1
Caitlin Corona
HNRS 225
Group 1
As a member of Group 1 my jobs included:
o Pitching the initial problem to our group.
Our group initially wanted to focus on flooding and I suggested that we focus on stormsurge related flooding.
o Synthesizing our problem statement and ideas
When we first got together as a group and discussed what our problem would be, we
found it very difficult to come up with a problem that was specific enough. Naturally, I
did a lot of pitching of ideas on topics we could focus on in relation to flooding in order
for everyone to feel comfortable enough with the problem we would end up choosing.
o Researching
In our group, we like to do the research collectively. So, most of the time we’ll all find
ourselves researching as a whole rather than setting specific research roles. As our project
progressed, I ended being the core researcher for the implementation of Strategy A:
building a sea wall.
o Note taking
I took notes when we got suggestions from the class and Professor Bird for our project.
2
Zachary Frenkel
Honors 225
Professor Bird
December 21, 2012
List of My Tasks in Group Project-Group 1










I have helped with a lot of the principle research on storm surge, including finding many
of the peer-reviewed papers that have led to our problem statement.
I took notes on some of the class lectures regarding the project, and posted them on the
blog.
I have helped come up with some of the strategies and implementation plans, specifically
building oyster walls, utilizing the National Guard, equipping firehouses and police
departments with aquatic rescue equipment, and building sand barriers on beaches on the
southern shores of Long Island, although we ultimately rejected these strategies.
I helped coordinate multiple group meetings during free hour outside of class. I have also
helped organize the division of assignments and research, although it was always a group
discussion on who does what.
I have helped take notes on some of the in class lectures and have posted them earlier on
my group’s web page. This helped focus the attention of the group, and helped narrow
down on a coherent problem statement.
While I have helped coordinate work and research efforts for the group via Facebook,
Ilana does not have an account. As such, I’ve been responsible for contacting her via
phone in order to fill her in on her responsibilities and the progress of the paper.
I ended up going into the city to print the poster for the common event. I had to
reschedule our printing date because of some miscommunication, but everything worked
out nonetheless.
I wrote the bullet points for the poster for the following sections: “Introduction-The
Risk”, “So What’s the Problem?” and “Our Goal”.
I wrote the background and introduction sections in the paper in their entirety. I also
added to the discussion section in terms of quantifying the monetary cost of loss of
human life, and how many lives we could expect to lose by 2080; I detailed the
assumptions I made regarding those calculations in the assumption/constraints section.
I completed the final editing and revision of the paper in terms of the grammar, spelling,
and layout. I organized all of the individual parts of the paper written by the team into a
coherent paper.
3
Ilanna Schuster
Individual Contributions
When first beginning our project, our group got together to discuss which topic we want
to research and how to express our problem statement. In the early stages of the project, we were
all involved in every aspect of it, including the problem statement and the brainstorming of
different strategies. The entire group discussed different possible strategies and how to go about
finding more information about each of them.
Once we began working on implementation plans, we decided to divide and conquer.
Each of us chose a few strategies that we were most interested in researching. I was responsible
for researching two strategies. The first is for communities that are vulnerable to floods to
develop an efficient evacuation plan in the event of a flood danger. The second is for residents in
flood-vulnerable communities to be educated in the dangers of remaining in danger zones when
an evacuation is in place. We ended up focusing mainly on the first strategy in our final report.
In addition to the implementation research, I was also in charge of the scientific poster.
My responsibilities included selecting the most important parts of our project and condensing our
project into the relatively small space of a poster. I was also in charge of both the aesthetic and
technical aspects of the poster production. When working on the final paper, I once again
consolidated the group’s work, this time in order to write the abstract and the conclusion to the
paper.
4
Katarzyna Zajac
HNRS 225 | Professor Bird
Due Date: 12/21/12
Individual Tasks
 Worked with Caitlin C., Zack F., and Ilanna S. to create an initial problem statement
for the final project.
 Did more comprehensive research on storm surge and worked with Zack F. to create
the most recent draft of the problem statement on the group page.
 Answered the questions in Hughes’ book to ascertain initial constraints.
 Did more research on storm surge and worked with Zack F. to create a rough draft of
the background/introduction section of our paper.
 Added coding to the group page to separate the contents into different pages.
 Appointed myself (through group consensus) as group leader.
 Created a rough draft of the implementation plan for three out of twelve strategies that
were initially proposed.
 Worked with Caitlin C., Zack F., and Ilanna S. to narrow final strategies down to two
final options that would appear on poster.
 Did research on Strategy B, “Utilize an Evacuation Plan,” to put onto the final poster
and into the final report.
 Worked with Caitlin C. and Zack F. to revise the initial draft of the poster, to take into
consideration Professor Bird’s comments about it.
 Expanded on the information about Strategy B that was put on the poster in the
appropriate section of the final report.
 Illustrated why or why not Strategy B would be an effective solution to the problem
being considered in the discussion section.
 Created a comprehensive list of final references and worked with Zack F. to put the
finishing touches on the final draft of the paper (editing, citations, etc.).
5
Minimizing Exposure to Storm Surge Along the Southern Shores
of Long Island
Science and Technology in New York City- Fall 2012- Professor Bird
Group 1: Caitlin Corona, Zachary Frenkel, Ilanna Schuster, and Katarzyna Zajac
ABSTRACT
Over the next few decades, it is predicted that the intensity and frequency of storm surges
in New York will increase due to climate change. Storm surge—the atypical rise of sea level that
is generated by the presence of a storm—can cause devastating flooding, resulting in the death or
injury to any exposed people. Our study focuses specifically on Suffolk County, located on the
southern shore of Long Island, New York. The number of people exposed to storm surge in this
area may increase from 88,885 individuals to 130,718 individuals-a 47% increase, by 2080.
