World Outlook for Nuclear Power after Fukushima
H-Holger Rogner
The immediate impact of the Fukushima Daiichi accident
The Fukushima Daiichi accident of 11 March 2011 that was caused by a devastating earthquake and
subsequent tsunami has re-ignited the debate about the role of nuclear power in the current and future
global energy mix. Initial government policy responses, in large part fuelled by sensationalist media
reports and public pressure, pointed towards an even more uncertain future of the technology than
before.
Germany, within weeks after the accident, renounced its September 2010 policy decision to extend the
lifetime of its reactor fleet by an average of twelve years and closed for good eight nuclear reactors that
were off-line for refuelling, maintenance or repairs. Moreover, an accelerated phase-out of the
remaining nine reactors by 2022 was decided upon which corresponds to an average plant-lifetime of
approximately 30 years. In order to mitigate the impact of the lower total generating capacity in the
country, the government announced a fundamental energy transformation (“Energiewende”) based on
renewables and energy efficiency improvements throughout the economy. The German phase-out-path
is considered to be the fastest possible way of shutting down the remaining nuclear power capacities
without running into critical system instabilities.
The Japanese government ordered the shut-down or blocked the restart of most reactors in the country
for the conduction of mandatory two-phase stress tests1. They further ceased all construction activities
of new builds and decided to decommission the Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 to 4. By May 2011 (two
months after the accident), only 26 of the remaining 50 reactors were in operation and this number
successively declined to zero on 5 May 2012 when Tomari-3, the country’s only reactor left in operation,
was taken off the grid for maintenance and refuelling. Several units that had completed planned
maintenance and refuelling outages remained shut down because of public opposition or lack of local
authorities’ endorsement of a restart.
On 16 June 2012, Prime Minister Noda announced the government’s approval, with agreement of the
local authorities, to restart Units 3 and 4 at Kansai Electric Power Company's (Kepco's) Ohi plant in the
Fukui prefecture. Both plants were shut down shortly after the Fukushima Daiichi accident for scheduled
outages and have since successfully passed phase 1 of the mandatory stress test. After two months
without nuclear power in Japan, Ohi-3 started generating electricity again on 5 July 2012 and was
followed by Ohi-4 two weeks later.
In late May 2011, the government of Switzerland allowed the country’s five existing reactors to continue
operating, but without replacement at the end of their service lives of approximately 50 years, with the
last reactor going offline in 2034. In September, the Swiss parliament endorsed this long-term phase-out
plan. In addition to operating safety concerns and lack of resistance to natural and man-made disasters,
the rationale was that new-build nuclear power would lose its competitive advantage due to the added
costs associated with new (post-Fukushima) safety and security standards.
1
Phase 1 requires utilities while units are shut down for inspections to examine the safety margins of important
reactor components with regard to their ability to withstand beyond design-based earthquakes and tsunamis, and
to put in place measure to cope with extended station black outs, etc. Based on the results of these tests, the
government will decide whether a reactor can or cannot resume operation. In addition any restart requires a go
ahead from Japan’s regulatory organizations and approval from local prefectural governments. Phase 2 of the
stress tests will involve a comprehensive safety assessment of all reactors with the objective to enhance the
reliability and effectiveness of safety checks. This overall assessment resembles the stress tests carried out in the
European Union and elsewhere.
1
In Italy, a referendum, planned before 11 March 2011, on the reintroduction of nuclear power which was
abandoned in the late 1980s by a similar referendum, was held in June 2011 and rejected the
reestablishment of a national nuclear power programme by a large majority.
In November 2011, Taiwan, China, announced a new nuclear energy policy of phasing out nuclear power,
however, no specific time frame has been outlined other than: “once their licenses expire” (Taipei Times,
2012). The plants currently under construction will be completed and become operational contingent
upon passing all safety inspections.
In Belgium in October 2011, the 2003 decision to shut down the country’s oldest nuclear power reactors
in 2015, which had been reconsidered in 2009, was reinforced. Moreover, the government proposed a
doubling of the special tax on nuclear power paid annually by the nuclear industry. The decision
effectively ruled out the building of new nuclear plants in the country. On 23 July 2012, the Belgian
government announced the schedule for the total phase out of nuclear power by 2025 complementing
the closures for three units announced on 4 July 2012. No particular justification was provided. All
Belgian units are to close between 2015 and 2025 which corresponds roughly to a service life of 40 years
per unit. Only one unit, Tihange 1, is permitted to operate to 50 years of age; an exception made
specifically to avoid blackouts.
