HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Lectures: The lectures for this module will be held in **, on Tuesdays from 7-8 pm. The lecturer in
Term 1 is Anthony Price (a.price@bbk.ac.uk). The lecturer in Term 2 is Sarah Patterson
(s.patterson@bbk.ac.uk).
Seminars: The seminars for this module will be held in **, on Tuesdays from 8-9 pm. They will be
led by **.
Readings: Every week there is one key reading that is the focus of the seminar discussion. One of
the purposes of the seminar is to help you to understand the reading, so do not worry if you have not
fully understood it in advance. Nevertheless, it is essential that you attempt the seminar reading each
week if you are to follow the lecture and to participate in the seminar discussion. There is also
‘additional reading’ listed that will deepen your understanding and help you to get the most out of the
module. You are especially advised to cover the additional reading for those topics on which you are
planning to write.
Essays: You should write two essays during each term of the course, taken from the titles below, and
receive feedback on them from your seminar leader. This is the best way of getting into the material
yourself (as well as the best way of preparing for examination). Within each term, you should submit
the first essay by the first seminar after reading week, and the second by one week after the last
seminar of term. [Notes: (1) You are always welcome to submit an essay earlier than these dates; (2)
the seminar leader should not be expected to comment on the same essay more than once.]
Exams: This module is assessed by a two-hour examination in Term 3. The exam falls into two
parts, one relating to Term 1, the other to Term 2; you will have to answer one question from each
part.
Moodle: Electronic copies of course materials are available through Moodle, at
http://moodle.bbk.ac.uk. You will need your ITS login name and password to enter.
Term 1
1
H IS T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y : P L A T O
Anthony Price
TWO RECOMMENDED COLLECTIONS
J. Cooper (ed), Plato: Complete Works (Hackett, 1997)
G. Fine (ed), Plato 1: Metaphysics & Epistemology (OUP, 1999)
INTRODUCTORY AND INSPIRATIONAL
Williams, B.
Burnyeat, M.
Vlastos, G.
‘Plato: The Invention of Philosophy’, in his The Sense of the Past (2006)
‘Plato’, Proceedings of the British Academy (2000)
‘A Metaphysical Paradox’, in his Platonic Studies (1973)
GENERAL
Brennan, T.
Shields, C.
Silverman, A.
‘Forms, Platonic’, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(added 10 December 2002)
‘Plato: Metaphysics’, in Shields (ed) The Blackwell Guide to
Ancient Philosophy (2003)
‘Plato’s Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology’, in
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008),
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-metaphysics/)
(1) & (2) THE THEORY OF FORMS (start with Phaedo 65d-66a, 74a-75b, 100b-e, Symposium
210e-212a)
Allen, R.E.
Nehamas, A.
Irwin, T.H.
Bostock, D.
Anscombe, E.
Fine, G.
Code, A.
‘Participation and Predication in Plato’s Middle Dialogues’,
Philosophical Review 1960, in Allen (ed) Studies in Plato’s
Metaphysics (1965), G. Vlastos ed Plato I (1971)
‘Plato on the Imperfection of the Sensible World’, American
Philosophical Quarterly 1975, in G. Fine (ed) Plato 1 (1999)
‘Plato’s Heracleiteanism’, Philosophical Quarterly 1977
Plato’s Phaedo (1986), ch 10
‘The Early Theory of Forms’, in her From Parmenides to Wittgenstein
(1981)
‘The Origin of Plato’s Theory of Forms’, in R.W. Sharples (ed)
Modern Thinkers and Ancient Thinkers (1993)
On Ideas (1993), esp. ch 4, available on Oxford Scholarship Online =
OSO
‘Vlastos on a Metaphysical Paradox’, in T. Irwin and M.C. Nussbaum
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Devereux, D.T.
Irwin, T.
Kahn, C.H.
Heinaman, R.
Modrak. D.
Rickless, S.
Harte, Verity
(eds) Virtue, Love and Form (1993)
‘Separation and Immanence in Plato’s Theory of Forms’,
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1994, in G. Fine (ed)
Plato 1 (1999)
Plato’s Ethics (1995), ch 10, in G. Fine (ed) Plato 1 (1999), OSO
Plato and the Socratic Dialogue (1996), ch 11
‘Plato: Metaphysics and Epistemology’, in C.C.W. Taylor (ed)
From the Beginning to Plato (1997)
‘Problems for Forms’, in H.H. Benson (ed) A Companion to Plato (2006)
‘Plato’s Parmenides’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007),
§ 4, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-parmenides/
‘Plato’s Metaphysics’, in G. Fine (ed) The Oxford Handbook of Plato
(2008)
What is a ‘Form’? Is it (e.g.) a universal, or a paradigm? How does it relate to particulars?