Our goal is to reduce the increased amount of people exposed to storm surge from 130,718
exposed individuals to 109,802 exposed individuals by 2080. We evaluate two strategies that
may or may not accomplish out goal. Our first strategy is to construct a retractable sea wall to
protect Suffolk County’s coast from storm surge. Our second strategy is to implement an
evacuation plan in order to remove at-risk residents from areas vulnerable to flooding before
each storm hits. Ultimately, both of our strategies do not seem effective in reaching our goal.
Because of the large cost, the construction of a sea wall is not a very likely option, but if the
money can be found the implementation of this strategy will likely reduce the risk of exposure to
flooding far more effectively than an evacuation plan would. However, since an evacuation plan
is far most cost-effective, this should be attempted both during the construction of the sea wall (if
possible), and in replace of a sea wall if the construction is impossible.
BACKGROUND/INTRODUCTION
Of the plethora of effects of the warming of the earth’s surface, the increase in intensity
of storm surge may concern New Yorkers most. Storm surge is the atypical rise of sea level that
is generated by the presence of a storm. It is above the regular or astronomical tide, and the
combination of storm surge and the regular tides is referred to as the storm tide (NOAA, 2012).
Astronomical tides are the natural and routine tidal shifts caused by the gravitational pull
6
between the sun, the Earth, and the moon (Missouri Botanical Garden, 2002). Since storm surge
is only an addition of water to the astronomical tide, it is a measurement of the difference
between the storm tide and the astronomical tide (NOAA, 2012). To put it simply, if the regular
tide is ten feet, and the storm surge is seven feet, the storm tide is seventeen feet.
Storm surge is caused primarily by the strong winds generated by a hurricane or tropical
storm. The circulation of wind around the eye of a hurricane blows on the surface of the ocean
and creates a vertical circulation of water. In the deep regions of the ocean, there is nothing to
interrupt this circulation, and so there is very little sign of storm surge out on the open water;
however, once the storm system reaches the more shallow water near the coast, the vertical
circulation that started in the deep ocean becomes disturbed by the ocean bottom. Since the water
is no longer able to go down, it has nowhere else to go but up onto the land. Therefore,
noticeable storm surge occurs where winds actually blow onshore. Practically every location on
the eastern coast of the United States is vulnerable to storm surge (NOAA, 2012).
There are a variety of factors that affect the height of storm surge. Firstly, there is central
pressure. While its effects are minimal, a lower central pressure will make for a higher storm
surge height. Stronger winds will produce a higher storm surge as well as the size of the storm. A
larger storm will produce a higher storm surge because its winds push against a larger area of
ocean than a smaller storm, and because the stronger winds typical of a larger storm will affect
the ocean surface for longer periods of time. Another factor in the height of the storm surge is the
coastline. If the slope of a coastline is gentle as opposed to steep, a greater storm surge will
occur. When on an open (exposed) coast, a faster storm will produce a higher surge, while a
slower storm will produce the same effect in enclosed bodies of water, such as bays and sounds.
A storm with an angle of approach that is perpendicular to the coast is also more likely to
produce a higher storm surge than a storm that moves parallel to the coast or at any different
angle, as is one that makes landfall on a coastline that curves inward (is concave) rather than one
that curves outward (is convex). Ultimately, though, storm surge is also highly dependent on the
local features and natural or artificial barriers that can affect the flow of water, such as the barrier
islands off the coast of North Carolina. The presence or absence of such barriers can greatly
affect how much of the storm surge influenced by the previously mentioned factors actually
makes its way inland (NOAA, 2012).
7
New York is one area that is extremely vulnerable to storm surge. An excellent example
of the damage wrought by hurricane-related storm surge is the recent Hurricane Sandy.
Hurricane Sandy hit the eastern coast of the United States on Monday evening, October 29,
2012. Hurricane Sandy brought with it winds of up to 90 mph and storm surge of up to fourteen
feet in some areas (McShane, 2012). Hurricane Sandy caused 113 deaths, with 48 in New York
alone (Serna, 2012). The damage that the storm surge of Hurricane Sandy caused is estimated at
around $70 billion (Thomson/Reuters, 2012). The floodwaters made firefighting impossible in
areas like Breezy Point, NY, which lost more than 100 homes to fire during the storm.
Perhaps the most unsettling fact about storm surge is that it is only predicted to get worse
with global warming. An increase in the surface temperature of the oceans is evident all around
the world. With this increase in sea temperature will come an increase in storm surge intensity
(Dasgupta, et al., 2009). Scientists estimate that thermal expansion of seawater (or the spreading
apart of water molecules from heat) due to ocean warming along with additional water input
from melting ice caps will lead to an increase in global sea levels between .3 and 1.8 m by 2100.
Additionally, the averaged intensity of worldwide tropical cyclones, or storms, is projected to
shift toward stronger storms, with intensity increases of 2-11% by 2100. These predicted changes
threaten to aggravate storm surge hazard by increasing the inland penetration of storm surge
(Shepard, et al., 2012).