Other countries pursued a less drastic approach. Clearly, a disaster such as the Fukushima Daiichi
accident calls for reflection. In most countries with nuclear programmes, the immediate response to the
accident was to conduct comprehensive safety reviews including reassessing the safety margins of
nuclear plants of all nuclear installations. In addition, many countries introduced improvements to their
frameworks for dealing with nuclear accidents and associated emergency preparedness and
communication activities. In addition, many countries revisited their long-term energy development
plans and policies and analysed their national energy demand and supply options. In order to enhance
nuclear safety, many countries ordered the implementation of stress tests of nuclear power plants to
evaluate their capacity to withstand extreme natural and often also man-made events. Measures have
been initiated to: improve preparedness for prolonged power blackouts; protect sources of backup
electrical power; and to assure the availability of water for cooling, even under severe accident
conditions. Emergency preparedness and response capabilities came under critical review, and plans to
strengthen these are currently under development. Most importantly perhaps is the radical revision of
worst-case assumptions for safety planning.
In addition, some countries with explicit intentions to explore the nuclear option or introduce nuclear
power to their national energy mixes have announced that they will no longer do so (e.g. Kuwait,
Senegal, Venezuela) or that plans will be delayed (e.g., Indonesia, Thailand) while governments continue
to reassess their plans for their future use of nuclear power.
The impact on the nuclear industry
The Fukushima Daiichi accident definitely undermined public confidence in nuclear power. Past
experience from the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents have shown that in many countries it will
take decades of successful operating experience of the global fleet of nuclear power plants to restore a
certain level of public confidence. In the wake of these accidents, the industry improved its overall safety
culture, particularly with regard to all operational aspects of nuclear power installations.
The memories of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents eventually faded, in large part due to
the demonstrated safe and economic operation of reactors around the world. In addition, during the
early years of the 21st century, several issues began to dominate public energy policy debates, namely:
mounting concerns about energy security; volatile fossil fuel prices after a long period of stability at low
levels; climate change considerations; and continuously rising electricity demand. As nuclear power can
play a pivotal role in mitigating all these issues, political and public opinion progressively tilted towards a
higher level of tolerance of nuclear technology in many countries.
2
As of 2004, construction starts per year began to rise and reached 16 new builds by 2010 - a level of
construction starts not witnessed since 1985 (see Figure 1). All starts since 2000 have occurred in
countries with already existing nuclear power plants, with Asian countries taking the global lead (see
Figure 2).
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Figure 1: Number of construction starts globally and total installed generating capacity, 1951 - 2012 (30 June 2012). Source:
IAEA, 2012a.
Before the Fukushima Daiichi accident many countries without nuclear power programmes expressed
interest in adding nuclear to their national electricity generation portfolios. This interest varied from
country to country. A dozen countries had decided to implement national nuclear power programmes
and started preparing the necessary infrastructure. Another seven countries started preparations,
however without a final decision. More than 40 countries either considered nuclear power programmes
or were interested in obtaining relevant information on the technology and its prerequisite
infrastructure requirements. Together with the surge in construction starts in countries with already
operating nuclear power plants, this rise in interest in, and popularity of, nuclear power after 20 years of
quasi stagnation (except for Asia) was popularly labelled as a “nuclear renaissance”.
Construction starts
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Grid connections
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Figure 2: Construction starts and grid connections since 01 January 2000. Source: IAEA, 2012a.
Figure 1 shows the global impact of the Fukushima Daiichi accidents on construction starts. Construction
starts in 2011 plummeted to four reactors (although all starts occurred after 11 March 2011) and to one
new build so far in 2012. This decline is the result of several factors as several countries suspended new
construction permits pending: site re-evaluations and seismic re-qualifications; reactor design reviews
especially with respect to withstanding multiple, concurrent external initiating events; and updated
safety and regulatory guidelines based on the “lessons-learned” from the accident. However, the preFukushima trend of uprates through reactor component refurbishments and renewed or extended
licences for many operating reactors continued in 2011 and the first half of 2012.
3
Nuclear Operating Safety
“One of the statutory functions of the IAEA is to establish or adopt standards of safety for the protection
of health, life and property in the development and application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,
and to provide for the application of these standards to its own operations as well as to assisted
operations and, at the request of the parties, to operations under any bilateral or multilateral
arrangement, or, at the request of a State, to any of that State’s activities in the field of nuclear energy”
(IAEA, 2003).
