the White House, the Tea Party and a bipartisan majority in the House.
They are in opposition to Mr. McConnell, his Intelligence Committee chairman, and a small group of defense hawks. In addition, two
Republican presidential candidates in the Senate, Ted Cruz of Texas and Rand Paul of Kentucky, have made it clear they will not
accept a straight extension of the current Patriot Act.
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**Impact
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2NC/1NR- CISA DISADVANTAGE- ANSWERS TO: CISA Good
CISA is bad- does little to protect against cyber attacks and hinders privacy
protections
Laperruque 2015- Jake, fellow on Privacy, Surveillance, and Security. Jake previously served
as a law clerk for Senator Al Franken on the Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law,
and as a policy fellow for Senator Robert Menendez. “How the OPM Hack Demonstrates the
Need to Improve CISA” https://cdt.org/blog/how-the-opm-hack-demonstrates-the-need-toimprove-cisa/
The recent mass breach of computers at the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has
increased pressure on Congress to act to enhance cybersecurity. However, the OPM hack demonstrates the
importance of strengthening the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA, S. 754) in two important ways that would not
undermine the goals of the legislation. First, information shared under the bill by the private sector with the government should go
to the Department of Homeland Security National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (DHS NCCIC) and not to
any government agency, as would be permitted under the current bill. This would direct the flow of cyber threat indicators to an
entity that was created to receive and protect them. Second, the requirements to eliminate personal information from cyber threat
indicators before they are shared should be strengthened. If less personal information is shared, less personal information is
available to the bad guys when they break in.¶ CISA Should Direct the Cyber Threat Indicators that Companies Share to the DHS
NCCIC¶ CISA authorizes private entities share cyber threat indicators (CTI’s) with any department or agency within the federal
government (Sec. 3(c)(1)). Many agencies do not have the operational ability to receive, store, and process these data, or – as the
OPM breach demonstrates – the security protocols and experiences to adequately protect personal information. ¶ A far better path
would be to follow the model of Rep. McCaul’s National Cybersecurity Protection Advancement Act (H.R. 1731), passed in the House
earlier this year. That legislation required that companies sharing cyberthreat indicators share them with the DHS NCCIC. The NCCIC
was created to receive, process, and protect sensitive cyber data. Requiring all private-to-government sharing be directed at this
entity would enhance data security and operational functionality.¶ CISA Should Require Implementation of Adequate Privacy
Protections Before Information Is Shared.¶ CISA
requires that all information shared with the federal
government be automatically and instantaneously shared with a range of federal entities (Sec.
5(a)(3)(A)(i)).[1] However, this sharing would occur without full application of privacy
protections. The bill requires that automated sharing occur in “real-time” without any “delay, modification, or any other action”
that would impede instantaneous receipt by all other designated agencies (Sec. 5(a)(3)(A)(i)). This would prohibit any
privacy protections – including redaction and removal of unnecessary personal information –
that would require any human effort or review.¶ Thus under CISA, personal data could be
instantly distributed to over half a dozen federal departments without adequate privacy
protections, and would then be vulnerable if computer networks in any of these entities were
breached. In contrast, the Protecting Cyber Networks Act (H.R. 1560, passed in the House earlier this year) requires sharing not
be subject to “delay, modification, or any other action without good cause that could impede receipt” (emphasis added). This
provision would better protect privacy and data security than CISA. Additional language should be added to make it clear that
application of the privacy policies to be created by the bill constitute “good cause.”¶ CISA Should Be Amended To Strengthen
Requirements To Remove Personal Information Before Cyber Threat Indicators Are Shared.¶ CISA’s requirement to remove personal
information (Sec. 4(d)(2)) is riddled with loopholes that can be closed without harming the goals of the legislation. Closing the
loopholes in three ways would mean less personal information is available if (and when) computer systems are penetrated again:¶
CISA does not require that companies “take reasonable efforts” to review cyber threat indicators or remove personal information
before sharing – any review, even if it were cursory and ineffective, would be sufficient. Both House information sharing bills (H.R.