Peer-reviewed research predicts that the frequency of storm surges resulting from
Category 3 hurricanes, which can reach 9 to 12 feet in height and result in flooding as far as 8
miles (13 kilometers inland), are going to increase in frequency on the south shores of Long
Island (Hurricanes and Tropical Storms, 2012). By 2100, a 100-year flood event can occur as
often as every 3 years under the A2 emissions scenario (Kirschen, et al., 2008). The A2
emissions scenario, often called the higher emissions scenario “describes a very heterogeneous
world. The underlying theme is self-reliance and preservation of local identities. Fertility patterns
across regions converge very slowly, which results in a continuously increasing population.
Economic development is primarily regionally oriented and per capita economic growth and
technological change more fragmented and slower than other storylines” (Houghton, 2009).
Long Island, NY is especially vulnerable to the changes in storm surge intensity.
The southern shores of Suffolk County located in Long Island, New York are predicted to
face a substantial increase in risk posed by storm surge. The southern shore of Suffolk County is
8
an 86-mile strip of coast that includes the towns of Babylon, Islip, Brookhaven, Southampton,
and East Hampton (Shepard, et al., 2012). Much of the southern shore of Long Island has a very
low elevation above sea level, making it very susceptible to flooding from storm surge. Storm
surge from category 3 hurricanes can reach heights of up to 15 feet above ground level along the
southern shores of Long Island. Under the A2 warming scenario, there could be as much as a .5
meter rise in sea level by 2080; subsequently, the Southern Shores of Long Island can face up to
a 47% increase in the amount of people at risk to storm-surge-related hazards if struck by a
category 3 hurricane.
Hazard in this context is defined as “an event or occurrence that has the potential to cause
harm to people and/or property.” Harm can range from any physical injury to death. Risk in this
context is the likelihood of such a hazard occurring. Calculating risk depends on a variety of
factors: Population density, age, education, ethnicity, income, and length of time living in the
area, just to name a few. All of the aforementioned factors affect people’s ability to response to
disaster, and help to determine how susceptible the area is to the hazardous flooding caused by
future storm surge (Shepard, et al., 2012).
Problem Statement: If the A2 warming scenario plays out, the number of people exposed to
storm-surge-related flooding along the southern shores of Long Island, NY will increase from
88,885 individuals to 130,718 individuals by 2080.
Goal: Our goal is to reduce the increased amount of people exposed to storm surge through sea
level rise along the south shores of Suffolk County from 130,718 exposed individuals to 109,802
exposed individuals by 2080.
Constraints/Assumptions

The first assumption is that warming is going to occur under the A2 emissions scenario;
otherwise, the intensity of storm surge will not be as severe by 2080.

The number of fatalities is also an assumption that was made, and the actual number of
mortalities from future hurricanes will largely impact the support and funding that our
strategies will receive, as well as how cost effective they will be.
9

Probability of storm surge is not a guarantee of actual events, so our assumption that four
hurricanes will happen by 2080 may not be true.

Our strategies and calculations are based on the assumption that global warming will not
be tackled on a global scale or national scale and the only way to combat the increased
threat of storm surge is on a local level. Our strategies focus on either minimizing the
storm surge or by removing people from areas under storm-surge threat.
STRATEGY A: CONSTRUCT A SEA WALL
In light of the recent Hurricane Sandy and the damage and death that occurred in New
York and New Jersey as a result of the storm-surge-related flooding, flood prevention and storm
surge protection measures have come to the forefront of the political discussions on the city and
state level. Among the strategies being discussed is one known as hard infrastructure (e.g. sea
walls, dikes, and floods gates) measures, such as building a $20 billion dollar sea wall to protect
Lower Manhattan from storm surge and the related flood risks. New York City Council Speaker
Christine Quinn, among others, has supported this strategy. Of course, debates have raged over
whether or not these measures would be cost-efficient or economically viable (Saul, 2012). In
fact, the biggest issue that is being addressed is how much such an infrastructure would actually
cost and where the money for construction and maintenance would come from. Skeptics question
if such construction would be state funded, privately funded, or federally funded?
Proposals for hard infrastructure to protect the financial district in New York are often
looked at from the economic standpoint; however, it is also important to consider the means
other than finances that are necessary to accomplish this task. Academic and scientific
communities have discussed the topic at length. There are currently many examples across the
globe of hard infrastructures protecting high-risk areas that are susceptible to flooding and high
storm tides. For example, there is the Thames River sea barrier that consists of multiple
retractable floodgates (Environment Agency, no date). There is also the large floodgate in Fudai,
Japan, which protected the small Japanese village from the devastating tsunami that hit in March
2011 (Hosaka, 2011). Finally, there is the massive North Sea Wall in Holland, which protects the
country’s agricultural land (National Geographic Channel, no date). These structures took
decades to construct; extremely detailed planning was necessary to determine what materials
were necessary in order for those walls to function properly.
10
The Thames Barrier, which is made up of 10 moveable and retractable steel gates, cost
$871 billion dollars to construct (Environment Agency, no date). Construction of the concrete
floodgate in Fudai began in the 1970s and cost a whopping $32 billion dollars to complete. This
structure was completed despite the protests of many Japanese officials, who thought it was
wasteful and too large, and ended up protecting the people of the small village while so many
others suffered the drastic consequences of flooding caused by storm surge (Hosaka, 2011). The
retractable sea wall in the Netherlands, which is considered a super structure with steel gates
towering almost as high as the Eiffel Tower, cost the Dutch $2.5 trillion to construct and
maintain (National Geographic Channel, no date; Walsh, 2012; Onishi, 2011). The range of costs
for such structures, as illustrated above, is one of the reasons it is so difficult to know the cost
effectiveness of constructing hard infrastructure to prevent storm-surge-related flooding for even
a small part of New York like Lower Manhattan, let alone the 86 miles of Suffolk County that
we wish to protect.