The IAEA safety standards establish fundamental safety principles (IAEA, 2006), requirements and
measures aimed at the protection of people and the environment against radiation risks by achieving the
highest practicable safety levels in nuclear installations. It also involves the control of radiation exposure
of people and the release of radioactive material to the environment, restriction of the likelihood of
events that might lead to a loss of control over a nuclear reactor core or a radioactive source and the
mitigation of the consequences of such events, if they were to occur.
A fundamental safety principle is that the prime responsibility for safety must rest with the person or
organisation responsible for facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks, i.e., nuclear facility
operators are ultimately responsible for the safety of their facility. Another principle is that an effective
legal and governmental framework for safety, including an independent regulatory body, must be
established and sustained. National governments, therefore, are responsible for regulations that govern
how safety at nuclear facilities is maintained, as well as for reducing radiation risks, including emergency
response and recovery actions, monitoring releases of radioactive substances to the environment, and
regulating the safe decommissioning of facilities, and the disposal of radioactive waste.
Nuclear accidents do not respect borders. Therefore, the primary responsibility of operators and
Member States, enshrined in the IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles, must be backed by an
international approach to safety. The IAEA, through the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security,
works to provide a strong, sustainable and visible global nuclear safety and security framework for the
protection of people, society and the environment. This framework provides for the harmonized
development and application of safety and security standards, guidelines and requirements. But the IAEA
does not have the mandate to enforce the application of safety standards within a country. Safety
standards are only effective, if they are properly applied in practice. National regulators, therefore, have
a pivotal role in ensuring continued nuclear safety and are encouraged to adopt the IAEA's safety
standards for use in their national regulations.
IAEA response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident
The IAEA responded to the accident by activating the Incident and Emergency Centre in Vienna and
organizing specialized expert missions to Japan to gain an understanding of the accident and to provide
assistance and expert advice. On 30 March 2011, the IAEA Director General called for a Ministerial
Conference on Nuclear Safety to be held in June 2011 to consider the implications of the accident. The
objectives of the Conference were to:
 Undertake a preliminary assessment of the accident;
 Identify actions needed to strengthen the national and international emergency preparedness and
response capabilities;
 Identify those areas of the global nuclear safety framework that may require strengthening.
The Conference adopted a Ministerial Declaration which requested the Director General, inter alia, to
prepare an IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.
The 12 point IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety was developed following intensive consultations with
Member States (IAEA, 2011). The Plan built on the Declaration by the Ministerial Conference, the
conclusions and recommendations of the three conference working sessions as well as other relevant
sources. It was adopted by the Board of Governors in September 2011 and unanimously endorsed by all
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Member States at the 2011 IAEA General Conference. The ultimate goal of the Action Plan is to
strengthen all aspects of nuclear safety worldwide.
The 12 points of the Action Plan with short annotations are listed in the Annex. Initial calls for a
comprehensive and globally binding convention of nuclear operating safety, e.g., mandating all countries
with nuclear facilities to adopt and fully implement current IAEA Safety Standards with verification of
adherence, were not supported by Member States. Nuclear operating safety remains a national
responsibility. Instead, the plan emphasizes voluntary peer reviews of the operating safety of all nuclear
power plants as well of the effectiveness of national regulatory bodies.
The Action Plan, therefore, is not a blue print for the employees of the IAEA Secretariat. Its success will
hinge on the level of ownership adopted by Member States, regulators, nuclear operators, vendors,
international and intergovernmental organizations, i.e., it requires inclusive participation and full
cooperation of all involved in nuclear matters. Actions, therefore, are explicitly addressed either to
Member States, or to the IAEA Secretariat or to other stakeholders, or to all.
It should be noted that, operationally, the level of nuclear power plant safety around the world remains
high. Safety indicators, such as those published by the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO)
and reproduced in Figure 3, improved dramatically in the 1990s along with plant performance measured
in annual plant availabilities. To a large extent, this attributable to the efforts of regulatory bodies over
the years as well as the standards that they have set in design and operation. In recent years, in most
areas the situation has stabilized. However, the gap between the best and worst performers is still large,
providing substantial room for further improvement.
Figure 3: Unplanned scrams per 7000 hours critical (left axis) and load factors (right axis). Source: WANO (2012)
Nuclear power today
As of 25 of July 2012, the global fleet of nuclear power plants consisted of 435 reactors with a combined
installed nuclear generating capacity of 370 GWe (375.5 GWe on 10 March 2011). Note: the total
includes plants that currently are off-grid such as the remaining 48 reactors in Japan but not declared as
permanently shut down. In 2011 nuclear power accounted for 12.3% of global electricity supply down
from 13.5% the year before. Figure 4 (left) depicts the regional distribution of nuclear generating
capacities.