Is there a Form for every property? If not, why are there Forms for some properties rather than
for others?
How is so-called ‘self-predication’ (e.g., ‘The Form of F is F’) best to be understood?
(3) THE ‘THIRD MAN’ ARGUMENT (Parmenides 132a1-b2)
Vlastos, G.
Cohen, S.M.
Meinwald, C.C.
Fine, G.
Sedley, D.
Rickless, S.
‘The “Third Man” Argument in the Parmenides’, PhilosophicalReview
1954, in his Studies in Greek Philosophyvol 2 (1995), R.E. Allen (ed)
Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics (1965)
‘Plato’s “Third Man” Argument (Parm. 132a1-b2): Text and Logic’,
Philosophical Quarterly 1969, in his Platonic Studies (1973)
‘The Logic of the Third Man’, Philosophical Review 1971, in
‘Good-bye to the Third Man’, in R. Kraut (ed) Cambridge Companion to
Plato (1992)
On Ideas (1993), chs 15-16
‘Platonic Causes’, Phronesis 43 (1998), 127-32 of 114-32
‘Plato’s Parmenides’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007), § 4.3,
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-parmenides/)
Is the so-called ‘Third Man’ Argument (TMA) ‘a record of honest perplexity’ (Vlastos, 1954)?
What are the implicit assumptions of the TMA? How, if at all, might it best be answered on
Plato’s behalf? (See esp. Fine.)
(4) KNOWLEDGE and OPINION (Republic v. 475e480a)
Fine, G.
Irwin, T.
Gonzalez, F.J.
‘Knowledge and belief in Republic VVII’, in S. Everson (ed.),
Companions to Ancient Thought 1: Epistemology (1990),
and her Plato on Knowledge and Forms (2003), 1st part
Plato’s Ethics (1995), pp 26471, OSO
‘Propositions or Objects? A Critique of Gail Fine on Knowledge and
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Taylor, C.C.W.
Price, A.W.
Belief in Republic 5’, Phronesis1996
‘Plato’s Epistemology’, in Fine (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Plato
(2008), pp 176-9
Virtue and Reason in Plato and Aristotle (2011), ch C 1 § IV, esp. n. 29,
OSO
How lucid and satisfactory is Plato’s distinction between knowledge and opinion? Can he allow
there to be any opinions about the world of Forms, and knowledge about the sensible world?
(5) SUN, LINE, and CAVE (Republic vi. 507b511e, vii. 514a518d)
Kenny, A.
Austin, J.L.
Fine, G.
Irwin, T.
Smith, N.D.
Denyer, N.
‘Mental health in Plato’s Republic’, in his The Anatomy of the Soul (1973),
pp 19-21
‘The line and the cave in Plato’s Republic’, in his Philosophical Papers,
3rd edn (1979), OSO
‘Knowledge and belief in Republic VVII’, in S. Everson (ed.),
Companions to Ancient Thought 1: Epistemology (1990),
and her Plato on Knowledge and Forms (2003), 2nd part
Plato’s Ethics (1995), pp 27180, OSO
‘Plato’s Divided Line’, Ancient Philosophy 1996
‘Sun and Line: The Role of the Good’, in J. Ferrari (ed), Cambridge
Companion to Plato’s Republic (2007)
How closely related are the similes of the Line and the Cave?
‘It’s a strange image you’re describing, and strange prisoners.’ ‘They’re like to us.’ (515a).
How so?
(6) MATHEMATICS AND THE FORM OF THE GOOD (pursue references to the Republic)
Gosling, J.C.B.
Annas, J.
Santas, G.X.
Mueller, I.
Irwin, T.
Burnyeat, M.F.
Santas, G.
White, M.J.
Plato (1973), ch 7
Aristotle: Metaphysics Books M and N (1976), 62-73
‘The Form of the Good in Plato’s Republic’, in J.P. Anton and A. Preuss
(eds) Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy (1983), in G. Fine (ed) Plato 1
(2000)
‘Mathematical Method and Philosophical Truth’, in R. Kraut (ed)
Cambridge Companion to Plato (1992), 183-94
Plato’s Ethics (1995), ch 16, OSO
‘Plato on Why Mathematics is Good for the Soul’, in T. Smiley (ed.)