Using global examples, such as those discussed, as well as recent proposals for the
construction of a sea wall to protect part of New York City, the assumptions can be made that the
cost of a sea wall running along the southern coast of Suffolk County, Long Island, which is
approximately 86 miles, could range between $20 billion and $2.5 trillion. This range leaves
many to question whether it is even possible to attain funding for such a structure, since it is only
meant to protect a small part of Long Island,. If there is so much debate over the construction of
a sea wall following a 5-mile stretch of Lower Manhattan coastline, it may not even be possible
to get legislative approval to create such a structure for Suffolk County, Long Island.
Objectives/Implementation Timetable for Strategy A: If a Category 3 or lower Hurricane strikes
the south shores of Suffolk County, then essentially a sea wall of 20 feet in height and 86 miles
in length would reduce harmful exposure by more than half of the predicted 47% increase by
2080 to 0% exposure. How would the construction of a sea wall of this magnitude be
constructed? The Army Corps of Engineers of New York would have to develop a blueprint for a
retractable sea wall that would later be constructed with as little disruption to the ecosystem as
possible by 2030. Volunteers with knowledge about the storm surge-related flood risks in
Suffolk County, New York would carry out door-to-door outreach to obtain resident approval for
11
the development of a 20-foot sea wall that would be essential to decreasing the risk of human
exposure to storm surges and related floods by 2035.
A lobbying group interested in human exposure to storm surges would have to be hired
by illustrating the situation and present the signed resident approvals for the development) and
get them to agree to help influence politicians to support this construction by 2035. The lobbyist
group would then get the support of elected officials who are responsible for and can influence
the passing of legislation on infrastructure development as well as attaining the federal funds
necessary to support this development. Legislation would have to allow the development of a 20foot sea wall that will protect parts of Suffolk County, Long Island by 2040. After obtaining the
necessary permits to start construction, the construction of a 20-foot high, 86-mile long
retractable sea wall in the south shore of Suffolk County, be halfway completed by 2060, and
finished by 2080.
STRATEGY B: UTILIZE AN EVACUATION PLAN
As detailed above, the first strategy would protect the people living on the south shores of
Long Island, NY from harmful exposure to storm-surge-related flooding by blocking the storm
surge and preventing it from ever reaching the coast. On the other hand, the second strategy, to
utilize an evacuation plan, would take a different approach. With this strategy, people living on
the coast would leave the at-risk zones on the southern coast of Suffolk county at least a couple
of days before the arrival of a forecasted Category 3 or lower hurricane and temporarily take
shelter further inland - in a public shelter or at a friend’s or relative’s house, if possible - until the
storm passed and there was no longer any dangerous storm-surge-related flooding occurring in
the evacuated area. The people who had evacuated would then be able to return to their homes
and remain there indefinitely, or until another hurricane strikes.
Suffolk County already has a plan such as the one described in place. Residents of this
area can go the “Prepare for an Emergency” page on the Suffolk County Government’s website
to check whether or not there is an incoming hurricane forecasted for the area and whether or not
an evacuation is necessary. They can also sign up to receive emergency notifications about such
potentially dangerous weather events from the Suffolk County Office of Emergency
Management’s Code Red System directly to their smartphones, if they prefer. On the same
website, residents are also provided information about how to put together an emergency supply
12
kit that they can bring with them during an evacuation. A link to a map of Suffolk County shows
them the best routes to use in order to leave the at-risk zones, and a link to another map shows
them the locations of all of the public emergency shelters that will be open when an evacuation is
deemed necessary. More information about how to prepare for an evacuation is also available on
the website for anyone who is interested (Suffolk County Government, 2012).
If a Category 3 or lower hurricane strikes the south shores of Long Island, as is predicted
to happen on at least four separate occasions before the year 2080, the evacuation plan that is
already in place in Suffolk County can be utilized to remove the people living in this area from
the potentially harmful exposure to storm-surge-related flooding that is likely to occur. The
evacuation plan can at least be utilized during the first of these four Category 3 hurricanes that
are predicted to occur. Then, based on the success of the evacuation during this first storm, i.e.,
based on how many people evacuate when required, a projection can be made about the success
of future evacuations and about whether or not the current plan is enough to achieve the overall
goal of reducing harmful exposure to at least half of the predicted 47% increase for this area.
If projections suggest that the current evacuation plan is effective enough to achieve the
ultimate goal, the plan can continue to be used during each of the successive storm-surge-related
flooding events predicted to occur by the year 2080 and in the years that follow, for as long as
such a plan is necessary to keep the risk of harmful human exposure to such storm-surge-related
flooding from increasing further. If the current plan is not enough to accomplish this goal,
though, research has to be done in order to determine how the current plan can be expanded and
improved upon before the arrival of the next predicted storm, if such modifications are possible
in that span of time, or even at all.
There are many examples of such changes that can be considered during the course of the
research, which may improve the viability of the evacuation strategy. It may be that information
about pre-hurricane emergency preparedness and about the actual evacuation process needs to be
made more accessible to the residents of Suffolk County. Perhaps not everyone knows about the
Suffolk County Government website or has access to it, as is very likely with older members of
the population. Perhaps not everyone knows how to interpret the many signs that hang around
various parts of Suffolk County’s evacuation zones, which are meant to direct people out of these
at-risk areas. By sending a paper copy of the evacuation plan and all of the additional prehurricane emergency preparedness information to the homes of all of the residents, along with a
13
comprehensive explanation of how to read and interpret all of that information, the success of a
consecutive evacuation may be greatly improved.