5
Global generating capacity: 370.0 GW
Latin
America
Africa
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0.5%
Latin America
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South East
Asia
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America
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America
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Plants under construction: 59.2 GW
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Europe/CIS
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Western
Europe
27.1%
Far East
53.2%
Western
Europe
3.2%
Eastern
Europe/
CIS
25.0%
South East
Asia
14.5%
Figure 4: Global generating capacity (left) and plants under construction (right) - as of 25 July 2012. Source: IAEA, 2012a
Despite the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the trend of uprates and renewed or extended licences for many
operating reactors continued in many countries. Uprates of some 400 MWe and the grid connection of 8
new build reactors (totalling 5.7 GWe since the accident helped mitigate the lost capacities of the 15
reactors (11.4 GWe) declared shut-down for good.
The right panel of Figure 4 shows the regional distribution of the 62 reactors currently under
construction with a combined generating capacity of 59.2 GW. It highlights the shift in expansion from
the traditional nuclear countries in North America and Europe which dominate the current regional
capacity distribution to Asia where the long term growth prospects remain centered.
Outlook
Every year the IAEA develops projections of global nuclear power development derived from a countryby-country ‘bottom-up’ approach. They are established by a group of experts and based upon a review of
nuclear power projects and programmes in Member States. The projections cover the period to 2030
with an outlook to 2050. The IAEA estimates should be viewed as very general trends whose validity
must be constantly subjected to critical review as energy and electricity demand and the role of nuclear
power are subject to economic growth and structural economic change, demographic developments,
technology performance and costs, energy resource availability and future fuel prices, and energy and
environmental policy. The projections provide a plausible range of nuclear capacity growth by region and
worldwide. They are not intended to be predictive nor to reflect the whole range of possible futures
from the lowest to the highest feasible.
The LOW projection accounts for new builds already firmly in the pipe line including scheduled
retirements, planned uprates and license renewals, plus projects in Member States that can be
reasonably assumed to materialize. Naturally, the Fukushima accident was on the minds of experts when
the 2011 and 2012 projections were compiled. Likewise, the continued financial and economic crises
and associated uncertainties affected the projections, especially in the short run. However, the past
drivers behind the use of nuclear energy have not changed (population and economic development,
environmental protection and climate change, energy security considerations and fossil fuel price
volatility) and will continue to fuel nuclear power development. The 2012 projection shows a 90 GWe
reduction compared with 2010 - the last projection before the Fukushima Daiichi accident (or 456 GWe
instead of 546 GWe for 2030).
The longer term outlook to 2050 with 469 GWe is rather modest. The projections reflect a future where
replacement investments of retired capacities rather than expansion characterize the nuclear sector
6
after 2030. The absence of growth, however, is consistent with the philosophy of the LOW projection as
only few projects can be considered ‘firm’ beyond 2030.
Additionally, the LOW projection does not automatically assume that ambitious targets for nuclear
power growth in a particular country would necessarily be achieved. These assumptions are relaxed in
the HIGH projection which is much more optimistic, but still plausible and technically feasible. The high
case assumes that the current financial and economic crises will be overcome in the not so distant future
and past rates of economic growth and electricity demand, especially in the Far East, would essentially
resume. In addition, the high case assumes the implementation of stringent policies globally targeted at
mitigating climate change. The Fukushima impact was a reduction of 63 GWe (down from 803 GWe in
the 2010 projection) by 2030.
The longer term outlook to 2050 (HIGH) is characterized by a temporal shift of about one decade to the
future - a continuation of the delay effect and ‘wait and see’ behaviour regarding the technology in
many, especially newcomer countries. In 2010 global nuclear generating capacities for 2050 were
estimated at 1415 GWe and about 1110 GWe for 2040. In 2012 the value for 2050 was lowered to 1137
GWe or about the 2010 estimate for the year 2040.
Figure 5 displays the historical expansion of nuclear generating capacities and the annual projections for
the period 2005 to 2012. For the LOW projections the financial and economic crises since 2008 did not
affect the outlook notably and projections still pointed to continued nuclear expansion. In contrast, the
HIGH projection was affected by the overall, rather dire global economic, outlook and the successively
higher projections since 2005 came to a halt in 2010.
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Figure 5: Development of successive annual projections of total nuclear generating capacities, IAEA LOW (left) and HIGH
(right) projections, 2005 - 2012. Source: IAEA, 2012b.