Mathematics and Necessity in the History of Philosophy (2000)
Goodness and Justice (2001), ch 5
‘Plato and Mathematics’, in H.H. Benson (ed) Companion to Plato (2006)
How should we conceive the nature and role of the Form of the Good? Why is mathematics so
important for its understanding? (See esp. Burnyeat.)
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‘Plato’s Idea of the Good is practically empty. It gives us no indication of what is good, in a
moral sense, i.e. what we ought to do’ (Sir Karl Popper): is this a fair criticism?
(7) THE SOUL IN THE PHAEDO (esp. 63e-69e)
Gallop, D.
Bostock, D.
Price, A.W.
Broadie, S.
Miller, F.D.
Plato: Phaedo (1975), pp. 86-103
Plato’s Phaedo (1986), ch 2
Mental Conflict (1995), ch 2 § 3
‘Soul and Body in Plato and Descartes’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 2001
‘The Platonic Soul’, in H.H. Benson (ed), A Companion to Plato (2006),
pp 280-6
In what ways is Plato a ‘dualist’? (E.g., does he hold that the soul can exist without the body?
Does he hold that the body, and the soul, are subject to radically different and exclusive
ranges of predicates?)
(8) THE DIVIDED MIND (Republic iv. 434d-441c, viii. 543c - ix. 576b; Phaedrus 246a-257a)
Kenny, A.
Cooper, J.
Kahn, C.
Irwin, T.
Price, A.W.
Shields, C.
Bobonich, C.
Burnyeat, M.
Lorenz, H.
Price, A.W.
‘Mental Health in Plato’s Republic’, Proceedings of the British
Academy 1969, in his The Anatomy of the Soul (1973)
‘Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation’, History of Philosophy
Quarterly 1984, in his Reason and Emotion (1999), in G.Fine (ed)
Plato 2 (1999), in E. Wagner (ed) Essays on Plato’s Psychology (2001)
‘Plato’s Theory of Desire’, Review of Metaphysics 1987
Plato’s Ethics (1995), ch 13
Mental Conflict (1995), ch 2 §§ 4-8
‘Simple Souls’, in Wagner (ed) Essays on Plato’s Psychology (2001)
Plato’s Utopia Recast (2002), ch 3
‘The Truth of Tripartition’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 2005/6
The Brute Within: Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle (2006), pt 1,
OSO
‘Are Plato’s Soul-Parts Psychological Subjects?’, Ancient Philosophy
2009
What does Plato mean by a ‘part’ of the soul? Is he subdividing the whole soul, or only the soul
as subject of belief and desire? Is he right, in his sense of ‘part’, to suppose that there are
three parts?
Is a part of a soul a homunculus (mini-person)? (See contra, Price, 1995: 53-7, 2009; pro,
Bobonich, Lorenz.)
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(9) THE IMMORTAL SOUL (Republic x. 608c-612a; Phaedrus 245c-250a; Timaeus 69c, 90ad)
Guthrie, W.K.C.
Rowe, C.J.
Bett, R.
Price, A.W.
Robinson, J.V.
Price, A.W.
‘Plato’s Views on the Nature of the Soul’, in G. Vlastos (ed) Plato II
(1971)
Plato (1984), ch 7
‘Immortality and the Nature of the Soul in the Phaedrus’, Phronesis1986,
in G. Fine (ed) Plato 2 (1999)
Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle (1989), pp 68-72, OSO
‘The Tripartite Soul in the Timaeus’, Phronesis 1990
Mental Conflict (1995), pp 73-6
Expound and assess the argument in the Phaedrus that the soul is immortal. (See Bett.)
Is the immortal soul simple, or complex? Do the Republic, Phaedrus, and Timaeus say the
same? What might explain any divergences? (See esp. Guthrie, Rowe.)
(10) PLATONIC LOVE (Symposium 199c-212c, Phaedrus 250e-256e)
Vlastos, G.
Price, A.W.
Ferrari, G.R.F.
Nehamas, A.
Kraut. R.
Obdrzalek, S.
Reeve, C.D.C.
Scott, D.
Obdrzalek, S.