On the other hand, people may understand how the evacuation strategy works, but they
may not understand how important it is to comply with this strategy. Improving the success of an
evacuation in that case may be as simple as emphasizing that such an evacuation is absolutely
necessary for the safety and well-being of the residents, rather than an optional suggestion made
by the local authorities. Pamphlets containing information illustrating the dangers of staying in
an evacuation zone during category 3 hurricanes could be sent out to all residents in advance of
such weather events. Legislation making such evacuations mandatory and implementing fines for
anyone who chooses to stay behind could also eventually be recommended and put into place.
Otherwise, the actual evacuation plan can be modified to create improved results. The
current evacuation routes that people utilize during an escape from the south shores of Long
Island may be kept in place as they are and simply added to, so that there are more options. On
the other hand, these current evacuation routes may be completely replaced by more convenient
ones, which are more accessible by a larger number of Suffolk County residents and which are
less likely to become congested during an evacuation procedure. Opening more public shelters
during such dangerous weather events may also help to make the evacuation process easier,
thereby increasing its rate of success.
If such modifications as those discussed in the paragraphs above are possible, or if any
other modifications are possible as well, they should be made quickly and the improved strategy
should be ready for implementation during all consecutive hurricanes predicted to occur by 2080.
It is only in this way that the goal outlined in the problem statement at the beginning of this
report can possibly be achieved for Suffolk County, and if such a modified evacuation strategy
succeeds, it can then continue to be utilized for as long as it is needed to protect the residents of
the south shores of Long Island, New York.
Objectives/Implementation Timetable for Strategy B: Clear objectives and timetables are quite
difficult to establish for this strategy because determining the efficacy is contingent on future
hurricanes, and any assumptions of when exactly they would strike would be superficial at best.
The timeline for the implementation of this strategy will also change depending on the evaluation
of the efficacy of the existing plans, the intensity of future storms, and the compliance rates.
14
DISCUSSION
Before an assessment about the efficacy of each of the above-outlined strategies can be
made, it is important to determine the total cost incurred as a result of the human lives that will
be at risk until 2080, if nothing is done to reduce that risk. According to the Environmental
Protection Agency, the “value of a statistical life” is $6.9 million dollars per person (Associated
Press, 2008). Determining the mortality expected to occur during a category 3 hurricane can be
imprecise; however, the assumption is that the death toll would be similar to that of previous
hurricanes that struck the New York area, so that as many as 35 deaths (Hurricane Fran) to 700
deaths (1983 hurricane) would occur during each category 3 hurricane predicted (Blaes, 2012;
Gornitz, et al., 2002). Obviously, these numbers may be very imprecise, as they are the mortality
rates associated with the entire area affected by the hurricane and not just Long Island; however,
it is a ballpark figure that allows for an evaluation to take place.
Furthermore, to determine the total cost of human lives put at risk, it is necessary to
determine how many hurricanes are actually expected to occur by the year 2080. Within the case
study sites, 100-year flood events could occur, on average, as frequently as once in every 43
years by the 2020s, once in every 19 years by the 2050s, and once in every 4 years by the 2080s,
in the most extreme case. The assumption is that the worst-case scenario would occur, so that
there would roughly be one flood between now and 2050, two from 2050 to 2070, and one more
between 2070 and 2080, for a total of four hurricanes predicted to occur by the year 2080.
Taking this into consideration, the total costs incurred as a result of the lives put at risk by that
year could range from anywhere between $966,000,000 and $19,320,000,000 in terms of human
life, where only mortality is being taken into account, and not suffering.
In comparison to this hefty sum, the cost of implementing an evacuation strategy in the
way illustrated in the previous section would be very affordable, if the evacuation strategy can
actually be implemented successfully. According to studies previously conducted into the matter,
an evacuation of the south shores of Long Island would only cost approximately $1,000,000 per
mile of coastline. This price tag takes into consideration the direct costs of an evacuation, such as
paying for gas to use in the getaway vehicle, as well as the cost of losses in commerce, tourism,
and general productivity that would be incurred during such an evacuation (Wolshon, et al.,
15
2005). Since the Coast of Suffolk County is 86 miles long, this would create a cost of
$86,000,000 per category 3 hurricanes and a total cost of no more than $344 million by the year
2080, if all four of the hurricanes that are predicted to occur by that year actually do. Obviously,
this is a much smaller value than that of the cost of human life at risk by doing nothing.
Therefore, this strategy could clearly be a very cost effective solution to the problem, as long as
the predicted hurricanes are not more severe than expected and everyone chooses to evacuate
when they are supposed to.
If the statistics about evacuations that took place during the category 3 or lower
hurricanes that previously struck New York and Long Island, as well as other parts of the East
Coast, are any indication, though, it is not very likely that the evacuation plan that is currently in
place for Suffolk County will be very successful in achieving the desired goal by 2080. These
data about previous weather-related scenarios, published and discussed at length in many official
reports and peer-reviewed research papers over the past few years, indicate that many people are
unwilling to leave their homes when an evacuation is required, regardless of the severity of the
predicted weather event and previous experiences with such events.
According to an assessment report created by Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, Inc. for
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1993, when Hurricane Andrew threatened to strike the
coast of Florida in 1992, the percentage of residents who evacuated their homes in the counties
of Broward and Dade to go someplace they perceived to be safer varied by proximity to the
shoreline. Between 69% and 71% of residents left from Category 1 areas, 63% from Category 23 areas, and between 33% and 46% from Category 4-5 areas. Approximately 13% evacuated
from inland areas beyond the limits of Category 4-5 storm surge.