After 2010 the Fukushima impact is clearly evident and, in the LOW projection, suggests a delay in
nuclear new builds of about a decade and the 2030 projection of 2012 now falls in the range of preFukushima projections for the year 2020. The sharp drop of construction starts in 2011 and 2012 (see
Figure 1) is the consequence of the suspension of construction permits in several countries, the
renewable directives in many jurisdictions, the emergence of potentially large amounts of relatively
inexpensive shale gas and the decline in public acceptance in many countries. The HIGH projections for
2030 show a lower reduction of nuclear generating capacities than the LOW projections in both absolute
and relative terms. This is consistent with the HIGH projections’ overall more optimistic outlook on
economic development, a new and effective binding international agreement on mitigating climate
change and the restoration of public confidence in the technology.
Figure 6 shows the projected nuclear capacity developments for major world regions. In both
projections, future nuclear development will be centered in Asia. This shift is already well in progress as
demonstrated by the location of the reactors currently under construction (see Figure 2). As the
momentum is rising to Asia, especially non-OECD Asia, Europe shows the biggest negative difference
between the 2011 installed capacity and the LOW projection - a contraction of 41 GWe from 125.8 GWe
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at the end of 2011 to 85 GWe in 2030. North America (-3.5 GWe) and Pacific OECD (-6.4 GWe) are
further regions with a contraction of nuclear generating capacities by 2030. The expansion leaders are
non-OECD Asia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with 97 GWe and 28 GWe additional
nuclear generating capacity. Modest nuclear growth occurs in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.
In the HIGH projection nuclear power capacities expand in all regions, most prominently in Non-OECD
Asia which account for 55% (or net 205 GWe) of the expansion alone. Europe and Pacific OECD reverse
the negative trends portrayed in the LOW projection and increase their respective current generating
capacities by about 30 GWe each. CIS and North America add 42 GWe and 33 GWe while Africa, Middle
East and Latin America experience the beginning of a bullish nuclear sector.
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Figure 6: Regional nuclear capacity developments in the 2012 IAEA LOW and HIGH projections. Source: IAEA, 2012b.
Conclusion
The Fukushima Daiichi accident and subsequent safety reviews and stress tests have significantly
affected the global prospects for new nuclear build. The 2012 projections of total nuclear power
generating capacity in 2030 is 8-16% lower than before the accident. However, globally, the accident is
expected to slow down or delay growth in nuclear power but not to reverse it. On a nation-scale, the
impact is more diverse and measures taken by countries have been varied: a number of countries
announced reviews of their programmes, some took steps to phase out nuclear power entirely while
others re-emphasized their expansion plans. In fact, most countries with nuclear power have reaffirmed
their commitment to expanding nuclear power while incorporating the lessons-learned from the
accident. In countries considering the introduction of nuclear power, interest also remains high. Of the
countries without nuclear power that before the accident had strongly indicated their intentions to
proceed with nuclear power programmes, a few have cancelled or revised their plans, while others have
taken a ‘wait-and-see’ approach. Most have continued in their pursuit of introducing nuclear power into
their energy mixes. The factors that had contributed to the renaissance of interest in nuclear power
before the Fukushima accident largely remain the same.
Questions about the future of the technology remain. In order to regain public confidence in nuclear
power, the lessons learned and those yet to be learned from the Fukushima accident have to be
implemented into national nuclear programmes in a timely, transparent and inclusive manner - a process
that will extend well into the future.
8
ANNEX
The Action Plan
1. Undertake assessments of the safety vulnerabilities of nuclear power plants in the light of lessons
learned to date from the accident: Member States assess the design of their nuclear installations against
site specific extreme natural hazards and implement the necessary corrective actions.
2. Strengthen IAEA peer reviews in order to maximize the benefits to Member States: Member
States incorporate the accident’s lessons into IAEA peer reviews, apply these more broadly to address
regulatory effectiveness, operational safety, design safety, and emergency preparedness and response.
The results should be made transparent. Member States are also requested to provide experts for peer
review missions.
3. Review and strengthen emergency preparedness and response arrangements and capabilities:
Member States conduct national reviews of their emergency preparedness and response arrangements
and capabilities, with IAEA providing assistance through Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV)
missions. The IAEA, Member States and relevant international organizations (IOs) review and strengthen
the international emergency preparedness and response framework encouraging greater involvement of
the relevant IOs in the Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan JREMP). Bolster the assistance
mechanisms to ensure that necessary assistance is made available promptly, and fully utilize the IAEA
Response and Assistance Network (RANET), including expanding its rapid response capabilities.