1731 and H.R. 1560) require a benchmark of “reasonable” efforts be taken, ensuring that attempts to review and remove personal
information before sharing are effective.¶ Even if an acceptable review were to occur, CISA
only requires companies to
remove personal information they “know” is unrelated to a cybersecurity threat. This could lead
companies to take a “default share” policy for personal information, and always include it unless
there is a rare smoking gun demonstrating irrelevance. Both House information sharing bills address this
loophole as well, requiring companies to remove personal information that is that is “reasonably believed” to be irrelevant.¶ CISA
only requires removal of information that is “not directly related” to a cyber threat, meaning that victims’ personal information
(which is generally related to the threat) will often go unprotected.
A better standard would require removal of
information not necessary to respond to the threat.¶ Information Sharing Is Not a Cybersecurity Silver Bullet.¶
Passing CISA without addressing operational, security, and privacy issues risks new problems
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without providing significant benefits. Attacks from “zero-day” vulnerabilities – which were used in major recent
breaches such as OPM and Sony – cannot be prevented through information sharing, because the exploit is unknown and
unpatchable at the time it is used. The
impact of new information authorities may actually be limited – a
letter sent to Congress this April from over 65 technologists and network security experts
concluded that “We do not need new legal authorities to share information that helps us
protect our systems from future attacks,” and categorized information necessary to share as “far more narrow” than
what is authorized by CISA. Greater focus should be placed on commonsense security measures that
can prevent the infiltrations that lead to and aggravate the impact of major breaches:
encrypting data, regularly reviewing and updating systems, and using multi-factor
authentication.¶ [1] Specifically, cyber threat indicators shared under the bill must be shared with the Department of
Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
Justice, the Department of the Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Cyberterrorism is overstated – no documented risk of attack
Lachow, 2014 (Dr. Lachow received his Ph.D. in engineering and public policy from Carnegie Mellon University.
He earned an A.B. in political science and a B.S. in physics from Stanford University. He currently works as a principal
cybersecurity engineer at the MITRE Corporation, where he provides technical and policy support to several government
organizations. He is also chair of the Board of Advisors of the National Cybersecurity Institute and serves as an adviser to
the State of Virginia’s Mach37 Cyber Accelerator initiative. http://ctnsp.dodlive.mil/files/2014/03/Cyberpower-I-Chap-19.pdf
CYBER TERRORISM is often portrayed as a major threat to the United States.
Articles, books, and reports discussing the subject conjure images of infra- structure
failures, massive economic losses, and even large-scale loss of life. Fortunately, the
hype surrounding this issue outpaces the magnitude of the risk. Terrorists use the
Internet extensively, but not to launch massive cyber attacks. In fact, while there is
clear evidence that terrorists have used the Internet to gather intelligence and coordinate
efforts to launch physical attacks against various infrastructure targets, there has not
been a single documented incidence of cyber terrorism against the U.S.
Government. Why is that? Is it just a matter of time until terrorists launch a massive
cyber attack against the United States, or are current trends likely to continue? If
terrorists are not using the Internet to attack us, what are they using it for? This chapter
addresses these questions.
The chapter begins by providing a framework for assessing the risks of cyber terrorism. It
uses this framework to develop a good understanding of the factors that terrorists must
consider when deciding whether to pursue cyber-based attacks. It also facilitates a
general assessment of the overall risks posed by cyber terrorists, today and in the next
few years.
Terrorist use of the Internet is common, even though cyber terrorism is rare. The Internet
provides an almost perfect tool for enabling the goals of many terrorist organizations.