‘The Individual as Object of Love in Plato’, in his Platonic Studies,
2nd edn (1981), in G. Fine (ed) Plato 2 (1999)
Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle (1989), chs 2-3,
‘Afterword’ (1997 edn), §§ 3-4, OSO
‘Platonic Love’, in R. Kraut (ed) Cambridge Companion to Plato (1992)
‘Beauty of the Body, Nobility of the Soul: The Pursuit of Love in Plato’s
Symposium’, in D. Scott (ed) Maieusis: Essays in Ancient Philosophy in
Honour of Myles Burnyeat (2007)
‘Plato on Love’, in G. Fine (ed) The Oxford Handbook of Plato (2008)
‘Moral Transformation and the Love of Beauty in Plato’s Symposium’,
Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2010), 415-444.
‘Plato on Friendship and Eros’ (2011),
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-friendship/)
‘Philosophy and Madness in the Phaedrus’, Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy 41 (2011)
‘Contemplation and Self-Mastery in Plato’s Phaedrus’, Oxford Studies in
Ancient Philosophy 42 (2012)
How, in Plato’s view, is the lover able to come to possess the good for ever (Symposium 206a)?
Does the Platonic lover ultimately love another person, or only the Forms?
How does philosophy relate to love, and madness?
Term 2
6
Term 2
TOPICS IN EARLY MODERN METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY
Sarah Patterson
Descartes (1596-1650), Spinoza (1632-1677) and Locke (1632-1704) are three of the most
significant philosophers of the Early Modern period. They offer very different accounts of the
structure of the world and the way in which we know about it. We will look at these accounts as
presented in Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), Spinoza’s Ethics (1677) and
Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding (1689).
Texts:
Descartes’s Meditations were originally published with Objections by other philosophers, plus
Replies by Descartes. Useful selections of these are included in these two editions, which also
have the essential AT pages numbers in the margins:


Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from the Objections and
Replies, tr. John Cottingham (Cambridge University Press, 1996)
Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from the Objections and Replies, René
Descartes, tr. Michael Moriarty (Oxford University Press, 2008)
The canonical translation of Spinoza’s Ethics is by Curley. It is available in two editions:


Ethics, Benedict de Spinoza, tr. Edwin Curley (Penguin Classics, 1996)
A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, ed. and tr. Edwin Curley (Princeton
University Press, 1994)
The canonical edition of Locke’s essay is the Clarendon edition published by Oxford University
Press, but it is also available in other editions:


1.
The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke: An Essay concerning Human
Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford University Press, 1975)
An Essay concerning Human Understanding, John Locke (Penguin Classics, 1997)
Descartes’s Use of Doubt
Seminar Reading:
 Descartes, Synopsis and First Meditation with selections from the Objection and Replies
Additional Reading:
 John Carriero, ‘The First Meditation’ in Vere Chappell (ed.), Descartes’s Meditations:
Critical Essays (Rowman & Littlefield, 1997). Originally in Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly (1987) 68: 222-248
 Bernard Williams, ‘Descartes’s Use of Skepticism’ in Myles Burnyeat (ed.), The
Skeptical Tradition (University of California, 1983)
7



Janet Broughton, Descartes’s Method of Doubt (Princeton, 2002), especially Part I
Sarah Patterson, ‘Doubt and Human Nature in Descartes’s Meditations’ Royal Institute of
Philosophy Supplements (2012) 70: 189-217
David Owens, ‘Descartes’s Use of Doubt’ in Janet Broughton and John Carriero (eds.), A
Companion to Descartes (Blackwell, 2008)
Essay Questions
o Why does Descartes begin the Meditations with a series of sceptical arguments?
o What did Descartes hope to achieve by introducing the possibilities that (i) we are
dreaming, and (ii) that we are deceived by an all-powerful being?
2.
Thinking Substances: Mind and God
Seminar Reading:
 Descartes, Second and Third Meditations with selections from the Objection and Replies
Additional Reading:
 John Carriero, ‘The Second Meditation and the Essence of the Mind’ in Amélie Rorty
(ed.), Essays on Descartes’ Meditations (University of California, 1986)
 Sarah Patterson, ‘How Cartesian was Descartes?’ in History of the Mind-Body Problem,
eds. Tim Crane and Sarah Patterson (Routledge, 2000)
 Robert Delahunty, ‘Descartes’ Cosmological Argument’ Phil. Q. (1980) 30: 34-46.
Reprinted in Vere Chappell (ed.), Descartes’s Meditations: Critical Essays (Rowman &
Littlefield, 1997).
 Frederick O’Toole, ‘Descartes’ Problematic Causal Principle of Ideas’ J. Phil. Res.
(1993) 18: 167-91. Reprinted in Vere Chappell (ed.), Descartes’s Meditations: Critical
Essays (Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).
