MORAL RELATIVISM
UVODNI OPIS TEME
Obravnava moralnega relativizma gre lepo s temo medkulturnega dialoga, saj postavi vprašaj
ustaljeno prepričanje, da je morala relativna. Če vprašate učence, kaj je morala, boste hitro prišli do
tega, da so morala družbena pravila, ki lajšajo delovanje družbe.
Ta vizija, nekakšna funkcionalistična teorija morale, seveda implicira, da ima vsaka družba svojo
moralo, da je torej morala relativna. Tema poskuša artikulirati, da je tak pogled na morala bil
napredek glede na pogled, da so tako imenovane primitivne družbe moralno inferiorne in jim je treba
vsiliti pravo, zahodno moralo in kulturo. Vendar sklepanje, da iz priznavanja razlik med moralami
sledi toleranca drugega, ni veljavno. Prav tako iz razlik med moralami ne sledi, da so te razlike res
moralne, niti ne, da so res temeljne. Rachels to dobro pokaže.
DIVERSITY – INTRODUCTION
Why do …
the Austrians … offer a glass of water with every cup of coffee?
the Belgian … persist in the dangerous principle of according driving priority from the right (à la
belgelop z'n belgisch)?
the British … think black cats are lucky when everyone else thinks the opposite?
the French … insist on saying soixante-dix and quatre-vingt when Swiss manage with septante and
huitante (or octante)?
the French … call a ship a building (bâtiment) and the German san airplane a machine (Maschine)?
the Germans … put the past participle at the end of sentences, the cause of breathlessnes in the
speaker and confusion in the listener?
the Greeks … nos as if saying »yes« when they're saying »no«?
the Italians … eat their pasta with noting but a fork?
the Portuguese … put their money sign in the middle, e.g. 32$40?
the Spanish … list words beginning with »ch« in the dictionary after »czar«?
the Swedes … finish their alphabet with »X, Y, Z, Ä, Ö, Å' ?
the Swiss … stick a diminutive suffix on so many things, including even their surnames?
(Richard Hill: We Europeann)
1. PICTURE (Larson, Gary)
Questions:
a. What is the picture about?
b. What is the source of morality, according to this picture?
c. Is, in your view, society really the source of morality?
d. What does this claim really mean?
2. THE CASE OF ESKIMOS
Consider the Eskimos. They are a remote and inaccessible people. Numbering
only about 25,000, they live in small, isolated settlements scattered mostly along
the northern fringes of North America and Greenland. Until the beginning of the
20th century, the outside world knew little about them. Then explorers began to
bring back strange tales. Eskimo customs turned out to be very different from our
own. The men often had more than one wife, and they would share their wives
with guests, lending them for the night as a sign of hospitality. Moreover, within
a community, a dominant male might demand and get regular sexual access to
other men's wives. The women, however, were free to break these arrangements
simply by leaving their husbands and taking up with new partners-free, that is, so
long as their former husbands chose not to make trouble. All in all, the Eskimo
practice was a volatile scheme that bore little resemblance to what we call
marriage. But it was not only their marriage and sexual practices that were
different. The Eskimos also seemed to have less regard for human life.
Infanticide, for example, was common. Knud Rasmussen, one of the most
famous early explorers, reported that he met one woman who had borne 20
children but had killed 10 of them at birth. Female babies, he found, were
especially liable to be destroyed, and this was permitted simply at the parents'
discretion, with no social stigma attached to it. Old people also, when they
became too feeble to contribute to the family, were left out in the snow to die. So
there seemed to be, in this society, remarkably little respect for life. To the
general public, these were disturbing revelations. Our own way of living seems
so natural and right that for many of us it is hard to conceive of others living so
differently. And when we do hear of such things, we tend immediately to categorize those other peoples as "backward" or "primitive." But to anthropologists
and sociologists, there was nothing particularly surprising about the Eskimos.
Since the time of Herodotus, enlightened observers have been accustomed to the
idea that conceptions of right and wrong differ from culture to culture. If we
assume that our ideas of right and wrong will be shared by all peoples at all times,
we are merely naive. (Rachels)
Questions:
- Are Eskimos primitive?