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**CISA DISADVANTAGE Affirmative
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2AC- CISA DISADVANTAGE- Link Turn Strategy
1. Non-unique- CISA will pass in the status quo- it has just enough votes
The Hill 2015- “GOP senator: Cyber bill has real shot in chamber” June 25
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/246111-gop-sen-leaders-still-want-to-move-cyber-bill
Sen. Deb Fischer (R-Neb.) expressed optimism Thursday about the chances of moving a stalled
cybersecurity bill through the Senate. “The leader wants to be able to get a bill out,” Fischer said an event hosted by
The Hill and sponsored by Visa, referring to Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.). “I think he has the support
of the majority of members in our conference and I would hope the American people would
continue to push all members to say we need to get this done.” ADVERTISEMENT Cybersecurity is “at the
forefront of discussions that we’ve had in leadership since the beginning of the session,” she added. In the wake of the
recent blistering cyberattack on federal networks, the upper chamber tried to attach a major
cyber bill — intended to bolster the public-private exchange of data on hackers — to a defense
authorization measure. Democrats rebelled, angry they would not be able to offer privacy-enhancing amendments to the
bill, known as the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA). With the help of a few Republicans, they blocked the maneuver. Civil
liberties advocates have argued CISA could shuttle sensitive data to the National Security Agency (NSA), empowering the spy agency
weeks after Congress voted to rein in its authority. CISA’s prospects have been uncertain since. Senate leaders have indicated there
is no set timeline to bring the measure up as a standalone bill. And House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Michael McCaul
(R-Texas) said on Wednesday that the Senate bill in its current form would be a nonstarter in the House, which has already passed its
two complementary companion bills. CISA supporters — including a bipartisan group of lawmakers, most industry groups and
potentially the White House — believe the measure is necessary to better thwart cyberattackers. By knowing more about our
enemies, we can better repel them, they reason. “If we don’t allow companies to be able to share information when they see
something, the American people are not going to be protected,” Fischer said. The bill would also help in the wake of massive data
breaches, such as the one that has felled the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Fischer believes. If
the public and
private sector are swapping more data, both sides can know sooner exactly what has happened,
she said. That “will get consumers more involved, I think, at an earlier time so that they know
that their information has been compromised,” Fischer said.
2. The plan prevents passage- it starts a debate about surveillance in
congress, which alienates republicans
The Hill 2015- “Senate GOP whip hopes to act on cyber bill in early August”
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/247921-senate-gop-whip-eyes-early-august-for-cyberbill, July 14
It would be the last chance for the upper chamber to try to pass the anti-hacking measure
before a four-week recess. The bill, known as the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), is intended to boost the
exchange of cyber threat data between the public and private sectors. The House has already passed its two companion pieces of
legislation.¶ But the prospect might seem a longshot to many. The Senate’s calendar is packed in its final weeks before the August
break. Myriad budget bills and a fight over the recently
struck deal to curb Iran’s nuclear program are expected to dominate
backing the
measure — a bipartisan group of lawmakers, most industry groups and potentially even the
White House — were hopeful for swift passage in the upper chamber after the House
approved its two measures by wide margins in April.¶ But the Senate bill was derailed amid a
fight over reforming the National Security Agency.¶ A right-left coalition of privacy advocates in
Congress are concerned that CISA would simply shuttle more sensitive consumer information to
the NSA, further enabling its surveillance programs only months after the Senate voted to restrict the agency’s authority.¶ Senate
the diminishing floor time.¶ The Senate has been trying to move the bill for months to no avail.¶ Those
Republicans tried to attach the CISA language onto a defense authorization bill in an attempt to rush the bill through following the
massive data breach at the Office of Personnel Management.¶ But Democrats revolted and blocked the maneuver.
Many on the left, including bill co-sponsor Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), were upset
lawmakers wouldn’t get to offer any privacy-enhancing amendments on the bill.¶ Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) over the weekend insisted Republicans were going to try and move the bill in the coming weeks.¶
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“These cybersecurity issues are enormously significant,” he said during an interview on “Fox News Sunday.” “What we're going to do
is before August, take a step in the direction of dealing with the problem with information sharing bill that I think will be broadly
supported.”¶ Cornyn backed McConnell’s plan.¶ “He would like to prioritize this and get it done before we leave,” Cornyn said.