Furthermore, individuals were more likely to evacuate from each of these zones if
officials came into their neighborhoods and told them to do so. Approximately 80% of those who
indicated that officials had actually told them to evacuate, did so. Compared to an evacuation
rate of 52% from residents who said officials did not tell them to leave, this statistic is much
higher; however, the numbers were even more significant when residents in each of the abovementioned zones perceived that officials ordered them to leave or told them that they must
evacuate, rather than making the evacuation sound like a suggestion, with an evacuation rate
between 87% and 89% for those individuals who perceived such a command (Post, Buckley,
Schuh & Jernigan, Inc., 1993).
16
Despite the different rates of success that occurred as a result of these differences in
information delivery (or lack thereof), it is clear that the evacuation was not 100% successful,
nor was it the rate of 91% that was predicted to occur based on telephone interviews that were
conducted in Florida between 1989 and 1990 (Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, Inc., 1993). The
results gathered from North and South Carolina following Hurricane Bertha and Hurricane Fran
show that the evacuations in each of these scenarios were no more successful. In Hurricane
Bertha, 31% of those from South Carolina who responded to the interviews conducted by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1998 said that they evacuated, while 44% of those who were
interviewed from North Carolina said they had left their homes to go someplace safer. Among
those individuals interviewed from North Carolina, approximately 70% of the ones who lived in
beach areas said that they evacuated. Evacuation from the mainland was not any higher.
Again, in both North and South Carolina, people who heard evacuation notices from
officials were more likely to leave than others who did not, and those individuals who believed
officials ordered them to evacuate were most likely of all the separate categories to leave. In
North Carolina, 81% of those who claimed that they were ordered to leave by officials did so,
while only 58% of those who said officials recommended that they evacuate did so. In South
Carolina, 56% of those who heard officials say that they must leave did so, while only 38% of
those who claimed they heard a recommendation and only 18% of those who claimed they heard
no evacuation notices at all did the same (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1998).
People who evacuated during Hurricane Bertha tended to evacuate during Hurricane Fran
as well. Approximately 49% of those who responded to interviews from South Carolina left their
homes during this severe weather event, while 57% of those from North Carolina did the same.
Of those who lived on the beaches in North Carolina, 87% evacuated. If they received official
evacuation notices, people were much more likely to evacuate than if they did not receive such
notices, with 90% of those who heard that they must leave doing so in North Carolina and 70%
doing the same in South Carolina (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1998).
Public response and evacuation rates were not that much better during the storm surge
events associated with Hurricane Hugo, as a research paper published by Earl J. Baker in 1990
indicates. Between 62% and 81% of individuals evacuated from sample locations during this
hurricane. Of those individuals, between 64% and 73% believed they had been told to leave by
officials. As in the previous examples, residents were more likely to leave if they interpreted the
17
notices as orders, with 89% of people who interpreted the notices as such doing so, compared to
70% of individuals who said that they only heard a recommendation. Surprisingly, though, 61%
of individuals who said that they did not heard any evacuation notice at all evacuated anyway
because they heard that they should leave from other sources or because they were aware that
neighbors were leaving the area.
As all of these instances indicate, there is a very small chance that the evacuation plan
currently in place in Suffolk County, let alone any evacuation plan that could be put into place
for this area, would have a very high rate of success, despite the appeal of its cost effectiveness
as compared to the cost of choosing to do nothing. The areas studied in each of the abovementioned cases have experienced many of such dangerous weather events and the storm-surgerelated flooding that usually accompanies them, and it is this prior experience that has probably
resulted in evacuation rates that are as high as they are. Research done into the matter does reveal
that, the higher of a risk someone perceives staying in an evacuation zone during a predicted
hurricane to be, the more likely he or she is to leave that area when an evacuation is required
(Stein, et al., 2011).
It is probably for this reason that people in North Carolina who had stayed behind in such
danger zones during Hurricane Hugo and had experienced the negative effects of doing so were
statistically more likely to evacuate during the storms that followed, such as Hurricane Bertha
and Hurricane Fran. They understood the high risk of staying behind. It is also for this reason
that people in Suffolk County might be more likely to evacuate during the next predicted
Category 3 or lower hurricane, as the effects of Hurricane Sandy that were experienced by these
individuals earlier this year were very devastating for these people. Furthermore, experiencing
any consecutive category 3 or lower hurricane that is predicted to occur in this area may further
reinforce the idea that staying behind in such at-risk areas is dangerous and cause the rate of
evacuation success to increase to an acceptable percentage by the year 2080, allowing the
ultimate goal to be achieved.
On the other hand, though, people who had stayed behind in such danger zones during
other previous hurricanes and had not experienced the negative effects of doing so told
researchers when they were asked that they would probably not evacuate if another similar
hurricane with storm-surge-related flooding was predicted to occur again, as they did not think
staying behind during such an event would be dangerous in the future either (Horney, et al.,
18
2011). These people did not perceive the risk of such weather events to be very high at all and
were probably the reason that the evacuation rates in the previously illustrated scenarios were
still not as high as they could have been if previous experiences of hurricanes were actually an
entirely positive contributing factor.