- Can we accept their bahaviour?
3. Anthropological interpretation
Normally, in short, within a very wide range, is culturally defined. It is primarily a term for the
socially elaborated segment of human behaviour in any culture; and abnormality, a term for
the segment that that particular civiliyation does not use. The very eyes with which we see
the problem are conditioned by the long traditional habits of our own society.
It is a point that has been made more often in relation to ethics than in relation to psychiatry.
We do not any longer make the mistake of deriving the morality of our locality and decade
directly from the inevitable constitution of human nature. We do not elevate it to the dignity
of a first principle. We recognize that morality differs in every society, and is a convenient
term for socially approved habits. Mankind has always preffered to say „It is morally good”,
rather than “It is habitual”, and the fact of this preference is matter enough for a critical
science of ethics. But historically the two phrases are synonymous. (Ruth Benedicts,
Anhropology and the Abnormal)
Questions:
- What is morality, according to Ruth Benedicts?
- Do you agree with her assesment?
4. Cultural Relativism – presentation of the argument
To many thinkers, this observation-"Different cu1tures have different moral codes"has seemed to be the key to understanding morality. The idea of universal truth in
ethics, they say, is a myth. The customs of different societies are all that exist. These
customs cannot be said to be "correct" or "incorrect," for that implies we have an
independent standard of right and wrong by which they may be judged. But there is
no such independent standard; every standard is cu1ture-bound. The great pioneering
sociologist William Graham Sumner, writing in 1906, put the point like this: The
"right" way is the way which the ancestors used and which has been handed down.
The tradition is its own warrant. It is not he1d subject to verification by experience.
The notion of right is in the folkways. It is not outside of them, of independent origin,
and brought to test them. In the folkways, whatever is, is right. This is because they
are traditional, and therefore contain in themselves the authority of the ancestral
ghosts. When we come to the folkways we are at the end of our analysis.
This line of thought has probably persuaded more people to be skeptical about ethics
than any other single thing. Cu1tural Relativism, as it has been called, challenges our
ordinary belief in the objectivity and universality of moral truth. It says, in effect, that
there is no such thing as universal truth in ethics; there are only the various cu1tural
codes, and nothing more. Moreover, our own code has no special status; it is merely
one among many. As we shall see, this basic idea is really a compound of several
different thoughts. It is important to separate the various elements of the theory
because, on analysis, some parts turn out to be correct, while others seem to be
mistaken. As a beginning, we may distinguish the following claims, all of which have
been made by cu1tural relativists:
1. Different societies have different moral codes.
2. There is no objective standard that can be used to judge one societal code better
than another.
3. The moral code of our own society has no special status; it is merely one among
many.
4. There is no "universal truth" in ethics; that is, there are no moral truths that hold
for all peoples at all times.
5. The moral code of a society determines what is right within that society; that is,
if the moral code of a society says that a certain action is right, then that action
is right, at least within that society.
6. It is mere arrogance for us to try to judge the conduct of other peoples. We
should adopt an attitude of tolerance toward the practices of other cultures.
(Rachels)
Questions:
What is the essence?
Tolerance, why tolerance is necessary?
Would you agree with this?
5. Freud’ theory of morality – superego
Superego
The superego is the legislative-judicial branch of the persona1ity. It represents the ideal
patterns and principles of behavior. Whereas the ego focuses on reality (what is the case),
the superego focuses on ideality (what ought to be the case). It is the source of morality
and law. Its goal is not pleasure but perfection or, at least, moral goodness. Whereas the
reality principle informs the person that stealing or cheating might bring great success in
reaching a goal, the superego would veto the proposal, prescribing adherence to a set of
moral principles. According to Freud, children internalize the principles their parents
communicate by word and deed. The superego is constituted by two subsystems, the egoideal and conscience. The egoideal corresponds to the child's conception of his parents'
values, which they communicate by rewards and punishments. If a child is consistent1y
punished for lying and rewarded for truthfulness, honesty is likely to be one of his ideals.