3. Issues are compartmentalized- support for the plan will not spill over to
effect CISA
Bouie 2011 (Jamelle, graduate of the U of Virginia, Writing Fellow for The American Prospect
magazine, May 5,
[prospect.org/csnc/blogs/tapped_archive?month=05&year=2011&base_name=political_capital)
Unfortunately, political capital isn’t that straightforward. As we saw at the beginning of Obama’s
presidency, the mere fact of popularity (or a large congressional majority) doesn’t guarantee
support from key members of Congress. For Obama to actually sign legislation to reform the
immigration system, provide money for jobs, or reform corporate taxes, he needs unified support
from his party and support from a non-trivial number of Republicans. Unfortunately,
Republicans (and plenty of Democrats) aren’t interested in better immigration laws, fiscal
stimulus, or liberal tax reform. Absent substantive leverage—and not just high approval
ratings—there isn’t much Obama can do to pressure these members (Democrats and
Republicans) into supporting his agenda. Indeed, for liberals who want to see Obama use his
political capital, it’s worth noting that approval-spikes aren’t necessarily related to policy
success. George H.W. Bush’s major domestic initiatives came before his massive post-Gulf
War approval bump, and his final year in office saw little policy success. George W. Bush was
able to secure No Child Left Behind, the Homeland Security Act, and the Authorization to Use
Military Force in the year following 9/11, but the former two either came with pre-9/11 Democratic
support or were Democratic initiatives to begin with. To repeat an oft-made point, when it comes to
domestic policy, the presidency is a limited office with limited resources. Popularity with the
public is a necessary part of presidential success in Congress, but it’s far from sufficient.
4. There is no impact to economic decline
Drezner 2014 (Daniel W., professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University. His latest book, The System Worked: How the World Stopped Another Great Depression, is just out from Oxford
University Press; “The Uses of Being Wrong”
http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T20276111299
&format=GNBFI&sort=DATE,D,H&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T20276111283&cisb=22_T20276111282&treeMax=true&tree
Width=0&csi=171267&docNo=1)
My new book has an odd intellectual provenance-it starts with me being wrong. Back in the fall
of 2008, I was convinced that the open global economic order, centered on the unfettered
cross-border exchange of goods, services, and ideas, was about to collapse as quickly as
Lehman Brothers. A half-decade later, the closer I looked at the performance of the system of
global economic governance, the clearer it became that the meltdown I had expected had
not come to pass . Though the advanced industrialized economies suffered prolonged
economic slowdowns, at the global level there was no great surge in trade protectionism, no
immediate clampdown on capital flows, and, most surprisingly, no real rejection of neoliberal
economic principles . Given what has normally transpired after severe economic shocks, this
outcome was damn near miraculous. Nevertheless, most observers have remained deeply
pessimistic about the functioning of the global political economy. Indeed, scholarly books with
titles like No One's World: The West, The Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn and The End
of American World Order have come to a conclusion the opposite of mine. Now I'm trying to
understand how I got the crisis so wrong back in 2008, and why so many scholars continue to
be wrong now.
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2AC- CISA DISADVANTAGE- Impact Turn Strategy
1. Non-unique- CISA will pass in the status quo- it has just enough votes
The Hill 2015- “GOP senator: Cyber bill has real shot in chamber” June 25,
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/246111-gop-sen-leaders-still-want-to-move-cyber-bill
Sen. Deb Fischer (R-Neb.) expressed optimism Thursday about the chances of moving a stalled
cybersecurity bill through the Senate. “The leader wants to be able to get a bill out,” Fischer said an event hosted by
The Hill and sponsored by Visa, referring to Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.). “I think he has the support
of the majority of members in our conference and I would hope the American people would
continue to push all members to say we need to get this done.” ADVERTISEMENT Cybersecurity is “at the
forefront of discussions that we’ve had in leadership since the beginning of the session,” she added. In the wake of the
recent blistering cyberattack on federal networks, the upper chamber tried to attach a major
cyber bill — intended to bolster the public-private exchange of data on hackers — to a defense
authorization measure. Democrats rebelled, angry they would not be able to offer privacy-enhancing amendments to the
bill, known as the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA). With the help of a few Republicans, they blocked the maneuver. Civil
liberties advocates have argued CISA could shuttle sensitive data to the National Security Agency (NSA), empowering the spy agency
weeks after Congress voted to rein in its authority. CISA’s prospects have been uncertain since. Senate leaders have indicated there
is no set timeline to bring the measure up as a standalone bill. And House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Michael McCaul
(R-Texas) said on Wednesday that the Senate bill in its current form would be a nonstarter in the House, which has already passed its
two complementary companion bills. CISA supporters — including a bipartisan group of lawmakers, most industry groups and
potentially the White House — believe the measure is necessary to better thwart cyberattackers. By knowing more about our
enemies, we can better repel them, they reason. “If we don’t allow companies to be able to share information when they see
something, the American people are not going to be protected,” Fischer said. The bill would also help in the wake of massive data
breaches, such as the one that has felled the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Fischer believes. If
the public and
private sector are swapping more data, both sides can know sooner exactly what has happened,
she said. That “will get consumers more involved, I think, at an earlier time so that they know
that their information has been compromised,” Fischer said.