4. Strengthen the effectiveness of national regulatory bodies: Regularly review (e.g. through IAEA
Integrated Regulatory Review Service - IRRS - missions) of national regulatory bodies, particularly their
independence and resources, and strengthen them as needed. The IAEA Secretariat to enhance the IRRS
for peer review of regulatory effectiveness through a more comprehensive assessment of national
regulations against IAEA Safety Standards.
5. Strengthen the effectiveness of operating organizations with respect to nuclear safety: Regularly
review (e.g. through IAEA Operational Safety Review Team - OSART - missions), and strengthen the
management systems, safety culture, human resources management, scientific and technical capacities
in operating organizations. Each Member State with nuclear power plants is requested to voluntarily
host at least one OSART mission during the coming three years, with the initial focus on older nuclear
power plants. Thereafter, OSART missions are to be voluntarily hosted on a regular basis.
6. Review and strengthen IAEA Safety Standards and improve their implementation: Improve the
effectiveness of the international legal framework and work towards a global nuclear liability regime that
addresses the concerns of all States that might be affected by a nuclear accident. Member States
implement the IAEA Safety Standards as broadly and effectively as possible, in an open, timely and
transparent manner.
7. Improve the effectiveness of the international legal framework (ILF): Improve the effectiveness of
the ILF and work towards a global nuclear liability regime that addresses the concerns of all States that
might be affected by a nuclear accident. Member States explore mechanisms to enhance the
implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel
Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the Convention on the Early
Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or
Radiological Emergency and consider proposals made to amend the Convention on Nuclear Safety and
the Convention on the Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. Member States work towards
establishing a global nuclear liability regime that addresses the concerns of all States that might be
affected by a nuclear accident with a view to providing appropriate compensation for nuclear damage.
Member States give due consideration to the possibility of joining the international nuclear liability
instruments as a step toward achieving such a global regime.
8. Facilitate the development of the infrastructure necessary for Member States embarking on a
nuclear power programme: Help countries planning to start a nuclear power programme to create an
appropriate nuclear infrastructure based on the IAEA Safety Standards. Member States are encouraged
to voluntarily host Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Reviews (INIR) and relevant peer review missions,
including site and design safety reviews, prior to commissioning the first nuclear power plant.
9
9. Strengthen and maintain capacity building: Member States with nuclear power programmes and
those planning to embark on such a programme strengthen, develop, maintain and implement their
capacity building programs, including education, training and exercises at the national, regional and
international levels; to continuously ensure sufficient and competent human resources necessary to
assume their responsibility for safe, responsible and sustainable use of nuclear technologies; and to
incorporate lessons learned from the accident into their nuclear power programme infrastructure.
10. Ensure the on-going protection of people and the environment from ionizing radiation following a
nuclear emergency: Member States, the IAEA Secretariat and other relevant stakeholders facilitate the
use of available information, expertise and techniques for monitoring, decontamination and remediation
of both on- and off- nuclear sites and the IAEA to consider strategies and programmes to improve
knowledge and strengthen capabilities in these areas; to facilitate the use of available information,
expertise and techniques regarding the removal of damaged nuclear fuel and the management and
disposal of radioactive waste resulting from a nuclear emergency; and to share information regarding the
assessment of radiation doses and any associated impacts on people and the environment.
11. Enhance transparency and effectiveness of communication and improve dissemination of
Information: Member States, with the assistance of the IAEA Secretariat, strengthen the emergency
notification system, and reporting and information sharing arrangements and capabilities; to enhance
the transparency and effectiveness of communication among operators, regulators and various
international organizations, and strengthen the IAEA’s coordinating role in this regard, underlining that
the freest possible flow and wide dissemination of safety related technical and technological information
enhances nuclear safety. The IAEA Secretariat facilitates and continues sharing with Member States a
fully transparent assessment of the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, in
cooperation with Japan. The IAEA Secretariat and Member States, in consultation with the OECD/NEA
and the IAEA International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) Advisory Committee review the
application of the INES scale as a communication tool.
12. Effectively utilize research and development: To conduct research and development in areas
highlighted by the accident, such as extreme natural hazards, management of severe accidents, station
blackout, loss of heat sink, spent fuel accidents, and post-accident monitoring systems in extreme
environments.
References
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), 2003. Fundamental Safety Principles: Safety Standards Series
No. NS-R-3, Vienna, Austria.
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), 2006. Fundamental Safety Principles: Safety Fundamentals,
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, Vienna, Austria.
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