Essay Questions
o Descartes claims in the Second Meditation that the mind is better known than the body.
Explain and assess his claim.
o Explain and assess the Third Meditation argument for the existence of God.
3.
God’s Guarantee and the Cartesian Circle
Seminar Reading:
 Descartes, Fourth and Fifth Meditations with selections from the Objection and Replies
Additional Reading:
 Lex Newman, ‘The Fourth Meditation’ Phil. Phen. Res. 59 (1999): 559-91
 Sarah Patterson, ‘Descartes’s Appeal to Divine Veracity’ (ms)
 David Rosenthal, ‘Judgment, Mind, and Will in Descartes’ available here:
https://wfs.gc.cuny.edu/DRosenthal/www/DR-Judgment-Will-Descartes.pdf
 James Van Cleve, ‘Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles, and the Cartesian Circle,’
Phil. Rev. (1979) 88: 55-91, particularly Part I
 Samuel Rickless, ‘The Cartesian Fallacy Fallacy’ Nous (2005) 39: 309-36
8

John Carriero, ‘The Cartesian Circle and the Foundations of Knowledge’ in Janet
Broughton and John Carriero (eds.), A Companion to Descartes (Blackwell, 2008)
Essay Questions
o Does Descartes succeed in reconciling the perfection of our creator with the fact that we
are prone to judge erroneously?
o What is the Cartesian Circle? Does Descartes have a way out of it?
4.
Correcting the Prejudices of the Senses
Seminar Reading:
 Descartes, Sixth Meditation with selections from the Objection and Replies
Additional Reading:
 Margaret Wilson, ‘The Epistemological Argument for Mind-Body Distinctness’ Nous
(1976) 10: 3-15. Reprinted in Vere Chappell (ed.), Descartes’s Meditations: Critical
Essays (Rowman & Littlefield, 1997)
 Marleen Rozemond, ‘Descartes’s Case for Dualism’ Journal of the History of Philosophy
(1995) 33: 29-63
 Michael Ayers, ‘The Second Meditation and Objections to Cartesian Dualism’ in Early
Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter, and Metaphysics, eds. Christia Mercer and Eileen
O’Neill (Oxford University Press, 2005)
 John Cottingham, ‘Descartes, Sixth Meditation: The External World, ‘Nature’ and
Human Nature’ in Vere Chappell (ed.), Descartes’s Meditations: Critical Essays
(Rowman & Littlefield, 1997)
 Gary Hatfield, ‘The Senses and the Fleshless Eye’ in Amélie Rorty (ed.), Essays on
Descartes’ Meditations (University of California, 1986)
 Sarah Patterson, ‘Descartes on Nature, Habit and the Corporeal World’ Aristotelian
Society Supp. Vol. (2013) 87: 235-258
Essay Questions
o Descartes argues in the Sixth Meditation that he (his mind) is distinct from his body and
can exist without it. Arnauld objects to the argument at AT VII 199-204, and Descartes
replies at AT VII 219-227. What is the strongest objection Arnauld raises? Does
Descartes have a satisfactory response to it?
o What does the Second Meditation contribute to Descartes’s Sixth Meditation argument
for dualism?
o In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes contrasts what he is taught by nature with what he has
acquired through a habit of ill-considered judgement. What is the significance of this
distinction between habit and nature for the argument of the Meditations?
5.
Spinoza’s One Substance
Seminar Reading:
 Spinoza, Ethics, Part I, up to and including Proposition 14
Additional Reading:
9





Beth Lord, Spinoza’s Ethics (Edinburgh University Press, 2010). Read the relevant
section of the ‘Guide to Part I’.
Michael Della Rocca, ‘Spinoza’s Substance Monism’ in Olli Koistinen and John Biro
(eds.) Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes (Oxford University Press, 2002)
Don Garrett, ‘Ethics IP5: Shared Attributes and the Basis of Spinoza’s Monism’ in J.A.
Cover and Mark Kulstad (eds.) Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy (Hackett,
1990)
William Charlton, ‘Spinoza’s Monism’ Philosophical Review (1981) 90: 503-529
Andreas Schmidt, ‘Substance Monism and Identity Theory in Spinoza’ in Olli Koistinen
(ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2009)
Essay Question
o Does Spinoza show that there must be at most one substance?
o ‘Spinoza shows that there must be one substance, but he does not show that it is Godlike.’
Discuss.
6.