2. Extend the 1NC link evidence- the plan causes the passage of CISA
3. That’s good- CISA is key to prevent a cyber attack
National Journal 2015-Here’s What Is in the Senate’s Cybersecurity Bill”
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/here-s-what-is-in-the-senate-s-cybersecurity-bill20150318, March 18
The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act is intended to help forestall cyberattacks like the
one that crippled Sony Pictures last year, but concerns about government surveillance
prevented a similar measure from earning a vote on the Senate floor in the last Congress. The
legislation creates a voluntary framework for the private sector to share more computer data with
the government by offering companies expanded legal liability if they choose to participate.¶
"This legislation protects the privacy rights of Americans while also minimizing our
vulnerability to cyber-attacks," Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Richard Burr said in a statement Wednesday.
"Information sharing is purely voluntary and companies can only share cyber-threat information
and the government may only use shared data for cybersecurity purposes."¶ ADVERTISEMENT ¶ Thanks
to an extended spate of high-profile hacks, the bipartisan measure could earn an expedited review and land on the Senate floor as
soon as April. In the House, Homeland Security Committee Chairman Michael McCaul signaled on Tuesday he plans to introduce his
own information-sharing bill this week.¶ The White House has identified information-sharing as a key priority this year, although it
has yet to say if it supports the current CISA language. President Obama issued a veto threat for a similar measure that passed the
House a few years ago, partly because of privacy concerns.¶ "We are committed to working with Congress to craft legislation that
reflects that balance, and can pass both houses," a senior administration official said in a statement. "In that spirit, we thank the
committee for working with us to address some of the administration's most significant concerns with the committee's bill, and look
forward to reviewing the legislation."¶ Among
the nuanced changes, the latest iteration of CISA grants
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liability protection for companies that share information related to "defensive measures" used
to fend off hacks, a term substituted for the more controversial "countermeasures." The bill further
clarifies that "defensive measures" does not include data that "destroys, renders unusable, or substantially harms an information
system."
4. A cyber attack would cause a nuclear war
Tilford 2012 (Robert Tilford, Wichita Military Affairs Examiner, Former soldier US Army,
infantry, July 27, 2012, Cyber attackers could shut down the electric grid for the entire east
coast, http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shut-down-the-electricgrid-for-the-entire-east-coa)
¶ To make matters worse a cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for example
could also cripple the U.S. military.¶ The senator notes that is that the same power grids that supply cities and towns,
stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors also power “every military base in our country.”¶ “Although bases
would be prepared to weather a short power outage with backup diesel generators, within
hours, not days, fuel supplies would run out”, he said.¶ Which means military command and control centers could
go dark.¶ Radar systems that detect air threats to our country would shut Down completely.¶ “Communication between
commanders and their troops would also go silent. And many weapons systems would be left
without either fuel or electric power”, said Senator Grassley.¶ “So in a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in
the world would be left scrambling to maintain base functions”, he said.¶ We contacted the Pentagon and officials confirmed the
threat of a cyber attack is something very real.¶ Top national security officials—including the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA
Director— have said, “preventing a cyber attack and improving the nation’s electric grids is
among the most urgent priorities of our country” (source: Congressional Record).¶ So how serious is the Pentagon
taking all this?¶ Enough to start, or end a war over it, for sure. A cyber attack today against the US
could very well be seen as an “Act of War” and could be met with a “full scale” US military
response.¶ That could include the use of “nuclear weapons”, if authorized by the President.