Such information and statistics does not bode well for the evacuation strategy being
considered. If there are many people who do not perceive the risks of staying behind in an
evacuation zone to be very high living on the south shores of Long Island, they will probably not
be very likely to evacuate during the four category 3 hurricanes that are predicted to occur by
2080, despite the devastation of Hurricane Sandy illustrated in a previous section of this report
and despite notices from officials that are worded as orders rather than as simple
recommendations. If such people dominate on the south shores of Long Island, evacuation rates
may continue to remain low and it may be impossible to accomplish the ultimate goal using this
strategy, even if modifications are made.
If utilizing an evacuation strategy cannot accomplish the goal set out, it is necessary to
consider whether or not the other strategy, constructing a retractable sea wall, could be any more
successful. Despite there being many hard infrastructures protecting coastal land from stormsurge-related flooding around the world, it is unclear how much a sea wall of the magnitude
necessary to protect the southern coast of Long Island would cost. The range of $20 billion to
$2.5 trillion, which was mentioned earlier, is wide enough to open up many possibilities;
however, it can also prove to be a hindrance to legislative approval as well as to gaining federal
funding for the completion. It creates a lot of uncertainty and doubt. New York City Mayor
Michael Bloomberg thinks it is impossible to receive the amount of money needed to construct
any type of sea wall from the federal government. He also thinks that a 20-foot sea wall would
not protect residents completely, which is true.
After all, a 20-foot retractable sea wall would only protect those at risk from a category 3
or lower hurricane. It would be ineffective against higher category weather events. This
reasoning, as well as the fact that the retractable barrier being considered would only protect a
small part of Long Island - only 86 miles of the full 118 miles of coastline - would make it very
difficult to receive state and federal approval and funding for the construction, especially since
this small area is not as important to the state and to the nation as other areas, such as the
financial district in New York City. A sea wall costing an estimated $20 billion to protect Lower
19
Manhattan would probably take precedence over a possibly more expensive 86-mile sea wall to
protect a small portion of the southern shore of Long Island.
Furthermore, even if funding could be successfully acquired and construction could be
completed on time, it is important to consider that there is still a chance of the sea wall failing
during a hurricane, despite its supposed strength. In Taro, Japan, one of the tallest and longest
Japanese sea walls, considered the “Great Wall of China,” failed after the catastrophic tsunami
that hit Japan in March 2011. The wall consisted of an inner wall and an outer wall of the same
height of 34-feet, and this height gave the people of Taro a false sense of security when the
tsunami hit, with some people even running towards the wall for protection. Unfortunately, the
wall was no match for the magnitude and strength of the tsunami (Onishi, 2011). Because it is
impossible to know the future, it is impossible to know the future efficiency, or lack thereof, of a
sea wall that would only protect a small portion of Long Island from flood risk.
With such uncertainty about the future severity of storms, as well as a possibility for the
price of construction being a great deal larger than the cost of mortality that results from doing
nothing, which was discussed earlier in this section, it does not seem as if building a sea wall
would be any more effective in solving the problem of harmful exposure than implementing an
evacuation strategy would be. It may be necessary to consider other strategies, which could be
more effective in mitigating the problem, or otherwise, to do nothing at all.
CONCLUSION
Storm surge-related flooding puts many individuals at risk, and the frequency of storm surge is
likely to increase. In order to reach our goal of reducing the increased amount of Suffolk County
residents exposed to hazardous flooding due to storm surge to 109,802 by 2080, we have
proposed two strategies—to build a protective sea wall and to assess and to improve upon
Suffolk County’s existing evacuation plan. Because of its huge price tag, the construction of a
sea wall is not a very likely option. However, if the money can somehow be found, the
implementation of this strategy will likely reduce the risk of exposure to flooding far more
effectively than an evacuation plan would. The evacuation plan is far more cost-effective than
the sea wall, but the effectiveness of this strategy in reaching our goal is questionable, because
many residents are likely to choose not to evacuate. We recommend that the sea wall strategy be
attempted, but if the necessary funds can not be found attention should be focused on improving
20
Suffolk County’s evacuation plan. Additionally, if it is decided that the sea wall will be built, the
evacuation strategies should be implemented for the storms that may occur before the wall’s
completion.
21
REFERENCES
1. Associated Press (2008). How to value life? EPA devalues its estimates. NBCNew.com.
Retrieved from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25626294/ns/us_newsenvironment/t/how-value-life-epa-devalues-its-estimate/#.UNEXBInjnzc
2. Baker, E.J. (1990). Evacuation decision making and public response in Hurricane Hugo in
South Carolina. FMHI Publications. Retrieved from http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/
3. Blaes, J. (2012). Hurricane Fran, September 1996. Retrieved from NC State University
website: http://www4.ncsu.edu/~nwsfo/storage/cases/19960906/
4. Dasgupta, S.; Laplante, B.; Murray, S.; & Wheeler, D. (2009). Sea-Level Rise and Storm
Surges: A Comparative Analysis of Impacts in Developing Countries [PDF document].
Retrieved from World Bank website:
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/4095
5. Environment Agency (n.d.). The Thames Barrier. Retrieved on December 19, 2012 from
Environment Agency: http://www.environmentagency.gov.uk/homeandleisure/floods/38353.aspx
6. Gornitz, V.; Couch, S.; & Hartig, E.K. (2002). Impacts of sea level rise in the New York City
metropolitan area. Global and Planetary Changes, 32, 61-88.
7. Horney, J.A.; MacDonald, P.D.M.; Berke, P.; Van Willigen, M.; & Kaufman, J.S. (2011).
Factors Associated with Hurricane Evacuation in North Carolina. In A. Lupo (Ed.),
Recent Hurricane Research - Climate, Dynamics, and Societal Impacts (pp. 421-440).