Conscience corresponds to the child's feeling regarding his success in living by the egoideals. It produces a discomforting feeling of guilt whenever one violates an ego-ideal but
a feeling of satisfaction whenever one adheres to one's ideals. The superego serves to
control behavior so that personalities can live together in peace and harmony. It places
inner constraints on the id and ego, harnessing the sexual and aggressive drives which
would endanger the stability of society. The id is a product of biological evolution,
something hereditary; the ego is a product of one's interface with the world; and the
superego is the product of socialization and culture. When the flow of instinctua1 energy
is blocked by the ego or superego, it tries to break through the constraining walls and
discharge itself in fantasy or action. When the breakthrough is successful, the ego's
rational governance is undermined. The person may make mistakes in speaking, writing
("Freudian slips"), perceiving, and remembering, and may have accidents because he or
she becomes confused and loses contact with reality. The ability to solve problems and
discover reality is diminished by the interference of impulsive wishes. For example, one
has a hard time keeping one's mind on one' s work when one is hungry, sexually excited,
or angry. (Pojman, Who are we?, p. 172)
Questions:
Is this theory of the origin of morality in accordance with moral relativism?
6. Rachels – The mistake relativists make
(1) The Eskimos see nothing wrong with infanticide, whereas Americans believe
infanticide is immoral.
(2) Therefore, infanticide is neither objectively right nor objectively wrong. It is
merely a matter of opinion, which varies from cu1ture to cu1ture.
Clearly, these arguments are variations of one fundamental idea. They are both
special cases of a more general argument, which says:
(1) Different cu1tures have different moral codes.
(2) Therefore, there is no objective "truth" in morality.
Right and wrong are only matters of opinion, and opinions vary from cu1ture to
cu1ture.
We may call this the Cu1tural Differences Argument. To many people, it is
persuasive. But from a logical point of view, is it sound? It is not sound. The trouble
is that the conclusion does not follow from the premise-that is, even if the premise is
true, the conclusion still might be false. The premise concerns what people believe. In
some societies, people believe one thing; in other societies, people believe
different1y. The conclusion, however, concerns what really is the case. The trouble is
that this sort of conclusion does not follow logically from this sort of premise.
Questions:
-
What is a way out?
7. One why out: Why There Is Less Disagreement Than It Seems?
Consider a culture in which people believe it is wrong to eat cows. This may even be
a poor culture, in which there is not enough food; still, the cows are not to be
touched. Such a society would appear to have values very different from our own.
But does it? We have not yet asked why these people will not eat cows. Suppose it is
because they believe that after death the souls of humans inhabit the bodies of
animals, especially cows, so that a cow may be someone's grandmother. Now do we
want to say that their values are different from ours? No; the difference lies
elsewhere. The difference is in our belief systems, not in our values. We agree that
we shouldn't eat Grandma; we simply disagree about whether the cow is (or could
be) Grandma. The point is that many factors work together to produce the customs of
a society. The society's values are only one of them. Other matters, such as the
religious and factual beliefs held by its members, and the physical circumstances in
which they must live, are also important. We cannot conclude, then, merely because
customs differ, that there is a disagreement about values. The difference in customs
may be attributable to some other aspect of social life. Thus there may be less disagreement about values than there appears to be. Consider again the Eskimos, who
often kill perfectly normal infants, especially girls. We do not approve of such
things; a parent who killed a baby in our society would be locked up. Thus there
appears to be a great difference in the values of our two cultures. But suppose we ask
why the Eskimos do this. The explanation is not that they have less affection for their
children or less respect for human life. An Eskimo family will always protect its
babies if conditions permit. But they live in a harsh environment, where food is in
short supply. A fundamental postulate of Eskimo thought is: "Life is hard, and the
margin of safety small." A family may want to nourish its babies but be unable to do
so. (Rachels)
Questions:
-
What do you think about solving the problem as presented above?
What would be universal values according to the argument?
How would you describe the difference between customs and values? Give an example from
your own cultural environment.
8. Another way out: How All Cultures Have Some Values in
Common
It should not be surprising that, despite appearances, the Eskimos are protective of
their children. How could it be otherwise? How could a group survive that did not
value its young? It is easy to see that, in fact, all cu1tural groups must protect their
infants:
(1) Human infants are helpless and cannot survive if they are not given extensive care
for a period of years.