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2AC- CISA DISADVANTAGE- Drone Affirmative- No Link/Link Turn
Congress is on board with armed drone surveillance- restriction unpopular- this
prevents passage
Hill 2012 (Kashmir Hill, Forbes, “Congress Welcomes The Drones”,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/07/congress-welcomes-the-drones/,
February 7, 2012)
Congress Welcomes The Drones Congress says, 'Bring in the drones!' The Senate passed a $63 billion bill Monday
to provide four years of funding for the Federal Aviation Administration. One of the provisions of the Reauthorization Act is that
the FAA clear the path for wider spread use of drones (a.k.a. unmanned aircraft) for governmental and commercial
purposes. Within 90 days, the FAA has to speed up the process by which government agencies and law enforcement can get permission to use drones,
and by 2015, it has to start allowing commercial use of drones: The FAA is also required under the bill to provide military, commercial and privatelyowned drones with expanded access to U.S. airspace currently reserved for manned aircraft by Sept. 30, 2015. That means permitting unmanned
drones controlled by remote operators on the ground to fly in the same airspace as airliners, cargo planes, business jets and private aircraft. via
Congress OKs FAA bill allowing drones in U.S., GPS air traffic control – chicagotribune.com. Currently, private use of drones is basically limited to
hobbyists, and they have to keep the drones under 400 feet and within their line of sight. Once the FAA changes the rules, a company such as Google
for example could finally buy drones and use them for mapping purposes. Yes, we may finally have Google Street Drone View. Currently, the FAA
restricts drone use primarily to segregated blocks of military airspace, border patrols and about 300 public agencies and their private partners. Those
public agencies are mainly restricted to flying small unmanned aircraft at low altitudes away from airports and urban centers. Within nine months of
the bill’s passage, the FAA is required to submit a plan on how to safely provide drones with expanded access. via Congress OKs FAA bill allowing drones
in U.S., GPS air traffic control – chicagotribune.com.
Drones are already being used to patrol our border s (and
occasionally to catch cattle rustlers), but their use beyond that is very limited. This Act will change that. “
We are looking at border
security using UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles) research, law enforcement , firefighting, just to name a few,” said
Texas Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison. “There are going to be more and more uses for unmanned aerial
vehicles to be able to do the surveillance and photographing that have taken helicopter pilots
and small general aviation and even large aircraft to do in the past.”
Drone surveillance is popular with republicans- the plan is perceived as a loss
Jones 2013 (Trahern Jones, Cronkite Borderlands Initiative, “U.S. Set to Deploy More Drones
Along U.S. Borders, Despite Concerns about Effectiveness and Cost”,
http://cronkite.asu.edu/buffett/canada/drones.html
CORPUS CHRISTI, Texas — Despite critical reports saying that the use of drones to patrol the nation’s borders is
inefficient and costly, the leading Congressional proposal for immigration reform would drastically
expand their use . In fact, the compromise bill would have U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which currently has a fleet of 10 Predator
drones, using the unmanned aircraft to patrol the southern border with Mexico 24 hours a day, seven days a week. An expanded drone program is also
sure to draw the ire of privacy advocates who already worry that increasing use of unmanned aircraft will result in intrusive surveillance of U.S. citizens.
The proposal for around-the-clock drone use flies in the face of recent reports from the Government Accountability Office and the Office of the
Inspector General. In a 2012 report, the OIG estimated that the agency only used its current Predator fleet about 40 percent of time the time it had
projected for use of the crafts. The same report criticized CBP for failing “to obtain reimbursement for missions flown on stakeholders’ behalf,” such as
U.S. Border Patrol, local law enforcement or emergency organizations, like FEMA. Criticism of the program also came in 2012 GAO report that said
drone program staff frequently had to be relocated from other regions to support Predator operations on the southwestern border. In spite of such
measures, the report noted that air support requests were more often left unfulfilled in this high-priority region when compared to lower-priority areas
like the Canadian border. Initiated in 2005 at a cost of nearly $18 million for each of the 10 drones and their support systems, the use of unmanned
aircraft is a relatively new tool for the Custom and Border Protection’s Office of Air and Marine. While agency officials say that the program is useful in
border surveillance, Predator aircraft cannot be launched on a 24/7 basis due to weather conditions and safety regulations. Unmanned aerial vehicles
are usually restricted to regions and altitudes where other aircraft do not share the same airspace in order to prevent mid-air collisions. That’s why