New York, NY: InTech.
8. Hosaka, T.A. (2011, May 5). How one Japanese village defied the tsunami. NBC News.
Retrieved from http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/43018489/ns/today-today_news/t/howone-japanese-village-defied-tsunami/#.UNOIO0Kf_ww
9. Houghton, J. (2009). Global Warming: The Complete Briefing (4th ed.). New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
10. Hurricanes and Tropical Storms (2012). In The Weather Channel Storm Encyclopedia.
Retrieved from http://www.weather.com/encyclopedia/charts/tropical/saffirscale.html
11. Kirschen, P.; Watson, C.; Douglas E.; Gontz, A.; Lee, J.; & Tian, Y. (2008). Coastal flooding
in the Northeastern United States due to climate change. Mitigation and Adaption
Strategies for Global Change, 13, 437-451. DOI 10.1007/s11027-007-9139-5
22
12. Long Island Regional Planning Council (2010). Sustainable Strategies for Long Island 2035
[PDF document]. Retrieved from Long Island Regional Planning Council website:
http://www.lirpc.org/3.2010-12-02_LI2035StrategiesReport.pdf
13. McShane, L. (2012, November 7). Nor’easter nears, storm surges expected up to four feet.
Daily News. Retrieved from http://articles.nydailynews.com/2012-1107/news/34977420_1_storm-surges-wind-gusts-incoming-storm
14. Missouri Botanical Garden (2012). Shorelines: Tides. Retrieved from MBGnet:
http://www.mbgnet.net/salt/sandy/index.htm
15. National Geographic Channel (n.d.). Megastructures: North Sea Wall. Retrieved on
December 19, 2012 from National Geographic Channel:
http://www.englishdaily626.com/national_geographic_channel.php?011
16. NOAA (2012). Introduction to Storm Surge [PDF document]. Retrieved from National
Weather Service Website: http://www.nws.noaa.gove/om/hurricane
17. NYSEMO GIS (2005). [Map illustrating Hurricane storm surge zones on Long Island, New
York - based on northwest direction at high tide]. Emergency Management. Retrieved
from http://www2.sunysuffolk.edu/mandias/38hurricane/storm_surge_maps.html
18. Onishi, N. (2011, March 31). In Japan, Sewall Offered a False Sense of Security. The New
York Times. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/world/asia/02wall.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
19. Post, Buckley, Schuh, & Jernigan, Inc. (1993). Hurricane Andrew Assessment: Review f
Hurricane Evacuation Studies Utilization and Information Dissemination [PDF
document]. Retrieved from NOAA website:
http://www.csc.noaa.gov/hes/docs/postStorm/H_ANDREW_ASSESSMENT_REVIEW_
HES_UTILIZATION_INFO_DISSEMINATION.pdf
20. Regnier, E. (2008). Public Evacuation Decisions and Hurricane Track Uncertainty.
Management Science, 54(1), 16-28. DOI 10.1287/mnsc.1070.0764
21. Saul, M.H. (2012, November 13). Quinn Calls for Sea Wall to Shield City. The Wall Street
Journal. Retrieved from
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324556304578117510549500542.html
22. Serna, J. (2012, November 3). Hurricane Sandy death toll climbs above 110, N.Y. hardest hit.
23
Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://www.latimes.com/news/nation/nationnow/lana-nn-hurricane-sandy-deaths-climb-20121103,0,6945430.story
23. Shepard, C.C.; Agostini, V.N.; Gilmer, B.; Allen, T.; Stone, J.; Brooks, W.; & Beck, M.W.
(2012). Assessing future risk: quantifying the effects of sea level rise on storm surge risk
for the southern shores of Long Island, New York. Natural Hazards, 60, 727-745. DOI
10.1007/s11069-011-0046-8
24. Stein, R.M.; Duenas-Osorio, L.; Buzcu-Guven, B.; Subramanian, D.; & Kahle, D. (2011).
“How Risk Perceptions Influence Evacuations from Hurricanes.” James A. Baker III
Institute for Public Policy, Rice University.
25. Suffolk County Government (2012). Prepare for an Emergency. Retrieved from
http://suffolkcountyny.gov/Home.aspx
26. Thomson/Reuters (2012, November 2). Catastrophe-Estimate Firm Eqecat: Sandy’s U.S.
Losses Might Hit $70 Billion. MoneyNews.com. Retrieved from
http://www.moneynews.com/Economy/Eqecat-Sandy-InsuredLosses/2012/11/02/id/462497
27. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Charleston District (1998). Hurricanes Bertha & Fran
Assessment: Review of Hurricane Evacuation Studies Utilization and Information
Dissemination [PDF document]. Retrieved from NOAA website:
http://www.csc.noaa.gov/hes/docs/postStorm/H_BERTHA_FRAN_ASSESSMENT_RE
VIEW_HES_UTILIZATION_DISSEMINATION_FINAL.pdf
28. Walsh, B. (2012, November 5). Sandy: What a Coastal U.S. Can Learn from Other
Threatened Cities. Time. Retrieved from http://science.time.com/2012/11/05/sandy-whata-coastal-u-s-can-learn-from-other-threatened-cities/
29. Wolshon, B., M.ASCE; Urbina, E., M.ASCE; Wilmot, C., M.ASCE; & Levitan, M. (2005).
Review of Policies and Practices for Hurricane Evacuation. I: Transportation Planning,
Preparedness, and Response. Natural Hazards Review, 6(3), 129-142. DOI
10.1061/(ASCE)1527-6988