Spinoza on Mind and Body
Seminar Reading:
 Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Propositions 11-13 and from the Postulates before Proposition 13
to Proposition 19
Additional Reading:
 Michael Della Rocca, Spinoza (Routledge, 2008), Ch. 3
 Beth Lord, Spinoza’s Ethics (Edinburgh University Press, 2010). Read the relevant
section of the ‘Guide to Part II’.
 Peter Dalton, ‘Mirroring Spinoza’s Mind’ in Olli Koistinen and John Biro (eds.) Spinoza:
Metaphysical Themes (Oxford University Press, 2002)
Essay Question
o Spinoza claims that the mind is the idea of the body. Can he reconcile his claim with the
fact that we seem to have no ideas of many of the processes going on in our bodies?
7.
Spinoza on Error and the Will
Seminar Reading:
 Spinoza, Ethics, Part II Propositions 32-43 and Propositions 48-49
Additional Reading:
 Michael Le Buffe, ‘Spinoza’s Psychological Theory’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spinoza-psychological/
 Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, Collective Imaginings (Routledge, 1999), Ch. 2
 Margaret Wilson, ‘Spinoza’s Theory of Knowledge’ in The Cambridge Companion to
Spinoza ed. Don Garrett (Cambridge University Press, 1996)
 Diane Steinberg, ‘Knowledge in Spinoza’s Ethics’ in Olli Koistinen (ed.) The Cambridge
Companion to Spinoza’s Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2009)
10

Olli Koistinen, ‘Spinoza on Action’ in Olli Koistinen (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to
Spinoza’s Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2009)
Essay Question
o Does Spinoza provide good grounds for rejecting Descartes’s claim that we make errors
because we misuse our wills?
8.
Locke’s Attack on Innateness
Seminar Reading:
 Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book I Chs. 1, 2 and 4
Additional Reading:
 Margaret Atherton, ‘Locke and the Issue over Innateness’ in Vere Chappell (ed.), Locke
(Oxford University Press, 1998)
 Nicholas Jolley, Locke: His Philosophical Thought (Oxford University Press, 1999), Ch.
3
 Samuel Rickless, ‘Locke’s Polemic Against Innatism’ in Lex Newman (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Locke’s “Essay concerning Human Understanding”
(Cambridge University Press, 2007) (e-book available via library)
 Jerry Samet, ‘The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness’, SEOP,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/innateness-history/
Essay Question
o Why is Locke so anxious to show that we have no innate ideas? Which of his arguments
for this claim is most compelling, and why?
9.
Primary and Secondary Qualities, Adequate and Inadequate Ideas
Seminar Reading:
 Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book II Chs. 1, 2, 8, 23, 31
Additional Reading:
 Edwin McCann, ‘Locke’s Philosophy of Body’ in Vere Chappell (ed.), The Cambridge
Companion to Locke (Cambridge University Press, 1994) (e-book available via library)
 Michael Jacovides, ‘Locke’s Distinctions Between Primary and Secondary Qualities’ in
Lex Newman (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s “Essay concerning Human
Understanding” (Cambridge University Press, 2007) (e-book available via library)
 Samuel Rickless, ‘Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities’ Pac. Phil. Q. 78 (1997):
297-319
Michael Ayers, ‘Primary and Secondary Qualities in Locke’s Essay’ in L. Nolan (ed.)
Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate (Oxford University
Press, 2011) (e-book available via library)
Essay Question
o What criteria did Locke use to distinguish between primary and secondary qualities? Did
he succeed in drawing the distinction in a satisfactory manner?
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10.
Locke on Knowledge of Substances
Seminar Reading:
 Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book IV Chs. 1, 3, 4
Additional Reading:
 Roger Woolhouse, ‘Locke’s Theory of Knowledge’ in V. Chappell (ed.), The Cambridge
Companion to Locke (Cambridge University Press, 1994) (e-book available via library)
 Hylarie Kochiras, ‘Locke’s Philosophy of Science’, SEOP,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-philosophy-science/
 Michael Ayers, ‘The Foundations of Knowledge and the Logic of Substance: The
Structure of Locke’s General Philosophy’ in Vere Chappell (ed.), Locke (Oxford
University Press, 1998) and in John Rogers (ed.) Locke’s Philosophy: Content and
Context (Oxford University Press, 1994)
Essay Question
o Locke understands science as general, instructive, certain knowledge (IV.iii.26). What
are his reasons for denying that we are capable of achieving such a science of natural
bodies? Are they good ones?
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