CBP’s Predator fleet almost always flies at night, further limiting potential operational hours. During an April visit to the National Air Security
Operations Center in Corpus Christi, Texas, which controls Predator flights over the Rio Grande, Cronkite student reporters observed that high winds
deterred launches for four days. A tire-puncturing device used by drug smugglers to evade Border Patrol agents. Known as 'caltrops,' such devices are
made from steel nails welded together. Photo by Trahern W. Jones. SLIDESHOW: A tire-puncturing device used by drug smugglers to evade Border
Patrol agents. Known as "caltrops," such devices are made from steel nails welded together. Photo by Trahern W. Jones A pilot for the program, who
requested to be unnamed for security reasons, described some of the challenges the agency has had in learning the new systems. “We’re bringing our
people up and getting more experience,” he said. “The technology changes; they can change the software. They can give us new payloads. Things come
pretty fast in the unmanned aircraft world as opposed to the manned aviation world.” The drones fly for an average of seven to nine hours a mission,
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often covering many miles of uninhabited deserts, rivers and forests. CBP’s Predator aircraft are equipped with high-tech cameras and communications
equipment to coordinate with Border Patrol and first responder agencies on the ground. Unlike the Predator program used in overseas military
missions, CBP’s fleet does not carry weapons payloads. The aircraft often provide useful information for agents in complex situations or difficult-toreach areas, according to Hector Black, border patrol associate Chief, and the agency’s liaison with CBP’s Office of Air and Marine at the Corpus Christi
Predator Operations Center. “When we come across something, we’ll contact the guys on the ground,” Black said in a phone interview. “Rather than
sending agents in their vehicle, where it may take an hour and a half or two hours to get out and look at these areas, we can cover it in five or ten
minutes with this aircraft.” The camera equipment aboard CBP Predators is sophisticated enough, according to Black, that even from an altitude of
many thousands of feet, “you can actually zoom in and get street names.” While the same camera equipment can be found on the agency’s manned
aircraft, the Predator’s longer flying time allows for increased surveillance and more immediate responsiveness to situations on the ground, according
to CBP officials. In attempting to measure the successes or failures of the program, Black cautioned that metrics like apprehensions, seizures or flight
hours might not be appropriate. Predator missions are often used for intelligence-gathering purposes, alongside interceptions of illegal crossings. A
more subtle measure of drones’ effectiveness is how they impact smuggling patterns in areas they patrol, Black said. “First we’ll see a spike in
apprehensions in those zones, and then the spikes will start to show a direct downward trend,” he noted. Not everyone is convinced of their
effectiveness, however. The perceived shortfalls noted by the GAO and OIG represent a systemic problem, according to Ed Herlik, a researcher with
Market Info Group, an aviation and defense analysis firm. “They already don’t fly their Predators much at all,” Herlik said in a phone interview. “We ran
the numbers. Part of the time there are no Predators in the air anywhere in the nation and most of the time there might be one.” “Now, of course they
can launch two or three or five if they want to,” he added, “but they almost never do, just by running the averages from what they report from flight
times.” The
reason for the program’s existence in the first place may have had more to do with
the politics of border security than actual need, according to Herlik. “The Predators were forced on them” he said. Herlik
explained that such systems were adapted from their wartime purposes in Iraq and Afghanistan for domestic use. “ Congress wanted
Predators over the border, therefore it happened ,” Herlik said. “The fact that they’re not tremendously useful is not
helpful.”
Plan reignites turf battles about Congressional oversight- distracts from bill
passage
Munoz, 2013 -- The Hill staff writer, covering Defense and National Security
[Carlo, "Turf battle builds quietly in Congress over control of armed drone program," The Hill, 49-13, thehill.com/homenews/administration/292501-turf-battle-builds-quietly-over-control-ofarmed-drone-program-, accessed 5-23-13,]
The fight is a typical battle over who on Capitol Hill will retain power over the program, according to
several analysts, who described it as predictable. ¶ “There is always going to be a turf battle” when dealing
with congressional oversight, said Lawrence Korb, a former DOD official and defense analyst at the liberal-leaning Center
for American Progress. ¶ But that battle could become particularly heated, given the high-profile
nature of the drone program, which since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks has become a huge factor in shaping
counterterrorism policy, given its success, Korb said. ¶ For congressional panels, the fight over who will control the drone program
will have a say in the relevancy of the two committees. ¶
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