(2) Therefore, if a group did not care for its young, the young would not survive, and
the older members of the group would not be replaced. After a while the group would
die out.
(3) Therefore, any cu1tural group that continues to exist must care for its young.
Infants that are not cared for must be the exception rather than the rule.
Similar reasoning shows that other values must be more or less universal. Imagine
what it would be like for a society to place no value at all on truth telling. When one
person spoke to another, there would be no presumption at all that he was telling the
truth for he could just as easily be speaking falsely. Within that society, there would
be no reason to pay attention to what anyone says. (1 ask you what time it is, and you
say "Four o'clock." But there is no presumption that you are speaking truly; you
could just as easily have said the first thing that came into your head. So I have no
reason to pay attention to your answer; in fact, there was no point in my asking you
in the first place.) Communication would then be extremely difficult, if not
impossible. And because complex societies cannot exist without communication
among their members, society would become impossible. It follows that in any
complex society there must be a presumption in favor of truthfulness. There may of
course be exceptions to this rule: There may be situations in which it is thought to be
permissible to lie. Nevertheless, these will be exceptions to a rule that is in force in
the society. (Rachels)
Questions:
-
Why is truthfulness so important for human societies? Which are other values that have the
same function for our social existence?
In which situations would be permissible to break this fundamental rule of telling the truth?
9. Consequences for education? Education teaches us about the differences, not about our
common humanity.
Not that my education was a complete failure. It prepared me superbly for a bird’s-eye view
of the world. It taught me how to recognize easily and instantly the things that differentiate
one place or one people from another. Geography had instructed me in differences of
terrain, resources, and productivity. Comparative culture had instructed me in the
differences in background and group interests. Anthropology had instructed me in the
differences of facial bone structure, skin pigmentation, and general physical aspect. In short,
my education protected me against surprise. I was not surprised at the fact that some people
lived in mud huts and others in bamboo cottages on stilts; or that some used peat for fuel
and others dung; or that some enjoyed music with a five-note scale and others with twelve;
or that some people were vegetarians by religion and others by preference.
In those aspects my education had been more than adequate. But what my education failed
to teach me that the principal significance of such differences was that they were largely
without significance. The differences were all but obliterated by the similarities. My
education had bypassed the similarities. It had failed to grasp and define the fact that
beyond the differences are realities scarcely comprehended because of their shattering
simplicity. And the simplest reality of all was that the human community was one – greater
than any of its parts, greater than the separateness imposed by nations, greater than
divergent faiths and allegiances or the depth and color of varying cultures. This larger unity
was the most important central fact of our time – something upon which people can build at
a time when hope seemed misty, almost unreal. (…)
It turned out that my ability to get along with other peoples depend not so much upon my
comprehension of the uniqueness of their way of life as upon my comprehension of the
things we had in common. It was important to respect these differences, certainly, but to
stop there was like clearing the ground without any idea of what was to be built on it. When
you got through comparing notes, you discovered that you were both talking about the same
neighborhood, i.e. this planet, and the conditions that made it congenial or hostile to human
habitation.” (Norman Cousins: “Confession of a miseducated man”, in Levin)
Questions:
-
How do you understand the idea that education protects a person against surprise?
What does education mean to you?
Do you agree with author's view, that beyond the differences there are realities that make
the differences insignificant?
What does it mean that the human community is one – to us? Do we live according to this
observation?
Film about diversity and unity, cultural identity and morality:
Grandmother (Authors: Martina Hudorovič, Dženi Rostohar, Fiona Braillon
2008, Luksuz Produkcija)
Available at: http://www.drustvo-dzmp.si/
Literature
Hill, Richard: We Europeans, Europublication 1993.
Larson, Garry: The Prehistory of The Far Side, A Universal Press Syndicate Company 1989
(p.215)
Lawhead, William: The Philosophical Journey, Mayfield Publishing Company 2000.
Levin, Gerald: Short Essays Essays, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1989 (p. 427, Cousins Norman)
Pojman, Louis: Who Are We? Oxford University Press 2006.
Rachels, James: The Elements of Moral Philosophy, McGraw-Hill College 1999.