On the Arbitrariness Objection to Foundationalism
The epistemic regress problem arises in discussions about the justification of beliefs. Some
of our beliefs are justified by other beliefs. However, what about those other beliefs? Are
they justified by still other beliefs? If so, how about the beliefs that justify them? If they are
also justified by other beliefs, does this imply that we must have an infinite number of
beliefs? Or could there also be beliefs that do not depend for their justification on other
beliefs? Clearly the most influential answer to this regress problem is the one given by
epistemic foundationalism. According to foundationalism, some of our justified beliefs may
depend for their justification on other beliefs, which may in turn depend on still other
beliefs for their justification, but the regress must terminate in beliefs that are immediately
justified, i.e., in beliefs that are justified by something other than beliefs.
An important objection to foundationalism, most prominently raised in some recent
papers by Peter Klein, says that it supports justificatory arbitrariness. Since
foundationalism allows for some beliefs justifying other beliefs but themselves being
justified even when no beliefs serve to justify them, so the argument goes, it allows for
beliefs being held in an arbitrary fashion.
In my talk, I will evaluate this arbitrariness objection. First, I will describe how Klein
thinks foundationalism allows for arbitrariness. Then, I will explain what exactly he means
by ‘arbitrariness’. I will assume that someone’s belief is epistemically arbitrary if she has
no reason for thinking it is true. Third, I will assess Klein’s objection. I will argue that
whether foundationalism must involve epistemic arbitrariness depends on what kinds of
items can be reasons for beliefs. If, as some have argued Klein assumes, only other beliefs
can be such reasons, then foundationalism must allow for epistemic arbitrariness. However,
if also other items, especially facts, can be reasons for beliefs, then foundationalism does
not have to allow for epistemic arbitrariness. For in that case it is in a position to construe
basic beliefs as beliefs for which there must be reasons. I will argue that since it is very
natural to regard (also) items other than beliefs as possible reasons for beliefs, Klein’s
objection fails.
Short biography
Coos Engelsma (1983) studied Philosophy at the University of Groningen. His main interests are
Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Religion, and Epistemology. Since October 2012, he is involved in
Jeanne Peijnenburg’s NWO-funded project: ‘The Regress Problem in Epistemology: A Probabilistic
Approach’. His research focuses on the question whether chains of epistemic justification may or do
legitimately come to an end.