Review of Reidar Maliks, Kant's Politics in Context, OUP, 2014, 195 pages, £50, ISBN 978019-964515-2
Reidar Malik's Kant's Politics in Context is a much needed addition to the literature on Kant's
legal and political philosophy. Its central aim is to show how Kant's mature legal and political
philosophy was shaped by the political debates during the French revolution and continued to
evolve as a response to his critics in the post-revolutionary period. In so doing, Maliks throws
considerable light onto the development of Kant's legal and political thought and provides an
invaluable picture of the German public sphere during that time.
It is well known that Kant was enthusiastic about the events of 1789. For Kant and other
intellectuals of his time, the French Revolution was a living experiment: the unique
opportunity to see philosophical ideals, for instance, the assumption of equal status between
the members of the nation, shape a political society, its government and constitution. It
brought about hopes that European politics would finally go beyond mere balance of powers
and political realism. However, subsequent events such as the violent Jacobin takeover of
1793 forced thinkers, Kant included, to revise or temper their initial endorsement of
revolutionary ideals. These further reflections can be found in Kant's works, for instance, in
the way Kant rejects a right to revolution (134) and allows for postponing political reforms,
when their hasty implementation would undermine their political aim (61).
The French Revolution stimulated an enthusiastic public debate in Germany concerning
pressing political questions: whether there is a right to revolution, if there should be hereditary
privileges in society, and about the legitimate function of the state. Answers to these questions
were urgently needed and the works of prominent figures such as Immanuel Kant were
obvious places to turn for guidance. However, by 1789, Kant had not yet published on
political and legal matters. So far, he had developed his theoretical and moral theory with
major publications such as the two editions of the Critique of Pure Reason, Groundwork
towards the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. Kant's followers
nevertheless sought to apply Kant's moral theory to these pressing issues, which they used
both to defend conservative ideals as well as to justify radical political changes.
As Maliks points out, Kant's own position or the "final version" of his legal and political
theory could not easily be predicted using his moral theory or even his first political writings
(65). Kant himself diverged not only from the conclusions of his conservative and radical
followers, but also from what one would naturally expect when acquainted with his moral
theory. This shows that the relationship between Kant's moral theory and his legal thought is
far from being straightforward; there are puzzling asymmetries between his moral and legal
thought. Contextualizing the development of Kant's legal thought in light of the vibrant
political debates during and after the French Revolution is therefore extremely useful for
understanding this relationship and Kant's legal theory itself. An excellent contribution of the
book is its account of the central role played by the challenges posed by Kant's conservative
opponents Möser, Gentz and Rehberg to the development of Kant's final conception of
external freedom and his metaphysical theory of private property (Chapter 2).
1
Despite the merits of the book, some of Malik's interpretations of Kant's texts are
unconvincing. For instance, he reads the early political writings such as "Idea for a Universal
History" as being about "moral agency" and the protection of the state as facilitating persons
capacity for autonomy (26). About Perpetual Peace, he stresses that "life in the republic puts
persons on the path to moral freedom" (78). However, none of the passages of Perpetual
Peace he appeals to support this interpretation.1 Kant argues instead that good laws make
good citizens, without presupposing moral character. A good constitution can take advantage
of the mechanisms of nature (individual inclinations) in order to ensure compliance with the
law. Kant concludes that one does not require angels (morally perfect beings) to realize his
ideal of politics. There is no evidence in Kant's writings for the claim that good laws would
promote "moral autonomy", unless one is confusing "thinking for oneself" and external
freedom with transcendental freedom and autonomy proper (as defined in the Groundwork
and Second Critique).
A controversial reading which is unfortunately not analysed in depth is Maliks claim that
Kant's congress of states in the Doctrine of Right is not a federation of any kind of states but
of republics (in Kant's sense of the term). "Although relations between republics have to be
regulated by the right of nations, the fact that republics themselves are law abiding renders
external enforcement inessential" (147). Maliks argues that the congress of states can be
wholly voluntary because no coercive law enforcement is required against such well behaved
member states.
This interpretation has the advantage of solving the apparent inconsistence pointed out by
Gentz that Kant's idea of a voluntary federation at international level would fail to solve the
assurance problem among cooperating states (145). However, if peaceful behaviour at
international level is to be understood as a descriptive claim about republics, as Maliks
suggests, it is not clear why international law regulation would be needed in the first place.
Further, it is not clear what the implications of this interpretation would be for the duties of
existing (imperfect) polities to leave the state of nature and enter a lawful condition
internationally. Maliks' reading seems to suggest that the duty at international level would not
be to leave the international state of nature, but rather for particular states to reform
themselves internally in order to to become a republic in the first place. International law
seems thus to become superfluous.
Very interesting is Maliks' view that, in regard to the French Revolution, "Kant was able to
have his cake and eat it": while Kant denied that there is a right to revolution, he was
nevertheless able to defend the events of 1789 from a juridical perspective (135). Endorsing
the Abbé Sieyès' views on popular constituent power (that the people can only act through
institutions) and pointing out that when Louis XVI summoned the Estates-General to ask for
advice concerning state debt, he allowed the assembly to represent the people, Kant argued
that the monarch had in fact transferred sovereignty from his person to the Estates-General.2
In other words, the people was mistakenly but legally put in charge by the monarch.
1
2
PP 8:376 (the famous "devils passage") and 8:366.
See MS 6:317.
2
According to Kant, the French "revolution" was thus a perfectly constitutional transition
(133).
It is undeniable that Reidar Malik's Kant's Politics in Context, despite problems with the Kant
interpretation, is a very useful book for anyone interested in Kant's legal and political thought.
It is a significant contribution to recent Kant scholarship and, last but not least, a fascinating
read.3
Dr. Alice Pinheiro Walla
Department of Philosophy, Trinity College Dublin
pinheira@tcd.ie
3
The work on this article was enabled by the ERC Advanced Research Project Distortions of Normativity at the
University of Vienna.
3